Vikrant and her Seahawk and Alize squadrons had commissioned in 1961. In the fourteen years that had elapsed till 1975, both Vikrant and her aircraft had aged considerably: Vikrant herself was becoming due for a major refit cum modernisation.

Despite the acquisition of the German Navy's surplus Seahawks in 1966, the serviceability of the Seahawks had become unpredictable. Their replacements had been identified as the Sea Harriers, but these were still under development in Britain.

The three-year, 1975-1978 refurbishment programme to extend the life of the Alizes up to the 1980s had commenced but was being afflicted by the non-availability of critical spares, which were no longer under production in France.

Seaking Anti Submarine Helicopters. The six Mk 42 Seakings that had arrived from Britain in 1971 had experienced numerous teething problems during the December 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. They underwent extensive evaluation and defect rectification in 1972 and 1973. By 1974, six new Seakings had arrived, repair and test facilities had been set up and expertise had begun to develop, all of which led to a marked improvement in availability and role worthiness.

Kamov 25 Anti Submarine Helicopters. Agreements had been signed for these helicopters to be embarked on board the Russian guided missile destroyers Rajput, Rana and Ranjit when they commissioned from 1980 onwards.

MATCH Alouettes. Nilgiri and Himgiri had each embarked a Multi-role Anti submarine Torpedo Carrying Helicopter. The MATCH also had been ordered for the next two frigates, Udaygiri and Dunagiri. It had been decided that in the last two Leander frigates, Taragiri and Vindhyagiri the MATCH would be replaced by the much larger and heavier Seaking.

SAR Chetaks. These were the French Alouette IIIs being manufactured by HAL under license. SAR flights were operational at sea in Vikrant and Deepak, and ashore in Hansa and Garuda.

Agreements had been signed for three Russian IL 38 MRASW aircraft to be delivered in 1977 and for the aircrew to commence training in Russia in 1976.

When Vikrant was first acquired in 1961, the basic role of the Seahawks was 'fighter-ground attack'. The Seahawks were not designed to intercept other aircraft. During exercises, however, a modest capability had been built up by officers from the aircraft carrier 'directing' a Seahawk, on Vikrant's radar, to within visual range of an intruding aircraft, for carrying out an attack using its 20 mm guns.

For the anti-ship role, the Seahawks' armament options were bombs, rockets and 20mm guns. Since the Seahawks were not fitted with radar, they had to be homed on to a target. The basic problem was to pinpoint the target ship for the Seahawks to attack.

The Alize was fitted with radar and one of its roles was tactical reconnaissance within a hundred miles of the aircraft carrier. If, during daytime, a contact was visually identified as hostile, the Alize could call for and home a strike by Seahawks. If, at night, a radar contact behaved suspiciously, it would be shadowed until dawn and, if visually identified to be hostile, a Seahawk strike would be homed in. Since dusk and dawn were tactically critical times for a Seahawk attack to arrive over the target, Seahawk pilots had to qualify for being recovered and launched during darkness.

The procedure that had evolved for Seahawk-Alize cooperation comprised three steps:

• The Alize would search a given area to locate the adversary. As soon as a contact was identified as hostile, it would ask Vikrant to launch a Seahawk strike. Positioning itself between Vikrant and the target, the Alize would home the Seahawks towards itself, allow the Seahawks to overtake it and head towards the target.

• The Seahawks would strike the target.

• On completion of the strike, the Alize would tell the Seahawks the direction in which they should fly to reach back to Vikrant.

Between 1966 and 1971, Hawk-Alize cooperation improved steadily. Experience showed that identification and attack during darkness would improve if the target could be illuminated. Lepus flare bombs were imported from Sweden.

For the Alize's anti submarine role, the sequence of events would be:

• The Alize might detect an echo on its radar or a radar transmission on its ESM system. If the echo quickly disappeared, it was suggestive of a submarine having crash-dived.

• The Alize would proceed to the position of the radar contact / estimated position of the radar transmission and drop a pattern of passive non-directional sonobuoys. The amplitude of noise detected by the sonobuoys would be transmitted to the sonobuoy receiver in the Alize. By correlating these amplitudes, the receiver would estimate a range. Where these estimated range circles intersected, the receiver would indicate the approximate area where the submarine might be. The Alize would then drop a third sonobuoy, get a third range intersect and obtain the most probable position of the submarine.

• The Alize would track the submarine by dropping more sonobuoys. When it was confident of carrying out an accurate attack, the Alize would drop anti submarine depth charges on top of the submarine.

• Should a submarine be surprised on the surface and attempt to crash dive, the Alize would attack it with anti-submarine rockets fitted with special pressure hull-penetrating warheads, which were most effective when the submarine had not had the time to dive too deep.

From the outset, the efficacy of the Alizes in the anti submarine role fell short of expectations. The limited availability of submarines and the disappointing performance of passive non-directional sonobuoys in the waters where anti submarine exercises were carried out led the Navy to acquire, from France, the Julie system. The Julie concept was to drop a mini bomb (called bombette) near the pattern of sonobuoys, which would then record not only the explosion of the bombette but also its echo from the submarine, if there was one in the vicinity. The time interval between the two echoes was converted into a range to get a more accurate position of the submarine. The two additional Alizes acquired from France were fitted out with the Julie recording system. Julie recorders were also imported for retrofitting in the earlier Alizes.

During the 1971 war, the Seahawks attacked ground targets and ships in harbour in East Pakistan, as they were designed to do. Since there were no Pakistan Navy ships in the Bay of Bengal, there was no occasion to resort to Hawk-Alize cooperation. On the one occasion when an intruding British RAF aircraft inadvertently flew over Vikrant, the Seahawk was unable to catch up with and visually sight the intruder.

Whenever the wind on deck was not sufficient to launch Seahawks, Alizes were utilised to bomb ground targets, but only at night so as to reduce their vulnerability to anti aircraft fire due to their slower speed. One Alize would drop a Lepus flare to illuminate the target and a second Alize would drop the bombs. The Alizes also proved useful in stopping those merchant ships that tried to evade contraband control by dropping depth charges well ahead of them. The Alizes operating from Bombay did not obtain any worthwhile contacts of Pakistan Navy submarines on their sonobuoys.

Regrettably, the capability of the newly arrived Seaking Mk 42 helicopters deployed at Bombay was not fully harnessed for combating the Pakistan Navy's newly acquired Daphne class submarines. Partly, this was due to the diffidence arising out of the technical teething problems experienced at Bombay. But mainly it was due to the differing opinions on how the Seakings should be employed. The first batch of aircrew that went to Britain to accept the first Seakings did not have the benefit of a combat workup with submarines. Plans for utilising Seakings primarily for the defence of Bombay appear to have been based on the assessment of the first batch. The second batch of aircrew underwent a full-scale work up in Britain with submarines and when they arrived in Bombay in October, they were more confident of Seaking capabilities. By this time, however, the plans for defensive utilisation had already firmed up. The tempo of events in November precluded attention on maximising the offensive potential of this latest combination of dunking sonar - air dropped torpedo anti submarine system which, being airborne was completely safe from being hit by submarine fired torpedoes.

From 1972 to 1974, Vikrant was under refit. Her workshops were re-equipped to enable her to operate Seakings. In 1973, three new Seakings arrived, followed by three more in 1974, enabling the commissioning of the second Seaking squadron INAS 336. Thereafter, Seaking availability and efficiency improved considerably. With a larger number of submarines having arrived from Russia and now available on both coasts, the Seakings were able to evolve and coordinate their anti submarine search and attack tactics and procedures with the latest anti submarine ships like the Russian Petya class submarine chasers and the British Leander class frigates.

The embarkation of helicopters in ships had started in the 1960s with the French Alouette IIIs in Vikrant (for the SAR role), in Darshak (for assisting survey work) and in Deepak (for assisting vertical replenishment) followed, in the 1970s, by the MATCH Alouettes in the first four Leander frigates. Thereafter:

• Taragiri and Vindhyagiri had one Seaking each. The Rajput class destroyers from Russia had one Kamov each. The Godavari class frigates of Project 16 had two Seakings each, as would their successors, the Delhi class destroyers of Project 15. The amphibious Landing ships, Magar and Gharial, were designed to embark the commando variant Seakings.

• All other frigate sized ships would have the lighter Chetaks - Trishul and Talwar after being fitted with surface to surface missiles, Brahmaputra, Beas and Betwa after conversion to the training role, the new cadet training ship Tir, the new survey ships and the new Khukri class corvettes of Project 25.

During the fifteen years between 1976 and 1990, the Naval Air Arm underwent momentous changes, many of which could not have been entirely foreseen.

Acquisitions included a second aircraft carrier and a wide variety of aircraft and helicopters equipped with the latest sensors and weapon systems.

Vikrant underwent two modernisations in preparation for embarking the new Sea Harrier Vertical/Short Take Off and Land (V/STOL) fighter aircraft and the new Seaking Mk 42 B ASW helicopters.

The transfer of the 'maritime reconnaissance' role from the Air Force to the Navy marked the rebirth of the shore-based arm of naval aviation.2 This started with the taking over of the Air Force's Super Constellations (Super Connies) by the Navy in 1976 and the acquisition of the Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti Submarine Warfare (MRASW) Ilyushin (IL) 38s from Russia in 1977. Eleven years later, the much longer range and much better equipped Russian Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRMP) Tupolev (TU) 142s replaced the Super Connies.

The combat capability of the Air Arm leapfrogged from the technology of the 1950s to that of the 1980s:

• The new sensors were the dunking sonars in the Kamovs and the Seakings Mk 42 B, the latest sonobuoys in the Seakings Mk 42 B, the ILs and the TUs, the Magnetic Anomaly Detectors (MAD) in the ILs and Kamovs, the ESM in the Seakings Mk 42 B, the tail radar warners in the Sea Harriers, the ILs and the TUs, and the modern radars in all these aircraft and helicopters.

• The new weapons were the French Matra air to air missiles in the Sea Harriers, the British anti ship Sea Eagle missiles in the Sea Harriers and Seakings, the Italian A 244 S and Russian anti submarine homing torpedoes in the helicopters and the anti submarine depth bombs in the Kamovs.

• The tactical missions of naval aircraft changed considerably, in step with the changes in the capabilities of their sensors and weapons.

• Three new naval air stations were commissioned. They made more complete the sea areas covered by maritime reconnaissance. At the older air stations, the Air Traffic Control facilities were modernised and runways lengthened and strengthened to operate the heavier new aircraft.

• The latest simulators were acquired for training Sea Harrier pilots, TU ASW teams and Seaking Mk 42 B maintenance personnel.

• New aircraft maintenance workshops were set up at Kochi for the Seakings, at Goa for the Sea Harriers and the Russian ILs and Kamovs and at Arakkonam for the TUs.

• Training syllabi were updated and training facilities were expanded. To facilitate the practical training of air technical personnel at HAL and with the Air Force, a site was identified at Bangalore for a spacious new Naval Air Technical School.

Between 1975 and 1979, flying operations aboard Vikrant started posing problems that compelled changes in the roles of aircraft.

Vikrant's radars had become unreliable and overdue for replacement. The tracking and marshalling of Seahawks had become stressful. Seahawk availability and the reliability of their navigation systems had become unpredictable. When the Seahawks embarked Vikrant for the last time in 1978, they could only carry out weapon and PR sorties.

Even though two refurbished Alizes were embarked, the inaccuracies of their navigation system degraded the effectiveness of Hawk-Alize cooperation and of anti submarine exercises using sonobuoys. The anti submarine role shifted from the Alize aircraft to the Seaking helicopters and the Alizes' main role became tactical reconnaissance.

Vikrant underwent two-modernisation refits - the first from 1979 to 1981 and the second from 1987 to 1989. During the Phase One modernisation refit, the major items undertaken were:

• Renewal of boilers.

• Extension of air-conditioning.

• Fitment of the Dutch Signaal radars, similar to those fitted in the Leander class frigates.

• Installation of Sea Harrier facilities, LUDS and flood­lighting of the flight deck.

• Fitment of L 70 guns and LIOD Sights for gun control.

• Fitment of new UHF, VHF, HF, MF communication sets.

• Installation of a towed torpedo decoy, an expendable bathythermograph and a sonic ray plotter.

• The catapult and arrestor gear were overhauled and retained for launch and recovery of the Alizes.

Between 1982 and 1986, Vikrant operated with Alizes in the tactical recce role and Seakings Mk 42 in the anti submarine role.

During the Phase Two modernisation from 1987 to 1989, Vikrant was fitted with:

• A ski jump for launching Sea Harriers in the Short Take Off mode. Since the Alizes had phased out, the catapult and arrestor gear were removed.

• Facilities for operation and maintenance of the new dual role anti submarine / anti ship Seaking Mk 42 B helicopter.

• LIOD Fire Control Systems and indigenous medium range chaff launchers.

• Magazine stowage for the new weapons of the Sea Harriers and Seaking Mk 42 B helicopters. The new weapons were the Sea Eagle anti ship missiles, the Matra air-to-air missiles, the A 244S anti submarine torpedoes and the chaff rockets.

During 1989-90, for the first time the Navy had two aircraft carriers at sea at the same time.

'Elephant' was the name intended for last of the series of the 1939-45 World War, 22,000 tonne, Centaur class, 'light fleet aircraft carriers' designed in Britain in 1943. When the war ended in 1945, construction of the Elephant was suspended. A few years later, construction was resumed, Elephant was renamed 'Hermes' and launched in February 1953. The original design of 1943 had envisaged the operation of propeller driven aircraft. This design had to be modified extensively to cater for the operation of jet-propelled aircraft and the new weapon systems that had entered service after 1943. Hermes commissioned in the British Navy in November 1959.

Hermes' first deployment was as a 'strike carrier' in Southeast Asia from 1960 onwards. Britain's economic difficulties in the 1960s led to the decision that it would withdraw from 'East of Suez,' reduce the size of its Navy and transfer her naval air arm's 'strike' aircraft to its Air Force. The British Navy decommissioned a number of its aircraft carriers. Hermes' catapult and arrestor wires were removed and she was placed in reserve. In 1973, she was taken out of reserve and refitted as an 'Anti submarine Helicopter Carrier' to meet NATO commitments in the Atlantic Ocean.

The British Navy, however, remained reluctant to forego the tactical advantages that aircraft carriers conferred in distant naval operations that were beyond the reach of shore based Air Force aircraft. It pursued two projects:

• A new smaller class of ship called the 'Through Deck Cruiser' that would have a “ski jump” to assist V/STOL aircraft to take off from a carrier without having to be catapulted. The V/STOL capability also dispensed with the need for arrestor wires.

• The development of the naval version of the P 1127/Harrier V/STOL aircraft that had been in service with the US Marine Corps and the British Air Force since 1970. By the mid 1970s, the Sea Harrier had taken shape.

In 1978, Sea Harrier trials were held on board Hermes. In 1980, Hermes was fitted with a 12-degree ski jump to enable it to operate Sea Harrier aircraft.

In 1981, again because of financial difficulties, Britain considered whether its Navy should be essentially an ASW force built around destroyers and frigates, whether the Through Deck Cruiser programme should be halted, whether the Hermes should be scrapped and whether the first through deck cruiser, HMS Invincible, should be sold to Australia. These considerations were overtaken by the crisis precipitated by Argentina's invasion of Britain's Falkland Islands, located in the distant South Atlantic Ocean. Argentina had decided to try and solve the longstanding dispute regarding its sovereignty over these islands.

Both Hermes and Invincible, with Sea Harrier strike aircraft and Seaking anti submarine helicopters embarked, were made operational and dispatched to the Falklands in April 1982. Both aircraft carriers returned to Britain in mid 1982, unharmed by the Argentine Air Force's Mirages and Skyhawks, but having lost a number of Sea Harrier aircraft and pilots in combat.

In 1983, Britain decided to place Hermes in reserve and continue the construction of 'Through Deck Cruisers'. In November 1983, Hermes sailed to Portsmouth for being mothballed and decommissioned. She remained idle from 1984 onwards.

In early 1985, Britain offered Hermes to India for outright purchase. By this time, the first batch of the Indian Navy's Sea Harriers had already been in service for over a year. The Navy had a long pending need for a second aircraft carrier to ensure that out of two carriers, at least one would be available should a sudden need arise.3

Admiral Tahiliani was the Chief of the Naval Staff in 1985. He recalls:

The Navy thoroughly examined the material state of Hermes, assessed the magnitude of the refit that would be required, determined the minimum requirements of new equipment and systems that were essential for providing an all weather, day and night capability for air operations, determined the stowage and supply arrangements for the new air to surface and air to air missiles, which were entering service and negotiated how much all this would cost.

On 24 April 1986, the Government announced in Parliament that an agreement had been signed with Britain to acquire the Hermes. A 63 million pound sterling acquisition package was worked out that included dry-docking, refit, spares, stores and services. The ship was towed to Plymouth for dry-docking and a 12-month refit that included:

• Shot blasting of the underwater hull and repair and preservation of fittings to ensure that the ship would not require docking for at least five years.

• Re-tubing of all boilers and overhaul / replacement of auxiliary machinery.

• Stripping and re-coating of the flight deck.

• Rectification of all pending defects and updating onboard systems.

• Alterations to weapon spaces, air department spaces and galleys.

The new equipment to be fitted included a Computerised Action Information Organisation system, modern deck landing and flight facility systems, and all the latest facilities required to operate the Sea Harriers and the new Seaking Mk 42 B helicopters.

On completion of refit, Hermes commissioned at Plymouth as INS Viraat on 12 May 1987. After sea trials off Plymouth and work up off Portland, Viraat sailed from Britain on 23 July 1987. She arrived off Bombay on 21 August 1987 where Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi boarded her, much as his grandfather Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru had welcomed Vikrant twenty-six years earlier in 1961.

The Sea Harriers embarked a month later in September. They dropped their first weapons - 1,000-pound bombs and cluster bombs - on 5 November 1987.

Viraat was the quickest acquisition that the Navy had ever made of a major war vessel.

The project for the indigenous aircraft carrier first took shape in 1979. Since the Navy's design capacities were fully stretched in designing ships and since the Navy had no experience of designing an aircraft carrier, discussions on design collaboration were held with shipbuilders in Europe who had built aircraft carriers for their Navies. During the course of these discussions, the staff requirements crystallised.

The main consideration was the type and number of aircraft that the ADS would operate. In 1979, the Navy had opted for the V/STOL Sea Harriers to operate from Vikrant. With the acquisition of Viraat in 1987, it became certain that the Sea Harriers would still be flying in the decade after 2000, after Vikrant decommissioned. The ADS would, therefore, need to have a ski jump until the Sea Harriers phased out.

To avail of the benefits of self-reliance and of standardisation, the choice of aircraft narrowed down to between:

• The Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) Russian MiG 29 K that was of the same lineage as the MiG 29 acquired by the Air Force, and

• The navalised version of the Light Combat Aircraft (LCA) that was being developed indigenously for the Air Force.

At the time of writing, it has been decided to acquire MIG 29K aircraft along with the second-hand Russian aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. The naval LCA is under development.

The Seahawks disembarked from Vikrant for the last time on 8 May 1978. Even ashore, their availability could not be sustained. By end 1978, the Seahawks phased out from service. The last Seahawk flight took place on 16 December 1983, when it escorted the first three Sea Harriers as they arrived overhead the Naval Air Station at Goa.

In 1995, as a gesture of goodwill, one of the Seahawks that had been purchased from the German Navy in 1966 was formally handed over in Goa to the Chief of German Naval Aviation for their Air Arm museum.

V/STOL aircraft had been under development in Britain since the end 1960s for the British Air Force. The British Navy intended to acquire the naval version, the Sea Harrier. In July 1972, a Harrier had come to India and landed and taken off from Vikrant to establish, prima facie, that V/STOL aircraft could operate from Vikrant's flight deck.

The roles envisaged by the British Navy for the Sea Harrier were:

• Air Defence, with particular emphasis on the shooting down of Maritime Reconnaissance and snooper aircraft.

• Reconnaissance.

• Air Strike, particularly against missile boats and surface targets.

In the ensuing years, the Indian Navy followed the development of the Sea Harrier. In 1977, the Navy obtained approval in principle for the acquisition of the Sea Harriers as replacements for the Seahawks. The first British Navy Sea Harrier flew in 1978 and by mid 1979, the first few aircraft were undergoing intensive flying trials.

In 1979, the Indian Navy placed an order for six Sea Harriers and two Sea Harrier Trainers for delivery in 1983.

The British Navy's aircraft carrier operations against Argentina in the Falkland Islands in 1982 provided the opportunity to assess Sea Harrier performance in combat. They performed effectively in the ground attack role using 30 mm front guns and bombs. In the air-to-air role, their effectiveness remained unproven because the British aircraft carriers stayed outside the strike range of the Argentine Navy's shore based Mirage and Skyhawk strike aircraft.

The Indian Navy's tactical problem was that even if the Fleet was operating outside the range of enemy shore-based strike aircraft, there would still be the threat from a hostile maritime reconnaissance aircraft armed with anti ship missiles. Hence the need for carrier borne aircraft to shoot down the snooper before it released its missiles. Being a V/STOL aircraft, it was known that the Sea Harrier was constrained by limitations on all up weight and its airborne time had to be optimised.

The view of the Indian Air Force, who had earlier evaluated the Harrier aircraft, was that vectored thrust aircraft had no chance against contemporary high performance supersonic aircraft. Moreover, the aircraft's engine performance would de-rate in the hotter Indian climate.

When the Navy proposed the acquisition of additional Sea Harriers, it was decided that a joint Indian Navy-Indian Air Force study should be carried out of the likely effectiveness of the Sea Harrier against the threat posed by missile-armed maritime reconnaissance aircraft.4

The scenario was straightforward. The enemy maritime reconnaissance (MR) aircraft needed to determine, on its radar, the direction and distance from which to fire its missiles. To do so, it would have to expose itself to detection by the target ship's radar. Starting from the time that the MR aircraft was detected on ship's radar, the question was whether a Sea Harrier (either already airborne on patrol or on deck ready for immediate take off) would be able to shoot down the MR aircraft before it released its missiles or would this only be possible after it had fired its missiles?

After computer assisted analyses of numerous variables, it was jointly agreed that:

• The Sea Harrier's ability to shoot down an enemy MR aircraft before it fired its missiles would be only marginal.

• However, after the anti ship missiles had been fired, the Sea Harrier would always be able to catch up with and shoot down the enemy MR aircraft.

• Not having Sea Harriers at all would give enemy MR aircraft total freedom to fire missiles unhindered and at leisure.

• Having Sea Harriers would unquestionably constrain enemy MR aircraft freedom of action before firing missiles and ensure certain destruction after missile release.

It was clear that in future operations, the primary role of the Sea Harrier would be the air defence of the Fleet, for which it had to have its own radar (to detect and track enemy aircraft) and air-to-air missiles (to shoot down enemy aircraft). For its role of anti ship attack, it would need an anti ship missile. For its role of ground attack, it would need front guns and bombs. An ESM pod would be valuable for specific missions.

The skill and speed of response required of a pilot of an aircraft which can hover in the air, and take off and land vertically are different from, and higher than, those required of a normal fixed wing pilot. After rigorous selection and several months of intensive training on the Air Force's high performance fighter aircraft, the first three pilots went to Britain in 1982.

After nine months of conversion, they underwent eight months Operational Flying Training with the British Navy from April to November 1983 on the aircraft produced for the Indian Navy. The bulk of this training comprised radar interception work and air-to-air combat training. Deck landings were practiced on board the Hermes.

The first three Sea Harriers (603, 604 and 605) took off from Britain on 13th December and, after overnight halts in Malta, Egypt and Dubai, landed at Goa on 16th December. After a brief maintenance period, the first Sea Harrier landed on Vikrant's deck on 20 December 1983.

On 26 January 1984, Sea Harriers participated in the Republic Day Flypast. During the Beating the Retreat ceremony on 29 January 1984, an astonished audience saw a Sea Harrier flown by then Commander (now Admiral and Chief of Naval Staff) Arun Prakash fly gently into Vijay Chowk, stop in hover, turn to face the President, dip its nose in salute, turn away, point skywards and take off with its engines roaring. Everyone was enthralled - the potential of V/STOL aircraft needed no further elaboration.5

Three more Sea Harriers (601, 602 and 606) and the first trainer (651) arrived in 1984. With the arrival of the second trainer (652) in 1985, the delivery of the first batch of eight Sea Harriers was complete.

Lieutenant (now Rear Admiral) Shekhar Sinha was the commissioning QFI of the squadron. He recalls:

Lieutenant (now Rear Admiral) SK Damle completed training in Britain and was in the Sea Harrier Squadron from 1984 to 1989. He recalls:

After operating from the carrier, two problems came into focus that required attention:

• A minimum of one operational aircraft and one trainer was required for training pilots ashore. This left only six aircraft available for embarkation in the aircraft carrier. Since all six could not always be serviceable, more Sea Harriers needed to be acquired.

• Air to air interception was best carried out with the Sea Harrier located below the aircraft to be intercepted. It was essential that the Sea Harrier's radar should display a clear picture when looking forward and upward. The radar fitted in the Sea Harriers displayed sea clutter when looking downwards and this made interception difficult, though an experienced pilot could still effect a successful interception. The next lot of Sea Harriers needed to have a radar free of sea clutter.

Every effort was made to acquire better radar in the next batch of Sea Harriers, but no better radar was available. Waiting for a better radar to be developed conflicted with the Navy's need to acquire additional Sea Harriers as early as possible.

The overall development and delivery cycles of modern high performance aircraft are never in step with the development and delivery cycles of their advanced avionics and weapon systems. This reality affected the combat capability of the batches of Sea Harriers acquired by the Navy. A total of 23 Sea Harriers and 4 Sea Harrier trainers were acquired between 1983 and 1992:

Batch Contracted Fighters Trainers Delivered

From the 'equipment fit' point of view, they could be considered as Batch One and Batch Two.

For the air defence role, these Sea Harriers (equivalent to the British Navy's FRS 1) had the Blue Fox radar, the French Magic Matra close range, air-to-air missile and a tail-warning receiver. For the anti ship / ground attack role, these Harriers could carry 30 mm gun pods, 68 mm rockets in pods, runway denial bombs, cluster bombs and 1,000 pound 'iron' bombs of 1939-45 World War vintage. All weapon release modes were calculated by weapon aiming computers and displayed on head-up symbology.

Due to the British Navy's financial constraints, its FRS 2 Sea Harriers started entering service only in the end 1980s. The replacement for the Blue Fox radar, named Blue Vixen, was still under development. The Navy had to decide whether to delay the induction of the additional Sea Harriers until the better radar was available or to accept the same standard as was fitted in the British Navy's FRS 2s, namely the same Blue Fox radar but now with two types of air-to-air missiles:

• The Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile that had a capability of several tens of kilometres for distant combat, and

• The 'All Aspect Air to Air Missile' for close range combat that enabled attack from all aspects, rather than only from behind the target.

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Benjamin Bathurst of the British Navy recalls:6

In view of these considerations, the improvements in the Indian Navy's Batch Two Harriers delivered between 1989 and 1992 were:

• The Sea Eagle anti ship missile.

• The French Matra Magic Two, All Aspect, Air to Air Missile.

• Wider coverage for the tail radar-warning receiver.

• Photo-reconnaissance pod.

• Associated changes in the weapon aiming computer software.

Of the nineteen Batch Two Sea Harriers, three fighters and one trainer arrived in 1989, eight fighters (607 to 614) and one trainer (653) arrived in 1990, four fighters (616, 617, 620 and 621) arrived in 1991 and the remaining two fighters (618 and 619) arrived in 1992.

For all practical purposes, the sea clutter problem had to be overcome by rigorous training.

Though the first batch of Sea Harriers arrived in India in 1983, the ski jump first became available after Viraat arrived in 1987. Vikrant, after installation of its ski jump, became available only in 1989.

It took some years to complete, satisfactorily, the numerous trials for proving Sea Harrier weapon capability:

Indigenous ECM pods for Sea Harrier successfully tried on MIG 21 1989 Runway penetration bombs and Twin Magic Matra air-to-air missiles Nov 1989 Reconnaissance pods Nov 1989 Sea Eagle air to surface anti-ship missile demonstration firing Apr 1990 Vikrant's ski jump proving trials Apr 1990 500 lb bombs Under trial in 1990 Chaff and flares Under trial in 1990 Runway penetration bombs Procurement held in abeyance due to shortage of foreign exchange

Samples of indigenously manufactured gun ammunition had to be sent to British Aerospace in Britain for EMI/EMC clearance, as had to be done with the 500 lb iron bombs of 1939-45 World War vintage.

The Sea Harrier Simulator was commissioned in the Naval Air Station at Hansa in 1984. It provided ab initio and re-familiarisation training, practicing of emergency procedures, tactical and mission training, accident investigation and validation of mission profiles.

The simulator was upgraded by a Bangalore firm to cater for the Batch Two Sea Harriers and re-commissioned in 1998. The upgradation provided:

• Integration of Blue Fox radar with Sea Eagle and Magic Matra missile delivery capability.

• Day and night visuals.

• Improvements of Electronic Warfare, Record/Replay and IOS features.

Until 1984, the 'basic conversion' and subsequent 'operational' training of Sea Harrier pilots was carried out in Britain. After the first trainer aircraft arrived in 1984, 'operational' training commenced in India. Basic training, however, continued to be carried out in Britain, despite its high cost, because there weren't enough aircraft.

The Batch Two and additional trainer Harriers started arriving in 1989. In 1990, the Sea Harrier Operational Flying Training Unit was formed as a separate unit within the Sea Harrier Squadron (INAS 300), with three Harriers and two trainers, to carry out both 'basic' and 'operational' training. In 1991, this unit was moved to the training squadron as INAS 551 Bravo Flight.

Since 1996, this flight has been functioning, informally, as a supplementary Sea Harrier squadron. In addition to training budding Sea Harrier pilots, the squadron imparts technical on-job-training to tradesmen of frontline and second line servicing units. When required, it augments 300 Squadron with aircraft and aircrew, afloat and ashore.

In 1974, the Navy decided to refurbish the Alizes and extend their life into the 1980s. This decision had been based on four factors:

• The Seahawks were nearing the end of their life. The Sea Harriers were not expected to arrive until the 1980s. If the Alizes were not refurbished, there would no aircraft available to fly from Vikrant.

• NARO had established the capability to undertake maintenance related inspections up to 1,200 hours but not for the mandatory 2,400-hour refurbishing. It would be more economical to undertake this refurbishing in NARO than sending them to France.

• The Alizes had already gone out of production in France and out of service in the French Navy. This would be the last chance to acquire whatever Alize spares were available in France.

• The French Navy's experience in refurbishing its Alizes could be availed of.

A small team was deputed to France to undergo six weeks training. Refurbishing of the first Alize started in 1977 and completed in 1978. The refurbishment programme of the remaining nine aircraft completed in 1982. The extent of refurbishment achieved was:

• Airframe completely refurbished;

• Engine completely overhauled;

• Radar, sonobuoy monitoring system and ESM components changed;

• The navigation system could not be satisfactorily refurbished. It was no longer in production. The French Navy had phased it out. No replacements were available for the worn out mechanical parts, which perforce had to be repaired, refitted and replaced locally in India as best as possible. The Omega Navigation System was evaluated as a possible replacement but its accuracy was found to be short of the requirement.

As a result, even though the Alize airframe, engine and electronics were refurbished by 1982, the inaccuracy of its navigation system degraded the accuracy of its sonobuoy monitoring system.

It also became clear that the Julie system, acquired with great expectations, had been designed for the French Navy's deep water anti submarine operations, where echoes from the sea bottom did not clutter the sonobuoys. In the comparatively shallower waters off the coast of India where anti submarine exercises were generally carried out, the Julie system gave such disappointing results that it went into disuse. This was compounded by the general lack of expertise on the Julie system itself.

Overall, the performance of refurbished Alize radars and ESM improved but the accuracy of the sonobuoy monitoring remained sub optimal. As a result, the Alize's ASW role died out. The last launch of Alizes from Vikrant took place on 2 April 1987. Thereafter they operated only from ashore.

During Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka, a detachment of two Alizes operated from Madurai from February 1988 till October 1989 and flew 1,800 hours in support of the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The aircrew won three Nao Sena Medals, four Mentioned in Despatches, four CNS commendations and twelve commendations by FOCINCEAST.

In November 1988, during Operation Cactus to assist the Government of the Maldives in suppressing an attempted coup, an Alize dropped charges ahead of the rebel's escape vessel, MV Progress Light, to persuade it to stop.

The Alizes stopped flying on 12 April 1991 and the Squadron was decommissioned in August 1991. Five Alizes were left of the total of 14 acquired. During the 30 years of the squadron's service, the Alizes had flown 35,912 hours and done 7,144 deck landings.

Twelve anti submarine Seakings Mk 42 had been acquired between 1971 and 1974, six in 1971 and six in 1974. Of these, four have been lost, leaving eight in service.

On 19 July 1979, the Seaking Flight and Tactical Simulator (FATS) commissioned in Garuda.

Three anti-submarine Seakings Mk 42 A were acquired in 1980. These had been modified for being hauled down on to the flight decks of the 5th and 6th Leanders, Taragiri and Vindhyagiri, using the Recovery, Assist, Secure and Traverse (RAST) system.

Commodore (then Commander) V Ravindranath carried out the first landing trials. He recalls:

After the Canadian Navy, the Indian Navy became the second navy in the world to have the RAST system and the first to operate a helicopter of Seaking size and capabilities from a small ship the size of a Leander.

Of the three Mk 42 As acquired in 1980, one was lost, leaving two in service.

By 1981, the Seakings Mk 42 had been in service for ten years and had begun to age. Replacement ASW helicopters were required not only for Vikrant but also for the Godavari class frigates, each of which was designed to embark two ASW helicopters.

The Navy's staff requirements stipulated both an anti submarine (ASW) and an anti ship (ASV) role. For the anti submarine role, the requirements were for a better dunking sonar, MAD and a LOFAR system to monitor low frequency sonobuoys. For the ASV role, the requirement was for an anti ship missile.

In March 1982, approval was accorded for 20 ASW/ASV helicopters - 6 for INAS 330, 2 for INAS 336, 4 for a new squadron INAS 339, 2 each for Godavari and Gomati and 4 for MRSOW. International tenders were floated. Three contenders were identified:

• An updated version of the British Seaking;

• The Italian Agosta. It transpired that this was the Italian version of the British Seaking; it was therefore excluded from further consideration;

• The French Super Puma.

The comparative evaluation of the British Seaking and the French Super Puma indicated that:

• The Super Puma's fuselage and rotor blades were made of the latest composite material. This was considered to be an advantage because the Seakings acquired in 1971 had to be grounded whenever their nitrogen filled rotor blades leaked. Whilst the Super Puma was not yet operational in any Navy in the ASW role, the ASW equipment being offered for fitment met the Navy's staff requirements and was operational in French MRASW aircraft and their Dauphine helicopters. However, the French could not offer the Exocet anti ship missile with the Super Puma because of a commitment they had given to the Pakistan Navy, when supplying them Exocet anti ship missiles for their Seaking helicopters. Nor were the British agreeable to let their Sea Eagle anti ship missile be released for fitment in the French Super Puma.

• The updated version of the Seaking, named 42 B, was still on the drawing board and none of the avionic systems being offered had yet been proven. On the other hand, the Indian Navy had acquired ten years experience in operating the Seakings and both infrastructure and expertise had built up. The Sea Eagle anti ship missile was available. And the Seaking AEW helicopter, then under development, appeared a promising option to meet the Navy's pressing need for an AEW platform for anti missile defence.

Whilst the choice between the Seaking and the Super Puma was still under discussion, the Navy decided to carry out, in Indian waters, comparative evaluations of the sonars being offered.

Commander (later Commodore) SV Purohit, an experienced Seaking pilot participated in these trials. He recalls:

The Bendix performed better than the HS 12 and the British 195.

There were two competing radars - the French Iguane / Varan pulse compression radars that were operational in the French Navy and the British Mel MAREC 2. The British were not agreeable to put the French radar on the Seaking nor were the French agreeable to fit the British radar in the Super Puma.

The competing sonobuoy systems were the French Lamparo and the British LAPADS, both of which were flying in their respective MRASW aircraft and both of which would require to be miniaturised for fitment in a helicopter.

In the light of the pros and cons of all these options, views became divided, both in the Air Arm and in the Navy, for and against the Seaking and the Super Puma. Eventually, when the choice was made in favour of the Seaking Mk 42 B, there was speculation that the choice had been made on extraneous considerations.

It is more likely, however, that the primary factor was to standardise on Seakings, minimise the cost of additional infrastructure and capitalise on the ten years experience of operating Seakings in India's tropical conditions.

• British Westlands for the helicopters;

• British Rolls Royce for the spare engines;

• British Marconi for the Hermes ESM;

• French Thompson CSF for the HS 12 sonar;

• Italian Whitehead Motofides for the A 244 S torpedo installation.

After the Seaking Mk 42 B was chosen as the basic platform, the software had to be developed to integrate the equipment chosen by the Navy into a Tactical Mission System. Delays started being experienced in developing this software. The Indian team deputed to Britain for inspection and trials helped to develop the software and devised a number of modifications to improve the overall effectiveness of the system. Eventually, when the Seakings Mk 42 B entered service in 1988, two years later than scheduled, they were fitted with:

• Composite fuselage and rotor blades (the development of which had also delayed delivery);

• The French HS 12 dunking sonar;

• The British LAPADS sonobuoy system ;

• The British Sea Eagle anti ship missile;

• The British Hermes ESM system.

Commander Purohit was deputed to Britain as part of the team for the induction of the Seaking Mk 42 Bs. He recalls:

Twenty anti submarine Seakings Mk 42 B were inducted between April 1988 and 1992. These were for the Godavari class frigates and the aircraft carriers Vikrant and Viraat. In the anti ship role, the Mk 42 Bs were capable of firing Sea Eagle anti ship missiles. Of the Mk 42 Bs, three have been lost, leaving seventeen in service.

Each indigenous Landing Ship Tank (Large) was designed to embark two troop-carrying helicopters. In May 1985, sanction was accorded for three Seakings Mk 42 C for the first LST (L). Sanction was also accorded for three Mk 42 Cs for the Marine Commandos defending the offshore oil platforms at Bombay High. These six Seakings Mk 42 C arrived in 1987. All six are in service.

The twin-engine Kamov 25s were acquired for the first three Russian guided missile destroyers ordered in 1975. The first Ka 25 entered service with the commissioning of the guided missile destroyer Rajput in Russia in March 1980. On 11 December 1980, the Kamov helicopter squadron was commissioned at Hansa and designated INAS 333.

A total of seven Ka 25s were inducted starting in October 1979, of which one was lost, leaving six in service.

By 1981, when the contract was signed for the next two guided missile destroyers, the Ka 25s had gone out of production and had been replaced by the Ka 28s. A total of thirteen Ka 28s were inducted starting on 7 July 1986, of which two have been lost, leaving eleven in service.

The French Alouette III light helicopters, productionised by HAL as 'Chetaks', first entered service in 1964.

When this squadron commissioned as INAS 321 on 15 March 1969, it comprised the SAR flights of Vikrant, Hansa, Garuda and Deepak. In subsequent years, flights embarked, whenever required, in:

• The old ships - Trishul and Talwar after they had been fitted with missiles, and in Brahmaputra, Beas and Betwa after conversion to the training role.

• The new ships - cadet training ship Tir, tanker Shakti, survey ships, LST(M)s, offshore patrol vessels (OPVs) and Khukri class corvettes of Project 25.

Since most ships were based in Bombay, embarkations were of short duration. INAS 321 relocated to INS Kunjali in Bombay on 1 August 1980.

In the early 1980s, HAL indicated that they were considering discontinuing the production of Chetak helicopters. Since the production of the replacement ALHs would take considerable time, HAL continued production.

A total of 85 Chetaks had been inducted into the Navy till 2002, of which 19 have been lost, leaving 66 in service.

In 1967, the Government had constituted the Aeronautics Committee to recommend the priorities for self-reliance. In 1969, the Committee recommended that capability should be developed for designing helicopters. In 1970, the Defence Committee of the Cabinet approved the conclusion of a Technical Assistance agreement with the French firm of SNIAS to design, develop and produce an Armed Light Helicopter for the Army, Air Force and Navy as a successor to the Cheetah and the Chetak. The Helicopter Design Bureau was established in 1970.

In 1976, financial sanction was accorded for the development of the single engine helicopter. In 1977, based on the feedback of the Vietnam War and the Arab-Israel conflict, the Air Force recommended to the Helicopter Steering Committee that the ALH should be twin-engined. In 1979, approval was accorded for the twin-engine configuration and the project was renamed as Advanced Light Helicopter.

In 1984, sanction was accorded for the development of the twin engined ALH under technical consultancy of the German firm of Messerschmitt-Bulkow-Blöhm (MBB).7 Each of the three services had estimated its requirement at over a hundred ALHs.

The Navy's staff requirements had envisaged a medium sized helicopter that, within an all up weight of about 5,000 kg, (lighter than the 10,000 kg Seaking but heavier than the Alouette), would permit its role to be changed to carry out anti submarine (ASW), anti ship (ASV), commando carrying (Utility) or Search and Rescue (SAR) missions.

The ASW variant is planned to have sonar, sonics, EW, weather radar, a Tactical Mission System (TMS) and armed with homing torpedoes / depth charges. The ASV version is planned to have fire control radar, EW, TMS and armed with anti ship missiles. The Utility version is planned to have a rescue hoist and the ability for medical evacuation by stretcher, ferry up to 14 personnel, slither commandos, etc.

Commodore Purohit recalls

The system inherited from the British was that the Air Force operated Maritime Reconnaissance MR aircraft for the Navy. The hostilities with Pakistan in 1965 highlighted the inadequacy of this arrangement. In 1966, the Navy recommended to the Government that responsibility for MR and the command and control of shore based MR aircraft be transferred from the Air Force to the Navy. The Air Force was not agreeable and preferred status quo. Cogent reasons were advanced for and against the Navy's proposal.

The Navy's position was that correct recognition of enemy warships at sea and the subsequent co-ordination of tactical action with cooperating surface forces required such extensive training that it was more cost effective for MR aircrews to be naval officers familiar with flying over the sea. It was for this reason that in all the major navies of the world (USA, Russia, Japan, China, France, Germany and Holland), MR aircraft were controlled and operated solely by the Navy. The only exceptions were Britain, India and Australia.

This was because in the early years of the British Air Force at the beginning of the 20th century, MR had been solely an Air Force responsibility. After the 1914-1918 World War, the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force had been formed from the Royal Naval Air Service and was largely manned by naval aviators who had transferred en bloc to the RAF Coastal Command at birth. Naval experience had, therefore, been available to the RAF and it was on this foundation that the RAF Coastal Command had evolved. Commonwealth countries like India and Australia had unquestioningly adopted the British model and in view of the developments in naval warfare, there was no justification for its continuance.

The Air Force position was that in the British Manual of Joint Operations, MR was a joint responsibility, that this system had stood the test of time in Britain and Australia, that there would be greater flexibility in aircraft utilisation if MR remained with the Air Force, (since the aircraft could be used for other roles as well) and that in the 1965 operations, the Air Force had done the best it could to meet the Navy's MR requirement within the inadequate resources available.

After prolonged discussions, it was decided to maintain the status quo. The Air Force was to remain responsible for MR as long as the existing Super Constellation aircraft were in service. The question of command and control of MR would be reviewed when considering the induction of new MR aircraft.

In subsequent years:

• From Pune and Bangalore, the Air Force continued to operate the vintage 1939-45 War Liberators and the Super Constellations airliners phased out by Air India.

• Every major Fleet exercise repeatedly highlighted the number of carrier-launched air strikes that were wasted at sea, time and again, because of mistaken identification. It became clear that the correct identification of ships at sea required extremely high skills of aircrews to distinguish between, and positively identify, own, enemy and neutral ships.

• The Joint Sea Air Warfare Committee evaluated the French Atlantic and the British Nimrod MRASW aircraft.

During the 1971 war, a Pakistan Navy submarine sank the Indian frigate Khukri. After the war, the Navy pressed its requirement for a versatile MRASW aircraft having radar, sonobuoy systems, sensors like magnetic anomaly detector (MAD), and submarine diesel exhaust trail indicator (sniffer), which could rapidly search a probable submarine operating area, locate a surfaced or snorting submarine whilst recharging batteries and with its weapons attack and sink the submarine.

In anti submarine operations, MRASW aircraft, anti submarine helicopters and anti submarine ships are three elements of a mutually supporting system. The high degree of coordinated response by each of these elements to effectively counter submarine evasive action is best achieved when all three elements are naval.

In addition to its primary anti submarine role, this type of aircraft would also meet the Navy's pressing need for maritime reconnaissance.

The Navy, therefore, urged the Government for an early decision to acquire a suitable naval MRASW aircraft. The available options were the British Nimrod, the French Atlantic and the Russian IL 38.

In May 1973, the Government accepted the Navy's reasoning and approved, in principle, the acquisition of four shore-based MRASW aircraft. The rise in oil prices after the Arab-Israel war of October 1973 created a shortage of foreign exchange and ruled out the purchase of either the Atlantic or the Nimrod.

Efforts then focused on obtaining IL 38 MRASW aircraft from Russia. The IL 38 production line was closing down. The Russian Navy was reluctant to spare these aircraft. After persuasion, the Russian side agreed and in February 1975, an agreement was signed for the acquisition of three IL 38s. In June 1975, Government took the decision to vest the command, control and operation of the IL 38s with the Navy.

Shri Govind Narain was the Defence Secretary in 1976. He recalls:

The contract for the IL 38s had been signed in 1975 for delivery in 1977. A large number of aircrew and maintenance personnel had been sent to the Soviet Union to undergo training on the IL 38. In 1976, the Air Force attempted to retrieve the situation. It offered to immediately hand over some of their old Super Constellation MR aircraft to the Navy. The offer had a caveat. Should the Navy not be able to cope with the large multi-engine Super Constellations, then the MR role, along with the Super Constellations and the IL 38s as well should revert to the Air Force.

In 1976, Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) NP Datta was the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff in charge of the Naval Air Arm. He recalls:

Five Super Constellation aircraft of the Air Force's No 6 Squadron at Pune were taken over from the Air Force on 18 November 1976 and designated INAS 312.

Four Super Connies were phased out between April 1981 and September 1983. The fifth aircraft collapsed whilst taxiing out in January 1983.

The squadron was wound down in January 1984 awaiting the arrival of replacements. In due course, the Super Connies were replaced by the Russian TU 142s, which started arriving in 1988.

Three IL 38s arrived in Goa in October 1977. The requirement steadily increased for these aircraft to be available for concurrent MR in the Bay of Bengal and the Arabian Sea, and for concurrent ASW exercises with the Western and Eastern Fleets.

In 1979, the Soviet side was requested to supply five more IL 38s. Their response was that the aircraft were going out of production and that the Indian side should indicate their requirements of what their replacements should have. The Navy indicated that the requirement was for longer endurance at longer range.

Since the three ILs in service fell due for major overhaul in Russia at the same time, the Soviet side was again urged to release five ILs from their Navy. Eventually, a contract was signed in May 1981 for two more IL 38s and these aircraft joined the squadron in 1983.

A total of 5 IL 38s had been inducted into the Navy, of which 2 have been lost, leaving 3 in service.

In 1981, in response to the Navy's requirement for MRASW aircraft having longer endurance at longer range, the Soviet side stated that they would not be able to supply new aircraft but would examine the possibility of providing refurbished TU 142 aircraft from their existing fleet.

The Navy was hesitant about the TU because its much larger size, much heavier weight and different equipment would require the runways to be upgraded and extended and maintenance facilities to be augmented. The Navy, therefore, pressed for three of the IL 38s being phased out of the Russian Navy to be refurbished. The Russian side was unable to do this. Eventually, an agreement was signed in December 1984 for the acquisition of eight TUs.

A total of 40 pilots and observers, 16 technical officers and 128 sailors underwent twelve months training in batches at Riga commencing May 1987. On completion of training, these personnel were sub-divided specialisation-wise and appointed to man the squadron, the Base Maintenance Facility at Goa and the Naval Air Technical School at Kochi. Four sets of aircrew were trained.

On 30 March 1988, the first three TU 142 M aircraft took off from Simferopol in the Crimean peninsula and arrived at Goa after a non-stop flight. Two more aircraft arrived on 13th April.

The squadron was commissioned at Hansa on 16th April and designated INAS 312. The remaining three aircraft arrived between August and October 1988.

In May 1992, the squadron relocated to the new naval air station INS Rajali at Arkonam on the east coast of India.

In the early 1980s, consideration commenced of the indigenous production of a 'Light Transport Aircraft', the LTA, to meet the needs of the Air Force, the Navy, the Coast Guard and of Vayudoot, the feeder airline for Indian Airlines. The concept was to have a common airframe and a common engine and fit it with equipment to suit the needs of individual customers. Each service had given its basic staff requirements. The Navy gave its requirements in terms of endurance and sensor loads.

Four aircraft were evaluated. The British Islander, the German Dornier, the Italian Casa and the American Twin Otter. The Dornier did not meet the Air Force needs. The Navy, the Coast Guard and Vayudoot found that the Dornier best met their needs. The Dornier was chosen for production at HAL Kanpur.

The evaluation of the productionised version, called Dornier 228, was done in Germany. The Navy envisaged the Dorniers as replacements for the Alizes in INAS 310.

In 1986, sanction was accorded for the Navy to acquire 10 Dorniers (3 for observer training, 4 for surveillance and 3 as MRSOW) equipped with radar and air-to-surface missiles. Sanction was also accorded for 4 Dorniers, funded by the Ministry of Petroleum, equipped only with radar and IFF transponders (similar to the Coast Guard version) for the surveillance around the offshore oil assets of Bombay High.

The drought of 1986 led to financial stringency and for the next few years, no foreign exchange could be released to HAL for the Dornier's radars and missiles. HAL postponed the delivery of the Dorniers to 30 months after the release of foreign exchange. Eventually, orders were placed in 1990 on HAL for one 'fly-away' Naval Dornier and 4 Dorniers for Bombay High in which the radars would be retrofitted.

The naval air station at Port Blair was commissioned as INS Utkrosh on 11 May 1984.

By the early 1980s, the Navy's infrastructure development plan for shore facilities had crystallised under five broad headings.

In 1972, there was a sharp increase in the requirement for Observer officers. The Air Force was unable to accommodate the Navy's needs. Experience had also shown that the purely navigation oriented training being imparted by the Air Force to naval Observers had to be supplemented by sorties over the sea. A proposal was initiated to acquire a suitable aircraft for training Observer officers, for coastal reconnaissance and for Fleet requirements.10

After comparative evaluation of available options, the British made, piston-engined, propeller-driven Islander (BN2A) was chosen. The first two Islanders arrived in Cochin and joined INAS 550 on 18 May 1976. The remaining three arrived by end 1976.

In 1981, two Islanders of INAS 550 were based at Port Blair for the surveillance of the A&N Islands. In 1984, these were commissioned as INAS 318 when the naval air station at Port Blair was commissioned as INS Utkrosh. Two more Islanders were procured for INAS 550 in Kochi. In end 1996, six 2T variant Islanders were acquired for INAS 550.

In May 2000, an Islander Flight was positioned at Dega.

A total of 17 Islanders had been inducted into the Navy, of which 4 have been lost, leaving 13 in service.

The Vampires were phased out by 1976. In 1978, the last of the Seahawks was returned to INAS 300.

Eight Kirans Mk II (the armed version) ex HAL Bangalore joined the squadron between July 1987 and February 1988. These aircraft are used for training jet pilots for the frontline squadron, for meeting fleet requirements like anti aircraft tracking practices and for consolidation flying of staff pilots.

A total of 23 Kirans had been inducted into the Navy, of which 9 have been lost, leaving 14 in service.

In December 1990, INAS 551 B was established as an independent Sea Harrier Training Squadron at Goa. This unit began undertaking the ab initio conversion on Sea Harrier aircraft and relieved 300 Squadron of this commitment.

By 1978, an acute shortage had built up in the Observer Cadre. Several factors had contributed to this shortage:

• The steady rise in demand. From manning only Alizes from 1961 onwards, new manning requirements had arisen for Observers to man Seakings in 1970, the Islanders in 1975, the IL 38s in 1976, and the Kamovs in 1978. Also, the increase in night flying (in Goa by IL 38s and in Cochin by the Seakings) required more Observers in the naval air stations.

• The Air Force was unable to train the additional observers required by the Navy. Islander aircraft were acquired to enable the Navy to train its observers.

• The duration of observer training had to be increased to cover specific naval requirements of practical training in ASW and maritime surveillance.

• A shortage of volunteers, caused by a perception that career prospects in the Observer cadre were not as good as in other cadres.

• Even though the strength of trainees per course was doubled from 3 to 6, the attrition during their rigorous training was 1 to 2 officers per course.

By the early 1980s, the Navy's requirements of pilots exceeded what the Air Force was willing to train. The Navy started considering undertaking the ab initio training of its pilots in Cochin. The trainer aircraft evaluated were HAL's HPT 36 and the Russian MIG trainers being considered by the Air Force. It transpired that the Air Force required all the HPT 36s that HAL could produce and had dropped consideration of the MIG trainer. Without a trainer aircraft, there was no way that the Navy could train its pilots. It continued to train its pilots with the Air Force.

By 1979, the diversity of aircraft and helicopters in naval service had increased substantially. Ashore, Super Constellations, IL 38s, Kirans and Islanders had entered service. On board ships, there were Seakings in Vikrant, Seaking Mk 42 As in Taragiri and Vindhyagiri, Kamovs in the Rajput class destroyers, MATCH in the earlier Leanders and Chetaks in a number of ships. The demand on skills of aircrew varied from aircraft to aircraft.

It was decided to establish a Board that would periodically categorise the professional knowledge of aircrew, on lines similar to what was being done by the Air Force's Aircrew Examination Board (AEB). Establishing standard procedures and yardsticks by which professional merit could be assessed and graded, would help to improve professionalism, aircrew motivation and individual career development. A naval team studied the Air Force AEB system, reoriented it towards naval operational requirements and formulated a standard syllabus, procedure and assessment system for grading each category of aircrew - pilots, observers, flight engineers, flight signallers, aircrew divers and air traffic control officers.

The Aircrew Categorisation and Standardisation Board (AIRCATS) was established in 1983 and based at Goa. Their primary duty was to carry out aircrew categorisation and standardisation and conduct Flight Safety Inspection of all units once in a year.

In subsequent years, AIRCATS fully met the objectives for which it had been set up.

By the mid 1980s, the inter-service pilot exchange programme had stabilised as follows:

Vikrant underwent a short 6-month refit in 1991 and was operational for 10 months. She underwent a 14-month refit from 1992 to 1994 and was operational flying Sea Harriers, Seakings and Chetaks until her final sea outing on 23 November 1994.

In January 1995, NHQ directed that Vikrant be kept 'Safe to Float' and that no further refit/dry docking be planned. She was laid up until she was decommissioned on 31 January 1997.

During her refit in Britain prior to commissioning in 1987, Viraat's underwater hull had been shot blasted and coated with the latest special long-life paint so that she would not require bottom cleaning for at least five years. It had also been decided that until the new graving dock was commissioned in Bombay, Viraat would be docked in Cochin Shipyard.

The first docking of Viraat in 1991 was followed by a second short docking in 1995 for repairs. She underwent refit and modernisation from 1999 to 2001. Phase I Medium Refit and Dry Docking at Cochin Shipyard lasted from May 1999 to November 2000. The modernisation Phase II at Naval Dockyard Bombay lasted till April 2001.

Except for these docking and refit periods, Viraat was operational throughout and participated in Fleet exercises.

The 44,500 tonne, steam propelled Gorshkov is the second of the series of three aircraft carriers, Minsk, Baku (renamed Gorshkov) and Ulganov built to succeed the Kiev class carriers. Baku had commissioned in 1987, served in the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and later in Russia's Northern Fleet. She was operational until 1996.

After the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia started downsizing its Navy due to financial constraints, the Russian side offered the Gorshkov to India, along with MIG 29 K aircraft developed specifically for carrier borne operations.11 The acquisition of Gorshkov formed part of the joint Indo-Russian Protocol on Military Technical Cooperation signed in December 1994. The financial aspects were unusual - Gorshkov 'as is, where is' would be free; India need only pay for the cost of refit and the aircraft.

As had been done in the case of Viraat, the Navy thoroughly examined Gorshkov's material state, assessed the magnitude of the modernisation and refit that would be required and identified the essential requirements of new equipment, weapons and systems.

The Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR) MiG 29 K aircraft to be acquired with the Gorshkov would, like the Sea Harriers, take off from a ski jump and land, like the Sea Hawks, by hooking on to arrestor wires.

In January 2004, the agreement was signed for the acquisition of the Gorshkov and its aircraft.12 The ship was to undergo a four and a half year refit in which she would be extensively refitted and nearly 80% of her equipment replaced with modern equivalents. Expected to commission in 2008, she would serve the Navy for over two decades, during which period the indigenous Air Defence Ship should enter service.

Approval was accorded in 2000 for the Air Defence Ship (ADS) to be built in Kochi Shipyard. The acquisition of the STOBAR MIG 29 K aircraft with the Gorshkov removed the grey area of the type of aircraft that this ship should be designed for. Meanwhile, development is continuing of the navalised version of the Air Force's Light Combat Aircraft (LCA). The naval LCA, like the MIG 29 K would be a STOBAR aircraft. Its operation from both the Gorshkov and the ADS would enable cross-operation.

By 1992, the last of the Sea Harriers ordered in the 1980s had arrived. Thereafter, all the earlier Sea Harriers were upgraded in India to Batch 2 standard.

Further improvements were also approved. These included better indigenous radar warning receivers, self- protection jammers, Global Positioning System (GPS), etc.

Efforts continue to acquire affordable pulse doppler radars, longer range 'Beyond Visual Range' air to air missiles and 'smart' data links.

As replacements for the aircraft lost, an order was placed for two-second hand, ex British Navy, Sea Harrier trainer aircraft. These arrived in early 2003.

The IL 38s and TU 142s acquired in the 1980s continued to meet the Navy's requirements. Until replacements could be identified and acquired, it was planned to extend the life of both these types of aircraft as long as possible.

The first naval Dornier from HAL joined INAS 310 on 24 August 1991. The second Dornier arrived later in 1991 and the next two in 1992. The fifth Dornier was delivered fitted with the Super Marec (maritime reconnaissance) radar. In subsequent years, the remaining Dorniers were retrofitted with this radar during their major inspections by HAL Kanpur.

For the coastal reconnaissance role, ten more Dorniers were acquired, in addition to the five acquired earlier. These Dorniers were progressively fitted with ESM, GPS and sonobuoy systems for the surveillance, ASW and EW roles.

By 2002, the Navy had acquired a fleet of 15 Dorniers.

The Seakings acquired in the 1970s were phased out as they reached the end of their useful life.

The Seakings MK 42 B, acquired in the 1980s continued to perform well. By 2000, the need was felt for more such helicopters and evaluations commenced for their successors.

The Kamov 25 continued to operate from the first three destroyers Rajput, Rana and Ranjit. Its successor, the Kamov 28, continued to operate in the next two destroyers Ranvir and Ranvijay. It was larger than the Kamov 25 and too big to fit into the Kamov 25 hangars.

The ALH has emerged as a multi role helicopter in the 4.5 to 5.5 tonne weight class, designed and developed by HAL to meet the specific needs of different customers like the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the Coast Guard and civilian organisations like ONGC, Pawan Hans etc. Its advanced technologies include the Integrated Dynamic System, Hingeless Main Rotor, Bearingless Tail Rotor, 4-axis Automatic Flight Control System, Full Authority Digital Electronic Control System and 6-axis Anti Resonant Isolation System.

The first flight of the Army / Air Force prototype flew in 1994 and that of the Navy in 1995. Series production started in 1996 and deliveries commenced in 2002.

At the time of writing, delivery to the Navy of the Utility variant ALHs has commenced. Deliveries of the ASW variant are expected to commence in 2005 and of the ASV variant in 2007.

With the advent of anti ship missiles in the 1970s, a clear operational need had emerged for the Navy to have airborne early warning aircraft. This would increase the reaction time required for dealing with hostile platforms before they came close enough to our own force to fire their missiles.

Large rotodome fitted aircraft, of the type the Americans and the Russians had, were neither available nor affordable. An indigenous R&D project to fit a rotodome on an Avro aircraft was unsuccessful.

The Navy pinned its hopes on acquiring AEW helicopters that were then under development. The British Seaking MK 42 D turned out to be too expensive. The Russian Kamov 31 was preferred and negotiations were concluded for their acquisition. Four KA 31s were inducted in early 2003.

With the increasing number of helicopters on board the ships based in Bombay, it became necessary to have a helipad area from where helicopters could continue flying when ships were alongside. In view of its proximate location, INS Kunjali became the Navy's helicopter base in Bombay.

For similar reasons, a naval air station was commissioned at Vishakhapatnam as INS Dega on 21 October 1991.

The fifth naval air station, on the east coast of India, commissioned in 1992 as INS Rajali.