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Commandant,
Members of the Directing Staff, Ladies and Gentlemen,
1. It is a great pleasure to be in the National
Defence College this morning to speak to speak to the
45th Course, and the faculty of the NDC. Although I
myself am not an alumnus of this highly regarded
institution, I am familiar with its worthy endeavours,
as well as many of its distinguished products. While
this College is, indeed, a revered establishment in
the Indian Armed Forces, one cannot help detecting a
note of pride and affection when talking even to civil
servants or foreign officers who have passed through
its portals. And of course, the NDC Old Boys network
has been known to achieve miracles when invoked!
2. Today I intend to speak to you, for about the next
three quarters of an hour on the subject of “Shaping
India’s Maritime Strategy – Opportunities and
Challenges”. It is an issue of relevance for the
Indian Navy; for while nations in general have
practised maritime strategy for centuries, the
literature on theoretical analysis of this subject is
only just over a century old. In fact, during the
great naval wars in the age of sail, few people looked
at any kind of strategy as a separate concept. The
publication of the Indian Maritime Doctrine in April
last year, was therefore, a significant milestone in
India’s maritime history. This was also the first step
towards crafting a Maritime Strategy for the Indian
Navy, which is now underway.
3. Before we go any further, let me draw a distinction
between doctrine and strategy, because this is often
an area of confusion.
4. Doctrine in simple terms is a collection of
“fundamental principles by which military forces guide
their actions in support of objectives.” It is also
defined as “a framework of principles, practices and
procedures relating to deployment of forces, the
understanding of which provides a basis for action”.
Doctrine leads through training, to a general
understanding (or even anticipation) of the
commander’s intent, consistent behaviour, mutual
confidence and properly orchestrated collective
action.
5. The principal sources of Doctrine are history and
experience, and the repeated success or failure of
actions over time tends to be generalised into beliefs
that become relevant to the present and the future.
Those lessons from the past that seemed to have proved
themselves over an extended period of time have been
elevated to a higher level and are termed the
“Principles of War”. Of course, Doctrine cannot just
be the result of experience. As Fredrick the Great
once pointed out, if experience were all-important, he
had several mules in his army, who had enough
experience to be field marshals!
6. On the other hand, for a Strategy (or a strategic
plan), the start point has to be a threat. Without a
specific threat, whether real or perceived, there is
no need for a Strategy. And as the threat alters, so
must the strategy keep evolving or changing. In the
national security arena, we are concerned with threats
to our national interests, which should cause the
national security decision-making machinery to go into
action. Ideally speaking, the political leadership of
a country, in conformity with national policies and
objectives, should evolve a Grand Strategy, which is a
plan of action for attainment of these objectives.
7. What the Armed Forces can contribute to the
accomplishment of these objectives is determined by
the capability of the military leadership of a
country. The military leadership, in turn, is driven
by the structure, strength and effectiveness of the
forces available. And this brings us neatly to the
start of this discussion and establishes a linkage
between Doctrine and Strategy.
8. Thus, Strategy is an overall plan to get from the
present situation to some desired goal in a threat or
conflict scenario, and its most critical attribute is,
that it is set in the context of a given
politico-military situation and within the ambit of an
overall set of national aims. Doctrine on the other
hand is a body of thought and a knowledge base, which
underpins the development of Strategy. Without
Doctrine, strategists would have to make decisions
without points of reference or guidance. In a
nutshell:
(a) Doctrine says that all
things being equal, this is the way we would like to
operate. It is not specific to time, place, or
adversary.
(b) Strategy, in contrast deals with specific threats, key
factors that change, possibly with defined opponents,
in particular places, at given times.
9. A study of the US is illustrative in this regard.
For 45 years since the end of the Second World War,
the US consistently maintained a policy of
“containment” of the threat from USSR in its Cold War
confrontation. The strategy to implement this went
through several iterations over these decades, but the
overarching philosophy remained constant, because the
enemy: Communism and the Soviet Union also remained
constant. The end of the Cold War changed the complete
threat scenario. The flux in international affairs
resulting from the fall of the Berlin wall, and now
the Global War on Terror has caused the US Department
of Defence and the US Navy to continuously evolve new
strategies and bring out vision documents, at the rate
of one almost every 4-6 years.
10. The Indian Navy is yet to enunciate a formal
Maritime Strategy document. However, after the
publication of the Indian Maritime Doctrine, using the
Navy’s stated roles as the start point, we have
identified the capabilities we should be able to
deliver. This exercise then gave us the strategic
basis for formulating our force level plans. These
have also been outlined, and I will mention the gist
of our conclusions later on in my talk. A formal
Maritime Strategy document is being worked upon. Once
formulated, it will highlight areas of warfare on
which we must focus sharply and help us prioritise our
equipment acquisition and technology development.
11. Before I go further, let me just place maritime
strategy in the overall context of National Security,
so that we see it in the right perspective.
Maritime
Dimension in the Context of National Security
12. One of the principal functions of a nation state
is to protect its people, territory and institutions
from external threats as well as internal dangers.
This function is termed as national security and
encompasses both national defence and foreign
relations.
13. The entire process of formulating a National
Security Strategy can be understood from the
simplified diagram shown on the screen. Our National
Interests flow from a set of National Values and the
National Purpose. Identification of National Interests
should lead to the promulgation of a National Security
Policy, from which emerge the National Security
Strategy, which has three components – Economic,
Diplomatic and Military. The Maritime Strategy is one
of the sub-sets of the overall Military Strategy.
14. While these objectives have not been stated by the
government in any formal document, a few things are
clear to us :-
(a) The highest priority before our
government is to ensure unhindered economic
development of our peoples so that we can lift
millions of our countrymen out of poverty and march on
to attain our manifest destiny.
(b) As far as our overall defence policy is concerned, we are
essentially a status quo power and harbour no
extra-territorial ambitions. However, we have island
territories in the Bay of Bengal as well as the
Arabian Sea. We also have friends in the Indian Ocean
Region, whose security is our concern. Therefore,
contingencies can be envisioned where we may be
compelled to cross the seas to protect our own island
territories, or even reach “out of area” to safeguard
the interests of our friends.
(c) As a booming economic power, our growth will be increasingly
dependent on trade and on energy availability, and
sooner or later on undersea resources. We therefore
have substantive maritime interests.
(d) Underpinning all this, our prime maritime interest is to ensure
national security and provide insulation from external
interference, so that the vital tasks of fostering
economic growth, and undertaking developmental
activities, can take place in a secure environment.
Broad Outline of Our Maritime Strategy
15. It is therefore clear that we must have “the
freedom to use the seas for our national purposes and
the wherewithal to safeguard our maritime interests
under all circumstances”.
16. Like many other such documents, the Indian
Maritime Doctrine envisages four broad roles for the
Indian Navy – Military, Diplomatic, Constabulary and
Benign. Flowing out of this, a broad vision of our
maritime strategy could be stated in these words:
“Through the
use of appropriate maritime forces:-
(a) In conjunction with other Armed Forces of the union, act
to deter or defeat any threats or aggression against
the territory, peoples or maritime interests of India,
both in war and peace;
(b) Project influence in our maritime area of interest, to further
the nation’s political, economic and security
objectives;
(c) In cooperation with the Coast Guard, ensure good order
and stability in our maritime zones of responsibility.
(d) Provide maritime assistance (including disaster relief)
in our maritime neighbourhood.
17. Each of these tasks requires a detailed strategy
for its correct and coherent implementation. For
example, let us see [Point (c)], which is; “Ensure
good order and stability in our maritime zone of
responsibility”. For doing this, we need to decide
issues such as: the specific areas of responsibility
between the Indian Navy and Coast Guard; the types and
numbers of ships and shore infrastructure that will be
required; the impact of international maritime law,
etc.
18. Several questions also arise from the broad
maritime strategy vision statement, which I have
outlined, which could include at the very least:-
(a) What is our maritime area of
interest?
(b) What are the threats that we face and how do we intend to
deter aggression?
(c) How are India’s legitimate maritime interests to be
defined?
(d) What political, economic or security benefits do we seek
through the projection of maritime power?
(e) What should be the composition of this capable,
three-dimensional blue water force?
19. I intend to address these issues one at a time,
during the course of my talk. So let me turn to the
first of the questions that I had raised, and define
our maritime area of interest. But in order to do
this, I need to delve a few centuries into our
history.
India’s Maritime Area of Interest
20. Not many people, even in India, are aware that the
seas around us were dominated by Indian mariners right
up to the 13th century. While activity on the west
coast was confined mainly to commerce with Red Sea and
Mediterranean ports, our eastern shores witnessed the
launch of a massive colonisation of SE Asia. This
impact of this invasion was mainly cultural and
religious, and its effects have persisted for almost a
millennium till today. From 4th century BC onwards,
the Maurya, Andhra, Pallava, Sri Vijay and Chola
dynasties maintained powerful navies and prevailed in
this region.
21. It was the decline of India’s prowess at sea by
the 14th Century which was to a large extent
responsible for the success of the European
adventurers who began to arrive on our shores in the
next century. The Portuguese came first, followed by
the Dutch, British and the French. They came in search
of spices, but stayed on to rule this land.
22. When the province of Bengal fell to the British
after Robert Clive’s victory at the Battle of Plassey,
in June 1757, the thin end of the wedge was in
position, and this event is commonly accepted as the
beginning of Britain’s 190-year rule of India.
Commenting upon this historic event, Admiral Mahan, in
his seminal work, “Influence of Sea Power on History”
remarks,
“…it may be said that the foundation thus laid
could never have been built upon, had the English
nation not controlled the sea. The conditions in India
were such that Europeans of nerve and shrewdness,
dividing that they may conquer, and making judicious
alliances, were able to hold their own against
overwhelming odds.”
23. In the latter years of the empire, Great Britain
was to realize that its authority in India hung on the
thin thread of safe naval communications and their
ability to reinforce their forces by sea. In fact Lord
Curzon, almost a century ago, informed the Foreign
Office that control of the key choke points extending
from the Horn of Africa to the Cape of Good Hope and
the Malacca Strait was essential to prevent an
inimical power from making an entry into the Indian
Ocean.
24. While the heyday of “gunboat diplomacy” and
colonial “spheres of influence” are over, we do
believe that whatever happens in the Indian Ocean
Region can impact crucially on our security and should
be of interest to our maritime forces.
25. Since any strategy is set in the context of a
given politico-military situation and within the ambit
of an overall set of national aims, let us next look
at the strategic scenario around us to identify
specific threats and opportunities, as they exist
today and extrapolate them for the foreseeable future.
Strategic Scenario
26. There is no doubt that today we live in uncertain
times in a difficult neighbourhood. A scan of the
Indian Ocean littoral shows, that with the exception
of a few countries, all the others are afflicted with
one or more of the ailments of poverty, backwardness,
fundamentalism, terrorism or internal insurgency. Many
countries are also either ruled by military
dictatorships or by authoritarian regimes. A number of
territorial and maritime disputes linger on – almost
all of them being the legacy of colonial rule.
27. Let us then have a look at the two major powers
that we will have to interact with in the coming years
– the US and China.
28. First, the sole superpower, the United States. For
the foreseeable future, the US will remain actively
engaged in the IOR and the wider Asia-Pacific region.
The US desire to contain China vis-à-vis Taiwan, the
ongoing operations in Iraq, the requirement to keep
the terrorism hubs in Pakistan and Afghanistan under
direct surveillance, and its active interest in
restraining the nuclear ambitions of North Korea and
Iran, all point towards this. The US core interest,
however, lies in tapping the hydrocarbon resources of
the Middle East and Central Asia. Growing economic
interaction with booming economies in the region like
China, Taiwan, India, Japan and Southeast Asia is
another imperative.
29. It is interesting to see how the US has steadily
altered her security policies to suit her national
interests, and with the changing global scenario,
transitioned from her Cold War posture to her present
stance. The US maritime strategy of the 1980s was
designed to meet the Soviet challenge through global
naval conflict on a Mahanian scale, but since the end
of the Cold War, the US Navy/Marine Corps combination
is now trained, equipped and deployed for what is
called “Expeditionary Warfare”, which essentially
means support of operations ashore in Third World
countries.
30. In recent years, the US has come to the conclusion
that India will be a valuable long-term military and
economic ally. The wide-ranging agreement reached
during the visit of our Prime Minister to the US in
July is an indictor of the new opportunities that have
arisen in our bilateral relationship. Opportunities
are however, always accompanied by challenges, and we
have to see how the relationship evolves. As a matter
of interest, for the first time the Indian Navy will
be seriously considering the acquisition of military
hardware from the US.
31. Let me come next to that fast emerging power on
the global scene; China. One can discern a number of
reasons which motivate her determined drive to build a
powerful blue water maritime force. Amongst the more
important ones are; the need to protect her seaborne
nuclear deterrent force, the requirement to safeguard
her vital energy lifelines from the Persian Gulf, and
of course the fulfilment of her desire to reunite
Taiwan with mainland China.
32. In her determined bid for regional preponderance,
and ultimately, for superpower status, China has
created many defence partnerships in the IOR. Apart
from Pakistan, she is a major arms supplier arms to
many of our neighbours. China has also undertaken
major arms transfers to a number of countries around
the Persian Gulf, especially Saudi Arabia and Iran. It
now remains to be seen whether such a relationship
will transform into military cooperation.
33. In this context, we must note that China has
provided massive assistance for construction of the
Gwadar deep-sea port on Pakistan’s Makaran coast. One
can only wonder if there will be a quid pro quo for
this support.
34. The PLA Navy is currently embarked on an ambitious
build up which encompasses ships, submarines and
strike aircraft acquired from Russia, as well as ships
and submarines constructed in Chinese yards. Of their
90 odd submarines, six are nuclear powered and China
has carried out successful tests of the 8,000 km DF-31
ballistic missile and its maritime derivative, the
8,000 km JL-2 SLBM.
35. It is imperative for India, therefore, to retain a
strong maritime capability in order to maintain a
balance of maritime power in the Indian Ocean, as well
as the larger Asia-Pacific region.
36. Next, a brief look at Pakistan. Driven by a
deep-seated and historic animus towards India,
Pakistan will continue to be one of the factors in our
security calculus in the foreseeable future. It is
certainly in our interest that Pakistan should remain
a stable and integral nation state, and outgrow the
sense of insecurity that has haunted her since
independence. Allowing bi-lateral trade and commerce
to grow, and enhancing people-to-people interaction
will certainly help in the normalization of relations.
However the Pakistan’s leadership, such as it is, has
to come to terms with a few facts of life. Firstly, as
a secular Republic with impeccable democratic
credentials, India is not going to allow anyone to
dictate terms, especially through the instrument of
terrorism. We can withstand a “thousand cuts” and
march on the road to economic, industrial and
scientific progress with resolve. Secondly, as the
Pakistanis themselves are discovering; in the 21st
century, governments need to concentrate funds and
energies on providing a better quality of life to
their citizens. And this is better done through social
change and economic development rather than by
breeding fundamentalism in madrassas.
37. Finally, looking east, one sees that the economies
of SE Asia, having weathered the crisis of the late
90s, are now upbeat once again. One of the
consequences of their resurgence has been the start of
a maritime arms race in this region. The provocation
for this has been provided on one hand by the fear of
a resurgent Chinese Navy and on the other hand by the
heady combination of national pride and availability
of funds. This development offers us several
opportunities to build partnerships by offering
assistance in areas where we have expertise and
cooperate in areas of commonality.
38. Coming to the hydra-headed monster of terrorism,
it is a harsh fact that the epicentre of not just
world terrorism, but also missile and nuclear
proliferation lies in our immediate neighbourhood.
Apart from the requirement to check terrorist
activities at sea, proliferation of WMD is another
phenomenon of serious maritime concern. Three
multinational initiatives – the International Ship and
Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code), the
Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) and the
Container Security Initiative (CSI) are in various
stages of implementation. India is already a
participant in the ISPS code and the CSI. We have not
yet agreed to participate in the PSI, as the
Government of India has certain reservations. However,
the issue is under discussion, and I am sure that we
will soon arrive at a mutually acceptable solution.
39. Having examined the strategic context in which we
have to operate, what is our broad strategy to deter
or counter the possible threats that we face? While I
cannot go into specifics, I can say that our maritime
military strategy would be predicated in preparing for
a possible conflict against one major adversary while
deterring a simultaneous attack by another, as the
worst case scenario. Within this broad frame of
reference, we need to have a blue water maritime force
that is capable of not only defeating our opponents in
a shooting war, but is also capable of deterring
stronger adversaries in a hostile situation. Strategic
deterrence is a part of this spectrum.
40. This brings me on to the next question – what are
our maritime interests?
India’s Maritime Interests
41. Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had famously stated: “…We
cannot afford to be weak at sea. History has shown
that whatever power controls the Indian Ocean, has in
the first instance, India’s seaborne trade at her
mercy, and in the second, India’s very independence
itself” In this context, national security encompasses
certain economic factors, which bear mention here.
42. India’s fortunate geographic location, astride the
major sea-lanes of the world, point to the crucial
relevance of its role in ensuring the free flow of oil
and commerce from the Gulf to the Asia-Pacific region.
The criticality of the sea-lanes from the Persian Gulf
to the Straits of Malacca is evident from the fact
that of the US$ 200 billion worth of oil coming out of
the Strait of Hormuz annually, US$ 70 billion passes
through the Straits of Malacca, mainly bound for
China, Japan and South Korea.
43. India is currently at a very energy-intensive
stage of its development. Between 1990 and 2003, oil
consumption in India (and China) grew at an average
rate of 7%, against just 0.8% for the rest of the
world. Today India imports over 70% of its oil
requirements and it is estimated that by 2050 India
will be the largest importer of oil in the world.
Imagine then, the effect of higher oil prices combined
with a possible threat to their security. A quick
calculation of loss to the national GDP in such a
circumstance is in itself justification enough for
investment in a strong navy.
44. A new development is our acquisition of oil and
gas fields across the globe. Today Indian companies
operate tank farms in Trincomalee and oil and gas
fields in the Sakhalin Islands, Egypt, Sudan and
Myanmar. While the Indian Navy is at this moment, not
mandated to provide security for these assets, the
billions of dollars of investment does warrant some
thought about its protection and security. A strong
maritime force with adequate reach and endurance is a
logical choice.
45. A quick look at our Overseas Trade. India is now
projected to become the fourth largest economy in the
world by 2020, after China, Japan and the US. India’s
exports for 2004-05 were over US$ 75 billion. This
figure is almost double our exports just five years
ago, and it is estimated that it would double again in
the next five years. The tremendous scope for further
growth can be imagined when we consider that our
present share of the world trade is only 0.7%.
46. Another facet of the ocean, which presents the
prospect of wealth and prosperity, and yet contains
the seeds of future conflict, is undersea resources.
India has a mineral rich EEZ currently extending over
2 million sq km, and the successful exploitation of
these could lift us from economic backwardness.
47. Lastly, India’s merchant navy, though small for
our needs and size, remains a major factor in our
maritime security planning. Relatively speaking, it
constitutes a little over one percent of the world
shipping tonnage, and our ships are able to carry only
about a third of our own foreign trade. In absolute
terms however, India’s growing fleet of over 600 ships
is quite large, and operates out of 12 major and 184
minor ports. The security of these ports, our merchant
ships and the sea-lanes that they ply on represent
vital maritime interests for us.
48. Having seen our maritime interests, I now come to
the political, economic and security objectives that
we seek to achieve through the exercise of a maritime
strategy.
Political, Economic and Security Objectives of
Maritime Power
49. Sir Julian Corbett, the British maritime
strategist who enunciated a diplomatic role for the
navy wrote: -
“Yes, it is true that the primary purpose of the
fleet is to win the ‘Big Battle’. But in the
meanwhile, the great dramatic moments in history have
to be worked for, and the first pre-occupation of the
fleet is to interfere with the enemy’s military,
economic and diplomatic purposes.”
50. There aren’t going to be any “big battles” any
more, but as I had mentioned earlier, maritime
strategy has a direct relationship, not just with the
overall military strategy, but also with a nation’s
economic and diplomatic initiatives. So, let me come
first to the security objectives of our maritime
strategy.
51. During the long years of peace, we need to project
power and show presence; catalyse partnerships through
our maritime capability; build trust and create
interoperability through joint operations and
international maritime assistance. Occasions may arise
when a state is required to use coercion to achieve
national aims, and maritime power is best suited for a
graduated escalation.
52. Coming next to the political (or diplomatic)
objectives of our maritime strategy. Our first
priority is to build strong relations with our
immediate neighbours and countries of strategic
interest in the Indian Ocean Region. We have set up a
new organisation at NHQ under a Rear Admiral, to give
concrete shape to such initiatives in close
coordination with the diplomatic establishment.
53. An example of this in the post Cold War years is
the Indian Navy’s role in improving our relations with
the US through the Malabar Exercises with the US Navy
and with ASEAN through the biennial gatherings named
“MILAN” with Bay of Bengal rim navies in Port Blair.
54. Apart from this navies are ideally suited for
“winning friends and influencing people”. Last year’s
tsunami provided a classic demonstration of the
positive role that navies can play. Witnesses to this
are thousands of people whose lives were touched by
the assistance provided by individual sailors. From
medical assistance, to cleaning of wells, to
restoration of infrastructure and supply of food and
water, they did it all. Ever since, the navy has been
receiving accolades for the fine job done by our men,
not only in India but also in Sri Lanka, Indonesia and
the Maldives.
55. Consequently, an integral part of our maritime
strategy will be the capability to provide
humanitarian assistance, particularly in our island
territories, and if required, to our friends abroad.
56. Coming finally to the economic objectives of our
maritime strategy. I have already outlined in great
detail our maritime interests, including the needs of
energy security, and trade.
57. Catering for our needs alone is, however, not
enough. Smaller nations in our neighbourhood as well
as nations that depend on the waters of the Indian
Ocean for their trade and energy supplies expect that
the Indian Navy will ensure a measure of stability and
tranquillity in these waters. Hence, our strategy also
needs to ensure that we cater for adequate capability,
in concert with our Coast Guard, to the constabulary
role.
58. Apart from combating piracy and terrorism at sea,
this also includes responsibilities of surveying the
waters around us, providing SAR facilities to those in
distress, coordinating navigational warnings over a
vast oceanic area and a myriad of minor, but vital
tasks that keeps the global maritime industry, and
economy ticking.
59. With this let me come to the last part of my talk.
What should be the composition of our maritime force?
Composition of our Maritime Force
60. It is an accepted tenet that in international
relations, there are no permanent friends or enemies,
only permanent interests. The order of battle of the
IN is not configured on the basis of perceived threats
to our security, but on the basis of our long term
interests, the capabilities existing in our
neighbourhood and the likelihood of emergent
challenges. This holds good, not just for adversaries,
but for all countries whose actions may impact on us.
The underlying premise is that if a capability is
available or being developed by a country with which
we share boundaries or interests, it could have a
bearing on our security, should circumstances or
intentions change over time.
61. As I brought out at the beginning of my talk, a
force planning exercise has recently been completed.
To cater for all the contingencies outlined above, the
IN needs to field a three-dimensional blue water force
with the capability to operate across the entire
spectrum of conflict. The capabilities required to
meet the challenges will include:-
(a) Prolonged surface operations
at extended ranges and periods.
(b) Submarine operations in coastal waters and on the high
seas.
(c) Anti-submarine warfare capability to counter enemy
submarine threat.
(d) Capability for combined operations with multinational forces
and ability to execute out of area contingencies –
either alone or under a UN mandate.
(f) Joint operations at theatre level with the other two
Services, which will require an amphibious and a
stand-off land attack capability.
(g) Last, but not the least, a sea-based strategic deterrent
capability.
62. This would require us to have a battle group on
each sea-board, formed around the core of an aircraft
carrier equipped with modern multi-role combat
aircraft and early-warning helicopters. In terms of
other platforms, such a force would translate into:-
(a) A balanced mix of
Destroyers, Frigates & Corvettes as escorts for the
carriers and to form independent action groups.
(b) Missile Boats and FACs for coastal defence.
(c) MCMVs for mine warfare.
(d) Amphibious lift capability for Brigade strength.
(e) Tankers & Logistic support ships to extend the reach of
the Fleet at sea.
(f) Sufficient air surveillance capability to cover our ocean
areas of interest.
(g) Support from auxiliaries like training ships, survey
ships, Diving Support Vessels, etc.
63. As our economy shook off its legacy of the
traditional “Hindu growth rate”, the navy’s share of
the defence budget also crept up steadily from 12% to
reach an all time high of 17% last year. We would be
content to see it settle down at around 20%.
64. To meet the requirements of the force levels
(including two carrier groups) which we hope to field
by 2015, there are currently on order, 21 ships and 6
submarines. We already have approvals for another
15-20 ships, but a lot depends on the production rate
of our shipyards, and how much our private industry
can contribute.
65. The former Russian 44,000 ton VTOL carrier Admiral
Gorshkov was acquired in 2003 and is currently
undergoing modernization and conversion to a new
configuration in the northern Russian port of
Severdovinsk. This configuration involves installation
of a ski-jump forward and a set of arrester wires aft,
and is known as STOBAR for “short take off but
arrested landing”.
66. The keel for a second such ship, the Indigenous
Aircraft Carrier (IAC) was laid in Kochi in April this
year, with a completion date of 2012. For obvious
reasons, this ship will have the same STOBAR
configuration and operate the MiG-29K too. At 37,500
tons the IAC is smaller than the Gorshkov, but as the
biggest warship ever built in India, will certainly
pose a challenge to our ship designers and builders.
In a parallel technology initiative, our aircraft
industry has embarked on a project to design a STOBAR
version of the indigenous Light Combat Aircraft
designated LCA (Navy) which we plan to induct on both
our carriers by 2015.
67. I have also set out some priority areas for the
Indian Navy for the immediate future. Foremost among
them is the ability to operate in a secure, networked
environment. Today the IN has weapons of formidable
range and our naval forces are deployed across vast
distances from the Arabian Sea to the Bay of Bengal
and the farthest reaches of the Indian Ocean. Our
desire is to network all our forces, in all three
dimensions, with our command centres, so that whatever
data is available to one unit is available to the
entire fleet. Networking will help us extend our
vision beyond a single unit’s capability and in
synergizing the strengths of our naval assets.
68. Aerial surveillance of our area of maritime
interest is another priority area. We must have
sufficient knowledge at all times, of what is
happening in the maritime domain of our interest.
Currently there are some voids in our maritime
surveillance capability, but this is being addressed
on priority.
69. Finally, let me touch upon the navy’s vision of
self reliance and indigenisation; two areas on which
we have retained sharp focus.
70. We are fortunate that a far sighted naval
leadership launched the navy on the path of
self-reliance nearly 40 years ago. Our shipyards have
delivered to us till today, over 80 warships, of which
the latest warship has an indigenous content of 85%.
As I mentioned earlier, our shipyards have reached a
level of competence where the IN has today on order
with them, 21 vessels which cover the full spectrum of
warship building: from patrol boats, landing ships and
corvettes, to frigates, destroyers and an aircraft
carrier; and of course, submarines in a few years
time.
71. We have also aggressively sought out centres of
excellence, whether in the public or private sectors,
and Indian industry now supports our warship building
endeavours by producing ship-building steel,
propulsion systems (steam and diesel), gear boxes, gun
mounts, torpedo tubes, power generation, air
conditioning, hydraulic, pneumatic and hundreds of
other ship-board systems. Having said that, I must
also admit that total self-reliance is a goal that is
still very distant: that is if want to aim for it at
all. We have, and we will continue to have platforms,
weapons, sensors and systems of foreign origin in our
inventory for a long time to come.
72. After the break up of the USSR we learnt many
bitter lessons about the pitfalls of dependence on
foreign sources: uncertain availability, arbitrary
pricing, and doubtful quality. With all this at the
back of our mind, we have embarked on a deliberate
programme of indigenisation and NHQ has recently put
in place a dedicated Directorate of Indigenisation to
synergise our endeavours in this direction.
73. The Government having permitted private
participation in defence production, we need to work
out methods of creating public-private synergy in the
form of partnerships, joint ventures or in any other
form. This will provide impetus to innovation and
bring economy and efficiency in defence production.
Conclusion
74. Gentlemen, all recent studies indicate, and you
are as well aware as I am, that in the coming decades,
India will be among the foremost centres of power –
economic, technological and cultural. This needs to be
matched by a concomitant accretion of military power,
of which the maritime power will be a critical
dimension.
75. As I have attempted to explain, the Indian Navy
can be the catalyst for peace, tranquillity and
stability in the Indian Ocean Region, across a wide
range of conditions and circumstances that one can
envisage in peacetime. It can be used to engage other
maritime nations and extend a hand of friendship and
co-operation. Its robust presence in a particular area
or region could contribute to stability and ensure
peace. Lastly, it can act as a strong deterrent with
the ability to prevent conflict, or to respond, should
it become necessary.
76. I am confident that the Maritime Strategy that we
will craft will be equal to the challenges of our
times.
77. Thank you. I am now open to any questions or
clarifications.
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