CHAPTER-17
THE GROWTH OF THE AIR ARM TILL 1965
Even though the need for a naval air arm and an aircraft carrier had been accepted in principle before, and again, after Independence in 1947, negotiations for the acquisition of the first carrier from Britain concluded only in 1957. Apart from the lack of resources for so large a project, this ten year delay was also caused by the outbreak of the Korean War, which prevented the British Navy from releasing to India a British aircraft carrier with British fighter aircraft. This delay was fortuitous for it enabled the acquisition from Britain of a surface fleet and the creation ashore of Training Schools to remedy the dislocation caused by the partition of the Navy in 1947.
It was decided to go ahead only with shore based aircraft. The Directorate of Naval Aviation started functioning in Naval Headquarters in 1948. From 1948 onwards, officers and sailors started going to Britain for training as pilots, as observers and for technical training in aircraft maintenance.
In 1951, the Fleet Requirement Unit (FRU) was formed to meet the Fleet's requirement of aircraft targets for gunnery and radar tracking practices, for radar and communication calibrations and for aircrew training.
The airfield at Cochin was taken over from the Directorate General of Civil Aviation on 1 January 1953. From that date, the Navy assumed responsibility of the operation from Cochin airfield of all aircraft, civilian and naval.
Ten amphibian Sealand aircraft were acquired in 1953 and were based in Cochin.
The FRU was commissioned on 11 March 1953 and the Navy's first Naval Air Station, INS GARUDA, commissioned on 11 May 1953.
Since the Sealands were not suitable for anti aircraft firing practices, between February 1955 and December 1958, ten target towing British naval Firefly aircraft were inducted. They were fitted with target - towing winches to tow drogue/sleeve targets. The last five of these Firefly aircraft were equipped with 20 mm cannon and were capable of carrying rockets and bombs. They marked the advent of weapon capability in the Air Arm.
From 1952 onwards, basic flying training had been imparted by the Air Force. To facilitate continuation flying training at Cochin, three Hindustan Trainer 2 (HT 2) aircraft, made by Hindustan Aircraft Ltd (HAL), joined the FRU in October 1956.
On 17 January 1959, the FRU became the first unit to be commissioned as Indian Naval Air Squadron (INAS) 550. It had ten amphibian Sealands, ten target towing Fireflies and three HT 2 trainer aircraft.
Until 1955, the British Navy had not been able to spare a light fleet carrier. Nor could the naval budget have been able to afford one. In 1955, Admiral Mountbatten succeeded in convincing Prime Minister Nehru that the Navy should have a carrier. Formal approval was accorded soon thereafter.
By 1957, the Navy was able to finalise the acquisition of the aircraft carrier VIKRANT along with two aircraft squadrons. In April 1957, VIKRANT commenced an extensive refit cum modernisation in Britain, scheduled for completion in 1961. Almost all the electronic and electrical equipment was to be replaced. The ship was to be fitted with an angled deck, a steam catapult and a mirror landing sight. Essential spaces were to be air conditioned. Additional accomodation and facilities were to be provided to enable VIKRANT to function as the Fleet Commander's flagship.
Since VIKRANT was going to operate jet aircraft, pilots had to undergo conversion. Three Vampire jet aircraft were acquired from HAL and one Vampire trainer was transferred from the Air Force. GARUDA's runway was not long enough to operate the Vampires. From September 1957 onwards, a `Naval Jet Flight' started operating from the longer airfield at Sulur near Coimbatore.
In 1960, the Naval Jet Flight at Sulur was designated as INAS 550`A' Flight and tasked with the training of pilots for VIKRANT's Seahawk squadron. The FRU at Cochin was designated as INAS 550`B' Flight.
INAS 550, 551 and INS HANSA Sulur
On 1 September 1961, the aviation unit at Coimbatore was commissioned as INAS 551. On 5 September 1961, the Naval Jet Flight was merged with the Naval Rifle Range Detachment Coimbatore and commissioned as INS HANSA. The B Flight at Cochin became INAS 550.
Establishment of Training and Maintenance Facilities at Cochin
Airmen Training. The School for Naval Airmen (SFNA) started in August 1956. The Observer School started in March 1960.
Air Technical Training. The Naval Air Technical School (NATS) started in June 1957.
Aircraft Repair. The Naval Aircraft Repair Organisation (NARO) started in February 1960. Its task was to repair and overhaul airframes and major components. Overhauls of engines would be undertaken by HAL and the Air Force.
Naval Aircraft Inspection Service. The Naval Aircraft Inspection Service (NAIS) started in November 1960.
Before VIKRANT arrived the basic support infrastructure for the Air Arm had been established ashore in Cochin.
VIKRANT, Seahawks and Alizes
VIKRANT commissioned in March 1961. After an intensive six week work up in Malta, she arrived in India in November 1961 with two air squadrons embarked:
(a) INAS 300, the first operational squadron of the Navy comprising Seahawk `Fighters Ground Attack' (FGA). The first flight of Seahawks had been constituted in end 1959 and the squadron had commissioned in Britain on 7 July 1960. The Seahawk was a well proven jet aircraft, having been in operation with the British Navy since 1953 and also in the German and Netherland Navies. A total of 74 Seahawks were eventually acquired, 46 from Britain between 1960 and 1964 and 28 from Germany in 1966.
(b) INAS 310 comprising Alize anti submarine aircraft had commissioned in France on 21 March 1961. The Alize too was a well proven turbo-prop aircraft, having been in operation with the French Navy since 1959. A total of 14 Alizes were eventually acquired, 12 in 1961 and 2 in 1969.
The Goa Operation in December 1961
Within a month of her arrival in India, VIKRANT was deployed for the Goa Operation. On patrol 75 miles seaward of Goa, her task was to counter any action by the Portuguese Air Force F - 86 Sabres (which according to intelligence reports were operating from Dabolim) and to forestall any interference by Western NATO allies of Portugal. VIKRANT steamed up and down at high speed for two days on 18 and 19 December, with Seahawk combat air patrols airborne from dawn to dusk. No Portuguese Sabre aircraft or any other intrusive air or naval activity was observed.
Lt Cdr (later Admiral) RH Tahiliani, flew the Seahawks from VIKRANT in 1961. He recalls:
"Early on the morning of 18 December, we were briefed that the Portuguese had Sabres in Goa and that they would possibly be coming out to sea to attack us. I was the leader of the first combat air patrol to get airborne at first light. I positioned myself between the ship and Goa and followed this routine throughout the day. We did not sight any enemy at all. After the operation, it transpired that the Portuguese did not have a single aircraft at Goa. It was faulty intelligence. As far as VIKRANT was concerned, we had a fully worked up ship and air squadrons and would have given a very good account of ourselves if we had been assigned any targets or if there had been some inter-services coordinated planning."
Captain (late Vice Admiral) N Krishnan was the Commanding Officer of the cruiser INS DELHI. He stated:
"Incredibly, VIKRANT, our latest and newest acquisition, was not taking part in the operation but was going to be deployed somewhere in the middle of the ocean where she would be `safe'. After giving distant support to the Army at Diu, I was to join VIKRANT and DELHI was to give her close support". (Note: Blueprint to Bluewater Page 395)
After the liberation of Goa in December 1961, the Portuguese airfield at Dabolim was taken over by the Navy in April 1962. In June 1964, INS HANSA and INAS 551 relocated from Sulur in Coimbatore to Dabolim. In July 1964, sanction was accorded for INS HANSA to be a full fledged Naval Air Station, to be equipped with a Ground Controlled Approach (GCA) radar. In November 1964, the Seahawk Squadron INAS 300 disembarked from VIKRANT directly to HANSA.
Helicopters first entered naval service with the VIKRANT's Sea Air Rescue (SAR) Flight whose primary role was to rescue ditched pilots. Helicopter pilots received their initial training with the Air Force and later in France. The two French Alouette helicopters obtained on loan for VIKRANT's work up in Malta were returned to France. Three Alouettes had been ordered from France for VIKRANT's SAR Flight but their delivery was expected only in 1964. To bridge the gap between 1961 and 1964, two American Sikorsky helicopters were obtained on loan from the Air Force. When the Navy's Alouettes arrived from France in early 1964, the Air Force had an urgent need of Alouettes for their high altitude operations. The Navy's Alouettes were therefore diverted to the Air Force. The Sikorskys continued to fly in VIKRANT till mid 1964 when more Alouettes arrived from France.
In 1964, the firing of weather rockets commenced from the launch range at Thumba near Trivandrum. The Navy undertook to operate and maintain the Russian MI 4 helicopter belonging to the Indian Committee for Space Research's Thumba Rocket Project till such time as their own personnel became available. The task involved range clearance and rocket recovery.
Helicopter Maintenance Unit in Bombay at INS KUNJALI
In 1964, INS DARSHAK, the first indigenously built survey ship was commissioned. She was designed to embark an Alouette helicopter. A small helicopter maintenance unit was therefore set up in Bombay in INS KUNJALI to support the Alouette helicopters in VIKRANT and DARSHAK.
NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS IN THE 1965 INDO PAKISTAN WAR
In April 1965, VIKRANT commenced her refit. When the Rann of Kutch incident started, an Alize was deployed at Jamnagar for electronic reconnaissance. VIKRANT was quickly boxed up, the air squadrons were re-embarked and VIKRANT patrolled between Bombay and Goa. After the cease fire in Kutch, the squadrons disembarked and VIKRANT resumed her refit which was rescheduled so as to complete in November 1965. When the Pakistani intrusions into Jammu and Kashmir started in August 1965, VIKRANT was still under refit, INAS 300 and 551 were at Goa and INAS 310 and INAS 550 were at Cochin.
INAS 300 had been programmed for its usual annual armament work up. Eight Seahawks arrived at Jamnagar as planned on 1 September 1965. The same morning, the Pakistan Army crossed the international border between West Pakistan and India. War appeared imminent.
Cdr (later Rear Admiral) RV Singh was the Commanding Officer of the Seahawk Squadron. He recalls:
"We were placed under the operational control of the Air Force and ordered to prepare for air defence and air strike missions. Badin was specially assigned to us as a target if the need arose.
"We set about obtaining live weapons from the Armament Depot Bombay or, where there was compatibility, from the Air Force. Air Force rockets were found to be suitable for the Seahawks and we equipped the Seahawks with them. The bombs had to be brought from Bombay and arrived after 4 days. There was some problem with regard to the fuzes. We were keen to have a fuze appropriate to low level attack. These were not available. Therefore we were restricted to dive bombing attacks.
"With the local Air Force authorities, it was worked out that Seahawks would carry out the dawn air patrols and Air Force would carry out the dusk air patrols. These were instituted by 2 September.
"On the evening of 6 September, soon after the dusk air patrol landed, Pakistan Air Force B-57 bombers appeared overhead. Initially, even the Air Force thought they were our own bombers but as soon they started bombing, it was clear that they were Pakistani B-57's. After this initial raid, a single B-57 continued bombing throughout the night to keep the air station on its toes.
"Fairly early on the evening of 6 September, we were informed by the OC Flying that we had been cleared to carry out the dawn strike on Badin airfield.
"At about 0400 on 7 September, whether as a result of these attacks or whatever, we were told by the Air Force that orders had been received for us to go back to Bombay.
"The Jamnagar airfield had been damaged quite heavily during the night. The dawn inspection of the runway indicated however that the Western half of the main runway was fairly clear. We used that portion to take off for Bombay.
The Pakistan Air Force air attack on Jamnagar on the evening of 6 December was a response to the Indian Army's thrust towards Lahore in the early hours of 6 December. Loaded for a strike as they were, the Seahawks were helpless in the fading light. Fortunately, the bombers failed to notice the Seahawks parked in the dispersal.
On 7 September, after the Seahawks withdrew to Bombay to operate from Santa Cruz, they were tasked with the air defence of Bombay since the Air Force resources at Poona had become fully committed in the air battles in the North. One hundred dawn and dusk patrols were flown but without contact.
Meanwhile the Alizes had moved up from Cochin to Bombay for anti submarine and reconnaissance patrols. Their activities have been described in the Chapter on the 1965 War. In addition, an Alize was deployed for electronic surveillance duties on the border with West Pakistan. Commander (O) (then Lieutenant) Dilip Choudhary, who flew in these sorties recalls:
"We were briefed to carry out a radar recce of enemy territory for our Air Force. During the war we flew low level sorties below 100 feet all along the Pakistan Border starting from the Kashmir sector, then the Punjab sector, Rajasthan sector and by the time we had come down to Jodhpur, the war had ended. The Alize's direction finding system detected a number of Pakistani radar stations. We pin-pointed each one with a three point fix and gave the positions to the Air Force. The Air Force of course did not have any such capability and they did not take our positions or our information very seriously.
"Even though we gathered a lot of information, I don't think the Air Force authorities ever used it. We got into trouble with the Air Force a couple of times, when we picked up a radar station like Sargodha and others which were still operating, because the Air Force had declared that they had destroyed these radars. We were jumped by our own Air Force aircraft every time, even though our silhouettes were available to them. We were even fired upon every time by the AA batteries on our border and we had to zig zag to avoid them. Throughout this operation, we survived on our wits and on secrecy. We were unarmed and we could only survive by operating on our own. We had a small detachment of our maintenance staff following us in a Dakota."
DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1966 AND 1971
The Aircraft Carrier.
By 1966, VIKRANT had been in commission for five years and had undergone major refits in 1963 and 1965. Between 1966 and 1971, VIKRANT participated in flying exercises whenever she was not afflicted with defects:
(a) Despite her refit in 1965, VIKRANT experienced problems on the catapult, the arrestor gear and the boilers in 1966.
(b) Throughout 1967, problems continued to recur on the catapult and the arrestor gear. In mid 1967, she suffered a burst boiler and underwent a long refit from end 1967 till early 1969.
(c) In mid 1970, cracks were detected in the water drum of one of her four boilers and she was laid up in Bombay.
(d) By mid 1971, both short and long term remedial measures had been instituted and VIKRANT was made operational to steam on only three boilers at lower speeds.
Additional Seahawk Fighter Aircraft
In addition to the initial order of 23 Seahawks acquired with the VIKRANT. 23 more reconditioned Seahawks had been purchased from Britain - seven in 1962, ten in 1963 and six in 1964.
In 1965, an agreement was signed for the purchase of 28 more Seahawks which were being phased out by the Federal German Navy. These aircraft arrived in 1966. Ten were day fighter bombers (MK 100) and eighteen were all weather aircraft (MK 101).
In 1968, Seahawks carried out DART target towing trials and the first ever live firing sorties at towed banner targets.
From 1963 onwards, the Seahawks had started suffering the consequences of the temperatures in India being higher than in Britain. The rear fuel tank fire warnings started operating with greater frequency. In 1966 and 1967, there were a large number of fire warning light incidents.
In 1968, a large number of short service Commission entry officers started joining the Air Arm. They were keen to become fighter pilots and often the material state of the Seahawks could not withstand the demands the enthusiastic pilots placed on the aging aircraft.
Between 1966 and 1970, Lt Cdr (later Commodore) DJ Shahane was the Deputy Air Engineer Officer of 300 Squadron then Air Engineer officer of the 551 Squadron and then Air Engineer Officer of 300 Squadron. He recalls :
"In 1966, the availability of the Seahawks was better from the carrier, not so much from ashore. On the carrier also, there were frequent problems of non-availability of hot ends and frequent hydraulic leaks, the canopy flying away or canopy being loose or inoperative etc. There was also the problem of shortage of maintenance personnel, which resolved somewhat after two to three years.
"Regarding the hot ends, the audio indication of the rear tank fire warning lights had not come into being. When that was introduced, within an year or so we found that the aircrew developed considerable confidence in the rear tank fire warning light system.
"Another experience was that when the Seahawks operated from the carrier, there were fewer instances of either rear tank fire warning light or high JPT or saddle tank burst. When the Seahawks were operating from ashore, and particularly during the practice MADDL sorties, we had saddle tank bursts coming up very often. (Footnote: When practising repeated dummy deck landings on shore airfield, pilots needed to use higher engine power for sustained periods).
"The saddle tank was a small tank of 40 gallons capacity which sort of straddled the hottest part of the Seahawk. During the MADDLs, we found that this area got heated up considerably and we had a few cases of saddle tanks bursting, causing structural damage. This could also lead to fuel leaks and fire in the rear tank area. Actually the saddle tank, having a capacity of only 40 gallons, used to get consumed within say the first ten minutes of the sortie. So a conscious decision was taken to remove the saddle tanks completely and make up for this 40 gallon shortfall of fuel by fuelling the drop tanks with 20 gallons each. Thereafter this problem reduced considerably, though there were a few cases when the saddle tank bay itself showed some sign of explosion.
"Over the next few years, while operating from ashore, the operating procedures were changed. The max engine RPM for operating from ashore was reduced from 12700 to 12400. From the carrier of course they continued to operate at 12700. This appears to have reduced the problem considerably.
"In early 67, the German Seahawks MK 100 and MK 101 joined the Seahawk fleet. Apart from the Seahawks themselves, we got a very large number of spares from the German Navy. Thereafter, with the improved spares position and with German Seahawks, the availability of the Seahawks went up considerabily.
"The period 1968 to 1970 was one of the finest periods of Seahawk operations. When I joined in November 1968, we had almost 20 Seahawks in the squadron. In February 1969, we embarked in VIKRANT after a gap of over a year, since VIKRANT had been under refit. We embarked with 18 Seahawks and the availability was extremely good. This was the time when we had Mark 100s and 101s joining the earlier Mark 6s . This was also the time when the manpower position had improved considerably. We had a fairly good and adequate maintenance crowd in the squadron. Throughout my one and a half years, we were able to keep the operational and material state of the Seahawks extremely high.
"We had two fatal accidents during the period, but only one of them could have been due to a material failure. The other one was most likely due to pilot disorientation. We undertook daring operations in flying. Somehow I felt that the air crew and the pilots were more confident in flying Seahawks at that time than I had seen them at any other time".
Replacements for the Seahawk Aircraft
With Seahawks having been phased out from the Royal Navy in the early 1960s, the Indian Navy was constantly on the look out for their replacements. The American Navy's A-4 Skyhawk appeared to be the most suitable, but political considerations precluded their acquisition from the USA. In view of the design limitations of VIKRANT's catapult, a study had been carried out whether the British GNAT fighter aircraft, which was being indigenously produced by HAL for the Air Force, could be `navalised'. It was not found cost effective.
In 1966, after a major Defence Review, the British Government decided to disband fixed wing naval aviation and its Navy's aircraft carriers. The British Navy managed however to safeguard its air arm by obtaining sanction for the "Through Deck Cruiser". This was basically a flat topped ship, without catapult or arrestor gear which would operate the short/vertical take off and land (STOL/VTOL) Harrier aircraft which were then under development. The subsequent addition of a ski-jump in the bows enhanced the aircraft operating potential of the ship.
The ground version of the Harrier entered service in the Royal Air Force in 1969. The US Marine Corps ordered the Harriers for their amphibious assault ships. The Royal Navy then asked British Aerospace to develop a maritime version of the Harrier (to be called Sea Harrier) for the roles of shipborne air defence and strike, with a specific requirement that it be able
to withstand the corrosive marine environment. The Indian Navy decided to await the developments of the Sea Harrier.
Alize Anti Submarine and Reconnaissance Aircraft
Twelve Alize aircraft had been acquired with VIKRANT. As in the case of the Seahawks, difficulties were experienced in obtaining additional Alize's, because the French Navy was phasing them out. Eventually, in 1966/67 the French Navy agreed to release two Alizes.
In the anti submarine role, the Alizes were fitted with radar to detect submarine periscopes/snorts and a direction finding system to detect submarine radar transmissions. For attacking a submarine the Alizes used sonobuoys to track the submarine and depth charges to damage the submarine. The two key elements were the availabilty of submarines to exercise with and the availability of large numbers of sonobuoys to achieve proficiency in tracking. Until, Indian submarines arrived in 1968, the Alizes did not have enough opportunities to exercise with submarines.
In 1965, the Alizes exercised with the British Submarine ASTUTE off Madras. In 1967, the Alizes exercised with the British submarine ONSLAUGHT off Cochin. After the submarines acquired from Russia arrived from 1968 onwards, the tempo of Alize anti submarine exercise steadily increased and made possible the sea trials of the sonobuoys which had been by then been developed indigeneously.
From 1965 onwards, attention focussed on carrying out trials on indigenous air dropped mines and on improving the anti submarine capability of the Alizes by fitting a sonobuoys recording system. The latter required:
(a) Comparitive evaluation of the sonobuoy recorders developed by INPL on French Julie recorders.
(b) Obtaining the latest JULIE sonobuoy recorders to be fitted in the two Alizes being acquired from France.
(c) Obtaining JULIE systems for retrofitting in all the earlier Alizes.
(d) Importing the minimum essential requirements of the latest sonobuoys from France.
(e) Developing and producing indigenous sonobuoys, which could cope with India's hot and humid tropical conditions, as well as minimise the outflow of precious foreign exchange on these expensive expendable items.
In August 1968, the two Julie fitted Alizes arrived from France, just in time for exercises with the submarine KALVARI which had arrived from Russia.
To increase their effectiveness in the reconnaissance role, the Alizes started carrying out the following exercises from 1966 onwards:
(a) Joint tactical exercises with Air Force Liberator MR aircraft, Canberra bombers, Hunters and HF 24 fighters in which Alizes homed these aircraft on to their targets.
(b) Trials with the newly acquired Swedish LEPUS flare bombs to illuminate targets at night for attack by Seahawks.
During this period, Alizes carried out electronic surveillance missions whenever and wherever required.
By 1970, the Alizes were getting older and defects were becoming chronic.
The period 1966 to 1971 saw a phenomenal increase in the variety and capability of helicopters entering service :
a) Seakings. The acquisition of the new French Daphne class submarines by the Pakistan Navy increased the urgency of acquiring anti submarine helicopters. In 1968, a proposal was made for acquiring 12 Seakings. Sanction for the acquisition of 6 Seakings was accorded in 1969 and in 1970 an order was placed for their delivery in 1971. Concurrently an order was also placed for the acquisition of the MK 44 anti submarine homing torpedoes. On 17 Apr 1971, the Seakings Squadron was commissioned as INAS 330. Between May 1971 and 1971, the Seakings were involved in the following activities:
- Conversion flying
- Maintenance courses at NATS
- Evaluation by Tactical School of Seaking capabilities and limitations and promulgation of preliminary Tactical Instructions
The preliminary evaluation was to prove misleading. The first group who had returned from UK had only done familiarisation flying. At Indian insistence, the British Navy was giving the second group tactical flying experience but this group only arrived in India in October 1971 and were deployed in Bombay. Meanwhile NHQ had based its assessment of Seaking utilisation on the limited information that had been given to the first group and tasked the Seakings for anti submarine patrols off Bombay harbour. To cap it all, the Tactical School's Seaking dockets were given high security classification. Consequently, the people who mattered remained in ignorance of Seaking performance and potential. The defensive utilisation of the Seaking helicopters in the 1971 War was the cumulative result of all these factors).
Seaking availability was low during May, June and July 1971. In August, NHQ lifted the ban on lowering Sonar 195 and the evaluation of Seaking's dunking Sonar 195 commenced in earnest. Since the MK 44 torpedoes were not yet available, flight trials were started for using depth charges. In end August, the Squadron started night flying. By October, two Seakings were based at Bombay. In November, this had increased to four Seakings. The remaining two were at Cochin.
MATCH Alouettes. The Leander Class frigates were designed to embark Multi-role Anti Submarine Torpedo Carrying Helicopters, whose acronym became `MATCH' helicopters. After the decision had been taken for the Army, Navy and Air Force to have a common helicopter, the French Alouette was chosen for indigenous manufacture at HAL. The Navy's first three helicopters were imported from France. The remainder were supplied by HAL.
SAR Alouettes. The Search and Rescue (SAR) Alouette helicopter had entered the service with VIKRANT in 1961. The survey ship DARSHAK, which had been designed to embark a helicopter and had entered service in 1964, first embarked an Alouette in 1970 to help survey the Gulf of Kutch. The tanker DEEPAK, which was commissioned in 1967, was designed to embark an Alouette. By March 1969, `Logistic Support' had been added to the Alouette's `Search and Rescue' role. On 15 March 1969, the Helicopter Squadron was commissioned as INAS 321. It comprised the SAR flights of VIKRANT, HANSA, GARUDA and DEEPAK.
On 15 September 1971, the Helicopter Training School was commissioned as INAS 561 to provide basic training on Hughes 300 helicopters acquired from the USA and provide advanced training on the MATCH and SAR role Alouttes produced by HAL.
INAS 551
As the Vampires became older and less available, the squadron started using Seahawks. Since the Seahawks were themselves ageing, seven indigenous "Kiran" jet trainer aircraft (HJT-16) were ordered from HAL. By mid 1971, all seven Kirans had been delivered. As Kirans joined, the Seahawks were returned to INAS 300 reserve stock.
NAVAL AIR OPERATIONS IN THE 1971 INDO PAKISTAN WAR
The achievements of VIKRANT and her air squadrons have been described in the Chapter on the 1971 War. The squadrons embarked VIKRANT in August, senior experienced pilots were inducted and aircraft holdings raised to 18 Seahawks and 5 Alizes. They worked up in the Bay of Bengal and were ready for operations by November.
Between 4 and 14 December, the Seahawks by day and the Alizes by day and by night struck targets at Cox's Bazar, Chittagong, Khulna, Chalna, Mongla, Barisal, Do Hazari, Chiringa and Bakarganj. Using 500 lb bombs, rockets and guns, they struck airfields, harbours, ammunition dumps, gunboats, armed merchant ships and troop positions. Despite damage by small arms fire, all aircraft were kept airworthy. The Alizes proved most useful in assisting ships of the Eastern Fleet in contraband control.
Lt Cdr (later Rear Admiral) SK Gupta, was the Commanding Officer of the Seahawk squadron on board VIKRANT. He recalls:
"VIKRANT with her squadrons was ready for action since November, having learnt to operate aircraft at marginal conditions of wind and low speeds and with the most experienced Seahawk pilots embarked on board.
"The initial Seahawk attacks were by eight aircraft with two aircraft providing air defence cover. The attacks knocked out the ATC and other airfield installations at Cox's Bazar. Similarly, Chittagong harbour and gunboats in the vicinity were sucessfully attacked.
"Thereafter, for the next 10 days, over 300 sorties were flown between the Seahawks and Alizes destroying pre-planned and opportunity targets. Enemy ground fire began to get more accurate and several aircraft were damaged, some requiring emergency landings on board, with the ship about 90 to 100 miles away. The Alizes were busy doing recce sorties by day and bombing the runways at Cox's Bazar at night. The Seahawks were very accurate in destroying small targets in the city, merchant ships in harbour and those that tried to sail out".
OPERATIONAL SORTIES FLOWN IN DECEMBER 1971
| Date | CAP | Anti Sub-marine Patrols | Cox's Bazar | Chitta gong | Khulna | Mongla Chalna Pussur River | Hothazari Dohazari/ Barisal/ Bakarganj | Night Strike | Contra band Control
|
Armed Recce | Army Coop |
| 4 | 4 HK | 5 AZ | 8 HK | 8 HK | - | - | - | - | - | - | - |
| 5 | - | 3 AZ | 2 AZ | 4AZ | - | - | |||||
| 6 | 3 HK | - | - | 4 HK 1HK | 4 HK | 4 HK 3AZ | 7 HK | - 1AZ | - 1AZ | - | - |
| 7 | 2 HK | - | 2 HK | 4 HK | - | - 2 AZ | - | - 2AZ | - 2AZ | - | - |
| 8 | - | - | - | 4HK | - | 3AZ | |||||
| 9 | - | - | - | - | 1AZ | 7HK | 2AZ | 3HK | |||
| 10 | - | - | 5AZ | - | 2AZ | 1AZ | |||||
| 11 | - | - | 2AZ | - | 1AZ | 1AZ | 1AZ | 2AZ | |||
| 12 | - | 1 AZ | - | 25HK | - | 4HK | |||||
| 13 | - | - | - | 16HK | 1AZ | 1AZ | 7HK | ||||
| 14 | - | - | 2HK 1AZ | 5HK 1AZ | - | 3AZ 1AZ | 1AZ | 2AZ |
| Total | Sorties | Hours Flown | |
| Seahawk | 128 | 108 | |
| Alize | 63 | 158 | |
| The vertical positioning need to be adjusted downwards. | |||
The Seahawk Squadron won one Maha Vir Chakra, five Vir Chakras, one Nao Sena Medal and three Mentions in Despatches.
The Alize Squadron won six Vir Chakras, six Nao Sena Medals and three Mentions in Despatches.
On the West Coast of India:
(a) Alizes operating from Bombay and Jamnagar carried out anti submarine and reconnaissance patrols. On 10 December, a Pakistan Air Force Starfighter, returning homeward, happened to sight an Alize and shot it down with a Sidewinder missile. All three crew were lost.
(b) Seakings operating from Santacruz Bombay carried out anti submarine patrols of the approaches to Bombay harbour. After KHUKRI was sunk on 9 December, the Seakings carried out a few anti submarine searches staging from the disused airfield at Diu.
(c) Alouettes, operating from INS KUNJALI in Bombay, provided air surveillance of the inner harbour to deter/detect clandestine underwater attacks by chariots and frogmen.
(d) Aircraft of the training squadrons INAS 551 and 550 carried out coastal surveillance off Goa and Cochin respectively.
(e) Requisitioned civilian flying club aircraft assisted coastal surveillance in their local areas.
Prior to the war, two naval pilots, Lieutenant (later Vice Admiral) Arun Prakash and Lieutenant (later Rear Admiral) P Debrass had been deputed to the Air Force as part of an ongoing exchange programme. During the war, the former flew Hunter aircraft in front line sorties while the latter unfortunately was hospitalised for a serious illness. Lt Arun Prakash won the Vir Chakra during these operations. He destroyed two C 130's.
DEVELOPMENTS BETWEEN 1972 AND 1975
After the war ended, VIKRANT undertook three crucial requirements before starting her long refit to attend to her boiler problems :
(a) Complete the training of the new aircrews which had been interrupted in September 1971, when senior experienced aircrew had been inducted.
(b) Carry out Seaking flying trials to finalise what was required to be done during the forthcoming refit to enable Seakings to operate from VIKRANT.
(c) Carry out Harrier trials to establish, "prima facie", its ability to operate from VIKRANT's fight deck.
In Aug 72, VIKRANT started a three year refit during which
(a) The boilers were refurbished.
(b) Seaking operating and maintenance facilities were installed.
(c) The communication systems were modernised and indigeneous communication equipment installed.
(d) All electronic compartments and test rooms were air conditioned.
VIKRANT become operational in May 1975. Seahawks, Alizes and Seakings resumed flying from VIKRANT and participating in Fleet exercises.
Between 1972 and 1974, the Seahawks, operating from ashore suffered a number of fatal accidents. The problems were similar to those experienced earlier with fire warning lights, but the aircrew were new entrants. It took some time for them to gain experience. By 1974, Seahawk spares become available in abundance. The firewalls were changed on almost all aircraft and Seahawks serviceability improved.
Harrier Trials on Board VIKRANT in 1972.
In July 1972, British Aerospace, sent their demonstrator G-VTOL Harrier to India for landing trials on board the VIKRANT. The trials showed that VIKRANT would be able to operate VTOL type aircraft.
In March 1973, a French team visited the squadron regarding refurbishment of the Alizes. The production line for Alizes had stopped long ago and the French Navy had resorted to "refurbishing" their Alizes. It was decided that the Indian Alizes should be similarly refurbished to stretch their life into the mid 1980s. Refurbishment commenced in 1975 and completed in 1978.
As a result of their extensive flying and limited maintenance in the 1971 war, the availability of Seakings fell sharply. It took nearly two years for the situation to get better. Specialists came from Britain to improve detection capability of the Seaking sonars. It took them over a year to isolate the causes and implement the remedies. The numerous other problems that accompany the induction of a technologically sophisticated new helicopter also took time to resolve.
In 1973, three new Seakings arrived, followed by three more in 1974, enabling the commisioning of the second Seaking squadron INAS 336.
Thereafter, Seaking availabilty and efficiency improved considerably. With a larger number of submarines also available on both coasts, the Seakings were able to coordinate their anti submarine search and attack tactics and procedures with those of the Russian Petyas and the British Leanders.
The following table gives an overview of the delays that had to be suffered in the induction of this potent new weapon platform:
| Period | Seaking Serviceability | Performance of Role Equipment | Flying Hours |
| January 1972 to July 1972 | Low | Poor | Limited |
| August 1972 to October 1972 | Low | Commenced Sea trials of Sonar. Performance poor (Note: No workshop facilities, no spares) | Limited |
| November 1972 to July 1973 | Improved | Poor | Limited |
| August 1973 to November 1973 |
-Three new Seakings arrived -Serviceability improved |
-Commenced trials and evaluations -Workshops and test equipment set up |
Improved
|
| December 1973 onwards |
Good
|
-Intensive anti submarine exercises -MK 44 torpedo evaluation |
Good |
| July 1974 | - Three new Seakings arrived | - Depth charge practices | Very Good |
| September 1974-1975 |
-INAS 336 commissioned - Seakings embarked in VIKRANT - First Flyex from offshore rig SAGAR SAMRAT - Seakings operated from Advance Landing Ground in Saurashtra |
-Evaluations of tactical antisubmarine cooperation between:- -Seaking and
Petyas - Seaking and Leanders - Seaking and Alizes - Seaking and Seahawks |
Very Good |
INAS 331. The MATCH flight for the first Leander class frigate, NILGIRI, was commissioned as INAS 331 on 15 May 1972.
In the light of experienced gained in the 1971 war of how useful the light Alouette helicopter could be, Alouette flights were sanctioned for a number of ships. Apart from the first four Leanders and the frigates TRISHUL and TALWAR, which embarked the MATCH Alouettes, SAR Alouettes were sanctioned for the frigates BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS, BETWA, the new training ship TIR and the new survey ships.
The Kirans started flying from HANSA in 1972. As experience was consolidated in operating and maintaining Kirans, their serviceability improved considerably.
Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) was two facets:
(a) In earlier days, the role of MR was to search large sea areas by day and by night to locate and track enemy warships and merchant ships and home air strikes and naval ships against them.
(b) With the increase in the number of submarines, the MR role evolved into MRASW to search, locate, track and attack enemy submarines on surface and submerged, and co-operate with own surface forces in anti submarine warfare operations.
The system inherited from the British, was that the Air Force operated MR aircraft for naval tasks.
The MR arm of the Indian Air Force was formed from World War II Liberator aircraft. The first Liberator Squadron (No 5) was raised in November 1948. Though old and inadequately equipped for the task, Liberators did useful work as a MR squadron as well as Air Sea rescue. In 1961, the IAF acquired seven Super Constellation (Super Connie) aircraft from Air India for conversion to the MR role.
During the hostilities with Pakistan in 1965, the inadequacy of MR become very apparent. During the Kutch operations in April-May 1965, every available MR aircraft was deployed to search for Pakistan naval forces but without result. During the war in September 1965, the MR effort available was barely able to cover the approaches to Bombay and that too only in conjunction with VIKRANT's carrier based aircraft flown from Santa Cruz. Despite the IAF's best efforts, the maximum that could be provided during the operations in May and September 1965 was about 10 hours per day as against a requirement of 80 hours per day in the Arabian Sea alone.
In 1966, the Navy recommended to the Government that the responsibility for MR and the command and control of shore based MR aircraft be transferred from the Air Force to the Navy. The Air Force was not agreeable and preferred status quo. The reasons advanced for and against this proposal were as follows:
- The Navy's position was that enemy ship recognition at sea and subsequent co-ordination of tactical action with co-operating surface forces required such extensive training that it was most cost effective for MR aircrews to be naval officers familiar with the sea. It was for this reason that in all the major navies of the world (USA, Russia, Japan, China, France, Germany and Holland), MR aircraft were controlled and operated solely by the Navy. The only exceptions were Britain, India and Australia. In the early years of the British Royal Air Force, MR had been solely the responsibility of the Air Force. After the First World War, the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force had been formed from the Royal Naval Air Service and was largely manned by naval aviators who were transferred en bloc to the RAF Coastal Command at birth. Naval experience had therefore been available to the RAF and it was on this foundation that the RAF Coastal Command evolved. The Commonwealth countries had unquestioningly adopted the British model. There was no reason for its continuance.
- The Air Force position was that in the British Manual of Joint Operations, MR was a joint responsibility, that this system had stood the test in Britain and Australia, that there would be greater flexibility in aircraft utilisation if MR remained with the Air Force, (since the aircraft could be used for other roles as well) and that in the 1965 operations, the Air Force had met the Navy's MR requirement to the extent possible within the inadequate resources available.
After prolonged discussions, it was decided to maintain the status quo. The Air Force was to remain responsible for MR as long as the existing Super Constellation aircraft were in service. The question of command and control of MR would be reviewed when considering the induction of new MR aircraft.
In subsequent years:
(a) The IAF continued to operate the Liberators and the Super Constellations from Poona and Bangalore.
(b) The Joint Sea Air Warfare Committee kept the augmentation of the MR squadrons under continuous consideration.
(c) Every major Fleet exercise repeatedly highlighted the number of air attacks that were wasted, time and again, because of mistaken identity.
It became unmistakably clear that the correct identification of ships at sea required extremely high skills of aircrews to distinguish between and positively identify own, enemy and neutral ships.
Evaluation of the French Atlantic MRASW Aircraft
In October 1968, an Atlantic gave a flight demonstration in Dabolim. In August 1969, a joint Navy Air Force team evaluated the French Navy Atlantic anti submarine reconnaissance aircraft. The Atlantic operated from the Air Force station at Poona and the evaluation was carried out with submarine KALVARI. The Atlantic was found to be suitable. A special study group was appointed to further examine the matter, after which a decision could be taken whether the Navy or the Air Force would operate MRASW aircraft.
Decision for Navy to Acquire MRASW Aircraft
After the 1971 war, in which KHUKRI was sunk by a Pakistan Navy submarine, the Navy pressed the requirement for a versatile MRASW aircraft which, with a good radar, could rapidly search a required area and be capable of attacking and sinking a submarine located by it. In addition to its primary role of anti submarine warfare, such a maritime aircraft would also meet the surveillance needs of the Navy over large ocean areas and thus act as the eyes of the Fleet over the horizon. In an anti submarine operation, MRASW aircraft, anti submarine helicopters and anti submarine ships had to act as a single weapon system. This required a high degree of coordination and similar mental response to submarine evasive action. This could only be done if MRASW aircraft were operated by the Navy. The Navy therefore urged the Government for an early decision to acquire a suitable MRASW aircraft to be operated by the Navy.
In May 1973, the Government accepted the Navy's reasoning and approved in principle the acquisition of four shore based MRASW aircraft.
In September 1973, a Naval team evaluated the British Nimrod aircraft in Britain. However the serious financial situation after the oil crisis of October 1973 ruled out the purchase in foreign exchange of either the Atlantic or the Nimrod.
Subsequent efforts focussed on ascertaining whether IL 38 MRASW aircraft could be obtained from Russia. The Russian Navy was reluctant to spare these aircraft from their inventory because they needed these for their own Navy. After persuasion, the Russian side agreed to spare a few aircraft.
In February 1975, the agreement was signed for the acquisition of three IL 38s from Russia.
In June 1975 Government took the decision to vest the command, control and operation of the MRASW IL 38's with the Navy.
Shri Govind Narain, then Defence Secretary recalls:
"The control of the air reconnaissance system over the sea was in the hands of the Air Force. The Navy wanted this control to be transferred to itself. This matter had been pending with the Government for nearly 10 years and it could not get resolved. In the 1971 war, all the three wings of the defence Forces played a very significant part and all concerned could observe their respective roles. The performance of the Navy in Karachi was brilliant and the whole country was very impressed.
"Pressure continued to mount from the naval side that they would do even better if their operators felt more confident, if the air recce system was also within their own control. On the other hand, the Air Force pleaded that they had all the airfield arrangements, they had all the know how, they knew which aircraft from which country could be best for what purpose, they had the maintenance facilities. All these were very strong points.
"When this matter came repeatedly to the Defence Ministry, what we did was to send the whole problem to the Committee of the three Chiefs of Staff and told them to deliberate afresh on these problems. We gave them two months time to come back to the Defence Ministry with an agreed solution. Whatever agreed solution was found would be acceptable to the Defence Ministry.
"At the end of the two months, no solution was forthcoming. In individual discussions, the three Chiefs expressed their helplessness that no agreement could be reached. We gave them another two months time to reconsider this matter as it was very urgent, very important and required their considered views. But again the matter remained with them for two more months and there was no solution forthcoming. Then we discussed with the three Chiefs that if they could not reach any conclusion, would they like the Defence Ministry to consider the whole matter objectively and find a solution. All the three Chiefs agreed that this should be done.
Thus the matter came to be considered in the Defence Ministry. We collected the necessary information from the various countries of the world which had developed a system of maritime reconnaissance. Then we analysed our own position. We went into great details of the points of view of the Navy. We went into great details of the points of view of the Air Force. Then we in the Defence Ministry prepared an elaborate note of 20 or 25 pages, putting down all points of view and reached the conclusion that it would be more prudent if maritime reconnaissance was put under the control of the Navy but the maintenance of the aircraft could be left with the Air Force. Naturally the Navy was jubilant and the Air Force was unhappy, but this solution was accepted by the Defence Minister, by the Political Affairs Committee of the Cabinet and finally by the Prime Minister and was enforced as a Government order."
Transfer of the Super Constellations to the Navy.
In early 1976, the Air Force wrote to the Navy offering to immediately hand over the Super Constellation MR aircraft. The offer had a proviso that should the Navy find that they could not cope with the Super Constellations, then the IL 38's should revert to the Air Force.
Admiral Tahiliani recalls:
"On the 5th of April 1976, at the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting in Delhi, an offer was made by the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar, to Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Cursetji, that with the Government having decided that the Navy will operate the IL 38s, (which were not due to arrive till the middle of 1977), the Navy should now take over the Super Connies.
"After a certain amount of discussion within the Navy, we naturally decided that we were going to do so. I first came to know about it on the day after, that is the 6th of April, when then General Raina, who was Chairman Chiefs of Staff, came and spent a day with us at sea on board VIKRANT. At lunch he said "What would be your reaction if I was to tell you that the Air Force has said that you can take over the Super Connies?" I said "Sir, there must be some catch in it". Then he related to me the discussion at the Chiefs of Staff Committee meeting. I said "We must take them over. There is not the slightest doubt in my mind." He said "How would you manage the maintenance and the flying part?" I said "We will give our aircrew conversions. In three months they will be flying the aircraft. Major maintenance is done by Air India and that is no hassle for us.
"I must pay tribute to the first team led by the late Cdr Ravi Dhir who did a magnificent job, because the loaned Air Force aircrews and ground crew were all withdrawn, after their initial loan period of six months. We had requested the Air Force to let them stay with us a little longer, because our aircrew had not acquired enough cloud flying, or experience in adverse conditions for which they were not rated. However the Air Force withdrew every single person of theirs at the end of six months. This first team got themselves rated, gained all the experience very quickly and we were flying the Super Connies as well, if not better than our Air Force friends. Purely in passing, I will mention that when the Super Connies were transferred from Air India to the Air Force, Air India crews had been loaned to the Air Force for a period of 20 months.
"So, although our Air Force friends might have thought that they were going to frighten the Navy into accepting a commitment we would not be able to cope with, in the bargain they gave us an opportunity, by grabbing which we were able, once and for all, to put this question of the operation of long range maritime ASW aircraft behind us".
Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar, then Chief of the Air Staff recalls:
"The control of Maritime Operations had been with the Air Force ever since Independence. Successive Air Chiefs were able to keep it with the Air Force, because they felt that air effort should be a single point responsibility. During the time of my predecessor, Air Chief Marshal OP Mehra, the question came up again very strongly and it was decided that when the new IL-38 Russian MRASW aircraft came, then these would be handed over to the Navy and put under their control. At that time, we were operating the Super Constellation aircraft in this role.
"At the beginning of my tenure, I felt that it would be the right and correct thing to do, that the Navy should be given Super Connies now, a year and a half in advance, so that they could familiarise to operate heavy aircraft. Any mistakes the Navy made or any accidents would be on these old aircraft and not on the new IL 38's. Surely this is reasonable thinking.
"In this context, I made the offer to hand over the Super Constellations to the Naval Chief, if I recall right, in the Defence Secretary Banerjee's office. The CNS, Jal Cursetji, was in fact taken aback, asked me if I was feeling alright. I said "Yes, I am making this offer because I feel this is the correct thing to do". He did not quite believe it, so I said "Shall I put it down in writing ?. I will send a note to Defence Secretary with a copy to you, saying that we are prepared to hand over the Super Connies immediately to the Navy. In fact, I suggest you take these aircraft now and we will send training teams, pilots and technicians for this.
"But I also mentioned to CNS that "If you find you cannot cope the Super Connies and you have a problem, then the same should be returned to the Air Force. This would be surely be in the national interest." Jal was a gentleman and he agreed. He said "You have my word". I said "Fine. The battle is closed".
"That is how the whole thing was done. Naturally, the IL 38 got reflected in the Naval budget because the Navy were going to get it. The Air Force would not want to pay for these then.
"Certainly some of us, and certainly myself, realised that the Navy had a point that MRASW should come under naval control and should be operated by navy pilots and maintained by naval personnel. If I may be utterly frank, I think what the Air Force feared was that after acquiring MR aircraft, the Navy would want to expand their carrier fleet and get more and more aircraft and perhaps try to take on some of the Air Force roles like the air defence of Bombay. The Air Force felt that their budget would be slashed and the Navy would get another carrier and more modern aircraft.
"I think the approach in the past had been that we should nip naval suggestions in the bud and say no to everything including the MR. I felt that "Let us handle each role by itself. Let the Navy have the MR and we will see in the future regarding the air defence of Bombay, whether the Navy can control it or do it better than we can." So that is how the decision about the immediate transfer of MR was taken. I think it was the right decision. All the Air Force crew, the pilots, the technicians, etc were briefed and told very clearly that everything possible should be done to train the Navy personnel quickly and seriously with the intention of early transfer of the Super Connies."
Vice Admiral (then Lt Cdr) Arun Prakash recalls:
"The Navy had been pecking away at the Government with its claim to take over MR and we had more than adequate justification. The Air Chief decided that he would by a "coup de main", once and for all, put an end to the Navy's claims to MR. He suddenly turned round and said "All right, I will hand over aircraft belonging to No 6 Squadron Air Force. You have six months to prove that you can fly and maintain that machine. If the Navy cannot do this, then the whole thing falls back to the Air Force". It was something like "double or quits". It could mean that the Navy would also lose the Ilyushin 38 MR/ASW aircraft.
"It was quite a challenge, because all our experience as far as flying and maintenance was concerned was confined to relatively small turbo prop or jet aircraft which were single engined. Now the Super Constellation was a giant (144,000 pound) machine with four piston engines. She had started off life as an airliner with Air-India, and when the aircraft were superseded by Boeing 707s they were handed over to the Indian Air Force for maritime reconnaissance.
"So the Air Chief did take a very calculated gamble. No naval aircrew had any experience of flying anything more than medium sized twin engine aircraft, and that too was way back in the days of the Sealand in the early 1950s. Most of us were single engine pilots, most of our observers had only experience of flying over the sea where they were more tactically oriented in terms of anti-submarine warfare and so on. Whereas flying these four-engined behemoths required skills, both of piloting as well as of navigation, of an entirely different kind. For example, if you had to go and land at an international airfield, the procedures and the holding patterns, the R/T natter and the circuits etc were so complicated, that we really had no experience of this. So it was not without a fair amount of trepidation that all of us gathered in Goa in early 1976 and we were deputed from there to proceed to No 2 Wing at Poona.
"The Squadron Commander (Designate) was Cdr Ravi Dhir, the Senior Pilot was Lt Cdr Bhide and there were two more pilots, I being one of them. Similarly, there were four co-pilots and about 6 to 8 observers. We all gathered in Goa and proceeded to No 2 Wing, Poona, where we were given a short course by the Air Force under the aegis of No 6 Squadron in basic flying procedures, the technical details of the aircraft and so on. The maintenance crew started their class room and practical training at the same time. After that, on completion of this brief course, all of us naval aircrew plus some Air Force flying instructors, navigation instructors and a core team of Air Force maintenance personnel were bundled off to Goa. Here we gathered once again into an "ad hoc" squadron which was given the designation INAS 312, although not yet commissioned. We gathered all our sailors who had any experience at all of piston engined aircraft and multi engined aircraft and put them in the hands of the IAF technical crew.
"Now we were quite clear in our minds that we had a short lease of time to show that we could handle this aircraft, both from the flying angle as well as the maintenance aspects. Fortunately, the Air Force crew who came along with us as a training team had no qualms or reservations at all. They were totally dedicated to their task, which was to train the naval personnel to take over, regardless of what the higher Air Force authorities had in mind. So we got down to our work with a will, and within about six weeks, the first Naval pilot flew solo and that was Lt Cdr Bhide who had jumped from single engine jets to a four engined aircraft. That I think was quite an achievement. Slowly and progressively, all four pilots went solo. Similarly our observers managed to master the art of navigation over land and of procedures and let down into busy international airports, which was quite an achievement. One fine day, we found that we had virtually taken over the squadron. A formal commissioning ceremony was then organised where both Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar and Admiral Jal Cursetji came down to Goa and the squadron was commissioned as INAS 312.
"We gathered from informal conversation and discussions with our Air Force colleagues who had worked with us that this was not as per the Air Force game plan. Actually, they had anticipated that with our background and our levels of experience, we would find it extremely difficult to get on top of this aircraft; certainly so in six months. They had estimated that 12 to 18 months was the minimum that the Navy would need to be able to fly this aircraft and handle all the maintenance operations that were involved. So I presume, this came as an unpleasant surprise to the Air Force that we were ready, willing and able to take on this task."
Commodore Shahane (then Cdr) was the Squadron Air Engineer Officer in HANSA from 1976 to 1978. He recalls:
"A large contingent had gone away to Russia for training and induction of the IL 38s. Technical manpower was minimal at HANSA and in the squadrons and in VIKRANT. Then we were suddenly faced with the problem of sending personnel for training and inducting a huge MR aircraft like the Super Constellation.
"At HANSA there were tremendous challenges for developing the infrastructure facilities for the Super Constellations, which were quite different from those which were already in hand for the IL 38s. I remember being on 10 boards at a time for developing all these facilities. We were also very apprehensive about how we would be able to operate the Super Constellations because the Air Force was not in a position to give us things like aircraft jacks and other support equipment. While dealing with the Air Force however, we found them very helpful at the squadron level. And the Air Force technical and operational staff and the pilots and the aircrew who had come to Goa were extremely co-operative in helping us with the maintenance of the Super Constellations. By and large, after the initial teething problems were resolved, not much difficulty was experienced."
VIKRANT underwent two modernisation refits:
(a) 1979 to 1981 In the first phase of her modernisation, her boilers were renewed, new radars were fitted, facilities were installed to operate the Sea Harriers, new anti aircraft guns were fitted, the communication systems were modernised, the air conditioning was extended, and the cata-pult and arrestor gear were overhauled since Alizes would continue to operate.
(b) 1987 to 1989 In the second phase of modernisation the catapault and arrestor gear were removed, a ski jump was fitted in the bows to assist the Sea Harriers to take off, facilities were installed to operate the newer technologically advanced Seaking helicopters and their new missiles and torpedoes.
VIKRANT continued to operate till 1994, after which she was laid up and eventually decommisioned in 1997.
In 1985, the second hand, 1953 vintage, British aircraft carrier HMS HERMES, became available for acquisition. It had already been operating Sea Harriers. After Government approved its acquisition and refit, it was commissioned as INS VIRAAT on 12 May 1987.
The Seahawks disembarked from VIKRANT for the last time on 8 May 1978. Even ashore, their availability could not be sustained. By end 1978, the Seahawks phased out. The last Seahawk flight was on 16 Dec 1983, to escort the first three Sea Harriers as they arrived over Naval Air Station Dabolim.
In 1977, Government approved the acquisition of 8 Sea Harriers, including 2 trainers. The first British Sea Harrier flew in 1978. By mid 1979, it was undergoing intensive flying trials. In 1979, NHQ placed an order for 6 Sea Harriers and 2 Harrier Trainers for delivery in 1983. The Sea Harrier entered service with the British Navy in 1980. In 1982, it proved its capability in the British operations against Argentina in the Falkland Islands.
The training in Britain of Indian Sea Harrier pilots started in 1982. The first three Sea Harriers landed at Dabolim on 16 December 1983. The first Sea Harrier landed on VIKRANT's deck on 20 Dec 83.
Sea Harriers were acquired in three batches.
| Batch | Sea Harriers | Trainers |
| First | 6 | 2 |
| Second | 7 | 1 |
| Third | 10 | 1 |
The Sea Harriers carried a variety of weapons; air to air and air to surface missiles; conventional and cluster bombs and runway denial weapons; rockets and guns. All weapon release modes were calculated by weapon aiming computers and displayed on the head-up symbology.
The Alizes were refurbished by 1978. The last launch of Alizes from VIKRANT took place on 2 April 1987. Thereafter Alizes operated only from ashore.
From February 1988 to October 1989, during Operation Pawan to assist the Government of Sri Lanka, the Alizes operated from Madurai in support of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. They flew 1800 hours and the crew won three Nao Sena Medals and four Mentions in Despatches.
During the operation to assist the Government of the Maldives, in suppressing an insurrection, an Alize spotted the rebel's escape vessel MV Progress Light and fired at it, forcing it to stop and be apprehended.
The Alizes stopped flying on 12 April 1991 and the Squadron was decommissioned in Aug 91. Seven aircraft were left of the total of 14 acquired. During the 30 years of the squadron's existence, the Alizes had flown 35,912 hours and done 7,144 deck landings.
On 24 August 1991, the first naval Dornier arrived to replace the Alizes in INAS 310. Thereafter additional Dorniers joined: one in 1991, two in 1992 and one in 1993, making a total induction of five Dorniers.
The Dorniers were progressively fitted with the latest radar, electronic and sonobuoy systems for the surveillance and EW roles.
Five Super Constellation aircraft of the Air Force's No 6 Squadron at Pune were taken over from the Air Force on 18 November 76 and designated INAS 312.
The Super Connies phased out in 1983 and in due course were replaced by the Russian TU 142s which arrived in 1988.
TU 142s for Long Range Maritime Patrol
On 30 March 1988, the first three TU 142 M aircraft landed at HANSA after a non stop flight from Russia. Two more aircraft arrived on 13 April. The squadron was commissioned at HANSA on 16 April and designated INAS 312. The remaining three aircraft arrived between August and October 1988.
Maritime Reconnaissance Anti Submarine Aircraft IL 38s.
Three IL 38's arrived in Goa in October 1977. Later, two more IL 38's joined the squadron in 1983.
The proposal to acquire Islanders for Pilot and Observer Training and Fleet requirements had been initiated in 1972. The first two Islanders arrived in Cochin on 18 May 76. The remaining three arrived by end 76.
In 1981, two Islanders of INAS 550 were based at Port Blair. In 1984, these were commissioned as INAS 318 and the naval air station at Port Blair was commissioned as INS UTKROSH.
The Vampires were phased out by 1976. In 1978, the last of the Seahawks was returned to INAS 300 and the armed versions of the Kirans joined the squadron for training jet pilots for the frontline squadron and for FRU tasks. In 1987 and 1988, 8 Kiran MK II's joined the squadron.
Helicopters in Frigates and Destroyers
The embarkation of helicopters in ships, which had started with the light Alouette IIIs in VIKRANT, DARSHAK and DEEPAK in the 1960's followed by the MATCH Alouettes in the first four Leander frigates in the 1970's, accelerated in the 1980s.
- all new front line frigates and destroyers were designed to embark heavy helicopters. TARAGIRI and VINDHYAGIRI had one Seaking each. The RAJPUT class frigates from Russia had one Kamov each. The GODAVARI class frigates of Project 16 had two Seakings each, as do the DELHI class destroyers of Project 15. The LST(L)'s were designed to embark the commando variant Seakings.
- all other frigate sized ships had the lighter Alouette IIIs (Chetaks) - TRISHUL and TALWAR after conversion, BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and BETWA after conversion to the training role, the new training ship TIR, the new survey ships and the new KHUKRI class corvettes of Project 25.
Induction of Russian KAMOV 25 Single Package Anti Submarine Helicopters
With the commissioning of the new guided missile frigate INS RAJPUT in Russia in March 80, the first KA 25 helicopter entered service. On 11 Dec 80, the twin engined KA 25 helicopter squadron was commissioned at HANSA and designated INAS 333. In subsequent years, the KA 28s replaced the obsolescent KA 85s.
On 1 Aug 80, INAS 321 relocated to Bombay in INS KUNJALI.
INAS 330/336 AND SEAKING VARIANTS
On 19 Jul 79, the Seaking Flight and Tactical Simulator (FATs) was commissioned in Cochin.
In addition to the ASW Seakings MK 42 acquired in 1971, other variants of Seakings were acquired in subsequent years:
| 1979/80 | Seakings Mk 42 A | ASW Helicopters designed for being hauled down on the decks of the 5th and 6th Leanders, TARAGIRI and VINDHYAGIRI using the Recovery Assist Traverse system (RAST). |
| 1987 to 1989 | Seakings Mk 42 B | ASW Helicopters for embarkation in the aircraft carriers VIKRANT and VIRAAT, the GODAVARI class missile frigates. In the anti ship role, the MK 42B's were capable of firing air to surface Sea Eagle missiles. |
| Seakings Mk 42C | Commando/Troop Carrying Helicopters for the Marine Commandos and for the indigenous Landing Ships MAGAR and GHARIAL. |
The third naval air station, on the east coast of India, commissioned in 1992 as INS RAJALI.
With the increasing number of helicopters on board the ships based in Bombay, it became necessary to have a helipad area from where helicopters could continue flying when ships were alongside. In view of its proximate location, INS KUNJALI became the Navy's helicopter base in Bombay.
For similar reasons, a naval air station was commissioned at Visakhapatnam as INS DEGA in 21 October 1991.