Transition To Eminence The Indian Navy 1976-1990-
Author: Unknown
Date: 2022-02-10T00:10:31+00:00

Vice Admiral GM Hiranandani (Retdo pvsm, avsm, rm, phd

A N EQUIDISTANT M A P OF THE W O R L D C EN TR E D ON DELHI

SHOWING

TRUE BEARINGS & DISTANCE

FROM DELHI

Scale 1 : 45 5 00 000

Projection : Lambert Azimuthal Equidistant

(Oblique Aspect)

O R IG IN : D E L H I

Latitude 28°35’N

Longitude 77°13’E

\

\

Read off the value on the graduated circle to get

° * » . Dehra Dun.

the true bearing to the nearest degree, of well

K.R. Srinrvasan. A V S M F IS Chief

° f R e 3r Admiral
known places radially from Delhi.

Government of incfa ' S ‘ C h'ef " ^ W h e r to the Examples True bearings from Delhi to

© Government of India Copyright. 2003

San Francisco, Tokyo, Cape Town and Moscow
are 015°, 065°, 226°, and 325°, respectively.

Transition
to

Eminence

The Indian Navy 1976-1990

Also on sale at www.bharat-rakshak.com/BOOKS

First published in India by

Lancer Publishers & Distributors

K - 36A (FF) Green Park Main, New Delhi-110016
lancerindia@vsnl.net

All rights reserved

© Director Personnel Services (DPS)

Naval Headquarters, New Delhi, 2005

ISBN 81 7062 266 2

N o part o f this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system.or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the prior permission o f the publisher. T h e contents, opinions and other materials in the context of the book are the individual assertions and opinion o f the Author and the Publishers do not take any responsibility for the sam e in any manner whatsoever.

T h e same shall solely be the responsibility o f the author/copyright owner. All disputes arising out o f the publication o f the book shall be the subject matter o f jurisdiction o f Delhi Courts only. Printed at Sona Printers, N e w D elh i.

“The heights by great men reached and kept,

Were not attained by sudden flight;

But they, while their companions slept,

Were toiling upwards in the night” .

This volume is dedicated to all those great men and women, in India and abroad, who helped India’s Navy to achieve what it did
as much as it is dedicated to the not-so-great, but nevertheless very
industrious, innovative and loyal officers, sailors and civilians of the Navy who too never desisted from toiling in the night whenever the occasion demanded

^■sfiuci ar^rrf

W TT^TeFT
f t to, 4

^ ^ ^ ^

■Q=FT^cT "g^T^T

^ fe fr-110011

Integrated Headquarters

A dm iral A run Prakash

Ministry of Defence (Navy)

PVSM, AVSM, VrC, VSM, ADC

New Delhi-110011

C h ie f o f the Naval Staff

'V ☆ ★

Foreword

In keeping with the endeavour to preserve our naval tradition for posterity, Naval Headquarters are pleased to bring out the fourth volume in a series that document the Indian Navy s history. This one entitled, most appropriately, Transition to Eminence covers the period 1976-1990, which saw our Service emerge as a navy of substance.

The term “eminence” has been used in the title by the author with deliberation. In addition to significant deployment of India’s maritime power in Sri Lanka and Maldives, this period was epochal, due as much to a series of remarkable innovations by our ship designers and builders, as to a farsighted submarine, aircraft and ship acquisition programme. All of these were to have a significant impact on the regional balance of power.

Nothing symbolises this era better than the “Tim e” magazine issue dated 3rd April 1989, which carried on its cover, the caption “Super India” . The purport of this hyperbolic declaration was that the world had begun to take note of India as an emerging power. Su ch is the sym bolism of maritime power, that to substantiate this statement, the cover was illustrated with an im posing photograph of the indigenous but hybrid IN S Godavari, bristling with S S M launchers!

In VAdm GM Hiranandani, the author of this volume, we are extremely fortunate to have an indefatigable researcher, who has taken great pains to unearth and record with diligence, historical facts in minute detail.

W hile giving us the benefit of his incisive analysis, he has avoided being judgmental, and in the best tradition of historians, left the reader to largely draw his own conclusion. We are indeed indebted to him for his labours.

Certain m easures have been initiated by N H Q to institutionalise historical record-keeping, and it is my earnest hope that this volum e and its predecessors will now become part of a continuum of the Indian Navy’s recorded history.

4 Decem ber 2004

New Delhi

Acknowledgements

During the years of research that have led up to this volume, 1 have incurred many debts of gratitude.

Much of this volume is based on interactive interviews with personages who were directly involved with the events between 1976 and 1990. I am grateful to all the senior officers, service and civilian, and friends and colleagues who spared time to interact and share their insights.

1 am indebted to the many libraries in India and abroad for extending their facilities and also to the authors, their publishers and other institutions from whose works 1 have quoted excerpts to present overviews of events. Credits have been given in the footnotes. Every effort has been made to contact copyright holders. The author and the publishers will be grateful for misquotes, errors and omissions to be brought to their attention.

The maps have been prepared by the National Hydrographic Office. 1 am grateful to the Chief Hydrographer, Rear Admiral KR Srinivasan (recently retired), and to Commander Suryajit S Kandal to whom this task was assigned and to his team of cartographers for preparing the maps so meticulously.

The photographs have been culled from naval archives and the personal collection of Commander Srikant Sharma of NHQ’s Directorate of Personal Services. I am indebted to him for his support and advice on the technical as well as photographic aspects.

The staffs of the Naval History Cell and the Naval History Project put in considerable effort to help sort and compile source material. Petty Officer Writers Mangal Singh and K Vijayan, the Leading Writers and the civilian stenographers worked tirelessly to transcribe interview tapes and to prepare the manuscript of this volume. I am grateful to them all.

I am particularly grateful to Naval Headquarters for providing all assistance very graciously and to the Directorates of Administration and Personal Services.

Many, many more who have not been mentioned individually, have helped. My grateful and heartfelt thanks to all of them.

My special thanks go to my wife, son, daughter and brother-in-law - to my son Manik for his support during my research in Europe and the US; to my wife Susheel, daughter Meera and my retired naval brother-in-law Captain Vijay Ramchandani for their advice on how to make the text understandable for both the lay reader and the naval scholar- and most of all to my wife for tolerating so patiently the long hours that the writing of history entails. The full extent of what I owe to my wife is immeasurable.

Preface

Preamble

Junior officers started losing touch with their senior

The history of the Indian Navy covering the period 1976 to
officers. Senior sailors started losing touch with their junior

1990 is fascinating for several reasons. This period laid the officers. Junior sailors started losing touch with their senior foundation for its emergence as the eminent Navy of the sailors. The edifice of leadership and man management South Asian region.

came under strain. The expectation that seminars, lectures
and management nostrums would relieve the strain turned

The international competition to sell arms’ presented out to be a mirage. Overall, there was a rise in cynicism.

the Navy with the opportunity to acquire the latest
technology from both the Soviet Gnion and the West,

The Navy owes a great deal to that handful of senior
indigenise through transfer of technology and increase self officers who were able to rise above this state of affairs.

reliance. New technologies drove innovation in indigenous By their upright stand on contentious issues and their deft shipbuilding concepts, in tactical doctrines, in personnel management of slender naval budgets, they were able to policies and in maintenance, refit and logistic procedures.

lay strong foundations for the future Navy.

In the preceding decade, the transition had been from

To give the reader a quick overview, the key sections of

British acquisitions to Russian acquisitions, from guns to this volume have been summarised below. This will allow missiles, from steam propulsion to gas turbines and from the reader to choose areas of interest at will, while saving analogue to digital electronics.

the rest for more leisurely reading.

Between 1976 and 1990, the transition was qualitatively

Towards Eminence
different. A whole generation of ingenious middle rank Eminence is contextual. This section provides an overview officers had developed the skills to probe suppliers as to of the growth of the Navy between 1976 and 1990. It the whys and wherefores of what was being offered. There provides also a perspective of why, since the 14th century, was effervescence in tactical and technical thought. There more than one foreign power has sought to dominate the was sharper focus on how effectively the new systems Indian Ocean and how motives and manipulations have would meet operational requirements and how they would remained unchanged over the centuries.

perform in tropical conditions.

Overview of the Growth of the Navy 1976 to 1990

Specialist teams mushroomed - Weapon Testing
and Tuning Teams, Sonar Evaluation Teams, Harbour During this period, the Navy’s growth was affected by three Acceptance Trials, Sea Acceptance Trials, Workup Teams, crises, each of which delayed the import of naval equipment Weapon Analysis Gnits, Tactical Committees, Tactical and the implementation of approved projects.

Evaluation Groups, Machinery Testing and Tuning Teams,

The first crisis followed the 1973 Arab-Israel war when

Diesel Testing and Tuning Teams, Gas Turbine Testing and the price of oil rose very sharply. The second crisis from Tuning Teams, Ship Maintenance Authority - the list was

1987 onwards originated from the failure of the monsoon
endless. Every working level strove to obtain and sustain in 1986 and the prolonged drought and financial austerity peak performance.

that ensued.

This pressure to keep abreast of technological change

Many of the Navy’s ships, submarines and aircraft were
generated stresses. It besieged the time-tested importance of Soviet origin. The third crisis started in the late 1980s of leadership and shifted the priority to technical ability. when the Soviet Gnion started re-structuring its economy, Except for a few who had the insight to sense what was freeing its industry from centralised control, requiring happening and ‘manage’ the change, the remainder sailed factories to become financially self sustaining by charging on dutifully, doing their best to cope with technology.

international prices and requiring payment in dollars. The

It became habitual to theorise about the peripheral deliveries of Soviet equipment and spares were disrupted.

relevance of naval traditions when compared to mastering It took some years to restore normalcy, partly because technology, to complain about the inadequate quality o

India herself was going through a financial crisis.

intake, to bemoan the slump in discipline, to critic's^ * e
tempo of acquisitions and to attribute the adverse effects
on morale to all these external factors.

Almost every war in Europe bred a contest between

Viewed in retrospect, these crises were, for the Navy, the armed merchantmen of the ‘East India Companies’, a blessing in disguise. Though they were a cause for supported whenever necessary by their national navies.

concern at the time, they compelled the Navy to innovate, These naval contests were essentially to safeguard to develop indigenous substitutes and to make better use economic well-being. The profit of their company underlay of its resources.

each nation’s geo-economic interest in the Indian Ocean

External Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean
and determined foreign policy.

Over the past 600 years, naval power has invariably come

Today, the rationale is no different. American and
from outside the Indian Ocean — the Chinese in the 15

European oil companies have extensive investments
century, the Portuguese in the 16th century, the Dutch, the in Persian Gulf oil whose importance for their economy English and the French in the 17th and 18th centuries. The
compels the deployment of their navies in the Indian

British predominance in the 19th century lasted until the

Ocean.

middle of the 20th century after which the United States
took over.

Over the centuries, in almost all cases, the greed of

Company employees defrauded Company profits. This led

Neither motives nor manipulations have changed for to the taking over of each Company by its Government and non-regional countries to maintain their naval presence in the conversion of the territory over which it exercised trade the Indian Ocean. In the earlier centuries, the Europeans
monopoly into a colony. The colony gradually became the
needed oriental aromatics, textiles and spices. In the 21st source of raw materials for the factories being spawned century, the world needs Persian Gulf oil.

in Europe’s 18th century Industrial Revolution. In turn, the

The Europeans did not enter the Indian Ocean to acquire
colony became a cosseted market for the products of its
territory. They were in search of a cheaper sea route to
colonial ruler’s factories. The responsibility for the security
carry oriental commodities to Europe.1 Since monopoly of distant colonies passed from each Company’s armed increased profits, the early Europeans were monopolists.

merchantmen to each nation’s Navy. Mutually expedient

They were not imperialists. Empire came later, as a
political and naval alliances between the colonising powers
safeguard for monopoly.

safeguarded their maritime trade from disproportionate
depletion.

The long sailing expeditions from Europe to the Indian

Ocean had to be financed by what is known today as

After Europe’s Napoleonic wars ended with the Congress

Venture capital’ and were expected to provide a ‘return on of Vienna in 1815, Britain became the world’s predominant investment’. Whilst the Portuguese expeditions were partly naval power. By the middle of the 19th century, India became a royal monopoly and partly financed by merchants, the the hub and the centre-piece of British power in Asia.3

‘East India Companies’ set up by the Dutch, the English

To cope with threats to India from landward, Afghanistan
and the French were private trading companies, started
and Tibet were crafted into buffer states between Tsarist
and financed by rich merchants under ‘charters’ granted

Russia and Manchu China.

by their governments.

India’s first war of independence in 1857 compelled

In their competition to secure monopoly rights in the Britain to formally take over the governance of India and highly profitable, well established intra-Indian Ocean textile
disestablish its East India Company.

and spice trade, these mercantile trading companies
found that by selectively taking sides in internecine feuds

Britain’s Navy assumed strategic responsibility for the
between local Asian rulers, they could progressively Indian Ocean. It developed naval bases where its warships acquire exclusive trading rights in territories which could could refuel (initially with coal and later with oil), replenish be supported from the sea.2 Soon, it became worthwhile fresh water and provisions, carry out essential maintenance for them to set up private local armies and arm their ships and be docked without having to return all the way to to assist the success of their proteges.

Britain.

1. Caravan transportation by the Central Asian ‘Silk Route' had become expensive because of the tolls imposed by the Ottoman Turks who straddled these routes.

2' ln‘er" ecine feudir’9 and squabbling is a universal facet of human nature. It led to the endless wars for empire between the dynasties of Europe. It led also to the colonisation of Asia, Africa and the Americas.

v

3. See Reference Note No 2, page 410.

X/TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

The base in:

controlled:

In the background of the Cold War and to safeguard

Simonstown (South Africa) the choke point around the Cape of
against interruptions in the flow of Persian Gulf oil, the United

Good Hope.

States leased the island of Diego Garcia from Britain.7 The

Aden
the choke point at the southern Soviet Gnion countered by deploying ships to the Indian entrance to the Red Sea and traffic Ocean. With the winding down of the Cold War in the end through the Suez Canal.

1980s, the Soviet Navy withdrew, leaving the US Navy as the

Bahrain
the sea lane through the Persian predominant naval power which it remains to this day.

Gulf.

Trincomalee (Ceylon)

In the 1990s, two economically resurgent nations
the sea lane across the Morth Indian

Ocean.

emerged in the Orient - India in the South Asian region
and China in the East Asian region. Despite their differing

Singapore
the choke point at the southern profiles, the Navies of both nations have come to be entrance to the Straits of Malacca.

regarded with respect.

The core of British naval strategy was to prevent rival

Today, global interest in the Indian Ocean centres on the
powers from establishing a naval base in the Indian oil and gas resources of the Persian Gulf. Nations whose Ocean - without access to a friendly base, no hostile economies are critically dependant on the uninterrupted warship could operate in this oceanic expanse for any flow of this oil have a strong interest in ensuring that this length of time.

region does not fall under the sway of states potentially

During the 1914-18 World War, raids by the German hostile to their well-being. There is basis also for unease, cruiser Emden sank merchant ships and generally particularly where international straits are located. The paralysed shipping in the North Indian Ocean.4

Straits of Hormuz, of Bab el Mandeb, of Malacca, and the

Mozambique Channel are zones where the seaways narrow

During the 1939-45 World War, Japan occupied India’s to an extent that makes it easy for amorphous ‘non-state’

Andaman and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal. entities to dislocate the movement of tankers carrying Japanese air power, both shore based and aircraft carrier petroleum products and ships carrying high value cargo.

based, inflicted heavy losses on British warships off

India’s geo-strategic significance is evident from the

Singapore, Colombo and Trincomalee and forced the Equidistant Map of the World Centred on Delhi. India British Fleet to withdraw to Madagascar off the east coast encounters Russia and China in the north, the Persian Gulf of Africa.5
in the west and Southeast Asia in the east. In the North

After each of these two ‘World Wars’ of the 20th century, Indian Ocean extending from the coast of Africa to the earlier empires dissolved. The victors created new nationcoast of Malaysia, India is the largest, stable, respected, states.. After the second of these wars, colonies obtained multi-ethnic democracy. It does not have any overseas independence and two powers emerged to contest for territorial interests. It has a modem efficient Army, Navy global ideological dominance - the (Jnited States of and Air Force. It is accepted as a rising world power having America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.6
the potential for a larger regional role in the years ahead.8

During the Cold War that lasted from 1947 (immediately

Today, bilateral agreements foresee cooperation in
after the 1939-45 War ended) until 1991 (when the Soviet protecting the sea lines of communication. Navies of the Union fragmented), new conglomerations were shaped under United States, Russia, France, Britain, Southeast Asian the headship of these two powers. In the mid 1960s, Britain and Indian Ocean countries look forward, just much as the announced its decision to gradually withdraw from the Indian Indian Navy does, to holding joint exercises and building Ocean, in step with the United States taking over.

bridges of friendship.

See Reference Note No 3, page 411.

See Reference Note No 5, page 413.

. . r-
rnr fhp welfare of the underclass of ‘workers' and ‘peasants’ had led to the emergence of the In the 19th century, Iliberal^‘Communism’ which advocated ‘class war’ between the ‘exploiting capitalist class' and the ‘exploited working class'.

TWs set th^Lage fo^the 20,h century's global ideological confrontation between 'the rich, imperialist, capitalist, colonising, exploiting classes’ and the ‘exploited worker/peasant and poor/colonised classes.

, f

^

. „ ^
thP Indian Ocean Diego Garcia’s huge protected anchorage gave it the potential of a ship, submarine and air base. The Located in the middle of
a

Mauritius and thereby removed all possibility of political agitation.

island s sparse plantation labour was reiocaieu

. . . . . .

,,

.

.

.

, ,

.. fnri 1<;

:ts interests in South Asia. Over the longer term, India is regarded as a more stable and regional 8. "The GS increasingly regards Ind.a as t
h
e
lnternational ,nsUtute for Strategic Studies, London)

partner". (Excerpt from the Strategic Survey

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XI

systems better suited to India’s tropical climate conditions

Towards Self Reliance
and maximising indigenous content.

Eminence is relative. Between 1976 and 1990, India s

The outstanding naval R & D project of this period was

Navy grew to be the largest and strongest in South Asia.

the APSOH sonar, specially designed for hot and humid

The acquisitions from abroad synergised with innovations tropical conditions and proved at sea in Indian waters for in warship design and production.

a full year during extensive trials. Its derivatives continue to

Innovation in Warship Design and Indigenous R & D
be fitted in the Navy’s latest ships, twenty years after it was
first developed. Less spectacular, but equally important

The period 1976-90 was lively and exciting, both for R & D developments for the Navy were the ongoing innovation in design and for self reliance.

development, and improvement, of the sensors, weapons

New ships entered service at a brisk pace, along with their systems and munitions already in service.

new sonars, radars, electronic warfare systems, missiles,
torpedoes, propulsion and power generation systems. Few The Air Arm
navies could have been so fortunate as to acquire at the There were numerous developments in the Naval Air Arm same time such a wide variety of technologically modern during the fifteen years between 1976 and 1990.

equipment. The Navy’s gifted young officers grasped the
opportunity. The results, in the areas of ‘Warship Design

A second aircraft carrier, Viraat, and a wide variety of and Production and of ‘Research & Development’, were aircraft and helicopters equipped with the latest sensors beyond expectations.

and weapons were acquired.

By bold improvisations, Russian, European and

Vikrant underwent two modernisations, in preparation
indigenous systems and equipment were successfully for embarking the new Sea Harrier fighter aircraft and the integrated and installed in Indian hulls. This process new Mk 42 B Seaking A SW helicopters.

started in 1976, when the entire missile and close-range
gun system of a 200-tonne Russian missile boat was

The maritime reconnaissance’ role was transferred
disconnected and re-installed in a 15-year old British anti from the Air Force to the Navy in 1976 with the taking submarine frigate along with the latest Italian electronic over of the Air Force Super Constellations. The acquisition warfare systems, thereby giving the Fleet an ocean-going,
in 1977 of the M RASW Ilyushin (IL) 38s from the Soviet
missile-warfare-capable frigate.

Gnion marked the rebirth of the shore-based arm of naval
aviation.10 In due course, the longer range and better

A few years later, it was decided to fit the entire missile and equipped Long Range Maritime Patrol Tupolev (TG) 142s gun system, identical to that of the latest 800-tonne Russian replaced the Super Connies.

rocket boats9 then being acquired, along with indigenous
and European equipment, in a hull design evolved from

The combat capability of the Air Arm leapfrogged from
the preceding Leander class frigates. The outcome was the the technology of the 1950s to that of the 1980s: three Godavari class frigates of the 1980s.

• The new sensors were the dunking sonars and

Once the intricacies had been mastered of interfacing
sonobuoys in the Russian Kamov and British Seaking
electrical and electronic equipment, regardless of their
helicopters, and the Russian IL and TG maritime aircraft,
origin, voltage and frequency, there was no looking back.

the Magnetic Anomaly Detectors in the Russian ILs and

Kamovs, the electronic warfare systems in the British

Appreciative of the success of Indian innovation, the

Mk 42 B Seakings and Sea Harriers and the Russian ILs

Russians offered their latest weapon systems for the series
and TGs, and the modern radars in all these aircraft and
of ships that followed - the 1500-tonne missile corvettes
helicopters.

of the Khukri class, the 6500-tonne missile destroyers of • The new weapons were the French air to air missiles the Delhi class and the 4000-tonne missile frigates of the

Brahmaputra class.

in the Sea Harriers, the British anti ship Sea Eagle
missiles in the Sea Harriers and Mk 42 B Seakings, the

Side by side with these innovations in warship design, the

Italian A 244 and the Russian anti submarine homing

Naval R & D laboratories developed sensors, weaponsand
torpedoes in the helicopters and the anti submarine
depth bombs in the Kamovs.

9. Known in Western naval parlance as ‘Nanuchkas’.

10. The amphibious Sealand aircraft had phased out in the 1960s.

XII / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

• New naval air stations were commissioned. They

During this period, the studies that had commenced
made more complete the sea areas covered by naval in the 1960s on nuclear propulsion were continued. To reconnaissance. At the older air stations, the runways better understand the technology, it was decided in the were lengthened and strengthened to operate the early 1980s to lease a nuclear propelled submarine from new aircraft and the naval air station facilities were the Soviet Gnion for three years. The crew underwent modernised.

training in Russia. INS Chakra operated in Indian waters
o Training syllabi were updated and training facilities were from 1988 to 1991. During these three years, valuable expanded. Simulators were acquired for training Sea understanding was acquired of nuclear submarine culture, Harrier pilots, TG ASW teams and Seaking Mk 42 B the practical aspects of handling nuclear power plants maintenance personnel.

afloat and anti submarine operations against nuclear
propelled submarines.

o New aircraft maintenance workshops were established
at the air stations where the squadrons were based.

The Submarine Arm had started with eight submarines

The Subm arine Arm
from Russia - four Kalvari class in 1968-69 and four

Vela class in 1973-74. Due to the increased corrosion

There were equally significant developments in Navy’s experienced in warm saline tropical waters and the Submarine Arm.

deferment of 6-yearly refits because the repair facilities in

Visakhapatnam Dockyard were not ready, the deterioration

In the early 1970s, evaluation had commenced of in the material state of the first four submarines was tackled European submarines to decide which of these best met on two fronts: the Navy’s requirements for commencing submarine • Submarines started being sent back to Russia for 6-construction in India. This evaluation culminated in the
yearly repairs. Concurrently, 6-yearly repairs were
late 1970s with the short-listing of the German HDW 1500
commenced in Visakhapatnam with Russian assistance,
submarine and the Swedish Kockums 45 B submarine.

using whatever limited facilities were available. It took

The German HDW 1500 was selected after prolonged
some years for the situation to stabilise. Between 1975
technical
evaluations and competitive commercial
and 1992, five submarines underwent 6-yearly repairs in
negotiations. Contracts were signed in December 1981 for

Russia and six submarines underwent 6-yearly repairs in
two submarines to be built in Germany followed by two to

Visakhapatnam.

be built in Mazagon Docks, with an option clause for two • Discussions were initiated with the Soviet side for more to be built in India.

successors to the earlier eight submarines. These

To learn all aspects of submarine design, construction,
culminated in the acquisition of the eight 877 EKM
overseeing, factory acceptance and sea trials and to
submarines between 1986 and 1990.11
facilitate transfer of technology, personnel from the Navy

Submarine Arm projects were not restricted to Europe
and from Mazagon Docks were deputed to Germany and Russia. A landmark deal was the VLF transaction, with whilst the first two submarines were being constructed in an American firm. When submerged, submarines can only Germany. These two submarines arrived from Germany in receive wireless messages on Very Low Frequency (VLF).

1987.

The discussions that had been in progress with the Soviet

The 3rd and 4th submarines built in Mazagon Docks Gnion and the Gnited States culminated in 1984 with the selection of an American company, in collaboration
commissioned in 1992 and 1994.

with an Indian company, to design, manufacture, install

Negotiations for the 5th and 6th submarines were and commission the VLF transmitting station; it was discontinued in 1987 due to a combination of cost commissioned in 1990.

escalation and resource constraints.

The Indo-Russian Naval Interaction

The performance of the HDW submarines fully met The naval acquisitions from the Soviet Gnion had started the Navy's operational requirements. This was as much a in 1965 when the Navy’s traditional supplier, the British tribute to Indian learning skills and meticulous insistence Navy, because of its own constraints, was unable to meet on quality as to the thoroughness of German training an
the Navy’s requirements for more powerful destroyers and
transfer of technology.

the latest conventionally propelled submarines.

11. Known in Western naval parlance as the ‘Kilo’ class.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XIII

systems better suited to India’s tropical climate conditions

Towards Self Reliance
and maximising indigenous content.

Eminence is relative. Between 1976 and 1990, India s

Navy grew to be the largest and strongest in South Asia.

The outstanding naval R & D project of this period was

The acquisitions from abroad synergised with innovations the APSOH sonar, specially designed for hot and humid in warship design and production.

tropical conditions and proved at sea in Indian waters for
a full year during extensive trials. Its derivatives continue to

Innovation in Warship Design and Indigenous R & D
be fitted in the Navy’s latest ships, twenty years after it was
first developed. Less spectacular, but equally important

The period 1976-90 was lively and exciting, both for R & D developments for the Navy were the ongoing innovation in design and for self reliance.

development, and improvement, of the sensors, weapons

New ships entered service at a brisk pace, along with their systems and munitions already in service.

new sonars, radars, electronic warfare systems, missiles,
torpedoes, propulsion and power generation systems. Few The Air Arm
navies could have been so fortunate as to acquire at the There were numerous developments in the Naval Air Arm same time such a wide variety of technologically modem
during the fifteen years between 1976 and 1990.

equipment. The Navy’s gifted young officers grasped the
opportunity. The results, in the areas of ‘Warship Design

A second aircraft carrier, Viraat, and a wide variety of and Production and of ‘Research & Development', were aircraft and helicopters equipped with the latest sensors beyond expectations.

and weapons were acquired.

By bold improvisations, Russian, European and

Vikrant underwent two modernisations, in preparation
indigenous systems and equipment were successfully for embarking the new Sea Harrier fighter aircraft and the integrated and installed in Indian hulls. This process new Mk 42 B Seaking A SW helicopters.

started in 1976, when the entire missile and close-range
gun system of a 200-tonne Russian missile boat was

The ‘maritime reconnaissance’ role was transferred
disconnected and re-installed in a 15-year old British anti from the Air Force to the Navy in 1976 with the taking submarine frigate along with the latest Italian electronic over of the Air Force Super Constellations. The acquisition warfare systems, thereby giving the Fleet an ocean-going,
in 1977 of the MRASW Ilyushin (IL) 38s from the Soviet
missile-warfare-capable frigate.

Gnion marked the rebirth of the shore-based arm of naval
aviation.10 In due course, the longer range and better

A few years later, it was decided to fit the entire missile and equipped Long Range Maritime Patrol Tupolev (TG) 142s gun system, identical to that of the latest 800-tonne Russian
replaced the Super Connies.

rocket boats9 then being acquired, along with indigenous
and European equipment, in a hull design evolved from

The combat capability of the Air Arm leapfrogged from
the preceding Leander class frigates. The outcome was the the technology of the 1950s to that of the 1980s: three Godavari class frigates of the 1980s.

• The new sensors were the dunking sonars and

Once the intricacies had been mastered of interfacing
sonobuoys in the Russian Kamov and British Seaking
electrical and electronic equipment, regardless of their
helicopters, and the Russian IL and TG maritime aircraft,
origin, voltage and frequency, there was no looking back.

the Magnetic Anomaly Detectors in the Russian ILs and

Kamovs, the electronic warfare systems in the British

Appreciative of the success of Indian innovation, the

Mk 42 B Seakings and Sea Harriers and the Russian ILs

Russians offered their latest weapon systems for the series
and TGs, and the modern radars in all these aircraft and
of ships that followed - the 1500-tonne missile corvettes
helicopters.

of the Khukri class, the 6500-tonne missile destroyers of • The new weapons were the French air to air missiles the Delhi class and the 4000-tonne missile frigates of the

Brahmaputra class.

in the Sea Harriers, the British anti ship Sea Eagle
missiles in the Sea Harriers and Mk 42 B Seakings, the

Side by side with these innovations in warship design, the

Italian A 244 and the Russian anti submarine homing

Naval R & D laboratories developed sensors, weapons and
torpedoes in the helicopters and the anti submarine
depth bombs in the Kamovs.

9. Known in Western naval parlance as ’Nanuchkas'.

10. The amphibious Sealand aircraft had phased out in the 1960s.

XII / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

• New naval air stations were commissioned. They
uring this period, the studies that had commenced
made more complete the sea areas covered by naval in the 1960s on nuclear propulsion were continued. To reconnaissance. At the older air stations, the runways better understand the technology, it was decided in the were lengthened and strengthened to operate the early 1980s to lease a nuclear propelled submarine from new aircraft and the naval air station facilities were the Soviet Gnion for three years. The crew underwent modernised.

training in Russia. INS Chakra operated in Indian waters

• Training syllabi were updated and training facilities were from 1988 to 1991. During these three years, valuable expanded. Simulators were acquired for training Sea understanding was acquired of nuclear submarine culture, Harrier pilots, TG ASW teams and Seaking Mk 42 B
the practical aspects of handling nuclear power plants
maintenance personnel.

afloat and anti submarine operations against nuclear

• New aircraft maintenance workshops were established propelled submarines.

at the air stations where the squadrons were based.

The Submarine Arm had started with eight submarines

The Subm arine Arm
from Russia - four Kalvari class in 1968-69 and four

Vela class in 1973-74. Due to the increased corrosion

There were equally significant developments in Navy’s
experienced in warm saline tropical waters and the

Submarine Arm.

deferment of 6-yearly refits because the repair facilities in

Visakhapatnam Dockyard were not ready, the deterioration

In the early 1970s, evaluation had commenced of in the material state of the first four submarines was tackled European submarines to decide which of these best met on two fronts: the Navy’s requirements for commencing submarine • Submarines started being sent back to Russia for 6-construction in India. This evaluation culminated in the
yearly repairs. Concurrently, 6-yearly repairs were
late 1970s with the short-listing of the German HDW 1500
commenced in Visakhapatnam with Russian assistance,
submarine and the Swedish Kockums 45 B submarine.

using whatever limited facilities were available. It took

The German HDW 1500 was selected after prolonged
some years for the situation to stabilise. Between 1975
technical
evaluations and competitive commercial
and 1992, five submarines underwent 6-yearly repairs in
negotiations. Contracts were signed in December 1981 for

Russia and six submarines underwent 6-yearly repairs in
two submarines to be built in Germany followed by two to

Visakhapatnam.

be built in Mazagon Docks, with an option clause for two • Discussions were initiated with the Soviet side for more to be built in India.

successors to the earlier eight submarines. These

To learn all aspects of submarine design, construction,
culminated in the acquisition of the eight 877 EKM
overseeing, factory acceptance and sea trials and to
submarines between 1986 and 1990.11
facilitate transfer of technology, personnel from the Navy

Submarine Arm projects were not restricted to Europe
and from Mazagon Docks were deputed to Germany and Russia. A landmark deal was the VLF transaction, with whilst the first two submarines were being constructed in an American firm. When submerged, submarines can only Germany. These two submarines arrived from Germany in receive wireless messages on Very Low Frequency (VLF).

1987.

The discussions that had been in progress with the Soviet

The 3rd and 4th submarines built in Mazagon Docks Gnion and the Gnited States culminated in 1984 with the selection of an American company, in collaboration
commissioned in 1992 and 1994.

with an Indian company, to design, manufacture, install

Negotiations for the 5th and 6th submarines were and commission the VLF transmitting station: it was discontinued in 1987 due to a combination of cost commissioned in 1990.

escalation and resource constraints.

The Indo-Russian Naval Interaction

The performance of the HDW submarines fully met The naval acquisitions from the Soviet Gnion had started the Navy’s operational requirements. This was as much a in 1965 when the Navy’s traditional supplier, the British tribute to Indian learning skills and meticulous insistence Navy, because of its own constraints, was unable to meet on quality as to the thoroughness of German training an
the Navy's requirements for more powerful destroyers and
transfer of technology.

the latest conventionally propelled submarines.

11. Known in Western naval parlance as the ‘Kilo’ class.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XIII

Concurrently licensed production commenced of the

The initial acquisitions of ships and submarines from gas-turbined missile boats of Project 1241 RE.

Russia had been designed for the Russian Navy, which
operated in a cold and dry climate and in cold, low salinity

By 1987, this wide scope of cooperation in warship
seas. They had not been designed to operate in the hot building required monitoring at high levels. Agreements humid climate and the warm, saline and highly corrosive had to be signed at the right time, to ensure that deliveries seas typical of the tropics. As the Navy gained experience were effected to the warship building yards - Mazagon of operating Russian vessels in tropical conditions, it Docks in Bombay, Garden Reach in Calcutta and Goa identified the essential alterations and additions required Shipyard - at the right time to avoid delays in their to ‘tropicalise’ the Russian designs.

construction schedules. A Joint Indo-Soviet Working Group

Each vessel was covered by a twelve-month guarantee on Shipbuilding was set up to smooth the way and clear period during which the Russian ‘guarantee specialists, problems in the licensed production of 1241 REs and the deputed to India by the respective ‘Original Equipment design assistance for the fitment of Soviet weapon systems Manufacturers’ (OEM) factories, rectified all shortcomings in indigenous warships. It was chaired jointly by the Deputy and replenished all the spare parts consumed. The feed Minister of Shipbuilding of the CJSSR and India’s Secretary back by these specialists to their respective factories in of Defence Production.

Russia reinforced Naval Headquarters’ projections to the

Russian side of the essential improvements. As a result,

There were some issues that figured repeatedly in the
each successor series of Russian acquisitions gradually naval interaction between the Indian and Russian sides became better than their predecessors.

between 1976 and 1990. Some were well resolved. Others
could not be resolved.

The Inter Governmental Agreements for the supply • The Indian Navy’s projections for better and better of ships, submarines and aircraft catered also for their
associated infrastructure. These encompassed facilities
sensors, weapons and equipment, all suitably modified
for the maintenance, repair and refit of equipment, the
for Indian conditions, to be fitted in successive
storage, maintenance and preparation of weapons, the
acquisitions of ships, submarines and aircraft.

training of crews in schools fitted with identical equipment

The maximum headway was made in this regard.

and simulators on which the crews could practice operating

• Repair Facilities for the Soviet Acquisitions.

procedures and tactics.

The crux of the problem was how best to keep the

The Navy’s successful operations during the 1971 Indo-

Russian-supplied ships, submarines and aircraft properly

Pakistan War led to two positive developments:

maintained and repaired until the requisite refit facilities

• The 1973 and 1975 Defence Reviews recommended,
ashore were fully established at the respective home-
and approval was accorded, for the Navy’s proposals
ports.

for acquiring modern Russian ships, submarines and

Some headway was made on this issue. By the 1980s,
aircraft.

the essential repair and maintenance facilities were set up

• The Soviet side responded positively to the Navy’s
at the respective naval ports and air stations from where
requests for better equipment in future Russian
these ships, submarines and aircraft actually operated.

acquisitions and for the installation of Russian weapons

With increased foreknowledge of the equipment and
in Indian-built hulls, interfaced with European and
weapons being inducted, it became possible to augment
indigenous equipment.

the facilities that had already been created instead of

Hybridisation’ began with the fitment in the 1960
setting up new facilities.

vintage, British anti submarine frigate, Talwar, of a surface

In the case of submarines, where ‘safety when dived’

to surface missile systems removed en bloc from a Russian
was paramount, the Soviet side helped by undertaking
missile boat. Talwar’s installation was completed in 1975
their 6-yearly Medium Repairs in the Soviet Gnion,

The next step was the installation of Russian radar and
whenever this became inescapable.

missile systems in the Godavari class missile frigates of

Project 16. The next step, again in consultation with the

• Participation in the Soviet State Committee Trials Prior to

Russian Ministry of Shipbuilding and its Design Bureaus
the Delivery Acceptance Trials of Ships and Submarines
was the installation of the latest Soviet systems in the

Constructed for the Indian Navy.

class m,ss,Ie corvettes of Project 25, the Delhi class

Based on the experience gained over the years in
missile destroyers of Project 15 and the Brahmaputra class
successive Delivery Acceptance Trials, the Indian side
missile frigates of Project 16 A.

considered it essential that Indian naval specialist

XIV / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

officers participate in the initial Soviet State Committee

Acceptance Trials. This would avoid dissension on
codification and nomenclature when preparing indents
for spares in the Russian language.

performance
parameters during the subsequent

Delivery Acceptance Trials. It would also enable the

On the one hand, the Russian side considered it

Indian specialists to learn and understand how, in later
imperative that requirements be precisely forecast and
years, to restore peak performance after equipment had
indents forwarded in good time to mesh with the Soviet
been overhauled during major refits.

Gnion s annual and five-year production plans.

On the other hand, India’s rigorous scrutiny of the

Mo headway could be made on this issue. Gnder
financial aspects of every' indent invariably took time
the constitutional law of the Soviet Gnion, it was not
because it required item-wise costing and this was not
permissible for foreign naval personnel to be allowed
readily available from the Russian factories.

into Soviet warship building yards where warships were
also being constructed for the Soviet Navy. Similar

Apart from the language barrier (very few in the Indian
considerations limited the Indian side’s requests for

Navy knew or spoke Russian), the fact that in every
organization, everywhere, logistics is considered so

Naval Dockyard civilian workers and supervisors to
mundane an activity as to be delegated to somebody
be allowed access into Soviet equipment factories for
else, the Indo-Russian naval interaction in the field
being given in depth, on-the-job, hands-on, deep-repair
of logistics tended to be prickly, though without any
training.

malafides on either side.

Instead, the Soviet side did permit Naval and civilian

From the mid 1980s onwards, the Soviet Gnion’s
specialists to see and learn how Indian submarines were
economic restructuring started freeing their factories
refitted in their Vladivostok yard. Special arrangements
from central control and required them to become self-
were also made for Indian personnel to be trained in
sufficient for resources. This resulted in an unforeseen
the deep repair/overhaul of major equipment like gas
interruption in the supply of the spares earlier indented.

turbines, the major repairs of a Rajput class ship, etc in

It took some time for new arrangements to be concluded

Special Training Centres set up for the Indian Navy.

with individual ‘original equipment manufacturers/

Model Contract.

factories. In some cases, Russian production lines had
closed down, leaving the Indian Navy with the difficult

In accordance with the Soviet procedure, a separate
choice whether to indigenise obsolescent spares or
contract had to be processed for ships and separate
to cannibalise. In other cases, allegations of excessive
contracts for their infrastructure. The Indian side felt it
indenting at prices inflated by OEMs and middlemen
preferable to formulate a ‘Model Contract’ which, in a
led to suspension of approvals for indents until Boards
comprehensive document for each acquisition, would
of Enquiry could recommend how loopholes should be
dovetail the timeframes for the delivery of the vessels
closed.

and their exploitation documentation in the English

The chapter on the Russian Acquisitions discusses
language, with the timely delivery of equipment for their
how the basic goodwill that has been the foundation
refit facilities and for the timely availability of the entire
of lndo-Russian naval cooperation surmounted
spectrum of refit spares, refit documentation etc. This
these difficulties and fostered an embargo-free naval
would help to eliminate the difficulties resulting from
relationship.

separate un-synchronised contracts.

Operations

No headway could be made on this issue. The
insurmountable problem was that too many ministries The induction of new ships, submarines, aircraft and were involved and under Soviet procedure, each ministry helicopters from 1976 onwards and the evaluation in Indian had to draw up its own contract in terms of financial waters of their capabilities enabled the Navy to evolve and clauses, delivery dates, documentation, guarantee prove at sea, the tactics appropriate for its unique mix of specialists etc.

platforms, sensors and weapons.

Timely Indenting and Delivery of Spares.

Carefully structured exercises helped to pin down

From the logistics point of view, p r o b l e m s were serious inadequacies and provide feedback to the R & D laboratories.

enough to require attention at very high levels^ The

The two significant operations were Operations Pawan

Soviet Onions centralised, state-controlled mdustnal and Cactus.

system required meticulous compliance with Russian

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XV

Operation Pawan in Support of the IP K F in

Personnel stood up well to the multifarious tasks of

Sri Lanka - 1987 to 1990
providing operational and logistic support for the IPKF,
maintaining round the clock ship and air patrols in the

Sri Lanka’s location astride the main shipping routes of the Palk Strait and along Sri Lanka’s eastern seaboard and Indian Ocean and its proximity to the Indian mainland has transhipping refugees, many of whom had to be given strategic significance for the security of India’s southern medical attention at sea.

seaboard. The political situation is complex - it has entailed
the Navy’s involvement for over 30 years.

Immediately after the last contingent of the IPK F had
been de-inducted from Sri Lanka, ships and aircraft of

Operation Pawan started with the induction of the IPKF India’s Navy and Coast Guard were deployed for Operation on 30 Ju ly 1987. The de-induction started in August 1989 Tasha to patrol the Palk Strait to minimise the movement and by October 1989, the bulk of the IPKF had withdrawn.

of militants and their material between Sri Lanka and India.

Operation Pawan terminated on 24 March 1990, when the Operation Tasha started in April 1990 and continues to final contingent of the IPKF sailed out of Trincomalee on this day.

board ships of the Eastern Fleet. When the last elements
withdrew, there still had been no solution of the political

In the years after 1990, India has abstained from further
problem that had necessitated the induction, nor indeed direct involvement and has encouraged every peacehas a solution emerged till the date of publication.

making effort for reconciliation between the Sri Lankan

Government and the LTTE.

In round figures, over 1200 deaths and 3500 wounded
was the price that the officers and men of India’s

The lessons of Operation Pawan are instructive for future

Peacekeeping Force paid to help a neighbour in distress.

missions of a humanitarian but political nature, which the

Navy will be called upon to undertake, or assist, as it grows

Though often criticised, Operation Pawan achieved the in eminence.

objectives that had been listed by India’s Prime Minister Rajiv

Gandhi in his letter to Sri Lanka’s President Jayawardene Operation Cactus in Support of the Maldivian when the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord was siqned on 29 Ju ly Government 1988

1987:

Whilst Operation Pawan was in full swing, a crisis erupted

"You had, during the course of our discussions, agreed in Male, the capital of the Maldive Islands. On the night to meet some of India’s concerns as follows:

of 2/3 November 1988, between 300 and 500 armed,

• Your Excellency and myself will reach an early Tamil / Sinhala-speaking mercenaries landed in Male understanding about the relevance and employment of harbour by boats from a mother ship and captured key foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view locations. During this attempted coup, President Gayoom to ensure that such presence will not prejudice Indo-Sri went into hiding and, in the early hours of 3 November, Lankan relations.

sought India’s help and immediate intervention.

• Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not

During the next 24 hours, the nearest naval ships were
be made available for military use by any country in a diverted to Male at maximum speed, naval reconnaissance manner prejudicial to India’s interests.

aircraft established surveillance over the Maldive Islands.

• The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee oil On the night of 3rd /4th, Air Force aircraft landed troops tank farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between on Male s airport on Hulule Island. On learning that these India and Sri Lanka.

troops were headed for Male, the mercenaries hijacked

• Sri Lanka’s agreement with foreign broadcasting the merchant vessel ‘Progress Light', taking Maldivian VIP
organisations will be reviewed to ensure that any hostages with them, and set course for Sri Lanka. In Male, facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as law and order was restored as soon as Indian troops arrived public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or on the morning of the 4th.

intelligence purposes.”

//VS Godavari was diverted towards Colombo to embark,

During Operation Pawan, the wear and tear on naval by helicopter, the team of negotiators that had been flown ships was substantial. The usage of ships exceeded from Male to Colombo.

stipulated norms by 50%. Despite the heavy toll that it
took in terms of wear and tear, it was invaluable for its

Reconnaissance aircraft shadowed all moving contacts
experience of low intensity conflict and inducting troops during the night of 3rd /4th. At first light on the morning over uncharted beaches.

of the 4 , the aircraft confirmed the detection of Progress

XVI / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Light and homed INS Belwa as soon as it arrived on the night of 4lh /5,h.

larger numbers and for them to build up and conserve

INS Godavari who had by then embarked expertise.

the negotiators from Colombo arrived by midday on the

5th

The prevalent recruitment, training and promotion
process was not yielding quality personnel in the numbers

Negotiations for the release of the hostages made no that the Navy needed.

progress. The mercenary leader insisted that the Progress

Light would proceed only to Colombo and demanded

In the job market, service in the Armed Forces was
intervention by an international team. The Sri Lankan no longer considered attractive. Emoluments, frequent Government intimated that the rebel ship would not transfers and career prospects were seen to be inferior to be allowed to enter Sri Lankan waters. The Maldivian those in the civil sector.

Government desired that the Progress Light should not be

Conserving expertise on hi-tech equipment was a knotty
allowed to proceed to Colombo.

problem especially in warships and to a lesser extent in

Throughout the 5th, the negotiators were unable to the Air and Submarine Arms. The need was to arrive at the right balance between two incompatible requirements,
dissuade Progress Light from steaming towards Colombo. each of which was logical but whose consequence was On the 6th morning, when Progress Light was 60 miles sub-optimal: from Colombo, pressure commenced with small arms
fire, followed by air-dropped depth charges ahead of the • The promotion regulations stipulated that promotion ship, followed by a gun broadside across the bows. When,
depended on demonstrated proficiency at sea. This
despite a final warning,
required that every officer and sailor be appointed to a

Progress Light still refused to stop,
a broadside was fired on the forward cargo section. The
ship for ‘sea time’ in successive ranks and be given the
opportunity for his fitness to be assessed for promotion.

ship stopped immediately.

The consequence was a continuous movement of

Naval teams boarded the ship and rescued the hostages.

personnel between shore and ship assignments in short

Godavari’s helicopter evacuated the injured hostages to
tenures.

the Military Hospital at Trivandrum. The mercenaries were • Hi-tech naval equipment required expert handling.

handed over to the authorities at Male. Progress Light,

Expertise on equipment was best developed by continued
already listing and flooding, capsized on the 7th morning,
and repetitive association. Continuous movement of

56 miles southwest of Colombo.

personnel in and out of ships had two adverse effects -it
conflicted with the need for continued association and it

Assistance Rendered by the Navy' in Peacetime
resulted in personnel of inadequate experience repeatedly

Integral to the Navy’s day to day operations are the

‘learning on the job’ to the detriment of operational
equipment.

myriad facets of the assistance that the Navy provides in
peacetime at sea and in the island territories. Together with

The ‘sea time vs expertise’ dilemma first became crucial
the Army and the Air Force, the Navy assists in disaster in the mid 1960s when the Navy began to acquire ships relief operations, particularly in the calamitous cyclones from Russia. In these ships, the number of bunks was less that devastate the coastal areas every year.

than what was required to accommodate the Indian Navy’s
trades / specialisations. Every possible measure was tried

Personnel
to resolve the problem:

A number of problem areas coalesced to compel • Categorising personnel as ‘seagoing’ and *non-introspection and reform. On the one hand, the scope
seagoing’. This was resented by those categorised as
of innovation and reform in personnel management

‘non-seagoing’.

policies was circumscribed by inter service equiva ence • Channelising personnel into British and Russian and statutory regulations. On the other hand, the urgency
equipment ‘streams’. This helped for a few years but
of providing the manpower to man the new acquisitions
could not arrest the dilution of expertise.

generated resistance to change.

• Lengthening tenures at sea. This conflicted with the
need to give ‘timely sea time’ to avoid demotivating

The crux of the problem was:

personnel on account of delayed promotions.

Having started to replace its ageing ships,

™

• Installing complete systems in training schools every
and aircraft with technologically better Russian,
time new equipment entered service. This became
and indigenous equivalents, the nee
m^r
jn
prohibitively expensive.

the Navy to have technically educated manpower in

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XVII

• Imparting ‘Pre-Commissioning Training’ (PCT) just prior

• The inability, in the field of anti submarine warfare,
to joining a ship. This required that sufficient manpower
to compel the fraternities in the surface ships,
be available to assemble an incoming crew to undergo
the submarines and the naval air arm to interact

PCT before relieving the outgoing crew. In an expanding
constructively and evolve the best way of detecting

Navy, there just wasn't enough manpower.

and killing hostile submarines. Instead, each fraternity
succumbed to the temptation of one-upmanship and,

These difficulties in conserving expertise led to the
during exercises at sea, exaggerated their claims of
unwanted ripple effects that have been discussed in
effectiveness.

the chapters on Manning, Training, Maintenance and

Logistics.

Apart from such operational and leadership issues, there
were events that attracted adverse public attention:

Some reforms like ‘Fixed Commissions’ and ‘Operator-

• The allegations in 1987 of kickbacks in the choice of

Maintainer’ could only make limited headway. Shortages in
submarine in the S S K Submarine Project.

manpower constrained adoption of ‘Fixed Commissions’.

Resistance to change constrained ‘Operator-Maintainer’.

• The senior officers alleged to have courted politicians
for personal advancement and key appointments.

It took time to strike the right balance. Pay Commissions

• The disinclination to stand by an officer, imprisoned for
improved emoluments. Cadre Reviews improved career
alleged treason, who subsequently was cleared by the
prospects. The Navy detached itself from the Army’s

Supreme Court.

recruitment organisation and soon better educated and
better quality manpower began to join the sailor cadre.

• The marked increase in the number of cases where

Innovative schemes for officer and artificer entry helped
senior service officers started seeking the intervention of
to attract volunteers of the required calibre in sufficient
the Courts to redress the injustice that they felt had been
numbers. Training was revitalised. The decision to train
done to them.

each man for his next job at sea eliminated deadwood in

Being in the public domain, these events have been
syllabi. Increased availability of family accommodation and addressed to the extent that information is reliable and not schooling facilities and longer tenures in shore billets helped sub-judice.

to induce experienced personnel to stay on in service.

There has been much soul searching amongst Senior

Challenges of Change

Officers of the Armed Forces as to the causes that have

While the previous sections deal with the effervescence in led to this situation.

tactical and technical thought that led the Indian Navy to
eminence in South Asia, this section addresses some of

It is perhaps wise to view this in the context of the
the challenges that accompanied this change.

changes sweeping across the socio-cultural framework of

India as a whole. The Navy could not remain unaffected

The urge to keep abreast of technological change by the societal churning that was transforming a medieval, strained the traditional edifice of leadership and man splintered, colonial India into a modern, unified, democratic management. It besieged the time-tested importance of nation-state.

leadership and shifted the priority to technical ability.

In the 1970s and 80s many incoming personnel held

There were many examples of institutions wearing down, values which were markedly more self-centred’ than with undesirable consequences:

centred on ‘Navy’ or ‘nation’. Weaknesses ingrained in

• The decay of well established, and statutory, procedures the fabric of a feudal society emerging from colonial rule that underpinned naval leadership — the Divisional showed up as flattery and sycophancy, a desire to please System, Evening Quarters, Divisions and Rounds.

those in power and putting self interest above the larger
naval interest.

• The neglect of drab chores like hull maintenance on
the reasoning that within the working hours available,

Careerism’ was contaminating substantial segments of
the Navy’s over-riding priority had to be technical

Indian society.

proficiency.

The careerist officer believes that he has a jo b to

• The resistance to grapple with difficult issues like perform within a corporate bureaucracy, that the true Operator-Maintainer or Maintainer-Operator, ostensibly measure of success is hou) far and how fast he can climb on the grounds that the change would be too difficult to
manage, which led to the over-manning of ships.

to what he perceives as the ladder o f success. His credo is
risk avoidance and promotion o f self, his loyalty is entirely

XVIII / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

personal, his ethics situational. Ifhe manages to manoeuvre
himself into a command position, he uses subordinates production can meet the Navy’s needs, shortfalls will con inue to be imported. The ships, submarines, naval
to advance his career, showing little understanding or aircraft and helicopters that have been acquired have appreciation o f his role as a leader, a teacher and example invariably been the latest available and, except for the two to his subordinates. This tragedy of the careerist is that he aircraft carriers, have entered the Indian Navy at nearly the is self replicating, for which he drives off many of the very same time as they have entered the Navy of the supplier type o f officer that the country needs ”

country. Inevitably, this determination to 'acquire the latest’

These psychological compulsions of self preservation, has resulted in the Navy having to 'debug’ the acquisition self glorification and enhancing personal image by and suffer delays until a realistic ranging and scaling of denigrating predecessors, all combined to enfeeble spares can be arrived at. A worrisome aspect is that during the ‘good judgment’ that is the underpinning of naval crises, imports from the West have been vulnerable to embargos.

leadership. Several well-meant but populist changes were
introduced on the reasoning of ‘what is wrong with change’,

The relationship between Indigenisation and Logistics
only to be reversed a short while later.

poses a dilemma. On the one hand there is the national
priority to be self-reliant and achieve transfer of technology

It was not unusual to hear an officer boasting to his and indigenisation to the maximum cost-effective extent.

younger officers of how necessary it was to play golf and On the other hand is the reluctance of Indian industry to how he left it to others who ‘worked too hard’. Loners were develop what the Navy needs unless it finds it profitable suspect. Thinkers who stood firmly by their views were to do so. This requires that the Navy’s ‘order quantity’ be sidelined and weeded out. The egalitarian, anti-elitist, antilarge enough and there be assurance of ‘repeat orders’

excellence spirit of the time insisted that all points of view to justify the development costs incurred by Industry. The had equal value.

Navy, being small, cannot make its order quantity’ large

The trends discussed in the chapter on the Erosion enough to permit economies of scale. The assurance of of Leadership Values, led directly, in the 1980s, to the ‘repeat orders’ is governed by the system of ‘lowest tender’

whenever a repeat order is to be placed. Indigenisation in
breakdown of faith in an essentially sound system of naval hi-tech has taken longer than expected. In low-tech areas, administration. The increasing number of ‘redressal of the enthusiasm for indigenisation has tended to erode grievance’ petitions and the resort to the courts to obtain every time an indigenous substitute fails at sea.13,14

‘justice’ tarnished the image of the Navy as ‘the silent
service’.

One topic that has not been touched upon in this
volume is the Advanced Technology Vessel (ATV) Project.

Also addressed in this section are issues relating to Apart from its being classified, the anecdotal fragments in Defence Procurement and the Checks and Balances in the the public domain are insufficient for meaningful history.

relationship between Naval Headquarters and the Ministry It would suffice to say that nuclear propulsion for ships of Defence.

was considered as early as 1964 by Dr Homi Bhabha and

There are certain endemic professional problems that pursued by his successors.

affect combat effectiveness and are relevant to future

The preceding volume, Transition to Triumph’, had
contingencies. They have been discussed to help future taken as its start point the year 1939 when the 1939-1945
generations to find solutions pertinent to their time.

World War started. It presented an overview of the events
concerning the Indian Navy between 1965 and 1975. It

In the case of the Indian Navy during the period 1976 to analysed the developments that preceded the two wars 1990, each of these problems was more multifacete t an of 1965 and 1971, and the developments that followed usual because of the interaction of several basic decisions them. This volume has, in certain chapters, covered a taken by a navy trying to be modern on an austere u ge .

Each decision was logical. The cumulative outcome was wider canvas.

sub-optimal.

By combining source material in the public domain and
memoirs and recollections of participants, it presents a

It has been the Navy’s overriding priority to be as reconstruction of events that is as accurate and authentic contemporary as possible in technology. ntI in *9

13. Known in Western naval parlance as the “Kashins .

^ ^

^ Navy joint|y interacted with the Russian side during the Navy’s

14. Naval-Air Force mutual understanding b,osson? ^ 'npr2^e frornttie aircraft carrier Gorshkov, negotiations for the MiG 29 K aircraft that would operate from

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XIX

as the information available. Contentious topics have

This growth would not have been absorbable without
been candidly discussed without mentioning personalities the natural genius and ability of Indians in all walks of life and without trying to vindicate or criticise. My aim is to to swiftly adopt new technology, to constantly innovate, to place before the serious and thoughtful reader, carefully improvise when faced with difficulties and to persevere in researched facts and overviews of events that can help him keeping equipment going.

to arrive at his own conclusion.

Despite being accorded lesser priority than the Army

As in the preceding volume, this volume too has been and the Air Force in the allocation of resources, the Navy structured for publication in two versions:

was able not only to stay abreast of other navies in naval

• The abridged volume is for the general reader and naval
propulsion, weapon, sensor and computer technology, but
officers.

also to achieve a respectable measure of self reliance.

• The unabridged volume contains more information. It

This volume discusses how well and how much was
provides naval scholars with a datum for further research achieved in certain areas and how much that remained as more information emerges in the public domain.

had to await tackling in the 1990s.

To save the reader the tedium of having to refer back

A great strength of the Navy has been the candour
to the preceding volume, most chapters in this volume with which it analyses the reasons for the problems that it present an overview of the events prior to 1975, discuss experiences. It is my hope that in maintaining the Navy’s the developments, achievements and shortfalls during tradition of candour, this volume will help the reader to the period 1976 to 1990 and end with a summaiy of create the future rather than just grasp the present and developments after 1990.

the past.

Viewed in perspective, the growth of the Navy between

Although this volume of the history has been sponsored

1976 and 1990 was extraordinary. Everyone in India, and by the Indian Navy, the views and the interpretation of facts all those abroad, who helped in meeting the Navy’s needs are entirely my own. They do not reflect the views either of can rightly feel gratified with their individual and collective the Indian Navy or the Government.

contribution.

New Delhi

(G M Hiranandani)

15 October 2004

Vice Admiral (Retired)

XX / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Glossary

Unless otherwise stated, a ‘mile’ in the text refers to a ‘n au tili

. u- u ■
naval unit of speed equal to one nautical mile per hour.

’

,C 1S Gq
t0 1,85 k,,ometres- 0ne kn° t is

BVR

Beyond Visual Range (air-to-air missile)

As & As

Alterations and Additions

C

AA

Anti Aircraft

AAM

Air to Air (Anti Aircraft) Missile

CABS

Commodore Bureau of Sailors
a/c

Aircraft

Cactus

The name of the 1988 naval operation in the

ACC

Maldives

Appointments Committee of the Cabinet

CAP

ABER

Combat Air Patrol (aircraft)

Anticipated

Beyond

Economical

Repair Capt

Captain (naval rank. Also Commanding Officer of a

(categorisation of ships’ equipment when preship)

planning refits/modernisations)

CAS

Chief of the Air Staff

ACR

Annual Confidential Report

CASEX

Combined Anti Submarine Exercise

Adm

Abbreviation for Admiral'

CBI

Central Bureau of Investigation (the Central

ADS

Air Defence Ship

Government’s investigation arm)

AEW

Airborne Early Warning (aircraft/helicopter)

CCPA

Cabinet Committee of Political Affairs

AlO

Action Information Organisation

Cdo

Commando

A1RCATS

Air Crew Categorisation and Standardisation Board

Cdr

Commander (naval rank)

(naval)

CDS

Combined

Defence

Services

(entrance

A&N

Andaman and Nicobar Islands (in the Bay of
examination)

Bengal)

CDT

Clearance

Diving

Team

(CCDT= Command

ALH

Advanced Light Helicopter

Clearance Diving Team)

AMD

Anti Missile Defence

CED

Central Equipment Depot

APSOH

Advanced Panoramic Sonar Hull-mounted

CENTCOM Central Command (United States)

ARD

Annual Review Demands (for stores and spares)

CFL

Cease Fire Line (in Jammu and Kashmir)

ASM

Air to Surface (anti-ship) Missile

CG

Coast Guard

AST

Afloat Support Team

Chennai

New name of Madras

ASV

Anti Surface Vessel (role for a helicopter)

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency (foreign intelligence

ASW

Anti Submarine Warfare
arm of the United States)

ATAS

Active Towed Array Sonar (see also TAS=passive CinC/CINC Commander in Chief Towed Array Sonar)

CKD

Completely Knocked Down (equipment/assemblies

ATC

Air Traffic Control (tower)

for reassembly at destination)

ATE

Avionic Test Equipment (for aircraft)

CLCS

(United Nations) Commission on the Limits of the

AVSM

Ati Vishisht Seva Medal (award for distinguished

Continental Shelf
service of an exceptional order)

CLS

Controller of Logistic Support (naval)

CMD

Chairman & Managing Director (of naval warship

B
building yards)

B & D

Basic & Divisional (initial training imparted to

Cmde

Commodore (naval rank)

officers)

, . .

CMP

Controller of Material Planning (naval logistics)

B & D

Base & Depot (refers to ships’ spares stocked

CMS

Coastal Minesweeper
ashore)

..

CNW

College of Naval Warfare (at Bombay)

BEC

Basic Engineering Course (in INS Shivaji)

CNS

Chief of the Naval Staff

BEL

Bharat Electronics Ltd (at Bangalore)

CO

Commanding Officer

BHEL

Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd

COAS

Chief of the Army Staff

Combined Diesel or Gas (propulsion system

BMF

Base Maintenance Facility (fo r Russian

CODOG
designed for using diesel engines for cruising at

BMCI

Base Maintenance Unit (for ships)

economical speed or using gas turbines for dashing

BOMS

Basic Operator-Maintainer School

}

at high speed)

BPT

Battle Practice Target (for surface fin g p

Chief of Logistics (naval)

BRO

Base Repair Organisation

COL

Chief of Material (naval)

BT

Bathythermograph

COM

BTE

Boys Training Establishment

ELI NT

Electronic Intelligence (electronic warfare)

COP

Chief of Personnel (naval)

EMI/EMC

Electro Magnetic Interference/Electro Magnetic

CPO

Chief Petty Officer (naval)

Compatibility (refers to the mutual
interference/

CPRO

Controller of Procurement (naval logistics)

compatibility of radar, communication and EW

Crore

Ten million rupees (=one hundred lakhs)

equipment/antenna fitted in a warship and its

CRs

Current Repairs (three yearly refits of Russian ships
and submarines)

masts)

CSL/KSL

Cochin/Kochi Shipyard Limited (in Cochin renamed

EOD

Explosive Ordnance Disposal

Kochi)

ER

Extended Refit (western ships)

CTS

Cadet Training Ship

ERA

Engine Room Artificer

CTS

Controller of Technical Services (naval logistics)

ESM

Electronic Sensing Measures (electronic warfare)

CW

Commission Worthy (sailor candidate considered

EW

Electronic Warfare
suitable for becoming an officer)

F

CWH

Controller of Warehousing (naval logistics)

FADS

Financial Adviser Defence Services

CWPA

Controller of Warship Production & Acquisition (in FDN

Floating Dock Naval

Naval Headquarters)

ffe
free foreign exchange (essential for paying for

D
import of naval equipment)

D & M

Divisional & Management (successor course to B & FOCEF

Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet

D)

FOCIF

Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet (predecessor
db
decibel (a logarithmic unit of acoustic (sound)

of FOCWF and FOCEF when India had only one
measurement)

Fleet)

DCNS

Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff

FOCINC

Flag Officer Commanding in Chief

DCPT

Director of Combat Policy and Tactics (now DSR)

FOCWF

Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet

DF

Direction Finding

FODA

Fleet Operational Demand to be Air-freighted (for

DG

Director General
very critical items, as against LPO for critical items.

D/G

Degaussing (reducing the underwater magnetic

FODAs are raised for both foreign and local items)

influence of ships to avoid triggering magnetic

FODAG

Flag-officer Offshore Defence Advisory Group
mines)

FOGA

Flag Officer Goa Area

DGND

Director General Naval Design

FOMA

Flag Officer Maharashtra Area

DGNP

Director General Naval Project (B)-Bombay, (V)-

FONA

Flag Officer Naval Aviation

Visakhapatnam

FORTAN

Fortress Commander Andaman and Nicobar Islands

DGS&D

Director General Supplies and Disposals (Central

(predecessor of CINCAN)

Govt)

FOSM

Flag Officer Submarines

DLRL

Defence Electronics Research Laboratory

FOST

Flag Officer Sea Training

DM

Defence Minister (see also RM)

Foxtrot class NATO nomenclature of Russian submarines (Indian

DPRO

Director of Procurement (naval logistics)

Kalvari & Vela class)

DPS

Defence Planning Staff

FXP

Fleet Exercise Programme

DRDL

Defence Research & Development Laboratory

G

DRDO

Defence Research and Development Organisation

DSR

Director of Staff Requirements (formerly DCPT)

GEBCO

General Bathymetric Chart of the Oceans

DSRV

Deep Submergence Rescue Vessel

GED

General Engineering Department (of the erstwhile

DSSC

Defence Services Staff College

Soviet GKES) (dealt with the delivery and exploitation

Dunking
of ships, submarines and aircraft)

Sonar

Equivalent of VDS but fitted in helicopters (during Gen

General (Army)

hover, the sonar is lowered deep into the sea to GMDSS

Global Maritime Distress Safety and Rescue Services
detect submarines)

Scheme

GKES

State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations

E

(the apex approving body of the erstwhile Soviet

EinC

Engineer in Chief

Gnion for meeting Indian naval requirements)

EAP

Electrical Artificer Power/Control System/Weapon

GPS

Global Positioning System (Global satellite-based

EAR

Electrical Artificer Radio/Radar/Sonar
navigation position fixing system)

ECDIS

Electronic Chart Display Information System

GOC1NC

General Officer Commanding in Chief (Army)

ECM

Electronic Counter Measures (electronic warfare)

GRSE

Garden Reach Shipbuilding and Engineering (in

ECCM

Electronic Counter Counter Measures (electronic

Calcutta)

warfare)

GRT

Gross Registered Tons (ship size)

EEZ

Exclusive Economic Zone

GRW

Garden Reach Workshops (in Calcutta renamed

EKM

Project designation of Russian submarine (NATO

GRSE)

designation Kilo class)

GSE

Ground Support Equipment (for aircraft)

ELF

Extremely Low Radio Frequency (below 10 khz)

GSL

Goa Shipyard Limited (in Goa)

XXII / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

GTD

General Technical Department (of the erstwhile IPV

Inshore Patrol Vessel (Coast Guard)

Soviet GKES) (dealt with shore infrastructure and ISI

Indian Standards Institution (now called BIS-Bureau
interface with Soviet factories of items supplied by
of Indian Standards)

the G ED )

1SRQ

Indian Space Research Organisation

GTs

Gas Turbines

Integrated Type Training Establishment

H

J
hz
hertz (unit of frequency)

J&K

Jammu and Kashmir

HAL

Hindustan Aircraft Limited

JCOs

Junior Commissioned Officers (Army counterparts

HATs

Harbour Acceptance Trials
of naval MCPOs and CPOs)

HDL

Hooghly Docking Ltd (in Calcutta)

JiSWOG

Joint Indo Soviet Working Group on Shipbuilding

HDW

Howal Deutsch Werke (German Submarine

(nowJIRWOG)

Construction firm)

K

HF

High Frequency (long distance communications)

HSL

Hindustan Shipyard Limited (in Visakhapatnam)

KA

Prefix for Russian helicopters manufactured by

HUK

Hunter Killer (anti submarine operation)

Kamov

HUMVAD

Hull Mounted and Variable Depth sonar

Kilo Class

MATO nomenclature of Russian submarine (see

EKM)

Kms

Kilometres

IAF

Indian Air Force

Knot
unit of ship speed - one nautical mile per hour

IB

Intelligence Bureau (India’s internal intelligence Kochi

New name of Cochin
agency)

Kolkata

New name of Calcutta

IBL

International Boundary Line

KV

Kendriya Vidyalaya (Central School)

ICCP

Impressed Cathodic Current Protection (electric

L
system activated in harbour to minimise underwater
hull corrosion and prolong hull life)

Lakh

One hundred thousand

Lightweight Airborne Passive Acoustic Detection

IDSA

Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis (think LAPADS
tank)

System

Light Combat Aircraft
lEDs

Improvised Explosive Devices

LCA

Landing Craft Gtility

IFF

Identification Friend or Foe (radar-associated LCG
interrogator facility to identify friendly contacts LOC

Line of Control/Communication
appearing on radar. Lack of response is classified LOFAR

Low Frequency Acoustic Ranging

Logistic Requirement (signal)

as foe)

LOGREQ

LPO

Local Purchase Order for critical items. (Can be

IFT U

Intensive Flying Training Unit (evaluates naval
raised for both foreign and local
aircraft on induction)

items). (Soviet demand procedure for meeting

IGA

Inter Governmental Agreement (umbrella agreement
operationally required spares for ships/submarines/
for acquisition of Soviet/Russian military supp ies)

aircraft)

1IT

Indian Institute of Technology (the five HTs at

Long Range Maritime Patrol (aircraft)

Bombay (Pawai), Delhi, Kanpur, Roorkee and LRMP

Landing Ship Tank (M)-Medium, (L)-Large

Madras (Chennai) along with the venerated Indian LST

Light Transport Aircraft

Institute of Science at Bangalore are the Ivy LTA

Lieutenant (naval rank)

League” of India’s technological higher stu^ies)

Lt

Lieutenant Commander (naval rank)

Lt Cdr

IKL

Ingeneer Kontor Lubeck (German
u ma

Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (Secessionist

LTTE
elements in Sri Lanka)

IL

^ftTforttype'of Russian aircraft manufactured by

M

S C L d Logistic Management System (naval)

Magnetic Anomaly Detector (sensor in naval aircraft/

ILMS

MAD

IMS

Inshore Minesweeper
helicopters for detecting submarines)

IMSF

Indian Marine Special Force

MARCOS

Marine Commandos

Relating to navigation or commerce on and in the

IN

Indian Navy

Maritime

INAS

Indian Naval Air Squadron
sea (See also Naval)

Marine Acoustic Research Ship

INS

Indian Naval Ship/Submarine
for every MARS

Manning and Training (series of committees for

IPC

Initial Provisioning Committe {
recommend MAT
working out the complements of Russian origin ships
type of a N p / su b m a rln ^ t

^
and the training of their commissioning crews)

the range and scale of spar
d jn the
fitted equipment for stocking On boar

Multi-role Anti Submarine Torpedo Caring

MATCH

‘Base & Depot’ spares).

k ig87 t0

Helicopter

IPKF

Indian Peace Keeping Force (in Sn LanK

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XXIII

1990)

MCF

Marine Commando Force

NHQ

Naval Headquarters

MCM

Mine Countermeasures

NIETT

Naval Institute of Education Teaching and Training

MCPO

Master Chief Petty Officer (1/11=First/Second Class)

NIO

National Institute of Oceanography

MDL

Mazagon Docks Limited (in Bombay)

NIOHC

North Indian Ocean Hydrographic Commission

MEA

Ministry of Externa! Affairs
nm
nautical mile of 2000 yards (vis a vis terrestrial mile

MERs

Matric (10th standard) Entry Recruits (Sailors)

of 1760 yards)

MES

Military

Engineering

Services

(Inter-service

MM

Nao Sena Medal (awarded for gallantry in the face of
organisation for all defence building construction
the enemy. Also awarded for sustained operational
and maintenance)

proficiency not considered as gallantry)

Met

Meteorology

NMERs

Non-Matric (below matric) Entry Recruits (Sailors)

MHQ

Maritime Headquarters

NMS

New Management Strategy (naval)

MI

Prefix for Russian helicopters manufactured by

NODPAC

Naval Oceanographic Data Processing and Analysis

Mikoyan

Centre

MIS

Management Information System

NOIC

Naval Officer in Charge

Mk

Mark (British codification to indicate the vintage of

NPOL

Naval Physical and Oceanography Laboratory
equipment)

NRs

Navigation Repairs (Russian ships)/Normal Refits

MO

Medical Officer (naval). Also Material Organisation

(other ships)

(naval logistics)

NSB

Naval Selection Board

MOD/MoD Ministry of Defence

NSD

Naval Store Depot

MOR

Maritime Operations Room

NSRY

Naval Ship Repair Yard

MOU

Memorandum of Understanding (between two

NSTL

Naval Science and Technology Laboratory

Governments spelling out the scope

O
of cooperation)

MPA

Maritime Patrol Aircraft

OEM

Original Equipment Manufacturer.

MRASW

Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti Submarine

O JT

On Job Training

Warfare (naval aircraft)

ONGC

Oil and Natural Gas Commission

MR

Medium Range (guns), Maritime Reconnaissance

OOD/ OOW Officer of the Day/ Officer of the Watch

(aircraft)

OPDEF

Operational Defect (report made by ships)

MRs

Medium Repairs (six-yearly refits of Russian ships

OPSTATE Operational State (report made by ships and
and submarines)

submarines)

MRSOW

Maintenance Reserve and Strike-Off Wastage (for

OPV

Offshore Patrol Vessel
aircraft and helicopters)

ORI

Operational Readiness Inspection

MS

Material Superintendent (naval logistics)

OTC

Officer in Tactical Command

Mumbai

New name of Bombay

OTIs

Operating and Tactical Instructions (Ships,

MVC

Maha Vir Chakra (award for gallantry of a very high
submarines and aircraft)

order in the face of the enemy)

P

N

Pawan

The name of the Inter-Service Operation in Sri

NA

Naval Attache / Naval Adviser (in embassies)

Lanka (1987-1990)

NAD

Naval Armament Depot

PCT

Pre Commissioning Training

NAI

Naval Armament Inspection

PM

Prime Minister/Pradhan Mantri

NA1S

Naval Aircraft Inspection Service

PNC

Price Negotiating Committee

NARO

Naval Aircraft Repair Organisation

PO

Petty Officer

NAS

Naval Air Station

POL

Petrol, Oil and Lubricants

NATS

Naval Air Technical School

PPM

Planned Preventive Maintenance

NAVAC

Naval Academy

PR

Photo Reconnaissance

Naval

Relating to ships or shipping. (See also Maritime)

psi
pounds per square inch (pressure)

NAY

Naval Aircraft Yard

PSO

Principal Staff Officer (in Service Headquarters)

NBCD

Nuclear, Biological, Chemical and Damage Control

PSCJ

Public Sector Undertaking (government owned

NCML

Naval Chemical and Metallurgical Laboratory
undertaking as opposed to private owned)

ND

Navigation (and aircraft) Direction (specialisation)

PTA

Pilotless Target Aircraft (for anti aircraft firing

NDA

National Defence Academy
practices)

NDC

National Defence College

PVC

Param Vir Chakra (award for gallantry of the highest

NDES

Naval Dockyard Expansion Scheme
order in the face of the enemy)

NGRI

National Geographical Research Institute

PVSM

Param Vishisht Seva Medal (award for distinguished

NGS

Naval Gunfire Support (bombardment by gunfire
service of the highest order)

from the sea to support army operations on land)

Q

NHO

National/Naval Hydrographic Office

QRF

Quick Reaction Force

XXIV / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

R

SSK

(Submarine Search and Kill) (conventional diesel/

R Adm

Rear Admiral
electric-powered, quiet, Hunter Killer submarines).

R & AW

Research and Analysis Wing (India’s external

Project Designation of the German HDW 1500
intelligence agency)

submarines built in India

R & D

Research and Development

SSM

Surface to Surface (anti ship) Missile

R & R

Rest and Recreation (visits of warships from distant STE

Sailors Training Establishment (INS Chilka in
countries to friendly ports in between long periods

Orissa)

of deployment at sea)

STEALTH

Technology of designing warships and aircraft

RyT

Radio Telephony
to minimise their detection by adversary radars/

R/V

Rendez Vous (meeting point at sea)

sensors

Radar

Radio Detection and Ranging device (above the STOL

Short Take Off and Land (as applicable to Sea
sea)

Harrier aircraft)

RCC

Recompression Chamber (divers)

STOVL

Short Take Off and Vertical Land (as applicable to

Recce

Reconnaissance

Sea Harrier aircraft)

Retd

Retired

STS

Sail Training Ship

RM

Raksha Mantri (Defence Minister)

SWA

Shipwright Artificer

RRM

Rajya Raksha Mantri (Minister of State for Defence)

T

RN

Royal Navy (British)

TAS

Torpedo Anti Submarine (officer specialisation).

RO

Reverse Osmosis (technology/plant to convert sea/

Also Towed Array Sonar
brackish water to potable water)

TOT

Transfer of Technology

RTD

Repair Technical Documentation (Russian)

TOTED

Towed Torpedo Decoy

Rupee

Indian currency

TU

Prefix for Russian aircraft manufactured by Tupolev

U

SA

Scientific Adviser (to the Defence Minister/CNS). UHF

Ultra High Radio Frequency (for short distance

Also Supplementary Agreement (to procure items
communications) (300,000 to 3,000,000 khz)

from Russia)

UK

United Kingdom (Britain)

S L t

Sub Lieutenant (naval rank)

UN

United Nations

S/M

Submarine

UNCLOS

United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea

SAM

Surface to Air (guided) Missile

URR

Urgent

Refit/Repair

Requirement

(Demand

SAR

Search and Rescue (by ships, aircraft and helicopters
procedure for equipment/spares urgently required
at sea)

to complete the refit/repair of a Soviet/Russian

SATs

Sea Acceptance Trials
origin ship/submarine/aircraft/equipment)

SBS

Special Boat Section (commandos)

US / USA United States / United States of America

SD

Special Duties (cadre of officers promoted from USS

United States Ship
sailor cadre)

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Soviet Union till

SDB

Seaward Defence Boat

1991, thereafter Russia)

SEAL

Sea, Air & Land (US Navy acronym for their Marine

Commandos)

V Adm

Vice Admiral

Seabird

Project designation of the new naval base at Karwar VCNS

Vice Chief of the Naval Staff

(in Karnataka)

VDS

Variable Depth Sonar (fitted in ships enables the

SFNA

School for Naval Airmen
sonar of a fast moving ship to be lowered on a

S1TREP

Situation Report (a report which summarises the
cable, deep into the sea to detect submarines)

present situation)

VHF

Very High Radio Frequency (for communications)

SLMS

Ship Logistics Management System

(30,000 to 300,000 khz)

SLOCs

Sea Lines of Communication .

VIP

Very Important Person

SMA

Ship Maintenance Authority

Visakhapatnam New spelling for Vizagapatam/Vishakapatnam

SMP

Self Maintenance Period (a period, normally
in harbour, when a ships company carries out Vizag

Naval parlance for Vizagapatam /Visakhapatnam
maintenance without outside assistance)

VLCC

Very Large Crude-oil Carrier

VLF

Very Low Frequency (communication with

SMCI

Ship Maintenance Unit
submerged submarines) (10 to 30 khz)

SOC

Senior Officers Conference

VrC

Vir Chakra (award for gallantry of a high order in the

SOMC

Stabilised Operational and Manning Cycle
face of the enemy)

Sonar

Sound Navigation and Ranging (underwater)

VSM

Vishisht Seva Medal (award for distinguished

SOP

Standard Operating Procedure
service)

SRV

Submarine Rescue Vessel

VTOL

Vertical Take Off and Land (as applicable to Sea

SSB

Services Selection Board

Harrier aircraft)

SSG

Special Services Group (commandos)

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XXV

W

WOT

Warship Overseeing Team

WATT

Warship Acceptance Trials Team

WPS

Warship Production Superintendent

W/T

Wireless Telegraphy

W W l

1914-1918 World War

WECORS

Weapon Control and Repair Shop (at Bombay)

WW II

1939-1945 World War

WED

Weapon Equipment Depot

X

W ESEE

Weapon & Electronic Systems Engineering XO

Executive Officer (2nd in command of a ship/naval

Establishment (successor of WESO)

establishment)

XXVI / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Contents

Dedication

V

The Development of CJS Facilities in Diego Garcia

13

Foreword

VII

Addoo Atoll

14

Acknowledgements

VIII

Gan

14

PR EFA C E

IX

Preamble
ix 3. THE DEVELOPM ENT O F TH E NAVY T ILL 1975 16

Towards Eminence
ix

Overview

16

Oueruieu) of the Growth of the Navy 1976 to 1990 ix

Developments Between 1947 and 1965

16

External Naval Presence in the Indian Ocean
x

The Acquisition of Ships from Britain

16

Towards Self Reliance
xii

The Reaction to the GS Buildup of the Pakistan Navy 17

Innovation in Warship Design & Indigenous R&D xii

China’s Intrusion in 1962 and the 1963-64

The Air Arm
xii

Defence Review

17

The Submarine Arm
xiii

The Leander Frigate Project

17

The Indo-Russian Naval Interaction
xiii

The Changeover to Russian Naval Acquisitions

17

Operations
xv

The 1965 War

18

Operation Pawan in Support o f the IPKF in Sri
xvi

Developments Between 1965 and 1975

20

Lanka 1987 to 1990

The Russian Acquisitions

20

Operation Cactus in Support o f the Maldivian
xvi

The Submarines and the Build-up of Anti Submarine

Government 1988

Proficiency

20

Assistance Rendered by the Navy in Peacetime xvii

The Seaking Anti Submarine Helicopters

21

Personnel
xvii

The Advent of Anti Ship Missiles

21

Challenges of Change
xviii

The Russian Acquisitions

21

Glossary

XXI

The Leander Frigate Project

22

Aircraft for Vikrant

22

SECTIO N I

The 1971 War

22

TOW ARDS EM INENCE

The Post War Defence Reviews

24

1. EXTERN A L NAVAL P R ESEN C E IN THE

Overview of Naval Acquisitions from 1947 to 1975

25

INDIAN OCEAN

4. TH E GROWTH O F TH E NAVY BETW EEN

Features of the Indian Ocean

1

1976-1990

28

Historical Overview of Naval Presence until the

Preamble

28

19th Century

1 Overview of Ship Acquisitions 1976-90

28

British Predominance in the 19th Century

3 Overview of Submarine Acquisitions

29

The Emergence of Oil as a Strategic National Interest

4

Overview of Aircraft and Helicopter Acquisitions

29

The 1914-1918 World War

4

Highlights of Developments Between 1976 and 1990 29

Between the Wars

4

Ships and Submarines Acquired Between

The 1939-1945 World War - Indian Ocean Aspects

5

1976 and 1990

29

British Strategic Perceptions Regarding India in 1946

6

Retrospect

32

American Indian Ocean & Persian Gulf Policy

During the Cold War - 1947 to 1991

7 Historical Reference Data

India’s Transition to South Asian Maritime Eminence

10

5. INDIAN OCEAN D EEP SEA B ED MINING

33

Historical Reference Data

The Mineral Potential

33

2. D IEG O GARCIA, ADDOO ATOLL AND GAN

11

The International Seabed Area

33

The Allocation of the Seabed Mining Site

33

Diego Garcia

11

Survey of the Site

33

Historical Background

11

Development of Seabed Mining Technology

35

6. TRAINING O F FO REIG N NAVAL P ER SO N N EL 36

The Third Frigate CJdaygiri

58

The Fourth Frigate Dunagiri

58

7. V ISIT S BY FO REIG N NAVAL S H IP S

Improvements in Anti Submarine Capability of the

1976 TO 1990

37

Fifth and Sixth Leanders

58

Seaking Helicopter

58

SEC TIO N II

Anti Submarine Sonars and Weapons

59

TOW ARDS S E L F RELIA N C E

The Fifth Frigate Taragiri

59

TH E FLEET

The Sixth Frigate Vindhyagiri

60

8. W A RSH IP D ESIG N AND PRODUCTION

44

Conversion From Furnace Fuel Oil to

Steam-Atomised Dieso-Burning System

60

Preamble

44

Overview of Warship Design and Construction

44

Overview of Construction Timelines

60

Delivered up to 1975

44

Overview of Improvements in Combat Capability

61

Delivered 1976 to 1990

44 The Leander Project in Retrospect

61

Delivered After 1990

44

Under Construction in 2004

45

10. P R O JE C T 16 GODAVARI C L A S S F R IG A T E S

64

Shipbuilding

45

Evolution of the Design

64

Historical Background of Warship Building Yards

45

Acquisition of Hindustan Shipyard Limited

46

Problem Areas

69

Computer Aided Action Information System

69

Acquisition of Mazagon Docks and Garden

Reach Workshops

46

Electronic Data Highway

69

Acquisition of Goa Shipyard Limited

46

Retrospect

70

The Navy’s Constructor Cadre

47

The Progression from the Nilgiri of 1972 to the

The Navy’s Design Organisation

48

Godavari of 1983

71

Vessels Designed and Constructed

49

11. P R O JE C T 25 K H U K R I C L A S S

Seaward Defence Boats

49

C O R V ET T ES

72

Landing Craft Utility

49

Landing Ship Tank - Large

49

12. IN D IG EN O U S SU BM A R IN E C O N ST R U C T IO N -

Survey Ships

49

T H E S S K P R O JE C T

74

Ocean-Going Tug Matanga

49

Cadet Training Ship Tir

50

Preamble

74

Fleet Tanker Aditya

50

The Considerations that led to the Selection of HDW 75

Project 15 Delhi Class Destroyers (Delhi,

The May 1977 Delegation to Evaluate European

Mysore and Mumbai)

50

Submarine Building Yards

75

Offshore Patrol Vessels

52

The May 1979 Policy-Technical Delegation to Italy,

Licensed Production of Project 1241 RE

Germany and Sweden

76

Gas-turbine Missile Craft

52

Indo-German Agreement on Technical Assistance’ 76

System Integration by W ESO 1978 to 1984 &

Contracts Signed on 11 December 1981

76

W E S E E from 1985

52

Teams Deputed to Germany for Overseeing

Naval Interaction with the Department of Electronics

53

Construction and Design Technology

77

CAAIS for Godavari Class Frigates

53

Submarine Construction Schedule

77

Electronic Data Highway for Godavari Class Frigates 53

Commencement of the Type 1500 Design by IK L

77

Disengagement of DO E From Naval Projects

53

Full Scale Submarine Model

77

Indo-Soviet Interaction in Indigenous Warship

Transfer of Submarine Design Technology

77

Design and Production

53

Construction of SSK s 1 and 2 in Germany

77

Indigenous Warship Design and Production in

MDLs Submarine Construction Facilities

79

Retrospect

54

Construction of SSK s 3 and 4 in Mazagon Docks

79

Dropping of SSK s 5 and 6 and Discontinuance of

9. T H E LEA N D ER FRIG A TE P R O JE C T

57

Indigenous Submarine Construction

80

Preamble

57

The First Frigate Nilgiri

57

13. W A R SH IP M O D ER N ISA T IO N S & H A LF-LIFE

R E F IT S

81

Changeover From Analog to Digital Electronic Systems57

The Second Frigate Himgiri

53

Overview

81

XXVIII / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Framraj

81

INAS 321 Chetak SAR Helicopter Squadron

99

Fitment of Russian Missiles in British-Built Warships

82

Genesis and Development of the Advanced

Fitting Missiles in Talwar

82

Light Helicopter

99

Modernisation of Trishul

83

Maritime Reconnaissance

100

Lessons Learnt from Trishul’s Modernisation

83

Background

100

Conversion of Brahmaputra, Beas and Betwa for

Decision for the Navy to Acquire MRASW Aircraft 100

Cadets Training

83

Transfer of the Super Constellations to the Navy

101

Modernisation of Vikrant

83

Induction of IL 38s for MRASW (INAS 315)

103

Phase One

83

Induction of TG 142s for LRMP (INAS 312)

103

Phase Two

84

The Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Dornier 228s

103

Installation of the Ski-Jump

84

New Naval Air Stations

104

Modernisation of the Petyas

84

Development of Aircraft Operating Facilities Ashore 104

Modernisation of the First Leander Class frigate Nilgiri 85

Trainer Aircraft

104

Islanders (INAS 550)

104

14. T H E NAVAL AIR ARM

86

Kiran Je t Training Aircraft (INAS 551)

104

The State of the Air Arm in 1975

86

Sea Harrier Training Squadron (INAS 551 B)

105

Vikrant and her Air Squadrons

86

Personnel

105

The Helicopter Fleet

86

Observers

105

Reconnaissance Aircraft

86

Pilots

105

The Transformation in Tactical Missions

86

Aircrew Categorisation and Standardisation Board 105

Seahawk Air to Air Role

86

Navy-Air Force-Army Pilot Exchange Programme 105

Seahawk Anti Ship Role and Hawk-Alize Cooperation 86

Developments After 1990

105

Alize’s Anti Submarine Role

87

Aircraft Carriers

105

The Indo-Pakistan War of 1971

87

Vikrant

105

After the War

88

Viraat

106

Policy Regarding Helicopters in Frigates and Destroyers 88

Gorshkov

106

Developments Between 1976 and 1990

88

Indigenous Air Defence Ship

106

Overview

88

Sea Harriers

106

Aircraft Carriers

89

Maritime Reconnaissance

106

Aircraft Carrier Vikrant

89

Anti Submarine Helicopters

107

Aircraft Carrier Viraat

89

Seakings

107

The Indigenous Air Defence Ship (ADS) Project

91

Kamovs

107

Fighter Aircraft

91

Advanced Light Helicopters

107

Phasing out of Seahawks

91

Airborne Early Warning

107

The Acquisition of the Sea Harriers and Their Role 91

New Naval Air Stations

107

Selection and Training of Sea Harrier Pilots

92

Overview of the Growth of the Air Arm 1976-1990

109

Lessons Learnt in the Early Years of Sea

15. TH E SUBM ARIN E ARM

110

Harrier Operations

94

The CJpgradation of Sea Harrier Capability

94

Preamble

110

Sea Harrier Simulator

95

Submarine Warfare

110

Ongoing Training of Sea Harrier Pilots

95

Submarine and Anti Submarine Tactics

111

Anti Submarine Aircraft

96

Stealth and Snorting

111

Refurbishment of Alizes

96

Submarine and Anti Submarine Tactics

112

96

Sonar Propagation

112

Helicopters

96

Submarine Location, Detection and Attack

112

The British Seaking 42 Series

96

MRASW Aircraft

113

The Mk 42s

96

Anti Submarine Ships and Their ASW Helicopters 113

The Mk 42 As

The Selection and Induction of Seakings Mk 42 Bs 97

Submarine Search and Kill (SSK) Submarines

113

99

The State of the Submarine Arm in 1975

114

The Mk 42 Cs

99

The First Eight Submarines

114

The Russian Kamov Series

Submarine Depot Ship - Amba

114

99

The KA 25s

Shortage of Submarine Personnel

115

99

The KA 28s

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XXIX

Submarine Infrastructure Facilities

115

Bombay Dockyard

135

Developments Between 1976 and 1990

115

Karanja Basin Bombay

136

Six Yearly Refits (Medium Repairs) of Kalvari and

Visakhapatnam Dockyard

137

Vela Class Submarines

115

Base Repair Organisation Cochin

138

Indigenisation of Submarine Propulsion Batteries

116

Base Repair Organisation Port Blair

138

Indigenous Submarine Construction -

Developments After 1975

139

The SSK Project

117

The Naval Dockyard at Bombay

139

Induction of Russian 877 EKM (Kilo Class)

The Naval Dockyard Expansion Schem e

139

Submarines

117

Expansion Works Undertaken in the First Stage 139

Personnel Shortages

118

Expansion Works Undertaken in the

Very Low Frequency Communications with

Second Stage

139

Submarines at Sea

118

Subsequent Works

141

Command and Control of Submarine Squadrons 119

The Modernisation of the Dockyard

141

Rag Officer Submarines

119

Modernisation/Augmentation Works Undertaken 141

FOSM ’s Interface with the Navy’s Command and

Dockyard Productivity

142

Control Organisation

119

The Naval Dockyard at Visakhapatnam

142

Submarine Rescue

119

The Soil Conditions at the Site

142

Transformation of INS Satavahana into the

The Soviet Project Report

143

School for Submarine Warfare

120

The Construction of the Dockyard

143

Nuclear Propulsion for Submarines

120

The South Dry Dock (Varuna Dock)

143

The Lease of Nuclear Submarine Chakra

121

The Steering Committee and Phases

143

The Utilisation of Chakra

121

The North Dry Dock (Matsya and Surya Docks) 144

Developments After 1990

121

The 1984 Master Plan

144

Kalvari/Vela Class Submarines

121

The 1991 Master Plan

146

Chakra

121

Chronology of Commencement and

Submarine Propulsion Batteries

121

Completion of Works

146

German HDW 1500 Shishumar Class (SSK)

The Naval Ship Repair Yard at Cochin

147

Submarines

121

Growth of the BRO into a Ship Repair Yard

147

Overview of the Submarine Arm 1976-1990

122

Alongside Berths

147

Retrospect

123

The South Jetty

147

The North Jetty

148

16. TH E RU SSIA N A C Q U ISITIO N S 1976 TO 1990 124

The Blossoming of Cochin into a Work Up

Preamble

124

Base

148

Constraints During Initial Interaction Between

The Naval Ship Repair Yard at Port Blair

148

1966 and 1976

124

The Ship Maintenance Authority

149

Flowering of Mutual Understanding

124

Dockyard Manpower

151

Acquisitions between 1966 and 1976

125

Reminiscences

151

Russian Acquisitions Between 1976 and 1990

125

Reminiscences of the Bombay Dockyard

151

Overview

]25

Reminiscences of the Vizag Dockyard

152

Major Issues

126

Retrospect

156

Hybridisation

128

Licensed Production

129

18. 1979-80 NAVAL E X P E R T C O M M ITTEE R EPO R T

JISW O G

129

ON M AIN TEN AN CE

158

Indigenisation

12 9

Preamble

158

Acquisitions Between 1976 and 1990

130

The Defence Reviews of 1973 and 1975

158

Indo Russian Relations and Naval Acquisitions

The Army Expert Committee

158

After 1990

130

The Naval Expert Committee

159

Retrospect

131

Salient Excerpts from the Committee’s Report

159

17. M AINTENANCE, REPA IR AND R EFIT

Adherence to Planned Preventive Maintenance

FA C ILIT IES

135

Routines

159

Incidence of Operational Defects During

Developments Till 1975

135

Operational Period

160

XXX / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Quality of Work Carried Out During Refits

160

Operation Starling in the Bay of Bengal 1981-1982

Maintenance Concepts

182

160

Operation Rajdoot off Aden From 28 Jan to

Tenures in Dockyard Appointments

160

3 Feb 1986

182

Excerpts From the Committee’s Findings

161

Exercise Brass Tacks 1987

1R3

On-Board Maintenance Workload vis-a-vis

The Genesis of the Exercise

183

Maintenance Manpower

161

The Unforeseen Escalation During the Exercise

183

Dockyards and the Quality of Refits

161

The Naval Aspects of Exercise Brass Tacks

183

The Productivity of the Dockyard Work Force

161

Operation Pawan

183

Excerpts From the Committee’s Recommendations

162

Overview

183

Base Maintenance Gnits

162

Sri Lanka’s Strategic Significance

184

Test Equipment

163

The Historical Background of the Ethnic Problem 184

Dockyards

163

Naval Operations in 1971

186
improving Dockyard Productivity

163

Developments Between 1983 and 1987

187

Naval Officers Appointed to Dockyards

163

Events Preceding the Accord of July 1987

189

Civilian Personnel in the Dockyards

163

The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

189

Ship Maintenance Authority

164

Relevant Excerpts From the Accord

189

The Outcome of the Committee’s Report

164

Relevant Excerpts From the Letters Exchanged

190

Retrospect

165

The Sequel to the Accord

191

Operation Pawan - Naval Operations

192

19. LO G IST IC S

166

The Navy’s Tasks

192

Overview

166

Coast Guard Support

192

Chronology of the Navy’s Efforts to Cope with

Initial Patrols

192

Logistics

166

The LTTE’s Reluctance to Abide by the Accord 194

Developments After 1990

170

Cordon Militaire

194

Special Operations

194

Historical Reference Data

The Sri Lankan Scene

194

20. THIRD NAVAL B A S E AT KARWAR - PR O JEC T

Special Contingency Plans

194

SEA B IR D

171

Operation Jupiter

195

Background

171

Statistical Overview of Operation Pawan

196

Conceptual Requirements for the Third Naval Base

172

Operation Pawan in Retrospect

196

The Choice of Karwar for the Third Naval Base

172

Lt Gen Depinder Singh

196

Acquisition of Land

174

Field Marshal Manekshaw

197

Laying of Foundation Stone

174

Operation Cactus

199

Selection of Consultants

174

Naval Deployment

199

Studies, Investigations and Model Tests

174

The Flight of the Mercenaries

199

Developments After 1990

174

Interception of MV Progress Light

199

The Financial Constraints of 1990-94 and the

The Negotiations Phase

200

Revised Phase I

174

Pressure Tactics

200

Evacuation of Injured Hostages

200

21. T H E IND IG EN O U S PANORAMIC SO NAR -

Capsizing of MV Progress Light

200

175

A PSO H

Return to Male

200

Preamble

175

Lessons Learnt

200

Developments Prior to 1976

175

Operation Tasha in the Palk Strait 1990

200

Developments From 1976 onwards

176

Historical Reference Data

Commodore Paulraj’s Reminiscences

176

23. A SSISTA N C E REN D ERED BY TH E NAVY IN

The Hull-Mounted Variable Depth Sonar HUMVAD

180

PEA C E TIM E 1976-1990

201

SEC TIO N III

Naval Assistance to Ships in Distress at Sea

201

O PERATIO N S 1976 - 1990

Search and Rescue

203

Medical Assistance and Evacuation

204

22. INDIAN NAVAL O PERATIO N S 1976 - 1990

181

Cyclone, Flood and Earthquake Relief

205

18

1 1

U 1

Preamble

Maintenance of Essential Services

206

181

The Salvage of INS Godavari 1976

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XXXI

Formation of the Directorate of Naval

Firefighting Assistance

207

Oceanology and Meteorology in 1982

239

Naval Aid to Civil Authority

207

Assistance by Naval Diving Teams

School of Naval Oceanology & Meteorology

240

208

Apprehension of Poaching and Smuggling Trawlers

Developments After 1990

240

212

WIP/VIP Transportation

213

Monsoon Experiments

240

Collection, Collation and Dissemination

24. G O O D W ILL V ISIT S TO FO REIG N PO RTS
of Oceanographic Data

240

1976-90

215

Fleet Ships and Submarines

215

28. T H E M ARINE CO M M ANDO S

241

Training Ships

223

The Creation of the Indian Marine Special Force

241

Role and Training

241

25. T H E NAVY’S PARTICIPATION IN THE

Operations Between 1987 and 1990

242

EX PED IT IO N S TO ANTARCTICA

225

29. TH E FO U N D ERIN G O F IN S ANDAMAN

243

The Continent of Antarctica

225

Antarctic Research

225

Synopsis of the Incident

243

The Navy’s Involvement in Antarctic Expeditions

226

Sequence of Events - August 1990

243

India’s Antarctica Expeditions

226

Sequence of Andaman’s Problems

244

Chronology of Expeditions till 1990

228

The Court Martial Findings

246

Reactions to the Foundering of the Andaman

246

26. NAVAL HYDROGRAPHY AND M ARINE

In Retrospect

247

CARTOGRAPHY

230

Overview

30. D EFEN C E O F O F F S H O R E A S S E T S

249

230

Developments Until 1975

230

Preamble

249

Developments 1976 to 1990

232

The Defence of Offshore Assets

249

The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea

232

1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea -

Passage of Foreign Warships Through

Safety Zones Around Offshore Structures

249

Territorial Waters

232

Traffic Regulatory Scheme

251

Surveys of National Importance

234

Resources for the Protection of Offshore Assets

251

Maritime Boundary Agreements

234

Developments in the 1990s

251

The Naval Hydrographic School, Goa

234

Hydrographic Surveys for Continental Shelf Claims

SEC T IO N IV

235

The Survey Flotilla

P E R S O N N E L 1976 - 1990

235

Milestones & Major Inductions of Technology in

31. P E R SO N N E L

252

Hydrographic Services

235

Rescheduling of the Survey Season

Preamble

252

236

Developments After 1990

Officers

252

236

Surveys of National Importance

Increasing Officer Intake

252

236

Continental Shelf Surveys

Professionalism at Sea and its Linkage with

236

India’s Representation at International Hydrographic

Promotions

253

Fora

Rationalising the ‘Rules of Sea Time’

253

236

‘Wet’ and ‘Dry’ Lists

254

27. NAVAL O CEANO LO GY & M ETEO RO LO G Y

237

Aircrew Officers in Embarked Flights

254

Overview

Improvements in Annual Confidential

237

Developments Until 1975

Report Forms

254

237

Developments 1976 to 1990

Linking the Command Examination and the

237

Monsoon Experiments

Staff Course

254

237

Monex 77

237

Career Prospects and Cadre Reviews

254

Monex 79

238

The First Cadre Review

255

Oceanographic Data

238

Flag Rank Up-gradations

255

Bathymetric Charts

238

The Second Cadre Review

255

Oceanographic Forecasting at Naval Command

Officer Up-gradations

255

Level

238

Additional Officer Concessions

255

XXXII / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

The Special Duties List

255

The Electrical Officer Opposition to the

Honorary Commissions in the SD List

256

Operator-Maintainer Concept

269

Naval Officers Computerised Management

MAT III of 1976 and the 1978 Operator-

Information System

256

Maintainer Progress Committee Report

269

Sailors

256

The Outcome of the ‘Operator-Maintainer’

Increasing the Period of Engagement

256

Scheme

271

Changes in Sailors Conditions of Service

257

The Inability to Implement Fixed Commissions

272

Change in the Educational qualification for

The 1979-80 Naval Expert Committee

Matric Entry Recruitment

257

Report on Maintenance - Excerpts

272

Policy for Transferring Sailors into and out of Ships 257

Tenures

272

The Master Chief Petty Officer (MCPO) Cadre

258

Continuity in Key Billets

272

Second Cadre Review

258

The Advent of the Stabilised Operational Manning

Sailor Gpgradations Artificers and Non-Artificers 258

Cycle to Build Gp Expertise

273

Additional Sailor Concessions

258

The 1985 Report on Manpower Optimisation -

Artificers

258

Excerpts

273

The Navy-Entry Artificers Scheme

259

The 1986 Committee to Review the Trade

Changes in the Sailor Structure

259

Structure of Seamen Sailors - Excerpts

274

The Instructor Cadre

259

The 1989 Report on Economy Measures with

Computerisation of Sailors’ Service Records

259

Regard to Personnel Movement - Excerpts

276

The Revised Commissions and Warrants Scheme 259

The 1990 Study by the College of Defence

Distance Education Programme for Sailors’

Management

277

Educational Tests ET1/ET1

260

Retrospect

277

The Navy’s Civilian Personnel

260

Operator-Maintainer

277

Overview of the Navy’s Borne Strength Between

33. TRAINING

279

1965 and 1990

260

Growth 1965 to 1975

260

Preamble

279

Growth 1976 to 1990

261

Officers

279

General

The Naval Academy

279

261

Controlling Manpower Costs From the Mid

The RSES Scheme

279

1970s Onwards

The G SES Scheme

279

261

Abolition of the Indian Naval Reserve and Indian

Sea Training of Junior Executive Officers

280

Naval Volunteer Reserve

Sea Training Requirements of Cochin Schools

282

261

Streaming and De-Streaming of Long Courses

282

Discipline and Morale

261

The Merger of the Supply & Secretariat and

Committee for the Review of Training of Officers
of the Armed Forces

282

Executive Branches

261

The Merger of the Engineering and

Sailors

283

The Boys Training Establishment

283

Electrical Branches

261

The Sailors Training Establishment

283

Naval Service Selection Boards

262

Abolition and Reintroduction of the Seaman

Retrospect

262

& Communication Instructor Cadre

284

32. MANNING O F S H IP S AND CONSERVATION

Revised Training Pattern for Logistic Cadre

O F E X P E R T IS E

264

Sailors

284

264

The Training Reforms of 1974-75

284

Preamble

264

Major Decisions

285

The Sailors Trade Structure in 1947

264

Stream Training

285

The C RO SS Committee of 1966

Organisational Changes in Training Schools in

Manning the Russian Acquisitions

265

265

Cochin

285

MAT I of 1966

Introduction of the Operator-Maintainer Concept

286

Re-Allocation in 1969 of Branch Responsibilities

The Creation of Training Command in 1985

286

266
and Duties in Petya Class Ships

The Rationale

286

MAT II of 1975 and the Introduction of the

The Delegation to Study the G S Navy’s

267

Operator-Maintainer Concept

Training System

287

268

The Introduction of Stream Training

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XXXIII

The 1986-89 Revitalisation of Training

287

Developments After 1990

306

Over-riding Principles

287

Annexure: Excerpts From the Fourth Pay Commission’s

Specific Measures

287

Report Pertaining to the Armed Forces

306

General

287

Officers

306

SOMC for Ships Having Pre Commissioning

Personnel Below Officer Rank

307

Training

288

Group D Civilian Personnel

309

Officers

288

Integrity in Government Employees

309

Sailors

288

Summary of Main Recommendations and

Extent of Revitalisation Achieved by End 1989

290

Conclusions

310

Training Equipment

291

Concluding Observations

311

Leander Training Equipment

291

Acknowledgements

311

Project VAJRA

291

Training Schools

292

37. GALLANTRY A W ARD S 1976 - 1990

312

The New Schools

292

38. T H E N EW NAVAL ACAD EM Y AT EZ H IM A LA

323

The Training Schools in 1990

292

Retrospect

293

Developments Until 1975

323

Sailor Training Establishments

323

34. M ER G ER O F SU PPLY & SECRETARIAT

Officer Training Establishments

323

BRANCH W ITH EXEC U T IV E BRANCH IN

Developments From 1976 to 1990

324

1978 & CREATION O F TH E LO G IST IC S

The Interim Naval Academy at Mandovi

324

CA D RE IN 1989

295

Conceptual Requirements for the New Naval

Preamble

295

Academy

324

The Events Leading to the Merger

295

The Choice Of Ezhimala

324

Merger of the Supply and Secretariat Branch with

Selection of Design Architects

325
the Executive Branch

296

Commencement of Training

325

The Intervening Years

296

The Creation of the Logistics Cadre in 1989

296

39. W E LF A R E

328

Reminiscences

297

Preamble

328

Historical Reference Data

Housing

328

35. T H E CAD RE R EV IEW S

299

Schooling

328

Kendriya Vidyalayas

328

Preamble

299

Naval Public Schools and Naval Kindergartens

329

The Navy’s Paper on the ‘Cadre Review of the

Statistics of Grants From INAF to Naval Public

Defence Services’

299

Schools and Naval Kindergartens

329

The First Cadre Review

303

Navy Education Society

330

Flag Rank Upgradations

303

Welfare Funds

330

The Second Cadre Review

303

Officer Upgradations

304

The Directorate of Non-Public Funds

330

Sailor Upgradations

304

Indian Naval Benevolent Association

330

Additional Concessions

304

The Evolution of the Family Assistance Scheme

Developments After 1984

304
into the Naval Group Insurance Schem e

330

Retrospect

3 0 4

Improvements in the Naval Group Insurance

Scheme

330

36. T H E FOURTH PAY CO M M ISSIO N

305

N G IF Housing Loan Scheme

331

Preamble

305

INBA Subsidiary Fund

331

Re-mustering of Seaman and Engineering

Enhancement of INBA Benefits

331

Mechanics

3Q5

INBA Benefits to Retired Naval Personnel

332

The Fourth Pay Commission

305

Indian Naval Amenities Fund

332

Officers

305

Welfare Projects Financed From the INAF

332

Sailors

305

Statistics of Disbursements for Welfare and

The New Pension Structure

305

Amenities

332

Pensioners Who Retired On or Before

Resettlement

333

1 January 1986

30g

The Directorate of Ex-Servicemen Affairs

333

XXXIV / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

SECTIO N V

Changes Between 1979 and 1984

358

CH A LLEN G ES O F CHANGE

NHQ After the 1984 Reorganisation

358

40. TH E ERO SIO N O F LEA D ERSH IP VALUES

Changes Between 1984 and 1986

359

334

NHQ After the 1986 Reorganisation

359

The Malaise

334

Changes Between 1986 and 1990

360

Overview

334

NHQ Organisation in 1990

361

The Deterioration From 1976 onwards

336

Developments After 1990

44. CHANGES IN COMMAND AND CONTROL

337

STRUCTURE

362

41. D EFEN C E PROCUREM ENT

338

Preamble

362

An Overview of the Defence Procurement Process

338

The Reorganisation of 1968

362

The Large Naval Procurements From Europe

The Command and Control Structure in 1975

363

1976-90

339

Changes in Command and Control Structure

The Sea Harrier Aircraft Acquisition From Britain 340

After 1975

363

The Seaking Mk 42 B ASW/ASV Helicopter

The Reorganisation of 1986

364

Acquisition From Britain

340

The Navy’s Command and Control Structure in 1990 365

The SSK Submarine Project Collaboration

Developments After 1990

366
with Germany

341

Naval Officers in Charge of the Coastal Areas

366

42. C H EC K S AND BA LA N C ES IN THE

SECTIO N VI

NHQ - D EFEN C E M INISTRY RELATIO NSHIP 345

G EN ERAL HISTO RICAL R EFER EN C E DATA

Preamble

345

45. TH E COAST GUARD

367

Financial Control

346

The British Legacy

The Genesis of the Coast Guard

367

346

The Canons of Financial Propriety

The Coast Guard Act 1978

367

346

The Duty of the Financial Adviser

The Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing

346

Developments 1965-1975
by Foreign Vessels) Act 1981

368

346

Developments 1976- 1990

Organisational Structure

368

348

The Points of View

Force Levels

368

348

A Naval Point of View

Manning and Training

368

348

A Finance Defence Point of View

Achievements

368

349

A Ministry of Defence Point of View

Developments After 1990

369

349

Promotions and Appointments

350

46. COM M ISSIONINGS & DECOM M ISSIONINGS 370

The Points of View

350

Commissionings

370

A Ministry of Defence Point of View

350

Ships Commissioned 1976 to 1990

370

A Presidential Point of View

351

Ships Commissioned After 1990

372

Civil Service Points of View

352

Ships Awaiting Commissioning at the

Views of Chiefs of the Naval Staff

353

Time of Writing

373

The Services Viewpoint

353

Submarines Commissioned 1976 to 1990

373

Developments After 1990

353

Submarines Commissioned After 1990

374

Historical Reference Data

Naval Air Squadrons Commissioned

43. CH AN GES IN NHQ ORGANISATION

355

1976 to 1990

374

Aircraft Inducted After 1990

374

Preamble

355

Shore Establishments Commissioned

The 1955 Reorganisation

355

1976 to 1990

374

NHQ After the 1962 Reorganisation

355

Shore Establishments Commissioned After 1990 374

Changes Between 1965 and 1968

355

Floating Dock

374

NHQ After the 1969 Reorganisation

356

Decommissionings

375

Changes Between 1970 and 1972

356

Ships Decommissioned 1976 to 1990

375

NHQ After the 1972 Reorganisation

357

Ships Decommissioned After 1990

376

Changes Between 1972 and 1978

357

Submarines Decommissioned 1976 to 1990

376

NHQ After the 1978 Reorganisation

358

Submarines Decommissioned After 1990

376

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / XXXV

47. COM M ISSIONING COMMANDING O FFIC E R S O F

The Indian Naval Sailing Association

400

M A JO R INDUCTIONS

377

Four Yearly Asian Games

401

48. NAVAL CEREM O NIAL

378

R E F E R E N C E N O T ES

403

Historical Overview o f Naval Presence in the Indian

Reviews of the Fleet by the President

378

Ocean - 15th to 18th Centuries

403

Presentation of Colours

378

The Chinese

403

Naval Bands

379

The Portuguese

403

49. NAVAL PHILATELY

386

The Dutch

405

The English

406

General

386

Chronology of Issues

388

The French

408

Other European Companies in the 17:h Century 408

50. TH E NAVY AND TH E ARM Y’S MILITARY

The 18th Century Anglo-French Contest

409

EN G IN EERIN G SER V IC E

390

The Situation in the Middle o f the 18th Century 409

Preamble

390

19th Century British Hegemony in the

The M ES’ Involvement with the Navy

390

Indian Ocean

410

Proposals to Restructure the M ES

391

The Operations o f the German Cruiser Emden in
the Indian Ocean in 1914

411

51. TH E NAVY AND TH E S E A CADETS

392

The Japanese Navy’s Foray into the Bay o f Bengal

Genesis of the Sea Cadet Corps

392
in 1942

411

Retrospect

393

The British Navy’s Attack on Madagascar in 1942413

Chronology

394

The Recapture o f the Andaman & Nicobar Islands413

British India GHQ Appreciation o f the “Results to

52. SA ILIN G AND YACHTING

397
the British Commonwealth o f the Transfer o f

Preamble

397

Political Power in India” forwarded to London by

Naval Sailing in the 1950s

397

Field Marshal Wavell, Viceroy o f India

413

Yachting From 1960 Onwards

397

Britain’s Perception o f the Russian Threat

416

The Sea Cadet Sail Training Ship Varuna

398

Iran

417

Varuna’s Voyage to Australia for the

The British Indian Ocean Territory and

Bicentennial Celebrations

398

Diego Garcia

418

Indian Naval Sailing Vessel Samudra

398

Iraq

419

Tri Service Expedition 1988-89

398

The Iran-Iraq War 1980-1988

420

BaliYatra 1992

399

The Iraqi Invasion o f Kuwait 1990

420

Chronology

399

Select Bibliography

422

The Naval Sailing Club Mumbai

400

Index

425

List of Maps

Equidistant Map of the World Centred on

Operation Cactus - Nov 1988

198

Delhi

Front Astar Homeward Passage of Ships & Submarines from

Major and Minor Ports of India

9

Europe 1976-90

219

Diego Garcia

12

Indian Antarctic Stations

227

Addoo Atoll and Gan

15 India’s Exclusive Economic Zone

231

Jam m u and Kashmir

19 Maritime Boundaries in the Bay of Bengal

233

Naval Operations in the Arabian Sea in Sept 1965

20 India’s Offshore Oil Basins

250

Missile Attacks on Karachi on Nights of 4/5 &

The New Naval Academy at Ezhimala

326

8/9 Dec 1971

23 January 1976 Fleet Review Chart

380

India’s Seabed Mining Site

34 February 1984 Fleet Review Chart

382

Naval Air Stations

108 February 1989 Fleet Review Chart

384

Naval Dockyard Bombay in 1990

140 Early European Trading Posts and Bases in the

Naval Dockyard Visakhapatnam in 1990

145

Indian Ocean

402

Naval Base under Construction at Karwar

173 Ports Visited by Indian Naval Ships 1976

Operation Pawan (IPK F in Sri Lanka) 1987 to 1990

193
to 1990

Rear Astar

XXXVI / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

1

External Naval Presence In The Indian Ocean

Features of the Indian Ocean

Historical Overview of Naval Presence until the 19th

Century 2

Smallest of the world’s oceans, the Indian Ocean
encompasses one fifth of the world’s sea area. It washes The causes that led to the arrival of external naval presence the shores of 34 littoral states and 11 hinterland states. It are linked to the pattern of trade between China, India, contains half the world’s seabed minerals. By 2020, two Southeast Asia and Europe over the centuries.

thirds of the world’s trade is likely to be passing through it.

For millennia, the sailing vessels of China, India and

Three features distinguish this Ocean. Gnlike any other Arabia availed of seasonal monsoon winds to carry ocean, it is capped by a huge land mass. It lies in the commodities between the entrepots of their era to barter middle of two great oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific,
the prized products of their time and trans-ship them to
and forms the connecting link between the two. Its shores destinations in the west and the east.3 Segments of these are occupied by developing countries to a greater extent voyages were vulnerable to piracy. Neither cargo owners than the other oceans.

nor cargo carriers armed their ships for protection from
pirates. For safe passage, it was cheaper to pay the local

It has a maximum west-east extent of 4200 nautical miles pirate chieftains, who controlled the choke points and and a maximum north-south extent of 3700 nautical miles. the vulnerable coastal segments, than to maintain armed Geographically, the Indian peninsula is the predominant ships.

feature of the northern Indian Ocean.1

In the centuries BC, Chinese silk and Indian cotton

The western region has twenty seven littoral countries travelled to Greece and Rome. As the Chinese empire compared with seven bounding the eastern region. Also expanded and Chinas Han dynasty made Central Asia in the western zone are all the territories still owned by the safe for east-west caravans, a network of overland trade erstwhile European colonial powers or in special association routes developed from China and India to Syria and Asia with them. France owns the Mayotte and Esparses islands Minor. By 100 BC, the 6000-kilometre Silk Route was well in the Mozambique Channel, as well as Tromelin, Reunion,
established. Because of the distance, traders concentrated

Amsterdam, St Paul, Crozet and Kerguelen. In addition,
on Iuxuiy items high in value but low in weight. These were

Djibouti and Mayotte are in special relationships with traded on through intermediaries rather than remaining France. Britain’s possessions are now restricted to the with a single merchant. Bulkier items continued to be islands comprising the Chagos Archipelago, of which the transported in ships of the coastal trade rather than on island of Diego Garcia, has been leased to the GSA.

camel-back.4

The ensuing historical overview summarises the motives

In the 13th and 14th centuries, the Mongols derived
that have driven developments in and around the Indian substantial revenues from their colonies in the Caucasus, Ocean and the inevitability of their continuance.

Persia, Central Asia and northern India that straddled the

Silk Route. In the 14th and 15th centuries, the Ottoman

1. Sub continental India has a coastline of 6300 km, with the island territories adding another 1100 km.

The coastline has 11 major, 20 intermediate and 100 minor ports. India has an Exclusive Economic Zone of 2.2 million square kms. By 2010, over 70% of India’s energy needs will come from abroad, nearly one third of which will be consigned to northwest India alone.

2. For details prior to the 19lh century, see Reference Note No 1, page 403.

3

There is no historical basis for the notion that until the arrival of the Europeans, there was no intra-regional maritime trade in the Indian Ocean.

4

After the opening of the sea route between Europe and Asia in the 16th century, trade on these land routes decreased in favour of ocean-bome trade.

Turks conquered Asia Minor. They increased their customs

In 1488, fifty four years after the Chinese voyages ceased,
duties on the Silk Route goods that transited through their the first Portuguese ship entered the Indian Ocean from territory. This raised the prices of oriental merchandise in the west when the Portuguese mariner Bartholomeu Dias rounded the southern tip of Africa that came to be called

European markets.

the Cape of Good Hope. A decade later, he was followed by

By the 15lh century, a stable pattern had evolved of Vasco da Gama’s ships which reached the Malabar coast India’s overseas trade:

(now part of the Indian state known as Kerala) in southwest

• The eastern trade was largely in the hands of Surat s India in 1498. What Vasco da Gama and his successors merchants.5 Their vessels plied between India’s west introduced into Indian maritime history was the claim to coast and Malacca, where Indian, Chinese and Javanese an ‘exclusive control of the seas’, a conception wholly at ships met to exchange their wares.6 Apart from the variance with what had been accepted as the ‘natural law’

Muslim merchants from Surat, Hindu merchants from both in Europe and in Asia.

the east coast and Bengal also visited Malacca.

The sailing expeditions from Europe to the Indian Ocean

• To the west, the carrying trade in the Arabian Sea was had to be financed. Whilst the Portuguese expeditions were mainly in the hands of Arab ship owners and flowed
partly financed by the monarchy and partly by merchants,
along two well established maritime routes:

the East India Companies set up later by the Dutch, the

-Through the Red Sea, overland to Cairo and Alexandria French and the English were private trading companies, from where Venetian ships carried the cargoes to financed wholly by wealthy merchants. These companies Europe.

were granted charters by their respective governments,

-Through the Persian Gulf, up through Basra and authorising them to acquire territory wherever they could Baghdad to join up with the Silk Route to Lebanon and to exercise in the acquired territory various functions and ports in the eastern Mediterranean.

of government, including legislation, the issue of currency,
the negotiation of treaties, the waging of war, and the

The Arabs, who were successful as merchant mariners,
administration of justice.

were mainly commercial navigators. They were not
instruments of any national policy nor had they the support

The companies found that they could gain exclusive
of any organised government.

trading rights by siding with one side or the other in local
feuds. It became worthwhile for them to have troops

The urge of European merchants to finance sea voyages and arm their merchantmen to help the success of their to outflank the Ottoman stranglehold on the land route proteges and be rewarded by trading privileges in wider coincided with the voyages of exploration that were taking territories. Successful companies became substantial place in the 15th century.7
contributors to their national economies back in Europe.

Their continued profitability became a ‘national interest’

At that time, the Portuguese were among the few in their Government’s foreign policy. Over time, however, European nations seeking navigational knowledge of the avarice tempted company employees to become covert west coast of Africa, having developed the capability for private entrepreneurs and line their own pockets. Decrease long sea voyages in sturdy ships fitted with cannons. From
in company profits and mismanagement led each home

1434 onwards, Portuguese influence spread down the west Government to take over its company, convert the territory coast of Africa towards the southern tip of Africa.

into a ‘colony’ and provide for its seaward defence by its

External naval power appeared in the Indian Ocean for Navy.

the first time in the 15th century.

In recent times, it has become comfortable for some

Oddly enough, the first ‘exploratory fleet’ came not from to voice the view that “the European invasion of India that the west but from the east. The Chinese Ming Dynasty’s started from the sea in the 15th century was successful Admiral Cheng Ho (Zheng He) made seven voyages because India had neglected its seaward defences. Indian between 1405 and 1434 visiting ports as far as the coast
rulers are to be blamed for pre-occupation with invasions
of Africa.

from Central Asia and pre-occupation with internecine

5. Surat s ancient prosperity was founded on the export of inexpensive white cottons that were an article of mass consumption in the Arab lands.

6. Merchants from Arabia and Persia journeyed to Surat to embark ships bound for Malacca.

7 L hoo W3S alS° the *Ure

(")rient’ wflose fabulous wealth had become legendary. Christopher Columbus set out westward from Spain in 1492 in quest of the riches of the Indies. The entry in his ship’s log on 10 October 1492 states “...I had started out to find the Indies and would continue until I had accomplished that mission". When he made landfall on the island he named San Salvadore, he believed he had arrived in Asian waters.

2 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

wars within India.'1 The historical record admits of a more last Indian Ocean harbour) in 1810 and seized Java and pragmatic view.

Batavia (Holland’s main base in the East Indies) in 1813.

The 1815 Congress of Vienna which established the

Firstly, the Europeans did not enter the Indian Ocean ‘European order’ after the defeat of France recognised, to invade India or to acquire territory. They were in search
de
facto, Britain’s global naval supremacy:

of a cheaper sea route to carry exotic oriental textiles,
aromatics and spices to Europe because transportation
o Britain retained the Cape of Good Hope, Mauritius and
by the Central Asian Silk Route had become increasingly

Ceylon.

expensive.

© Java was returned to Holland but Britain acquired a
foothold is Singapore in 1819.

Secondly, in the 16th and 17th centuries, the coastal
kingdoms were willing partners in seaborne trade. When

With India as the pivot of British presence, possession of
disputes led to hostilities, ships of the coastal trading these bases made the north Indian Ocean a ‘closed sea’.

kingdoms on the west coast of India did successfully
harry European ships, despite the superiority of European

With its central situation in the Indian Ocean, India
shipborne firepower. Ships of the Zamorin of Calicut’s fleet became a supplier of vast military manpower and resources.

often defeated the Portuguese. Ships of Maratha Chatrapati The defence of India and of the regional sea lines of imperial Shivaji and his successors bested British ships in many communication became a major consideration in Britain’s skirmishes.

expansion in Asia. India became ‘the keystone in the arch
of Imperial defence’.

Thirdly, when the wars in Europe spilled over into the

Indian Ocean, Indian kingdoms who were perpetually

The occupation of Aden in 1839, the opening of the
struggling for supremacy had no hesitation in manipulating Suez Canal in 1869, the laying of undersea telegraph the competing companies to their own advantage for short cables from Britain to her Indian Ocean bases in the 1870s, the advent of steam-propelled, propeller-driven
term gains. It was only when India became an independent, warships, the establishment of coaling stations, dry docks integrated nation in 1947 that one could talk of a ‘national and armament depots in the naval bases all combined to navy’.

underpin Britain’s Indian Ocean strategy.10 The core of this

The uncomfortable reality is that the feuds between strategy was: local chieftains and kingdoms facilitated the piecemeal

• To maintain the strongest ships of her fleet in British
subjugation by the European powers of the coastal sections
waters and deploy smaller-older-weaker squadrons
of India. Whenever local rulers were weak and naive, the
in distant bases. As soon as a threat was reported to

Europeans successfully manipulated circumstances to

Britain’s sea lines of communication, warships of the
their own advantage.8 On the other hand, when faced
appropriate power and speed would be directed by
with strong rulers, manipulative subjugation was rarely
telegraph to converge on the threat. In the event of a
successful.

prolonged confrontation, reinforcements would be

There is some substance in the view that the European
moved in from elsewhere.

trading companies would have done better for themselves • To prevent rival powers from establishing a naval base if they had resisted the temptation to meddle in local
in the Indian Ocean. Without access to a friendly base,
squabbles.9
no hostile warship could operate in this oceanic expanse
for any length of time.

British Predominance in the 19th Century

At the beginning of the 20th century, the location of

During the Napoleonic Wars, Britain had captured the Britain’s naval bases and the segments of the Indian Ocean Cape of Good Hope in 1806, seized Mauritius (France’s
sea-lanes that they controlled were:

8

Internecine feuds and squabbles led to the endless wars for empire between the rulers of European nations. They led to the colonisation of Asia, Africa and the Americas. They continue to this day, as do their manipulations by vested interests.

9

Thomas Saunders,® a perceptive employee of the English East India Company, wrote to his directors in London from his governor’s seat at Fort St David in 1751:

“We must recognise that if the Europeans had not interfered in their affairs and had left India's princes to resolve their own quarrels that might have been infinitely more beneficial to the trade."

10. Reference Note No 2 elaborates this strategy, (page 410)

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 3

the effectiveness of the German Cl-boat campaign against

The base in:

Controlled the sea-lane:

the oil and food sea lines of communication (SLOCs)

Simonstown (South Africa)

around the Cape of Good

Hope
across the Atlantic. The thirst for oil for military and naval
operations led to fears that there might be a global oil

Aden
through the Red Sea
shortage.

Bahrain
through the Persian Gulf

The United States entered the war in 191712. Its massive

Trincomalee (Ceylon)

across the North Indian Ocean
contribution in men and material to the defeat of Germany

Singapore
through the Straits of Malacca
marked the first step in the world’s acceptance of the US
as a global power. Its role in the Peace Treaty of Versailles

The Emergence of Oil as a Strategic National Interest
and the founding of the League of Nations confirmed this
position.

Coal combustion had led to coal-fuelled steam-propelled
warships. The discovery of oil11 led to oil-fuelled steam-

During this war, new forms of warfare made their debut
propelled warships.

and changed the nature of war:

• Naval air power in the form of aircraft carriers.

As oil replaced coal as the primary source of energy,

America, Britain, Russia, Germany and Japan, all

• Unrestricted submarine warfare.

realised the importance of oil for the sustenance of their

• Land based air power in the form of fighter, bomber
industrialised economies in peace and the mobility of their
aircraft and aerial reconnaissance.

armies and navies in war.

• Fast, tracked, armoured vehicles like tanks and personnel

The discovery of oil in Persia raised the importance of the
carriers.

Persian Gulf region. Britain, which already had major stakes

• Chemical warfare.

in this region because of its proximity to its arch imperial
rival Russia, now had increased interest because of oil.

All these forms of warfare were dependent on oil fuel

Territories which had originally been brought under British and its derivatives.

rule or influence to secure India’s maritime flanks now came

Betw een the Wars
to acquire a strategic importance in their own right.

In the ‘new world order’ after 1918, the Austro-Hungarian

The 1914-1918 World War
and Ottoman empires were carved up into numerous

In the First World War of 1914-1918, Britain, France and small states. America and Britain quickly created protege Japan fought against Germany and Russia.

kingdoms (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Syria, Jordan) and
sheikhdoms (Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, Oman, the Trucial

At the outbreak of the war in 1914, the world’s leading oil States) in the oil rich areas around the Persian Gulf. In these producers were the United States, Russia and Mexico. New states and sheikhdoms, they established their proprietary oilfields were being discovered in Persia and Mesopotamia
oil producing companies. In the late 1920s, when the first
and exploratory drilling had begun. Both Britain and

Iraqi well was drilled, 200 wells were producing in Iran. In

Russia were seriously concerned about their respective oil

1931, the first well was drilled in Bahrain. Care was taken
supplies from the Gulf and from Baku, on the borders of to ensure that all Gulf oil production remained firmly under the Caspian Sea, in view of the threat to these areas posed Anglo-American control.

by the Ottoman Turkish Army.

In the 1930s, all the major world powers started rearming.

By the end of this war, the central place of petroleum

Russia already had oilfields in the Caspian Sea and knew
in world strategy had become obvious. British and French
that there was plenty of oil in nearby Iran. Germany and
dependence on the United States for oil proved to be one Japan, having no assured access to oil in case of war, of the most critical logistic crises of the war. At one point,
planned to stockpile enough oil to sustain their campaigns

Britain was on the verge of ending hostilities because of
until they secured the nearest oilfields. In its contingency

11. The first oil well was drilled at Titusville in Pennsylvania in the USA in 1859. The CIS became the pioneer in the commercial production of oil. As the imperatives of the Industrial Revolution exerted their pressures, the demand for oil grew. Geologists quickly recognised that the conditions existing in the USA had to be duplicated in other parts of the world. The search for new petroleum fields, employing American-pioneered exploratory drilling, spread around the globe and reached the Persian Gulf. In 1911, Persia (now Iran) became the first country in the Persian Gulf to produce petroleum in commercial quantities.

12. In his address to Congress on 2 April 1917, US President Wilson declared, “The present German submarine warfare against commerce is warfare against mankind. It is a war against all nations”.

4 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

plans, Germany, in addition to developing an oil substitute,

For the next four years, the Allied Powers’ - the Gnited
planned to first capture the oilfields in Romania and later States, the Soviet Gnion, Britain and France were ranged in the Caspian Sea; Japan planned to capture the oilfields against the Axis Powers’13 - Germany, Italy and Japan.

in the Dutch East Indies (Indonesia).

In Southeast Asia, Japan’s Navy had within a few days

The 1939-1945 World War - Indian Ocean Aspects
successfully crippled British and American naval and

When the Second World War broke out in 1939, it was a maritime power. By the end of March 1942, Japanese armies had occupied the Dutch East Indies and their

European conflict between Germany and an Anglo-French- oilfields, Singapore, Malaya and Burma and started Polish coalition. Mo immediate threat was perceived to advancing towards India.

Britain’s naval supremacy in the Indian Ocean. Gntil
mid 1941, the British Joint Planning Staff in India were

Japanese naval forces captured the Andaman
preoccupied with sustaining the Anglo-German land and Nicobar Islands in the Bay of Bengal, bombed battles in Egypt.

Visakhapatnam on the east coast of India and attacked
and paralysed merchant shipping in the Bay of Bengal. A

America’s relations with Japan had deteriorated over pincer attack was being planned - overland into northeast several years. In September 1940, Japan coerced German- India toward the oilfields of Assam and over the sea to occupied France into giving up northern Indochina. capture Ceylon. This invasion could not take place. The America retaliated by prohibiting the export to Japan of Indian Army blocked the landward advance into northeast steel, scrap iron, and aviation fuel.

India

In April 1941, Japan signed a neutrality treaty with the

In April, a Japanese fleet entered the Indian Ocean and

Soviet Gnion as insurance against a Soviet attack in case sank British naval ships off Colombo and Trincomalee.14
conflict erupted with Britain or America whilst Japan started
occupying Southeast Asia. When Germany attacked the

To avoid further losses and regroup, the remnants of the

Soviet Gnion in Junel941, Japan considered terminating British Navy in the Indian Ocean withdrew westwards to its treaty with the Soviet Gnion and attack it from the east. the coast of Africa and attacked the French naval base at It chose instead to concentrate on Southeast Asia.

Diego Suarez on the northern tip of Madagascar.15

On 23 July 1941 Japan occupied southern Indochina.

The closure of the Suez Canal had resulted in all

Two days later, America and Britain froze Japanese assets. shipping to and from the Indian Ocean having to go The effect was to prevent Japan from purchasing oil and around the southern tip of Africa. This concentration of strategic metals, which would help cripple its army, navy shipping attracted the attention of German submarines.

and air force. Japan had only six months oil reserves. It By mid 1943, German G boat operations had extended decided to secure the resources of Southeast Asia before around the Cape of Good Hope and northwards into the it was too late.

Mozambique Channel, which was a focal area for shipping
proceeding to and from the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf.

On 7 December 1941, the Japanese Navy attacked Several G boats penetrated the Persian Gulf in 1944.

Pearl Harbour in the middle of the Pacific Ocean and
inflicted severe damage on the battleships of the GS

Japanese submarines also operated in the Indian

Pacific Fleet. On the same day, Japanese forces struck Ocean and sank shipping as far west as the Mozambique the American bases in the Philippine Islands and the Channel.

British bases in Hong Kong, Siam and Malaya. On the

These
distant
submarine
deployments
entailed

8th December, America declared war on Japan. On the
replenishment of fuel and food and rest and repair bases

10th December, Japanese torpedo bombers operating between missions. Three rest and repair bases were from Saigon in southern Indochina sank the two British established in Japanese occupied ports: battleships that had arrived to defend Singapore. On 11th

December, Germany and Italy declared war on America.

• Penang, off the west coast of Malaya, was the main

The Soviet Gnion had already entered the War after
submarine base. The first German G boat entered in

Germany invaded it on 22 June 1941.

Ju ly 1943.

13. Treaties between Germany, Italy and Japan in 1936-1937 brought into being the Berlin-Rome-Tokyo Axis. The Axis Powers thereafter became the collective term for these countries and their allies.

14. See Reference Note 4, page 411.

15. See Reference Note 5, page 413.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 5

• Batavia (Jakarta) in the Dutch East Indies was the

These documents also reveal the basis for developments
second base.

in the Indian Ocean during the second half of the 20th
century and the Anglo-American mindsets during this

• Singapore’s repair base was operational from mid 1944 period.

until it was recaptured in 1945.

Of particular interest are the 1946 assessments of India

Throughout 1943 and 1944, German U boats were and her potential by the General Headquarters of the deployed on offensive operations in the Indian Ocean,

Commander in Chief India.17
replenishing from tankers and proceeding to Penang for
rest and repairs.

Strategically, the British were extremely apprehensive of
what the Soviet Union would do, particularly in the context

The recapture of the Andaman Islands was delayed by of the Great Game that Britain and Russia had played in three years. The British Navy could not control the Bay of Central Asia for nearly a hundred years to counter each Bengal until the Japanese Fleets had been overpowered.

other’s expansion

This was achieved by the United States Navy after the

.18
major Pacific Ocean battles in the Coral Sea on 7th and 8th

The crux of the British fears was:

May 1942 and off Midway in June 1942.

• When they evacuated India, the Russians would

In 1943, the British Navy returned to Trincomalee. In
penetrate and there would be no effective defence of

June 1944, ships from the British squadron at Trincomalee

India against external dangers.

carried out the first bombardment of the Andaman Islands.

• If India became
dominated
by the

Russians,

A year later, after more battleships had been assembled,
communications with Australia and New Zealand would
bombardment of the islands led to the surrender of the
be cut off.

Japanese garrison.16

• The position of the British Commonwealth would

British Strategic Perceptions Regarding India in 1946
be seriously injured because India would cease to be
a participant in the British Commonwealth Defence

As the 1939-1945 World War neared its end, it was clear

System.19
that the world order based on the British Empire had come
to an end. The United States and the Soviet Union had

The British Jo in t Planning Staff Memorandum of 1947
emerged as the contestants for global dominion.

for the India-Burma Committee on ‘Strategic Requirements
in India’ therefore started positioning Pakistan as a

In 1980, Her Majesty’s Stationery Office published “The

Transfer of Power 1942 to 1947”. These volumes contained
possible ally in the event that a ‘hostile’ India emerged.

This document stated that:

the Top Secret and Secret correspondence between the

Viceroys and Commanders in Chief in India and their

“The area of Pakistan is strategically the most important
counterparts in the British Government in London in the in the continent of India and the majority of our strategic years prior to 1947 regarding the strategic implications of requirements could be met, though with considerably India becoming independent.

greater difficulty, by an agreement with Pakistan alone.”

These documents reveal three consistent strands of

In hindsight, it is clear that a pro-Pakistan mindset not
strategic anxiety:

only governed British policy when Pakistan invaded Jam m u

• The threat of Russia invading India after the British left.

and Kashmir in October 1947; it was also conveyed to the

• The serious implications for Imperial Defence if an

U S when the British told them that with the end of the
independent India opted out of the British Commonwealth

British Empire looming, Britain would hand over the baton
and became susceptible to Russian influence.

to the US.

• The feasibility of propping up an independent Pakistan

Even though the

1939-1945 War had greatly
against threats from Russia and India.

impoverished Britain, she still enjoyed the prestige of
a great power. She saw herself as a true partner of the

16. See Reference Mote 6, page 413.

17. See Reference Mote 7, page 413.

18. See Reference Note 8, page 416.

19. To hedge against this contingency, the British Government in London was promising the British Indian Government in India as early as 1944 that the Royal Indian Navy would be given modern ships after the war ended.

6 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

United States - equal in status and influence if no longer

America started providing substantial economic and
in actual power. She still ruled over a vast empire and her military assistance to these and other countries bordering American ally continued to defer to her the leading role the Soviet Gnion to preserve their pro-GS orientation and in South Asia and the Middle East. At the time of India’s from 1947 onwards, GS policy had two priorities: independence, America was content to follow the British
lead in the region.

© To maintain uninterrupted, the flow of oil from the Persian

Gulf, at a reasonable price, to the capitalist industrialised

American Indian Ocean & Persian Gulf Policy
nations of the world (most of whom became its allies in

During the Cold War - 1947 to 1991
the Cold War against Communism).

In the years after the war, additional discoveries of oil

© To counter the political and military influence in the
in Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Abu Dhabi and Dubai made the
region which the Soviet Gnion enjoyed because of its
contiguous border with Iran along the Caspian Sea.

Persian Gulf the world’s major source of liquid energy. The

Soviet Gnion, having surplus oil, could assure its availability

This was to be achieved through a series of alliances
to its proteges. For the Gnited States, it was vital to ensure and arms supply relationships. It signified the beginning the security of oil supplies from the Persian Gulf to the of the GS decision to globally counter Soviet interests and

‘non-communist world.’

started the Cold War that was to last until 1990.

In 1946, a dispute erupted between Iran and the Soviet

After the Suez crisis and the Arab Israeli war in 1956,

Gnion regarding Iran’s northern border with the Soviet state the credibility of Britain and France in peacekeeping in the of Azerbaijan.20 The Soviet Gnion took a rigid stand. The Middle East evaporated. The GS Administration concluded Soviet Gnion’s immediate proximity to the oilfields of the that ‘the existing vacuum in the Middle East must be Persian Gulf loomed as a threat to GS oil supplies. Fearing filled by the Gnited States before it is filled by Russia.’

that pro-Soviet groups might eventually topple the fragile The GS assumed this responsibility and codified it in the regimes in Iran, Greece and Turkey and send them into Eisenhower Doctrine.22
the Soviet bloc, America declared the Truman Doctrine in

1947.

The Nixon Administration fashioned what came to be
known as the Nixon Doctrine.23 The GS would draw back

The gist of the 1946 Truman Doctrine was that ‘the militarily from selected areas of the world and rely on local GS must support free people who are resisting attempted allies to make the primary contribution to self-defence and subjugation by armed minorities or outside powers.’ It local security.

declared the GS commitment to preserve the pro-West

In the Persian Gulf, this was supplemented by its Twin
orientation of states in the Persian Gulf bordering the Pillars’ policy wherein the GS sought to promote Saudi-Soviet Gnion to preclude the Soviet Gnion from gaining Iranian cooperation in maintaining stability. This policy control of the region.21
fitted neatly into the plans of the Shah of Iran to acquire the

The GS secured military facilities in Dhahran (Saudi armed muscle necessary to protect the Iranian oil lifeline Arabia) in 1947 and port facilities in Bahrain for GS Navy running the length of the Persian Gulf. It was strengthened ships in 1949. Today Bahrain is the base for the GS Navy’s by the Saudi decision to embark on a similar programme Fifth Fleet.

to arm itself. The GS played the major role in helping

20. See Reference Note 9, page 417.

21. The Truman Administration had in any case decided that any further progress of Communism would adversely affect American interests. The Truman Doctrine of extending American economic and military aid to European countries (known as the Marshall Plan) to contain the Soviet Gnion’s expansion in Europe was the first step in America’s global strategy to contain the Soviet Union’s expansion in Europe.

22. The Eisenhower Doctrine enunciated in January 1957 sought to contain and reduce the growth and spread of Arab nationalism and radical forces, which were perceived as a sign of increasing Soviet influence in the region. The doctrine premised that the GS must be prepared to use its armed forces "to secure and safeguard the territorial integrity and political independence of such states, requesting any aid against overt armed attack and aggression from any country controlled and directed by international Communism." The doctrine declared a very strong commitment to eliminate Soviet influence in the Gulf region.

23 The Nixon doctrine sought to avoid repetition of the Vietnam experience by using regional surrogate states, instead of direct involvement, to protect GS interests The doctrine’s emphasis was to build and militarily strengthen American allies in the region who saw their interests tied to GS interests and objectives in the area. Countries threatened by communist aggression must take the primary responsibility for their defence. This did not mean that GS forces had no military role; what it did mean was that threatened countries had to be willing to bear the primary burden of supplying the manpower. It undertook to provide arms and money to nations in the path of direct or indirect aggression, if they could provide the men.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 7

Saudi Arabia to procure modern weaponry and training

Iran and would maintain relations with Iran in foreign policy,
for its armed forces believing that cooperation between
economics and security. In the end of 1978, a conservative

Iran and Saudi Arabia would ultimately protect GS security Islamic revolution, inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini, took interests.

over and forced the Shah to abdicate.

In 1968, Great Britain announced a total withdrawal of its

The GS Administration was now faced with progressive
remaining military forces east of Suez. This was immediately instability in the strategic ‘Northern Tier’ of the Middle followed by the first deployments of Soviet naval ships in East that had been designed in the Eisenhower era to the Indian Ocean. The Soviet Navy’s deployments to the block the Soviet Gnion’s southward expansion - Turkey, northern Indian Ocean in 1967-68 stemmed from two Iran, Afghanistan and Pakistan were all becoming developments:

unstable. This led to the temporary deployment to the

Indian Ocean of aircraft carriers from America’s Pacific

• To fill the vacuum following Britain’s 1964 decision to Ocean Fleet and the crystallisation of longer-range plans withdraw from ‘east of Suez’.

for the Indian Ocean - a Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)

• The threat to the southern Soviet Gnion posed by the and the expansion of the facilities in Diego Garcia.

4000-kilometre Polaris missiles that could arise if the

GS decided to deploy its nuclear-powered ballistic

America therefore now turned to a new ally Saddam
missile equipped submarines to the Arabian Sea. The Hussein in Iraq.25

G S’ development of facilities in Diego Garcia24 and in

By 1980, with Soviet help, Iraq had built up its military

Australia added to this apprehension.

strength to become the most powerful state in the Gulf.

To minimise the need for base facilities in the Indian The GS Administration started improving relations with Ocean littoral, the Soviet Navy relied on floating anchorages Iraq. Militarily, Iraq was the Gulf’s most important state and, having ships with repair facilities in international waters.

after Saudi Arabia, the Gulf’s most important oil producing
state. After its Revolution, Iran had become America’s new

During the 1973 Arab-Israel war, the Organisations of enemy.

Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries clamped a complete
embargo on oil exports to the GS because it supported

Iraq seized the opportunity of the Revolution in Iran to

Israel. To exert further pressure on the GS, the Organisation settle old territorial disputes. It invaded Khuzistan, where instituted a series of cutbacks in oil production that reduced

Iran’s oil fields were located. During the war, the GS
the availability of oil worldwide, created an acute shortage Administration facilitated arms sales to Iraq not so much to of oil and caused the price of oil to skyrocket.

support Mr Saddam Hussein, but out of antipathy toward

Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini. The Iran-Iraq war lasted from

By the mid 1970s, the GS realised that a permanent

1980 to 1988.26 Iran recovered its territory at an enormous
naval presence would be necessary for rapid deployment cost in lives. When Iraq resorted to chemical warfare, Iran in the Gulf. It planned to further develop Diego Garcia as a sued for peace.

basing facility for a GS task force in the Indian Ocean.

After Iraq won that devastating war, Mr Saddam Hussein

One of the first actions by the Carter Administration in
continued to pursue independent economic development

1977 was to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Gnion rather than letting transnational corporations reap profit leading toward a demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean.

from his country’s oil resources. He worked to form the

That effort was suspended as a result of Soviet and Cuban Arab Cooperation Council to join Iraq with Jordan, Egypt, intervention in the Horn of Africa.

and Yemen in a regional trading bloc.

In 1978, the GS increased the flow of arms and advisers

The Reagan Administration reiterated the re-imposition
to Iran to bolster the Shah of Iran’s efforts to counter of the Carter Doctrine, with the aims and intentions of growing domestic dissidence against ‘westernisation’. In the Truman Doctrine, which represented ‘an unequivocal response to Soviet concern over GS attempts to influence
commitment to respond, in whatever fashion necessary,
developments in Iran, the GS stated that whilst they to any strategic effort to gain a geopolitical presence in would not interfere in Iran’s internal affairs, the GS firmly the Gulf.’

supported the Shah in his efforts to restore tranquility in

24. See Reference Note 10, page 418.

25. See Reference Note 11, page 419.

26. See Reference Note 12, page 420.

8 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

MAJOR AND MINOR PORTS OF INDIA

INDHX

* MAJOR PORTS

* Minor Ports

Jakhau

> KANDLA

'^Nnvlnkhi
j»R ad
likka

IlAI-CHAi

Bafcshwjr,

Magdalla

Dhnmm.

(Damon

MUM B AI*

Gopa]piir<

J>Revadan<ia

Bavanapada y
yMurnd - Janjrra

Srn ardhan » Banker

Vllamai

VDabhol

VISHAKHAPATNAM

PJaigarb

Kakinada>

Devgarb V*' Uayodurg
tMalvan

A R A B I A N

MacbHJpatmun •

Wengurla

Nizam patnainp-^i/

>Rcdi

Vadarevu/

V m o r m u g a o

S E A

\Bctul

Ramaypatnamrf

\Karwar

BENGAL

VBclikeri

VHcmavar

VBhaikal
pCoondapoor
fMalpc

Vn IvW MANOAIjORR

I emple Sound / \ Port ConrwaJGs
v Mangalore

-f JSJewtSocnd

ANDAMAN

VfMqr»Baodv

\Kasaragod

| JRancac

VA/hiknl

Port AnsoaLi lEJrteislonnr

SCaimanorc

Port Mccdo^-s//^ Loccam Hr

LAKSHADWEEP

\lclljchcny

°

ISLANDS

W o I l'S f e 0 * 0

Amini/Kadmal

Porto Novo,

Knlpitti o
o Androlh

NagapattxouD'

Jackson Cr Dugoag Cr

Kavaratri 0

U n a Bay
o Knlpcm
klleppy Mnn.

Sum Bay
fOuilon

\KofacheL VcppalodaT

Mus Anch ® CarNicobar

BoQj Mafv

Wllinjam

[UTICORJN
o Mini coy

NICOBAR

SRT

LA N K A

ISLANDS

PnioMdow

St George* Ch (^Campbell

MALDIVE

ISLANDS

0

I N D I A N O C E A N

By the end 1980s, when it became clear from the Soviet

Certain facets of geo-strategy are, and will continue to

Onion’s reforms to dismantle its centralised economic be relevant: structure that the Cold War was nearing its end, there was

• The continuity in American Indian Ocean and Persian
a significant shift in CIS policy.

Gulf naval policy.

Mr John Lehman, the Secretary of the Navy said in his

• The continuing presence of western navies.

report for Fiscal year 1987 to the CIS Congress that:

• The trend towards entrusting to regional navies the

“We no longer depend on West Asia and the Gulf for
safeguarding of their respective segments of the Indian
our vital energy needs. Oil from this area now forms

Ocean SLOCs.

less than 5% of our total oil imports. Today the United

• The expectation that in the years ahead the Indian Navy

States has an Indian Ocean orientation at least equal to
could and should play a stabilising role in the northern
our involvement with Europe in war. We plan to deploy
half of the Indian Ocean.

two Carrier Battle Groups and one Battle Ship Group to
operate in the Indian Ocean”.

India has neither territorial claims nor any clash of
maritime interests. For over 30 years, it has steadfastly

Later, in the same report, the GS Chief of Naval supported the Gnited Nations resolution for this Ocean Operations, Admiral Watkins stated:

to be a zone of peace. It also has an efficient Army, Navy

“The scope of GS world wide interests focus on the
and Air Force to defend its interests. India’s contribution to
developing world and not necessarily as parts of a
regional stability will therefore be invaluable.

strategy to counter the Soviets in global war...”

India’s bilateral strategic and cooperative relationships

In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait to settle several disputes- with the GS, Russia and with other countries in the region territorial and financial. It led to the GS led Gulf War of
will need to reconcile, and be comfortable, with the reality

1991 that forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait.27 The that:

Administration of President Bush (Senior) described the

• The GS has made heavy investments over decades

Persian Gulf region as a ‘nerve centre’ of the industrialised
to safeguard its interests in the Indian Ocean and the
and developed Western economies. In the GS view, it was

Persian Gulf. Its forces are not going to leave soon. The
a “stark struggle against Iraq for domination and control of

Fifth Fleet will remain in the Persian Gulf, as will preoil resources of the region - these oil resources were not positioned intervention capability and its facilities in
only the life-blood of modern developed countries but also

Diego Garcia.

a vital element of military power.”

• Regardless of anti-American hostility in the Persian Gulf,

After the end of the Cold War in 1991, the dissolution
to which America has become accustomed over the
of the Soviet Gnion and the Warsaw Pact meant that the
decades, GS policies will, as in the past, adroitly manage

GS no longer had a global superpower to confront, except
regional disputes.

for China, which was seen as a long-term future rival.

Consideration began of how the GS should recast its Gulf

India has little to lose from this reality. Continued GS
policy and transform the roles of its Armed Forces.

presence will help ensure that Persian Gulf oil is available
at affordable prices without interruption. The G S effort

This bird’s eye view of American policy in the Persian Gulf to politically stabilise India’s neighborhood is in India’s makes it clear that the successive ‘Doctrines’ announced by interest.

the GS are links of a constantly evolving policy to maintain
control of the energy resources of the Persian Gulf.

The Indian Navy’s transition to eminence has been
timely and essential to secure India’s growing role as an

India’s Transition to South Asian Maritime Em inence
economic powerhouse and to contribute towards a secure
and prosperous region.

For the first time in the history of the Indian Ocean, India, a
littoral country, has emerged in the region extending from

It is against this background that the development of
the coast of Africa to Malaysia as the largest, most stable,
the Indian Navy during the period 1976 to 1990 is best
democratic, populous, multi-ethnic nation, whose modern viewed.

Navy is being looked at for its potential to contribute to
maritime stability.

27. See Reference Note 13, page 420.

10 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

2

D iego Garcia, Addoo Atoll And Gan

Diego Garcia

Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT),* by amalgamating the

Historical Background

Aldabra Islands and the Farquhar and Desroches islands

(all of which were purchased from the Seychelles, a British

The semicircular Chagos Archipelago, a group of islands Colony) with the Chagos Archipelago (which was formerly and coral atolls, is located in the central Indian Ocean, about a dependency of Mauritius).

1,000 miles (1,600 km) from the southern tip of India. It has

Under a bi-lateral agreement in 1966, the islands of
an area of 44 sq km encircling a V-shaped, 24 km long, 11
the BIOT were earmarked for defence purposes. Britain
km wide lagoon that is open at the north end.

leased Diego Garcia to the US for an initial period of 50

Diego Garcia is the largest of the fifty-two islands years, under dual British and US control, as part of their that comprise the archipelago. It was discovered by the worldwide communication network.

Portuguese in the early 1500s. In 1715, the island was

After 1966, most of Diego Garcias transient population
claimed by the French and governed from Mauritius. After was relocated to Mauritius and the Seychelles. In 1968, the English captured Mauritius in 1810, France formally Britain announced the withdrawal of its remaining military ceded possession in 1814.

forces east of Suez. This was immediately followed by the

In the past, under both French and English rule, the island first deployments of Soviet naval ships in the Indian Ocean.

was used primarily for coconut plantations. During French

Until l970, the production of copra from coconut palms
rule, the plantations flourished under individual ownership. was the only economic activity. About 350 people, most After France lost the area to England, the plantations were of them from Seychelles, were employed at the East Point sold to private companies based in Mauritius, Seychelles plantation. They picked and processed about 100 tonnes of and England. A coaling station and a phosphate mine coconut per month for export to India via the Seychelles.

were set up in the 19th century.

Britain finally withdrew its forces from east of Suez on

During World War I, the German commerce-raiding 30 November 1971. In 1971, when the US commenced cruiser Emden put into Diego Garcia for some time. During construction activity, only one plantation remained in World War II, Indian troops manned the coast battery guns operation and the last of the plantation workers and their and the seaplane base at East Point. Until the early 1950s, families were moved to Mauritius.

the island was used as a coaling station for ships travelling
between Australia, New Zealand and Indonesia to and from

From the outset, the littoral and island states of the
the Seychelles and Mauritius.

Indian Ocean protested against the development of Diego

Garcia. They wanted to preserve the ‘zone of peace’, non

In 1964, Britain decided to start withdrawing its forces militarised status of the Indian Ocean as embodied in from ‘East of Suez’ and pass on the strategic responsibility United Nations resolutions, but to no avail.

for the Indian Ocean to the USA. The Chagos Archipelago
was strategically situated at the centre of the Indian Ocean,

In June 1976, the islands purchased from the Seychelles
it lay out of the path of cyclonic storms and there was no were returned to the newly independent Republic of likelihood of any local political opposition. At the time, it Seychelles. After that date, the BIOT comprised only the was the best available choice for a naval base.

islands of the Chagos Archipelago.

On 8 November 1965, before granting independence to

From 1965 to 1976, the administrative headquarters of

Mauritius, Britain created a new colony called the British
the BIOT were at Victoria in the Seychelles. After 1976,

* See Reference Note 10, page 418.

DIEGO GARCIA

2 Nautical Miles

East Island

Barton point

A nchorage Area

RAMBLER

.Runway

Point Marianno

INDIA

TURTLE BAY

they were at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in

London.

The US Administration was now faced with progressive
instability in the entire strategic ‘Northern Tier’ of the Middle

The Development of U S Facilities in Diego Garcia

East that had been designed in the Eisenhower era to block
the Soviet Union’s southward expansion - Turkey, Iran,

Construction commenced in March 1971. A naval Afghanistan and Pakistan were all becoming unstable.

communications facility and an 8,000-foot runway were
commissioned in 1973. By 1974, a ship channel and

The US Administration decided to deter any direct
turning basin was dredged in the lagoon, the original intervention in Iran that the Soviet Union might be 8,000-foo : runway was extended to 12,000 feet, new tempted to contemplate. This led to the 1980 Carter hangars,
ways and accommodation were constructed

Doctrine.2 It created the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF)

in February 1980, which led to the temporary deployment
o nd all St.

ort facilities augmented.

to the Indian Ocean of aircraft carriers from America’s

Ourir,

1973 Arab-Israel war, the Organisations of

Pacific Ocean Fleet and the expansion of the facilities in
nb Pe
jm Exporting Countries clamped a complete

Diego Garcia.

-mbargc n oil exports to the US because it supported

Israel. To cert further pressure on the US, the Organisation

The new US defence posture in the Indian Ocean area
posited the need for pre-positioned materials to support
instituted a series of cutbacks in oil production that reduced the rapid deployment force and a more active US presence the availability of oil worldwide, created an acute shortage in the area. It was decided to further expand the facilities of oil and caused the price of oil to skyrocket.

at Diego Garcia in order to provide support for several pre

By the mid 1970s, the US concluded that the security of positioned ships, loaded with critical war supplies. By the oil supplies necessitated a permanent US naval presence end of 1980, the Naval Facilities Engineering Command for rapid deployment in the Persian Gulf. It planned to had advertised a $100 million contract for initial dredging further develop Diego Garcia as a basing facility for a US at Diego Garcia to expand the berthing facilities.

task force in the Indian Ocean.

In January 1983, the Rapid Deployment Force

In 1976, the US Senate opposed this expansion until transformed into the Central Command (CENTCOM), the President reported to Congress his Administration’s whose Headquarters were in the United States. For all efforts to negotiate with the Soviets on de-militarisation practical purposes, the Gulf Region came under the direct and naval arms limitations in the Indian Ocean. The control and protection of the United States. Diego Garcia Ford Administration turned down the suggestion on the saw the most dramatic build-up of any US location since grounds that negotiations on such matters were not in the the Vietnam War.

US interest while the Soviet Union and its Cuban surrogate

In 1986, on completion of a $500 million construction
were actively engaged in support of revolution in Africa, programme, Diego Garcia became fully operational as especially in Angola.

a Naval Support Facility. Thus, what began simply as a
communication station on a remote atoll became a major

In 1975 and 1976, Diego Garcia’s facilities were fleet and US armed forces support base by the 1980s.

expanded to provide logistic support for US Navy task
groups operating in the Indian Ocean. Additional projects

The 1990 Iraqi invasion of Kuwait marked the most
were undertaken in 1978.

intense operational period in Diego Garcia’s history. From

1 August 1990 to 28 February 1991, NAVSUPPFAC Diego

In the end of 1978, a conservative Islamic revolution, Garcia provided levels of support, which outstripped all inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini from France, took over and contingency planning. The base population doubled forced the Shah of Iran to abdicate.

almost overnight, with the deployment of a Strategic

The toppling of the Shah of Iran, the success of the anti- Air Command Bombardment Wing and other aviation American Iranian Revolution and the Soviet intervention in detachments. Diego Garcia became the only US Navy base Afghanistan in December 19791 combined to sharpen US that launched offensive air operations during Operation concern about the security of the oilfields in Iran.

Desert Storm.

1. President Carter's Secretary of State Zbignfew^^ednski, 's reported to ha^Publicly p ^ ^ ^ s o ^ e t e into an 'un-winnable war.

Mujahedeen six months before
in te rn e d in 1979^ ^

^

^

^

^ ^ ^

^ ^ ^

^

2. The Carter Doctrine stated, Any attempt^by any ou
necessary, including military force."

the vital interests of the CIS and such an assault will De repeneu uy y

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 13

There is no permanent civilian population in Diego

In 1960, the agreement was revised and Gan was leased

Garcia. In the mid-1990s, about 3,500 GS and British to Britain for 30 years beginning 1956 against an immediate military and contract civilian personnel were stationed
grant of 100,000 pounds and a further payment of 750,000
there.

pounds spread over an unspecified period as ‘project aid’.

In 1969, Britain agreed to provide an additional 500,000

Addoo Atoll
pounds for ‘developmental projects’. The essential features

In 1940, the British East Indies Fleet became seriously of the agreement were that the facilities could be used concerned about a foray by the more powerful Japanese
only for Commonwealth defence and for exclusive use by

Navy into the Bay of Bengal. Knowing that its naval bases

Britain.

in Colombo and Trincomalee were weakly defended, it

In 1974, Britain decided to close down Gan and
secretly built up fuelling and replenishment facilities at eventually withdrew in 1976. The Maldives then advertised Addoo Atoll in the Maldive Islands.

in leading papers in Hong Kong, Singapore and London

In February and March 1942, the Japanese captured inviting tenders for leasing Gan and the facilities thereon Singapore and Rangoon. Their next target was expected for any purpose considered reasonable. Apparently, the to be Ceylon. Except for the forces deployed to defend decision to advertise was taken because bilateral efforts to Colombo and Trincomalee, all other British warships in the interest the GS, Germany and France had not evoked any Indian Ocean were assembled at Addoo Atoll.

positive response.

In April, the Japanese Navy entered the Bay of Bengal.

In 1976, Gan had the following facilities:

The details of the naval operations that followed are

• A 9,000-foot Class A airfield.

summarised in the Reference Notes.

• Air surveillance radars, radio communication and

By 1944, the Japanese naval threat had ceased to
satellite tracking facilities.

exist. Addoo Atoll was no longer required. The British

• A naval anchorage and refuelling and watering

Fleet returned to Trincomalee from where it launched
facilities.

its operations to recapture the Andaman and Nicobar

• Living accommodation for a battalion.

Islands.

• Base facilities for 60 officers, 500 other ranks and local

G a n
manpower.

Gan is a small island in the Addoo atoll, the southernmost

India’s position was, and remains, that it is committed to
atoll of the Maldives Islands. In round figures, it is 700 miles the consensus that as a zone of peace’, the Indian Ocean from Sri Lanka, 350 miles from the southern tip of India,
should be free from military bases. Since Gan is within

700 miles from Cochin and 380 miles from Diego Garcia.

striking distance of India’s southern coast, it would be
not be in its strategic interest if Gan’s facilities were made

In 1956, Britain entered into an agreement with the available for military use by an inimical power.

Maldives for the establishment of a British Air Force staging
post at Gan and a radio station on the nearby island of

Operation Cactus in 1988 reinforced the close and

Hitadu.

friendly relations between India and the Maldives. These
continue to this day.

14 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

a d d o o a t o l l

G A M

The Development O f The Navy Till 1 9 7 5

O v erv iew
threats from Pakistan and China and the •

:wy tun; - to

Russia for its acquisitions after the U S arid Britain had

When India attained Independence from Britain in 1947,
declined naval assistance.

she had no overseas national interests. The role of the

• 1973 to 1975 when, after the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War,

Navy was straightforward - to defend India from seaward
the 1974-79 Defence Plan was formulated and Indo-
aggression.

Russian naval cooperation moved to a higher threshold.

Independent India’s overriding priority was the removal
of economic and social backwardness to bring India’s

Both the 1964-69 and the 1974-79 Defence Plans
millions into the mainstream. Her foreign policy was one
were approved after consideration of the threats, the inter
of friendship with all, with particular empathy towards
service priorities, the scarcity of foreign exchange, the
countries that were attaining independence after colonial
scope for self reliance, the likelihood of soft credit being
rule. Territorial border disputes with neighbouring countries
available for the requirements that had to be imported
that were a legacy of de-colonisation were to be resolved
and the capabilities and limitations of Defence R&D and
bilaterally or in the forum of the British Commonwealth or

Defence Production.

in the United Nations.

D e v elo p m e n ts B e tw e e n 1947 a n d 1965

The difficulty started in 1947 with Pakistan’s position

T h e Acqu isition o f S h ip s from Britain
on Kashmir. The situation became complex with the
contest for global supremacy between the United States

Even though the allocations to the Navy after Independence
and the Soviet Union, with both sides forging alliances
in 1947 were not high, a modest force was gradually built
and arming their Cold War allies. For India, the problem
up. India had chosen to remain a member of the British
aggravated in the 1950s when India declined the US

Commonwealth. As part of the “Commonwealth’s defence
invitation to participate in the Cold War and Pakistan
against the Soviet Union”, Britain provided warships to
accepted the invitation. Pakistan received generous

India, as it did to the other members of the Commonwealth.

military and economic aid as a CENTO and SEATO ally.

India paid Britain from the sterling balances that had

The aid was meant to counter communism. Everyone
accumulated for the services provided by India to Britain
knew that Pakistan intended to use it against India. The
during the 1939-45 World War. In sum, India was able
anti-communism facade faded when Pakistan seized the
to obtain its immediate defence requirements; Britain
opportunity to cultivate ties with Communist China after
was able to dispose of its war surpluses and at the same
the 1962 India-China border dispute.

time run down the war debt represented by the sterling
balances.

Against this brief backdrop, a bird’s eye view of the thirty
odd years of the Indian Navy’s development from 1947 to

Despite the Government disinclination to increase

1975 shows three peaks:

defence expenditure and even after meeting the pressing

• 1957 to 1959 when the Navy took measures to cope
needs of the Army and Air Force, the Navy’s percentage
with United States aid to the Pakistan Navy.

share of the defence budget rose from 4% in 1950/51 to 9%

• 1963 to 1965 when, after China’s intrusion in 1962,
in 1956/57 and 12% in 1959/60. From 1961 onwards, the
the 1964-69 Defence Plan was formulated to counter

Navy s allocation steadily declined to a low of 4% in 1964/65,

because of the pressing need to expand and modernise the

Army and the Air Force to cope with China.1
the coastal defence batteries and the responsibility for
coastal defence. The Army also handed over to the Navy

Reaction to the U S Build-up of the Pakistan Navy
the garrisoning and defence of the Andaman and Nicobar
slands; this would help to cope with Indonesia’s naval build

By 1956, Pakistan had joined the US-led anti-Communist up that had commenced in 1958 with Soviet assistance.

CENTO and SEATO alliances and had been promised
substantial naval assistance. The GS committed to directly

The 1963 review recommended that the Navy should
supply two destroyers and eight minesweepers and pay have a Fleet in the Arabian Sea and a Fleet in the Bay of Britain for refurbishing and supplying a cruiser and four Bengal, together with the requisite base and logistic support destroyers. To cope with this development, the Indian Navy facilities. The Government accepted the acquisition during obtained approval for the acquisition of destroyers from the 1964-69 Defence Plan of additional ships, submarines Britain and decided to retain the existing aging ships in and aircraft. These requirements were projected to the United Stares, the Soviet Union and Britain. In 1964,
commission. Together with the eight new frigates under high-level Inter Service Defence Delegations visited these construction in Britain, the expectation was that the countries. Only the Soviet Union was willing and able to increased number of ships in the Fleet would balance the meet the Navy’s requirements.

increased size of the Pakistan Navy.

The Leander Frigate Project

Since the Bombay Dockyard would not have been able
to berth the increasing number of ships, approval was Discussions and negotiations had been in progress with accorded in 1958 for setting up a major naval base at Britain since 1960 for the construction in India of frigates.

Vishakhapatnam and the immediate construction there of In October 1964, an agreement was concluded for a jetty and a base workshop.

Mazagon Docks in Bombay to collaborate with Britain to
build three Leander class frigates. The first Indian frigate

As an immediate measure to relieve the congestion of would be built to be in step with its latest counterpart being ships at Bombay and to ease the growing workload on the built in Britain for the British Navy. This would enable the Navy’s only Dockyard in Bombay, the Navy re-based some personnel deputed from India to acquire hands-on training ships at Cochin, Vishakhapatnam and Calcutta.

and facilitate step-by-step transfer of technology.

China’s Intrusion in 1962 and the 1963-64 Defence

The Changeover to Russian Naval Acquisitions

Review

In 1965, a succession of events precipitated the decision

The Chinese intrusion in the northern and northeastern land to acquire the ships and submarines that the Soviet Union borders in 1962 inflicted serious and humiliating military had offered in 1964, the acceptance of which had been reverses. It led to a comprehensive review of national security deferred:2
and of the pressing requirements of the Army, Air Force and • In April, Pakistan intruded into Indian territory in Kutch3

Navy. This 1963 reappraisal was based on the premise of • In May, Britain informed India that due to its financial continuing hostility from both Pakistan and China.

difficulties, after having extended credit for the Leander

To enable the Army to concentrate its attention on the

Frigate Project, it was unable to extend credit for a
land borders with Pakistan and China, the Navy took over
submarine to be built in a British shipyard.4

------- ------------------------- -------- _
frinatP* the second cruiser and the aircraft carrier had been ordered.

1. The ‘sterling balances’ had exhausted by 1957. By then the
g

.

hj

(an aircraft carrier, two cruisers, six destroyers,

Overall, the acquisitions from Britain during this period included second nano J

'

and a landing ship), followed later by eight new postwar frigates an, *;

^

^
and wanted t0 await Britain-S nnal response

2. The Navy had been diffident, and reluctant, to sever its traditional c submarine similar to those being built for the British Navy.

regarding financial assistance for constructing in Britain an
ero Pakistani memoirs revealed that it was
a rehearsal for

3- Prim a facie, the intrusion w as to resolve a border claim.

a more aggressive operation planned for taking over as mir i
conslcjered it unwise of India to start a Submarine Arm with

4. Su b s e q u e n t revelations indicated that a segment o f Britain’s N ^ ^ ^ ^
l0 the release of this latest technology in view of India's
an advanced subm arine like the Oberon. At another level,

PP
aftef ,ndia had signed the naval agreement with the S o v i e t developing defence relationship with the Soviet Onion. Ini November 1 9 ^ ^

^
therequi
n* of the Indian Navy met.by the

Union, Admiral Mountbatten was to write "I have been instrumental 'tnh9ed“ ' ^ oyerSi ,he organisations for building the frigates at Bom bay British Government, including the two cruisers the aircraft c
of a British submarine but alas it all took so long
etc. 1 had even m an ag ed to get m ore favourable ter™

Sridharan's 'Maritime History of India page 429.)

particular transaction fell through" (quoted in Rear

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 17

• In June, Indonesian intrusions increased in the Nicobar
calling itself as the ‘Voice of Kashmir’, of the setting up

Islands.5 The Navy recommended to the Government
of a Revolutionary Council to take over all authority in
an immediate increase in the naval presence in the Bay

Kashmir. Within days, however, it became clear to the
of Bengal to deter such intrusions.

world that this was a propaganda hoax. Soon, even

Pakistani newspapers ceased further propaganda. By

• Britain’s inability to extend credit to build a submarine

11th August, the Pakistan Army realised that Operation

(and its earlier expressed inability to meet the Navy’s

Gibraltar had flopped. From 15th August onwards, the
requirements for ships) and the need for increased naval

Pakistan Army stepped up its violation of the cease-fire
presence in the Andaman and Nicobar (A&N) Islands
line on the Srinagar-Leh road”.8
precipitated the Government’s decision to accept the
offer of ships and submarines that the Soviet Gnion had

“The firm decision that the Army should cross the
made in September 1964.

Cease-Fire Line to root out the infiltrators’ bases and,
in case Pakistan regular forces intervened, our forces

• In September 1965, an agreement was concluded
should be free to retaliate at any suitable place of their
for the acquisition from Russia of four submarines,
choice was taken on the night of 13th August by the
a submarine depot ship, five Petya class submarine

Prime Minister, when the Defence Minister and certain'

chasers, two Landing Ships Tank Medium and five patrol
boats, all for deployment in the Bay of Bengal and the
officials, including the Chief of the Army Staff, were
present. These decisions were taken on the request of

A&N Islands.

the Chief of the Army Staff that to check infiltration,

The 1965 W a r 6
the infiltrators’ bases should be destroyed and in any
fight between regular forces, the Services should not

Pakistan launched its Operation Gibraltar on 5th August.

be restricted. Shri Lai Bahadur Shastri was anxious to

Sixty companies of Pakistani personnel in disguise, armed
avoid any extension of the conflict but was determined
with modern weapons and explosives, infiltrated across the
that measures to liquidate infiltrators should be pursued
cease-fire line over a 700-kilometre front from Kargil to
vigorously. The Prime Minister gave expression publicly

Chhamb. Their task was to blow up bridges and disrupt
to the decision taken at his speech from the Red Fort
movement, to raid supply dumps, to kill VIPs and to cause
on 15th August, when he declared, “Resort to the sword
arson. The Indians as well as the local Kashmiris were
will be met with the sword”. And even as the speech was
taken by surprise.

being made, our troops occupied certain posts across

On 5th August itself, some infiltrators were apprehended.7
the Cease-Fire Line near Kargil and, in the following

“It was only on
days, occupied various places across the Cease-Fire

8 August 1965 that more detailed

Line, including Haji Pir and destroyed the infiltrators’

information about extensive infiltration by armed men
from Pakistan was provided to India’s Prime Minister,
hideouts.” 9

Shastri. The Prime Minister asked the Chief of the Army

When Pakistan Army Headquarters found that the tide

Staff to take whatever action he considered necessary to was turning against them, pressure mounted to retrieve prevent new infiltrations.

the situation by launching the third phase - Operation

“On 9th August, as per its pre-arranged plan, Pakistan Grand Slam - to capture Akhnoor and Amritsar. This announced a rebellion in Kashmir and the heroic exploits operation would require the Pakistan Army to move across of the freedom fighters who were helping them. It also the international frontier. On 1st September, a column of reported receiving a broadcast, by a secret radio station
seventy tanks and two brigades of troops drove towards

5. Aceh, the turbulent province in the northern tip of Indonesia s island of Sumatra is separated from the southern tip of India’s island of Great Nicobar by a mere 90 miles.

6. The details of the events leading up to, and the naval operations during the 1965 War have been discussed in the preceding volume titled Transition to Triumph - History of the Indian Navy 1965 -1975.’ In this volume, this war has been dealt with as briefly as possible so that the reader can co-relate the pattern of events with that in the 1971 War and again in the end 1990s.

7. In his foreword to Air Marshal Asghar Khan’s book The First Round’, Mr Altaf Gauhar, then Pakistan’s Secretary of Information and Broadcasting states: (Page xii).

'The truth is that the first four volunteers who were captured by the Indians described the whole plan in a broadcast on All India Radio on 8 August 1965, nearly a month before India crossed the international boundary.” On hearing these broadcasts, Pakistan realised that its secret plan was now open knowledge.

8. Mr CP Srivastava, the Private Secretary to Prime Minister Shastri in 1965, in his memoirs 'Lai Bahadur Shastri,’ Page 208.

9. Mr PVR Rao, the Defence Secretary in 1965, in his 1972 Lecture to the United Services Institution of India.

18 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Akhnoor Bridge to cut off the supply line from
the Punjab to Kashmir.

Intense air battles took place over the next
few days. The Pakistan Army achieved initial
surprise at Chhamb. By 5th September, when
they were only 20 miles from Jammu, on their
way to the crucial Akhnoor Bridge over the

River Chenab, the Air Force halted the Pakistani
columns at Jaurian.

“When the conflict started in the Jammu
area of Kashmir and their tanks came into
our territory where our tanks could not easily
go because the bridges were not strong
enough, there was a real dilemma. It was
still being thought of as a local battle. But
we realised that the terrain where we were
fighting was one where we were much more
vulnerable and communication depended
on a couple of bridges - if they were blown
up, we just would be completely cut off.

And, therefore, thought turned to using the
plan, which had been earlier evolved, for
marching into Lahore. But even then, it was
a very firm decision that we would not allow things to
been too long a hesitation to use it. But the feeling was
escalate into a full-scale war - I mean war in the legal
strong that if we could contain the Pakistani forces and
sense - between India and Pakistan.

hold them on land, then perhaps it would be wiser not

“Admiral Soman (India’s Chief of the Naval Staff) had
to get the Navy involved. I knew that the Navy was not
in the meantime - ever since the involvement of the Air
happy with this decision because they were very anxious

Force (on 1st September) - been straining at the leash
to go into action.’ 10
saying, ‘Look, let me go into action.’ But again the

At Naval Headquarters in New Delhi, the situation
same consideration, which was acting as a restraint - was quite vexed. After the Chinese intrusion in 1962, the on using the Air Force or going into Lahore - prevailed. Army had handed over the garrisoning and defence of the It was felt that if we now opened up another front off A&N Islands to the Navy. Between 1962 and 1965. close Karachi, it would become a major engagement and relations had developed between Indonesia and Pakistan.

would no longer be a matter of localised conflict. So Pursuant to Indonesia’s intrusions into the islands in 1964, the decision was taken that the operation to march into the best the Navy could do was to show a strong presence Lahore would be launched but that the Navy would not in the region with whatever ships were available. In August be involved.

1965, when Pakistan launched Operation Gibraltar, all the

“The Indian Army crossed the international border at operational ships of the Indian Fleet were in the Bay of Wagah on the morning of 6th December and headed for Bengal. When Pakistan’s intrusions started in August and Lahore. President Ayub (of Pakistan) went on the air. It the Navy considered bringing the Fleet back to Bombay was a very, very strong and angry broadcast. Admiral from the east, it was told not to get involved. When the Soman thought that the opening of the Lahore front Pakistan Army crossed the international border on 1st meant that a no-holds-barred situation had come and September, the Fleet was recalled to Bombay - ships he, I think, issued a signal that we were at war with arrived a week later in ones and twos because of their Pakistan. This signal had to be countermanded, because disparate speeds.

we did not want to go to that stage so soon. But still

“On 6lh September, the Pakistan Flotilla received
we realised that the Navy had the capability and if the the news that the Indian Army had attacked across the events so necessitated, I don t think there would have

10. Mr LK Jha, the Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister, in “Blueprint to Bluewater" Pages 460 et seq.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 19

international border in the Lahore area and ships sailed for
their pre-assigned war stations.

“On the afternoon of 7th September, Pakistan Naval

Headquarters directed a task group, comprising the
cruiser, five destroyers and a frigate, to bombard Dwarka
the same night and added that one or two enemy frigates
may be encountered in the area in addition to enemy air
threat. The task group refuelled from their tanker and
arrived off Dwarka at midnight. Dwarka was blacked out
and could only be identified on radar... After a four-minute
bombardment, the task group withdrew at full speed.” 11

The attack on Dwarka outraged India and humiliated
the Navy.12 There were questions in Parliament as to where
the Navy was and what it was doing. The fact was that the
ships of the Fleet had just trickled into Bombay and were
replenishing prior to sortying out on 10th September.

Gntil the cease-fire on 23rd September, the Fleet patrolled
off the coast of Saurashtra. No contact occurred with any
units of the Pakistan Navy.

Viewed in retrospect, the Navy’s development between

1947 and 1965 was steady:

• Eight new frigates from Britain had augmented the old
ships of the 1939-45 World War.

• The indigenous construction of a modern frigate, as
also minor war vessels, had been taken in hand.

• Agreements had been signed for the induction of

Russian ships and submarines.

refit and logistics procedures conformed to practices in the

• Gseful operational lessons had been learnt in the 1965 Soviet Gnion. And so on.

War.

Almost as soon as the ships and submarines

Developments Between 1965 and 1975
commissioned, the Indian side started suggesting

The Russian Acquisitions
modifications. Interaction between the Navies and with the

Fmm iQfifl
fu d

•
u-
designers and shipyards in the Soviet Gnion enabled some
contracted for in 1

S

^
sut,marines»

modifications to be incorporated before delivery. This

S s tech o '" in /h
p arnV,ng in india- The P0SitiVe interaCtion resuited in the Navy placing orders in more advanced th a n

W 3 S e n d 197 1 ^o r ^
m o r e P e t Y a class submarine chasers and
more advanced than the 1950s technology that had four more submarines entered service between 1958 and 1961 in the new British
frigates. On the other hand, these Russian vessels and ^ le Subm arines and the Build-up of Anti Subm arine their machinery and equipment had been designed for Proficiency the Soviet Navy - for colder temperatures, for colder and

• . r ,

The arrival of the submarines from 1968 onwards gave
less corrosive seas, for Russian dietary requirements, for the anti submarine frigates and the aircraft carrier’s anti Russian naval norms of fresh water consumption /capacity, submarine Alize aircraft their long awaited ‘exercise etc. The number of bunks conformed to Russian officer time with submarines. The increase in anti submarine and sailor branches and specialisations. The maintenance
effectiveness was, however, short of expectations. There
were several reasons:

11 The Story of the Pakistan Navy, pages 216 et seq.

,2-

,o m"

w m
in ,h= 1971
w » » » » „ „ „ »

lndi„ Heet ,0 bomb„ d poBS on Pakistan’s

20 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

o For the first time, the Navy came to grips with the of the sea. Britain was developing equivalent Seaking unusual hydrological conditions in Indian waters. These helicopters for its Navy.14
conditions favoured the submarines - they could lurk
in shadow zones beneath layers of sea temperature.

In 1969, approval was accorded for the Navy to acquire

Sonars mounted on ships hulls could not penetrate from Britain six Seakings and their homing torpedoes. In these layers - their sound waves got refracted. This

1970, an order was placed for their delivery in 1971. The
highlighted the urgent need for ships and helicopters Seakings arrived a few months before the Indo Pakistan to have sonars that could be lowered to depths at which War broke out in December 1971.

submarines could be detected.13

The Advent of Anti Ship Missiles
o The submariners were eager not only to demonstrate
their offensive potential in pro-sub exercises but also to After the Pakistan Navy’s bombardment of Dwarka in the work out their capabilities and limitations for operational

1965 War, Naval Headquarters had been deliberating
patrols during war. Submarine time had, therefore, to measures for the defence of the Kutch and the Saurashtra be shared between anti submarine work-up exercises, coast against Pakistani hit and run raids.

pro-sub exercises and training more submarine

In the early 1960s, the Soviet Gnion had supplied small,
personnel to enable the fledgling Submarine Arm to fast, thin-skinned boats armed with surface-to-surface grow.

missiles to the Indonesian and Egyptian navies. These
o The annual rotation of ships crews meant that personnel boats had also been offered to the Indian delegation that who had acquired anti submarine proficiency had had visited Russia in 1964, but their acquisition had been to be replaced by others who needed to acquire this accorded lesser priority because their effectiveness had yet proficiency. This retarded the overall build up of anti to be proved in war.

submarine expertise.

In the 1967 Arab-Israel war, anti ship missiles fired from
o The time lag in the setting up of specialised workshops an Egyptian boat deployed for harbour defence, summarily and test facilities resulted in ships’ sonars not being in sank, within minutes, an approaching Israeli frigate at a top condition.

range well beyond the latter’s guns. It heralded the eclipse
of gun battles between warships and the transition to swift

The Seaking Anti Submarine Helicopters
missile engagements beyond visual range.

In 1964, the CIS had loaned the Pakistan Navy its first

In 1968, the Navy obtained approval to acquire missile
submarine, the Ghazi. After the 1965 War, the Pakistan boats from Russia, primarily to deter Pakistani ships from Navy’s programme for acquiring French Daphne class bombarding the Kutch and Saurashtra coast. In 1969, an submarines with longer-range torpedoes made it clear agreement was concluded with Russia for the supply of that it intended to concentrate its offensive potential in missile boats. Eight of these boats arrived in early 1971.

submarines and deploy its surface flotilla defensively.

The Russian Acquisitions

At this time, the GS Navy was developing anti submarine
helicopters equipped with ‘dunking’ sonar that could be By 1971, four submarines, a submarine depot ship, a lowered into the sea while hovering and armed with submarine rescue vessel, two landing ships, five submarine an air-dropped, anti submarine homing torpedo. This chasers, and five patrol boats had arrived and were based innovative combination overcame the hazards that surface in Vishakhapatnam. Though they had been acquired for ships faced when combating a submarine. Firstly, being the Bay of Bengal and the A&N Islands, they had started airborne, the helicopter could not be hit by a submarine exercising in the Arabian Sea as well. The eight missile torpedo. Secondly, by having a sonar device, whose depth boats were based in Bombay.

under the surface could be raised and lowered to obtain

To support these acquisitions, work had commenced in
maximum detection range, the helicopter could overcome Vishakhapatnam on the construction of a new Dockyard, adverse hydrology and deprive the submarine of its ability of submarine support facilities, of torpedo preparation to evade detection by lurking below the temperature layers
facilities and of training facilities. The construction of the

13. In ships, these sonars were called variable depth sonars. In helicopters, they were called 'dunking sonars’.

14 The Seakinq gearboxes were of US origin. When the OS imposed sanctions after India's nuclear tests in 1998 some Seaking gearboxes

' were in the US for overhaul and came within the purview of the sanctions, it took several years for these gearboxes to be returned even after the sanctions were lifted. The Chapter on Defence Procurement discusses the nuances of such vexatious embargos.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 21

new workshops was retarded, however, by the sinking of mines. There was no air threat after Indian Air Force attacks their floors, due to the inability of the local marshy soil
grounded aircraft in East Pakistan.

to bear their heavy weight. These delays in setting up

Carrier borne aircraft avoided attacking neutral merchant
maintenance and refit facilities seriously afflicted the shipping at sea. They concentrated on immobilising operational state of Russian equipment.

Pakistani vessels and cratering all airstrips, which Pakistani

The Leander Frigate Project
forces in East Pakistan might use to escape capture. Ships
of the Eastern Fleet enforced contraband control until

The construction of the first two frigates had commenced tasked with an amphibious landing to cut off escape routes but was behind schedule due to the teething problems of into Burma.

start up, the changeover from British analogue electronics
to Dutch digital electronics in radars, fire control systems

Pakistan’s forces in the east laid down their arms after a
and AIO from the second frigate onwards and the problems short, sharp campaign of thirteen days. The new nation of of indigenising major items like the propulsion and auxiliary Bangladesh came into being.

machinery systems.

The situation in the Arabian Sea was altogether different.

Aircraft for Vikrant

The submarine, surface and air threats were higher. There
were differences in the assessment of these threats between

The only aircraft that could replace the aircraft carrier’s

Naval Headquarters and Headquarters Western Naval
ageing Seahawks were the GS Navy’s A4 Skyhawks.

Command. These were serious enough for FO C IN C W EST

Efforts to acquire the A4s had not been successful. It was to voice his concern.

decided, therefore, to avail of the opportunity to acquire the

Seahawks being disposed of by the German Navy. These

The first missile boat attack on Karachi, launched from
aircraft arrived in 1968 and were to prove useful in 1971.

Saurashtra along the coast, was a success - it sank a Pakistani
destroyer and a coastal minesweeper. In Naval Headquarters

The 1971 W ar15
and Headquarters Western Naval Command, however, there

During the months preceding the outbreak of war in was restlessness at the Western Fleet’s diversion southward December 1971, there were developments connected with to shake off Pakistani reconnaissance aircraft because this the two latest acquisitions - the Russian missile boats and the diversion delayed the second missile boat attack that was British anti submarine helicopters. The first was the working to be launched by the Fleet from seaward. After the Fleet through of the innovative concept of Fleet ships towing the regrouped, it detached ships to attack Karachi and the tiny, limited-range but fast and powerful, missile boats into Makran ports on night 6/7 December. On the afternoon of the Arabian Sea from where they could be detached, under 6th December, Naval Headquarters intervened to cancel the escort, to carry out a missile attack and to be taken back Fleet’s attack on Karachi.16
in tow after the attack. The second was to maximise the

Gnknown to the Indian side, the Pakistan Flotilla had
effectiveness, in tropical hydrological conditions, of the new prudently withdrawn into Karachi harbour: Seakings against Pakistan’s newly acquired Daphne class
submarines. The missile boat innovation was successful.

“After the missile attack, the position of the surface

The Seakings were not fully exploited.

ships at sea became almost untenable, as they had no
defence against missiles. On 7th December, the Flag

There was a sharp contrast between the type of

Officer Commanding the Flotilla, after consulting his
operations in the Bay of Bengal (Eastern Naval Command)

sea going commanders, met the C-in-C. He acquainted
and those in the Arabian Sea (Western Naval Command).

him with the prevailing situation and suggested a

In the Bay of Bengal, there was no surface threat. At the
withdrawal of the ships inside the harbour in order to
very beginning of the war, the submarine threat vanished
escape a missile attack, which was most likely to occur.

after the GS-Ioaned, Pakistan submarine, Ghazi, exploded

The ships would of course be more susceptible to air
at the entrance to Vishakhapatnam harbour whilst laying
attack there, but could also provide a powerful anti
aircraft threat, particularly against a low flying attack.

15. The details of the events leading up to, and all the naval operations during the 1971 War have been discussed in the preceding volume titled Transition to Triumph - History of the Indian Navy 1965 - 1975.'

18. That very morning a Pakistan Air Force aircraft had mistakenly attacked a Pakistan Navy frigate on patrol off Karachi. India’s Chief of aval Staff assessed that the state of alertness off Karachi signified by this incident warranted a postponement of the missile boat attack speeding to strike Karachi that night.

22 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

M ISSILE ATTACKS O N KARACHI O N NIGHTS O F 4/5 A N D 8/9 DECEMBER 1971

SMjMADHUMATI

C ro srsd C31C45

NORTH ARABIAN SEA

(N sx k o lM ik s)

It was, therefore, decided to withdraw all ships to the racing towards Karachi. Once again, the missile attack harbour on 8th December, except for the fleet oil tanker, achieved surprise. Fortuitously, a missile set Karachi's fuel storage tanks aflame and another hit
which was fully loaded. It had to stay out because of the

Dacca, the Pakistan

Navy’s tanker, at the anchorage.

fire hazard within the harbour by its presence and also
since its deep draught restricted entry into port. The oil

These two missile attacks on Karachi resulted in
tanker Dacca was, therefore, ordered to anchor with the international shipping seeking from the Government of other merchant ships away from the port.

India in New Delhi an assurance for safe passage out of

Karachi. The Western Fleet had achieved dominance of

The Indian Fleet planned its next attack for night 8/9 the sea approaches to Karachi.

December - a missile boat attack on Karachi and gun
bombardment of Jiwani on the Makran coast to divert

However, once again, there was restlessness in Naval
attention from the missile boat group. The bombardment Headquarters and Headquarters Western Naval Command group, under the cruiser Mysore, apprehended Pakistani at the Mysore Group not bombarding Makran to avenge merchant ship Madh.uma.ti south of Jiwani after she a
the 1965 bombardment of Dwarka.

transmitted an SO S to Karachi. After Madhumati had

On 7th December, Naval Headquarters prodded
been boarded, FO C W EF called off the gun bombardment FOC1NCWEST to do something about the Pakistani of Jiwani as he considered the merchant ships SOb to submarine that had been reliably D/F’d off Bombay. On Karachi a sufficient distraction for the missile attac group

Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan published in Pakistan in 1972, soon after the war.

17. Excerpt from “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership by Maj

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 23

8th December, two frigates,

The first conclusion was that large-calibre gun

Khukri and Kirpan. were sailed
from Bombay to ‘flush' this submarine away from the
engagements between warships were no longer likely.

Saurashtra coast where ships were assembling for the next Anti ship missiles would dominate future surface warfare.

Small calibre guns would be essential for defence against
missile attack on Karachi.

incoming missiles. This led to the decision that future

On the evening of 9th December, the Pakistani submarine ships should be equipped with surface-to-surface missiles Hangor successfully torpedoed and sank the Khukri.18 A and high rate-of-fire small calibre guns. To start with, a sustained anti submarine operation over the next four days squadron of eight longer-range missile boats was acquired was unable to prevent the Hangor’s return to Karachi.19
from Russia. The next step was to graft a complete Russian
missile boat system on to the British-built frigate Taltuar On the evening of 10th December, an Alize aircraft was and into a missile coast battery at Bombay. From 1976
sent to probe suspicious activity near the Indo-Pakistan onwards, all the new ships like the 800-tonne ocean going naval border off Jakhau. It ended in a fatal chance
encounter. The Alize fell prey to a Sidewinder missile fired

Durg class rocket boats, the Rajput class destroyers, the

Godavari class frigates, the Khukri class corvettes, and
by a homeward-bound Pakistani fighter aircraft.

their successors, were equipped with missiles, rapid fire

The war ended on 17lh December when Pakistan guns and active / passive means of electronic warfare. In accepted India’s offer of a cease-fire.

due course, the new improved Seakings and the new Sea

Harriers were equipped with anti ship missiles.

In Retrospect

• In the West, the Fleets rigorous work up and preparation

The second conclusion was that defence against
for war validated the maxim that flexibility in battle is a modern conventional submarine required a three-gained only through long and arduous preparation.

dimensional anti submarine capability:

The loss of the Khukri was the result of the contentious

• In the air - M RASW aircraft and anti submarine
notion: “How can we have an enemy submarine sitting
helicopters with better weapons.

outside Bombay and do nothing about it.” Had the

© In ships - improving the effectiveness of existing sonars,
new Seaking anti submarine helicopters acquired from
fitting better sonars and anti submarine weapons in

Britain been as rigorously worked up for anti submarine
new ships and improving the prediction of hydrological
operations against Daphne class submarines as the
conditions.

missile boats had been worked up by the Fleet for
missile action at sea, the outcome may well have been

© Under the sea - acquiring Hunter-Killer (SSK) submarines.

different. The lethality of the Daphne’s long-range The Post War Defence Reviews torpedoes was known. Khukrfs deliberate decision to
search at slow speed so as to increase the chances In 1973, the Government constituted an Apex Committee, of her sonar detecting the submarine at longer range headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Planning sealed her fate.

Commission. Its task was to examine the immediate

• In both Fleets, the material state of ships was poor requirements of the three services based on a re-assessment despite a pre war preparation period of seven months.

of the threat and to dovetail its recommendations with the

The fact that they achieved what they did was a tribute resources likely to be available in the 5th Five Year Plan to the perseverance and ingenuity of the Dockyards and

1974-79.

the sheer grit of the ships at sea.

The general economic conditions and financial

• The Indian Air Force attacks on the installations at perspectives within which the Committee conducted its Karachi were both precise and timely. The maritime deliberations were: reconnaissance effort by the over-aged Super Connies

• After China’s attack in 1962, Government spending had
was as earnest as it could be but totally inadequate to
increased and the years between 1963 and 1967 had
cope with modern submarines like the Daphnes.

experienced rapid inflation.

The lessons learnt in the war were invaluable. Two basic

• Between 1965 and 1967, there had been an extended
conclusions shaped the Navy’s planning for its future
drought and development outlays had to be cut back.

warships.

• The econom y im proved fro m 1968 onwards. Between

This was the first occasion after the 1939-45 World War that a submarine torpedoed and sank a major warship.

19. This setback was to drive the Navy's efforts in ensuing years to improve anti submarine capability.

24 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

1970 and 1973, the harvests had been good, there projects. By 1975, the debilitating impact of spiralling was price stability and development outlays had been inflation on defence projects made it necessary to appoint increased.

another high-level committee.

o The only cloud on the horizon was the steadily increasing
burden of repayments to Russia. India had started to

The tasks of this second committee were to review the
borrow from Russia for development purposes in 1955. needs of the three services in the light of: The first defence credit became available in 1965. By the • The compulsions of the economic situation and the rise early 1970s, more than 50% of the value of exports from
in oil prices.

India to Russia under the Trade Plan was being used • The latest weapon systems that had been fielded in the for payment of interest and repayment of loans. Of this,

Arab Israel War.

two thirds was on defence account and one third was • The need to improve fighting capacity as cost effectively on development account. This increasingly required the
as possible.

diversion of India's traditional exports like tea, jute and
leather to balance the rupee-rouble trade. Nevertheless,

It recommended enhanced allocation of funds to
in view of the acute shortage of free foreign exchange, support core naval projects.

which restricted imports from the West, imports from

Between 1972 and 1975, the following had been

Russia and the Eastern bloc countries like Poland inducted:

remained preferable because of their softer terms.

• Ships: Five Russian Petya class submarine chasers, eight

The Committee recommended special consideration

Russian missile boats, the first two indigenous Leander
for naval development and cleared the Navy's proposals
class frigates (Nilgiri in 1972 and Himgiri in 1974) and for replacing old ships and the development of support
four Polish LSTs.

facilities. The Navy progressed discussions with Russia to • Submarines: Four Russian submarines.

crystallise the next series of naval acquisitions within the
framework of the Committee’s recommendations.

• Aircraft: Six Seakings from Britain. The aircraft carrier Vikrant underwent a refit from 1972 to 1975 during

The Arab Israel War of October 1973 was followed by a
which facilities were installed for operating Seaking
sharp rise in the international prices of oil. This dislocated
helicopters.

India’s national budgeting and decelerated all defence

Overview of Naval Acquisitions from 1947 to 1975

MDL

-

Mazagon Docks Ltd, Mumbai

GSL

-

Goa Shipyard

GRW

-

Garden Reach Workshops, Kolkata

HDL

-

Hooghly Docking Ltd

H SL

-

Hindustan Shipyard Vishakhapatnam

WW

-

Second Hand Ships ex 1939-45 World War

Year

Supplier

Acquisition

Standard

Name

Vintage

Year

Displacement

Ordered

Delivered

(Tonnes)

Light Cruiser

7000

DELHI

WW

1948

Britain

WW

1949

Britain

Light Destroyers

1700

RAJPUT

RANJIT

RANA

Landing Ship Tank

2200

MAGAR

WW

1949

Britain

WW

1953

Britain

Escort Destroyers

1000

GODAVARI

GOMATI

GANGA

Light Tanker

3500

SHAKTI

WW

1953

Italy

NEW

1952

1954

Britain

Inshore Mine -

120

BASSEIN

B1ML1PATAM
sweepers

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 25

N EW

1952

1956

Britain

Coastal Mine360

KARWAR
sweepers

CAN N AN O RE

C U D D A LO RE

KAKINADA

Light Cruiser

8700

M Y SO R E

W W

1957

Britain

Anti Aircraft

2250

BRAHM APUTRA

N EW

1955

1958

Britain

Frigates

B E A S

1958

BET W A

1960

Surface Escorts

2150

T R IS H U L

N EW

1955

1959

Britain

TALWAR

Anti Subm arine

1200

KH U KRI

N EW

1955

1958

Britain

Frigates '

KIRPAN

1959

KUTHAR

1959

Seaward Defence

63

SU BH A D R A

N EW

1957

Italy

Boats (for Central

SUVARNA

1958

Board of Revenue)

SHARAYU

SAV1TRI

Seaward Defence

86

SHARADA,

N E W

1959

Yugoslavia

Boats

SUKANYA

Repair and Store

4600

DHAR1NI

Second

1959

Italy

Ship

Hand

Seaward Defence

120

A JA Y

New Ind

1960

G R W and

Boats Mk I

ABH AY
igenous

1961

H D L

AKSH AY

1962

Light Aircraft

18000

VIKRANT

W W

1957

1961

Britain

Carrier

Survey Ship

2800

D ARSH A K

New Ind

1954

1964

Hindustan
eginous

Shipyard

Landing Ships

730

GHARIAL,

New

1965

1966

Russia

Tank (Medium)

G ULD AR

Patrol Boats

80

PAMBAN

New

1965

1967

Russia

PANVEL

PA N AJl

PURI

PU LICA T

Fleet Tanker

22,600

D EEPA K

New

1964

1967

Germ any

Inshore

170

BH A TK A L

New

1961

1968

M D L

Minesweepers

B U LSA R

Indigenous

1970

Subm arines

1975

KALVARI

New

1965

1967-69

Russia

KH A N D ERI

K A R A N J

KU RSU RA

Subm arine Depot

5900

AM BA

New

1965

1968

Russia

Ship

Anti Subm arine

1000

KAM ORTA

New

1965

1968-69

Russia

Vessels

KADM ATT

KILTAN

KATCH ALL

KAVARATTI

26 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Seaward Defence

150

AMAR

New

1963

Boats Mk 1

1969

GRW

A JIT

Indigenous

ATUL

Missile Boats

180

VINASH

New

1969

1971

Russia

VIDYGT

V IJETA

VEER

NIRGHAT

NIRBHIK

NASHAK

NIPAT

Subm arine Rescue

800

NISTAR

Reserve

1969

1971

Russia

Vessel

Stock

Lec'.nder Class

2960

NILGIRI

New

1966

1972

MDL

Frigate

Indigenous

Anli Submarine

1000

A R N A U

1968/69

1971

1972

Russia

Vessels

ANDROTH
from

ANJADIP

Reserve

Stock

Fleet Tug

700

G AJ

New

1968

1973

GRW

Indigenous

Anti Subm arine

1000

ANDAMAN

New

1971

1973-74

Russia

Vessels

AM1NI

Improved

Subm arines

1975

VELA

New

1971

1973-74

Russia

VAGIR

Improved

VAGLI

VAGSHEER

Leander Class

2960

HIMGIRI

New

1968

1974

MDL

Frigate

Improved

Landing Ships

1120

GHORPAD

New

1972

1975-76

Poland

Tank (Medium)

KESARI

Improved

SHARDUL

SHARABH

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 27

4

The Growth O f The Navy

1 9 7 6 - 1990

Preamble

Some recommendations of the 4,n Pay Commission
remained un-implemented even in 1990.

Two major Defence Reviews had marked the closing years
of the decade 1965 to 1975. In 1973, the high level APEX

Two compulsions had a bearing on the Navy's

Committee recommended special consideration for the development. In many ways, they were a blessing in Navy’s development and cleared the Navy’s proposals disguise:

for replacing old ships and the development of support • The priority accorded to Army and Air Force facilities. Before any agreements could be negotiated, the
requirements to counter land-ward threats limited the

Arab Israel war erupted in October 1973. As a reaction

Navy to a ship replacement programme. The slowed
to America having rushed military aid to Israel, the Arab
pace of replacement by indigenous construction and
oil producing nations sharply increased the international
acquisition from Russia helped successive inductions to
price of oil. Since India imported much of her oil from the
be technologically superior to their predecessors

Persian Gulf, the unavoidable increase in the outflow of • The scarcity of foreign exchange for importing the foreign exchange seriously dislocated national budgeting
latest technologies compelled the Navy to innovate and
and decelerated defence projects. The Navy, nevertheless,
indigenise.

continued its ongoing discussions with Russia, so that
when times became better, ideas would be clearer about

The austerity that resulted from these compulsions kept
the next series of Russian acquisitions.

the Navy lean and agile.

The debilitating impact of spiraling inflation in 1974

Overview of Ship Acquisitions 1976 - 1990
made it necessary to appoint another high level Apex

Committee to review defence needs in the light of Acquisitions strategic developments and economic compulsions. This • From Britain: Second-hand aircraft carrier Viraat.

Committee recommended enhanced allocation of funds

• From Russia: Guided missile destroyers, ocean going
to support core naval schemes which otherwise would
rocket boats, extended range missile boats, gas turbine
have languished.

propelled missile boats, anti submarine patrol vessels,

The Government’s acceptance of these recommendations
coastal minesweepers, inshore minesweepers.

underpinned the major acquisitions in 1975.

• From Poland: Landing Ships Tank.

The failure of the monsoon in 1986 and the resultant

• From Germany: Fleet Tanker.

drought led to a serious resource crisis from 1987 onwards.

• From Korea: Offshore Patrol Vessels.

To cope, the Navy had to:

Indigenous Construction

• Curtail administrative expenses.

• 3rd and 4th Leander frigates.

• Reduce inventory levels.

• Improved 5th and 6th Leander frigates.

• Reduce fuel consumption.

• Missile frigates of the Godavari class.

• Consider preservation of ships and submarines.

• Missile corvettes of the Khukri class.

• Upgrade the seven Offshore Patrol Vessels (OPVs) to
give them a limited combat role.

• Offshore Patrol Vessels.

• Landing Ship Tank Large, Cadet Training Ship, Survey

ships, Fleet Tug, Seaward Defence Boats, Survey Craft, Helicopter Acquisitions Torpedo Recovery Vessels, Landing craft.

• From Britain - ASW and Commando Seakings.

o Diving Support Vessel as Interim Submarine Rescue

Vessel.

• From Russia - ASW Kamovs.

• Indigenous - MATCH and SAR helicopters.

Modernisations
o

Highlights of Developments Between

Talwar and Trishul were fitted with Russian missiles.

1976 and 1990
o Vikrant was fitted with a ski jump, new radars, AIO and The details of the major developments during the period other facilities to operate the Sea Harrier aircraft and covered by this volume have been discussed in the Seaking helicopters
respective chapters on:

• The Russian Acquisitions.

Conversions

• Indigenous Warship Construction.

o The late 1950s-vintage anti aircraft frigates Brahmaputra,

Betwa and Beas were converted to the ‘training role’ to • The Submarine Arm and the SSK Submarine Project.

replace the early 1940s- vintage Cauvery, Krishna and

• The Air Arm.

Tir.

• The Revitalisation of Training.

Overview of Submarine Acquisitions

The priorities which the Navy was able to fulfill in large
measure were:

Acquisitions

• Hybridising Russian, European and indigenous systems
o From Russia: - 877 EKM submarines.

in indigenously built ships.

- Nuclear-propelled submarine, Chakra, on lease for 3 • Induction of the new Sea Harriers, new ASW / ASV
years.

helicopters and the aircraft carrier Viraat.

o From Germany - HDW 1500 submarines.

• Induction of new submarines and commencing

Modernisations
submarine construction in India.

o The improvements effected in the VELA class submarines • Anti ship missiles in ships, aircraft, helicopters and were retrofitted in the earlier submarines.

coastal defence batteries.

• Improved sonar and sonobuoy systems, and anti

Overview of Aircraft and Helicopter Acquisitions
submarine weapons in ships, submarines, helicopters,

Aircraft Acquisitions
and MRASW and LRMP aircraft.

• From Britain: - Sea Harriers to replace the Seahawks.

• Evolving and validating tactical doctrines for the Navy’s
unique mix of weapons platforms and weapons.

- Islander aircraft.

• Creation and upgrading of all maintenance and refit

• From Russia: - T(J 142 LRMP and IL 38 MRASW
facilities for ships, submarines and aircraft.

aircraft.

• Revitalising Naval Training.

• From U SA : - Pilotless Target Aircraft.

• Building up facilities in the Andaman and Nicobar

• Indigenous - Transfer from the Air Force of Super

Islands.

Constellation MR aircraft.

• Synergising Naval R&D.

- H JT 16 and Kiran Je t Trainer Aircraft.

• Introducing computer culture in all areas of naval

• Modernisations - Refurbishment of Alizes.

activity.

S hips and Subm arines Acquired Between 1976 and 1990

A b breviation s u sed in the table

Mazagon Docks Ltd, Mumbai

MDL

Garden Reach Shipbuilders and Engineers, Calcutta

GRSE

Hindustan Shipyard Ltd, Visakhapatnam

HSL

Goa Shipyard Ltd, Goa

GSL

Hoogly Docking and Engineering Works Ltd, Calcutta

HDL

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 29

Year

Acquisition

Standard

Name

Vintage

Year

Supplier

Displacement

Ordered

Delivered

(Tons)

Missile Boats

255

PRALAYA

New

1973

1976-77

Russia

PRATAP

PRABAL

PRACHAND

CHATAK

CHAMAK

CHAPAL

CHARAG

Leander Class

2995

UDAYGIRI

New

1967

1976

MDL

Frigate

DUNAGIRI

1970

1977

Fleet Tanker

22580

SHAKTI

New

1974

1976

Germany

Ocean-going

675

VUAYDURG

New

1975

1976

Russia

Rocket Boats

SINDHUDURG

1977

HOSDURG

1978

Coastal

800

PONDICHERRY

New

1975

1977

Russia

Minesweepers

PORBANDAR

1978

BHAVNAGAR

1979

BEDI

1979

ALLEPPEY

1980

RATNAG1RI

1980

Seaward Defence

210

T 51

New

1972

1978

GRSE

Boats MK II

T 52

1972

1977

T 53

1972

1978

T 54

1980

1982

T 55

1980

1983

Guided Missile

4890

RAJPUT

New

1975

1980

Russia

Destroyers

RANA

1982

RANJIT

1983

Landing Craft

560

L 31

New

1974

1978

HDL

Utility Mk I

L32

1981

Landing Craft'

560

L33

New

1975

1980

GSL

Utility Mk II

L 34

1983

L 35

1983

Improved Leander

3040

TARAGIRI

New

1970

1980

MDL

Class Frigates

VINDHYAGIRI

1981

Survey Ships

1930

SANDHAYAK

New

1973

1981

GRSE

N1RDESHAK

1976

1983

NIRUPAK

1976

1985

INVESTIGATOR

1986

1990

Torpedo Recovery

160

TRVA71

New

1978

1982

GSL

Vessels

TRVA72

1983

Ocean Going Tug

1630

MATANGA

New

1973

1983

GRSE

Inshore

100

MALVAN

New

1981

1983

Russia

Minesweepers

MANGROL

1983

MAHE

1983

MULKI

1984

MAGDALA

1984

MALPE

1984

30/TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

GODAVARI

3610

GODAVARI

New

Class Frigates

1978

1983

MDL

GANGA

1985

GOMATI

1988

Survey Craft

200

MAKAR

New

1979

(S D B Hulls)

1984

G SL

MITHUN

1984

M EEN

1984

M ESH

1984

Seaward Defence

210

T 56

New

1980

1984

G RSE

Boats Mk II

T 57

1985

G SL

T 58

1985

G RSE

T 59

1985

G SL

T60

1985

G R SE

T 61

1986

G SL

Torpedo Trials

160

ASTRAVAHINI

New

1980

1984

H SL

Vessel

----------------
i Landing Ship

1410

CHEETAH

New

1982

1984

Poland

Tank(Medium)

MAHISH

1985

GGLDAR

1985

KGMBHIR

1986

Subm arines (S S K )

1655

SHISHGM AR

New

1981

1986

Germany

SHANKOSH

1986

Cadet Training Ship

2650

TIR

New

1982

1986

MDL

Subm arines (EKM )

2890

SINDHUGHOSH

New

1983

1986

Russia

SINDHGDHVAJ

1987

SIND H G RAJ

1987

SINDHUVIR

1988

SINDHURATNA

1988

SIND HUKESARI

1988

SINDHGKIRTI

1987

1989

SINDHUV1JAY

1988

1990

Russia

Coastal

880

KARWAR

New

1983

1986

KAKINADA

1986

Minesweepers

CGDDALORE

1987

CANNANORE

1987

KONKAN

1988

KOZHIKODE

1988

New

1982

1986

G SL

Landing Craft

560

L 36

1986

Utility Mk III

L3 7

1986

L 38

1987

L 39

New

1981

1986

Russia

Guided Missile

5055

RANVIR

1987

RANVIJAY

Destroyers

Landing Ship

5655

MAGAR

New

1981

1987

G R SE

Second

1985

1987

Britain

Aircraft

28,500

VIRAAT

Hand

Russia

New

1984

1987

Fast Missile

500

V EER

1987

N1RBHIK

Attack Craft

1988

NIPAT

1989

NISHANK

1989

NIRGHAT

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 31

-

1988

M D L

Diving Support

2160

N IR EEK SH A K

Second

Hand

Vessel

Offshore Patrol

1890

SUKANYA

New

1987

1989

Korea

SUVARNA

1990

Korea

Vessels

SU BH A D R A

1990

Korea

SAVITRI

1990

H S L

SARAYU

1987

1991

H S L

SARADA

1992

H S L

SU JA T A

1993

H S L

Anti Subm arine

485

ABHAY

New

1986

1989

Russia

Patrol Vessel

AJA Y

1990

AKSH AY

1990

AGRAY

1991

Missile Armed

1350

KH U KR I

New

1986

1989

M D L

Corvettes

KUTH AR

1990

M D L

(Project 25)

KIRPAN

1987

1990

G R S E

K H A N JA R

1991

G R S E

Retrospect
momentum that had built up in the indigenous warship-
building programme. Confidence had grown in the

The growth of the Navy during the period 1976 to 1990
capability of the Navy’s Design Organisation. The
was the outcome of several serendipitous factors:

warship building yards (Mazagon Docks, Garden Reach

• The growth between 1976 and 1983 was the result of the
and Goa Shipyard) had begun to press the Ministry of

Defence Reviews carried out by the Apex Committees

Defence Production for long term orders to keep their
in 1973 and 1975.Their recommendations led to the
workforce gainfully employed. Russia continued to offer
acquisition of Russian guided missile destroyers, ocean
to India its latest weapons for installation in Indian built
going rocket boats, minesweepers MRASW aircraft and
hulls. There was willingness from the Russian side to

A SW helicopters.

assist indigenous warship production.

• These

Russian acquisitions coincided with the

• All these factors culminated in the sanctions for the
redesigning then in progress of the frigates that would
indigenous production of guided missile destroyers
follow the sixth and last of the Leanders. It led to the

(Project 15) and frigates (Project 16 A), missile corvettes

Project 16 Godavari class frigates redesigned to fit the

(Project 25A), gas turbine propelled missile boats

Russian weapon systems, retaining the steam propulsion

(Project 1241 RE), landing ships, survey ships, tankers
of the earlier Leanders and installing as many as possible
and diverse smaller ships.

indigenous systems of proven performance.

• The growth between 1984 and 1987 stemmed from the

The failure of the monsoon in 1986 led to the drought
unprecedented harmonious relationship between the of 1987 and financial stringency until 1990. The financial Navy and the Ministry of Defence. A similar harmony crisis of 1991 prolonged the period of austere naval prevailed between the three service chiefs themselves. It budgets. Fortunately, Naval Headquarters’ systematic and led to the swift acceptance of the British offer in 1985 to swift staff work in 1985 and 1986 had obtained sanctions sell their aircraft carrier Hermes. The need to replace the for all naval priority projects and it was possible to keep ageing earlier Russian acquisitions led to the acquisition these projects moving albeit at a slower pace, until the of better submarines, fast missile attack craft, anti
economy started recovering from 1994 onwards.

submarine patrol vessels, landing ships and maritime

The outcome of the 1971 war had given the Navy
reconnaissance aircraft.

triumph. The reforms, the consolidation and the

• The success of implanting Russian weapon systems shipbuilding achievements between 1976 and 1990 gave in the Godavari class frigates synergised with the
the Navy regional eminence.

32 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

5

Indian Ocean Deep Seabed Mining

The Mineral Potential

The AJIocation of the Seabed Mining Site

Polymetallic nodules, found in abundance on the floor The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea prescribed of the worlds oceans, are a rich source of metals. These a regime for the International Seabed Area and granted potato-shaped, porous nodules are found between depths India, France, Japan and the Soviet Union ‘pioneer status’

of 3,500 metres and 6,000 metres. Besides manganese for seabed mining. The conditions for qualifying as a and iron, they contain nickel, copper, cobalt, lead, pioneer investor were that the nation should have spent $
molybdenum, cadmium, vanadium and titanium, many of 30 million on deep-sea mining. India qualified by proving which are of strategic industrial importance.

her capability to extract nodules from the seabed.1

In the Indian Ocean, polymetallic nodules lie outside

In August 1987, on the basis of the delineation of a

India’s Exclusive Economic Zone. The area covered by prospective area covering 3,00,000 square kilometres, these nodules is 10 to 18 million square kilometres. The the Preparatory Commission for the International Sea total estimated reserves in the Indian Ocean are 0.15 Bed Authority (ISBA) allotted to the Department of Ocean trillion tonnes.

Development (DOD) a 150,000 square kilometre area
in the central Indian Ocean Basin to carry out seabed

Successful exploitation depends on:

exploitation activities for the recovery of polymetallic

• Technological development.

nodules. India became the first state to be registered as

• Geological and environmental factors.

a pioneer investor’. Half of the allotted area was to have
been surrendered to the International Seabed Authority by

• Metallurgical factors.

2002 for its technical arm named ‘Enterprise.2

• Legal and political factors.

The area is located 1,080 nautical miles south of Cape

The International Seabed Area

Comorin, the southern tip of India, and within 1,000
kilometres of the US naval base at Diego Garcia.

In 1970, drafters of the Laws of the Sea Convention
had proposed that the deep-sea areas beyond national

Survey of the Site
jurisdiction be held in trust of the United Nations as the India surveyed and mapped the area. The richest area in Common Heritage of Mankind’ and the resources be the site had a density of up to 30 kilograms of nodules per developed by a United Nations’ enterprise. This idea square metre.

was not accepted by most nations. A compromise was,
therefore, made with respect to deep-sea mining with

The survey for mapping and detailed bathymetry of the
certain concessions to nations that had already made an pioneer area was subsequently strengthened by the use investment in exploration.

of a multi-beam swath bathymetric system (hydrosweep)

on the DOD's Oceanic Research Vessel (ORV) Sagar

India s interest in deep seabed mining evolved from its Kanua Environmental data, baseline oceanographic data I°ng-terrn requirements for manganese, nickel, cobalt and on physical, chemical and biological map parameters was copper. In the early 1970s, a systematic study of the ocean also collected.

floor revealed that about 15 million square kilometres, deep

Detailed sampling was carried out at 2,500 locations-
ln the middle of the Indian Ocean, had mineral nodules, Over 250 tonnes of nodules were collected and supphedto rnaInly manganese, of different size and quality.

Department of Ocean Development s 'Vision 2015.

2. Ibid.

IN D IA 'S SEA BED M IN IN G SIT E

various laboratories for extractive metallurgy programmes. Marine Industrial Technology for developing marine non

In the area allotted to India, resources translated into 607 living resources.

million metric tonnes of manganese, copper, cobalt and
nickel nodules.3

At the time of writing, India has developed expertise in
metallurgical processes and has established at Hindustan

Development of Seabed Mining Technology

Zinc Limited at Udaipur a pilot plant for extracting
metals from nodules. A nucleus has been established for

Research & Development on the design concepts of developing a test mining system.

seabed mining technology has been entrusted to the

National Institute of Ocean Technology (NIOT) in Chennai

India’s potential capabilities in deep seabed mining have
and organisations in the public and private sectors.

been recognised. Norway, Finland and Japan have offered
assistance for jointly developing a test mining system.

Five pilot plant campaigns were completed at the

National Metallurgical Laboratory, Jamshedpur and the

India’s Department of Ocean Development is the

Regional Research Laboratory, Bhubaneswar for obtaining nodal agency for implementing the deep seabed-mining material and energy balance under the Extractive Metallurgy programme. It has drawn up a long-term plan to fulfil its Project. A joint workshop has also been held with the United obligations as Pioneer Investor, and reach the stage for Nations Industrial Development Organisation (UNIDO) on
seeking production authorisation as quickly as possible.

3. In-situ resources of Polym etallic Nodules in the Pioneer Area in m illion m etric tonnes (MMT): Wet Nodules

759 MMT

Dry Nodules

607 MMT

Manganese

144 MMT

Cobalt

0.85 MMT

Nickel

7.00 MMT

Copper

6.5 MMT

Total Metal

14.0 MMT

{So u rce: Department of Ocean Development)

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 35

6

Training O f Foreign Naval Personnel

Region

Country

Years in which Naval Personnel

Total Trained

Attended Courses in India
since 1956

INDIAN

Maldives

1984, 1988, 1989, 1990 to 1993, 1996 to 2003

82

OCEAN

Mauritius

1974, 1975, 1982, 1983, 1985 to 2003

264

Seychelles

1989, 1991, 1992 to 2001

49

SOUTH

Bangladesh

1973 to 1979, 1982 to 2003

290

ASIAN

Myanmar

1973, 1996 to 2000

13

SEABOARD

Sri Lanka

1965 to 1986, 1988 to 2003

1862

SOUTH

Cambodia

1974 to 1980, 2001,2002

15

EAST

Fiji

1981

1

ASIAN

Indonesia

1969-71, 1974-75, 1978-80, 1989-92, 1997 to 2001

39

SEABOARD

Malaysia

1965 to 1971, 1973 to 1986, 1988 to 2001, 2003

144

Philippines

1979, 1996, 1997

2

Singapore

1973 to 1976, 1978 to 1982, 1984, 1995, 1996

21

Thailand

1974 to 1986

8

Tonga

1984, 1985

2

Vietnam

2002, 2003

3

SOUTH

Aden

1969, 1970

2

WEST

Iran

1974, 1982 to 1988, 1992, 1998 to 1999

52

ASIAN

Iraq

1968 to 1979

106

SEABOARD

Kuwait

2003

10

Oman

1989, 1991 to 1998, 2000, 2001

30

Qatar

1988

7

UAE

1991, 1996 to 1999

4

Yemen

1969

1

EAST

Ethiopia

1967 to 1971, 1972, 1986 to 1990

6

AFRICAN

Kenya

1974 to 1987, 1989 to 2000

27

SEABOARD

South Africa

1999

4

Sudan

1970, 1973 to 1983, 1986, 1987

49

Tanzania

1973 to 1987, 1998 to 2001

87

Uganda

1981, 2002

11

Zanzibar

1980 to 1982, 1985 to 1988

6

WEST

Benin

1982

8

AFRICAN

Gambia

1996

1

SEABOARD

Ghana

1967 to 1984, 1987-88, 1993 to 2003

333

Namibia

2000, 2001

3

Nigeria

1965 to 1989, 1994-95, 1997 to 2003

1483

Sierra Leone

1978

3

OTHER

Malta

1981, 1982

2

7

Visits By Foreign Naval Ships

1976 To 1990

| Nationality

Name of Warship/s

Port/s Visited

Dates

France

Jeanne D’Arc, Forbin

Bombay

9-15 Feb 76

Malaysia

Perdana, Serang Ganas, Ganyang

Madras

16-21 Feb 76

Sri Lanka

Gajabahu

Cochin

23-26 Feb 76

U SSR

F Bellinsgausen

Bombay

25-27 Ju n 76

U SSR

Kallisto

Bombay

22-25 Ju l 76

U SSR

Vasily Golovin

Bombay

29 Jul-2 Aug 76

Australia

Hobart

Cochin

14-16 Aug 76

France

Protet, La Dieppoise

Cochin

20-25 Sep 76

U SSR

Destroyer 143,

Cochin

12-15 Dec 76

Patrol Sloop No.835

France

Commandant Bourdais,

Bombay

18-22 Dec 76

Commandant Kersant

Iran

Rostam, Bushehr

Bombay

6-10 Ja n 77

Sweden

Alvanabben

Bombay

1-5 Feb 77

U SSR

Admiral Vladimirsky,

Bombay

11-15 Feb 77

F Bellinsgausen

Thailand

Prasae, Maeklong,

Andaman &

7 Mar 77

Pinklao

Nicobar Islands

U SSR

Peter Libodev, Soruy Vasilov

Bombay

18-21 Mar 77

Sri Lanka

Samudra Devi Ranakamie, Balawatha

Cochin

4-8 Apr 77

France

Bouvet, Tourville

Bombay

31 May-6 Ju n 77

U SSR

Dauria

Bombay

7-14 Ju n 77

U SSR

Professor Vaze

Bombay

14-18 Ju n 77

U SSR

Priliv, Privoy, Ockjan,

Bombay

22-25 Ju n 77

Academik Shirshov

Italy

San Giorgio

Bombay, Cochin

29 JuI-9 Aug 77

Australia

Melbourne, Brisbane

Bombay

27 Jul-29 Aug 77

Italy

San Giorgio

Madras

2-5 Sep 77

Jap an

Katori, Takatsuki

Bombay

2-6 O ct 77

Korea

Ju n Duck, Kyong Nam

Bombay

2-5 Nov 77

Doudart De Lagree

Cochin

8-14 Dec 77

France

Destroyer 239, Patrol Sloop 215

Bombay

16-21 Dec 77

U SSR

Nationality

Name of Warship/s

Port/s Visited

Dates

New Zealand

Monowai

Bombay

30 Dec 77-1 Jan 78

Britain

Hydra, Hecate

Bombay

10-27 Feb 78

France

Ouragan, Tartu

Bombay

17-21 Feb 78

Germany

Deutschland

Bombay

27 Feb-3 Mar 78

France

Commandant De Pimodan

Cochin

21-25 Mar 78

Britain

Tiger, Rhyl, Mohawk, RFA Grey Rover

Bombay

22-27 Mar 78

France

Jeanne D’Arc, Forbin

Madras

24-27 Mar 78

USSR

Borodino

Bombay

21-25 Apr 78

Indonesia

Martadinata, Monginsidi

Bombay

2-5 May 78

Sri Lanka

Sooraya, Weeraya

Madras

27-29 Jun 78

Sri Lanka

Dakshay, Sooraya

Madras

5-7 Jul 78

Iran

Milanian, Kahna Muie

Bombay

20-23 Sep 78

Iran

Artemiz, Palang, Fara Marz, Larak

Bombay

20-24 Sep 78

Iran

Milanian, Kahna Muie

Cochin

25-28 Sep 78

Sri Lanka

Korawakka

Rameshwaram

3-4 Oct 78

France

La Galissonniere, Victor Schoelcher

Cochin

17-23 Oct 78

USSR

Ocean

Bombay

1-5 Nov 78

Belgium

Westdiep

Bombay

4-7 Nov 78

Britain

Fox,

Bombay

13-29 Jan 79

Hydra,

Bombay

Heraid, Pawn

Bombay

France

Doudart De Lagree, Duquesne

Bombay

30 Jan-5 Feb 79

Norway

Veermar

Calcutta

3-4 Feb 79

Visakhapatnam

Australia

Vampire, Perth

Madras

10-14 Feb 79

Portugal

Sagres

Goa

24-27 Feb 79

Bombay

1-5 Mar 79

USSR

Borodino

Madras

23-27 Mar 79

Netherlands

Tromp, Foolster, Kortenaer, Drenthe

Bombay

12-16 Apr 79

USSR

Liman

Bombay

20-25 Apr 79

Malaysia

Hang Tuah

Bombay

11-15 Jun 79

Cochin

18-20 Jun 79

Italy

Lupo, Ardito

Bombay

13-16 Aug 79

Singapore

Resolution

Cochin

10-14 Sep 79

France

La Combattante

Cochin

27-30 Sep 79

Malaysia

Handalan, Pendekar, Perkasa, Gempita

Goa

14-17 Oct 79

Britain

Norfolk, Arrow, Dido and Fort Grange

Cochin

9-13 Nov 79

USSR

Sevastopol, Victoria,

Bombay

27 Feb-3 Mar 80

Thailand

Racharit, Udomdet, Withayakhon

Madras

8-10 May 80

Germany

Luetjens, Hessen, Coburg, Spessart

Bombay

10-14 Jun 80

Australia

Perth

Madras

4-8 Oct 80

Britain

Coventry

Bombay

6-10 Nov 80

38 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

N ationality

Name of Warship/s

Port/s Visited

Dates

Australia

Brisbane

Bombay

19-21 May 81

U SSR

Borodino

Madras

7-11 Oct 81

U SSR

Yamal, Apsheron

Madras

15-21 May 82

Britain

Aurora

Bombay

16 to 20 Aug 82

Thailand

Maeklong & Prasae

Madras

11-14 Mar 83

Thailand

Chon Buri

Bombay

10-13 May 83

Britain

Avenger

Madras

12-16 May 83

Thailand

Songkhla

Bombay

17-20 Aug 83

Britain

Invincible Aurora

Bombay

10-14 Oct 83

Rothesay

Goa

11-15 Oct 83

Andromeda, Achilles

Cochin

12-18 O ct 83

USSR

Stvor & Cheleken

Bombay

18-22 Nov 83

Admiral Vladimirsky,

Bombay

22-26 Nov 83

F Bellinsgausen

France

Jacques Cartier

Cochin

28 Nov-1 Dec 83

Thailand

Phuket

Bombay

12-16 Dec 83

France

Eridan, Var

Bombay

12-16 Dec 83

Portugal

Sagres

Goa

28-31 Ja n 84

U SSR

Novorossiysk, Nikolaev

Madras

5-10 Feb 84

Poryvisti, Boris Butoma

U SA

Whipple

Cochin

16-18 Feb 84

Britain

Glamorgan, RFA Blue Rover

Cochin

20-25 Feb 84

Iran

Hangam, Bandar Abbas

Goa

21-25 Feb 84

Iran

Bandar Abbas, Hengam

Madras

10-14 Mar 84

Britain

Glasgow

Goa

3-7 May 84

USA

Lewis B Puller

Bombay

21-25 May 84

Malaysia

Mahawangse

Bombay

15-17 Ju n 84

Germany

Niedersachsen, Lubeck,

Cochin

21-24 Sep 84

Qucksburg

Britain

Peacock, Plover

Goa

25-27 Oct 84

30 Oct-2 Nov 84

Oman

Shabah

Goa

Cochin

5-8 Nov 84

U SSR

Razumny, Revnostny

Bombay

15-19 Nov 84

Singapore

Endurance(LST L 201)

Cochin

21-24 Ja n 85

Sweden

Carlskrona

Bombay

14-18 Feb 85

Bombay

15-19 Feb 85

Iran

Larak

Bushehr

Goa

9-13 Mar 85

20 Feb-20 Mar 85

Oman

Al-Said

Bombay

(For Repairs)

U SA

Downes

Goa

28 Feb-3 Mar 85

Australia

Adelaide, Sydney

Bombay

22-25 May 85

Gordelivey

Bombay

1-5 Ju n 85

U SSR

Bombay

13-14 Ju l 85

Indonesia

Martha,

Kristina Tiya Hahu

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 39

Nationality

Name of Warship/s

Port/s Visited

Dates

Japan

Katori, Makigmo

Bombay

22-26 Sep 85

Malaysia

Hng Tuah, Mutiara

Madras

24-30 Oct 85

USSR

Boris Butoma

Bombay

17-22 Nov 85

Oman

Shabab

Cochin

12-17 Oct 85

Bombay

22-27 Oct 85

Malaysia

Nangtuah

Madras

26-28 Oct 85

(JSSR

Boris Butoma

Bombay

17-22 Nov 85

Iran

Bandar Abbas, Hangem

Cochin

23-28 Feb 86

Italy

Scirocco

Bombay

2-4'Mar 86

Italy

Grecale

Goa

5-7 Mar 86

Thailand

Pinklao

Bombay

11-15 Mar 86

Malaysia

Mahamir, Jeral, Ledang, Kinabalu

Bombay

17-20 Mar 86

Britain

Broadsword

Bombay

7-9 Apr 86

USA

Rathburne

Cochin

12 May 86

Indonesia

Hasanudin

Bombay

23-26 Jun 86

USSR

Training Ship 126

Madras

21-25 Aug 86

USA

Marvin Shield

Bombay

6-10 Oct 86

France

Victor Schoelcher, Var

Bombay

16-21 Oct 86

Britain

Illustrious

Bombay

14-16 Nov 86

USSR

Donuslav, Deresan,

Bombay

23-26 Nov 86

Naval Tug MB- 105

USSR

F Bellensgausen, V Golovnin

Bombay

8-12 Dec 86

USA

Robison, Goldsborough

Cochin

12-14 Jan 87

Iran

Tonb, Kharg

Cochin

8-10 Mar 87

Egypt

A1 Nasser

Bombay

29 Mar-1 Apr 87

USSR

Boris Butoma

Bombay

9 Apr-12 Apr 87

USSR

Akademik Nikolayandrev

Madras

27 Apr-30 Apr 87

USSR

Irkut

Bombay

18 May-22 May 87

Germany

Deutschland

Madras

21 May-25 May 87

USSR

C 522 (Rescue Tug)

Bombay

27 May-1 Jun 87

USA

Worden, Crommelin

Bombay

3-7 Jun 87

France

Commandant Bory

Bombay

8-12 Jun 87

USSR

N-905 & N-737

Bombay

25-29 Jul 87

France

La Gracieure, La Railloure

Madras

17-21 Aug 87

Jeanne D’Arc, La Motte Picquet

Bombay

31 Aug-3 Sep 87

Thailand

Bang Rachan

Bombay

7-11 Sep 87

Britain

Edinburgh

Bombay

14-17 Oct 87

USA

Harold E Halt, Curt & Perry

Cochin

5-8 Nov 87

USSR

Marsha! Shaposhnikov,

Bombay

29 Nov-3 Dec 87

Admiral Zakarov, Boevoy

France

Clemenceau, Suffren

Bombay

30 Dec 87-3 Jan 88

USSR

Stovr, F Bellensgausen

Cochin

5-9 Jan 88

40 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

N ationality

Name of Warship/s

Port/s Visited

Dates

France

Jeanne D’Arc

Cochin

11-15 Ja n 88

Commandant Bourdais

Indonesia

YD S Sudarso

Bombay

12-14 Ja n 88

(JS A

Reasoner

Madras

24-28 Feb 88

Iran

Lavan, Kharg

Bombay

9-12 Mar 88

Singapore

Excellance

Goa

10-14 Mar 88

USSR

Marshal Vasilevsky (N-645)

Bombay

16-19 Mar 88

France

Jeanne

D’Arc

&

Commandant Madras

14-17 Apr 88

Bourdais

Pondicherry

18 Apr 88

Thailand

NCM4 Sarai

Bombay

18-22 Apr 88

USSR

472 & 381

Bombay

6-10 May 88

New Zealand

Manawanui

Cochin

14-16 May 88

Britain

Britannia

Cochin

4 Ju n 88

Greece

Aris

Bombay

27-29 Ju l 88

U SA

Fanning

Madras

28 Jul-1 Aug 88

U S S R

Marshal Shaposhnikov

Bombay

5-10 Aug 88

Italy

Caio Duilio

Bombay

12-17 Aug 88

Netherlands

Vitte De with Kortenaer

Bombay

24-29 Aug 88

Ja n Van Bra Kel, Juldenkruis

U SSR

Marshal Shaposhinikov Poryvisty 626

Bombay

26-30 Sep 88

Indonesia

Multatuli, Pulau Rengat S- Pulau Rupat

Bombay

11-13 Oct 88

Britain

Ark Royal, RFA Fort Grange

Bombay

15-19 Nov 88

U SSR

N 695

Bombay

16-19 Nov 88

U SA

Barbey

Bombay

27 Nov-1 Dec 88

U SSR

Vassily Golovin (R V)

Bombay

1-5 Dec 88

Indonesia

Oswald Siahan

Cochin

27-29 Ja n 89

France

Marve, Protet, De Grasse

Bombay

2-7 Feb 89

U SSR

Profenor Shotoman

Goa

15-17 Feb 89

U SA

Leftwich

Cochin

17-21 Feb 89

Thailand

Sichang, Pinklao, Tachin

Bombay

9-12 Mar 89

U SSR

N541K

Goa

11-15 Mar 89

France

Marve, Protet

Cochin

13-17 Mar 89

Australia

Derwent, Stuart

Madras

13-17 Mar 89

U SSR

Profenor

Madras

17 Mar 89

Bangladesh

Abu Bakr, Umar Farooq

Cochin

23-25 Mar 89

Britain

Billiant

Bombay

7-11 Apr 89

U SSR

Iskatel-4

Goa

20-25 Apr 89

Radm Perchin, MV-99

Goa

29 Apr-2 May 89

U SSR

Profenor Shotoman

Goa

8-10 May 89

U SSR

U SSR

Borodino

Goa

14-18 May 89

Cochin

9-14 Ju n 89

Australia

Oxley

Garonne, Psyche

Cochin

29 Jun-3 Ju l 89

France

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 41

Nationality

Name of Warship/s

Port/s Visited

Dates

Brazil

Ne Brasil

Bombay

17-20 Jul 89

GSSR

Yurka 702

Madras

24-27 Jul 89

GSSR

Boevoy

Madras

7-11 Aug 89

GSA

Lawrence, Joseph Hewes

Goa

10-13 Aug 89

Indonesia

Nanggala

Cochin

21-23 Aug 89

GSSR

Yakor

Madras

26-31 Aug 89

GSSR

Adm Spridonov

Cochin

6-9 Sep 89

GSA

GSS Leahy

Cochin

18-19 Sep 89

GSSR

PM 92

Goa

18-21 Sep 89

GSA

Ford

Cochin

27-28 Sep 39

Oman

A1 Mubrukah

Cochin

6-9 Oci 89

GSA

Gary, McClusky

Bombay

24-26 Oct 89

Oman

Zinat al Bahaar

Goa

28 Ocl-3 Nov 89

Bombay

4-10 Nov 89

Korea

Chungnam, Kyungbuk

Bombay

2-5 Nov 89

GSSR

VFA

Visakhapatnam

3-4 Nov 89

Sweden

Carlskrona

Bombay

20-24 Nov 89

Malaysia

Kasturi, Mahawangsa

Goa

21-23 Nov 89

GSSR

Zaryad

Goa

5-8 Dec 89

Indonesia

Baruna Jaya II

Cochin

10-12 Dec 89

GSA

Stein

Madras

14-17 Dec 89

Britain

Beaver

Goa

29 Jan-2 Feb 90

GSSR

Vasily Golovnin

Goa

6-9 Feb 90

Britain

Minerva, Bristol

Cochin

19-22 Feb 90

GSSR

Borodino

Cochin

26 Feb-2 Mar 90

Iran

Kharg

Cochin

3-6 Mar 90

GSSR

Admiral Vladimirsky

Cochin

8-12 Mar 90

Indonesia

Baruna Jaya III

Cochin

13-15 Mar 90

France

Jeanne D’Arc, Commandant

Bombay

13-17 Mar 90

Bory, Commandant Bourdais

Britain

Charybdis

Madras

3-6 Apr 90

GSSR

Izumrud

Bombay

18-21 Apr 90

Indonesia

Abdul Halim Perdanakusumah

Cochin

5-7 May 90

Italy

Libeccio

Bombay

7-10 May 90

Turkey

Turgutreis (F-241)

Madras

11-13 May 90

France

Marne, Doudart De Lagree

Bombay

28 May-1 Jun 90

Oman

Nasr Al Bahr

Goa

29 May-1 Jun 90

Australia

Oxley

Cochin

9-14 Jun 90

Mexico

Cuauhtemoc

Bombay

9-12 Aug 90

GSSR

Admiral Tribuz

Goa

12-16 Sep 90

Oman

Al Maubrukah

Goa

3-6 Oct 90

42 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

N ationality

Nam e of Warship/s

Port/s Visited

Dates

U S S R

Kedrov

Goa

11-15 Oct 90

U S S R

Akedemic Nikolay Andreyev

Bombay

18-21 Nov 90

Portugal

Macau

Cochin

25-30 Nov 90

Goa

2-9 Dec 90

Portugal

Macau

Daman

11-13 Dec 90

Bombay

14-19 Dec 90

22-26 Dec 90

Cochin

Om an

Fulk al Salamah

Madras

19-24 Dec 90
t r a n s it io n TO EMINENCE / 43

Warship Design And Production

P ream ble

• Offshore Patrol Vessel: Sauitri

• Cadet Training Ship:

Warship design and construction during the period 1976

Tir
to 1990 covered a wide field of activity. Separate chapters Survey Flotilla deal with the Leander Frigate Project, the Project 16

Godavari class frigates, the Project 25 Khukri class missile Survey Ships corvettes and the SSK Submarine Project.

• Sandhayak Class: Sandhayak, Nirdeshak, Nirupak

This chapter deals the generic and chronological

• Improved Sandhayak Class: Investigator
aspects of warship design and construction and the other Survey Craft ships designed and constructed during this period.

• Makar, Mithun, Meen and Mesh

O ve rvie w o f W arsh ip D e sig n and Construction

M inor War Vessels

D elivered up to 1975

• Seaward Defence Boats Mk II: T 51 to T 55

• Leander Class Frigates: Nilgiri, Himgiri

• Seaward Defence Boats Mk III: T 56 to T 61

• Survey ship Darshak (French design, built at Hindustan

• Landing Craft Utility (LCCJs) Mk I: L 31 and L 32

Shipyard)

• Landing Craft Utility (LCUs) Mk II: L 33 to L 35

• Seaward Defence Boats (SDBs) Mk 1: Ajay, Abhay,

• Landing Craft Utility (LCUs) Mk III: L 36 to L 39

Akshay, Amar, Ajit and Atul

• Fleet Tug:

Auxiliaries

Gaj

• Ocean Going Tug:

• Inshore Minesweepers:

Matanga

Bhatkal and Bulsar

• Yard craft (harbour tugs, grab dredgers, bucket dredgers,

• Torpedo Recovery Vessels (TRVs): A 71 and A 72
hopper barges, oilers, HSD tankers, Avcat tankers,

• Torpedo

Launch
and

Recovery Vessel

(TLRV):

ammunition barges, water barges, victualling barges,

Astravahini
ferry craft, diving boats, water boats, berthing pontoons,

Delivered After 1990
boat pontoons etc.)

Destroyers

D elivered 1976 to 1990

• Project 15 Delhi Class: Delhi, Mysore and Mumbai

Frigates

• Leander Class:

Frigates

CJdaygiri and Dunagiri

• Project 16 A Improved Godavari Class:

• Improved Leander Class:

Brahmaputra

Taragiri and Vindhyagiri
and Betwa

• Project 16 Godavari Class: Godavari, Ganga and

Gomati

S S K Submarines

•

Missile Corvettes

Shalki and Shankul

• Project 25 Khukri Class: Khukri, Kuthar

Missile Corvettes

General

• Project 25 Khukri Class: Kirpan and Khanjar

• Project 25 A Improved Khukri Class:

• Landing Ship Tank-Large (LST-L): Magar

Kora, Kirch, Kulish
and Karmuk

General

The English East India Company set up its first trading
o Fleet Tanker: Aditya
post at Surat in 1613. In 1661, the Company moved its
o Landing Ship Tank-Large (LST-L): Gharial
headquarters from Surat to Bombay.2 In 1735, at the
o Offshore Patrol Vessels: Saryu, Sharda and Sujata
invitation of the Company, a talented young shipbuilder,

Lovji Nusserwanji Wadia, moved from Surat to Bombay to

Survey Ships
start building ships in a new shipyard.3
o Improved Sandhayak Class: Jamuna and Sutlej

The dock at Mazagon was completed in 1774. It was
q Mew Darshak Class: Darshak and Sarvekshak
built primarily to cater to ships of the East India Company,
all of which could not be taken into the Naval Dockyard

Minor War Vessels
due to overcrowding. Ships started being built there in
o Fast 400-tonne Missile Craft: Vibhuti, Vipul, Vinash, 1801. Mazagon’s first dry dock was built in 1839 and the

Nashak, Vidyut, Prahar, Prabal and Pralaya
second in 1865.

© Fast Attack Craft: Trinkat, Tillanchang, Tarasa and Between 1735 and 1884, a succession of master

Tarmugli
shipbuilders of the Wadia family built, both in Mazagon
o Extra Fast Attack Craft: T 80 to T 83
and in the Bombay Dockyard, a total of 300 ships for the

Auxiliaries

Company, for the English Navy and for private owners. One
of these warships, still afloat, is the Trincomalee launched
o Ocean Going Tug: Gaj
in Mazagon and fitted out in the Bombay Dockyard between
o Marine Acoustic Research Ship (MARS): Sagardhwani

1814 and 1817.4
o Sail Training Ship (STS): Tarangini

In the second half of the 19th century, several

Cinder Construction in 2004
developments took place. Two major English shipping
companies, Peninsular and Orient (P&O) and British

Destroyers

India Steam Navigation Company (BISN) established

® Project 15 A: Improved Delhi class
a monopoly of all sea-borne passenger traffic and sea-
mail delivery 'East of Suez. In 1860, the P&O acquired

Frigates

Mazagon Docks at Bombay to build, maintain and repair

• Project 16 A Improved Brahmaputra class
its ships operating in the Arabian Sea and westward and

• Project 17 Shivalik class
southward. BISN acquired the Garden Reach Workshops
in Calcutta to repair and maintain its ships operating in the

Bay of Bengal and eastward and southward.

Shipbuilding

The Suez Canal opened in 1869 and traffic increased
manifold. Steel hulls gradually replaced wooden hulls.

Historical B a c k g ro u n d of Warship Building Yards

Steam-driven ships gradually replaced sail driven ships.

In the 17th, 18th and 19th centuries, Indian-built wooden

In Mazagon Docks, ship repair skills overtook shipbuilding
hulled sailing ships, built of Malabar teak, were renowned skills. In every British war east of Suez, ships of both these for their sea-worthiness and survivability in the East India companies were converted in their dockyards at Bombay Company’s (and later England’s) contests for empire.

---------------------- ;-----—
f

,. .

i s of Gr in Babylon testify to the antiquity of Indian ships built of teak.

1. The 5,000-year old Mala ar tea
earns
india Company had assumed responsibility for Bombay.

2. The Portuguese had handed over Bombay to ,1e E n g ^ 6 5 5 J n ^

^ ^

.n

^

,n ^

harf ^
fifst

3. This shipyard was the forbear of today s Naval D° ^

Qthal [ocated at the northern tip of the Gulf of Cambay - was built circa 2,500 BC .

c o n te m p o r a r y d ry d o c k . Its p re d e c e s s o r - the o c a o

^

^

o f J a m s e tje e B o m a n je e W adia. W h e n sh e arrived in 4. Trincom alee was constructed by Indian craftsmen
next 25
in reserVe and became obsolete. In the 1840s, she was converted

England in 1819, the Napoleonic Wars had ended, b n e p ^
g por the next 12 years> she sai|ed the oceans of the world on anti slavery into a corvette - 24 large cannons replaced her 44

. tj

|oration> By the late 1850s, sailing warships had become obsolete. In 1857, patrols, fishery protection, disaster relief, coastal su rvey an

Bombay built sister, the 84-gun battleship Ganges, was converted into an she was converted into an afloat training ship for reserve sailors, (her d o y

_

_

----------- -----

^
ron_
pH FnilHm i„ n t In thp

____________________ ________

- sh'p for; ei a9X she J s acquired by a philanthropic ship preserver and renamed Foudroyant. In the afloat training ship for serving sailors.) In the mid189US. si

H

Trincomalee and was opened to the public as the last classic fngate of in extensive restoratron. In 2002 she was re
publishing

20Q2)

1990s, she underwent an
the sailing era. (Source: Trincomalee: the last o f HelsonsFngates by And TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 45

and Calcutta to ferry thousands of Indian troops to and

1960. The deal provided for part of the payment to be
from the battle zones.

adjusted towards repairs of P&O Group ships after take
over.

On the eve of the 1914-18 World War, P&O merged with
the BISN and became the British Empire’s largest shipping Acquisition o f G o a Shipyard Lim ited cartel - the ‘P&O Group’. It also became the main operator In the 1950s, Japan started rebuilding its industries after for India’s coastal passenger traffic. Its services linked India the devastation it had suffered during the 1939-45 World with the Persian Gulf, the Far East and East and South War. It evinced interest in importing iron and manganese Africa. The Mazagon Dock Company was formed in 1915.

ore from Goa, which at that time was still a Portuguese

The Group improved the facilities at Mazagon Docks and enclave. Development commenced of the mines in the Garden Reach Workshops to sustain their ships. The hills upstream of the Rivers Zuari and Mandovi. The ore Group also held a controlling interest in the Mogul Line in was to be transported in barges down these rivers to bulk-Bombay. Until the first half of the 20th century, the Group ore-carrying merchant ships at anchor off Marmogoa.

successfully edged out every Indian-owned company that
tried to penetrate their monopoly, with one exception - the

In 1957, the Portuguese established, at the mouth of the

Scindia Steam Navigation Company

River Zuari, a small shipyard named ‘Estaleiro Navais de

Goa’ to construct and repair ore carrying barges, provide

A cqu isition o f H in du stan Shipyard Lim ited
assistance to maintain and refit merchant ships and assist

During the 1939-1945 World War, an urgent need arose to visiting Portuguese warships. By 1960, this yard could build merchant ships in India to replace Britain’s wartime
repair barges. By 1961, the yard had set up rudimentary
losses. In 1941, the Scindia Steam Navigation Company facilities to construct barges.

was given a site at Vishakhapatnam on the east coast of

Operation Vijay (17 to 20 December 1961) liberated

India. It launched its first merchant ship in 1948. In due Goa from 450 years of Portuguese rule and marked the course, this shipyard was taken over by the Government
and renamed Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL).

formation of Goa as a Union Territory. The Naval Officer
in Charge Goa was appointed as the custodian of the

Acqu isition o f M a z a g o n D o c k s Lim ited an d G ard en shipyard. A few months later, the yard was entrusted to

R each W o rk s h o p s 5

MDL Bombay on lease and renamed as Mazagon Dock

Goa Branch.

By the mid 1950s, mail was being delivered by air and
there was a slump in world shipping. In 1956, the P&O

From 1962 onwards, yard infrastructure was expanded

Group offered to sell Mazagon Dock Limited (MDL) to the to help maintain and repair the ore barges. From 1964

Government of India. The reaction to this offer was that onwards, the yard started constructing barges.

“the demand for ships of 4,000 GRT and below, especially
for new ships, and the demand for odd harbour craft are so

In 1967, the lease agreement with M DL ended. The yard
small that it would not be advantageous for Government became an autonomous subsidiary of M DL and renamed to consider taking over Mazagon Docks merely for the
itself as Goa Shipyard Ltd (G SL). Under this subsidiary
construction of smaller vessels”6
arrangement, MDL provided G SL with technical know-how
for shipbuilding and ship repair, assistance in securing

In 1957, Mr VK Krishna Menon became India’s Defence orders and purchase of materials, and transferring, at book Minister. He was an ardent pioneer of self-reliance in value, machinery from MDLs yard at Bombay.

defence, particularly for core requirements of warships,
tanks and aircraft. H SL was fully occupied building

G SLs 15-year plan commenced with setting up
merchant ships. The choice for building warships lay fabrication and joiner shops and slipways. The existing between MDL and Garden Reach Workshops (GRW). He workshops were expanded. New ICE, Fitting Out and appointed a committee to look into MDLs capabilities for Machine Workshops were set up. This enabled GSL, under building frigate-sized warships.

the Norwegian aid scheme, to construct deep-sea fishing
trawlers.

After protracted negotiations, the Government purchased

MDL and GRW in a package deal for 12.1 million pounds

In 1970, G SL started taking naval orders. Between 1975

(approximately Rs. 3.85 crore at that time) on 19 April
and 1977, the building berths were extended, new slipways

5. Garden Reach Workshops (GRW) was later renamed as Garden Reach Shipbuilding and Engineering (GRSE).

6. H istory o f Mazagon Docks Ltd by Rear Admiral K Sridharan.

46 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

and a fitting out jetty built, overhead cranes installed, etc

This enabled G SL to construct, between 1980 and 1987

From the mid 1960s onwards, the faculty and the
minor war vessels like Landing Craft Utility, Torpedo
officers undergoing training as naval architects at

Recovery Vessels, survey craft and Seaward Defence

IIT Kharagpur started feeling that naval architecture

Boats.

training would be better done in Delhi, closer to Naval

Headquarters, where warships were being designed and

From 1990 onwards, G SL started constructing larger
where experienced naval architects could give them
ships like offshore patrol vessels and survey ships and
lectures. From the mid 1970s onwards, the IIT Delhi
participate in the licensed production of Russian 400-
started the training of naval architects.

tonne missile boats.

In the 1970s, when Russian equipment started being
fitted into indigenous ships, naval constructors started

T h e N avy’s Constructor Cadre
being sent to the Soviet Union as well as to Britain for

The Navy’s design capability started literally from scratch.

the Long Architecture Course’. Today the strength of the

At the time of independence in 1947, there was no

Constructor Cadre is well over 200 naval architects."

indigenous in-house design capability.

A separate Constructor Cadre was sanctioned in

Rear Admiral SMMisra, who retired in 1990 as Chairman 1974. In 1977, the venue of training of naval constructor and Managing Director of Garden Reach Shipbuilding and officers was shifted from IIT Kharagpur to IIT Delhi. A Engineering (G RSE) recalls:

Constructors’ Training Office was set up in the Naval

Dockyard Vishakhapatnam to impart practical training to

“In 1951, Naval Headquarters recruited three civilian precede professional training.

naval architects. Mr Paramanandhan had been trained
in Britain and was working in the Bombay Port Trust. Mr

In 1987, it was decided to augment the intake of Naval

Dhotiwala had been trained in Britain. Mr Dhumal had Constructors through the 10+2 Technical Cadet Entry been trained in the Massachusetts Institute of Technology Scheme. Sanction was obtained for the attachment of 8
in the CIS. All three were designated as Technical Technical Cadets per year with the Department of Ship Assistants (Construction) - two were appointed to the Technology, Cochin University for the regular B Tech (Naval Naval Dockyard Bombay and one to NHQ.

Architecture) Course.

“At that time, ‘naval construction’ was in the domain

From then onwards, the Navy has had three sources
of the Engineering Branch. To build up a cadre of naval from which naval constructors enter service - the IIT Delhi, constructors, Indian naval cadets undergoing engineering the Cochin University and the IIT Kharagpur.

training in Britain were invited in 1952 to convert to ‘naval

Mr Paramanandhan joined in 1952 and retired in 1983
constructors’. This entailed a further four years training as the Director General of Naval Design and became the in naval architecture followed by practical training under doyen of the Navy’s warship designers. He recalls: British naval architects. Only one volunteered. In 1955,

1956 and 1957 two cadets volunteered every year - all

"In 1952, the total number of naval architects available
had qualified as marine engineers before commencing
was three civilians, Mr Dhotiwalla, Mr Dhumal and myself.

Whatever leisure we had was spent with the draftsmen
training as constructors.7
who were ex general apprentices. With these resources,

“The Navy, however, needed marine engineers and was
we managed to convert not only Shakti and Dharini,
reluctant to spare them for the constructor cadre. From
but also two sloops, one into the cadet training ship, Tir

1958 onwards, naval architects who had qualified from
and the other into the survey vessel, Investigator. Even
the IIT Kharagpur started joining the Navy s constructor
though certain decisions could be taken on board, but
cadre. In 1962, it was arranged that the IIT Kharagpur
the drawings had to be generated with whatever facilities
would increase its course by 18 months for those naval
we had. I suppose we had a lot more stamina in those
architects who were being recruited for the Navy. This
days than now.

helped to dispense with the initial four years training in

“Much of NHQ’s organisation and working was based

Britain. Most of them were sent to Britain for a two-year
on the British Admiralty Pattern. One British naval

‘Long Naval Architecture Course’ and attachment with
constructor Captain came on deputation and by that
the British Navy.

-------------------

T

* lecture is held at the IIT Delhi every year. The late AN Thukral and SM Misra volunteered 7. The first to volunteer was VP Garg, in whose ■
mcmojy Prakash and Kapoor volunteered in 1957. From IIT Kharagpur, Damodaran and Kamath in 1955, D Dean and KK Lohana volunteered in W ,

Warship design, construction, overseeing and modernisation during the

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 47

time we had decided to form the Corps of Constructors.

maintenance. As the sole repository of expertise, not only

The first plans for the formation of the Corps with 18 was it responsible for the design and construction of ships officers was prepared under the guidance of then COM,
but it was also the nodal agency at Naval Headquarters for

Capt Daya Shankar. It was in his own handwriting and
the acquisition and induction of all ships from abroad.

is a part of the historical record in the Directorate. The

In 1965, the overseeing of the construction of the
initial graduate training at IIT Kharagpur was to be frigates being built at Mazagon Docks was entrusted to the followed by post graduation training in Britain.

DNC and Mr Dhumal became the first Officer in Charge of

“When the plans paper for the training of constructors the Warship Overseeing Team in Bombay.

was put up, the Government was very reluctant to approve
their post graduate training in Britain. They asked a

In 1968, the management of the Russian acquisition
simple question, ‘Does it mean that the training in India
programme was hived off from DNC and entrusted to a
would not be as good?1 The straight answer for that was
new Directorate of Acquisition Project (DAP).

‘Because there are no R&D facilities to upgrade our

In 1969, the Frigate Cell of DNC was hived off to
technology in the area of naval architecture, we have no
become the Directorate of the Leander Project (DLP). In
other option.’ When I explained what happens to a naval
due course, DLP became today’s Directorate of Naval Ship
architect who studies abroad as an undergraduate and

Production (DNSP).

comes back, and the low level at which his technology
will be after 10 years, the Government agreed. I firmly

A major objective of the 1969-74 Defence Plan was
believe that whenever we put our problems fairly and
self-reliance in the field of warship design and warship
tell the Government This will be the end result and it is
production. Accordingly, the indigenous construction of
up to you to take a decision’, they tend to take the right frigates, patrol craft, submarines, minor war vessels and decision.

auxiliaries had been accepted in this plan.

“So the Navy decided to form its own Design

In 1969, there was an acute shortage of naval architects

Organisation. There was a bid from Mazagon Dock and
and specialist constructer officers. The Navy did not have
from the Ministry of Defence Production to take over either adequate experience or capacity to undertake the Design Organisation. Some senior naval officers
indigenous design of the range of ships and craft
asked me, ‘Wouldn't you feel more comfortable working
envisaged in the plan. In its proposal to Government for
in a Public Sector Enterprise?’ My answer was simple,
a full-fledged Directorate of Naval Design (DND), Naval

‘If the Navy is not directly involved in ship design, its

Headquarters envisaged induction of foreign warship
building and its commissioning, we will meet the same designers on loan with assurance of back up from their fate as a Defence Production Gnit, where the hardware parent organisations.

is made and the Services are not accepting it, because
the Services are not deeply involved right from day one.

In 1970, the Design Cell of DNC hived off to become

The Navy’s involvement should be right from the Staff the Directorate of Naval Design (DND). It started off with Requirement, which should be refined by the Material
designs for new classes of Seaward Defence Boats (SD Bs

Branch as regards our own capability. The Staff Branch Mk II), Survey Vessels and a Landing Ship Tank (LST). From and the Material Branch should work hand in hand
the outset, DND was conceived and created as an integral
till the design is frozen and then it can be given for part of Naval Headquarters. This ensured close interaction production.

with all the professional directorates in NHQ at all levels,

“The second advantage is that the design period may while functioning under the scrutiny of the Naval Staff. In be four years. Till the design is frozen, the shipyard does
later years, DND was upgraded to become the Directorate
not know what to do. We can overlap the three-year

General of Naval Design (DGND).

design period plus the production at every stage and

Negotiations with Britain for the deputation of warship
ensure that we get the best out of the ship at the time of designers on loan did not bear fruit. In 1973, a team of commissioning. This proved to be correct in the Project warship designers from the Soviet Gnion visited India to 16 frigates which we designed later.”

suggest the organisation to design, de nouo, frigates and

T h e N a v y ’s D e s ig n O rga n isa tio n
submarines. They quantified the requirement to be at least

170 specialists for the ab initio design of a ‘new’ frigate The Directorate of Naval Construction (DNC), when
and, likewise, at least another 170 specialists for the ab first established in the 1950s, was responsible for all
initio design of a new submarine. This magnitude of
aspects of naval construction - policy, planning and hull
manpower was just not available. The only alternative was

48 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

to do the best that could be done until the cadre of naval
constructors gradually built up.

Landing Craft Utility

Between 1978 and 1987, a total of 9 LCUs were delivered.

In 1985, the Directorate of Naval Construction (DNC) The first two Landing Craft Utility (LCUs) Mk I were built was renamed Directorate of Naval Architecture (DNA)

at Hooghly Docking Calcutta. Three LCUs Mk II and four

Vessels Designed and Constructed

LCUs Mk III were built at Goa Shipyard.

Seaward Defence Boats

The design did not prove entirely suitable and no further

LCUs of that design were ordered.

Captain (then Lieutenant) J Subbiah recalls:

Landing Ship Tank - Large

“My first assignment in DND was the design of fast

Seaward Defence Boats (SDBs). The Staff Requirements, The Landing Ship Tank-Large (LST-L) design evolved from as originally formulated, envisaged a six-in-one design. In 1973 onwards. Staff requirements were steadily updated pure naval architecture terms, it was a more challenging to enable it to embark troops, tanks, heavy vehicles, jeeps, assignment than even the later Godavari class frigate. assault landing craft and two Seaking Mk 42 C large troop-The SD Bs Mk I then in service were operating at a speed carrying helicopters.

of less than 15 knots. The staff requirements for the new

In 1980, the order for its construction was given

SD Bs called for a sprint speed of around 30 knots. This to Mazagon Docks. The following year, the order was involved the development of an entirely new hull form.

transferred to GRSE. At that time, its displacement of 5,500

“We developed the hull form successfully and carried tonnes made it the largest vessel to have been designed out the model tests at (the then) National Physical (and built) indigenously.

Laboratories, Feltham, England in 1972. The SDB

The first (LST-L), Magar, commissioned in 1987 and

Mk II version was powered by two 3,500 horsepower the second, Gharial, in 1997. The third was launched in British Deltic engines with an integral gearbox. We 2004.

were able to pack this power within the same 37.5
metre hull length of the earlier SDBs.

Survey Ships

“This design was later modified in the SDBs Mk III to The new design of a survey ship crystallised by 1974 and fit the German MTU engines. Since the MTU engines the order for the first ship was placed on GRW in 1975. In were larger and since a separate gearbox had to be 1976, two more ships were ordered from GRW. Sandhayak, accommodated, the length was increased.

Nirdeshak and Nimpak commissioned between 1981

“These SD Bs did not sport any impressive weapon and 1983. This new class of survey ships was fitted with package. Had the Staff wanted one, the hull form could the latest survey equipment available at that time - Hifix, have accommodated it. In fact, a study was made to Trisponder, satellite navigation receivers, side scan sonar fit the then popular French Exocet surface-to-surface etc.

missiles, but was not pursued due to policy constraints

The Sandhayak design and its survey equipment
on the choice of weapons. This ability to fit weapon were improved upon and the first ship of the improved packages of different origin blossomed later in the Sandhayak class, Investigator, commissioned in 1990. It Godavari class frigates.

was followed by two more survey ships of the same class,

“On the whole, as a first design from the Directorate Jamuna and Sutlej in 1991 and 1993.

of Naval Design, it was a professionally satisfying and

The design and the survey equipment were further
successful project. The concept of 6-in-1 design was improved upon in the new Darshak class survey ships, substantially fulfilled. This design was built in four Darshak and Sarvekshak, which commissioned in 2001
versions - SD Bs Mk II and III, Torpedo Recovery Vessels, and 2002 respectively.

Survey Craft and Customs Craft.

Ocean-G oing Tug Matanga

Eventually, five SD Bs Mk II, six SDBs Mk III, four Survey

Craft, two Torpedo Recovery vessels were delivered to e The order for the ocean-going tug was placed with Navy and a number of SDBs were delivered to t e oas

GRSE Calcutta in 1973. Due to the prolonged difficulties

Guard, all built either at Garden Reach Calcutta or a
that GRSE was experiencing, Matanga could only be

Shipyard.

commissioned in 1983.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 49

C a d et Training S h ip Tir

Gnion for an updated weapon package of Godavari plus

RBG 6000.

In 1978, the Design Directorate commenced the design
of a Cadet Training Ship having a displacement of 2,400

“During

1981, there was debate within Naval
tonnes, a maximum speed of 18 knots, a complement of

Headquarters on the selection of the Gas Turbine

354 including 120 cadets and a helicopter deck but no
propulsion package. The contenders were the General
hangar. To keep the cost low, it was decided that the ship

Electric LM 2500 and the British Rolls Royce SM 1 A.

would be built to American Bureau of Ship (A BS) Standards

Two separate design studies were carried out in 1981 to
i.e. merchant ship standards rather than warship standards.

integrate the SM I A and the LM 2500 in the designed

It was intended that three such ships would be built by
hull. The SM I A did not find favour because of its

Mazagon Docks to replace the ageing Brahmaputra class
development status and low power output.

ships that had been converted earlier to the training role.

“During 1982, examination continued of a Western anti
missile defence option and of propulsion and weapon

Construction commenced in 1982, the ship was
configurations.

launched in 1983 and commissioned as Tir in 1986. In
the intervening years, it was decided not to build the other

“In 1983, the Soviets offered a modern weapon
two cadet training ships. Tir remained the only ship of her
package and also a propulsion package of a reversible
class.

gas turbine that made us completely change the
platform design. The earlier hull form, of about 3,500

F leet Tanker Aditya
tonnes, just could not take the finally selected weapon
and propulsion package. The redesign resulted in a ship

The order for the fleet tanker was placed with G R SE in

161 meters long and about 6,300 tonnes displacement.

1985. Due to the prolonged difficulties that G R SE was

It was no longer a frigate. It became a destroyer.

experiencing, the tanker could only be commissioned in

2000.

“But even to arrive at that size of the ship, we virtually
had no data. Our experience till then in warship design

Project 15 D elhi C la s s D e stro y e rs (Delhi, M y so re and
was very limited. Experienced designers like Capt

M u m b a i)

Mohan Ram and Capt Subbiah who were the mainstay

Design development of the ‘10th, 11th and 12th frigates’

of the design team of Godavari class were not available
commenced in 1980. At the initial stage, these ships were
when the Project 15 design commenced. However, even
to be designed as ‘follow-ons’ to the 7th, 8th and 9th frigates
though our team members were all inexperienced, there
of Project 16 that were to be commissioned in the 1980s
was a lot of enthusiasm in the multi-disciplinary design
as the Godavari class.

team for the project.

“Success or failure of a warship design largely depends

Commander (later Rear Admiral and DGND) NP Gupta
on initial estimates of displacement and stability, which
was associated with the design of Project 15 from the design
depend heavily on the available data of ships similar in
stage till production commenced in end 1987. He recalls:

size. These two parameters are veiy important for the

“In Ju ly 1980, I was shifted to DGND and was asked
success of any warship design. While the Godavari
to work on the design of Project 15 frigates. Work
was only 20% bigger than a Leander, Project 15 was
commenced with very brief Staff Requirements in the

75% to 80% bigger than the Godavari. We were on a
form of a note from the then DCPT. A new ship design
very difficult wicket on this. Certain additional margins
was to be made, based on a mix of Soviet and Western
to displacement and stability were added purely on
weapon package similar to the Godavari class with the
professional judgment, as these could not be supported
addition of Russian RBG 6000 anti submarine rockets.

by any calculations.

Gas turbine propulsion was specified.

“The hull form and the ship design started in mid

“A very small design team developed the hull form

1984 when the Russian team came and data on the
in four months. This design of about 3,500 tonnes
propulsion and weapon packages started coming to us.

displacement and 124 meters LB P (a few metres longer

Within nine months we were ready with the new larger
than Godavari) was presented to the Naval Staff as
platform design for model testing.

well as the Material Branch, but could not be taken for

“Model tests were carried out at SSPA, Sweden in the
model tests as the decision with respect to the weapon
latter half of 1985. They were surprised to see a large
package and propulsion package was not finalised.

6,300 tonne warship design coming from India. When

“In September 1980, a request was made to the Soviet
the actual model tests were going on, the then Chief

50 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

of the Naval Staff, Admiral Tahiliani, visited Sweden.

showed that the VDS could be used up to sea state 4.

He also visited SSPA and witnessed the model going

We were keen to push it up to sea state 5, at par with
through the sea keeping tests in the Ship Dynamic
the other weapons on board. Considerable time was

Laboratory. He asked the SSPA about the quality of the
spent in thinking of how to do this. We also studied the
hull form and was informed that Project 15 would be
stern design of the Rajput class where we found a very
a good ship. When the results of the measurements
complex diamond shape on the bottom of the stern. We
were analysed, SSPA declared that the ship would be
could not figure out how it had been done and whether
an excellent weapons platform. This was demonstrated
or not it had any relation with the operation of VDS.

when the first ship faced extremely rare storm conditions

“So we devised our own simple method of increasing
for several hours in 1999.

the stability of the VDS by providing a mini cut-up just

"We had also decided to carry out parallel model
below the VDS gear. Even though it looked very simple,
tests at Krylov Institute in the Soviet Union. These were
it was difficult to implement the scheme structurally.

carried out in 1986. The results from SSPA and Krylov

When we were doing model tests at SSPA, we devised
were similar and within the limits of normal accuracy of
a test procedure to model this phenomenon and then
such tests.

confirmed that it was really possible to operate the VDS

“While designing Project 15, it was realised that sharply
in sea state 5.

raked bows which were the feature of most Soviet

“When Project 15 was on the drawing board, there were
designs in particular the Rajput class gave a fierce look,
several other projects including Project 25 corvettes,
befitting a warship. It would also improve sea-keeping
the Landing Ship Tank, the Cadet Training Ship etc. at
qualities. We adopted this feature in our design.

various stages of design. The Submarine Design Group

“Since a ship is designed around the weapon and
was also being set up and required a large number of
propulsion packages, the required data / inputs were

Naval architects to be deputed for training. This affected
provided by specialists from the Soviet Design Bureau.

the availability of suitable Naval architects for Project

The leader of the Design Bureau team made it clear

15. Lieutenant Commander Sainath (Later Commander
that the ship’s design was the responsibility of the

Sainath) and Lieutenant Commander Ram Mohan (now

Indian side. The hull form, the displacement, the main

Commander) joined the team in 1985/86 on return
dimensions etc were finalised by us independently. The
from training in Russia, but by then the basic design
overall design responsibility was with us and Soviets
had already been completed. Commander Sequeira
ensured that all information pertaining to the weapon

(now Commodore) also joined in late 1985 and made
and propulsion package and their integration was
significant contributions in detailing the design.

provided to us.

“Crucial decisions taken and leadership provided by

“As regards EMI and EMC, in the mid and late 1980s,
certain individuals went a long way in ensuring the success
when Project 15 was on the drawing board, we were
of the Project 15 design. In the early 1980s, when the
search for weapons was on, the pragmatic approach of
still in the process of planning and setting up our NEC.

JD N P Captain (later Vice Admiral) RB Suri and JD CPT

Though initially we had planned to off load a study to

Captain (later Rear Admiral) RB Vohra in recommending
a suitable western agency to carry out copper model
acceptance of the Soviet integrated weapon and Gas
studies, this was not done for security reasons. Since the

Turbine propulsion packages was crucial to the project,
weapon / sensor package was predominantly Soviet, the
despite opposition from certain quarters.

Soviet side developed and supplied the mutual interface
suppression system to ensure that these sensors

“Embarking on a design of such complexity without
performed satisfactorily. The Indian designers for the
even a discussion was an equally bold decision reflecting
first time separated the communication transmitters and
the confidence reposed by the Naval Staff in their ship
receivers and solved the associated design problems.

designers. Internally, the DGND Captain KK Lohana and

This was a challenge but was handled satisfactorily.

Rear Admiral Damodaran gave tremendous support and

Further, general EMI / EMC guidelines in the layout
freedom to the design team to take technical decisions.

of cables/equipment as per the normal shipbuilding

They were always there when the design team required
practices were followed.

them. But for the break-up of the Soviet Union and
the delays in the arrival of the contracted weapon and

“We faced an interesting challenge in the integration of
propulsion packages, the first ship of Project 15 would
the Variable Depth Sonar (VDS). Our initial calculations
have commissioned in 1994 instead of 1997”.8

8. Eventually, D elhi commissioned in 1997, Mysore in 1999 and Mumbai in 2001.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 51

O ffsh o re Patrol V essels

S y ste m Integration by W E S O 1978 to 1984 & W E S E E from 1985

In 1986, sanction was accorded for seven helicopter-
capable ships for patrolling the offshore assets in the Until the advent of the Project 16 Godavari class frigates, Bombay High region. Three of these offshore patrol
system integration was not a major problem since European
vessels (OPVs) Sukanya, Subhadra and Suuarna were equipment in the Leanders was mutually compatible.

built in Korea in 1989-90. The remaining four, Sauitri,

In the Godavari class, however, in view of the hybrid of

Saryu, Sharda and Sujata, were built at Hindustan

Russian and European systems, there arose a requirement

Shipyard to the Korean design and delivered between to interface inputs and outputs in varying forms. It was also 1990 and 1993.

necessary to ensure that in view of the ‘Cold W ar’ between

L ic e n se d Production o f Project 1241 RE G as-tu rb in ed
the West and the Soviet Union, the sensitive parameters of

M issile Craft

Soviet and Western equipment were protected from each
other. This was resolved by the Weapons and Electronic

The development of 400-tonne missile boats was first Systems Organisation (W ESO) designing microprocessor-mentioned by the Soviet side in 1972 - their production was based interface boxes that fulfilled the above functions.

expected to commence in 1976. Since the Navy required To minimise degradation of reliability, the number of more missile boats earlier, eight 200-ton ‘extended range’

interface boxes needed to be minimised. This was
missile boats with better missiles were ordered in 1973.

achieved by persuading as many suppliers as possible to

These were delivered in 1976-77.

accept changes in the input / output specifications of their

The development of the 400-tonne missile boats took respective equipment. The success of the interface boxes longer than anticipated. In 1981, they were formally offered
in the Godavari class led to their adoption in all subsequent
to the Navy and shown to a naval delegation as Project new construction ships.

1241 RE.

Rear Admiral (then Commander) A Ganesh, who was in

The Navy had assessed its requirements as twenty boats W ESO from 1979 onwards recalls: by 1990. Accordingly:

“In 1978, when the go-ahead was given for the design

• Five boats were ordered for delivery in the period 1986-
of the Godavari class frigate to be a hybrid of Russian

90.

weapon systems and numerous other European and

• Discussions were held with the Soviet side in 1982
indigenous equipments, the question arose as to who
and 1983 for the licensed production of the remaining
would be responsible for eventually handing over a fully
fifteen boats in Indian shipyards, with the weapon and
integrated ship to the Navy?

propulsion packages being supplied by the Soviet side as

“MDL stated that it did not have the expertise but was
was being envisaged for Projects 16, 25 and 15. These
willing to fund a separate organisation from the Frigate
discussions concluded that it would not be possible for

Project budget. This led to the creation in 1978 for a
all fifteen boats to be produced by 1990. The plan for
period of six years of an ad hoc Project Management
licensed production was scaled down to six boats by

Group that soon became an autonomous organisation,

1990 and the remaining nine by 1995.

W ESO , under the Ministry of Defence. W E SO was

• Indigenous production was to be shared between
headed by Commander (L) J J Baxi who was also the

Mazagon Docks and Goa Shipyard.

member secretary of the W E S O Steering Committee
headed by the Scientific Adviser to the Defence Minister

-Five boats were commissioned in the Soviet Union
and whose other members were the Chief of Material and
between 1987 and 1989.

the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff (Policy and Plans).

-M D L delivered a total of three boats (1991, 1992 and

“In 1978, W E S O ’s primary task was to interface the

1994).

Russian weapon systems into the Godavari frigate design

- G S L delivered a total of five boats (one each in 1993,
and assist the Department of Electronics to develop and

1995, 1997 and two in 2002.

install the Computer Aided Action Information System

(CAAIS) system for Godavari.

In the 1990s, due to financial stringency and rise in
costs, the Navy decided not to build any more 1241

“Before the six-year sanction expired in 1984, the

R Es after 2002. Of the fifteen boats originally envisaged
case was taken up to convert W E SO into a permanent
for indigenous construction, only eight were eventually
systems establishment, Weapons and Electronics
built.

Systems Engineering Establishment (W E S E E ), to handle

52 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

the numerous other projects, which had crystallized after

Since removal of the now redundant direct cabling would

1978”.

entail ripping open the entire ship, it had to be retained.

Naval Interaction with the Department of Electronics

Disengagement of DO E from Naval Projects

In the early 1970s, the Electronics Commission had These and other such delays had led to the constitution of been set up on the same lines as the Atomic Energy a Committee to monitor the progress of the Navy’s projects Commission. The Department of Electronics (DOE) was a being handled by the DOE. Since the requirements pending department under the Electronics Commission. Its charter with DOE had eventually to be imported, the Committee was to undertake market surveys for electronic products, discreetly closed the earlier projects and no further projects set up Electronic R&D Centres adjacent to the electronic were entrusted to DOE.

production centres and help entrepreneurs to set up
electronic product factories.9

Indo-Soviet Interaction in Indigenous Warship

Design and Production

In the 1970s, DOE’s role progressively expanded into
that of a regulatory body. It had the authority to decide The first decade of Indo-Russian naval interaction, 1965
what could be produced in India. All proposals for import onwards, had focused entirely on the acquisition of Russian of anything electronic had to be cleared by DOE. During produced ships and submarines. From 1974 onwards, in the decade 1975-1985, the Navy had to entrust several addition to acquiring better ships, submarines, aircraft, projects to the DOE, like ASW computer for the 5th and 6th helicopters and weapons from Russia, there was increasing Leander class frigates, Computer Aided Action Information interaction on the acquisition of Russian weapons and System (CAAIS) for the aircraft carrier
systems for installation in Indian built hulls, interfaced with

Vikrant and the

Godavari class frigates and Data Highway System for the Western and indigenous equipment.

Godavari class frigates.

This ‘hybridisation began with the fitment in the 1960

In each of these cases, the DOE decided that it could vintage, British anti submarine frigate, Talivar, of the surface to surface missile system removed
be designed and produced indigenously by DOE itself and
en bloc from a

Russian missile boat. Talwar's installation was completed
therefore vetoed import.

in 1975. This has been discussed in the chapter on ‘Warship

CAAIS for Godavari Class Frigates

Modernisations and Half Life Refits’.

In the case of the CAAIS, little progress was made until

The next step was to decide the weapon package for

1981 when only two years were left before Godavari the three ships that had been sanctioned to follow the six commissioned. DOE then decided to clear the import of Leanders built at Mazagon Docks. In 1976, particulars a CAAIS system. Dutch, Italian and British suppliers were became available of the 5.000-tonne frigates of the short-listed. Despite the Navy’s preference for the Dutch Rajput class and 800-tonne ocean going rocket boat of CAAIS system, DOE cleared the import of the Italian the Durg class, the contract for which had been signed in CAAIS system. When Godavari commissioned in 1983,

1975. In consultation with the Soviet Ship Design Bureau,
she had no CAAIS. Eventually, the Italian IPN 10 system consideration began of the installation of the Rajput’s radar was installed in the third frigate, Gomati, in 1989.

and the Durg’s surface to surface and surface to air missile
systems in a new hull design. The outcome has been

Electronic Data Highway for Godavari Class Frigates
discussed in the chapter on ‘Project 16 - The Godavari

In 1979, it had been decided that the Godavari class Class Frigates’.

frigates would be fitted with an electronic data highway

The next step, again in consultation with the Russian
system to integrate the disparate weapon, sensor and Ministry of Shipbuilding and their Ship Design Bureau, CAIO systems. This would dispense with complex and was the installation of more modem systems in the new dense direct cabling. Until 1985, DOE could not decide Corvettes of Project 25, the new Destroyers of Project 15
on which system to import - American or Norwegian. and of Project 16A, the successors of the earlier Godavari Eventually, DOE’s veto was over-ruled and it cleared the class frigates. In due course, similar consultations took import of the American system. As a result of the delay in place for the follow-on Corvettes of Project 25A and the the clearance to import, each of the three ships had to be follow-on Destroyers of Project 15A.

fitted with direct cabling. Eventually, when the data buses
arrived they could only be retrofitted during major refits.

Concurrently the first step in “licensed production’ was

9 Th' I d to the setting up of KELTRON in Kerala and MELTRON in Maharashtra, both of which in later years produced equipment for the Navy.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 53

taken in the new 400-tonne, gas-turbined missile boats of

-Thirdly, the Navy started inducting naval constructors

Project 1241 RE.

in uniform. These uniformed constructors became
a highly specialised cadre, capable of handling all

By 1987, it became clear to both the Soviet and the
aspects of naval architecture, ship design and ship

Indian sides that the expanding scope of cooperation in
construction.

shipbuilding required monitoring at high levels to ensure

‘’On the Mazagon Docks side, the Navy sent some of
that agreements and protocols were signed at the right
their best officers and best brains to go into shipbuilding.

time, to ensure that orders were placed and deliveries

The best naval technical officers were placed at the
effected to Mazagon Docks, Goa Shipyard and Garden

Reach at the right time to avoid delays in construction.

disposal of Mazagon Docks to be able to build the ships.

"This total involvement of Naval Headquarters in ship

The Joint Indo Soviet Working Group on Shipbuilding
design, ship construction, development, inspection and

(JISW O G ) was set up to smooth the way and clear such
testing, whereby NHQ was itself the vendor and was
problems. It was chaired jointly by the Deputy Minister of
also the customer, led to a pragmatic approach by NHQ

Shipbuilding of the GSSR and India’s Secretary of Defence
whenever confronted with compromises in the design

Production to deal with licensed production of 1241 REs,
process.

the design assistance for the fitment of Soviet systems in
the indigenous hulls of Projects 25, 15, 25A, 16A etc.

“Unfortunately, in the Army and the Air Force, exactly
the reverse happened. Because there was the Defence

The first meeting of the JISW O G was held in New

Research Development Organisation and there was

Delhi in March 1988. Thereafter meetings were held every
the Directorate General of Inspection, most of the
six months, alternately in Russia and India, in which the
time they treated these two organisations as if they

Chairmen of the Defence shipyards also participated. In due
were the vendors and the Army Headquarters or the
course, the JIS W O G ’s terms of reference were expanded to

Air Headquarters were the customers. Because they
include discussion of product support problems for ships
themselves did not have any design or construction
and equipment that had already been supplied.

responsibility, they tended to treat the designer or Indian

Indigenous Warship Design and Production
industry at that stage at par with their corresponding
in Retrospect
designer in the world market. In that mindset, if I get
a MiG 21 from the world market, I want a MiG 21 from

The success of “hybridisation1 depended on electronic

HAL. This was never possible and never feasible. And
integration and interfacing. Commander J J Baxi’s team of
because there was no involvement on the part of the
bright young W ESO officers laid the foundation in 1979
service, they were not able to succeed.

when designing the Godavari class frigates for integrating

“Whereas in our case, first of all, progressive
the diverse electronics of Russian, European and indigenous
indigenisation was done. The goal and ambition were
systems. Their success led to similar integration in the
limited. The first Leander was made totally from sub
ships that followed.

systems imported from Britain. The second Leander

Rear Admiral Baxi, the first Director of W ESO and in
had partial indigenisation, in the sense that whatever
later years the Chairman and Managing Director of Bharat
systems were available within the country or could be

Electronics, recalls:

developed were utilised. The remaining systems were

There were several
organic elements which
imported. And so on.

contributed to the success of the Navy’s projects:

“Then naturally the next corollary was that we re

-First and foremost, amongst the three services, the
designed the fifth Leander, the Taragiri, with one

Indian Navy has shown the greatest determination

Seaking helicopter. Then we went on to the seventh
to be self sufficient and self-reliant. And this was by a
frigate, the Godauari that again was designed by naval
genre of people over generations, not merely by one
officers, with two Seaking helicopters. The Directorate
individual.

of Combat Policy and Tactics, was the one who actually
did the concept designing and asked why can’t we have

- Secondly, by creating the Directorate General of Naval
two Seaking helicopters on board? Right from top-

Design within Naval Headquarters, we got an agency,
level decision makers like DCPT and DNP, down to a
manned by officers on deputation, responsible for

Lieutenant in the naval architecture branch, everybody
indigenisation, under the direct control of Naval
learnt to take technological and professional decisions.

Headquarters, which slowly started to build up

A complete, integral, decision-making process built up
complete design and project management skills in-
within the confines of NHQ.

house, within the Navy.

54 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

This is the one and only reason why, other than the
something that can come out of a Government office or

Atomic Energy Commission and later on the Space
a laboratory, placed too much faith in that Department.

Organisation, Naval Headquarters is the only service in

It took some time for the Navy to extricate itself from
this country which had truly succeeded in indigenisation.

that.”

If you see the ingredients of Space and Atomic Energy, it
is exactly the same story as Naval Headquarters. Space

Captain NS Mohan Ram recalls:

and Atomic Energy had nobody to fall back upon. They

“It is essential that the time taken for the delivery
were the designers, they were the ones who formulated
of the vehicle be minimised to reduce the level of
the concepts, they were the ones who did the designs,
obsolescence. This requires appropriate organisational
they ultimately had to see that their rocket fired and
structures, systems and procedures, which facilitate
so a large amount of in-house work had to be done
speedy decision-making and implementation.

in developing systems, sub-systems and concepts in

“The Navy’s surface ship programme has been
design. These are the three services you can be proud
singularly successful. Series of frigates, corvettes,
of, who have done true indigenisation namely Naval
offshore patrol vessels, landing ships, training ships and a

Headquarters, ISRO, and the Department of Atomic
number of other smaller vessels have been indigenously

Energy. In my opinion, this is the crux of the matter.

developed and are in active service. Undoubtedly there

“1 have always maintained that nothing succeeds like
have been some delays in these projects but still the
success. The indigenisation of the propulsion system,
ships have come out and are in service.

the main machinery, the auxiliaries, the switchboards,

“The most important reason for this superior track
the cables, the fire control systems, including those
record is the setting up of organisations within the
that were manufactured by Bharat Electronics under

Navy responsible for design and induction of the first
license from Holland, all gave NHQ a lot of confidence.

of class ships and for repeat orders. Co-location of the

This confidence, of having succeeded with a concept
designers and project managers of the ships, under one
and the feeling that we can do it, led to the design of
roof and single point accountability for the end result,
the Taragiri and the subsequent design of Godavari
has been the common factor in the success of these
and then of Project 25 (Khukri class corvettes), Project
programmes.

16 Alpha (Brahmaputra class frigates) and Project 15

“This aspect of single point accountability becomes

(Delhi class destroyers) and the Navy has never looked
more and more important as project complexity
back. The ingredients of why NHQ succeeded, which
increases. Sub-system responsibility can be entrusted

NHQ actually implemented, are not being replicated by
to different specialist organisations but there has to be
many organisations in this country.”

one set up accountable for the overall result.

Captain S Prabhala, later Chairman and Managing

“Distance impedes communication and results in

Director of Bharat Electronics Ltd, recalls:

distortions. The Naval Design Directorate and Directorate

“This commitment to indigenisation, the willingness
of Ship Production have overcome the problem by coto experiment and the willingness to suffer the locating the specialists together under one roof. The
consequences by way of delays, by way of equipment

Naval Constructors have taken on the role of total vehicle
still undergoing trials, even though the ship is complete
system responsibility. Their location in Naval Headquarters
is a tremendous plus point with the Navy. Of all the three
has facilitated constant interaction with the Naval Staff.

services, the Navy had this risk taking ability, it had the

“lt will be fair to say that the real credit belongs to the
internal organisational mechanisms to initiate major

Senior Naval Officers who took decisions in the 1960s
indigenous programmes, and it had the ability to coax,
and 1970s on organisational structures, which is paying
persuade and control the indigenous manufacturers
us good dividends today.”

to also rise to the occasion. It was a tremendous

Captain J Subbiah was associated with the design and
experience.

construction of the Godavari class frigates, the Khukri class

“There was only one occasion when, to my mind, corvettes and the Delhi class destroyers. He recalls: the Navy erred. That was in their impatience to go in

“Both in Britain and the USA, the concept has been in
for more and more indigenisation and feeling that
vogue, for several years, of developing detailed design

Bharat Electronics was not responding fast enough, the
drawings and processes for the first ship in a shipyard

Department of Electronics came forward and said that
designated as a ‘lead yard’, and later to transfer the knowthev could develop the CAAIS. The Navy, without realising how to other yards designated as ‘follow-on yards’. This
that an equipment or a system for shipboard use is not

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 55

concept provides for orderly transfer of services and

“The reason for delving into this subject is to lay the
ensures that the follow-on yards need not ‘re-invent the
foundation to discuss the cost-plus and fixed price
wheel’.

contracts. When the design is fully completed, there is
no reason for going for a cost-plus contract since all

“In India, partly due to the smaller number of ships
elements are known. Even in this case, most capital goods
programmed to be built and due to the need for the injection
contracts like shipbuilding cater for increase in contract
of large amounts of capital to develop the shipyards, this
price due to ‘change orders’ from the ‘owners’. Even in
concept was not practiced up to the early 1980s.

a fully developed design, in the first ship of a class, there

“However, during the second half of the 1980s, when
are bound to be a large number of change orders and
the build programme of the Navy increased substantially,
the inevitable haggling in the price. This would, of course,

Mazagon Docks Limited (MDL) alone could not cope up
reduce in the subsequent ships of a series.

with the load. It was around 1986 that the Navy and the

“Resource-constrained Navies have a problem. Very

Coast Guard decided to put this concept into practice.

seldom do we build a large number of ships to the

“The contract for the first three Project 16 ships was
same design. Even in the Leander programme, no two
awarded to Mazagon Docks and the contract for the
ships were built to the same design in terms of weapon
second lot, designated Project 16A was awarded to
package and the associated internal layout. This imposes

Garden Reach Shipbuilding and Engineering (GRSE).

a tremendous strain in going through the fixed price

MDLs Design Department was asked to ensure the
contract. In fact, the time spent in the negotiation of the
transfer of technology to GRSE.

contract price variation may be disproportionately larger

“Similarly, the second lot of Project 25 was also
than the time spent in settling the technical aspects of
awarded to G R SE and the process was repeated.

the design changes, if fixed price contracts were to be
practiced in such cases.

“In the case of Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL), MDL
acted as the lead yard for the Offshore Patrol Vessels

“Having spent almost 20 years in the development of
and the 1241 REs. The design drawings and processes
basic designs and detailed designs for warships, most
were transferred to G SL to build the follow-on ships.

of them with Soviet weapon packages, I was associated
with several delegations of Soviet Designers who had

“Successful implementation of this concept improved
come to India to work on the projects. I had also visited
the flexibility of the Navy and the Coast Guard in
the erstwhile Soviet Union.”

managing the build programme and also injected an
element of competitiveness.

Viewed overall, the Navy’s achievements in the field of

“As General Manager of the Design Department, I was warship design and production were amazing. In the twenty five years between 1965 and 1990, a tiny ‘ship design cell’

responsible for implementing this concept of Technology that was designing yard craft had blossomed into the Transfer and in retrospect, it was a success.

Directorate General of Naval Design that was designing

“Having been associated with the development of an aircraft carrier, submarines, destroyers and numerous concept and basic designs of Project 16 and Project 25 types of large auxiliary and minor war vessels.

ships and the detailed designs of several projects, I was
inevitably part of the concept of ‘telescoping of design

The Soviet Shipbuilding Ministry, its Warship Design
into production to reduce the total time of Concept to

Bureaus and Weapon Supply organisations were unstinting

Delivery’. The concept certainly reduced the total time
in their help. The regular interaction that had started in the
in the case of Project 16. However in later years, the

1970s at high levels regarding the developments of future
degree of ‘telescoping’ was increased to perhaps an

Russian systems enabled planners in the Naval Staff to
unacceptable level and it had its fall-outs.

arrive at cost effective Russian weapon packages to achieve
standardisation in systems and economy in inventories.

“In fact, this resulted in a controversy, which led to
the appointment of (late) Mr Lovraj Kumar to study the

Enormous synergy was generated by the interchange
concept and submit a report on its suitability. I spent of talented young naval architects between ship design several sessions with Mr Lovraj Kumar explaining the assignments in the Directorate General of Naval Design concept and going through the case studies, both the and assignments as naval overseers in the warship building successful and the not so successful ones. As in any yards to oversee the construction of the ships that they had concept of this nature, there is no ‘black and white’

helped to design. This synergy helped Mazagon Docks,
answer. If practiced in moderation, the concept will yield

Garden Reach and Goa Shipyard to acquire the confidence
certain benefits in the form of reduced lead-time.

in the ‘hybridising’ that was to become standard practice in

Indian naval warship building.

56 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

9

The Leander Frigate Project

Preamble
early 1964. Later he was in the Directorate of the Leander

In November 1960, soon after Mazagon Docks was taken Project and later still he was Chairman and Managing Director of Bharat Electronics. He recalls:

over, Government approved the construction of three

Leander class frigates. MDL held discussions in Britain

“We found that the company SIGNAAL in Holland,
with shipbuilding firms and the Admiralty. After receiving
which supplied the fire control equipment and the radars

MDLs report on its requirements for additional facilities,
for the Dutch Navy's Leanders, had superior equipment,
the British firm of Sir Alexander Gibbs and Partners (who
superior in the sense they were already using digital
were also consultants for the Expansion Scheme of the
electronics as opposed to the analog electronics of the

Bombay Naval Dockyard) were retained to advise and

British systems. The Navy, therefore, felt that if we went
prepare plans for expanding MDLs facilities, both for ship
in for the indigenous manufacture of the analog systems,
repair and ship construction.

we would be stuck with them for the next several years.

Why should we make outdated analog systems when

In 1964, agreements were concluded for the
digital electronics were already coming into vogue? If we
construction of the latest design Leander class frigate, in
were going to make anything indigenously, we should
step with the construction of a similar frigate in Britain to be
start with something technologically more up to date
commissioned in 1969. This would enable the personnel
than the obsolescent analog British systems then availdeputed by the Navy and MDL to undergo training, to see able.

and learn at first hand how a modern frigate was built and

“Then we found that if we were to fit the Signaal
inspected at every step and subjected to rigorous harbour
equipment, the ship would require some modifications
and sea trials before acceptance into service.

in the hull and in the structure, related only to these
equipments and not to a wholesale change of design.

The First Frigate Nilgiri

Therefore, we needed somebody to supply us the

Nilgiri’s keel was laid on 15 October 1966. She was
modified shipbuilding drawings to enable us to fit
commissioned on 3 June 1972. The problems encountered
the Dutch Signaal radars and fire control in a broad
and overcome, and the delays experienced, have been
beam Leander and for that we tied up with NEVESBCJ,
recounted in the previous volume of this series “Transition
the Dutch Warship Design Bureau. The Dutch fire
to Triumph - The History of the Indian Navy 1965-
control and radar equipment were then licensed for

1975".

manufacture to Bharat Electronics, which was the only

Indian company at that time that had some experience

C h an geover From A n alog to Digital Electronic System s
of manufacturing radars and electronic equipment for

Initially, the Government had ordered only one frigate.

the Defence Services.”

There was delay in placing the order for the second and

Eventually, Himgiri, and the subsequent Leanders, were
third frigates because India was going through a foreign fitted with the following Dutch SIGNAAL equipment: exchange crisis. Eventually in 1967, an order was placed • The VM 45 fire control system for the 4.5-inch gun.

on MDL to build two more frigates. Naval Headquarters

took advantage of this delay to upgrade the radars, fire • Two VM 44 fire control systems for two, sided, Seacat control systems and the Action Information Organisation
anti aircraft guided missile launchers.

(AIO) of the Operations Room.

• Long range Air Warning Radar LW 04, Surface Warning

Radar DA 05 and Navigation Radar ZW 06.

Lieutenant Commander (L) (later Captain) S Prabhala
was in the first team which went to Britain for training in

• DS 22 Display Systems in the Operations Room. This

system was still under development by Signaal and the

1970. The fourth Leander was launched on 9 March

Indian Navy was the first customer for it.

1974. She was on the slipway for only 14 months as
compared to 18 to 25 months for the second and third

Since a better, modified British Sonar 184 M was being frigates respectively. Fitting out was affected by delays in offered, it replaced the earlier Sonar 184.

receipt of indigenous as well as imported equipment. The
main engines and gearboxes were received in May 1975.

The Second Frigate Himgiri

Basin trials were carried out in October 1976 and sea trials

Himgiri's keel was laid on 4 November 1968. She was
completed satisfactorily in November / December 1976.

launched on 6 May 1970. MDL had been able to reduce The final inspection of hull, weapons, radio compartments the time between keel laying and launch from 25 months and systems was completed in early 1977. Dunagiri to 18 months. The fitting-out, however, was considerably commissioned on 5 May 1977.

delayed due to the late arrival of major items, both from
abroad and within India.

The time between keel laying and launching had been
reduced to 14 months. The time from launching to delivery

The machinery installation was completed in December
had been reduced to 38 months - the shortest period yet

1973, Basin Trials were successfully completed in January achieved. Nevertheless, the total of 58 months from start 1974 and the Contractors Sea Trials commenced on
of production was still too long by world standards. On

6 April 1974. At the preliminary full power trials, the the other hand, the range of equipment being indigenously temperature of the gearbox bearings was found to be produced for the first time by Indian industry was rising above acceptable limits. The gearbox was the first impressive - main boilers, main turbines, main gearing, to have been made in India to the Swiss MAAG design.

main circulators, turbines for turbo alternators, diesel

In consultation with the Swiss designers, it was decided
alternators, stern tube bushes, heat exchangers, radar
to modify the bearings and check the alignment of the and fire control equipment, data processing computers, turbines. The Repeat Contractor’s Sea Trials in September
air conditioning and refrigeration machinery, broadcast

1974 were successful, and Himgiri commissioned on 23 equipment, telephone and teleprinter equipment, main November 1974.

and auxiliary switch boards, complex system valves, fire
detection sensors and a host of other minor equipment.

On the plus side, Himgiri got better radars, sonars, AIO
and fire control equipment and two Seacat guided missile

By the time the fourth Leander had been built,
launchers instead of one. Design changes were also made
considerable confidence had built up at all levels.

in the communication systems and the layout of mess
decks to improve habitability in tropical conditions.

Improvements in Anti Subm arine Capability in the

Fifth and Sixth Leanders

The Third Frigate Udaygiri

In 1972 and 1973, operating experience started building

Since orders for the second and third frigates had been
up on the newly commissioned first Leander, the Nilgiri,
received together, MDL was able to build them faster than
and the recently acquired Seaking anti submarine, dunking
the first frigate. The fabrication work on the third frigate,
sonar helicopters. In view of the continuing acquisition by
scheduled to commence in January 1970, started in April

Pakistan of modem submarines from France, it was clear

1970 due to late receipt of steel from Hindustan Steel Ltd.

that future Leanders would require greater anti submarine

In 1969-70, there had been an acute shortage of capability.

steel. MDL had been able to carry on production without

In early 1973, Naval Headquarters initiated studies to
serious dislocation because its earlier orders for steel
improve the anti submarine capability of the 5th and 6th
had materialised. By 1970-71, however, the fall in steel

Leanders. These changes crystallised in mid 1973. The
production adversely affected MDLs work. The interval
major changes envisaged embarking the heavy Seaking
between keel laying and launching increased to 25 months.

helicopter (instead of the smaller MATCH role helicopter)

The main machinery that should have arrived at the time and improving the anti submarine sonars and weapons.

for the ship’s launching in October 1972 was actually
received in May 1974, thereby further delaying the ship’s Seaking Helicopter commissioning till 18 February 1976.

In 1966, the Canadian Navy had pioneered the operation

The Fourth Frigate Dunagiri
of a Seaking helicopter from the deck of a frigate. This
entailed designing a ‘Bear Trap’ Haul-down and Traversing

Orders for the next three frigates were placed in Ju ly
system for moving the heavy helicopter on the small flight

58/TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

deck, providing a large hangar and strengthening the flight
feasible. Finally, the design was accepted. That is how
deck to bear the weight of a heavy helicopter. All these
we in DLP came back into the design of the 5th frigate,
changes would affect the ship’s overall design, stability and
the Taragiri"

sea-keeping qualities.

Anti Submarine Sonars and W eapons

To meet the conflicting requirement of a large hangar
and a long clear flight deck, the hangar would have to be The design modifications and changes were discussed telescopic. Extra flight deck space aft could only be made with individual equipment suppliers in Canada, Sweden, available by removing the anti submarine Mortar and the Britain and Italy in 1974. By 1975, the changes had been Variable Depth Sonar wells.

finalised:

© The British Mortar Mk 10 anti submarine ahead throwing

Lieutenant Commander (later Rear Admiral and
weapon fitted aft would be replaced by the Swedish

Chairman) J J Baxi recalls:

Bofors SR 375 Twin Rocket Launcher with its integral

"When I came back to NHQ in 1973, NHQ had decided
magazine and hoist, all fitted in the bows forward of the
chat the design of the fifth frigate would be given to the
gun mounting.

Director (ate) of Naval Design (DND) and not to the ® Two, sided Torpedo Tube Launchers would be fitted to Director (ate) of the Leander Project (DLP). As DDLR 1

fire the latest Italian A-244 homing torpedoes being
realised that we really did not have much to do, because
acquired as successors to the obsolescent British Mk 44
if the design was being done by DND, what was going to
torpedoes.

be D LP’s role? In those days, DND had come up with a © British Graseby’s 184 SS (solid state) search sonar design for a new weapon package.

would be fitted in lieu of the earlier valve version Sonar

“In the meanwhile, I went into the technical feasibility

184 M in the preceding Leanders.

of DND’s design to see whether a large anti submarine • French Thomson-CSF solid state, search and attack helicopter like a Seaking could operate from a Leander. I
sonar Diodon would be fitted in lieu of the earlier valve
distinctly remember we consulted some Admiralty Fleet
version attack Sonar 170 M in the preceding Leanders.

Orders and then invited the DND, who had earlier given • British Graseby’s Sonar Gl 738 Underwater Telephone an opinion that this was not feasible, to discussions with
would be fitted in lieu of the earlier Sonar 182.

DLP When I went into it, it was on a limited presumption • India’s Department of Electronics would produce that the anti submarine Mortar Mark 10 fitted at the rear
the ASW fire control computer to control the new SR
end of the ship was required and that it could never be

375 Rocket Launcher and the deck launched A 244
removed. Then we came up with the idea that if the
torpedoes.

mortar well was covered up, the overhead space would
be just enough for a Seaking to operate from there. The • The latest available Italian electronic warfare equipment anti submarine mortar could be replaced by another
would be fitted.

type of forward throwing rocket launcher like the

The Fifth Frigate Taragiri

Swedish Bofors SR 375. Then I worked day and night
so that no one else would come to know what we were The design work for these extensive modifications doing. Between Constructor Captain Choudhary who was, for the first time, undertaken by the Naval Design was in the Directorate of Leander Project and myself, Organisation.

we did all the initial design work, showing the new flight

These design changes delayed the commencement
deck, showing the new helicopter and showing the new of construction, which should have started immediately weapon package that was involved. This was the most after the launching of the fourth frigate. Production could creative time of my life as a designer.

commence only in April 1975. The keel was laid six months

“We actually came up with a new design concept
later and the ship was launched on 25 October 1976.

We gave a

Thereafter there was a major setback in fitting-out because
p r e s e n ta t io n to the Chief of the Naval Staff
and he accepted our design. Dr Roy Q » u d ta y «
of a delay of one year in receipt of the main engines. This
the Scientific Adviser to the
created its own chain of delays. Contractor’s Sea Trials

D e f e n c e M . m s t e r n d he
commenced in April 1979. During trials, vibrations were
also accepted that our design would work Even M
observed in the main turbines. The defects were rectified,

Paramanandhan, who had by then become: the: Direct
repeat sea trials were satisfactorily completed in December

General of Naval Design, was grac.ous ^ ^ o a c c e p
and Taragiri commissioned on 16 May 1980. Whilst the
that operating a Seaking helicopter from a fngate was

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 59

time from keel laying to launch had been only 12 months,

“Added to this, they had problems while operating
the least period so far, the time taken from launching to
steam ships and steam boilers in that some of their
commissioning was 43 months, much more than the time
ships had experienced a number of furnace failures and
taken for any of its predecessors.

explosions. It was with this in mind that they thought
they would overcome the problem by changing over

The Sixth Frigate Vindhyagiri
from FFO to diesel.

Vindhyagiri was the first Leander to have the steam-

“The Indian Navy got a place for one Engineering
atomised Dieso-burning system to mitigate the boiler
officer to participate in these trials, which were really of
refractory problems that had been experienced in the
a Research and Development nature and buttressed by
earlier Leanders.

actual trials on a Y-160 boiler at Haslar. Trials were done
in a most methodical and professional manner, where

In other respects, she was identical with Taragiri.

frequent inspections of the furnace from inside were

Construction commenced on 5 Ju ly 1976. Her keel was
backed by a lot of effort from their labs in UK. A number
laid on 5 November 1976, and she was launched on 12
of burners were experimented with until they arrived at

November 1977 after a period of 12 months, the same
the most optimum geometry for these burners, which
time as was taken for the Taragiri. She commissioned
gave the most optimised atomiser for the burning tips.

on 8 Ju ly 1981, having taken 44 months from launch to

Although trials were not hundred percent complete, my
delivery.

deputation period ended on a satisfactory note of not

C o n v ersion from Furnace Fuel O il (F F O ) to S te a m -
having any major problems with the burning of diesel.

A to m ise d D ie so -B u rn in g S y stem

Trials did continue after 1 returned.

“We went into it by the year 1976, when Naval

In 1967, the British Navy commenced trials to changeover

Headquarters decided to implement it. We could not
from FFO to Diesel fuel in its Leander class frigates. Vice
implement it until 1979 because even the Royal Navy

Admiral (then Lieutenant) L Lowe was deputed to Britain
required a large number of conversion kits for their own
to participate in these trials. He recalls:

ships.”

“My deputation to the Admiralty Marine Engineering

Establishment, Haslar was to associate with the trials

The Minutes of the Commanders’ Conference 1981
team formed by the Royal Navy for converting their state:

boilers from FFO to Diesel. The Royal Navy found it

“Vindhyagiri, the sixth Leander and the last of series
expedient to go in for a single fuel at that point of time,
was commissioned on 8 Ju ly 1981. This is the first
because of the induction of gas turbines into their Navy.

Leander with the steam atomised Dieso burning system,

Having FFO burning Leanders and follow on steam
which should reduce the boiler refractory problems that
ships would create logistic problems for them, and
have plagued earlier Leanders. All Leanders are to be
therefore, they thought it wise to go in for a ‘single fuel
converted to this system during their planned refits.”

Navy’.

Overview of

Timelines

MDL Yard No.

228

248

274

298

308

318

Ship’s Name

Nilgiri

Himgiri

(Jdaygiri

Dunagiri

Taragiri

Vindhyagiri

Order Placed on MDL

Jul 65

Sep 67

Sep 67

Jul 70

Jul 70

Jul 70

Fabrication Commenced

May 66

Jul 68

Apr 70

Sep 72

Apr 75

Jul 76

Keel Laid

Oct 66

Nov 68

Aug 70

Jan 73

Oct 75

Nov 76

Launched

Oct 68

May 70

Oct 72

Mar 74

Oct 76

Nov 77

Commissioned

Jun 72

Nov 74

Feb 76

May 77

May 80

Ju l 81

60 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Overview of Improvements in Combat Capability

^oroveme^rwf^p
m SenSOrS and weaPons between the first and the sixth Leander. Equally significant improvements were effected in the ena neprinn

___

M

3 a

N ILG IR I

HIM GIRI, (JDAYGIRI

TARAGIRI

(First

DCINAGIRI

VINDHYAGIRI

Leander)

(2nd, 3rd and 4th

(5th and 6th

Leanders)

Leanders)

Surface to Air

British

Dutch

Dutch

Missile Fire Control

Gun Mounting

British

Dutch

Dutch

Fire Control

Ship Launched Torpedoes

-

-

Italian

Anti Submarine

British

British

Swedish

Weapon

Anti

French Alouette

Indian Alouette

British

Submarine
with British
with British

Seaking with

Helicopter

Torpedoes

Torpedoes

Italian Torpedoes

Close Range

20 mm Oerlikon

20 mm Oerlikon

20 mm Oerlikon

AA Guns

(ex stock)

(ex stock)

(ex stock)

Chaff

-

-

-

Radars

British

Dutch

Dutch

Sonars

British

British

British and French

Action Information

British

Dutch

Dutch

System

Electronic

British

British

Italian

Warfare System

The Leander Project in Retrospect
relentlessly. He had always maintained that unless India
was self-sufficient in major items of defence equipment,

The Leander Frigate Project, which commenced with the
we would never be totally free and that, further if we were
construction of the Nilgiri on 23 October 1966, completed
dependent on the West or on anyone else, we would
with the commissioning of the Vindhyagiri on 8 July 1981.

be badly let down, in time of war when the ‘crunch’

During these fifteen years, six frigates were delivered, an
came. And indeed this was proved time and again, in
average of 30 months per ship. By the time of the b
the conflicts with Pakistan in 1948 and 1965, when both

Leander, the indigenous content of bought out equipment

Britain and the USA imposed embargos.

had risen to 70%. The 5th and 6th ships had an ^ported

“Today looking back, it is quite extraordinary the degree
content of only 27% as against 70% in the case o
e
to which indigenisation was achieved. For instance, we
frigate.

are now accepting, without demur, the Main Gearing
being manufactured by Walchand Magar in collaboration

Vice Admiral BA Samson was t h e Chairman and
with MAAG of Switzerland. And yet in 1966, when this

Managing Director of MDL when the first few frigates w
was first suggested, there was horror. The very idea of
being built He recalls:

a highly sophisticated piece of equipment like the main

“The specifications, the veiy fine
gearing being manufactured, way out in the middle of
performance ratios and the fact t a a

Indian
nowhere, some 60 to 70 miles outside Poona, in what
had to be Shock-proof, were parameters
was originally a sugar factory in a little village, was

Industry, by and large, w e r e i W ^ ,nspirallon of
unbelievable to most. And yet it did succeed.

“There were numerous problems, aggravated to some
r ^ b L X " o " n 1 n ien ,s,.,o n was progressed

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 61

extent by doubts and lack of confidence, but we won
indigenisation. In retrospect, I would say this was the
through. What is important is that it created the kind
best and most systematic indigenisation effort the Navy
of confidence and experience, both in the Service and
ever had. And taking the totality into account, it was
specially in Indian Industry who, having succeeded
possibly the best in the country at that time.

in producing equipment of such high specifications

“While the main engines of the first ship were imported,
for the Navy, were emboldened to go in for higher
the second ship’s set of main engines were made by
technology."

B H E L in Bhopal, using the same English Electric

Captain NS Mohan Ram, a naval constructor, recalls:

drawings made in Foot Pound System by converting
the measurements to the Metric System, which had

“The Directorate of Leander Project in 1969/1970 was
been adopted in India and in which Bhopal’s machines
veiy exciting. I had excellent colleagues. On the electrical
were set. We also developed an indigenous version of
side there were Commanders Baxi and Qanesh, on the

Allen’s steam auxiliaries with Jyoti of Baroda and BH EL
engineering side there was Commander Bose. We did

Bhopal. A steam test rig was set up in Bhopal, financed
the very first composite layouts of compartments like
by the Navy, to give these machines a test run under
the galley, the electronic warfare office, the electronic
steam before accepting the machinery for installation
warfare equipment room etc. We did the complete air
on board.

conditioning of the Nilgiri.

“Special weld-able steel, known as Ship Building

“I also did the collapsible hangar, which the Royal Navy

Quality Steel or Lloyd’s grade A/B is used in shipbuilding.

did not have. We needed a hangar that could collapse like

These steels were not manufactured in India till then. We
an accordion, so that when the helicopter was landing,
had the blessings of the. Ministry of Steel to undertake
the hangar would be closed and when the helicopter
the project at Rourkela Steel Plant and they did a fairly
was parked, the hangar would be open. Nobody had
successful job, though it did not meet the specification
done this in a ship of N ilgiri’s size. We got a company to 100%. This steel was considered acceptable under
called Dominion Aluminum Fabricating Company of
deviation and used in constructing the second Leander.

Canada to do the collapsible hangar.

Subsequently, of course, it was found that imported

“It was a very interesting time because we were
steel was of quicker delivery and cheaper, and was used.

learning on the job. And stupid mistakes used to happen

Having established an indigenous source of manufacture
also. I went to Mazagon Docks for an inspection of the
of shipbuilding quality steel, we could always revert to it
helicopter landing deck. The Alouette is a three-wheeled
whenever necessary.

helicopter, the front wheel is in the middle. The helicopter

“The boilers of the first Leander were erected in the
guide platforms were welded as per the original British

Naval Dockyard Bombay. A new Boiler Shop was created
design for the British Westland Wasp, which was a four-
and the boilers, with drums, tubes, mountings etc from
wheeled helicopter. When I went and asked the Naval
the British firm Babcock and Wilcox were erected.

Air Staff. ‘Why didn’t you tell us earlier? I got no reply.

Being very heavy and bulky, these boilers were put on

To rectify that mistake, we had to change the whole
trailers in the Naval Dockyard Bombay and transported
insulation and the wiring. We did a lot of foolish things.

to Mazagon Dock for installation on board.

But we were learning all the time.

“The development of the main shafting was attempted

"In those four or five years, Mazagon Docks and the
at the Heavy Engineering Corporation (HEC) Ranchi. But

Navy learnt so much. I think the future of the Navy was

HEC was experiencing serious administrative problems.

laid in the Leander Frigate Project. For the first time,

As such the project did not finally succeed. They met
we were getting into the nitty gritty of building warships
the specifications in only 50% of the items. They could
and this really culminated when the Navy put the big
have had 100% success had they carefully followed our

Seaking helicopter in Taragiri with a bigger extendable
instructions of cropping the ends of the forgings before
hangar. It was something quite phenomenal, something
rolling the shafts, in order to achieve good quality
to be proud of.”

forgings for turbine rotors for the Navy and for Power

Commodore (then Commander) SC Bose, an engineer

Houses, HEC had initiated action for procurement and
officer, recalls:

installation of a Vacuum Degassing Plant and a 6,000-
tonne press. Unfortunately, after installation, these

“We had the Department of Defence Production,

Ministry of Defence, working hand in hand with
valuable plants were lying idle due to lack of initiative,

Naval Headquarters and Mazagon Docks towards
and rotor forgings were being imported by B H E L and
other turbine manufacturers.

62 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

The main gear cases, a very critical piece of machinwith it, the organisation of the Directorate of Warship ery, were also indigenised. In the first Leander, we used

Projects initially and the organisation of the Directorate
imported David Brown gearing but for the second Leander
of Production and Inspection Navy later, gave us the
we went in for ones to be produced at Walchand Nagar
confidence that we can go ahead more boldly with
near Pune, under collaboration with MAAG Gearwheel
procurement of equipment from indigenous resources.2

Co of Zurich.1 Here again we faced many problems in

For instance, the communication equipment, ICS 3, for
conversion of metric CGS into Foot Pound Systems, as
the Leanders was imported from the UK but we were able
the terminals had to be in the FPS system to match with
to get Bharat Electronics to develop it - whether it was
the turbines and shafting while the internals imported
the (JHF transreceiver or the CCS equipment and the
from MAAG were in CGS system. I must say that the

Versatile Console System - to a degree which the other

Directorate of Leander Project (DLP), the Directorate of
two services did not indigenise. The naval constructors

Marine Engineering (DME) and the Directorate of Warship
also rose to the occasion and came out with improved

Projects (DWP) under the Ministry of Defence Production
designs of the Leanders like the Taragiri and the Project
burnt midnight candles in Walchand Nagar, checking

16 Godavari class frigates."

every dimension and manufacturing tolerance, meeting
both FPS and CGS system of the terminal components,

Overall, the Leander Frigate Project was, for its time, a
lt was a success in one shot.

significant achievement. The boldness of the naval decision
makers, the enthusiasm, perseverance and dedication
liWe had set up a Test Rig using a redundant cruising of the implementers in Mazagon Docks, in the Ministry of turbine of a Khukri class frigate for back-to-back test Defence Production and in the Navy, the assistance by the under actual steam and give both the gear wheels British Admiralty, by the British shipbuilding collaborators, overspeed and overload runs of the kind it would Vickers and Yarrow, by the Dutch Design Bureau NEVESBU, experience in a ship for maximum exploitation. We were the assistance of the diverse suppliers - all these contributed told that such trials were done only in Canada and in to the success of the project.

Switzerland. We ran continuous trials for 72 hours. The
trial runs went as scheduled except for one incident when

Particularly valuable was the close and informal
one set of bearings failed. We immediately knew what interaction, between personages as high as the Secretary it was due to. The representative of MAAG Gearwheel, Defence Production, HC Sarin, his Additional Secretary a renowned designer, was present at the trials. We all (and later Secretary) MM Sen and their teams in the Ministry agreed with the corrective actions and continued with of Defence, Defence Production and Defence Finance, the trials. I don’t think such a bold step would be taken and the bright young naval officers of the Leander Project.

anywhere, to introduce into service a gear case, which Within the Navy, the elders trusted the youngsters to do was never tried earlier. We were very lucky that the what they thought best. The success of indigenisation was a direct result of the Indigenisation Study Group’s free,
propulsion system with the changed component gave frank and helpful interaction with Indian Industry through no problem of noise or vibration in any mode.

DWP and DPI (N).

“We developed all the gun-metal valves and fittings
indigenously. Similar indigenous substitutes were found

The self-confidence gained in this project by the Navy’s
for electrical fittings, items of domestic and hotel seivices weapon planners, the naval architects and the shipbuilder laid the basis for the success of the series of warships that
nature, etc.”

followed.

Captain Prabhala recalls:

“The success of the indigenisation effort in building the

Leanders and the machinery that came into existence

--------------------- -------- r T T T T Z I T m e d and was working satisfactorily in Canadian Navy frigates that were similar to our 1. Since 1966, Swiss MAAG gearing had already Deen

Leanders.

after ^ engineering items. The Directorate of Production and Inspection, DPI (Navy), 2. The Directorate of Warship Projects DWk; o
d E ,ectronic items and machinery spares,
looked after the common user Naval Store Hems,

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 63

10

Project 16 - The Godavari Class Frigates

Evolution o f the D e sig n

The Directorate of Marine Engineering suggested that
steam propulsion be replaced by gas turbine propulsion.

Project 16 was the designation given to the three frigates
that followed the six ships of the Leander Project. The

Since constraints4 precluded a totally de novo design
staff requirements for this new design were formulated with gas turbine propulsion, the Naval Staff approved in 1972 before Nilgiri, the first Leander, had even been this hybrid weapon package but retained the indigenous
commissioned.1 They incorporated the lessons learnt in
propulsion machinery and other equipment developed for
the recently concluded 1971 Indo-Pakistan War.

earlier Leanders. Approval was also accorded for having
two Seakings embarked, along with a system that would

Discussions in 1973 and 1974 made it clear that the
assist the recovery and movement of these heavy 10-tonne

Navy did not have, and was not likely to have, naval
helicopters on a heaving deck. In end 1975, the Naval
architects and warship designers in the numbers required

Staff and the Government accepted this design. Detailed
to undertake a de novo frigate design. During these two drawing and design work started in 1976.

years, detailed discussions had been going on with the

Soviet side for the next series of Russian acquisitions,

The design was entrusted to a project team headed
which included Kashin class guided missile destroyers
by Commander (later Captain) NS Mohan Ram, a naval
and Nanuchka class ocean-going rocket boats. Progress architect, trained in Britain and who had worked in the was also being made in the development of indigenous

British Leander Design Section. Lt Cdr (later Captain) J
systems.

Subbiah was the second member of the team.

In 1974, the Directorate of Combat Policy and Tactics

Captain J Subbiah recalls:

(DCPT)2 suggested that the Project 16 frigates should

“Initially, the proposal to upgrade the Leander weapon
have:

package was being handled by the Directorate of Leander

• The Russian surface-to-surface missile, surface to air

Project. The project was later moved to Directorate of
missile and gun systems of the Nanuchka class rocket

Naval Design because:

boats and the surface warning cum height finding radar
of the Kashin class.

-Apart from upgrading the package, the staff
requirements called for augmentation and a mixed

• Two Seaking anti submarine helicopters (instead of the
origin of weapons.

one that Vindhyagiri had) so as to ensure that at least
one serviceable helicopter would always be available.3

- From an essentially anti-submarine project, the project
called for the addition of surface-to-surface missiles,

• The latest Indian APSO H sonar designed for Indian
more powerful anti aircraft weapons and ability to carry
waters, instead of British sonar.

two large helicopters.

• A mix of Soviet and Indian radars and Italian CAAIS and

EW systems.

1. It takes ten years from the time the ‘staff requirement’ is formulated till the time a frigate is commissioned. During this ten-year period, many developments can and do occur - changes in threat assessments, availability of new and better weapons and systems, successful development of indigenous systems etc. The ‘staff requirement’ foresees these as best as possible to avoid subsequent piecemeal modifications in design that would delay the completion of construction.

2. Now known as the Directorate of Staff Requirements. The author was DCPT at the time.

3. A Naval Headquarters Technical Team visited Canada in 1974 and saw a Canadian 4,100-tonne Destroyer that had two Seakings embarked.

4. There were neither enough trained draughtsmen nor junior designers. Expertise had to be developed in-house. Organisational capability had to be built up concurrently with the design.

Neither of these requirements could be achieved

The Leander was propelled by two steam turbines of
in the existing platform. It was decided, therefore, to

15,000 shaft horsepower each. The first assumption
develop a new design.

was that the larger ship would need about 40,000

“Before taking up the design of Project 16, we carried
horsepower total and would need major changes to the
out an experiment of fitting Soviet missiles in an existing
power plant. The marine engineers of the Navy wanted
hull, much against the advice of the Soviet experts.

to fit gas turbines, which we had never done before.

We cannibalised the surface-to-surface missiles from

We had some experience with operating gas turbines in
a missile boat and fitted three missiles abreast on the
ships acquired from the Soviets but designing a ship for
foe sle5of a British Type 12 frigate — Talwar. Although we
gas turbine propulsion was a very complex affair.

made some mistakes in the finer aspects of the design,

“I was keen to minimise changes from known
the concept proved to be successful in the final weapon
aggregates and to resort to fresh design effort only
trials. This gave us substantial confidence in taking up
where essential. In any case, we had to design the ship
the Project 16 design with the mixed weapon package.

to house new weapons and fire control systems. The hull

“The work on the design of Project 16 commenced in
had to be larger resulting in totally new hull systems. If

1974, the preliminary design was completed by 1975
we changed the power plant also, it would involve total
and work then commenced on the detailed design in
redesign of the ship and the problem became even more

1976.

intractable. I was, therefore, keen to continue using the
steam turbines, which were manufactured under license

“In end 1980, in keeping with the policy of assigning
in India by Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited.

the designers of a ship to the task of building the ship,

I was sent to the Warship Production Superintendent

"I asked myself ‘What would happen, if I powered the
organisation in Bombay. For the next three years, my
new ship with the same power plant - two turbines of
main assignment, as the Naval Overseer, was to ensure
fifteen thousand horsepower each, without any change.

completion of the first ship of Project 16”.

How much would the speed drop? Was there any chance
of convincing the naval staff that a small sacrifice in

Captain NS Mohan Ram recalls:

top speed would make the ship more economical and

“My team consisted of just six officers, two each of
easier to construct?’ I did a quick back-of-the envelope
construction, engineering and electrical and weapons
calculation to estimate the speed loss. To my utter
disciplines. Our draftsmen were inexperienced and
surprise, the answer came out that the ship did not lose
were mostly non-matriculate apprentices trained by
speed at all. On the contrary, it would go a full knot
us in-house. We had a few experienced civilian design
faster, at 29 knots, which the naval staff wanted!

specialists who had also come up from the ranks. No

“No one believed me at first. I was greeted with a stony
other navy in the world would have dared to embark on
silence and most of my colleagues, thought that I had
a project of that magnitude with such meagre resources
gone out of my head. I could not blame them, as my
and inexperienced personnel.

findings were totally counter-intuitive. I then asked my
colleague, Lieutenant Commander Subbiah, a brilliant

“When we started the design, we had no data on Soviet
designer, to check the power requirements and speed
weapons and systems. I started the deck layout scaling
independently. He also arrived at the same answer. Our
up dimensions from the small photographs of Soviet
boss, the Director General, Mr Paramanandhan, did not
frigates and missile ships from the well-known military
believe me at first. But when both Subbiah and I, two
publication Jane's Fighting Ships'. From a photo of
of his brightest officers had come to the same answer,
about six inches or so length, we had to scale up space
he realised that I might have stumbled on to something
requirements and clearances for sophisticated missiles
extraordinary. He still insisted that another officer should
and guns.

check the numbers. Lo and behold, the answer was the

“The next issue was the power plant to get the higher
same. We realised that we could preserve the power
speed in a bigger ship. The Leanders displaced about
plant of the Leander class frigates and meet the Naval

3,000 tonnes and had a top speed of about 28 knots.

Staffs requirement for higher speed.

The Naval Staff wanted a minimum one knot^extrai from

“We had to find the reason for this windfall benefit. A
this ship, which was estimated to displace about 3,6
detailed analysis showed that below twenty-two knots
tonnes and be about 12 tol3 metres (40 feet) longer.

is called the forecastle or ‘foc'sle’ for short, the middle part is called 'midships’ and the rear part is 5. In naval terminology, the front part of a ship i
called ‘quarterdeck'.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 65

speed, the larger ship required more power for the same

“When we announced our findings to the Naval Staff,
speed as the Leander. At around twenty-two knots, both
the Marine Engineering Directorate questioned the
ships required the same power but above 22 knots, the
validity of our calculations. Many meetings ensued, but
bigger ship required less power. Again, above 31 knots,
we prevailed.

the bigger vessel was again at a disadvantage compared

“A peculiar problem arose due to the mixture of
to the Leander class ships. But happily, at 29 knots

Soviet and Western weapon systems. Soviet ships use
plus, the larger ship needed only the same power as the

380 volts, 3 phase, 50 cycles main power supply while

Leanders 30,000 HR A happy combination of the laws

Western ships use 440 volts, 3 phase, 60 cycles power
of hydrodynamics was working to our advantage.

supply This required that the ship should operate two

“Further analysis revealed that at lower speeds, the
distinct electrical systems. Enquiries with auxiliary
resistance to ships’ motion was primarily due to friction,
machinery suppliers revealed that changeover of power
in which the larger ship with about 20% greater wetted
systems to 380 volts from 440 volts and from 60 to 50
surface area (area exposed to the water) was at a
cycles would result in major changes in dimensions and
disadvantage. Above 22 knots, the resistance to motion
geometry of the machinery, which would in turn cause
from wave making due to the ship cleaving through
major changes to the engine room and boiler room
the sea became more prominent than friction. If the
arrangements. So we decided to keep the main power
interference between the waves created by the bow
generation from diesel and turbo alternators as per the

(front) of the ship and the stem (rear) of the ship were

Leanders’ 440 volts, 3 phase and 60 cycles.

positive, resulting in a crest at the rear end, resistance

“For Soviet weapons and systems, we decided to
due to wave-making would be lower. If the interference
install two motor alternators of 350 kW each, converting
between the bow and stern wave systems resulted in a
the supplies to 380 volt and 50 cycles. This solution of
trough at the stern, the resistance due to wave-making
having two distinct power supplies in one warship was
would be higher. The interference is a function of a
unorthodox and was one of the many departures from
factor called Froude Number, which relates the square
convention in the design of the ship.

of the speed of the ship to the length of the ship.

“By physically locating all machinery spaces, diesel

“In the case of the Leander at 28 knots, the
alternator rooms, boiler room, engine room, stern
interference caused a trough at the stem increasing the
compartments and propeller shaft supports and the
wave-making resistance. But in the new longer ship, the
propeller supporting bracket at the same relative
interference resulted in a crest. This resulted in a lower
locations and distances as in the original Leanders,
wave resistance in the bigger ship, which more than
substantial engineering redesign was averted.

compensated the increased drag due to greater area.

“The evolution of the new design involved calculated

Overall, this led to the bigger ship going faster. Once we
risk-taking, innovation and extrapolation of available
had done this detailed analysis, the picture became a lot
knowledge. The decision to go ahead was a bold act of
clearer.

faith on the part of the Navy. It reflected the confidence

“We also found that the same principle was being
the Navy had in its young designers and the growing
adopted in ‘jumboising’ super tankers by adding a new
capability of Mazagon Docks.

mid section, making the ships longer to carry more
crude without losing speed.

“The go-ahead was given in 1975. The keel was laid
in 1977. Godauari commissioned in December 1983.

“While we could reach the top speed comfortably

She fully met the specifications and exceeded all major
with the same engines, at the normal cruising speeds
performance requirements” .6
the ship consumed twenty per cent more fuel than the

Leander. We had to increase the fuel tank capacity of the

Mr S Paramanandhan headed the Design Directorate.

ship.

He recalls:

“Using the same power plant, gearing, transmission

“The Navy was looking around for a cost effective
and even propeller as the Leander in the new ship
option where surface to surface, air to surface and anti-air
enabled us to save immense design effort and cost.

capabilities would be available from a single ship. This

Moreover, Mazagon Docks experience of constructing
naturally required the ship to have helicopter launched
six Leander class ships with the same power plant would
air to surface missiles, surface to surface missiles,
make engine-related erection easier.

surface to air missiles, a large stock of anti submarine

6. In recognition of his contribution, Commander Mohan Ram was awarded the Vishist Seva Medal.

66/TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

INS TA RA G IRI, the fifth indigenously-built Leander class frigate, having improved sonars and anti submarine weapons and hangar for one Seaking anti submarine helicopter (1980s)

.Kiq rANGA the ninth indigenously-built frigate of Project 16, having surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles, modern electronic warfare and anti missile systems and hangar for two Seaking anti submarine helicopters (1980s)

INS KHCJKRI (top) and INS KCJTHAR (below) indigenously-built corvettes of Project 25, having surface-to-surface missiles, anti missile systems and capable of operating a Chetak helicopter (1980s)

IN S D E L H I - the first indigenously-built missile destroyer of Project 15 with hangar for two Seaking Mk 42 B helicopters

Indigenously-built Landing Craft Utility - LCCJ (1980s)

ruiiMi L a n d in g snip lank capable of landing five main battle tanks during amphibious operations

INS VEER - Russian Project 1241 RE Fast Missile Attack Craft

INS A BH A Y- Russian Project 1241 PE Anti Submarine Patrol Craft (1980s)

IMS PORBANDAR - Russian Project 266 ME Coastal Minesweeper (1970s) Russian Project 205 Extended Range Missile Boat firing an anti ship missile (1970s)

torpedoes and two Seaking helicopters, so that at any
full power, she was one and a half knot slower than the
one time you could keep one helicopter in the air, be it

Leander. But the moment she reached 85% to 90% of
for an anti submarine mission or an anti ship mission.

full power, her acceleration was higher and she could

The Staff definitely wanted two Seakings. They were not
overtake the Leander.

happy with only one. With surface-to-surface missiles,

“We had a group of engineer and electrical officers
surface-to-air missiles and two Seakings, it appeared to
working with us. Mazagon Dock wanted them to help
be a cost effective ship. Certainly the Leander hull was
in no position to take it.

build the ship. I gladly agreed to let them go. When the
ship went out for trials, there were Soviet experts on

The second problem that came up was the economics
board. They had their own misgivings about the ship’s
of it. We had invested more than Rs 150 crore in the
speed but when they observed she was doing 29 knots,
indigenous development of the steam machinery. This

29.5 knots and even up to 30 knots, they were surprised
led to a clear decision that the propulsion package
and equally, we were surprised. The ship was keeping up
would remain the same, but the ship must have the
with the gas turbine propelled Rajput.7
weapon package, which meant both the L Band and the

“When both ships were asked to do a zigzag manoeuvre,

S Band radars and, to accommodate the Soviet design
the Godauari could do better than the Rajput. The wake philosophy and their weapons, dedicated radar for
of the Project 16 was classic, whereas the Rajput was
each weapon. This was too much to go into a Leander
churning the ocean. Any commanding officer would
design. This naturally meant that a new frigate had to be
like to have a ship that has no wake at all, or at least a
designed from scratch, except for the propulsion packpartially suppressed wake.

age, which should not change.

“I do not claim any credit for me or for any of my design

“Our initial check indicated that we might lose around
officers. It’s one of those things where fortune favours

2 knots of speed but could provide 20% longer range,
those who are willing to take the risk. And Godauari

150% more aviation fuel, all weapon packages and
happened to have ended well.”

additional complement to man the weapons and the
helo included. The Naval Staff were willing to accept the

Captain KK Lohana succeeded Mr Paramanandhan as

2-knot penalty.

DGND. He recalls:

“From there, we proceeded to do a serious design.

“I had one other small part to play when we were doing

Halfway through, we realised the ship was getting longer
the upper deck layout. When the missile containers
and thinner and if we adopted the same propulsion
were put on either side of the super structure, which
package, the length advantage might give an edge
was protruding out towards the forward end from the
and we might be able to do just about half a knot less
main superstructure, there was not enough space for
than the Leander. From that proposition, we went for a
people to walk past the containers, after allowing for
model test. Of course, we changed the fore part of the
the minimum distance between the containers. My
ship because the Leander fore part would have posed
main contribution in this area was suggesting that there
a lot of obstruction, both for the missile, the gun and
should be sponsons on either side of the weather deck
the surface-to-air missile. Starting from that point, there
to locally create more width to allow for the extra space
was very little commonality between the Leander and
required. This proved to be a successful and distinctive
feature of the ship.

Project 16.

“There was another technical fineness in ship propul-

“After this project was finally approved for construction,
sion and ship model test. When, at maximum speed,

Mazagon Dock wanted the Navy to send somebody who
the cut-up under the stem of a ship happens to be in
would help the shipyard in translating the Navy’s design
the trough of the bow wave, the ship loses speed. If the
into workshop drawings. I was asked to go to Mazagon
cut-up happens to be on the crest of the bow wave, the

Dock as the Head of the Warship Design Section and
ship gains speed. When Mohan Ram, Subbiah and 1
entrusted with the task of doing that. It was a great
had a look at the model test results, we found that the
opportunity. As the work progressed, there was constant
interaction between the production side on one hand
ship was comfortably sitting on the crest and we were
and the Naval Headquarters design organisation on the
overwhelmed. It seemed possible that the ship might
other. It was tight rope walking between the two, which
go even faster than the Leander at

P ° ^ ™ ' % waS
we managed to do successfully.

amply proved during sea trials. Till 60%, 70%, 75% of

Kashin class guided missile destroyers. It arrived in India in 1981 and. at the time of Godavari's sea 7. Rajput was the first of the 5 , ° 0 0 4 o n n e Sov^t.

Hence the elation of the designers at Godavari’s comparative performance, trials in 1982, was the N a v y s latest ana D esi
u

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 67

“At the same time, the colleague who was in charge
protocols were available in the Western world at that
of the Merchant Ship Drawing Office also resigned and
time. This is where the idea of W E SO came in.

left, so I had the opportunity of heading the entire design

“The W ESO idea was not really mine. It came originally
organisation of the Mazagon Docks. And by the time
from Captain PR Sen. He had taken the idea from a

I was called back to Naval Headquarters as DGND, the

Japanese Naval Review on how the Japanese do system

Godavari, the first ship of the class, had almost proceeded
engineering on their warships. The Japanese had
to completion. I attended her commissioning ceremony.”

created an organisation like W E SO to avoid invoking

Rear Admiral (then Cdr) J J Baxi8 was associated initially
the embargo of the Americans. That paper was followed
with the design and later headed the new Weapon and
up by Commodore Mudholkar.9 Then it was followed up

Electronic Systems Organisation, W ESO , which was
by Captain Prabhala,10 then he handed it over to the
created to resolve the electronic integration between the

Directorate of Weapons and Equipment, Commander

Russian, European and indigenous systems. He recalls:

Venkatesh11 and finally it came to Directorate of

Electrical Engineering to Commander Ravi Kohli.12 It is

“After Taragiri, (the 5th Leander class frigate), there at that point of time that Naval Headquarters decided to
was a very healthy competition between the Directorate
create the W ESO .

of Naval Design and the Directorate of Leander Project.

Commander (later Captain) Mohan Ram and Lieutenant

“ In 1977, there was a discussion in Naval Headquarters

Commander (later Captain) Subbiah, who were the two
between the Chief of the Naval Staff and the Scientific
best young naval constructors that the Navy had, joined

Adviser to the Defence Minister to decide the person
the Directorate of Naval Design. They said, “If an electriwho would be able to handle this and who had weapon cal officer like Baxi can meet the staff requirement for a
system background. Although I was a Commander, I
frigate with one Seaking helicopter, why cant we come
was appointed as the Director of the Organisation in
up with a larger and better hull which can meet the staff

1977. That is when from 1978 to 1984, we actually
requirement for two Seaking helicopters?

designed the interfaces that finally made the ship

“By that time, the Directorate of Combat Policy and
successful.

Tactics had suggested that Soviet weapon systems

“As regards availability of Soviet system data,
be integrated into the next design. Not only were they
we had Commander Pradeep Kar and Lieutenant
cheaper and more cost effective but would also enable

Commander Avadhanulu on the staff of W ESO . In my
standardisation of missile inventory.

opinion, they were amongst the brainiest naval officers

“ I distinctly remember that I was opposed to that idea,
our country has produced in terms of technology.

thinking that we would not be able to carry out the

These two started going into the Soviet system of
interfaces. But ultimately, history proved that this was the
documentation.

right decision and we became the first Navy in the world

“There was a general belief in the Navy that Soviet
to succeed in designing a hybrid ship, the Godavari of
documentation did not give enough data. That proved

Project 16, having a mix of Soviet and Western sensors
to be wrong, because very detailed information was
and weapon systems.

available. The problem only arose when we needed a

“We found that putting Soviet systems in an Indian
specific electrical design characteristic. Naturally, no
hull, which also had Western systems was not only
user handbook had this kind of information. It is at that
feasible but also realistic. The only thing that we did not
point that there were a lot of ‘doubting Thomases’ in
know was how to interface the various Western electrical

Naval Headquarters.

inputs and outputs with those coming out of the Soviet

“That is the point of time when we wrote to you in
weapon systems to make it suitable for whichever

8. Rear Admiral J J Baxi (then Commander) was the first Director of W ESO, the organisation that interfaced and integrated the electronics of the Russian and European sensor and weapon systems. In later years, he rose to become Chairman and Manaqinq Director of Bharat Electronics after Captain S Prabhala.

9. Commodore BG Mudholkar was the Director Naval Research and Development. He had undergone electrical training with the British Navy and at Cambridge. He rose to become the Chief Controller of Research and Development in the Defence Research and Development Organisation.

10. Captain S Prabhala later joined India’s premier public sector electronics firm Bharat Electronics where he played a sterling role in indigenising and productionising naval radars and sonars. He rose to become Chairman and Managing Director of Bharat Electronics.

11. Commodore R Venkatesh rose to become Chairman and Managing Director of Goa Shipyard.

12. Later as a Vice Admiral, Ravi Kohli was the Director of Naval Research and Development.

68 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Russia and requested you to send us the data.13 We had
has given a tremendous boost to the weapon system
no other option, since we had been given the charter to
engineering ability of the Indian Navy today.

get the data.

“The Navy also realised at that time that this kind of

Having got the data, we started doing the interface.

weapon system engineering could not succeed unless the

Once the Soviet specialists from the Design Bureau came

Executive Branch themselves had a strong professional
to know that I had what I wanted, they become helpful.

group which looked into the application level software.

Commodore Mudholkar used to take measurements on

So we had a Rule Writing Group. This group has now
existing Soviets ships and a Russian expert would stand
come of age and they are giving a lot of inputs to W ESO
behind him with an avometer to help him because they
which later on was renamed W ESEE - Weapons and
also began to realise the importance of our requirement.

Electronic Systems Engineering Establishment.

The Russians realised the importance of interfacing

“W ESEE has given the Indian Navy system engineering
with Western systems so as to have greater universal
expertise, which only the more advanced countries
marketability of Soviet systems. They had not been
have. The most important thing is that this expertise is
thinking like that earlier. For the first time, they realised
within Naval Headquarters and not in industry. Today
that there could be a better sensor or a better fire control
everybody in the other two services realises that they
system or a better missile by taking indigenous systems
have a lacuna in this area and are considering seriously
or weapons of other countries and yet maximise the
whether to replicate W ESEE."

importance of Soviet systems. Once we had broken the Problem Areas
ice, we never had any difficulty. Hundred percent data
came through the formal and official sources.

Computer Aided Action Information System (C A A IS )

“W ESO was the first organisation to come up in an The Godavari class frigates were to be fitted with a wide under-developed country to take on the major exercise variety of equipment: Russian radars, missiles, guns, anti of weapon system engineering. The Soviets gave us the submarine rockets and their associated fire control systems, data for the first time, some of which you yourself had indigenous radars and sonar, German gyros, French logs, sent. We had all the Western interfaces available to us. etc, all of which had to be electronically interfaced.

Fortunately, the Indian designers, and particularly naval
officers, had already understood the power of computers.

DOE decided to produce the Command and Control

And although we used older computers, which are now CAAIS system. Little progress was made until 1981.

out of date, but for the purpose of converting Soviet Only two years were left before Godavari commissioned.

data into Western data and vice versa, the power of MDL voiced serious concern that the Rs 200 crore being these computers was adequate.

invested in these frigates were being held up by a lack of
decision on 4 crore worth of CAAIS. It was then decided

“The only contribution which I think 1 made as a to clear the import of the CAAIS system. Dutch, Italian technical manager was in bringing together brilliant and British suppliers were short-listed. Despite the Navy’s people of diverse background like Ajay Sharma, A preference for the Dutch CAAIS system, DOE cleared the Ganesh, Pradeep Kar, Avadhanulu and Muthangi. Each import of the Italian CAAIS system. Due to this delay, when of them was brilliant in his own right. But I had to make Godavari commissioned, she had only two DS 22 displays sure that they worked together as a team and produced as in the earlier Leanders.

the requisite output.

“It was really three people Kar, Avadhanulu and

Eventually, when the Italian IPN 10 system was installed

Muthangi who first thought of the idea of having a in the third frigate, Gomati in 1989, it required extensive computer box with requisite processing power and de-bugging as had been anticipated during evaluation.

memory and having outputs which interface directly Electronic Data Highway
either with a western weapon or an indigenous system.

This modular design, which could act as an interface In 1979, it had been decided that these frigates would be device between Soviet and Western weapons was the fitted with an electronic data highway system to integrate primary reason for success. This kind of success that the disparate weapon, sensor and CAAIS systems. This we had, both with hardware and software development,
would dispense with complex and dense direct cabling.

-----

“

.

,

Soviet union as the Commanding Officer designate of the first Project 61 M E destroyer that later commissioned as the 13. The author was i

^ officers of the commissioning crew, whilst undergoing training, obtained the required design characteristics from their R ajput. The young

^

^
w£js gent back to Commander Baxi and his team. This direct interaction eliminated procedural delays.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 69

Until 1985, DOE could not decide on which system to

Rule Writing Group (RWG) under Commander (later
import - American or Norwegian. Eventually, the Ministry

Commodore) Man Singh wrote the rules for IPN 10 so
intervened and cleared the import of the American system.

well that they have become standard for subsequent

As a result of this delayed decision, however, each of the
programmes.

three ships had to be fitted with direct cabling. Eventually,

“I recall an industrialist, who had participated in several
when the data buses arrived, they could only be retrofitted
indigenous ventures, telling me:

during major refits. Since removal of the now redundant

“The Nauy has been a uery tough customer. We
direct cabling would entail ripping open the entire ship, it
quickly realised that they did not belieue in a traditional
had to be retained.

customer- contractor relationship; they were more our

R etrosp ect
collaborators and consultants in design, production,
quality control, inspection and euen in some aspects

Godauari was launched in May 1980 and commissioned in
o f management. They were uery inconvenient, asking

1983. Ganga was launched in 1982 and commissioned in
too many questions along the way and were stubborn

1985. Gomati was launched in 1984 and commissioned
about relaxation o f standards.

in 1988.

“Despite some flutters, we did not lose monetarily

In each of the three ships fitting out was delayed due to
with the one-off, high tech production actiuity, but
the late supply of items of machineiy and equipment from
we did not make uery high profits either. But our true
various manufacturers.

gains haue been in the realisation that concepts such
as TQM, ISO standards o f documentation etc haue

Rear Admiral (L) (then Commander) A Ganesh headed
been a way o f life with the Nauy and the execution
the W E S E E from 1984 onwards, after Commander Baxi.

o f your orders has giuen us so much confidence and

He recalls:

recognition in other markets that we are easily able to

“Where else would one find Indian radars RAWLVRAWS
satisfy the toughest customers and yet be competitiue
feeding information through an American data bus to
euen against global bidders. Thank you, Indian Nauy;
an Italian command and control system (IPN 10) to
you haue made us com e o f age."

control Russian fire control and weapon systems? The

70 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

The Progression from the Nilgiri of 1972 to the Godavari of 1983

The last column of this table shows how the improvements achieved in the first six frigates ollowed on into the next three frigates of the Godavari class in the 1980s.

Year

1972

1974 to 1977

1980-81

1983 to 1988

N ilg iri

H im g iri,

Taragiri

Project 16

(First Leander)

C ldaygiri

Virxdhyagiri

G o d avari, G anga, G o m ati

D un ag iri

(5th and 6th Leanders)

(7th, 8th & 9th Frigates)

2nd, 3rd and 4th

Leanders)

Anti Ship M issiles

-

-

-

Russian SSM s

Surface to Air M issiles
a) Launchers

One Seacat

Two Seacats

Two Seacats

Russian SAM
b) Fire Control

British

Dutch

Dutch

Russian

Gun Mounting

Twin 4.5-inch

Twin 4.5-inch

Twin 4.5-inch

Twin Russian 57 mm

Fire Control

British

Dutch

Dutch

Russian

Ship Launched

Sided launchers for Italian

Sided launchers for Italian

Anti-Submarine
torpedoes
torpedoes.

Range

8,000

Torpedoes
metres

Anti Submarine

British Mortar

As for N ilg iri

Swedish rocket

Russian

Weapon

Range 1000 Yards

Range 3,750 metres

Range 6000 metres

A SW Computer

British

As for N ilg iri

Indigenous

Indigenous

Anti

French Alouette

Indian Chetak

British Seaking

Two Seakings

Submarine
with British
with British
with Italian
with Italian

Helicopter
torpedoes
torpedoes
torpedoes
torpedoes

Close Range

Guns

20 mm Oerlikon

20 mm Oerlikon

20 mm Oerlikon

Four twin automatic Russian

30 mm Mountings

Close Range Fire Control System

Russian

British:

Chaff

Radars

British

Dutch

Dutch

Russian & Dutch

British

Indigenous

Search Sonar

British

British

French

Attack Sonar

British

British

A IO

British

Dutch

Dutch

Italian

Electronic W arfare

British

British

Italian

Italian

Com m unications

H F

British

British

British

Indigenous

V H F

British

British

Indigenous

Indigenous

G H F

British

Indigenous

Indigenous

Indigenous

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 71

11

Project 25 Khukri Class Corvettes

In the mid 1960s, Government had accepted the Navy’s
corvettes from other countries. None met the
requirements for 500-tonne patrol craft. In subsequent
requirements of the Naval Staff. The problem was the
years, various options were considered - building them in
same as that encountered in Project 16 - the need for

Bombay in the Gun Carriage Basin near INSKunjali, building
a heavier punch and a mixed package, in addition to
them in the new Naval Dockyard at Vishakhapatnam etc.

the need for a helicopter in a ship of the same size as
a Petya.

By the early 1970s, two schools of thought had
emerged. One view was that with the cost of ships steadily

“Eventually, the project was assigned to the Directorate
increasing, the Navy had no option but to go in for small,
of Naval Design and the work on this commenced in
fast, missile armed corvettes. The other view was that all

1976. We were able to meet the Staff Requirement in
the staff requirements could not be met in a 500-tonne
full. The highlights were:

patrol craft.

-A new hull form was developed. This was later tested
in the SSPA tank in Sweden and they declared that the

The Petya class submarine chasers that had been
hull form was at least 10% better than the contemporary
acquired from the Soviet Union in the late 1960s would
international hull forms available at that time.

also need to start being replaced in the end 1980s. The
outcome was that the 500-tonne patrol craft got renamed

-The sea keeping qualities were also found to be far
as the Corvette Project, to be built in two versions - anti
better and met the needs for helicopter operation from
aircraft and anti submarine. International tenders were
such a small platform.

called for and various weapon packages were considered.

-The anti surface and anti air weapons were of Soviet

The rise in oil prices after the 1973 Arab-Israel War led to
origin and the sonar was ours.

a serious shortage of foreign exchange. Naval Headquarters

-W e could accommodate a helicopter, which was a
then decided that the corvettes would be designed and
major plus point as compared to the Petyas.

built indigenously for the defence of the island territories

-The design was completed in 1978 and presented to
and offshore oilrigs.

the Naval Staff. We were able to demonstrate that we

Design work commenced in 1976, which eventually
could pack a much heavier weapon load than in the
culminated in the Khukri class corvettes of Project 25.

Leanders at less than half the displacement.

“However, the project suffered a delay of two years

Captain J Subbiah was the leader of the Corvette Project

Team. He recalls:

on account of the choice of propulsion package.

The original design was based on a Pielstick engine.

“The corvettes had an interesting background. The

Later, the Directorate of Marine Engineering desired

1,500-tonne, Khukri class, Type 14 frigates, acquired
to replace it with a MTU engine. Several studies were
from Britain had very little armament.

carried out. It was found that the MTU engine could not

“In the late 1960s, the Navy acquired the 1,200-tonne
be accommodated without a major redesign exercise,

Petyas from the Soviet Union. These were lighter, faster
which would have involved a much longer and heavier
and more heavily armed. The anti submarine capabilities,
hull and increased cost. After two years of discussions,
in particular, were considered far superior to the Type
the design was eventually cleared with the original

14. The Petyas, however, had one weakness - inability to
propulsion package of the Pielstick engine.

carry a helicopter.

“Later, the project suffered some more delays on

“ During the late 1960s and the first half of the
account of clearance for the weapon package from the

1970s, the Navy examined the possibility of acquiring

Soviet Union.

Eventually the detailed designs were developed at
and the final powering calculation was completed. The

Mazagon Docks and the corvettes were built with very
choice of propeller was also settled and it was decided to
little change to the original concept design."

go in for a controllable pitch propeller (CPP). However,

Mr Paramanandhan was the Director General of Naval
that resulted in a slightly heavier tail shaft and propeller

Design at that time. He recalls:

and a higher trim aft. The discussions on engines, and
the mid course correction which some people wanted

The Corvette Project had been going up and down,
that it should not be a single engine per shaft or two
with French collaboration, with international tenders
engines per shaft, did push the project back by about
and with British private companies putting in a bid. All

18 months.

that took very nearly three years. But nothing came
out of the series of discussions we had, either with the

“When you are working on a Naval Staff Requirement

French or with the British. The Naval staff then took a
and when the total project starts sliding back 18
decision to go ahead and start work on a design and
months, everybody gets fresh ideas. Fresh weapons,
construct a Corvette to our own specification, which
fresh helicopters, fresh radars, fresh sonar and everyone
would accommodate a helo plus four Soviet surface-
wants to pitch in. That has a very deleterious effect.

to-surface missiles and a Soviet gun mounting. After

“By the time I left NHQ, the ship had been ordered,
this decision was taken, the normal process of model
the design had been frozen and the model tests had
testing, powering and general layout were all finalised as
been completed. But 1 believe the Soviets insisted that
a preliminary design.

the bridge structure should go further aft. And it got

“There were a lot of discussions whether for anti misshifted. 1 would not have permitted that to happen. It sile defence we should go in for the Soviet 30 mm gun
caused some trim problem which had to be adjusted by
mountings or the Bofors 40/70 gun mountings. That
other means. In my opinion, Project 25 was a fairly well
took about six to seven months. Ultimately, a clear
thought out design, it had a well thought out weapon
decision was given that we should have four surface-
package which I believe is giving good service.’

to-surface missiles plus the Soviet guns. It was also

Orders for the first two corvettes were placed on Mazagon
decided to fit some of the Leanders’ radars, sonar, Docks in 1986. Khukri, launched in December 1986, was communication equipment etc.

delivered in 1989. Kuthar was launched in January 1988

"The point where the decision got delayed was the and delivered in 1990.

propulsion package. There was discussion as regards a

Mazagon Docks then acted as the lead yard and
single engine room or two engine rooms, two engines provided all drawings and shipbuilding material inputs to per shaft or one engine per shaft etc. The gearing of two Garden Reach for building the next two corvettes. Kirpan diesel engines to one shaft posed problems. Would it be was delivered in 1990 and Khanjar in 1991.

better to have a single robust engine rather than two, in
a small ship of this size? Should we have a fixed pitch

Except for the Russian weapon systems, all four corvettes
propeller or a CPP?

were fitted with indigenous equipment to the maximum

“To settle these issues, Naval Headquarters constituted extent possible.

a group of officers to write a service paper. The then

Later in the 1990s, orders were placed on Garden Reach

Chief of Material and the Director of Marine Engineering for four more corvettes of Project 25 A.

produced a paper based on which the design proceeded

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 73

12

Indigenous Submarine Construction

The S S K Project

Preamble

Evaluation of these proposals helped to update the
staff requirements for a S S K submarine of about 1,500

In the 1960s, the conventional wisdom, based primarily tonnes.

on Western naval journals, was that “Russian submarines
were noisy and that Western submarines were quieter”. In

A delegation visited Sweden in 1973 to discuss the
the deadly game of hunter-killer-submarine-warfare, where
feasibility of collaborating with Kockums for building
one submarine stalks another submarine deep under the submarines in India.

sea, the quieter submarine has the advantage of being able
to detect earlier, the noisier submarine.

The steep rise in oil prices after the 1973 Arab-Israel

War perpetuated the shortage of foreign exchange and the

As early as 1960s, the Navy started considering SSK project had to be deferred. Comparative evaluation the construction in India of smaller S S K 1 submarines continued of the various proposals.

specifically for submarine versus submarine operations.

A study was also carried out as to which of the

By 1969, ideas crystallized to build small SS K shipbuilding yards - Mazagon Docks in Bombay or Garden submarines in India in collaboration with a European firm,

Reach in Calcutta or Hindustan Shipyard in Vizag - should
on lines similar to what was being done for surface ships in
undertake the S S K project. Submarine fabrication required
the Leander Frigate Project. Discussions had been initiated specialised heavy-duty machines. For fabricating the hull, with Dr Gabler, the reputed and experienced designer of the shipyard had to have a Plate Bending Machine to bend German submarines during World War II.

the ring frames made of special, 35 mm thick, steel plate.

What started as a project to build small submarines The shipyard had to have Plater and Assembly Shops for gradually ballooned into a larger coastal submarine. By the profile cutting and edge preparation of these thick steel time Dr Gabler’s design met the Navy’s staff requirements, its plates prior to welding. Highly specialised welding skills cost had overshot the resources available. These discussions were required to weld these ring frames together to form a however, helped the Navy to understand the complexities of circular pressure hull, which would withstand the crushing submarine design and the trade-offs that had to be made in
pressure of the sea at deep depth.

the ‘staff requirements’.

Mazagon Docks in Bombay had some of these machines

Since foreign exchange was always a constraint on
in its yard where oilrigs were being fabricated for the Bombay
acquiring ships, submarines or aircraft from European

High Offshore oilfield. And Mazagon Docks was near to
sources, enquiries were initiated with the Soviet Gnion.

the engineering sub-contractors in the Bom bay industrial

Their response was that they did not have any submarines area to whom the machining and fabrication of non-critical of the size and characteristics that the Navy wanted, but jigs and fixtures could be entrusted. It was decided that they could design one.

Mazagon Docks was best suited for collaboration in the

After the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, the project for building of S S K submarines. M DL started preparing for this project.

indigenous submarine construction resumed momentum.

In response to enquiries for constructing S S K submarines

Also by 1979, the Navy was able to evaluate in great detail
in India, proposals were received from the reputed
the pros and cons of the German H DW Type 1500 and
submarine manufacturers of Europe.

Kockums Type 45, both of which were still on the drawing

1 • SSK was the GS Navy acronym for Submarine Search and Kill.

board. Kockums shipyard, despite being highly automated
to take us to see an Agosta that was building in

(all designing was done by computer, without the help of

Cherbourg.

a scale model) and having excellent infrastructure, had not

As far as the Dutch submarine was concerned, it was
exported any submarines and their experience was limited to
too small for our requirement though they showed us
building submarines of 1,400 tons for the Swedish Navy. On
two submarines of a very interesting design.

the other hand, the HDW shipyard had built 130 submarines
for the German Navy, had exported 60 submarines. It was

“Germany’s HDW seemed well positioned to build
building submarines for numerous countries and was
submarines for us. They had already supplied a number of
backed by the design organisation IKL at Lubeck. IKL had
submarines to other countries. They had the background
an efficient design facility founded by Dr Gabler and fully
and experience of the German Submarine Fleets during
backed the HDW shipyard in submarine design.

the First and Second World War - a considerable body of
experience and data available from what were extensive

The Considerations That Led to the Selection of HDW
sea-going operations. And German Industry, both prewar and post-war, had a reputation for engineering skills In 1975, the Apex Defence Review Committee supported
and thoroughness.

the Navy’s proposal for constructing submarines. The

Soviet Gnion had already indicated that it did not have

“Having studied the Kockums submarine theoretically
submarines of the size that the Navy was looking for. In
and having had a glimpse of the HDW facilities and

1977, Government accepted the requirement for looking
visited a submarine being built for a South American
at alternate sources for building submarines.

country, my own views were that eventually it did not
very much matter which of these two submarines we

The May 1977 Delegation to Evaluate European
went in for because the idea was that we should develop

Submarine Building Yards
the capacity to design and build for ourselves.”

The delegation was led by Rear Admiral NP Datta and

Captain M Kondath was the Director of the Submarine
comprised three submariners - Commanders (X) VS Arm and dealt with the SSK Project from 1977 until the Shekhawat, (L) Thukral and (E) Chaudhury.

contract was signed in 1981. He recalls:

Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) NP Datta recalls:

“In the Directorate of the Submarine Arm, we analysed
the report of this 1977 delegation. When it was put up

‘As DCNS, I was part of the delegation which went
the Government, the Ministry suggested that every
in 1977 to five European countries - France, Germany
submarine building shipyard, including Russian, should

(two shipyards in Germany), Holland and Sweden to
be invited to offer their proposals. Britain did not respond
evaluate the various types of submarines offered to us.

except for offering their wire-guided torpedoes.

We short-listed two possible sources of cooperation.

“Formal proposals were received from:

These were the two German shipyards and the Swedish

Kockum shipyard.

-Howal Deutsch Werke (HDW) of Kiel, Germany for
their Type 209-1.

“We ruled out the French Agosta primarily because
it was too small for our requirement, it was not fully

- Thyssen Nord See Werke (TNSW) of Emden, Germany
tropicalised and they had no great advantage in sensors
for their Thyssen 1500/1700.

and weapon systems over the Russian submarines that

- Italcantieri of Italy for their ‘Sauro’ class.

we had.”

- DTCN of France for their ‘Super Agosta’ class.

Commander (later Admiral) VS Shekhawat (who had

- Kockums of Sweden for their Type 45 B/Naaken.

commanded submarines) recalls:

- Nevesbu of Holland for their ‘Swordfish” class.

“I accompanied Admiral Datta to Europe in the early

-Vickers of Britain for the wire guided Tigerfish
part of 1977. We visited shipyards in Germany, Sweden
torpedo.

Holland and France to see what they haci to>
offer which

“A paper evaluation was carried out of these offers. Based
could be compared with the earlier Swedish offer, both
on this initial evaluation, the shipyards were requested to
in technological terms as well as in financial terms,
indicate if they were prepared to modify their design or
transfer of technology, support, documentation, etc.

alternatively design a submarine to meet the Navy’s staff

“The visit to France was disappointing. They were
requirements. Holland and France declined and withdrew
reluctant to e.en show os their Agost. class^ubi—

from the list of contenders.

After some pressure had been exercised, they .greed

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 75

CCPA Approval in Principle

• Consultations between the two Governments to resolve
problems, if any, arising out of the implementation of

“Approval ‘in principle’ was accorded in February 1979
the collaboration project.

for the induction of four submarines from non-Soviet
sources, two to be built abroad and two to be built in India.

In d o -G e rm a n ‘A g r e e m e n t o n Technical A s s is t a n c e ’

The total outlay estimated at that time was Rs 350 crore

(including Rs 275 crore in foreign exchange). Mazagon As a policy, the German Government avoided defence Docks, which was to build the submarines, was to invest supplies that might aggravate tension. After the 1971
around Rs 10 crores on infrastructure. Approval was also

Indo-Pakistan War, the Indian subcontinent had been
accorded for setting up a Negotiating Committee."

declared an area of tension, lt was also reluctant to supply
defence equipment to non-NATO countries because such

The M ay 1979 Policy-Technical D elegation to Italy,
equipment might be used against their allies.

G erm any and Sw eden

In the end 1970s and early 1980s there v/as scepticism

The Shipyards were informed of the points that the Indian
in Germany, France, Britain and Italy, 'chat if the scope
side wanted included in an inter Government MOU:

of defence cooperation with India was enhanced, India

• The foreign shipyard has the necessary authorisation of because of its close relationship with the Soviet Union its Government to sell submarines to India.

may not be able to protect NATO hi-tech information from

• The shipyard is authorised to collaborate with India for Soviet espionage.

constructing submarines in India under licence and with

In view of these considerations, India considered it
provision for incorporation of subsequent improvements
essential, as a measure of abundant caution, that before
and modifications.

contracts were signed, there should be agreement at the

• Assurance of the supplier Government for continued

Government to Government level to safeguard Indian
product support in all its aspects for the life cycle of the interests. The 1979 Delegation had already informed the submarines or for 25 years.

European shipyards of the safeguards that the Navy would

• Similar assurance that no prohibitions or restrictions will
like incorporated in an Inter-Government Memorandum of
be imposed by the supplier Government on the supply Understanding (MOCI).

and services and continued flow of product support for

Between June 1980 when the CCPA approved the
that period.

collaboration with HDW for the S S K Project and December

• Authorising the shipyard for transfer of the full range of

1981 when the contracts were signed, there were detailed
technology for the construction of submarines in India.

discussions to formulate the MOCI. The best that could

• Transferring from the suppliers Navy the full range of be achieved was an Agreement on Technical Assistance’

design technology for the development of submarine
between the German and Indian Ministries of Defence.

design capability in India.

This was signed in Ju ly 1981.

• Government clearance for sale to India of connected

C o n trac ts S ig n e d o n 11 D e c e m b e r 1981
weapons, armament, sensors, machinery and systems.

After detailed negotiations, contracts were signed in on 11

• Support by the supplier Navy for the training of:

December 1981:

-Naval and Dockyard personnel for the operation,

• To build two submarines at the HDW yard in Germany,
maintenance, repair and overhaul of submarines and
where Indian personnel would acquire practical training
the related systems.

in submarine construction techniques and Indian naval

- Naval crew in all aspects of submarine warfare including
architects and overseers would learn how to design,
tactical doctrines and electronic warfare, consistent
understudy how to build and oversee the construction
with national commitments.

of submarines.

- Indian personnel for the logistic support for the

• To transfer technology and material packages to
submarine and its systems.

M DL for building two more submarines in India. MDL

• Quality control, certification, trials and acceptance of
personnel would acquire on-job training in Germany
the submarine and its related systems by the supplier’s
during the period when the first two submarines were

Navy and supply of necessary documentation.

under construction.

• Assurance by both sides regarding security of information

• Giving the Indian side the option of ordering material
and equipment.

packages for two more submarines before D e c e m b e r

76/TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

1982 at the same baseline cost as the first four Transfer of Submarine Design Technology submarines.

© Supply of wire-guided torpedoes.

The programme for the transfer of design technology was
formulated through extensive discussion between IKL and

Subsequently, in 1985, a contract was signed for the SSK NHQ. It was decided that the ideal method for achieving Simulator for installation in the Submarine Headquarters this would be in two distinct phases: Complex in Bombay.

© By a combination of formal lectures and discussions with

IKL experts, IKL would give to the Design Team complete

Teams D eputed to Germany for Overseeing
details of the design of the Type 1500 submarine.

Construction and D esign Technology

© To check whether the Design Team had fully understood

The teams deputed to the HDW shipyard at Kiel were:

the complexities of submarine design, it would, under
o Overseeing and Quality Control Teams of the two
the guidance and supervision of IKLs experts, develop de
submarines to be built there.

novo a new design according to the staff requirements
o Key personnel of the commissioning crews.

specified by NHQ.

o Base and Dockyard Teams to undergo training for

Design Training started in 1982. By mid 1984, 98% of
manning, maintaining and repairing sonar, torpedoes, the syllabus was completed and the Design Team became shafting, main diesel, compressors, auxiliary machinery, fully occupied with the de novo design.

hydraulic systems, damage control, power generation

Construction of SSK s 1 and 2 in Germany
distribution and propulsion, ESM, gyro and navigation
aids, refrigeration and air conditioning, etc.

Captain (later Rear Admiral) DM Thukral, an experienced
o Material Management and Logistics Group and the submariner, was deputed to HDW as the leader of the Documentation Cell.

Indian Naval Submarine Overseeing Team (INSOT) from

1982 to 1987 when the first two submarines were under

The Submarine Design Team was deputed to IKL at construction in Germany. He recalls: Lubeck and the Naval Armament Inspectors were deputed

“In Germany, Professor Gabler was known as the ‘Father
to Wedel to inspect and accept the torpedoes.

of Submarine Design.’ Ingeneer Kontor Lubeck (IKL), the

Subm arine Construction Schedule
design arm and Machinen Bow Gabler, the manufacturing
arm, were located in contiguous premises - he looked after

• 12 months for planning.

both of these. While we were there, he turned 75, there

• 6 months for preparation of detailed engineering
was a big function, and he handed over charge of both
drawings.

the design and the manufacturing aspect to two directors

• 6 months for part fabrication and assembly of subwho had been with him for a number of years. It was a very professionally run organisation.

units.

“Our submarines were designed by Professor Gabler.

• 12 months for complete fabrication.

He was with us throughout the period when HDW was

• 6 months on the pontoon for fitting out.

constructing our submarines. There is no doubt that

• 6 months for sea trials escorted by a HDW vessel.

his experience was unbeatable. He treated the Indian

Design Team with great respect because he realised that

• Total time 48 months.

the IQ level of the technical officers that the Navy had

Com m encem ent of the Type 1500 Design by IK L
sent was high. He was with them not only at the senior
level, but also at the junior level when they were doing

IKL started work on the detailed design only after the
the design and doing mock ups. He would saunter into
conclusion of the contract because the weight and volume
the Design Room and interact with our people. He really
calculations could only be carried out during p acemen
was a ‘father figure'. 1 have a lot of respect for him.

of orders.

“There were two separate contracts - one for the

Full Scale Submarine Model
submarines to be built in Germany and one for the
submarines to be built by MDL. There was a dual

To aid production by HDW, IKL produced a finished mode1
responsibility. Firstly, to inspect the submarines being
of the Type 1500 submarine. All equipment,
ty
built in Germany and secondly to build the submarines
l i a s S
pipe-Mngs were modelled. ™ ree ln<i» ^

in India.

shipwrights participated in the production of this model.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 77

“The task of building the submarines in India was that
waiting for the next morning. If a schedule was made
of Mazagon Docks. Their team was the first to arrive
that a certain inspection was to be done at a certain
in Germany. They had been carefully selected to learn
time, we were there to do so, all the time.

all aspects of submarine construction. MDLs team

“Initially, in the implementation stage, we had very
was also responsible for the inspection of the German
few hiccups in Germany. Those that did occur were
material packages to be shipped to India for the 3rd and
absorbed well in time, because when the contract was

4th submarines.

finalised with the Germans, tremendous penalties had

“Right from the initial planning stages, it was decided
been stipulated for delays.

at Naval Headquarters that there had to be a dual

“But soon we had problems. The first problem was the
presence in the shipyard at Kiel. The first was that of
rejection of a number of sections of the first submarine
the Naval overseers who were directly from the Navy
hull. And linked with this were ‘welding technology’

as the Indian Naval Submarine Overseeing Team. The
problems.

second presence was of M DL who had to learn how to
build the submarine, how the material package was to

“There were a certain number of ring frames, which
be dispatched to India in a phased and timely manner
had been specially designed for automatic welding.

and to ensure that the inspectors who were from the

The welding of these sections required a very carefully

Navy would eventually transfer their expertise to MDL.

controlled environment-temperature wise and humidity
wise - to make sure that the weld was totally defect free.

“In the overseeing team I had two categories of people.

Earlier, most of H DW ’s welding was manual. These

The first lot were there for approximately a year and a
automatic-welding stations had their teething problems
half - they were supposed to learn their part of it, then go
and some of these problems caused permanent damage.

back to India and start the inspections for the first one

Repairing a badly welded frame costs four times more
and a half years of the MDL programme. By this time,
than a new frame. The Germans initially tried to say that
the rest of the Kiel team would have learnt the balance

This is OK, we will get the welding institutes to have a
part of inspections and would go back to India and take
look at it’. But I would like to compliment the support we
on the specialised inspections of the latter half.

got from Naval Headquarters who said, “Ju st make sure

“My team had technical professionals from the
that you do not get pressurised. Go ahead and take the

Engineering, the Electrical and the Hull side. We laid
assistance of anybody, whether in India, or Germany or
down our own priorities. Quality was to be Number
abroad.’

One priority because there is nothing like a 99% safe

“Luckily, when we approached the welding institutes
submarine; it has to be 101% safe. The second priority
and the people who were welding technology experts
was Timely Completion. Most projects had the bad
in Germany, they agreed with our stand. The B W B also
reputation of having time and cost over-runs. Quality
supported us 100% and said ‘Yes, you are right to reject
and Time were the two major aspects that we looked at,
at every stage.

them. There are hair line cracks and we cannot accept
any kind of nonsense as far as quality is concerned.’

“I must highlight that we were concurrently learning and

And, therefore, some seven or eight sections had to be
applying the knowledge to inspection. We were learning
rejected.

from the German Organisation called the BW B, which
oversees quality assurance for the German Navy, as well

“It probably cost H DW a few million marks but finally
as for a foreign Government if the foreign Government
they accepted the fact. Later, after a couple of years, we
decides to use their facility. It was recommended by
read reports in various technical journals where HDW

HDW that B W B were meant for this purpose and, for
tried to tell the world that for the sake of quality they
a small fee, one could use their facilities. So we had a
had sacrificed so many million marks. As far as we were
presence of B W B in the shipyard.

concerned, we never allowed any aspect of submarine
quality to be jeopardised. Eventually, the H DW yard

“Initially, we learnt from them and finally, having
realised that we were professionals.

picked up whatever was required, we carried out the
inspection ourselves. The important thing was that our

“German Navy submarines had not experienced this
team realised that time over-runs are caused whenever
kind of welding problem because all German submarines
there is a delay in inspection. If a certain function by
were of smaller lengths and their sections were welded
the shipyard has been completed and the next step
manually. This was the first time that specially constructed
can only be taken after inspection, then it has to be
automatic welding stations were being used by HDW. I
done immediately. There is no question of weekends or
can only say that these were teething problems.

78 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

“With a view to becoming self reliant in submarine
changes were brought about. Minor changes of adding a
design, Naval Headquarters had deputed a separate
weight here or shifting an item from A to B were effected
design team to IKL to acquire hands-on design
as necessary. Technically, the submarines are absolutely
experience under the supervision of Dr Gabier. Project
sound.

X was the code name given to an indigenous design
of a submarine. It was supposed to be a little larger

Right from day one, the Submarine Overseeing
submarine than the Type 1500. It had a dual objective.

Team found themselves in a very professionally run

Firstly, to learn how to design a submarine. Secondly,
organisation. We realised that we had a lot to learn
to meet the staff requirements, which were given to the
and to apply that learning to inspection. Therefore, the

Project X team.

interaction with the shipyard personnel had to be very
professional. This paid us dividends eventually because

The Overseeing Team was also involved in the
the quality of our submarines has been outstanding
training of the crews and the sea trials. Our crews had
as has been borne out of the experience of the last 13
two elements of training. One was classroom training.

years.”

We had selected experienced submariners for these
submarines and very few were new, so that aspect was

The first two submarines built in Germany were
not difficult at all.

commissioned as INS Shishumar (S 44) on 22

September 1986 and INS Shankush (S 45) on 20

“For sea training, we divided the crews into two halves. November 1986.

One on morning shift and one on evening shift, on
the same submarine, depending on the time available.

M D Ls Subm arine Construction Facilities

Sometimes, when both our submarines were at sea, we MDL had started liasing with HDW immediately after the had a little more flexibility. Let me take one submarine, CCPA had decided on HDW in June 1980. In May 1982.

one crew. Normally, the Germans did the operation of a separate liaison office was started at the HDW shipyard the submarine during sea trials. Because of the safety at Kiel.

aspect and the fact that you cannot cross the figure of 40
because of the limitation of the size of the rescue sphere.

Separate and dedicated
submarine construction

These were some of the mandatory aspects that you facilities were set up in MDLs East Yard. They consisted of just cannot avoid. You cannot carry 41 bodies on board. three large workshops and a diy dock: Therefore, it had to be 20 German crew and 20 of our • The first workshop, 50 m x 25 m, had two 20-tonne crew Consequently, training had to be slightly lengthened
cranes for fabricating the ring frames of the pressure
to make sure that every man got his man-days or man-
hull.

hours on a particular equipment or in operations or in • The second workshop. 100 m x 30 m, had two 60-tonne navigation or whatever. This had been carefully planned
cranes for fabricating pressure hull sections.

and, therefore, the entire submarine training as far as the
crew was concerned went more or less on schedule.

These two workshops were completed in February

“Then there were other elements where the inspection 1984.

teams were not involved in the full aspect, except for

The Prime Minister, Mrs Indira Gandhi, formally
relevant people. For example, the sonar trials and the inaugurated the ‘submarine construction facilities’ on weapon firing trials etc were done by the HDW team 6 May 1984.

teaching our people. The German Navy provided targets • The third workshop, 99 m x 35 m, was for fitting out and as and when required and the training aspect was
joining the pressure hull sections to form a complete
generally handled by HDW.

submarine. This workshop and the 90 m x 17 m dry

“As regards sea trials, we had difficulties from time to
dock, with all its services, were completed in February
time. Certain equipment that did not function absolutely

1986.

correctly had to be either replaced or repaired. I would
say that by any universal standard, it was a sat'sfac ory

A separate dedicated Pipe Shop and a Stores Complex
period. Hitches are there in any choice and do no
were also built in the East Yard.

think we got a larger share of problems than normal.

Construction of S S K 3 and 4 in M azagon Docks

“The specifications of the submarines that we ordered The shipping, from Germany, of the material packages, were spelt out in tremendous detail in various v o ^ m j along with the first set of drawings, had commenced in Except for minor changes, which resulted on the basis 1982 and went on till 1983.

of trials carried out or some technical reason, no majo

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 79

Construction of the third SS K commenced on 12 and for incorporating changes like the better super-charged January 1984. It took five years for her to be launched diesel engine, better sensors and weapons, substitution of on 30 September 1989 and three more years till she obsolescent equipment etc.

commissioned as INS Shalki (S 46) on 7 February 1992.

By 1985, three options were considered for SSK s 5 and 6:

Construction of the fourth S S K began on 12 September

• Build both in HDW (Favoured by H DW and those

1984. She commissioned ten years later as INS Shankul
who wanted to upgrade the design with the latest

(S 47) on 28 May 1994.

equipment).

Dropping of S S K s 5 and 6 and Discontinuance of

• Build both in MDL (Favoured by M DL ‘to keep the

Indigenous Subm arine Construction
submarine production line going’).

The HDW contract contained an option clause, to be

• Build one in HDW and one in M DL (To get the best of
exercised by end 1982, for two more SS K submarines at
both options).

the 1981 baseline price, but to which escalation-would be

In October 1985, approval was accorded for the

‘addable’. For various reasons, NHQ and MoD were unable acquisition of two more HDW submarines. Negotiations to exercise the option by 1982 and sought, and obtained,
were to be based on the “one by HDW and one by MDL’

extensions from HDW to hold the baseline price.

option.

From MDLs point of view, it was essential that the

The preliminary discussions in 1985 revealed that the
submarine production line was not interrupted. If SSK s prices quoted by HDW had increased steeply. These were 5 and 6 were not ordered in time, it would be forced to never built / acquired.

divert to other jobs, the manpower that was being trained
for submarine construction at such high cost.

MDL delivered S S K 3 in 1992 and S S K 4 in 1994. Their
operational performance met the Navy’s expectations.

In the intervening years, NHQ had interacted with HDW
on improving the operational capability of SSK s 5 and 6

80 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

13

Warship Modernisations And Half-Life Refits

Overview

The frigate Taliuar was the first to be fitted with a complete missile system removed from a non-operational

I he Navy’s endeavours in the field of warship modernisation missile boat. The innovation proved successful.

commenced in the mid 1960s with a study called FRAMRAJ
on the ‘Fleet Refit and Modernisation of Rajput’ (a destroyer

It was decided to commence the Modernisation Half-
of 1940s vintage). By the time the study took shape, its cost life Refit programme with the modernisation of Talwar’s effectiveness was undermined by the vastly higher level of sister ship, Trishul, in two phases. The staff requirements technology that was entering service in the Soviet supplied envisaged fitment of a mix of Russian, Italian and British Petyas. The study was, however, valuable for realising the systems. Phase 1 commenced in 1975 and completed in intricacies of modernising aged warships.

1977. Phase 2 commenced in 1979 and completed five
years later in 1984.

By the early 1970s, the experience of the eight new

British frigates acquired between 1958 and 1961 indicated

The long endurance of the three diesel-engined
that whereas the life of their hulls might be stretched to 20 Brahmaputra class frigates made them particularly or 25 years, the operational reliability of naval electronic suitable for conversion into cadet training ships. From equipment could not be stretched beyond 11 to 12 years.

1976 onwards, one ship at a time was taken in hand for
conversion, the last of which completed in 1980.

In 1974, following the recommendations of the

Subramaniam Committee, the Government laid down a

The aircraft carrier Vikrant underwent modernisation in
life of 12V2 years for electronic equipment. This enabled two phases - the first from 1979 to 1981 and the second the Navy to pre-plan the replacement of electronic systems from 1987 to 1989.

during ‘Modernisation-cum-Half life Refits. Together with

In the end 1970s, the study for modernising the 1960-
overhaul of essential machinery and renewal of hull plates, vintage Russian Petyas showed that it would not be cost these refits were expected to give ships hulls and electronics effective.

an additional operational life of 11 to 12 years.

In the 1980s, the study for modernising the first, 1972-

The Modernisation Half-Life Refit programme had vintage, Leander class frigate, Nilgiri, was overtaken by been planned to commence in 1971-72 with the Khukri the inability to obtain firm commitments for the delivery of class frigates. The loss of Khulai in the 1971 war and the Russian weapon systems contemporary with those being deterioration in the material state of Kuthar and Kirpan during fitted in ships being acquired from Russia.

the same war made their half-life refit non cost effective.

In the case of the Russian-built ships and submarines,

The arrival of the missile boats from Russia in early 1971, upgradation-cum-modemisation could be implemented immediately sparked interest in fitting surface-to-surface only to a limited extent during their major six-yearly Medium missiles in other ships. After seeing the effectiveness oft

Repairs.

missiles in the 1971 war, the Navy explored the fitment of
these missiles in its fastest British-bu.lt ships that were near g

Framraj
the half-life refit stage. These were the cruiser Mysore and the In 1966, the Navy initiated its first detailed study in the frigates Talivar and Trishul.

field of warship modernisation. The project was named

FRAMRAJ - Fleet Refit and Modernisation of the sturdy,

A study was carried out of what was required to high-speed Rajput class destroyers built during the 1939-45
modernise Mysore. It emerged that whereas w u

World War.

armour plate were sound, her propuls.on system was
old as to make its modernisation impractical.

Rear Admiral then Lieutenant Commander J J Baxi was
the width of Talwar's fox’le did not permit the siting of four
associated with the study. He recalls:

missile launchers abreast, it was decided to fit only three
abreast.

“Primarily Framraj was not pursued because it would
have been cheaper at that time to buy a new ship from

The first missile firing was carried out on 11 December
the Soviet Gnion than to spend so much money on

1975. It scored a bull’s eye on a target moored at a range
modernising an old ship like RajpuL where the life of the of 20 miles.

machinery and the hull system were absolutely doubtful
and inadequate/’

Mr Paramanandhan, the then Director of Naval Design,
recalls:

The great benefit of the Framraj study was the

“The Russians were not at all in favour of putting
opportunity it provided to the planners and designers to
one of the three missiles on the centre line. I did not
come to grips with the difficulties, the trade-offs, the costs
see anything wrong in putting it there, as long as
and the benefits of modernisation.

the deflectors were correct and we knew the correct

Fitm ent of Russian Missiles in British-Bulit Warships
distances and if the flame should strike the bulkhead,
there should be no damage done. So we decided to

The missile boats arrived from Russia in the first half of
have a forward bulkhead with an air space and also have

1971. The Navy saw at first hand the compactness and
a walkway for people in case something went wrong.

the operational potential of this new system. Even before
the missiles proved their effectiveness in the December

“We had a group of scientists in the first firing for which

1971 war, the Navy requested the Soviet side to supply a
we wrote down the specifications for firing the missile.

set of missile launchers along with the fire control system

That raised the eyebrows of some officers in the Material
and installation drawings and to depute Soviet specialists

Branch, especially in the Directorate of Weapons and
to help fit the system on board an ageing ship on an

Equipment. They said ‘W ho are these naval designer
experimental basis.

jokers in Ramakrishnapuram1 to tell us what to do with
the weapons on board?’ But we were worried about an

In 1972, the Soviet side agreed to depute a group of
accident, nothing more than that.

Russian specialists to study the feasibility of fitting missiles

“We had asked for many measurement ‘gadgets’. One
in existing Indian ships.

of these was to put a series of shoe-strings along the

In 1974, as the first step towards implementing
deck and on the bulkhead. We knew what their charring
the overall approval that had been accorded for the
temperature was. That would immediately indicate how

‘modernisation of ships’, Naval Headquarters commenced
far the deflectors were effective and how far they were
design work on the modernisation of Talwar and Trishul.

not effective.

The staff requirements envisaged fitment of Russian

“A salvo of three missiles was fired successfully.”

missiles, Russian radar controlled 30 mm guns, improved

British sonar and an Italian Electronic Warfare ESM system

Constructor Captain (then Commander and later DGND)

that would help in identifying adversary warships from their

KK Lohana recalls:

radar transmissions at ranges compatible with the range of

“It was a very bold step to remove the missile containers
the missiles and whose ECM would be an essential element
from a missile boat and fit them in Type 12 frigate. The
of anti missile defence.

Soviets were not particularly enthusiastic about such a

Fittin g M issiles in
proposal. It was, therefore, decided that we would do it

Talwar
on our own.

Since the design for modernisation would take time, it

“Secondly, the three-missile configuration, which
was decided to upgrade Talwar with whatever was readily
was planned for Talwar’s fox’le deck to get maximum
available and complete the remainder of the modernisation
benefit out of the deck area available, was something
later.

unique. There were definitely inherent doubts and risks

During the Long Refit between December 1974 and
as to how the flight paths would be affected and what

November 1975, Talwar's 4.5-inch mounting and its
were the clearances required and what should be the

F P S 5 fire control system was removed and in its place was
interface with the rest of the equipment and so on.

installed an entire missile, radar and fire control system

“This assignment became an article of faith with
after lifting it out of a non-operational missile boat. Since

Mr Paramanandhan. In the absence of clear cut

1. The Directorate of Naval Design was located in Ramakrishnapuram, an office complex in New Delhi.

82/TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

documentation and data, quite a large amount of capacity afloat for training cadets and midshipmen at sea.

study had to be carried out of the existing fittings in the To start with, the cruiser Delhi was converted to undertake missile boat in order to decide what equipment was to this sea training. Thereafter, the three British-built frigates be removed in addition to the containers themselves

Brahmaputra, Beas and Betwa, which had commissioned
what was the interface, how the fire control would work in 1958, 1959 and 1960 were converted for undertaking and so on. And I must say that the whole exercise, in the sea training of cadets. The conversion involved the spite of certain technically inspired assumptions, was removal of weapons, construction of classrooms, cadets’

something which went off very well and the Navy could accommodation and mess, installation of equipment to well be very proud of it.”

facilitate training in astro and coastal navigation, etc.

Modernisation of Trishul

Modernisation of Vikrant

The Trishul modernisation was entrusted to Mazagon Phase One Docks and was implemented in two phases:

After the 1971 war, Vikrant needed a long refit to replace
o In Phase 1, which commenced in 1976 and completed the boilers as they had revealed cracks. Since this was in 1977, surface to surface missiles and associated expected to be a long refit from 1979 to 1981, it was fire control system were fitted in the place of the gun decided to concurrently undertake as much modernisation mounting and its fire control system, as had been done of weapons, sensors and Action Information Systems as earlier in Talwar.

possible.

o Phase 2 modernisation commenced in 1979 and

During the Phase One modernisation refit, the major
though expected to complete in 1982, completed five items undertaken were: years later in 1984. During this phase:

• Renewal of boilers.

- A flight deck was provided for operating a MATCH role
helicopter.

• Extension of air-conditioning.

-Radars and AIO were replaced by Dutch Signaal • Fitment of the Dutch Signaal LW 04, DA 05, ZW 06
systems as in the Leanders.

radars and DS 22 Action Information system as in the

Leander class frigates.

- 90% of the hull plates were renewed and all cabling
changed.

• Installation of Sea Harrier facilities, LCDS and
floodlighting of the flight deck.

-All propulsion machinery was either given a major • Fitment of LIOD Optronic Sights and Bofors 40/70 gun overhaul or renovated.

mountings for anti missile defence.

- The ship was fully air-conditioned.

• Fitment of new (JHF, VHF, HF, MF communication

L e s s o n s Learnt from Trishul’s Modernisation
sets.

• Installation of a towed torpedo decoy, an expendable

Analysis of the time and cost overrun of Trishul s
bathythermograph and a sonic ray plotter.

Phase 2 modernisation concluded that half-life refits and
modernisation could not be afforded. Extensive renewal of • The catapult and arrestor gear were overhauled and hull plating and rewiring the main cabling literally meant
retained for launch and recovery of the Alizes.

taking the ship apart and rebuilding it. Both cost and time • The main and auxiliary machinery were refurbished to wise, it was found cheaper to build a new ship than to do a
the maximum extent feasible.

Trishul-type modernisation.

Mr Paramanandhan, the then DGND recalls:

After
the

Trishul
experience,
such
extensive

“There was a serious proposal to put the large Soviet
modernisations of frigates were never attempte a9a1^*
combined surface warning - height estimating - S band

Only limited modernisations were contemplated an ,
radar on the ship. Vikrant’s masts were already saturated.

for a variety of reasons, even these became inn e

We were asked to find out some way of putting the antenna
replacement of specific systems.

up there. We worked with the IIT Madras on the structural
side and we gave a proposal, which was workable. But

C o n version o f Brahmaputra, Beas and Betwa
the cost factor and the time required was such that the

C adets Training

Naval Staff decided to forego that radar.

When the Naval Academy was started in 1971 to’ '"^ease

"The second thing we spent a lot of money and a lot
officer intake, it became necessary also o 1

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 83

of time on was that a lot of DC / AC alternators were put
degrees. The challenges were the precise execution of
on board Vikrant to create a larger AC power capacity
the structural design, translating it from pre-fabricated
for dedicated services.

modules to be placed precisely and welded without
distortions to achieve the exact exit angle with a tolerance

“There was a proposal to fit the new Bofors 4 0 /7 0
of plus minus 10 seconds of arc. British Aerospace had
guns and a new type of laser sensor for anti missile
specified 54 minutes of arc as the tolerance of the exit
defence. The initial proposal was to fit the Soviet 30
angle.

mm gun mountings in lieu of the old hand-operated

Bofors. If we had gone firm on that, probably we would

“To start with, British Aerospace said that the Navy
have achieved it at a much lesser cost and much
would not be able to tackle the ski jump’s structural
quicker. While the Soviet weapon systems had their own
design. We said ‘we know exactly what we can do.

deficiencies, they had the advantage that they suited

Please pass on the drawings to us'. Then they said that
our culture and way of working and maintainability.

‘you cannot achieve this in just 18 months lime’. Vikrant

Each 30 mm mounting had its own dedicated radar
was dry docked in the Cruiser Dock for a total period of
and its own display, which made it autonomous for

7 months, at the end of which the ski jump had been
operation. So if one mounting did not work, at least the
installed.

other one would be available. That philosophy was not

“When the Royal Navy Harriers arrived for the test flights,
accepted half-way through. And when they changed
they had planned a series of 18 aircraft configurations
over to the new weapon system, our Directorate was
with which the ski-jump would be tested. At the end
not involved any further.”

of three test flights, they had determined that the exit

Ph ase Two
angle had been achieved with accuracy of plus minus

10 minutes of arc, far below the specified minimum of

During this phase of modernisation from 1987 to 1989,

54 minutes of arc. As a result, all further test flights were

Vikrant was fitted with:

deemed to be of no use except the most imbalanced

• A ski jump for launching Sea Harriers in the Short Take
configuration of a Sea Harrier having under one wing

Off mode. Since the Alizes had phased out, the catapult
a 1,000 pound bomb (that had failed to release) and
and arrestor gear were removed.

nothing under the other wing. Take off and landing with
this imbalanced configuration represented the worst

• Facilities for operation and maintenance of the new
case. This too succeeded beyond expectation.

dual role anti submarine / anti ship Seaking Mk 42 B
helicopter.

“At the end of it, the Chief of Naval Staff passed on to
us a very nice letter from the Chief Engineer of British

• LIOD Fire Control Systems and indigenous medium

Aerospace, commending the quality of work of the
range chaff launchers.

Naval Dockyard Bombay.”

• Magazine stowage for the new weapons of the Seaking

Mk 42 B helicopters like the Sea Eagle anti ship missiles,

After completion of modernisation in 1989, Vikrant
the A 244 S anti submarine torpedoes and the chaff was operational till her final sea outing on 23 November rockets.

1994. After that, she remained alongside until she was
decommissioned on 31 January 1997.

In stallation of the Sk i- Ju m p

M odernisation of the Petyas

Rear Admiral (then Captain) A Ganesh was the General

Manager Refit in the Bombay Dockyard in 1989 when

The 6-yearly Medium Repair programme of the Petyas
the ski jump was installed during Phase 2 of Vikrant’s
had been repeatedly postponed for several reasons like
modernisation. He recalls:

the delays in completion of the facilities in the new Naval

“The ski jump installation in

Dockyard coming up in Vizag, their bunching at the time

Vikrant was a massive
exercise which virtually involved redesign of the forward of acquisition meant bunching for Medium Repairs, the one third of the ship - removal of the steam catapult,
delays in getting spares from the Soviet Union, etc.

re-appropriation of a whole lot of compartments below

In 1979, consideration commenced on modernising the
the steam catapult, extensive structural modification of weapons and sensors of the Petyas during their 6-yearly the deck, creation of new compartments under the ski Medium Repairs. The Navy preferred to fit sensors and jump, rendering the flight deck worthy and coating it weapons similar to the ships recently acquired from the with the new anti skid paint developed by NCML.

Soviet Union like the RBCI 6000 anti submarine rockets,

“Vikrant's ski jump was to have an exit angle of 9.75

30 mm mounting with their fire control etc. Discussions

84 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

with the Soviet ship designer revealed that this would entail

In 1980, staff requirements were prepared for the
such extensive redesign that it would not be cost effective.

modernisation of the Nilgiri, which had commissioned in

1972. In view of the high cost of the extensive modernisation

Modernisation of the First Leander Class
based on the staff requirements prepared in 1980, NHQ

Frigate Nilgiri
reviewed the scope of modernisation in early 1981. It was

In 1971, the British Navy started the half-life modernisation decided to modernise Nilgiri only to the extent necessary of their earlier FSA 29 Leanders. This envisaged the fitment to make it a viable first rate anti submarine frigate. Even of the French Exocet surface-to-surface missiles, the British this could not be achieved due to the non-availability from Seawolf surface-to-air missile, the Ikara anti submarine the Soviet Union of RBU 6000 anti submarine rocket missile, Computerised Action Information System (CA1S) launchers and 30 mm gun mountings and their fire control in the Operations Room and the Westland Wessex WG 13 system.

helicopter for anti submarine and anti ship roles.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 85

The Naval Air Arm

The MATCH also had been ordered for the next two

The State o f the Air A rm in 1975
frigates, (Jdaygiri and Dunagiri. It had been decided that VIK R A N T and H er Air S q u a d ro n s
in the last two Leander frigates, Taragiri and Vindhyagiri the MATCH would be replaced by the much larger and

Vikrant and her Seahawk and Alize squadrons had
commissioned in 1961.1 In the fourteen years that had
heavier Seaking.

elapsed till 1975, both Vikrant and her aircraft had aged S A R C h e ta k s. These were the French Alouette Ills being considerably: Vikrant herself was becoming due for a
manufactured by HAL under license. SAR flights were
major refit cum modernisation.

operational at sea in Vikrant and Deepak, and ashore in Despite the acquisition of the German Navy’s surplus Hansa and Garuda.

Seahawks in 1966, the serviceability of the Seahawks had

R e c o n n a is s a n c e A ircraft
become unpredictable. Their replacements had been
identified as the Sea Harriers, but these were still under Agreements had been signed for three Russian IL 38
development in Britain.

M RASW aircraft to be delivered in 1977 and for the aircrew
to commence training in Russia in 1976.

The three-year, 1975-1978 refurbishment programme to
extend the life of the Alizes up to the 1980s had commenced

T h e T ra n sfo rm a tio n in Tactical M is s io n s
but was being afflicted by the non-availability of critical
spares, which were no longer under production in France.

S e a h a w k A ir-to -A ir R o le

When Vikrant was first acquired in 1961, the basic role of

Th e H elicopter Fleet
the Seahawks was ‘fighter-ground attack’. The Seahawks

S e a k in g Anti S u b m a rin e H elicopters. The six Mk were not designed to intercept other aircraft. During

42 Seakings that had arrived from Britain in 1971 had
exercises, however, a modest capability had been built up
experienced numerous teething problems during the
by officers from the aircraft carrier ‘directing’ a Seahawk,

December 1971 Indo-Pakistan War. They underwent on Vikrant’s radar, to within visual range of an intruding extensive evaluation and defect rectification in 1972 and
aircraft, for carrying out an attack using its 20 mm guns.

1973. By 1974, six new Seakings had arrived, repair and

S e a h a w k An ti S h ip R o le a n d H a w k -A liz e C o o p e ra tio n test facilities had been set up and expertise had begun
to develop, all of which led to a marked improvement in

For the anti-ship role, the Seahawks’ armament options
availability and role worthiness.

were bombs, rockets and 20mm guns. Since the Seahaw s
were not fitted with radar, they had to be homed on to a

K a m o v 25 Anti S u b m a rin e H elicopters. Agreements had been signed for these helicopters to be embarked on
target. The basic problem was to pinpoint the target ship
board the Russian guided missile destroyers Rajput, Rana
for the Seahawks to attack.

and Ranjit when they commissioned from 1980 onwards.

The Alize was fitted with radar and one of its roles was
tactical reconnaissance within a hundred miles of the

M A T C H A louettes. Nilgiri and Himgiri had each embarked a Multi-role Anti submarine Torpedo Carrying Helicopter.

aircraft carrier. If, during daytime, a contact was visua y

1. The Seahawks first saw action in the Anglo-French attack on Egypt in 1956 in the ground attack and interdiction role. In 1956, the Navy purchased 22 aircraft and the West German Navy purchased 64 aircraft. The Indian Navy ordered 9 second hand aircraft in 19

»

followed in 1961 by an order for the last 14 new aircraft that were produced and the purchase of 22 more second hand aircraft. In 19

>
the Navy purchased 28 second-hand aircraft from West Germany. O f the Navy’s total induction of 73 Seahawks, 14 were new and 5 ?

second hand.

identified as hostile, the Alize could call for and home a • Should a submarine be surprised on the surface and strike by Seahawks. If, at night, a radar contact behaved
attempt to crash dive, the Alize would attack it with
suspiciously, it would be shadowed until dawn and, if visually
anti-submarine rockets fitted with special pressure
identified to be hostile, a Seahawk strike would be homed
hull-penetrating warheads, which were most effective
in. Since dusk and dawn were tactically critical times for a
when the submarine had not had the time to dive too

Seahawk attack to arrive over the target, Seahawk pilots
deep.

had to qualify for being recovered and launched during
darkness.

From the outset, the efficacy of the Alizes in the
anti submarine role fell short of expectations. The

The procedure that had evolved for Seahawk-Alize limited availability of submarines and the disappointing cooperation comprised three steps:

performance of passive non-directional sonobuoys in the
o The Alize would search a given area to locate the waters where anti submarine exercises were carried out led adversary. As soon as a contact was identified as the Navy to acquire, from France, the Julie system. The hostile, it would ask Vikrant to launch a Seahawk strike. Julie concept was to drop a mini bomb (called bombette) Positioning itself between Vikrant and the target, the near the pattern of sonobuoys, which would then record Alize would home the Seahawks towards itself, allow the not only the explosion of the bombette but also its echo Seahawks to overtake it and head towards the target.

from the submarine, if there was one in the vicinity. The
time interval between the two echoes was converted into
o The Seahawks would strike the target.

a range to get a more accurate position of the submarine.

o On completion of the strike, the Alize would tell the The two additional Alizes acquired from France were fitted Seahawks the direction in which they should fly to reach out with the Julie recording system. Julie recorders were back to Vikrant.

also imported for retrofitting in the earlier Alizes.

Between 1966 and 1971, Hawk-Alize cooperation The Indo-Pakistan War of 1971
improved steadily. Experience showed that identification
and attack during darkness would improve if the target During the 1971 war, the Seahawks attacked ground could be illuminated. Lepus flare bombs were imported targets and ships in harbour in East Pakistan, as they were designed to do. Since there were no Pakistan Navy ships in
from Sweden.

the Bay of Bengal, there was no occasion to resort to HaWk-

Alize’s Anti Submarine Role

Alize cooperation. On the one occasion when an intruding

British RAF aircraft inadvertently flew over Vikrant, the For the Alize’s anti submarine role, the sequence of events Seahawk was unable to catch up with and visually sight would be:

the intruder.

• The Alize might detect an echo on its radar or a radar

Whenever the wind on deck was not sufficient to launch
transmission on its ESM system. If the echo quickly Seahawks, Alizes were utilised to bomb ground targets, disappeared, it was suggestive of a submarine having but only at night so as to reduce their vulnerability to anti crash-dived.

aircraft fire due to their slower speed. One Alize would

• The Alize would proceed to the position of the radar drop a Lepus flare to illuminate the target and a second contact / estimated position of the radar transmission Alize would drop the bombs. The Alizes also proved useful and drop a pattern of passive non-directional sonobuoys. in stopping those merchant ships that tried to evade The amplitude of noise detected by the sonobuoys contraband control by dropping depth charges well ahead would be transmitted to the sonobuoy receiver in the of them. The Alizes operating from Bombay did not obtain Alize. By correlating these amplitudes, the receiver any worthwhile contacts of Pakistan Navy submarines on would estimate a range. Where these estimated range their sonobuoys.

circles intersected, the receiver would indicate the

Regrettably, the capability of the newly arrived Seaking Mk
approximate area where the submarine might be. me 42 helicopters deployed at Bombay was not fully harnessed Alize would then drop a third sonobuoy, get a third range for combating the Pakistan Navy’s newly acquired Daphne intersect and obtain the most probable position o
class submarines. Partly, this was due to the diffidence
submarine.

arising out of the technical teething problems experienced

. The Alize would track the submarine by dropping| more at Bombay. But mainly it was due to the differing opinions sonobuoys. When it was confident o cariym
on how the Seakings should be employed. The first batch of
accurate attack, the Alize would drop ant. submarine aircrew that went to Britain to accept the first Seakings did depth charges on top of the submarine.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 87

not have the benefit of a combat workup with submarines.

D e v e lo p m e n ts B e tw e e n 1976 a n d 1990

Plans for utilising Seakings primarily for the defence of Overview Bombay appear to have been based on the assessment of
the first batch. The second batch of aircrew underwent a

During the fifteen years between 1976 and 1990, the Naval
full-scale work up in Britain with submarines and when they Air Arm underwent momentous changes, many of which arrived in Bombay in October, they were more confident could not have been entirely foreseen.

of Seaking capabilities. By this time, however, the plans

Acquisitions included a second aircraft carrier and a
for defensive utilisation had already firmed up. The tempo wide variety of aircraft and helicopters equipped with the of events in November precluded attention on maximising
latest sensors and weapon systems.

the offensive potential of this latest combination of dunking
sonar - air dropped torpedo anti submarine system which,

Vikrant underwent two modernisations in preparation
being airborne was completely safe from being hit by for embarking the new Sea Harrier Vertical/Short Take Off submarine fired torpedoes.

and Land (V/STOL) fighter aircraft and the new Seaking

Mk 42 B A SW helicopters.

A fter the W a r

The transfer of the ‘maritime reconnaissance’ role from

From 1972 to 1974, Vikrant was under refit. Her workshops the Air Force to the Navy marked the rebirth of the shore-were re-equipped to enable her to operate Seakings. In
based arm of naval aviation.2 This started with the taking

1973, three new Seakings arrived, followed by three more in
over of the Air Force’s Super Constellations (Super Connies)

1974, enabling the commissioning of the second Seaking
by the Navy in 1976 and the acquisition of the Maritime
squadron INAS 336. Thereafter, Seaking availability and

Reconnaissance and Anti Submarine Warfare (MRASW)

efficiency improved considerably. With a larger number of Ilyushin (IL) 38s from Russia in 1977. Eleven years later, submarines having arrived from Russia and now available the much longer range and much better equipped Russian on both coasts, the Seakings were able to evolve and

Long Range Maritime Patrol (LRM P) Tupolev (TG) 142s
coordinate their anti submarine search and attack tactics replaced the Super Connies.

and procedures with the latest anti submarine ships like
the Russian Petya class submarine chasers and the British

The combat capability of the Air Arm leapfrogged from

Leander class frigates.

the technology of the 1950s to that of the 1980s:

• The new sensors were the dunking sonars in the Kamovs

Policy R e g a rd in g H e licop ters in Frigates an d
and the Seakings Mk 42 B, the latest sonobuoys in the

D e stroye rs

Seakings Mk 42 B, the ILs and the T(Js, the Magnetic

The embarkation of helicopters in ships had started in the

Anomaly Detectors (MAD) in the ILs and Kamovs, the

1960s with the French Alouette Ills in Vikrant (for the SAR

ESM in the Seakings Mk 42 B, the tail radar warners in
role), in Darshak (for assisting survey work) and in Deepak the Sea Harriers, the ILs and the TGs, and the modern

(for assisting vertical replenishment) followed, in the 1970s,
radars in all these aircraft and helicopters.

by the MATCH Alouettes in the first four Leander frigates.

• The new weapons were the French Matra air to air

Thereafter:

missiles in the Sea Harriers, the British anti ship Sea

• Taragiri and Vindhyagiri had one Seaking each. The Eagle missiles in the Sea Harriers and Seakings, the

Rajput class destroyers from Russia had one Kamov

Italian A 244 S and Russian anti submarine homing
each. The Godavari class frigates of Project 16 had two
torpedoes in the helicopters and the anti submarine

Seakings each, as would their successors, the Delhi
depth bombs in the Kamovs.

class destroyers of Project 15. The amphibious Landing

• The tactical missions of naval aircraft changed
ships, Magar and Gharial, were designed to embark the
considerably, in step with the changes in the capabilities
commando variant Seakings.

of their sensors and weapons.

• All other frigate sized ships would have the lighter

• Three new naval air stations were c o m m is s io n e d .

Chetaks - Trishul and Talivar after being fitted with They made more complete the sea areas covered by
surface to surface missiles, Brahmaputra, Beas and
maritime reconnaissance. At the older air stations,

Betwa after conversion to the training role, the new
the Air Traffic Control facilities were modernised and
cadet training ship Tir, the new survey ships and the runways lengthened and strengthened to operate the
new Khukri class corvettes of Project 25.

heavier new aircraft.

2. The amphibious Sealands were phased out in the 1960s.

88 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

O The latest simulators were acquired for training Sea • The catapult and arrestor gear were overhauled and Harrier pilots, TU ASW teams and Seaking Mk 42 B
retained for launch and recovery of the Alizes.

maintenance personnel.

o New aircraft maintenance workshops were set up at

Between 1982 and 1986, Vikrant operated with Alizes
in the tactical recce role and Seakings Mk 42 in the anti

Kochi for the Seakings, at Goa for the Sea Harriers and submarine role.

the Russian ILs and Kamovs and at Arakkonam for the

TGs.

During the Phase Two modernisation from 1987 to
o Training syllabi were updated and training facilities

1989, Vikrant was fitted with:

were expanded. To facilitate the practical training of air • A ski jump for launching Sea Harriers in the Short Take technical personnel at HAL and with the Air Force, a site

Off mode. Since the Alizes had phased out, the catapult
was identified at Bangalore for a spacious new Naval Air
and arrestor gear were removed.

Technical School.

• Facilities for operation and maintenance of the new

Aircraft Carriers
dual role anti submarine / anti ship Seaking Mk 42 B
helicopter.

Aircraft Carrier VIKRANT

• LIOD Fire Control Systems and indigenous medium
range chaff launchers.

Between 1975 and 1979, flying operations aboard Vikrant
started posing problems that compelled changes in the • Magazine stowage for the new weapons of the Sea roles of aircraft.

Harriers and Seaking Mk 42 B helicopters. The new
weapons were the Sea Eagle anti ship missiles, the Matra

Vikrant’s radars had become unreliable and overdue
air-to-air missiles, the A 244S anti submarine torpedoes
for replacement. The tracking and marshalling of
and the chaff rockets.

Seahawks had become stressful. Seahawk availability
and the reliability of their navigation systems had become

During 1989-90, for the first time the Navy had two
unpredictable. When the Seahawks embarked
aircraft carriers at sea at the same time.

Vikrant for
the last time in 1978, they could only carry out weapon Aircraft Carrier VIRAAT
and PR sorties.

‘Elephant’ was the name intended for last of the series of

Even though two refurbished Alizes were embarked, the 1939-45 World War, 22,000 tonne, Centaur class, ‘light the inaccuracies of their navigation system degraded fleet aircraft carriers’ designed in Britain in 1943. When the effectiveness of Hawk-Alize cooperation and of anti the war ended in 1945, construction of the Elephant was submarine exercises using sonobuoys. The anti submarine suspended. A few years later, construction was resumed, role shifted from the Alize aircraft to the Seaking helicopters Elephant was renamed 'Hermes’ and launched in February and the Alizes’ main role became tactical reconnaissance.

1953. The original design of 1943 had envisaged the
operation of propeller driven aircraft. This design had to

Vikrant underwent two-modernisation refits - the first be modified extensively to cater for the operation of jet-from 1979 to 1981 and the second from 1987 to 1989. propelled aircraft and the new weapon systems that had During the Phase One modernisation refit, the major items entered service after 1943. Hermes commissioned in the undertaken were:

British Navy in November 1959.

• Renewal of boilers.

Hermes' first deployment was as a ‘strike carrier’ in

• Extension of air-conditioning.

Southeast Asia from 1960 onwards. Britain’s economic

• Fitment of the Dutch Signaal radars, similar to those difficulties in the 1960s led to the decision that it would withdraw from ‘East of Suez,’ reduce the size of its Navy and
fitted in the Leander class frigates.

transfer her naval air arm’s ‘strike’ aircraft to its Air Force. The

• Installation of Sea Harrier facilities, LCIDS and flood

British Navy decommissioned a number of its aircraft carriers.

lighting of the flight deck.

Hermes' catapult and arrestor wires were removed and she

• Fitment of L 70 guns and LIOD Sights for gun control.

was placed in reserve. In 1973, she was taken out of reserve
and refitted as an Anti submarine Helicopter Carrier’ to meet

. Fitment of new C1HF, VHF, H F MF communication

NATO commitments in the Atlantic Ocean.

sets.

• Installation of a towed torpedo decoy, an expendable

The British Navy, however, remained reluctant to
bathythermograph and a sonic ray plotter.

forego the tactical advantages that aircraft carriers

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 89

conferred in distant naval operations that were beyond

Admiral Tahiliani was the Chief of the Naval Staff in
the reach of shore based Air Force aircraft. It pursued

1985. He recalls:

two projects:

“I got a letter from my counterpart in the British Navy.

• A new smaller class of ship called the Through Deck

1 still remember the letter was dated 1 March 1985.

Cruiser' that would have a “ski jump” to assist V/STOL

He simply said that because they had now three newly
aircraft to take off from a carrier without having to be
built aircraft carriers in commission, they were going
catapulted. The V/STOL capability also dispensed with
to put Hermes in the reserve fleet and would India be
the need for arrestor wires.

interested in getting this carrier? He said further that the
price would be competitive and, if 1 remember rightly,

• The development of the naval version of the P 1127/
even quoted the figure of 35 million pounds. He said

Harrier V/STOL aircraft that had been in service with the
that if I was interested, I should send out a team to look

GS Marine Corps and the British Air Force since 1970.

at the ship and its material state before they actually

By the mid 1970s, the Sea Harrier had taken shape.

mothballed it.

In 1978, Sea Harrier trials were held on board Hermes.

“This looked like an excellent opportunity. Although

In 1980, Hermes was fitted with a 12-degree ski jump to we had been wanting to start building our own carrier,
enable it to operate Sea Harrier aircraft.

we hadn’t got the sanction and were nowhere near ready

In 1981, again because of financial difficulties, Britain
to begin our programme so that we would have a carrier
considered whether its Navy should be essentially an
to replace Vikrant when she was phased out in another

A SW force built around destroyers and frigates, whether

8 to 10 years.

the Through Deck Cruiser programme should be halted,

“We sent out a team led by the Deputy Chief of the
whether the Hermes should be scrapped and whether

Naval Staff. He came back and gave us a report that
the first through deck cruiser, HMS Invincible, should be
although Hermes had been commissioned in 1959
sold to Australia. These considerations were overtaken by

(which was before Vikrant), but because she had been
the crisis precipitated by Argentina’s invasion of Britain’s
periodically laid up and had had three extensive refits /

Falkland Islands, located in the distant South Atlantic
modernisations, her material state was ten years younger

Ocean. Argentina had decided to try and solve the
than Vikrant. We took up the proposal with Government
longstanding dispute regarding its sovereignty over these
and, happily for us, everything worked out right.”

islands.

The Navy thoroughly examined the material state of

Both Hermes and Invincible, with Sea Harrier strike Hermes, assessed the magnitude of the refit that would be aircraft and Seaking anti submarine helicopters embarked,
required, determined the minimum requirements of new
were made operational and dispatched to the Falklands in
equipment and systems that were essential for providing

April 1982. Both aircraft carriers returned to Britain in mid
an all weather, day and night capability for air operations,

1982, unharmed by the Argentine Air Force’s Mirages and determined the stowage and supply arrangements for Skyhawks, but having lost a number of Sea Harrier aircraft the new air to surface and air to air missiles, which were and pilots in combat.

entering service and negotiated how much all this would

In 1983, Britain decided to place Hermes in reserve and cost.

continue the construction of Through Deck Cruisers’. In

On 24 April 1986, the Government announced in

November 1983, Hermes sailed to Portsmouth for being

Parliament that an agreement had been signed with
mothballed and decommissioned. She remained idle from

1984 onwards.

Britain to acquire the Hermes. A 63 million pound sterling
acquisition package was worked out that included dry-

In early 1985, Britain offered Hermes to India for outright docking, refit, spares, stores and services. The ship was purchase. By this time, the first batch of the Indian Navy’s towed to Plymouth for dry-docking and a 12-month refit Sea Harriers had already been in service for over a year.

that included:

The Navy had a long pending need for a second aircraft

• Shot blasting of the underwater hull and repair and
carrier to ensure that out of two carriers, at least one would
preservation of fittings to ensure that the ship would not
be available should a sudden need arise.3
require docking for at least five years.

3. D uring the 1965 war, Vikrant w as under refit. During the 1971 war, Vikrant w as afflicted by cracks in her boilers that restricted her speed.

90 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

o R e-tu b in g o f all boilers and o verhaul / rep lacem en t of Russian MiG 29 K that was of the same lineage as the
a u x ilia ry m a c h in e ry .

MiG 29 acquired by the Air Force, and
o Stripping and re-coating of the flight deck.

• The navalised version of the Light Combat Aircraft
o R e c t if ic a t io n o f all p e n d in g d e fe c ts an d u p d atin q (LCA) that was being developed indigenously for the Air
o n b o a r d s y s te m s .

Force.

o A lte r a tio n s to w e a p o n s p a c e s , air d e p a rtm e n t s p a c e s At the time of writing, it has been decided to acquire
and galleys.

MIG 29K aircraft along with the second-hand Russian

The new equipment to be fitted included a Computerised aircraft carrier Admiral Gorshkov. The naval LCA is Action Information Organisation system, modern deck under development.

landing and flight facility systems, and all the latest facilities Fighter Aircraft required to operate the Sea Harriers and the new Seaking

Mk 42 B helicopters.

Phasing out of Seahawks

On completion of refit, Hermes commissioned at The Seahawks disembarked from Vikrant for the last time Plymouth as INS Viraat on 12 May 1987. After sea trials on 8 May 1978. Even ashore, their availability could not be off Plymouth and work up off Portland, Viraat sailed from sustained. By end 1978, the Seahawks phased out from Britain on 23 Ju ly 1987. She arrived off Bombay on 21 service. The last Seahawk flight took place on 16 December August 1987 where Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi boarded 1983, when it escorted the first three Sea Harriers as they her, much as his grandfather Prime Minister Jawaharlal arrived overhead the Naval Air Station at Goa.

Nehru had welcomed Vikrant twenty-six years earlier in

In 1995, as a gesture of goodwill, one of the Seahawks

1961.

that had been purchased from the German Navy in 1966
was formally handed over in Goa to the Chief of German

The Sea Harriers embarked a month later in September. Naval Aviation for their Air Arm museum.

They dropped their first weapons - 1,000-pound bombs
and cluster bombs - on 5 November 1987.

The Acquisition of the Sea Harriers and Their Role

Viraat was the quickest acquisition that the Navy had V/STOL aircraft had been under development in Britain ever made of a major war vessel.

since the end 1960s for the British Air Force. The British

Navy intended to acquire the naval version, the Sea

The Indigenous Air Defence Ship (A D S ) Project

Harrier. In July 1972, a Harrier had come to India and

The project for the indigenous aircraft carrier first took landed and taken off from Vikrant to establish, prima shape in 1979. Since the Navy’s design capacities were facie, that V/STOL aircraft could operate from Vikrant’s fully stretched in designing ships and since the Navy had no flight deck.

experience of designing an aircraft carrier, discussions on

The roles envisaged by the British Navy for the Sea
design collaboration were held with shipbuilders in Europe Harrier were: who had built aircraft carriers for their Navies. During • Air Defence, with particular emphasis on the shooting the course of these discussions, the staff requirements
down of Maritime Reconnaissance and snooper
crystallised.

aircraft.

The main consideration was the type and number of • R econnaissance.

aircraft that the ADS would operate. In 1979, the Navy • Air Strike, particularly against missile boats and surface had opted for the V/STOL Sea Harriers to operate rom
targets.

Vikrant. With the acquisition of Viraat in 1987, it became certain that the Sea Harriers would still be flyingin
e

In the ensuing years, the Indian Navy followed the
decade after 2000, after Vikrant decommissioned 1 he development of the Sea Harrier. In 1977, the Navy obtained ADS would, therefore, need to have a ski jump unti
e approval in principle for the acquisition of the Sea Harriers
as replacements for the Seahawks. The first British Navy

Sea Harriers phased out.

Sea Harrier flew in 1978 and by mid 1979, the first few

To avail of the benefits of self-reliance and of aircraft were undergoing intensive flying trials.

standardisation, the choice of aircraft narrowe

In 1979, the Indian Navy placed an order for six Sea
between:

Harriers and two Sea Harrier Trainers for delivery in 1983.

• The Short Take Off But A rre ste d R e co ve ry (STO

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 91

Sea Harrier would always be able to catch up with and

The British Navy’s aircraft carrier operations against
shoot down the enemy MR aircraft.

Argentina in the Falkland Islands in 1982 provided the
opportunity to assess Sea Harrier performance in combat.

• Not having Sea Harriers at all would give enemy MR

They performed effectively in the ground attack role using
aircraft total freedom to fire missiles unhindered and at

30 mm front guns and bombs. In the air-to-air role, their
leisure.

effectiveness remained unproven because the British

• Having Sea Harriers would unquestionably constrain
aircraft carriers stayed outside the strike range of the
enemy MR aircraft freedom of action before firing

Argentine Navy’s shore based Mirage and Skyhawk strike
missiles and ensure certain destruction after missile
aircraft.

release.

The Indian Navy’s tactical problem was that even if the

It was clear that in future operations, the primary role

Fleet was operating outside the range of enemy shore-
of the Sea Harrier would be the air defence of the Fleet,
based strike aircraft, there would still be the threat from a
for which it had to have its own radar (to detect and track
hostile maritime reconnaissance aircraft armed with anti
enemy aircraft) and air-to-air missiles (to shoot down
ship missiles. Hence the need for carrier borne aircraft enemy aircraft). For its role of anti ship attack, it would to shoot down the snooper before it released its missiles.

need an anti ship missile. For its role of ground attack, it

Being a V/STOL aircraft, it was known that the Sea Harrier would need front guns and bombs. An ESM pod would be was constrained by limitations on all up weight and its valuable for specific missions.

airborne time had to be optimised.

Selection and Training o f Sea H arrier P ilots

The view of the Indian Air Force, who had earlier evaluated
the Harrier aircraft, was that vectored thrust aircraft had no The skill and speed of response required of a pilot of an chance against contemporary high performance supersonic
aircraft which can hover in the air, and take off and land
aircraft. Moreover, the aircraft’s engine performance would vertically are different from, and higher than, those required de-rate in the hotter Indian climate.

of a normal fixed wing pilot. After rigorous selection and
several months of intensive training on the Air Force’s high

When the Navy proposed the acquisition of additional
performance fighter aircraft, the first three pilots went to

Sea Harriers, it was decided that a joint Indian Navy-

Britain in 1982.

Indian Air Force study should be carried out of the likely
effectiveness of the Sea Harrier against the threat posed by

After nine months of conversion, they underwent eight
missile-armed maritime reconnaissance aircraft.4
months Operational Flying Training with the British Navy
from April to November 1983 on the aircraft produced for

The scenario was straightforward. The enemy maritime the Indian Navy. The bulk of this training comprised radar reconnaissance (MR) aircraft needed to determine, on
interception work and air-to-air combat training. Deck
its radar, the direction and distance from which to fire
its missiles. To do so, it would have to expose itself to
landings were practiced on board the Hermes.

detection by the target ship’s radar. Starting from the

The first three Sea Harriers (603, 604 and 605) took off
time that the MR aircraft was detected on ship’s radar,
from Britain on 13th December and, after overnight halts in
the question was whether a Sea Harrier (either already Malta, Egypt and Dubai, landed at Goa on 16th D ecem ber.

airborne on patrol or on deck ready for immediate take After a brief maintenance period, the first Sea Harrier off) would be able to shoot down the MR aircraft before it landed on Vikrant’s deck on 20 December 1983.

released its missiles or would this only be possible after it
had fired its missiles?

On 26 January 1984, Sea Harriers participated in the

Republic Day Flypast. During the Beating the Retreat

After computer assisted analyses of numerous variables,
ceremony on 29 January 1984, an astonished audience
it was jointly agreed that:

saw a Sea Harrier flown by then Commander (now Admiral

• The Sea Harrier’s ability to shoot down an enemy and Chief of Naval Staff) Arun Prakash fly gently into Vijay MR aircraft before it fired its missiles would be only Chowk, stop in hover, turn to face the President, dip its marginal.

nose in salute, turn away, point skywards and take off with

• However, after the anti ship missiles had been fired, the
its engines roaring. Everyone was enthralled - the potential
of V/STOL aircraft needed no further elaboration.5_____ _

4. T h e author represented the N avy in this study.

5. T h is rem arkable dem onstration w as acco m p lish ed despite the pr< o f birds. Fortunately, en gin e noise help ed to keep th e m away. To avoid m ishap, this dem onstration w as never repeated.

92 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Three more Sea Harriers (601, 602 and 606) and the
first trainer (651) arrived in 1984. With the arrival of the

Falkland War of 1982). During this OFT, we exploited
the Sea Harrier (our own aircraft) in her various roles,
second trainer (652) in 1985, the delivery of the first batch
or eight be a Harriers was complete.

which included air interception by day and night using

Blue Fox radar, photo recce, air to ground and air-to-air

Lieutenant (now Rear Admiral) Shekhar Sinha was the
weapon firings, instrument rating and deck landing up
commissioning QFI of the squadron. He recalls:

to DLQ stage on board the HMS Hermes (which later
became INS Viraat). This training lasted for nearly 10’/^

“It was a great honour to be selected as the first
months. We had the entire IN team of technical officers

Qualified Flying Instructor oftheyetto be commissioned
and sailors doing their O JT under RN supervision.

Sea Harrier Squadron in April 1982 and to be nominated

At the end of it, I left for 233 OCCI at Wittering to
to accompany then Commander Arun Prakash who
undergo the ‘Competent to Instruct’ (C to I) course on
w a s nominated as the Squadron Commander. I had
the Harrier. The RAF was saddled with a major problem.

a lr e a d y obtained instructional Cat ‘B ’ on the Kiran

I did not have adequate flying hours on the Harrier,
a ir c r a f t from the IAF and done a stint at the Air Force
which was required by their system to join the Harrier

A c a d e m y . Learning the Harrier in the United Kingdom

QFI course. The then Naval Advisor, Commodore
w a s not easy. The aircraft being unstable in yaw and

Santosh Gupta, MVC, NM, came down to Wittering and
neutrally stable in roll and pitch meant that she was
resolved the issue by committing that should there be
not going to land / take off like a conventional aircraft.

a requirement to fly additional sorties to achieve the

Also, it was incumbent on my part to understand the
required standards of an instructor, the Government of
aerodynamics of it all to ensure that I taught the right

India would provide for it. Well, at the end of the C to I
thing when we got back. We went through learning
course there was no additional sortie required and the
basics at 233 OC(J located at RAF station Wittering.

RAF CFS (equivalent to our AEB/Aircats) were happy

Apart from the two of us (Indians), we also had two
to categorise me as a Harrier QFI. That indeed was a

Spanish Navy pilots and four each from RAF and RN. It
matter of satisfaction for me and a great relief to the Navy
was indeed a unique experience flying in the GK given
that a Harrier QFI was born. I was fully aware that with
the vagaries of weather and dialects. On completion
qualifications of Fully ops, DLQ, CTOI and Green rating,
of basic V/STOL training, Commander Arun Prakash

I had the responsibility of training a fresh generation of
and I got posted to the British Aerospace Sea Harrier

Naval fighter pilots in techniques of V/STOL aviation. I
assembly line at Dunsfold which is in Guildford County,
am happy that for the next 10 years, I devoted myself

Surrey. We were required to maintain continuity in flyto this task. 1 was extremely fortunate to have had the ing on the company’s aircraft as also gain background
professional and timely guidance of Commander Arun
factory experience, which would assist us in mastering

Prakash (now Admiral) at every stage of Sea Harrier
the test-flying techniques. This is where we had the
exploitation.”

great opportunity to fly and interact with renowned

Harrier test pilots like John Farley, Mike Snelling, Heinz

Lieutenant (now Rear Admiral) SK Damle completed

Frick and Taylor Scott (who subsequently died in an training in Britain and was in the Sea Harrier Squadron accident). We utilised our insights to write the first draft from 1984 to 1989. He recalls: of SO Ps and the Sea Harrier Guide Book. We virtually

“While operating from Vikrant, we learnt how to
saw steel being cut of the first aircraft IN 601 and
operate the Sea Harrier from a carrier. When Viraat
subsequent ones till its acceptance. This tenure gave
came in, we progressed from these basic concepts and
us very deep understanding of this wonder machine.

started operating in bad weather, taking advantage of

By December 1982, we had finished with this phase.

the Sea Harrier’s capabilities to land from any direction.

The carrier did not have to turn into the wind.

“In January 1983, we moved to the IN detachment
at Royal Naval Air Station Yeovilton (HMS Heron) for

“With the help of the Indian Air Force, we developed

Operational Flying Training (OFT). We were joined by
the air combat potential of the Sea Harriers.

Commander RT Rajan and Lieutenant Commander

*‘ln the Seahawk days, the emphasis used to be on close

Sanjoy Gupta (AWI designate). They had bothfinished
formation flying and delivery of air to ground weapons.

their OCU phase while we were at Dunsfold. O

But as far as air-to-air combat was concerned, there
was being conducted by INTO headed by L.eutenan
was no radar on the Seahawks and any air-to-air radar

Commander Mike Blisset, RN. We also had Fi ght
interception capability was definitely not there during

Lieutenant Paul Barton (RAF) an
e^ n, .

the
the Seahawk days.

Thomas, RN (both decorated for gallantry

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 93

“The Sea Harrier was a quantum jump. The aircraft the Navy’s need to acquire additional Sea Harriers as early was more advanced, almost state of the art technology.

as possible.

Secondly the aircraft could carry more all up weight,

The Upgradation o f S ea Harrier Capability
more load in terms of weapons, various kinds of weapons
and, therefore, many modes of delivery. Thirdly, we had The overall development and delivery cycles of modern high air-to-air radar and, therefore, we could do air-to-air performance aircraft are never in step with the development interception.

and delivery cycles of their advanced avionics and weapon

“Air-to-air combat was something that had to be systems. This reality affected the combat capability of the developed in our Navy after the Sea Harriers were batches of Sea Harriers acquired by the Navy. A total of acquired. During the Seahawk days some attempt had 23 Sea Harriers and 4 Sea Harrier trainers were acquired been made to actually do some kind of air combat, but between 1983 and 1992: we found that people were not very keen and it was never

Batch Contracted

Fighters

Trainers

Delivered
really done as a serious business. But in the Sea Harriers

1

Nov 79

6

2

1983
we had to take it seriously because we understood well

II

Nov 85

10

1

1989-90
that Sea Harriers were the air defence fighters operating
from the carrier and we had to learn air combat to the

III

Oct 86

7

1

1990-92
same level that the Air Forces interceptors and fighters

From the ‘equipment fit’ point of view, they could be
did.

considered as Batch One and Batch Two.

“Similarly, we started flying in bad weather much
more than the Sea Hawks used to do. With the inertial Batch One navigation system, we had a navigation kit available on

For the air defence role, these Sea Harriers (equivalent
board. We could also use our own radar for assessing to the British Navy’s FRS 1) had the Blue Fox radar, the clouds and for navigation. The instrumentation of the

French Magic Matra close range, air-to-air missile and

Sea Harrier was much better than that of the Seahawks.

a tail-warning receiver. For the anti ship / ground attack

With all these advantages, we developed the art of flying
role, these Harriers could carry 30 mm gun pods, 68 mm
in bad weather, which we never used to do in the Sea
rockets in pods, runway denial bombs, cluster bombs and

Hawks.”

1,000 pound ‘iron’ bombs of 1939-45 World War vintage.

All weapon release modes were calculated by weapon

L esso n s Learnt in the Early Years o f Sea Harrier
aiming computers and displayed on head-up symbology.

Operations

After operating from the carrier, two problems came into Batch Two focus that required attention:

Due to the British Navy’s financial constraints, its FR S

• A minimum of one operational aircraft and one trainer 2 Sea Harriers started entering service only in the end was required for training pilots ashore. This left only six

1980s. The replacement for the Blue Fox radar, named
aircraft available for embarkation in the aircraft carrier.

Blue Vixen, was still under development. The Navy had to

Since all six could not always be serviceable, more Sea
decide whether to delay the induction of the additional Sea

Harriers needed to be acquired.

Harriers until the better radar was available or to accept the

• Air to air interception was best carried out with the Sea
same standard as was fitted in the British Navy’s F R S 2s,

Harrier located below the aircraft to be intercepted. It namely the same Blue Fox radar but now with two types of was essential that the Sea Harrier’s radar should display air-to-air missiles: a clear picture when looking forward and upward. The

• The Beyond Visual Range (BVR) missile that had a
radar fitted in the Sea Harriers displayed sea clutter
capability of several tens of kilometres for distant
when looking downwards and this made interception
combat, and
difficult, though an experienced pilot could still effect

• The ‘All Aspect Air to Air Missile’ for close range combat
a successful interception. The next lot of Sea Harriers
that enabled attack from all aspects, rather than only
needed to have a radar free of sea clutter.

from behind the target.

Every effort was made to acquire better radar in the next

Admiral of the Fleet, Sir Benjamin Bathurst of the British
batch of Sea Harriers, but no better radar was available.

Navy recalls:6

Waiting for a better radar to be developed conflicted with

6. Personal correspondence

94 / T R A N SIT IO N T O E M IN E N C E

,n i ? 82i the B,ue Fox radar was the only show in Chaff and flares town. The Royal Navy had a very tight budget for the Sea

Under trial in 1990

Harrier Project and it was the only radar that could have Runway penetration bombs Procurem ent held
met the In Service Date (ISD). Until early 1982 (British)

in abeyance due to
shortage of foreign
aircraft carriers and the Sea Harrier force were under the
exchange
sentence of death, only to be reprieved by the Falklands
campaign. There was no way the Blue Vixen radar could

Samples of indigenously manufactured gun ammunition
have been fitted to meet your (the Indian Navy’s) ISD, had to be sent to British Aerospace in Britain for EMI/EMC
even if you had been prepared to fund the development! clearance, as had to be done with the 500 lb iron bombs The issue of any security concerns about technology of 1939-45 World War vintage.

transfer is irrelevant. Blue Vixen did not enter service in Sea Harrier Simulator our Sea Harrier 2s until the second half of the nineties.’’

The Sea Harrier Simulator was commissioned in the

!n view of these considerations, the improvements in the Naval Air Station at Hansa in 1984. It provided ab initio In d ia n Navy’s Batch Two Harriers delivered between 1989
and re-familiarisation training, practicing of emergency
a n d 1992 were:

procedures, tactical and mission training, accident
o The Sea Eagle anti ship missile,
investigation and validation of mission profiles.

o The French Matra Magic Two, All Aspect, Air to Air Missile,

The simulator was upgraded by a Bangalore firm to
o Wider coverage for the tail radar-warning receiver,
cater for the Batch Two Sea Harriers and re-commissioned
o Photo-reconnaissance pod.

in 1998. The upgradation provided:

o Associated changes in the weapon aiming computer • Integration of Blue Fox radar with Sea Eagle and Magic software.

Matra missile delivery capability.

• Day and night visuals.

Of the nineteen Batch Two Sea Harriers, three fighters
and one trainer arrived in 1989, eight fighters (607 to 614) • Improvements of Electronic Warfare, Record/Replay and and one trainer (653) arrived in 1990, four fighters (616,

I

OS features.

617, 620 and 621) arrived in 1991 and the remaining two Ongoing Training of Sea Harrier Pilots
fighters (618 and 619) arrived in 1992.

Until 1984, the ‘basic conversion’ and subsequent

For all practical purposes, the sea clutter problem had ‘operational’ training of Sea Harrier pilots was carried to be overcome by rigorous training.

out in Britain. After the first trainer aircraft arrived in

1984, ‘operational’ training commenced in India. Basic

Weapon Capability
training, however, continued to be carried out in Britain,

Though the first batch of Sea Harriers arrived in India despite its high cost, because there weren’t enough in 1983, the ski jump first became available after Viraat aircraft.

arrived in 1987. Vikrant, after installation of its ski jump, The Batch Two and additional trainer Harriers started
became available only in 1989.

arriving in 1989. In 1990, the Sea Harrier Operational Flying

It took some years to complete, satisfactorily, the Training Unit was formed as a separate unit within the Sea numerous trials for proving Sea Harrier weapon capability.

Harrier Squadron (INAS 300), with three Harriers and two
trainers, to carry out both ‘basic’ and ‘operational’ training.

Trial

Completed

In 1991, this unit was moved to the training squadron as

Indigenous ECM pods for Sea

INAS 551 Bravo Flight.

Harrier successfully tried on MIG 21

1989

Since 1996, this flight has been functioning, informally,

Runway penetration bombs and

Twin Magic Matra air-to-air missiles

N °v
as a supplementary Sea Harrier squadron. In addition to
training budding Sea Harrier pilots, the squadron imparts

Reconnaissance pods

^ov
technical on-job-training to tradesmen of frontline and

Sea Eagle air to surface anti-ship

^
missile demonstration firing

Pr
second line servicing units. When required, it augments

300 Squadron with aircraft and aircrew, afloat and

Vikrants ski jump proving trials

Apr 1990

500 lb bomb,

Under trial in 1990
ashore.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 95

Julie system gave such disappointing results that it went

A n ti S u b m a rin e A irc ra ft
into disuse. This was compounded by the general lack of

Refurbishment o f Alizes
expertise on the Ju lie system itself.

In 1974, the Navy decided to refurbish the Alizes and

Overall, the performance of refurbished Alize radars
extend their life into the 1980s. This decision had been and ESM improved but the accuracy of the sonobuoy based on four factors:

monitoring remained sub optimal. As a result, the Alize’s

• The Seahawks were nearing the end of their life. The A SW role died out. The last launch of Alizes from Vikrant Sea Harriers were not expected to arrive until the 1980s.

took place on 2 April 1987. Thereafter they operated only

If the Alizes were not refurbished, there would no aircraft from ashore.

available to fly from Vikrant.

During Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka, a detachment

• NARO had established the capability to undertake
of two Alizes operated from Madurai from February 1988
maintenance related inspections up to 1,200 hours but till October 1989 and flew 1,800 hours in support of not for the mandatory 2,400-hour refurbishing. It would
the Indian Peace Keeping Force. The aircrew won three
be more economical to undertake this refurbishing in

Nao Sena Medals, four Mentioned in Despatches, four

NARO than sending them to France.

CNS commendations and twelve commendations by

• The Alizes had already gone out of production in France

FOCINCEAST.

and out of service in the French Navy. This would be

In November 1988, during Operation Cactus to assist the
the last chance to acquire whatever Alize spares were

Government of the Maldives in suppressing an attempted
available in France.

coup, an Alize dropped charges ahead of the rebel’s escape

• The French Navy’s experience in refurbishing its Alizes vessel, MV Progress Light, to persuade it to stop.

could be availed of.

The Alizes stopped flying on 12 April 1991 and the

A small team was deputed to France to undergo six Squadron was decommissioned in August 1991. Five weeks training. Refurbishing of the first Alize started in 1977

Alizes were left of the total of 14 acquired. During the 30
and completed in 1978. The refurbishment programme of years of the squadron’s service, the Alizes had flown 35,912
the remaining nine aircraft completed in 1982. The extent hours and done 7,144 deck landings.

of refurbishment achieved was:

• Airframe completely refurbished;

Helicopters

• Engine completely overhauled;

The British S eaking 42 Series

• Radar, sonobuoy monitoring system and

ESM

The M k 42s
components changed;

Twelve anti submarine Seakings Mk 42 had been acquired

• The navigation system could not be satisfactorily between 1971 and 1974, six in 1971 and six in 1974. Of refurbished. It was no longer in production. The French

Navy had phased it out. No replacements were available these, four have been lost, leaving eight in service.

for the worn out mechanical parts, which perforce had

On 19 Ju ly 1979, the Seaking Flight and Tactical
to be repaired, refitted and replaced locally in India as

Simulator (FATS) commissioned in Garuda.

best as possible. The Omega Navigation System was
evaluated as a possible replacement but its accuracy The M k 42 As was found to be short of the requirement.

Three anti-submarine Seakings Mk 42 A were acquired in

As a result, even though the Alize airframe, engine and

1980. These had been modified for being hauled down
electronics were refurbished by 1982, the inaccuracy of its
on to the flight decks of the 5th and 6th Leanders, Taragiri
navigation system degraded the accuracy of its sonobuoy and Vindhyagiri, using the Recovery, Assist, Secure and monitoring system.

Traverse (RAST) system.

It also became clear that the Julie system, acquired

Commodore (then Commander) V Ravindranath carried
with great expectations, had been designed for the French
out the first landing trials. He recalls:

Navy’s deep water anti submarine operations, where echoes

“The Seaking landing trials on Taragiri were carried
from the sea bottom did not clutter the sonobuoys. In the
out during the monsoon of 1980 and 1981. It was the
comparatively shallower waters off the coast of India where
first time in the world that a large helicopter of Seaking
anti submarine exercises were generally carried out, the
size was successfully flown off from a Leander. The object

96 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

of the trials was to determine the limiting parameters of
sea state all up weight, and wind conditions on deck in the Fren ch Su p e r P u m a ind icated that: which a Seaking could be operated.

• The Super Puma s fuselage and rotor blades were made

Initially we carried out the trials with the RAE Bedford
of the latest composite material. This was considered
to be an advantage because the Seakings acquired in
doing the instrumentation of the aircraft and the

1971 had to be grounded whenever their nitrogen filled
ship. That was a complete failure, because the RAST
rotor blades leaked. Whilst the Super Puma was not
equipment, which is used to hold down the helo, failed
yet operational in any Navy in the ASW role, the ASW
completely. In fact we had a couple of risky moments
equipment being offered for fitment met the Navy’s staff
during the trials. The Royal Navy also didn't give us any
requirements and was operational in French MRASW
data on the test. They just told us what should have
aircraft and their Dauphine helicopters. However, the
b e e n achieved in such and such conditions.

French could not offer the Exocet anti ship missile

"The second time the trials were carried out, the RAE
with the Super Puma because of a commitment they
bedford came as observers. The instrumentation was
had given to the Pakistan Navy, when supplying them
d o n e by our ARDE Kirkee in a fantastic manner. That is

Exocet anti ship missiles for their Seaking helicopters.

w h y the trials were very successful. In fact, the Seakings

Nor were the British agreeable to let their Sea Eagle anti
w e r e cleared in record time for operating from Leander
ship missile be released for fitment in the French Super
class frigates.”

Puma.

• The updated version of the Seaking, named 42 B,

After the Canadian Navy, the Indian Navy became the
was still on the drawing board and none of the avionic
second navy in the world to have the RAST system and the
systems being offered had yet been proven. On the other
first to operate a helicopter of Seaking size and capabilities
hand, the Indian Navy had acquired ten years experience
from a small ship the size of a Leander.

in operating the Seakings and both infrastructure and

Of the three Mk 42 As acquired in 1980, one was lost,
expertise had built up. The Sea Eagle anti ship missile
leaving two in service.

was available. And the Seaking AEW helicopter, then
under development, appeared a promising option to

The Selection and Induction of Seaking Mk 42 Bs
meet the Navy’s pressing need for an AEW platform for
anti missile defence.

By 1981, the Seakings Mk 42 had been in service for ten
years and had begun to age. Replacement ASW helicopters

Whilst the choice between the Seaking and the Super
were required not only for Vikrant but also for the Godavari Puma was still under discussion, the Navy decided to class frigates, each of which was designed to embark two carry out, in Indian waters, comparative evaluations of the A SW helicopters.

sonars being offered.

The Navy’s staff requirements stipulated both an anti

Commander (later Commodore) SV Purohit, an
submarine (ASW) and an anti ship (ASV) role. For the anti experienced Seaking pilot participated in these trials. He submarine role, the requirements were for a better dunking recalls:

sonar, MAD and a LOFAR system to monitor low frequency

“We evaluated, very systematically, three dunking
sonobuoys. For the ASV role, the requirement was for an
sonars. These were the American Bendix, Plessey's
anti ship missile.

modification of their British sonar 195 and the French

Thomson CSF HS 12. NPOL was extensively involved

In March 1982, approval was accorded for 20 ASW/ASV
in these trials, which were conducted off Cochin in the
helicopters - 6 for INAS 330, 2 for INAS 336, 4 for a new
early 1980s.

squadron INAS 339, 2 each for Godavari and Gomati and

“By this time we had considerably improved upon the

4 for MRSOW. International tenders were floated. Three
procedures of the early 1970s for evaluating and testing
contenders were identified:

helicopter sonars and had learnt the technique of making

• An updated version of the British Seaking,
the manufacturers accept our demands that their sonars

• The Italian Agosta. It transpired that this was the
be tested in our own waters. We had realised that the
version of the British Seaking; it was therefore exc u e
hydrological conditions in their waters and overall sonar
performance in their temperature were different from
from further consideration;
those in India. Equipment often gave problems because

• The French Super Puma.

of heat and humidity and did not perform as well because

The comparative evaluation of the British Seaking and
of our peculiar hydrological conditions.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 97

“For the first time, there were three Seakings fitted with

• The French H S 12 dunking sonar;
these three different sonars and pinging against the same

• The British LAPADS sonobuoy system ;
submarine in the same hydrological conditions. Their • The British Sea Eagle anti ship missile; performance in identical conditions was scientifically
compared.”

• The British Hermes ESM system.

The Bendix performed better than the HS 12 and the

Commander Purohit was deputed to Britain as part of

British 195.

the team for the induction of the Seaking Mk 42 Bs. He
recalls:

There were two competing radars - the French Iguane /

“The Indian Navy constituted a multi disciplinary

Varan pulse compression radars that were operational in
team consisting of air engineers, air electricals and
the French Navy and the British Mel MAREC 2. The British
experienced Seaking aircrew. The team, which was
were not agreeable to put the French radar on the Seaking
sent to C1K actually did the work of developing and
nor were the French agreeable to fit the British radar in the
defining the parameters and algorithms. This team was

Super Puma.

actually behind the development of the entire software

The competing sonobuoy systems were the French
for this helicopter and we should be proud of it. The

Lamparo and the British LAPADS, both of which were flying
bigger problem was of developing the software with the
in their respective M RASW aircraft and both of which would

Tactical Mission System of the 42 Bravo. In the process
require to be miniaturised for fitment in a helicopter.

we acquired the confidence to undertake the techniques
of interfacing weapons with platforms.

In the light of the pros and cons of all these options, views

“After the 42 Bravos started arriving in India, Naval
became divided, both in the Air Arm and in the Navy, for and

Headquarters took the very wise decision that before
against the Seaking and the Super Puma. Eventually, when
the choice was made in favour of the Seaking Mk 42 B,
these helicopters were deployed as operational units,
they must be tactically evaluated and a document
there was speculation that the choice had been made on
extraneous considerations.

be promulgated for their optimum utilisation and
exploitation. The UK manufacturers had given only the

It is more likely, however, that the primary factor was to
capabilities of the sensors. These capabilities had to
standardise on Seakings, minimise the cost of additional
be evaluated in our environment, our work culture, our
infrastructure and capitalise on the ten years experience of
operating philosophy and our ship capabilities.

operating Seakings in India’s tropical conditions.

“Based in Cochin, this was done by the Intensive

In Ju ly 1983, agreements were signed with:

Flying Training Gnit (IFTG) in a period of ten months.

• British Westlands for the helicopters;

Naval Headquarters, Southern Naval Command and

Western Naval Command made available their best

• British Rolls Royce for the spare engines;
units. Whichever ship, submarine or aircraft was asked

• British Marconi for the Hermes ESM;
for, it was always provided. Handpicked aircrew carried

• French Thompson C S F for the H S 12 sonar;
out very intensive flying. We looked at maintenance
practices; we tried to establish failure rates; which kind

• Italian Whitehead Motofides for the A 244 S torpedo
installation.

of failure we should expect; which items were more
likely to fail for which more spares should be procured.

After the Seaking Mk 42 B was chosen as the basic

We operated with every type of ship, every type of
platform, the software had to be developed to integrate
submarine, every type of aircraft and used every sensor
the equipment chosen by the Navy into a Tactical Mission
under controlled and methodically planned conditions.

System. Delays started being experienced in developing

“At the end of it, we came out with a Guide Book that was
this software. The Indian team deputed to Britain for
prepared by the IFTCI and the School o f Maritime Warfare
inspection and trials helped to develop the software and
and Tactics and had been actually tested in operational
devised a number of modifications to improve the overall
conditions with inputs coming from submarines, ships
effectiveness of the system. Eventually, when the Seakings
and aircraft. There was complete interaction between

Mk 42 B entered service in 1988, two years later than
the surface, sub-surface and airborne Navy.

scheduled, they were fitted with:

“The punch and the capability that the 42 Bravo has

• Composite fuselage and rotor blades (the development
are amongst the best in the world. We could not have
of which had also delayed delivery);
had it if we had not taken the bold step of contracting

98 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Dec 1983 on VIKRANT's flight d eck to w itness S e a H arrier op erations at sea. Sta n d in g (from left) C O o f 3 0 0 S q u a d ro n C d r (n o w A d m ira l) A ru n P ra k a s h ; P rim e M in iste r M rs In d ira G a n d h i; (o n h e r left) C h ie f o f th e N a v a l S t a f f A d m O S D a w s o n ; (th ird fro m right) Q F I o f 300 S q u a d ro n L t C d r (n o w R e a r A d m ) S h e k h a r S in h a . M r R ajiv G a n d h i, later P rim e M in is te r o f In d ia, c a n b e s e e n b e h in d h im

&

Sea Harrier taking off from IN S VIRAAT’s ski jum p (1980s)

During the Beating Retreat ceremony in New Delhi on 29 January 1984, an enthralled audience saw a Sea Harrier flown by Cdr (now Admiral) Arun Prakash fly slowly into Vijay Chowk, stop in hover, turn to face the President of India, dip the aircraft’s nose in salute, turn away and take off skywards

S e a H arriers parked to the right of VIKRA N T's ski jump (1989) Anti subm arine Seaking Mk 42 helicopter in hover and lowering its sonar body into the sea.

IM S VIKRANT in the background (1970s)

i!

Seaking M k 42 B armed with two Sea Eagle anti ship missiles

R u s s ia n A n ti S u b m a r in e Kam ou 25 helicopter-tw in co n tra - ro ta tin g ro to rs (1 9 8 0 s )

•

Com m and o version British Seaking Mk 42 C (1980s)

Russian 1L 38 - Maritime Reconnaissance & Anti Submarine Aircraft (1970s)

Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Domier 228

\

for something which nobody had and which was still in
the concept stage."

survey ships, LST(M)s, offshore patrol vessels (OPVs)

and Khukri class corvettes of Project 25.

Twenty anti submarine Seakings Mk 42 B were inducted

Since most ships were based in Bombay, embarkations
between April 1988 and 1992. These were for the Godavari were of short duration. IMAS 321 relocated to INS Kunjali class frigates and the aircraft carriers Vikrant and Viraat In in Bombay on 1 August 1980.

the anti ship role, the Mk 42 Bs were capable of firing Sea

Eagle anti ship missiles. Of the Mk 42 Bs, three have been

In the early 1980s, HAL indicated that they were
lost, leaving seventeen in service.

considering discontinuing the production of Chetak
helicopters. Since the production of the replacement ALHs

The Mk 42 Cs
would take considerable time, HAL continued production.

Each indigenous Landing Ship Tank (Large) was designed

A total of 85 Chetaks had been inducted into the Navy till
to embark two troop-carrying helicopters. In May 1985, 2002, of which 19 have been lost, leaving 66 in service.

sanction was accorded for three Seakings Mk 42 C for the
first LST (L). Sanction was also .accorded for three Mk 42 Genesis and Development of the Advanced Light Cs for the Marine Commandos defending the offshore oil Helicopter (ALH) platforms at Bombay High. These six Seakings Mk 42 C In 1967, the Government had constituted the Aeronautics arrived in 1987. All six are in service.

Committee to recommend the priorities for self-reliance.

In 1969, the Committee recommended that capability

The Russian Kamov Series
should be developed for designing helicopters. In 1970,

The Ka 25s
the Defence Committee of the Cabinet approved the
conclusion of a Technical Assistance agreement with the

The twin-engine Kamov 25s were acquired for the first three French firm of SNIAS to design, develop and produce an Russian guided missile destroyers ordered in 1975. The Armed Light Helicopter for the Army, Air Force and Navy as first Ka 25 entered service with the commissioning of the a successor to the Cheetah and the Chetak. The Helicopter guided missile destroyer Rajput in Russia in March 1980. Design Bureau was established in 1970.

On 11 December 1980, the Kamov helicopter squadron
was commissioned at Hansa and designated INAS 333.

In 1976, financial sanction was accorded for the
development of the single engine helicopter. In 1977, based

A total of seven Ka 25s were inducted starting in October on the feedback of the Vietnam War and the Arab-Israel 1979, of which one was lost, leaving six in service.

conflict, the Air Force recommended to the Helicopter

Steering Committee that the ALH should be twin-engined.

The Ka 28s

In 1979, approval was accorded for the twin-engine

By 1981, when the contract was signed for the next two configuration and the project was renamed as Advanced guided missile destroyers, the Ka 25s had gone out of Light Helicopter.

production and had been replaced by the Ka 28s. A total

In 1984, sanction was accorded for the development
of thirteen Ka 28s were inducted starting on 7 July 1986, of the twin engined ALH under technical consultancy of of which two have been lost, leaving eleven in service.

the German firm of Messerschmitt-Bulkow-Blohm (MBB).7

INAS 321 - Chetak SAR Helicopter Squadron

Each of the three services had estimated its requirement at
over a hundred ALHs.

The French Alouette 111 light helicopters, productionised by

The Navy’s staff requirements had envisaged a medium

HAL as 'Chetaks', first entered setvice in 1964.

sized helicopter that, within an all up weight of about 5,000

When this squadron commissioned as IMAS 321 on
kg, (lighter than the 10,000 kg Seaking but heavier than

15 March 1969, it comprised the SAR n'Sh

- the Alouette), would permit its role to be changed to carry

Hansa, G aruda and Deepak. In subsequent years, flights out anti submarine (ASW), anti ship (ASV), commando
embarked, whenever required, in:

carrying (Utility) or Search and Rescue (SAR) missions.

The ASW variant is planned to have sonar, sonics, EW,
weather radar, a Tactical Mission System (TMS) and armed

Betwa after conversion to the training
with homing torpedoes / depth charges. The ASV version

. The new^hip1 -
c a ^

7. M BB's present nam e is Burocopter-Deutschland.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 99

is planned to have fire control radar, EW, TMS and armed
had been formed from the Royal Naval Air Service and
with anti ship missiles. The Utility version is planned to was largely manned by naval aviators who had transferred have a rescue hoist and the ability for medical evacuation en bloc to the RAF Coastal Command at birth. Naval by stretcher, ferry up to 14 personnel, slither commandos,
experience had, therefore, been available to the RAF and
it was on this foundation that the RA F Coastal Command
etc.

had evolved. Commonwealth countries like India and

Commodore Purohit recalls

Australia had unquestioningly adopted the British model

“After our experience in the development of the 42 and in view of the developments in naval warfare, there was Bravo, NHQ rightly placed an experienced and well
no justification for its continuance.

chosen team of officers at the full-time disposal of

The Air Force position was that in the British Manual of

H A L We brought about significant changes, which Joint Operations, MR was a joint responsibility, that this have combined pragmatism with the requirement. We system had stood the test of time in Britain and Australia, have simplified the ALH to the extent possible so as to that there would be greater flexibility in aircraft utilisation reduce our maintenance problems, reduce inventory if MR remained with the Air Force, (since the aircraft cost and increase the availability on any given day could be used for other roles as well) and that in the 1965
because we know what happens on board ship where operations, the Air Force had done the best it could to spares are hard to come by, test equipment is hard to
meet the Navy’s MR requirement within the inadequate
come by and we cannot afford to have too many spares.

resources available.

We have methodically used our experience of the 42s,
the 42 Alphas and the 42 Bravos in ensuring that the

After prolonged discussions, it was decided to maintain
chosen sensors are more reliable. They require less the status quo. The Air Force was to remain responsible maintenance, they are more compact and they cause
for MR as long as the existing Super Constellation aircraft
fewer problems.”

were in service. The question of command and control of

MR would be reviewed when considering the induction of

M aritim e R e co n n a issa n c e
new MR aircraft.

Background

In subsequent years:

The system inherited from the British was that the .Air

• From Pune and Bangalore, the Air Force continued to

Force operated Maritime Rreconnaissance MR aircraft for
operate the vintage 1939-45 War Liberators and the
the Navy. The hostilities with Pakistan in 1965 highlighted

Super Constellations airliners phased out by Air India.

the inadequacy of this arrangement. In 1966, the Navy • Every major Fleet exercise repeatedly highlighted the recommended to the Government that responsibility for

MR and the command and control of shore based MR
number of carrier-launched air strikes that were wasted at
sea, time and again, because of mistaken identification.

aircraft be transferred from the Air Force to the Navy. The

Air Force was not agreeable and preferred status quo.

It became clear that the correct identification of ships

Cogent reasons were advanced for and against the Navy’s
at sea required extremely high skills of aircrews to
proposal.

distinguish between, and positively identify, own, enemy
and neutral ships.

The Navy’s position was that correct recognition of • The Joint Sea Air Warfare Committee evaluated enemy warships at sea and the subsequent co-ordination
the French Atlantic and the British Nimrod M RASW
of tactical action with cooperating surface forces required
aircraft.

such extensive training that it was more cost effective for

MR aircrews to be naval officers familiar with flying over the Decision for the N a vy to Acquire M R A S W Aircraft
sea. It was for this reason that in all the major navies of the
world (CISA, Russia, Japan, China, France, Germany and

During the 1971 war, a Pakistan Navy submarine sank

Holland), MR aircraft were controlled and operated solely the Indian frigate Khukri. After the war, the Navy pressed by the Navy. The only exceptions were Britain, India and
its requirement for a versatile M RA SW aircraft having

Australia.

radar, sonobuoy systems, sensors like magnetic anomaly
detector (MAD), and submarine diesel exhaust trail indicator

This was because in the early years of the British Air

(sniffer), which could rapidly search a probable submarine

Force at the beginning of the 20th century, MR had been
operating area, locate a surfaced or snorting submarine
solely an Air Force responsibility. After the 1914-1918 whilst recharging batteries and with its weapons attack and World War, the Coastal Command of the Royal Air Force
sink the submarine.

i 100 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

In anti submarine operations, MRASW aircraft, anti
country could be best for what purpose, they had
submarine helicopters and anti submarine ships are three
the maintenance facilities. All these were very strong
elements of a mutually supporting system. The high degree
points.

of coordinated response by each of these elements to
effectively counter submarine evasive action is best achieved

‘When this matter came repeatedly to the Defence
when all three elements are naval.

Ministry, what we did was to send the whole problem to
the Committee of the three Chiefs of Staff and told them

In addition to its primary anti submarine role, this type
to deliberate afresh on these problems. We gave them
of aircraft would also meet the Navy’s pressing need for
two months time to come back to the Defence Ministry
maritime reconnaissance.

with an agreed solution. Whatever agreed solution was
found would be acceptable to the Defence Ministry.

The Navy, therefore, urged the Government for an early
decision to acquire a suitable naval MRASW aircraft. The

“At the end of the two months, no solution was
available options were the British Nimrod, the French
forthcoming. In individual discussions, the three Chiefs

Atlantic and the Russian IL 38.

expressed their helplessness that no agreement could
be reached. We gave them another two months time

In May 1973, the Government accepted the Navy’s
to reconsider this matter as it was very urgent, very
reasoning and approved, in principle, the acquisition of
important and required their considered views. But
four shore-based MRASW aircraft. The rise in oil prices after
again the matter remained with them for two more
the Arab-Israel war of October 1973 created a shortage of
months and there was no solution forthcoming. Then
foreign exchange and ruled out the purchase of either the
we discussed with the three Chiefs that if they could

Atlantic or the Nimrod.

not reach any conclusion, would they like the Defence

Ministry to consider the whole matter objectively and find

Efforts then focused on obtaining IL 38 MRASW aircraft
a solution. All the three Chiefs agreed that this should be
from Russia. The IL 38 production line was closing down.

done.

The Russian Navy was reluctant to spare these aircraft.

“Thus the matter came to be considered in the Defence

After persuasion, the Russian side agreed and in February

Ministry. We collected the necessary information from

1975, an agreement was signed for the acquisition of three
the various countries of the world, which had developed

IL 38s. In June 1975, Government took the decision to
a system of maritime reconnaissance. Then we analysed
vest the command, control and operation of the IL 38s
our own position. We went into great details of the
with the Navy.

points of view of the Navy. We went into great details

Shri Govind Narain was the Defence Secretary in 1976.

of the points of view of the Air Force. Then we in the

Defence Ministry prepared an elaborate note of 20 or 25

He recalls:

pages, putting down all points of view and reached the

“The control of the air reconnaissance system over the
conclusion that it would be more prudent if maritime
sea was in the hands of the Air Force. The Navy wanted
reconnaissance was put under the control of the Navy
this control to be transferred to it. This matter had been
but the maintenance of the aircraft could be left with the
pending with the Government for nearly 10 years and

Air Force. Naturally the Navy was jubilant and the Air
it could not get resolved. In the 1971 war, all the three

Force was unhappy, but this solution was accepted by
wings of the defence forces played a very significant part
the Defence Minister, by the Political Affairs Committee
concerned could obseive their respective roles
of the Cabinet and finally by the Prime Minister and was
and all ----------

. . . -u- *

The performance of the Navy in Karachi was brilliant
enforced as a Government order.’’8
and the whole country was very impressed.

-

9

Pressure continued to mount from the Naval side that Transfer of the Super Constellations to the Haoy they would do even better if their operators felt more The contract for the IL 38s had been signed in 1975
confident, if the air recce system was also w,thl[^ t
for delivery in 1977. A large number of aircrew and
own control. On the other hand, the Air Force: pleaded
maintenance personnel had been sent to the Soviet
t h a t they h a d a l l t h e a i r f i e l d a r r a n g e m e n t s they h a d Union to undergo training on the IL 38. In 1976, the
all the know how, they knew which aircraft from whic

,
r v,™

Ministry of Defence resolved a contentious Problem where each Se™ce Head<

)uarters held

8. This is a noteworthy example of h
s° " n^ ™
strongly held and persuasive pro essi

|L 3g dedsion and |ed to the offer of transfer of the Super Constellations has 9.

« = p—

- * * » • " " » » »

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 101

Air Force attempted to retrieve the situation. It offered
operate them and not able to get the flying hours, then
to immediately hand over some of their old Super
the Navy should shut up forever and let the Air Force

Constellation MR aircraft to the Navy.

The offer had a
keep maritime reconnaissance.

caveat. Should the Navy not be able to cope with the

“When this proposal came to NHQ, the CNS, Admiral
large multi-engine Super Constellations, then the MR

Cursetji, sent for me and said, T h is is a booby trap and
role, along with the Super Constellations and the IL 38s
we should not fall into it.’ I replied, ‘Sir, I think, it is a as well should revert to the Air Force.

booby trap all right, but not for us - it is for the Air Force.

If you are challenged, you must accept.’ He said, 'No,

In 1976, Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral) NP Datta was

No, Moolgavkar is a very experienced man, he knows our
the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff in charge of the Naval
difficulties. We are a small plane operator, single engine

Air Arm. He recalls:

maintainer. The aeroplanes that they fly are twenty times

“The most interesting episode during my tenure as
the size of our aircraft. How can we maintain them, how

DCNS was the acquisition of maritime reconnaissance
can we operate them, how can we fly them ?’ I said, ‘I will
capability. We had been trying for the Navy to take over
consult the Naval Air Staff and I will come back to you.’

maritime reconnaissance since 1965 when I happened

“So I sent for my DNAS, Commodore Puri, and DNAM,
to be in NHQ in the Personnel Branch. Admiral Soman

Commodore Joginder Singh, From their professional
was the Naval Chief at that time. He sent for me one
point of view, they threw their hands up. Puri said, ‘No,
day. Since 1 had been his Fleet Operations Officer,
sir, I cannot spare the pilots.’ And Joginder Singh.said,
he used to consult me occasionally. He said, The

‘I have not got the maintenance engineers, or the extra
question has come up of the Navy taking over maritime
tools, or the bodies to maintain them. I don’t think we
reconnaissance and would I prepare a note, which
should take them.’

would be put before the Chiefs of Staff Committee’. So
in 1965, we fired the first salvo why the Navy should

“It looked like the situation was out of our hands. But
have maritime reconnaissance aircraft. The Air Force
the more they resisted, the more cussed I became. I
reaction was straightforward - ‘over our dead body’.

said, ‘Instead of saying no, go and find ways in which we

Therefore, we did not make much headway at the
can take them over. I give you a week.’ They came back

Chiefs of Staff Committee. We approached the Ministry
and said, ‘There are various ways of doing it. We don’t
of Defence directly and both sides argued their cases
operate certain types of aircraft. We will withdraw them
vigorously. The Defence Minister, Sardar Swaran Singh,
from service, send up some people for training with the
must have got quite fed up. He wanted the two services

Soviets for multi-engine aircraft, withdraw some people
to settle it. He did not want to be an arbitrator between
from training and likewise for maintenance personnel.’

the two services.

“Meanwhile I had been making my own inquiries and

“From our point of view, a stroke of good luck was
found that maintenance was a complete bugbear. The
when Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar took over as Chief of
entire maintenance of the Constellations was being

Air Staff. He had the reputation of being an ace fighter
done by Air India at Bombay. I went down to Bombay
pilot and he decided to go for the jugular vein’. He
and asked the Air India people to show me around. They
wrote a letter to the Defence Minister, copy to the CNS,
showed me around a cavernous stock room in which
saying that instead of creating bad blood between the
they had about 15 years of spares for these Constellation
two services, he had five Super Constellation aircraft
aircraft. They said, ‘We will never use these in their life
that they were operating and in his opinion, the Navy
time, they will all go waste. So there is no problem.

did not have the expertise to operate this kind of big

You send them to us for first line, second line and third
multi-engined aircraft, as the Air Force themselves
line maintenance. We will do it for you, because we are
were finding it difficult. Since the Navy was so keen on
doing it already and that’s how the Air Force is operating
having maritime reconnaissance, he made an offer. He
them. They do no maintenance of their own.’ That was
was prepared to hand over the five Constellations to
one strong point that I explained to Joginder Singh and
the Navy. He was prepared to help during a transition
he said, ‘Yes, that is a possibility.’ As regards Puri, I think
period of six months to train our pilots and maintenance
it ultimately came down to ‘1 will ground the Seahawk
engineers. After that, he would withdraw all his people
squadron’, which really did not make much difference,
and then the Navy could operate these aircraft. If the
because the aircraft carrier was going in for a long refit

Navy made a success of it, then the Navy could keep
anyway. So we reduced the strength of the pilots on
the MR role. On the other hand, in case the Navy had
training duties at Goa and we sent them all for training
accidents and was not able to maintain them nor able to
all over the place.

102 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

“Slowly, within six months we were able to man these
aircraft, first of all under the supervision of the Air Force Induction of TU 142s for LRMP (INAS 312)

and then on our own. The individual Air Force officers In 1981, in response to the Navy’s requirement for MRASW
were very cooperative and they trained our people. But aircraft having longer endurance at longer range, the when it looked like becoming a success, the Air Force Soviet side stated that they would not be able to supply gradually withdrew them much before the six month new aircraft but would examine the possibility of providing stipulated period. So when six months were over, we were refurbished TG 142 aircraft from their existing fleet.

entirely on our own. And we slowly picked up the expertise
for maintaining them and operating them successfully.

The Navy was hesitant about the TG because its much
larger size, much heavier weight and different equipment

“As it turned out, we were able to get more flying hours would require the runways to be upgraded and extended out of those five ancient machines than the Air Force and maintenance facilities to be augmented. The Navy, ever did. This experience helped us when acquiring the therefore, pressed for three of the IL 38s being phased out Russian IL 38 maritime aircraft, which we were able to of the Russian Navy to be refurbished. The Russian side fly and operate in no time. Ever since then, maritime was unable to do this. Eventually, an agreement was signed reconnaissance has been an integral part of the Navy.

in December 1984 for the acquisition of eight TGs.

“Sometimes it pays if you are thrown into the deep

A total of 40 pilots and observers, 16 technical officers
end.”

and 128 sailors underwent twelve months training in

Five Super Constellation aircraft of the Air Force’s No 6 batches at Riga commencing May 1987. On completion of Squadron at Pune were taken over from the Air Force on training, these personnel were sub-divided specialisation-18 November 1976 and designated INAS 312.

wise and appointed to man the squadron, the Base

Maintenance Facility at Goa and the Naval Air Technical

Four Super Connies were phased out between April School at Kochi. Four sets of aircrew were trained.

1981 and September 1983. The fifth aircraft collapsed

On 30 March 1988, the first three TG 142 M aircraft
whilst taxiing out in January 1983.

took off from Simferopol in the Crimean peninsula and

The squadron was wound down in January 1984 arrived at Goa after a non-stop flight. Two more aircraft awaiting the arrival of replacements. In due course, the arrived on 13th April.

Super Connies were replaced by the Russian TCI 142s,

The squadron was commissioned at Hansa on 16th April
which started arriving in 1988.

and designated INAS 312. The remaining three aircraft

Induction o f IL 38s for M R AS W (INAS 315)

arrived between August and October 1988.

Three IL 38s arrived in Goa in October 1977. The

In May 1992, the squadron relocated to the new naval air
requirement steadily increased for these aircraft to be station INS Rajali at Arkonam on the east coast of India.

available for concurrent MR in the Bay of Bengal and the The Maritime Patrol Aircraft (MPA) Dornier 228s

Arabian Sea, and for concurrent ASW exercises with the

Western and Eastern Fleets.

In the early 1980s, consideration commenced of the
indigenous production of a ‘Light Transport Aircraft’, the

In 1979, the Soviet side was requested to supply five LTA, to meet the needs of the Air Force, the Navy, the more IL 38s. Their response was that the aircraft were Coast Guard and of Vayudoot, the feeder airline for Indian going out of production and that the Indian side should Airlines. The concept was to have a common airframe and indicate their requirements of what their replacements a common engine and fit it with equipment to suit the should have. The Navy indicated that the requirement was needs of individual customers. Each service had given its for longer endurance at longer range.

basic staff requirements. The Navy gave its requirements
in terms of endurance and sensor loads.

Since the three ILs in service fell due for major overhaul
in Russia at the sam e time, the Soviet side was a3a'n “ 9*

Four aircraft were evaluated. The British Islander, the
to release five ILs from their Navy. ven u® ’

d th

German Dornier, the Italian Casa and the American Twin
was signed in May 1981 for two more IL 38s and

Otter. The Dornier did not meet the Air Force needs.

aircraft joined the squadron in 1983.

The Navy, the Coast Guard and Vayudoot found that the

Dornier best met their needs. The Dornier was chosen for

A total of 5 IL 38s had been inducted into the Navy, of production at HAL Kanpur.

which 2 have been lost, leaving 3 in service.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 103

The evaluation of the productionised version, called

By the early 1980s, the Navy’s infrastructure development

Dornier 228, was done in Germany. The Navy envisaged
plan for shore facilities had crystallised under five broad
the Dorniers as replacements for the Alizes in INAS 310.

headings.

In 1986, sanction was accorded for the Navy to acquire Trainer Aircraft 10 Dorniers (3 for observer training, 4 for surveillance Islanders (INAS 550)

and 3 as M RSOW ) equipped with radar and air-to-surface
missiles. Sanction was also accorded for 4 Dorniers,

In 1972, there was a sharp increase in the requirement for
funded by the Ministry of Petroleum, equipped only with

Observer officers. The Air Force was unable to accommodate
radar and IF F transponders (similar to the Coast Guard
the Navy’s needs. Experience had also shown that the
version) for the surveillance around the offshore oil assets
purely navigation oriented training being imparted by the
of Bombay High.

Air Force to naval Observers had to be supplemented by
sorties over the sea. A proposal was initiated to acquire a

The drought of 1986 led to financial stringency and
suitable aircraft for training Observer officers, for coastal
for the next few years, no foreign exchange could be
reconnaissance and for Fleet requirements.10
released to HAL for the Dorniers radars and missiles. HAL
postponed the deliveiy of the Dorniers to 30 months after

After comparative evaluation of available options, the
the release of foreign exchange. Eventually, orders were

British made, piston-engined, propeller-driven Islander
placed in 1990 on HAL for one ‘fly-away’ Naval Dornier (BN2A) was chosen. The first two Islanders arrived in Cochin and 4 Dorniers for Bombay High in which the radars would and joined INAS 550 on 18 May 1976. The remaining three be retrofitted.

arrived by end 1976.

New Naval Air Stations

In 1981, two Islanders of INAS 550 were based at Port

Blair for the surveillance of the A&N Islands. In 1984,

The naval air station at Port Blair was commissioned as these were commissioned as INAS 318 when the naval air INS (Jtkrosh on 11 May 1984.

station at Port Blair was commissioned as INS (Jtkrosh.

D evelop m en t o f Aircraft Operating Facilities Ash ore

Two more Islanders were procured for INAS 550 in Kochi.

In end 1996, six 2T variant Islanders

W EST COAST

EAST COAST
were acquired for INAS 550.

Upgradation of

INS Hansa at Goa

In May 2000, an Islander Flight was

Existing Major

INS Garuda at Cochin
positioned at Dega.

Air Stations

New Major

@Kalyan near Bombay/

INS Dega at Vishakhapatnam

A total of 17 Islanders had been

Air Stations

Enclave at Santa Cruz Bombay INS Rajali at Arakkonam
inducted into the Navy, of which 4 have

Minor Naval

NAS Kunjali at Bombay

INS (Jtkrosh at Port Blair
been lost, leaving 13 in service.

Air Stations

*Daman

@Belgaum

Kiran Jet Training Aircraft (IN A S

@Sulur

5 5 1 )

Forward

©Mangalore

@Kayattar

The Vampires were phased out by

Operating

^Trivandrum

Enclave at Meenambakkam

1976. In 1978, the last of the Seahawks

Bases

Madras
was returned to INAS 300.

Campbell Bay in Great Nicobar

@Kavaratti in Lakshadweep

Eight Kirans Mk II (the armed version)

Diglipur in North Andaman
ex HAL Bangalore joined the squadron

Advance Landing Okha
between Ju ly 1987 and February 1988.

Grounds for

Porbandar

These aircraft are used for training jet

ASW Helicopters

Diu
pilots for the frontline squadron, for

By 1990, naval facilities had been established at all the locations except: meeting fleet requirements like anti

• At Daman and Trivandrum marked * where the Navy shared the facilities developed by the Coast Guard.

aircraft tracking practices and fc>r

• At the locations marked @ where, for technical/financial reasons, it was decided not to create consolidation flying of staff pilots.

exclusively naval facilities.

10. The Fleet Requirement Unit (FRU) had commissioned as INAS 550 on 17 June 1959. At that time it had consisted of 10 Amphibia11

Sealands, 10 Fireflies and 3 HT 2s.

104 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

A total of 23 Kirans had been inducted into the Navy of Constellations, IL 38s, Kirans and Islanders had entered which 9 have been lost, leaving 14 in service.

service. On board ships, there were Seakings in Vikrant,

Seaking Mk 42 As in Taragiri and Vindhyagiri, Kamovs in Sea Harrier Training Squadron (IPiAS 551 B)

the Rajput class destroyers, MATCH in the earlier Leanders

In December 1990, 1NAS 551 B was established as an and Chetaks in a number of ships. The demand on skills of independent Sea Harrier Training Squadron at Goa. aircrew varied from aircraft to aircraft.

This unit began undertaking the ab initio conversion on

It was decided to establish a Board that would periodically

Sea Harrier aircraft and relieved 300 Squadron of this
categorise the professional knowledge of aircrew, on
commitment.

lines similar to what was being done by the Air Force’s

Personnel

Aircrew Examination Board (AEB). Establishing standard
procedures and yardsticks by which professional merit

Observers
could be assessed and graded, would help to improve
professionalism, aircrew motivation and individual career

By 1978, an acute shortage had built up in the Observer development. A naval team studied the Air Force AEB

Cadre. Several factors had contributed to this shortage:

system, reoriented ittowards naval operational requirements
o The steady rise in demand. From manning only Alizes and formulated a standard syllabus, procedure and from 1961 onwards, new manning requirements had assessment system for grading each category of aircrew -
arisen for Observers to man Seakings in 1970, the pilots, observers, flight engineers, flight signallers, aircrew Islanders in 1975, the IL 38s in 1976, and the Kamovs divers and air traffic control officers.

in 1978. Also, the increase in night flying (in Goa by

The Aircrew Categorisation and Standardisation Board

IL 38s and in Cochin by the Seakings) required more (A1RCATS) was established in 1983 and based at Goa.

Observers in the naval air stations.

Their primary duty was to carry out aircrew categorisation

© The Air Force was unable to train the additional observers and standardisation and conduct Flight Safety Inspection required by the Navy. Islander aircraft were acquired to of all units once in a year.

enable the Navy to train its observers.

In subsequent years, AIRCATS fully met the objectives

• The duration of observer training had to be increased to for which it had been set up.

cover specific naval requirements of practical training in

A SW and maritime surveillance.

Navy-Air Force-Army Pilot Exchange Programme

• A shortage of volunteers, caused by a perception that By the mid 1980s, the inter-service pilot exchange career prospects in the Obsewer cadre were not as programme had stabilised as follows: good as in other cadres.

Fixed Wing Aircraft

Helicopters

• Even though the strength of trainees per course was Navy pilots with the MIGs and Ajeets

Ml 8s
doubled from 3 to 6, the attrition during their rigorous Air Force were flying training was 1 to 2 officers per course.

Air O P Chetaks

Navy pilots with the

Army were flying

Pilots

Seakings and

Air Force pilots with

Sea Harriers

By the early 1 9 8 0 s , the Navy's r e q u ir e m e n ts of pilots Chetaks
the Navy were flying
exceeded what the Air Force was willing to■
train. The Navy

Chetaks

Army pilots with the
started considering undertaking the
ini io

Navy were flying
pilots in Cochin. The trainer aircraft e v a lu a t e d w e re ^ Ls Developments After 1990

HPT 36 and the Russian MIG trainers,beirig

Aircraft Carriers

Vikrant
consideration of the ^ [^ ^ X v y ^ o u W ^ ra in its pilots. It
there was no way that the N vy

Vikrant underwent a short 6-month refit in 1991 and was
continued to train its pilots with the
operational for 10 months. She underwent a 14-month

Aircrew Categorisation and Standardisation Board
refit from 1992 to 1994 and was operational flying Sea

Harriers, Seakings and Chetaks until her final sea outing
on 23 November 1994.

By 1979, f t .

naval service had increased substantia, y

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 105

In January 1995, NHQ directed that

The Short Take Off But Arrested Recovery (STOBAR)

Vikrant be kept 'Safe
to Float’ and that no further refit/dry docking be planned.

MiG 29 K aircraft to be acquired with the Gorshkov would,

She was laid up until she was decommissioned on 31
like the Sea Harriers, take off from a ski jump and land, like
the Sea Hawks, by hooking on to arrestor wires.

January 1997.

In January 2004, the agreement was signed for the

Viraat
acquisition of the Gorshkov and its aircraft.12 The ship was

During her refit in Britain prior to commissioning in
to undergo a four and a half year refit in which she would

1987, Viraat’s underwater hull had been shot blasted and be extensively refitted and nearly 80% of her equipment coated with the latest special long-life paint so that she
replaced with modern equivalents. Expected to commission
would not require bottom cleaning for at least five years.

in 2008, she would serve the Navy for over two decades,

It had also been decided that until the new graving dock during which period the indigenous Air Defence Ship was commissioned in Bombay, Viraat would be docked in should enter service.

Cochin Shipyard.

Indigenous A ir D e fen ce Ship

The first docking of Viraat in 1991 was followed by a
second short docking in 1995 for repairs. She underwent Approval was accorded in 2000 for the Air Defence Ship refit and modernisation from 1999 to 2001. Phase I Medium

(ADS) to be built in Kochi Shipyard. The acquisition of the

Refit and Dry Docking at Cochin Shipyard lasted from May STO BA R MIG 29 K aircraft with the Gorshkov removed 1999 to November 2000. The modernisation Phase II at the grey area of the type of aircraft that this ship should Naval Dockyard Bombay lasted till April 2001.

be designed for. Meanwhile, development is continuing
of the navalised version of the Air Force’s Light Combat

Except for these docking and refit periods, Viraat Aircraft (LCA). The naval LCA, like the MIG 29 K would be was operational throughout and participated in Fleet a STOBAR aircraft. Its operation from both the Gorshkov exercises.

and the AD S would enable cross-operation.

Gorshkov

S e a H arriers

The 44,500 tonne, steam propelled Gorshkov is the By 1992, the last of the Sea Harriers ordered in the 1980s second of the series of three aircraft carriers, Minsk, Baku had arrived. Thereafter, all the earlier Sea Harriers were (renamed Gorshkov) and Ulganov built to succeed the upgraded in India to Batch 2 standard.

Kiev class carriers. Baku had commissioned in 1987,
served in the Soviet Black Sea Fleet and later in Russia’s

Further improvements were also approved. These

Northern Fleet. She was operational until 1996.

included better indigenous radar warning receivers, selfprotection jammers, Global Positioning System (GPS), After the Soviet Union dissolved and Russia started
etc.

downsizing its Navy due to financial constraints, the

Russian side offered the Gorshkov to India, along with

Efforts continue to acquire affordable pulse doppler

MIG 29 K aircraft developed specifically for carrier borne
radars, longer range ‘Beyond Visual Range’ air to air
operations.11 The acquisition of Gorshkov formed part missiles and ‘smart’ data links.

of the joint Indo-Russian .Protocol on Military Technical

Cooperation signed in December 1994. The financial

As replacements for the aircraft lost, an order was placed
aspects were unusual - Gorshkov ‘as is, where is’ would for two-second hand, ex British Navy, Sea Harrier trainer be free; India need only pay for the cost of refit and the
aircraft. These arrived in early 2003.

aircraft.

M aritim e R e c o n n a is s a n c e

As had been done in the case of Viraat, the Navy The IL 38s and TU 142s acquired in the 1980s continued thoroughly examined Gorshkovs material state, assessed to meet the Navy’s requirements. Until replacements could the magnitude of the modernisation and refit that would
be identified and acquired, it was planned to extend the life
be required and identified the essential requirements of of both these types of aircraft as long as possible.

new equipment, weapons and systems.

1'' b 2 n S l o l nd

29 K N3rrier b0rne/ ,ghter aircraft ( °f the same lineage as, but different from, the Indian Air F o r c e M iG29)hS

Deen developed tor the Russian Navy s aircraft carriers.

of the Navy’s MiG 29 K aircraft

^orce was fully associated with the evaluation, negotiations and contractual provisions 106 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

The first naval Dornier from HAL joined INAS 310 on

24 August 1991. The second Dornier arrived later in

The first flight of the Army / Air Force prototype flew

1991
in 1994 and that of the Navy in 1995. Series production
and the next two in 1992. The fifth Dornier was delivered started in 1996 and deliveries commenced in 2002.

fitted with the Super Marec (maritime reconnaissance)

radar. In subsequent years, the remaining Dorniers were

At the time of writing, delivery to the Navy of the Utility
retrofitted with this radar during their major inspections by variant ALHs has commenced. Deliveries of the ASW

HAL Kanpur.

variant are expected to commence in 2005 and of the ASV
variant in 2007.

For the coastal reconnaissance role, ten more Dorniers
were acquired, in addition to the five acquired earlier. These Airborne Early Warning Dorniers were progressively fitted with ESM, GPS and With the advent of anti ship missiles in the 1970s, a sonobuoy systems for the surveillance, ASW and EW roles.

clear operational need had emerged for the Navy to have

By 2002, the Navy had acquired a fleet of 15 Dorniers.

airborne early warning aircraft. This would increase the
reaction time required for dealing with hostile platforms

Anti Submarine Helicopters
before they came close enough to our own force to fire
their missiles.

Seakings

Large rotodome fitted aircraft, of the type the Americans

The Seakings acquired in the 1970s were phased out as and the Russians had, were neither available nor affordable.

they reached the end of their useful life.

An indigenous R&D project to fit a rotodome on an Avro

The Seakings MK 42 B, acquired in the 1980s continued aircraft was unsuccessful.

to perform well. By 2000, the need was felt for more

The Navy pinned its hopes on acquiring AEW
such helicopters and evaluations commenced for their helicopters that were then under development. The successors.

British Seaking MK 42 D turned out to be too expensive.

The Russian Kamov 31 was preferred and negotiations

K am o os
were concluded for their acquisition. Four KA 31s were

The Kamov 25 continued to operate from the first three inducted in early 2003.

destroyers Rajput, Rana and Ranjit. Its successor, the New Naval Air Stations Kamov 28, continued to operate in the next two destroyers

Ranuir and Ranuijay. It was larger than the Kamov 25 and With the increasing number of helicopters on board the too big to fit into the Kamov 25 hangars.

ships based in Bombay, it became necessary to have a
helipad area from where helicopters could continue

A d va nced Light Helicopters (ALH)

flying when ships were alongside. In view of its proximate
location, INS Kunjali became the Navy’s helicopter base

The ALH has emerged as a multi role helicopter in the

4.5 to 5.5 tonne weight class, designed and develope
in Bombay.

by HAL to meet the specific needs of different cus omer

For similar reasons, a naval air station was commissioned
like the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, the oas
at Vishakhapatnam as INS Dega on 21 October 1991.

and civilian organisations like ONGC, Pawan ans

•

The fifth naval air station, on the east coast of India,
advanced technologies include the Integra e

System, Hingeless Main Rotor, Beanngless Tail Roton
commissioned in 1992 as INS Rajali.

4-axis Automatic Flight Control System, u
t

Digital Electronic Control System and 6-axis Ant. Resonan

Isolation System.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 107

108 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Overview of the Growth of the Air Arm 1976-1990

Year

Carrier Borne Aviation

Ship Borne Helicopters

Maritime Surveillance

Trainers & Sim ulators

1975

Seahawks, Alizes and

• MATCH in Cldaygiri

Seakings operate from

• Chetak in Shakti

V ikran t

1976

V ikran t operational

• MATCH in Dunagiri

• Five Super Connies taken

• Five Islanders arrive and

• Chetak in Talwar
over from the Air Force
based in Cochin
and based in Goa

• Vampires phase out.

• Kirans MK1 phase in

1977

V ikran t operational

• Three IL 38s arrive and
based in Goa

1973

V ikran t operational

• Chetaks in Brahmaputra

Seahawks phase out
class training frigates

1979

V ik ran t’s Phase 1

• Seaking MK 42 A in Taragiri

• Seaking FATS
to 1981

Modernisation Refit

Simulator commissioned

1980

V ikran t under refit

• Kamov 25 in Rajput

• Seaking MK 42 A in

Vindhyagiri

1981

V ikran t under refit

• Kamov 25 in Rana

• Two Islanders based at

• Chetaks in Trishul and

Port Blair

Sandhayak

1982

• Alizes and Seakings
operate from Vikrant

• Super Connies phase out

1983

* Sea Harriers arrive

• Kamov 25 in Ranjit

• Two more IL 38s acquired

• Chetaks in Godavari
and Nirdeshak

• Two Sea Harrier trainers

1984

V ik ran t operational

• Chetak in Ganga
arrive and based in Goa

Sea Harriers embark

Vikrant

• Sea Harrier Simulator

• Kamov 28 in Ranvijay

1985

V ik ran t operational

• Chetaks in Gomati and Nirupak
commissioned

• Kamov 28 in Ranvir

1986

V ik ran t operational

• Chetak in Tir

Kirans MK 2 phase in

• Seakings MK 42 B arrive and

1987

1987 to 1989 Vikrant’s
replace the Chetaks in the

Phase 2

Godavari class frigates

Modernisation Refit

V ira a t commissioned

Sea Harriers operate
from Viraat

Alizes phase out

Seaking MK 42 B

.S»»n3,«4 2B— - X “>tfor

Simulator commissioned

1988

V ik ran t under refit

V iraat

. Seakings MK 42 C phase in

1989

V ik ran t under refit
and em bark Maga

V ira a t operational

• Chetak in Investigator

1990

Sea Harriers and Seaking

M K 42 Bs operate from

V ik ran t

V ira at under refit

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 109

15

The Submarine Arm

Preamble

An attempt to fulfil this condition was made in the case
of S S Laconia in 1942 when three (J boats towed boats full

This chapter starts with a retrospect of the international
of survivors for several days until attacked by Allied aircraft.

law aspects of submarine warfare.

Admiral Donitz thereafter sent his famous “Be Harsh”

It is followed by an overview of submarine and anti
signal to all Cl boats.

submarine tactics to help the reader to better understand

At Nurnberg, the Tribunal gave a hedged judgment:

the concerns that drove several inter-related naval

• It recognised that both sides had conducted submarine
developments during the period 1976 to 1990:

warfare of considerable ferocity, and that there had been

• The taking over of the Maritime Reconnaissance
justification for German attacks on British shipping,
role from the Air Force, the induction of Russian IL
particularly as that shipping was defensively armed and

38 M RASW and TU 142 LRM P A SW aircraft and the
had orders to report submarines.

induction of British Seaking Mk 42 B and Russian

• But it found against Admiral Donitz for conducting

Kamov A SW helicopters. These have been dealt with
attacks on neutral vessels without warning and for
in the chapter on the Air Arm.

the fact that submarine crews had failed to rescue

• The selection of the German HDW 1500 design
survivors.

for commencing indigenous construction of S S K
submarines in India. This has been dealt with in the

During war, international law places submarines under
chapter on “Indigenous Submarine Construction - The
stringent constraints. On the other hand, “ It is universally

S S K Project”.

recognised that in every war, the actions of any nation

• The acquisition from the Soviet Gnion of the latest 877
are influenced substantially by the behaviour of its

EKM (Kilo class) S S K submarines to replace the earlier
opponent.” 1

Russian submarines.

The following excerpts from the memoirs of Grand

• The indigenous manufacture of submarine propulsion Admiral Raeder, the Chief of the German Navy during the batteries for all classes of submarines in service with

1939-1945 World War, are pertinent.2
their designs improved for better performance in tropical
conditions.

“The German Naval War Staff ensured that:

• Every precaution was taken against any violation of the

• The leasing of a Russian nuclear propelled submarine to
better understand its capabilities and limitations.

rules of international law in regard to war at sea.

• No actions should be taken, no orders or directives

S u b m a rin e W arfare
issued, which could lead to a violation of the moral law

The London Protocol of 1936 stated that submarines must
of the sea as it is recognised by all civilised peoples.

conform to the rules of international law to which surface

“I knew positively that Admiral Donitz, as Commander of
vessels are subject; and these rules included the provisions
the Submarine forces, had on several occasions deliberately
that a merchant ship's crew must, before the ship itself was
put some of our U-boats and their crews in positions of
destroyed, be put in a place of safety. Moreover a ship’s utmost danger from enemy attack in order to insure the boat is not a ‘place of safety’.

safety of surviving crew members of torpedoed ships.”

1. German Navy’s Grand Adm Raeder's memoirs 'M y L ife ’, page 388.

2. Ibid ‘Unrestricted Submarine Warfare' Pages 394 et seq.

,

* I J 5"46 tnals of war criminals" held in Nurnberg by the Allied International Military Tribunal, Admirals

These replies proved to the Nurnberg court that the

Raeder and Donitz were charged with having conducted German Navy had conducted its own naval warfare in naval warfare contra^ to the rules of civilised warfare’ with accordance with the same rules and customs that were observed by the two largest sea powers with whom it was
particular reference to unrestricted submarine warfare by engaged. As a result, the International Military Tribunal the German Navy. To prepare the defence against this completely vindicated the German Navy in its methods of charge, their defence counsel sent questionnaires to the

British and American Navies.

warfare, certifying that such warfare had been conducted
in full accord with the rules of international law.”

From the answers of the British Admiralty, it was

Submarine and Anti Submarine Tactics
established, and accepted by the court, that at the very
beginning of the war, the British Navy had begun arming Stealth and Snorting British merchant ships in accordance with directives already Stealth is the watchword of all submarines. The modern, laid down in 1938 in their Handbook for the Merchant diesel-electric propelled SSK submarine is very stealthy, Marine. It had
also sent ships out under armed escort. provided the utmost care has been taken to minimise British merchant ships had orders to report all submarines its self noise.3 Carefully handled, she can be as quiet as sighted, and for this purpose were made part of the British the grave. At low speeds, the soft hum of her electric Navy's reconnaissance and warning system. On 1 October propulsion power unit is almost un-discernable. (Jnlike a 1939, the British Navy had directed British merchant ships nuclear propelled submarine, she has no reactor requiring to ram German submarines whenever possible. And on
the support of numerous mechanical subsystems, all of

8 May 1940, the British naval forces had received orders which are potential noise-makers.

to sink, w ithout w arning, any ship encountered in the Skagerrak.”

When dived, the submarine is propelled by a set of
huge electric batteries. Depending on how much battery

‘Admiral Nimitz was equally frank and helpful in his power is used up (the higher the speed, the quicker the answer to the questionnaire. Immediately upon outbreak battery runs down), the batteries require to be recharged of the war with Japan, he avouched, the CIS Government regularly by diesel generators. Just as a car engine needs had declared the whole Pacific Ocean a war zone, and an intake of oxygen, so do the two internal combustion had ordered all-out war against Japan. In this war zone, diesel generators in a submarine. The diesel engine must the largest ocean area in the world, CIS submarines had have air. To get air, a submarine must come up to at least authority to attack, without warning, all merchant ships periscope depth and then she becomes vulnerable to sighted. Hospital ships, and other vessels proceeding detection.

under security protection for humanitarian purposes, were

Batteries can be recharged either by being on the
the only ships exempted from this directive.

surface (more vulnerable) or by remaining at periscope

“The crucial question in the questionnaire sent to Admiral depth and sucking in air (less vulnerable). When a diesel-Nimitz was this: 'Were American submarines forbidden, electric submarine comes to periscope depth and raises her snort mast to suck in the air required to run her diesel
either by specific order or recognised practice, to take generators to recharge her batteries, the process is known m easures fo r rescue o f the passengers and crews o f ships
sun k w ith o u t w arn in g if the safety o f the subm arines as ‘snorting’.4
them selves w ere endangered b y these m easures.

Even though a submarine hull is not visible whilst
snorting, the acoustic noise of its diesel engines can be

The unequivocal reply of the CIS Admiral was: “In heard by another submarine if in the vicinity. Its periscope general practice, the CIS submarines did not rescue enemy and snort masts that stick out above the water can be survivors if such an attempt meant an unusua a i
detected on ship and aircraft radar. The ions in the diesel
risk or if the submarine was thereby en angere
exhaust can be ‘sniffed’ by detectors fitted in MRASW
further execution of its tasks.

.

,t has t0 be rigorously monitored and minimised throughout a submarine’s Self noise is a critical parameter

3.

in submarine

^

By reducing
noise generated by the submarine at or
b e ir n o is e is a critical

*--------

,

. e ie ctro-m agneuc
operational service. The ocean offers na ^ra
effectively conceal itself in the ocean
below the natural noise of the sea. the s u b m n e

^

* periscope depth,
raised and lowered when ~ r

-

’ their baUeries and when batteries were low, became

4. The ‘snort’ Is a waterproof h * .

be oaerables the submarine to recharge batteries with her hull below the surface

~ ‘ to the invention of the snort ,

—
engines. Prior
attack.’ etc. In effect, the snort
very vulnerable to ramming sudden
and only the top of the snort being visible.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE /111

aircraft. There is little a submarine can do about these including light, are rapidly attenuated.

limitations, except to stop recharging and crash dive every

The temperature of the sea becomes cooler as depth
time her ESM detects radar emissions of an approaching
increases. This change in temperature affects the velocity

A SW aircraft/helicopter or her passive sonar detects the

(and hence the path) of the sound waves transmitted by a
noise of approaching ships.5
sonar. Temperature layers in the sea refract sound waves

During war, a submarine patrolling in hostile waters
much the same way that a prism refracts light.8
comes up near the surface only when she has to recharge

The sound velocity gradient near the sea surface is
her batteries. Even then, she will only do so at night, and
considered ‘positive’ if velocity increases with depth,
for the shortest possible time, so as to minimise the chance

‘negative’ if velocity decreases with depth.

of being detected and ‘localised’ for attack.6

A positive gradient causes upward refraction of sound

S u b m a rin e a n d Anti S u b m a rin e Tactics
energy. Upward refracted rays will be reflected by the air-

For successful attack, a submarine relies on concealment sea interface at the surface and surface reflection will be and surprise rather than concentration of force. A
continued. Positive velocity gradients give rise to surface
submarine attack is more successful because it detects the
bounded ducts that can carry acoustic energy for very long
ship earlier and can deliver a high weapon density attack
distances since the spreading is two-dimensional. Long-
before being detected - this quality provides surprise.

range detection can be made under these conditions if the
sonar and its target are both located in this duct.

To avoid mutual interference, submarines operate singly.

When more than one submarine is deployed in the same

A negative velocity gradient refracts sound waves
region, each submarine is given a specific demarcated
downwards. As a result, a shadow zone is created which is
area in which to operate.7
not insonified. Under these conditions, by operating in this
shadow zone, a submarine can, without being detected,

A submarine stalks its prey. Its target - a warship, a
move close to its target to within torpedo firing range.

merchant ship, or a convoy- seeks clues as to a submarine’s
presence in order to take evasive action. In anti submarine

The way to detect a submarine lurking in a shadow zone
warfare, M RASW aircraft, A SW helicopters, sonar fitted
or below a temperature layer is to position the sonar in the
warships and S S K submarines are the predators and
same shadow zone or below the same temperature layer.

submarines the prey.

This is achieved on board ships by lowering a large towed
sonar dome (called Variable Depth Sonar - VDS) to the

When a submarine closes its target ship or submarine,
required depth whilst maintaining speed. Anti submarine
the latter try to counterattack and evade the blow. When
helicopters lower their small sonar dome (called ‘dunking
anti submarine forces localise a submarine, it either fights
sonar’) whilst hovering.

like a cornered beast or goes silent and tries to slip away.

S u b m a r in e L o ca tio n , D e te c tio n a n d A tta c k The crux of all submarine warfare is to sink the enemy
target, get away from the area and survive the anti

Submarines are potent weapon platforms. Their traditional
submarine chase that is sure to follow.

task is to attack enemy warships and enemy submarines.9

They are designed to minimise the chances of their being

S o n a r P ro p a g a tio n
detected and to withstand anti submarine attacks. They

Sound is virtually the only form of energy that propagates
are equipped with accurate and lethal weapons for attack
usefully underwater, where electromagnetic waves,
and for self-defence.

5. The great advantage of a nuclear propelled submarine is that it does not need to come to the surface to recharge batteries because it does not need propulsion batteries. The nuclear reactor heats water to generate steam that runs steam turbines that drive the propeller. Its mobility and endurance when dived has none of the limitations of a diesel-electric propelled submarine.

6. Since recharging batteries exposes the diesel-electrical submarine to detection, or in other words to be ‘indiscreet’, the parameter ‘indiscretion rate (how often a submarine is compelled to be indiscreet) is regarded as vital as ‘self noise’ in submarine design and in the technology of submarine batteries.

7. For a short period in 1942-43, during the 1939-1945 World War, German U-boats operated successfully as ‘wolf packs' against convoys in the Atlantic Ocean. This was possible because submarines generally operated on the surface and dived only for the attack.

8. Every sea area is subject to diumal and season effects and also prevalent and changing currents. The combination of these effects causes different temperature patterns at different depths.

9. In recent years, submarines have attacked land targets with precision guided missiles.

112/ TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

A submarines asset is its invisibility when dived. Its
imitation ,s that its underwater mobility is constrained by their radar can constrain a submarine’s freedom to recharqe its batteries.

t e endurance of its propulsion batteries. When recharginq
batteries, a submarine loses its asset of invisibility.

In rough weather and poor sonar conditions, localisation
by an MRASW aircraft could be as poor as an area of several

As mentioned, when dived, a submarine is propelled hundred square miles, almost like looking for a needle in by electric motors that are powered by batteries. The a haystack.

endurance of these batteries depends on the speed of the
submarine. The faster it goes, either to get as far away

However as soon as a submarine has been localised
from the position where it was first detected or to evade the and accurately tracked, the aircraft attacks it with its own weapons fired at it, the quicker the batteries get exhausted. weapons. Additional MRASW aircraft can help to maintain The submarine then has to surface and recharge its pressure on the submarine to remain dived.

batteries before it can dive again with its mobility restored Anti Submarine Ships and Their ASW Helicopters by recharged batteries.

As soon as the MRASW aircraft localises a contact, ships

The crux of anti submarine warfare is to compel the designed for anti submarine warfare and having anti submarine to remain dived by repeated and intense attacks submarine helicopters on board proceed to the area and thereby exhaust its batteries, to reduce its mobility to where the MRASW aircraft’s sonobuoy patterns have evade attack and hit it with weapons to force it to surface been laid.

and surrender.

Anti submarine helicopters can search a given area

In ASW tactics, the ship tries to evade or avoid a quicker and, being airborne, they cannot be hit by submarine probability area. It endeavours to confuse and submarine fired torpedoes. After ascertaining the progress constrain submarine tactical choices by deft combinations on localisation from the MRASW aircraft, they either lay of speed and manoeuvre.

their own sonobuoys to localise the contact or use their
dunking sonar to search. If the sonar search is passive, their

M RA SW Aircraft
sonars listen for tell tale noise of submarine presence.

When a submarine is sighted on surface or it makes a

If the sonar search is active and a submarine is
wireless transmission that betrays its presence by giving present, the sonar receives an acoustic echo back from Direction Finding (D/F) equipment an approximate the submarine hull and the submarine can be tracked by position of the transmission, a maritime reconnaissance sonar transmissions. As soon as the submarine’s position anti submarine warfare (MRASW) aircraft speeds to that and movements are accurately determined, helicopters position. It drops a number of sonobuoys to ‘localise’ the release their anti submarine homing torpedoes. Helicopter contact and if possible to attack it. The MRASW aircraft, attacks continue until the submarine is hit and sinks or the therefore, is in the first line of submarine location, detection submarine surfaces and surrenders because its batteries and attack.

have exhausted.

The objective of an MRASW aircraft is to obtain an

A submarine knows when it has been detected on
initial position of a submarine. For example an indication sonar - it can hear the sonar transmissions. It knows it will on its detector of the ‘magnetic anomaly created by the come under attack. It will try to evade helicopters. When submarine’s steel hull or a ‘sniff of diesel exhaust ions or cornered, it may choose to attack the ship because a ship a disappearing radar contact suggestive of a submarine can be instantly sunk by submarine fired torpedoes.

having crash dived to evade detection. As soon as t e

The role of the anti submarine ship is to stand-off outside

M RASW aircraft obtains an initial position, it drops a pattern the range of the submarine’s torpedoes and keep on reof passive sonobuoys to localise the contact.

fuelling and re-arming the helicopters until the submarine

Modern conventional submarines (and their batteries) ar
nears exhaustion. She then moves in to fire intensive
designed to minimise the need to snort to a few ours every barrages of anti submarine rockets.

few days. This time is too short for an MRASW aircraft to Submarine Search and Kill (SSK) Submarines get an accurate enough localisation. On t e one a »

M RASW aircraft may choose not to use its radar

^

The advantage of having submarines to search and kill
the submarine’s snort mast sticking out o t e wa
enemy submarines is that both share the same undersea
environment to detect and track each other, without being
o th ^

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 113

limited by shadow zones and temperature layers. Using

By 1975, the material state of the first four submarines
active sonar would immediately betray presence. Detection
had deteriorated. This was a cumulative result of several
by passive sonar requires high skills in picking up even the
factors:

faintest noise emanating from the opposing SSK . Hence

• The tropical, hot and humid Indian climate, the corrosion
the emphasis, during SS K designs, on silent machinery
caused by the higher salinity of tropical seas and the
and minimum noise levels.

corrosive atmospheric pollution caused by the industrial
emissions at Vishakhapatnam.

SSK s are deployed in areas where there is likelihood of
encountering only enemy submarines and no possibility

• Bunching. The induction of the first four submarines in
whatsoever of own anti submarine forces mistaking own

24 months and the next four submarines in 16 months

S S K for an enemy SSK . The contest is between two dived
meant that their major six-yearly refits would also have

SSKs.

to be undertaken after six years within periods of 24
and 16 months respectively. This bunching of major

Once the opposing SS K has been detected and tracked
refits could not have been avoided - it made no sense
and the fire control problem solved, wire guided torpedoes
to order one submarine at a time when starting a
are fired in a way that the target SS K would not have time

Submarine Arm.

to fire its own wire guided torpedoes in self defence. In

• Submarine repairs required highly skilled, experienced
effect, this means getting as close as possible to the victim
before firing - but in so doing, it also means that the
and deeply specialised expertise. The Navy did not have
victim S S K may hear you and fire its own torpedoes before
this expertise. It could only be built up slowly because
you fired yours. The direction from which the retaliatory
officers and artificers were periodically transferred and
torpedoes would come is predictable - straight down the
the civilian cadres of the new Dockyard were being built
direction that the incoming torpedo’s homing head starts
up from scratch.

its active sonar transmissions. At this moment, decoys can

Six-yearly refits could not com m ence on time because
be released to seduce the incoming torpedo away.

the submarine refit workshops and facilities were still coming

Both submarine warfare and anti submarine warfare
up in the new Dockyard. The new civilian workforce had no
are driven by constantly evolving frontier technologies.

knowledge of submarine repair technology. Even though

With long years of peace interspersed by short sharp wars,
vertically specialised and experienced Soviet specialists
success requires:

in submarine repair were available, they had no Indian
counterparts to whom they could transfer their technology

• The continuous intensive training of highly motivated
and expertise.

and experienced personnel.

• Sustaining the highest standards of material readiness of

All these factors were aggravated by the procedural
the platforms (ships, submarines, aircraft and helicopters)

delays in the delivery of submarine refit spares from
and their sensors (sonars, radars and ESM ) and their

Russia. The only solution was for submarines to be refitted
weapons (torpedoes, rockets, and depth bombs).

in Russia.

T h e S ta te o f the S u b m a rin e A rm in 1975

Initially, the Indian side found it difficult to countenance
sending submarines to Russia for refit. Not only might it

T h e First Eight S u b m a rin e s
indicate lack of self-confidence, but also because heavy

The Submarine Arm started with the acquisition from the
investments had been made in setting up the new Dockyard

Soviet Gnion of four of their latest Project i 641 K (NATO
for this very purpose.

classification Foxtrot class) 2,000 tonne ocean going

The Russian side too, perhaps for security reasons and their
submarines. These arrived between 1968 and 1970.

own submarine refit workload, was reluctant to accept Indian

The problems experienced in operating the first of these
submarines in their dockyards. After considerable interaction,

Kalvari class submarines in tropical conditions were fed
both sides realised that there was no other option.

back to the design bureaus in Russia. Improvements were
gradually introduced in the remaining three submarines

S u b m a r in e D e p o t S h ip - A m b a
before delivery.

T h e Submarine Depot S h ip Amba h a d c o m m is s io n e d in Another four submarines were contracted for in 1971.

1968 and had b een b a sed in V ish akhap atn am . B etw een

These improved Vela class submarines arrived between

1969 and 1971, Amba supported the submarines operating

1973 and 1975.

on the West Coast.

J1 4 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

IN S SIN D H U G H O SH - R u s s ia n P r o je c t 8 7 7 E K M s u b m a rin e (1 9 8 0 s )

C o m p artm en t containing the huge batteries that provide electric propulsion for a subm arine w hen dived

INS AM BA - Submarine Depot Ship
in lannarv 1988 she was received by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi.

On IN S CH AKRA's arrival at V i s a k h a p a ^ ^

(F0 C jn c East) and C h akra’s Commanding Officer

Also seen are Defence Minister K

([ater Vice Admiral) RN Ganesh

IN S CHAKRA - R u s s ia n n u cle ar- p ro p e lle d s u b m a r in e le a s e d fro m 1 9 8 8 to 1991

British Seaking Mk 42 B anti submarine helicopter lowering its sonar dom e into the sea (1980s) Anti submarine torpedo fired from INS RAJPUT during a practice firing

French Alize - Carrier-borne Anti Submarine & Reconnaissance Aircraft (1960s) Russian TCI 142 - Long Range Maritime Patrol & Anti Submarine Aircraft (1980s)

t h ^ r 1 r
dfR idedKt0 baSe the four new submarines of
the Vela class at Bombay, Amba was re-based at Bombay.

to assist in cariying out Khanderi’s refit with the help of Russian specialists.

She provided the essential battery recharging facilities
until a full-fledged battery charging facility was established

Kalvari started her refit on 1 January 1975 and returned
ashore in 1978. In addition, she had a recompression
to Vishakhapatnam in mid 1976 with ‘zero defects’. The
chamber, could prepare torpedoes, recharge High
performance of her equipment was so satisfactory that

Pressure air and provide comfortable accommodation for Kalvari provided the benchmark for the high standard that submarine crews.

Vishakhapatnam had to achieve for Khanderi’s refit.

Shortage of Submarine Personnel

When Khanderi’s refit started in mid 1976, the position
was:

In the short period of eight years between 1966 and 1974, • The new Naval Dockyard under construction at the Navy had manned eight submarines as well as their

Vishakhapatnam was nowhere near ready to undertake
technical facilities ashore. Personnel shortages began to
such a complex refit.10 The only facilities available
cause concern. The ‘rejection procedure was reviewed and
were a two-and-a-half-bay, rudimentary, Base Repair
made more pragmatic. To induce personnel to volunteer,

Workshop, the submarine battery commissioning /
monetary incentives like Submarine Allowance, Submarine
charging-discharging facility called the Energy Block,

Pay, and Hard-lying Money at full rates were sanctioned,
and the Torpedo Preparation Workshop.

special benefits like Special Submarine Rations and Special

Submarine Clothing were authorised, procedures were • There was neither the capability for the survey of a simplified and sustained recruitment drives were resorted
submarine’s pressure hull nor a naval dry dock in which
to dock a submarine.

to.

• The team of Dockyard officers and civilian foremen that

Submarine Infrastructure Facilities
had been deputed to Russia to participate in Kalvari’s

The 1965 agreement with Russia covered not only the
refit had, to a limited extent, imbibed what needed to be
done, how it was to be done and how best to improvise
delivery of ships and submarines, but also the creation
facilities in Vishakhapatnam until the new workshops
of a modern dockyard at Vishakhapatnam, along with
were ready.

infrastructure.

• The set of Refit Spares required for the mandatory, time-

The
shore infrastructure for the Submarine Arm
bound replacement / overhaul of critical equipment had
comprised a submarine base, a submarine training
not arrived.

establishment, submarine maintenance and repair • The Repair Technical Documents (RTDs) required for the workshops, facilities to charge submarine propulsion
repair and refit of equipment were incomplete. Whatever
batteries and high-pressure air bottles and facilities
had been received was in the Russian language. There
for blowing the ballast tanks and preparing submarine
was a shortage of translators and a backlog had built
torpedoes. Since the new Dockyard would take several
up of documents awaiting translation from Russian into
years to come up, interim arrangements were made for

English.

the Base Repair Workshop in Vishakhapatnam to be

On the plus side, the expert civilian Russian specialists
expanded.

from the factories that manufactured equipment could be

Developments Between 1976 and 1990
requested for to assist and provide guidance on how to
refit the equipment.

Six-Yearly Refits (Medium Repairs) of Kalvari and Vela

Class Submarines

However, Russian specialisation was very narrow - each
specialist from each manufacturing factory knew all about

It was decided that the first submarine, Kaluan would
his specific equipment but not much about the other
be refitted by the Russian f ^

be refitted in equipment.

the second submarine, Kha"

Naval Dockyard

Vishakhapatnam. A team fr

;n

The Indian side was reluctant to afford the high costs

Kalvari's

Vishakhapatnam was deputed to Pa ‘
experience
that would have to be incurred for the deputation of such a

18-month ,=f,t in Russ,, .o ac,u,,e
large number of specialists.

of a six-yearly refit and, on return to visn

10. See

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 115

The Khanderi refit was beset with all these problems.

Kursura was laid off for a number of years and

There was no way to overcome the inexperience of dockyard
cannibalised to keep the other submarines operational.

workers, their low productivity, their learning curve, their

In 1985, it was decided to make her operational.

low expertise, the shortage of spares and documentation

Subsequently, she sailed and dived for a full operating
and the inadequate infrastructure.

cycle before she was pulled up on to Vishakhapatnam
beach after decommissioning in 2001 and made into a

In 1980, the Naval Expert Committee was constrained
museum. In 1987 , Khanderi was laid u p fo r cannibalisation,
to comment:

as Kursura had been earlier.

“Over 80 Soviet specialists had been imported for

The overall sharing of the six-yearly refits (Medium
facilitating Khanderi’s medium refit. Each one of them

Repairs) of the first eight submarines between refit yards in
was a specialist in repair of submarines. The Chief Russia and Vishakhapatnam was: Shipbuilder had an experience of about 12 years in
refitting submarines alone. Soviet specialists included ship

• Russia:

builders, designers, technologists, specialists in quality

Kaluari (1975-76), Karanj (1978-79), Vela (1980-82), control, electro-deposition and specialists on almost each

Vagli (1981-84), Vaghsheer (1983-85)

important equipment and system on which they had long

• India:

experience.

Khanderi (1976-81), Kursura (1977-95), Vagir (1981-84),

“Despite the Soviet specialists, the refit was taking more

Kaluari (1984-88), Vela (1986-88), Karanj (1988-96), than twice as long and was nowhere near finishing. If the

Vela (1993-98), Vagli (1997-99)

Navy had to acquire and replicate the expertise possessed
by the Soviet specialists, in time to come, the following

The Indigenisation of Subm arine Propulsion Batteries
steps were unavoidable:

From the inception of the submarine acquisition programme,

• Undertake most meticulous planning of work and
the Navy had decided to become self sufficient for its
material requirements.

requirements of submarine propulsion batteries. The offers

• Create Bureaus of ship builders, technologists and
of competing Indian firms and their foreign collaborators
designers as recommended by the Soviet side, consisting
were evaluated. Standard Batteries of Bombay were chosen
of 32 Technologists and 15 Designers for submarines in 1973 to manufacture propulsion batteries in technological alone.

collaboration with Tudor of Sweden.

• Create a core of supervisory staff and workers and

The first eight submarines had commissioned with
specialise only in refit of submarine hull and its

Russian propulsion batteries. Each submarine’s set of
equipment. This would mean a larger requirement of batteries weighed over 300 tonnes and comprised 448
manpower, but narrow specialisation to preserve the
battery cells, each one metre high, and half a metre wide.

quality of work appeared to be the only answer to the The set had to be charged before loading on board. To problems being experienced.”

recharge the batteries at sea, a submarine had either to

Kaluari’s refit in Vladivostok had lasted 18 months.

come to the surface or, to be safer, come to snort depth,

Khanderi’s refit in Vizag lasted five and a half years, from
and use the diesel generator for recharging. The battery

1976 to 1981. It was, nevertheless, a significant learning set had a life of 100 charge-discharge cycles or two and experience. Considerable innovation had to be resorted
a half years, whichever was earlier. The Russian Navy
to as was done for testing critical equipment like high-
had adjusted their submarine operating cycle such that
current-carrying propulsion battery breakers and the these 100 cycles would be expended between three-yearly back-to-back testing of the overhauled main electric-refits called Current Repairs. To avoid having to lay off an
propulsion motor.

operational submarine during its operational cycle, the

Russians always installed a set of new batteries during the

In subsequent years, both expertise and productivity three-yearly refit.

gradually improved. For the reasons discussed in the chapter
on Logistics, the delivery of Refit Spares continued to remain

The Navy’s experience with Russian batteries soon
untimely. Delays were inescapable in the completion of a
revealed that in Indian tropical conditions, the evolution of
massive project like the new Vishakhapatnam Dockyard.

hydrogen when recharging the batteries was much greater

And because the submarines were acquired in bunches than in the cooler Russian weather. Mixing additives to the of four, there was no escape from the ‘bunching’ of their electrolyte solved this problem partially. A basic design six-yearly refits.

problem, however, was the inability of the electrolyte

116/ TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

cooling system in the Russian battery to cope with high
tropical temperatures.11

9
submarines commissioned in 1986. Due to initial start-up
problems, the submarines built by MDL commissioned in

Standard Batteries modified the design of the Swedish 1992 and 1994.

Tudor battery to overcome these problems. It innovated

The selection and construction of these submarines have
tubular construction instead of grid construction and
been discussed in the chapter on “Indigenous Submarine
instead of having cooling coils in the electrolyte, it achieved Construction - The SSK Project".

more efficient cooling through ducts in the bus bars

After the initial teething troubles had been overcome, the The Induction of Russian 877 EKM (Kilo Class) performance of indigenous batteries proved to be better in Submarines Indian conditions than that of imported batteries.

In the late 1970s, the Russian side was requested to suggest

I he German HDW submarines, which entered service replacements for the eight Foxtrot class submarines that in 1986, were equipped with German Hagen batteries. The had been inducted in earlier years, concurrently as the design of the Hagen battery was indigenised by Chloride case was on for building SSK submarines in India.12 The India, the makers of Exide batteries.

Russian response in 1978 was that the EKM design was
on the drawing board and that India should make up its

The Russian EKM submarines started entering service mind quickly so that its requirements could be bulked.

from 1986 onwards. The indigenisation of their batteries The Navy was hesitant to do so, seeing in the Russian was once again entrusted to Standard Batteries.

offer, perhaps rightly, that it was to compete with the

Swedish and German SSK evaluations then in progress.

In 1990, the Battery Commissioning Facility in Bombay Years passed.13 In February 1981, the Russian side offered was completed. It met the requirements of the both the 877 EKM submarines. The Navy asked for its team the EKM and HDW submarines based at Bombay and to see the 877 but was asked to wait. By this time, the dispensed with the need for Russian submarines to go all decision had already been taken to collaborate with HDW
the way round to Vizag to replace their batteries.

of Germany for the indigenous construction of submarines

The indigenisation of submarine propulsion batteries and final negotiations were in progress. The German HDW
was a success story. Despite setbacks and teething SSK agreement was signed in December 1981.

problems, perseverance, innovation and close interaction

In 1983, an Indian team visited and evaluated the 877
between submariners and the factories culminated in and found that its design and performance as an SSK was the production of propulsion batteries that had superior comparable to that of the HDW SSK. In 1984, an agreement cooling power in the tropics, longer life, higher capacity, was signed for six submarines. The seventh submarine was superior plate technology all of which helped to lower ‘contracted in 1987 and the eighth submarine in 1988.

indiscretion rate. In later years, Russia and other countries

These eight 877 EKM Sindhughosh class submarines
started importing these batteries from India.

(NATO classification Kilo class) were commissioned

In digen ou s Subm arin e Construction - The SSK
between 1986 and 1990. They were a generation ahead of
the earlier i641 Foxtrot class and on par with the German

Project

HDW 1500 submarines.

In the early 1970s, proposals were invited from rePute^
and well-established submarine manufacturers Base

The Moscow newspaper Pravda published the following
on the technologies reflected in the off®r® 1 at
report in 1988:

sent, the Navy incorporated the desire
ea u^e

“Th eSinduratna is an 877 EKM submarine of the Kilo
each proposal and informed them of its revised
class. When surfaced, she displaces 2,300 tonnes and
requirements’.

is capable of a speed of 10 knots. Fully autonomous for

45 days, it can dive to 300 metres, carries a crew of 52

In 1981, after prolonged evaluations, a c0^
c|
and is equipped with six 533 mm torpedo tubes. The
signed with HDW of Germany or four

,

^
submarine was developed at the Rubin Design Bureau
submarines - the first two to be buitt
y ,
in St Petersburg.

next two by Mazagon Docks, Bombay.

—-----

11. Russian batteries used grid plate technology instead of
buUdj f of submarines and had advised against diversiiying the types of 12. The Russian side was aware of the Navy s discussio
submarines in service.

sea trials.

the prototype 877 had been undergoing

13. It emerged later that during these years

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 117

“The 240 feet long, 3,000 tonnes dived, extremely
in India, extensive sonar trials were carried out and
quiet, diesel-electric Kilo class SS K can run submerged
the ranges obtained were just slightly less than what
at speeds up to 17 knots.

we had obtained in the Baltic. The sonar is excellent
the underwater telephone facility is excellent, and the

“The battery gives the Kilo a range of some 400 miles,
intercept sonar is very good. In addition there is mine
running slowly and silently, before she needs to recharge.

hunting sonar which is very useful.”

She can travel 6,000 miles ‘snorting’ before refuelling.”

In the initial, years, the EK M submarines suffered

Almost all the officers who underwent EKM training
inadequacy of air conditioning in tropical conditions. This
in Russia gathered the impression from their Russian was progressively resolved by increasing the air conditioning instructors that the EKM ’s teardrop hull, its anechoic rubber capacity. The acute shortage of fresh water was eventually tiling and other attributes were features of a submarine that resolved by fitting reverse osmosis plants.

was supposed to take a miniaturised nuclear reactor. But
during development, either the reactor could not be fitted

Personnel Shortages
in the space available or technical problems constrained
further miniaturisation and it was converted into a diesel- The tempo at which submarines were inducted
electric propelled boat. This helps to explain why, despite
necessitated measures to increase induction of personnel
the Russian Design Bureau’s experience of the Indian
into the submarine cadre. Basic submarine courses
side’s need for more air conditioning capacity when were increased from one per year to two per year and operating Russian submarines in tropical conditions, the
recruitment drives were intensified. But it was qnly after
shortfall in air conditioning could not be remedied before the Fifth Pay Commission in the 1990s that emoluments the submarines commissioned.

improved sufficiently to start attracting personnel of the
desired calibre to volunteer for the Submarine Arm.

Commander (later Captain) KR Ajrekar underwent
training in Russia and on return to India became Very Low Frequency Com m unications with Commanding Officer of the Sindhughosh. He recalls:

Subm arines at Sea

“Russian training was the best training we ever received.

Whereas a submarine on the surface can transmit and

The best part was the training on the torpedo fire control
receive wireless messages just like a ship can, submerged
system. The instructor was a commanding officer who
submarines can only receive wireless messages on Very
had just come from an operational submarine. He had

Low Frequency (VLF). V LF transmitters require huge

15 years experience in operational submarines and it was antennae suspended high above the ground.

absolutely invaluable. After each attack, we had to point
out our own mistakes and the rest of the junior officers

The initial discussions were solely with the Russian side,
watched the commanding officer analyse his mistakes. I
from whom the submarines had been acquired. Later
found that people did come out with their own mistakes
enquiries with western manufacturers indicated that better
and such mistakes were not repeated a second time.”

technology might be available from America. Parallel
discussions were, therefore, pursued both with Russia and

Recalling the qualities of the EKM submarine that he with America.

commanded, he said:

“The tear-drop hull configuration, being hydro-

Between 1979 and 1984, modalities were worked out
dynamically the best underwater, the underwater for Continental Manufacturing Company of America, management of the EKM is excellent. The EKM has
in collaboration with Triveni Sangam Ltd of India, to be
auto diving control - you can steer the submarine responsible for the detailed design, manufacture, site automatically even from the fire control computer. The
installation and commissioning of the V LF Transmitter and
hydroplanes are located in the midship portion where the Auto Transmitting Units.

there is no interference with the sonar. The submarine

The hardware arrived by 1986. Installation of the VLF
hull is covered with rubber tiles that absorb the acoustic Transmitter commenced in 1987. Trials were completed energy of enemy sonar transmissions. The radiated
in 1989.

noise of the submarine was very low. The sonar could
pick up H E at very long ranges. Never before had I

During the same period, the Defence Research and
picked up those kinds of ranges. In fact, we thought Development Organisation undertook the design of the that we would pick up these ranges only in Arctic waters antennae to be fitted in submarines for receiving VLF
or the Baltic Sea. However, within a month of our arrival
transmissions.

11$ /TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

On 20 October 1990, the VLF Transmitting Station was
commissioned as INS Kattaboman in Tamil Nadu onThe

With multiple squadrons based in Bombay and
southern tip of India.

Vishakhapatnam, the Commanding Officers of Virbahu
and Vajrabahu were initially designated as COMSUB

Command and Control of Submarine Squadrons

East and West and later re-designated as Commodore

Commanding Submarines (COMCOS) East and West

After the arrival from Russia of the fourth submarine respectively.

in end 1969, all four submarines of the Kalvari class

(Russian Project i 641, NATO designation Foxtrot class)

Submarines were placed under the operational and
constituted the 8th Submarine Squadron. It was based at administrative control of the respective Cs-in-C, who were Vishakhapatnam under INS Virbahu, which commissioned designated as Submarine Operating Authorities. The in 1971. CO Virbahu functioned as Captain SM 8 and Class COMSGBs were responsible to their Cs-in-C for operational Authority for all submarines.

readiness and providing their submarines with ‘Base’ and

‘Material’ support.

The next four Vela class improved versions of the Kalvari Flag Officer Submarines (FOSM) class were based in Bombay. When the fourth submarine
arrived in end 1974, these four submarines, under Captain The constitution of FOSM was promulgated in 1986 after SM 9, constituted the 9th Submarine Squadron. Captain the arrival of the first EKM submarine from Russia and SM 8 at Vishakhapatnam continued to function as the implemented in 1987 just prior to the arrival of the SSK
class authority for submarines.

submarines from Germany.

The first submarine

FOSM ’s Interface with the Navy’s Command and Control Organisation
of
the

Sindhughosh
class (Russian Project

CNS (NHQ)

877

EKM,

NATO
designation Kilo class)

FOCINC EAST
arrived in 1984. The

FOCINC WEST
first four submarines
constituted
the

11th

Submarine

Squadron

CAPT/CMDE (SM)

FOSM

CAPT/CMDE (SM)

and
were
based
at

Vishakhapatnam
to
facilitate the training of
r

Kalvari

Sindhughosh

EKM
commissioning

Vela

Shishumar

Sindhughosh CO Satavahana

Class S/Ms

Class S/Ms
and replacement crews.

Class S/Ms Class S/Ms Class S/M

CO Virbahu

8 SS

11 SS

Facilities to carry out

9 SS

10SS

12 SS
their annual repairs were
taken in hand for completion by 1990.

• FOSM responsible to NHQ for all Class Authority and
training functions in regard to submarines.

The first two Shishumar class SSK submarines arrived
in Bombay from Germany in 1987 and constituted the 10

• FOSM
under
the
administrative
control
of

FOCINCEAST.

Submarine Squadron.

• FOSM to interact with both FOCs-in-C on all matters

The next four EKM submarines
related to his charter of duties.

were based in Bombay and constitute t e
f

Squadron. The four ageing Vela dass

• Captain/Cmde (SM) on the East Coast and CO Virbahu
s u b m a r i n e s of
the
to be separate entities.

9 - Submarine Squadron gradually relocated

Vishakhapatnam.

Submarine Rescue

The last two, M D L-built SSK submarines joined the 10- Submarine Rescue Vessel (SRV) Nistar was acquired Submarine Squadron in 1992 an
from Russia, commissioned in 1971 and based at

Vishakhapatnam . She conducted the diving operation on

Until INS Vajrabahu was " ^ J y ^ l ’admWstered
the Pakistan Navy submarine, Qhazi, which sank outside

1 9 9 6 , * e submarines based in Bom b ^ Vishakhapatnam

Vishakhapatnam harbour in December 1971. From 1972
locally and Subm arine Headq
dealt with technical matters.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 119

a landing ship and transported to Cochin where it was
onwards, Nistar helped train the Navy’s Deep Divers and
reinstalled and reconnected.

Clearance Divers.

In 1975, a full-fledged medical organisation was

In 1989, Satavahana was designated as the School for
sanctioned to provide cover for submarine rescue Submarine Warfare.

operations. In 1977, a safe ‘Submarine Bottoming Area’

By 1990, the EKM training equipment and the EKM
was established off Vishakhapatnam to exercise mating
command and control / attack simulator had been
trials between Nistar and submarines.

installed.

Between 1982 and 1987, contemporary European

N u c le a r P ro p u ls io n fo r Su b m arin es

SRVs were evaluated for their suitability. A study was
carried out of the utilisation, on payment, of the CIS

“Nuclear propulsion in India was first mooted in 1967

Navy’s air-portable Deep Submergence Rescue Vessel when a naval officer and a BARC scientist prepared a feasi

(DSRV) rescue system. Each of these had pros and cons
bility report. A more detailed report was prepared in 1971
in Indian conditions.

as the Committee of Secretaries felt that R&D on nuclear

The drought of the late 1980s and the ensuing shortage
propulsion technology was inescapable if India was not to
of resources led to the acquisition of a new SRV being
be left too far behind by the end of the century, when atomic
postponed and the search for an interim solution.

energy would be a major source for both propulsion and
energy requirements. A small nucleus of engineers was

In 1988, a vessel, which Mazagon Docks had built as
located in BARC as early as 1978.” 14
a Diving Support Vessel for offshore oil exploration work
became available for acquisition. It had a dynamic thruster

“Seeing the advent of nuclear propulsion in submarines
facility and a recompression chamber. It was taken on dry of other navies, a study was undertaken by BARC to charter and fitted with the diving bell and other essential
study a nuclear propulsion package for naval ships and
rescue equipment removed from Nistar. After trials, she
submarines. A stage arose when it became necessary
was commissioned as INS Nireekshak on 8 Ju n e 1989.

to train serving personnel in this very important area of

Even though she was not a perfect SRV, she was better than
propulsion technology."15
the Nistar, which had become due for decommissioning.

“The offer by the Soviet authorities of a ‘nuclear-powered

The roles envisaged for Nireekshak were:

submarine fleet’ for the Indian Navy was made by Marshal

• Facilitate rescue from a submarine in distress.

Ogarkov during his visit to India in April 1981. The Soviets

• Facilitate training of saturation divers.

offered to arrange a two-year training programme for Indian
naval personnel, lease one nuclear submarine for five years

Tran sform ation o f IN S Satavahana into the S c h o o l for for practical training and to render technical assistance for

S u b m a rin e W arfare
creating maintenance facilities in India for nuclear powered

When INS Satavahana commissioned in 1974, the submarines. He added that the sale, as also assistance for Submarine Training Wing and the Submarine Escape
designing and constructing nuclear-powered submarines,

Training Facility formed part of the Integrated Type Training
could be taken up later.” 16

Establishment for the Russian acquisitions.

“An agreement was concluded with the Soviet Onion

In 1986, when Southern Naval Command was assigned
and a team of officers under the supervision of Vice
the task of ‘Training’, NHQ decided that submarine training Admiral MK Roy was formed to steer the project. After a would remain under Flag Officer Submarines.

rigorous selection procedure, the first batch of the nuclear
submarine crews, under the command of Captain S Daniel

To concentrate surface ship training in Cochin and
commenced their training in the G SSR . The training was,
to make space available in Satavahana for the training
perhaps, the most thorough and taxing course that any
equipment of the newly inducted 877 EKM submarines,
of the Indian submariners, most of whom had over a
all the training equipment in the Surface Training Wing of decade of submarining behind them, had ever undergone.

Satavahana was carefully disconnected, bodily lifted into

14. W ar in the Indian O cean by Vice Admiral MK Roy, Pages 114 et seq.

15. Excerpt from The P icto ria l H istory o f the Subm arine Arm published by Naval Headquarters 1992.

16. W ar in the Indian O cean, by Vice Admiral MK Roy, pages 114 et seq.

120/ TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Jp lo m b ’- rbed the neW techn° ' ° 9y ^

Professi°n a l
escort her homeward. On arrival at Vishakhapatnam, she
was received by Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi, the Defence

Between 1982 and 1986, the crew was trained The Minister KC Pant and the CMS Admiral Nadkarni. After base facilities were set up by 1987.

embarking, they were taken to sea for an outing.

“On September 14, (1987) Admiral Roy, Vice Chief of

During the three years of her lease, Chakra worked with
the Eastern Naval Command, conveyed to me the pleasant both the Fleets off the east and west coasts of India.

news that the Government had finally decided to take the

Developments After 1990
first nuclear-propelled submarine from the Soviet Union
on lease, as purchase would entail acceptance of NPT Kalvari / Vela Class Submarines conditions.

The four submarines of the Kalvari class decommissioned

The idea of acquiring a nuclear-propelled submarine between 1989 and 2003 (giving an average in-service life was floated by me as Defence Minister and after months of 28 years). Of the four Vela class, two underwent 6-yearly of bargaining the Soviets agreed. A training programme refits between 1995 and 1999 and are still in service. The was arranged for Indian sailors. I had visited the trainees other two decommissioned between 1997 and 2001.19
in Leningrad and Riga. 1 was also happy that the lease Chakra amount charged by the Soviet Union was fairly reasonable.

The nuclear propelled submarine had the advantage of On completion of the lease, Chakra sailed for Russia on remaining under water, which was not possible for the 16 December 1990 and was thereafter decommissioned conventional submarines. It was also proposed at that in January 1991.

time that a second nuclear-propelled submarine would Submarine Propulsion Batteries be built in India. The Atomic Energy Commission experts
were confident of producing an atomic power pack for the The programme for the indigenisation of propulsion submarine.” 18
batteries for the 877 EKM submarines that had been
initiated in 1987 had not completed when the Soviet Gnion

The Lease of Nuclear Submarine Chakra
dissolved in 1991. By 1992, however, part supply of the
first battery set for both EKM and SSK submarines started

On completion of the sea training commitment, the being received from Standard Batteries and Chloride India submarine was taken in hand to prepare her for the three- respectively. It took some years for indigenous batteries to year period of lease.

completely replace those coming from Ukraine.

The Utilisation of Chakra

German HDW 1500 Shishumar Class (SSK )

Chakra commissioned on 5 January 1988 and sailed for Submarines

India on 15 January 1988. Except when transiting through SSK 3, Shalki, commissioned on 7 February 1992 and SSK
shallow waters in the South China Sea, the Singapore 4, Shankul, commissioned on 28 May 1994. After Shankul's Straits and the Strait of Malacca, her passage was commissioning, the indigenous submarine construction submerged. Throughout her passage, she was trac e
programme at Mazagon Docks came to an end.

by Australian and American M R A S W aircraft. The frigate

Dunagiri rendezvous’d her in the South
ina

3i5

18. Former President, R Venkataraman, m his

V
nings and Decommissionings , page 376.

,9. For details, see Historical Reference Data section Uded TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 121

O v e rv ie w o f the S u b m a rin e A r m 1 9 7 6 -1 9 9 0

Year

RUSSIAN

GERMAN

RUSSIAN

RUSSIAN

INFRASTRUCTURE

KALVARI & VELA CLASS

HDW CLASS

EKM CLASS

NUCLEAR CHAKRA

1975

KALVARI under refit

Under evaluation

Escape Training Tower
in Russia Jan75-Jul 76
commissioned

KCJRSCJRA continued torpedo
firings for NSTL 58

1976

KHANDERI commenced

Under evaluation

Indigenous production
refit in Visakhapatnam
established of batteries for

KA. /ARI and VELA class

1977

KALVARI-NISTAR

Under evaluation
submarine escape trials

1978

KARANJ under refit

Under evaluation

Russian side
in Russia Feb 78-Oct 79
mentions EKM

1979

-

Under evaluation

Refit facilities established
in Visakhapatnam First
submarine docked in ND(V)

for repairs

1980

KHANDERI completed

Under evaluation

Russian side
refit in Visakhapatnam
offers EKM

KURSURA under refit in

Russia Sep 80-Apr 82

VELA under refit in

Russia Sep 80-Apr 82

1981

VAGIR under refit in

Contract signed

Russian side

Visakhapatnam
in Dec 1981
repeats offer

Jul 81-Oct 84

1982

VAGLI under refit in

Agreement signed

Russia Sep 82-Mar 84

Crew selected

1983

SSKs 1 and 2

Indian side

Crew commenced
construction
visits EKM
training in Russia
commenced in

Germany

1984

KALVARI under refit in

SSKs 3 and 4

Visakhapatnam
construction

Nov 84-Oct 88
commenced in India

1985

1986

SSKs 1 and 2

EKM 1

Crew completed
commissioned in
commissioned
training and returned

Germany
to India

1987

EKMs 2 & 3

Crew standing by

Construction of VLF station
commissioned
commenced

1988

KARANJ under refit in

Indigenous

EKMs 4, 5 & 6

Visakhapatnam

CHAKRA
production

Sep
commissioned

88-Dec 90
commissioned
established of
batteries for SSK and

EKM submarines

1989

KARANJ under refit in

EKM 7
in Visakhapatnam

Diving Support Vessel
commissioned

NIREEKSHAK chartered as
interim Rescue Vessel

122 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

1990

KARANJ under refit
in Visakhapatnam

EKM 8

- VLF Station commissioned
commissioned

- Battery Commissioning

Facility established in

1990

Bombay

CHAKRA returned to

Russia

1992

SSK 3 commissioned
in India

1993

1994

SSK 4 commissioned
in India

R etrosp ect
a tradition uniquely appropriate to Indian conditions and

By any yardstick, the achievements of the Submarine climate.

Arm were remarkable. In the thirty years from 1962 when,

As in the case of warships, Admirals Gorshkov and
starting from scratch, the very first submariners underwent Chernavin of the Soviet Navy did their utmost to help training in the British Navy, until 1991, the Navy inducted the Submarine Arm. The assistance of the Soviet and eighteen of the latest conventional submarines of their German governments and their navies was very valuable.

time, sixteen from Russia and two from Germany (with two Most valuable of all was the understanding of the Indian more German submarines under construction in Bombay) Government of the future potential of the Navy’s Submarine and also manned, operated and maintained a missile-firing Arm.

nuclear propelled submarine for three years, apart from

Submariners have always been an elite fraternity. The
setting up submarine infrastructure facilities at Bombay unique characteristic of submariners in every Navy, and and Vishakhapatnam.

one which India’s submariners have nurtured with the

The difficulties encountered in attracting into, and utmost care, is the awareness that when dived, the safety retaining in, the submarine cadre sufficient technical of their submarine depends on every member of the crew personnel (officers, artificers and non-artificers), the doing everything right. Each one of the crew knows that difficulties in refitting submarines and the difficulties in the lives of all depend upon each one doing the right thing.

coping with the ripple effects of inadequate air conditioning Mishaps have been manageable and non-catastrophic.

in tropical conditions were tackled with the typically Indian

Submariners also have unique customs. Writing in the
tenacity to keep things going until solutions were found.

Navy Foundation’s annual magazine Quarterdeck 1987,

The best features of four distinct traditions (three Commodore (later Rear Admiral) KR Menon said: pertaining to conventional submarines - the British

“Submarines may change, but customs and traditions
tradition in the early 1960s, the Russian tradition in the
don’t. Submarines still leave homeport for change of

1970s and 1980s, the German tradition in the 1980s and
base with a band on the jetty, and come back to be
the fourth tradition in the 1980s pertaining to Russian
received by the Captain SM and the traditional cake.”

nuclear submarines) were adapted and synthesise in o

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 123

16

The Russian Acquisitions 1976 To 1990

P re a m b le
trip or a long term assignment to embassies or trade
delegations, were thoroughly checked by various

The naval acquisitions from Russia (then known as the
authorities. The final decision was made by a special

Soviet Gnion) started in 1965 when the Navy’s traditional
department of the Communist Party Special Committee.

supplier, the British Navy, because of its own resource

Every individual leaving the country was called to this
constraints, was unable to meet the Indian Navy’s
department for an interview on his or her public position
requirements for modem destroyers and submarines. The
and private life, as well as on ‘Rules of Conduct for
initial acquisitions from Russia were mainly for deployment

Soviet Citizens Abroad’. These rules had been approved
in the Bay of Bengal to deter misadventure by a bellicose
by the Central Committee; they consisted of written

Indonesia laying claim to the island of Great Nicobar,
instructions and anyone going abroad had to sit through
which was separated from Aceh, the historically turbulent,
an explanation and sign a statement saying he had
northern tip of Sumatra by a mere 90 miles.

received and understood them.

T h e C o n stra in ts D u rin g Initial Interaction b e tw e e n

“Most of the rules listed things that were prohibited

1966
a n d 1976
or not recommended for Soviet citizens in foreign
countries. They were supposed to prevent us from

At the working level, the first decade of Indo-Russian naval

‘being probed and recruited by foreign intelligence’ on
interaction was afflicted by the Navy’s suspicions of the
the street and in stores, at the movies and theaters, at

‘secretiveness’ of the Russian specialists who came to
receptions and other events to which invited. Breaking

India to provide guarantee cover for each acquisition. In
the rules meant either being sent home immediately or
the Cold War propaganda of the time, Western literature
refused permission to travel abroad again.”

about the Soviet Gnion was in the English language and
portrayed the negative Western view of Communism and

In those early years, three main factors were at work.

of the Soviet Gnion. Many Indian naval minds became The Indian Navy strictly enforced the policy of ‘Need to susceptible to this bias.

Know’ to comply with its assurance to the Soviet side that
the security of their naval equipment would be assured.

Decades later, the memoirs of Anatoly Dobrynin,1 the Secondly, there was a near total paucity of naval personnel Soviet ambassador in Washington from the 1950s till the who knew the Russian language. And lastly, there was 1980s, shed light on this secretiveness that perplexed the
the secretiveness of the Russian specialists who came to

Navy in those days:

India. These factors combined to constrict the interaction

“Characteristics of Russian Official Dealing
that was so essential for coping with the new Russian

- Strict sense of secrecy/mania for secrecy.

technologies and procedures. Interaction improved slowly
as the two sides got to know each other. It was after the

- Inappropriate to talk with foreigners unless witnesses

1971 war that interaction rose exponentially.

were present.

- Ideological bias against everything foreign.

T h e F lo w e rin g o f M u tu a l U n d e r s t a n d in g

“Virtually no Soviet citizen was permitted to travel

The Indian Navy’s innovative use of Russian missile boats
abroad on anything except officially sanctioned business
in the attacks on Karachi during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan
or cultural exchanges.

War led to two significant developments.

“All Soviet citizens going abroad, either on a short

Within India, the Government and the nation became

1. In Confidence by Anatoly Dobrynin, Times Books, Random House, New York, 1995.

aware for the first time since Independence in 1947 of the
contribution that naval operations could make to national resultedtn HS|eemtntS ^ itS 0Wn 9estation tirne and policy objectives and how the Navy's swift achievemen
effort
aff6Cted °P erational availability. The
of regional maritime supremacy had hastened the end effort to synchronise all such facets of each acquisition'

of the war. This led, during the 1973 and 1975 Defence Contract'

^

S'de S proposal for a ‘Model

Reviews, to the Governments ready acceptance of the

Navys requirements for the acquisition, from Russia, Acquisitions Between 1966 and 1976
of ships, submarines and aircraft to fulfill long deferred Vessels requirements.

Delivered

Class

Two 730 tonne Landing Ships Tank

1966

Gharial

Within the Russian Navy, respect had developed for the

(Medium) LST(M)s
way the Indian Navy had used what Russia had supplied.

Five 80 tonne patrol boats

1967

P class

1 he Russian side responded positively to the Navy’s

Four 2,000 tonne ocean going

1967-69

Kalvari
requests for progressively better equipment in future
submarines
acquisitions.

A 6,000 tonne Submarine Depot Ship 1968

The initial acquisitions of ships and submarines had

Five 1,000 tonne anti submarine

1968-69

Kamorta
vessels.

been designed for the Russian Navy, which operated in a
cold and dry temperate climate and in cold, low salinity

Eight 180 tonne missile boats

1971

205
seas. They had not been designed to operate in the hot and

A 800 tonne Submarine Rescue Vessel 1971
humid climate and the warm, high salinity, corrosive seas

Five improved 1,000 tonne anti

1972-74

Arnala
typical of the tropics. As the Indian Navy gained experience
submarine vessels
of operating Russian vessels in tropical conditions, it

Four improved 2,000 tonne ocean

1973-74

Vela
was able to identify, and project to the Russian side, the
going submarines
essential alterations and additions required to ‘Indianise’ • Four improved 1,120 tone LST (M)s 1975-76 Ghorpad the Russian designs.

Each vessel was covered by a twelve-month guarantee

Russian Acquisitions Between 1976 and 1990
period during which the Russian ‘guarantee specialists’,
deputed to India by the ' zauods’2 of the respective Overview

‘Original Equipment Manufacturers’ (OEMs), rectified Surface Vessels all shortcomings and replenished all the spare parts • Eight missile boats in 1976.

consumed. The feedback by these specialists to their
respective zauods in the Soviet Union reinforced the • Three rocket boats between 1976 and 1978.

Navy’s official projections to the Russian side regarding • Six coastal minesweepers between 1977 and 1980.

the improvements considered essential for operation in the • Three guided missile destroyers between 1980 and tropics. As a result, the Russian side tried its best that each

1983.

successor series of Russian acquisitions became better • Six inshore minesweepers between 1983 and 1984.

than their predecessors.

• Four landing ships between 1984 and 1986.

The agreement for each ship / submarine catered also • Two guided missile destroyers between 1986 and for the supply of the onboard spares required for routine

1987.

maintenance up to the annual refit of the ship s equipmen

• Six coastal minesweepers between 1986 and 1988.

and the initial training of its crew. Separate
had to be signed for shore facilities like t e s o

, • Five gas turbine propelled missile boats between 1987
maintenance and preparation of weapons, or se 1

and 1989.

of facilities for major refits, for the supply o rePai

• Four anti submarine boats between 1989 and 1990.

and repair technical documentation, for ^a,n^ entiCaI
repair training, for crew training facilities avi

^

Submarines
equipment as was fitted on board an or
dures

• Eight submarines between 1986 and 1990.

which the crews could practice opera mg pracedures

• Lease of nuclear propelled submarine 1988 to 1991.

and tactics, etc. The implementation of each of

2. “zauod” is the Russian word for factory, industrial enterp TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 125

surface missiles, air-to-surface anti ship missiles fired from

Aircraft

Russian aircraft, sub-surface launched anti ship missiles

• Three MRASW IL 38s in 1977.

from submarine torpedo tubes, Airborne Early Warning

• Kamov 25 and Kamov 28 A SW helicopters from 1980
helicopters etc. The Soviet side promised to offer these
onwards.

requirements as soon as they had been developed.

• Two MRASW IL 38s in 1983.

How best to keep Russian ships, submarines, aircraft

• Eight LRMP TO 142s in 1988.

and equipment properly maintained, repaired and refitted
until the requisite refit facilities ashore had been fully

Infrastructure at Vishakhapatnam
erected and equipped at the respective home-ports.

• Construction continued of the new Naval Dockyard.

Som e headway was made on this issue. In the end

• South Dry Dock was completed in 1978.

1960s, for security reasons of segregating them from the

• Missile Technical Position established in 1985.

Western origin ships based in Bombay, all the Russian

• North Dry Dock Complex commissioned in 1990.

acquisitions had been based in Visakhapatnam on the East
coast. Operational considerations gradually compelled

Infrastructure at Bombay
critical facilities to be replicated in Bom bay on the West

• Missile Boat Engine Repair Facility was completed in
coast. By 1990, essential repair and maintenance facilities

1980.

had been set up on both coasts at most of the naval ports

• Mobile missile coast batteries.

and air stations from where the ships, submarines and
aircraft actually operated.

• Moored sonobuoys and monitoring systems.

The time over-runs that plagued the completion of

Technical and Design Assistance
facilities in the new Naval Dockyard at Visakhapatnam have

• Fitment of Russian weapons, fire control systems,
been discussed in the chapter on Maintenance, Repair and
sensors and associated equipment in the indigenous

Refit Facilities, as has the adverse effect of these delays
frigates and corvettes.

on the seaworthiness of ships and submarines. As far as

• Licensed production of Project 1241 RE missile boats in
submarines were concerned, where ‘safety when dived’

Bombay and Goa.

was paramount, the Russian side helped by undertaking
their 6-yearly Medium Repairs in Russia, whenever this

M a jo r I s s u e s
became inescapable.

Several issues animated the naval interaction between the

The Procedural Inability o f the Soviet Side to Supply

Indian and Soviet sides during the period 1976 to 1990.

Yard Materials’ like Hull Plates, Pipes and Cables

The Indian Navy’s projections for progressively better

Critically Required for Refits.

sensors, weapons and systems, suitably modified for

The Soviet State Committee for Foreign Economic

Indian conditions, to be fitted in the ships, submarines

Relations (G K ES) had under it two Departments - the
and aircraft being acquired from Russia, and in the Indian-

General Engineering Department (G ED ) and the General
built ships being fitted with a mix o f Russian, European

Technical Department (GTD). The G ED was responsible
and Indian equipment.

for the delivery of ships, submarines and aircraft complete

The maximum headway was made in this regard.

with exploitation documentation, on-board spares and five

By 1990, better missile boats, minesweepers, guided
years exploitation spares, the training of commissioning
missile frigates, submarines, helicopters and maritime
crews, training courses, etc. The GTD was responsible for
reconnaissance aircraft had been acquired from Russia.

dealing with all aspects of shore support (maintenance,

The latest available equipment and weapons were fitted
repair, refit, refit spares, repair documentation, workshop
in the frigates of the Godavari class, the corvettes of the
equipment and machinery, etc). As ships and submarines

Khukri class and were being negotiated for the follow-on
started being taken in hand for major 3-yearly and 6-yearly

Project 16 A frigates of the Brahmaputra class, the follow-
refits, the problem arose of the supply of items like hull
on corvettes of Project 25 A and the Project 15 guided
plating, pipes and electric cables, known as ‘Yard Materials .

missile destroyers of the Delhi class.

When demands for these items were raised on the GTD,
the GTD advised that these be demanded from the Ministry

There were some critical requirements that the Russian
of Foreign Trade. The Ministry of Foreign Trade declined
side could not meet by 1990 like longer range surface to
to accept these demands because the order quantity was

126 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

too small. The following excerpts reflect the nature of the
procedural deadlocks:

e

Problems of the kind took years to unravel.

“The supply of Yard Materials - hull plates, sections and

Indian Participation
t* • i"

Russian State Committee
pipes - for Soviet origin ships has been taken up time and
ceptance Trials and Training in Deep Repair.

again but without result. The QTD stand has been that

The Russian side was in complete agreement that the
these should be supplied by the Trade Agencies of the
ian avy should be self reliant in ‘repair expertise’ to

Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Ministry of Foreign Trade the maximum extent possible. The difficulty was how to has not accepted our requirement on the grounds that the
transfer this expertise.

quantities required by the Indian side are uneconomical
and should be supplied by GED/GTD. In July 1978,

Acceptance of a new Russian vessel was conducted
requirements of hull plates, sections and pipes for the in two phases, in the first phase, the Russian Navy’s next five years were given to the Ministry of Foreign Trade. representatives participated in the Russian Government’s They refused to accept and stated that the supply of yard

State Committee Acceptance Trials’. Before accepting
materials by the Ministry of Foreign Trade was not possible the Indian ship / submarine from a Russian shipbuilding in the foreseeable future.

yard, they checked that performance was as per
contract’. A Russian Navy crew then sailed the ship to the

"In view of this difficulty, it was suggested that GTD may
port at which the ship would be handed over. The vessel
obtain the material from the Trade Agencies and supplied wou^ t*ien be handed to the Indian commissioning crew rtn ‘ / 'a r k
t__ i:__j.__ i ii__j; i

. 1

1
to
t
o cam
ca /
rr
y ni
o lt
u
t ‘D

‘ p

D l
e ivp
liv r
e v
ry A r r p

Acc n h
ept n r
an p
ce Tr

T ia
ri l
a c’

ls ’. Hn

D r
u in
ri n
n
g t-
t hn
h c-
esa
on ‘cash and carry’ basis. GTD indicated that it did not deal
e
with the supply of such materials, which are to be indented trials, the Indian side would systematically verify that the directly on Trade Agencies. The GTD suggested that the performance specified in the contract for each system was minimum quantity that the trade agency could supply satisfactorily demonstrated. Whenever the performance parameters stipulated in the contract were not met, there
should be ascertained and orders placed accordingly. It would be dissension. The Indian side, therefore, suggested was also suggested that Indian Navy should explore the that the Indian Navy’s representatives should participate possibility of getting these materials through Indian firms in the State Committee trials. This would not only help to dealing with Soviet trade agencies.

avoid dissension during the Delivery Acceptance Trials, it
would also enable the Indian specialists to learn how to

“The Indian side pointed out that some of the items
achieve / restore peak performance in subsequent years
supplied in the Remont spares for submarines, like after equipment had been overhauled during refits.

plating and cables, were not sufficient to carry out refits.

The Soviet side stated that the Soviet Navy also faced

No headway could be made on this suggestion. Under the
similar problems and that the Indian side should not co

^ n stit

_ u

_ t

_ion law

_____ of the Soviet Union, it was not permissible
attempt making wholesale replacement, but do so only ^ foreigners to be allowed into shipbuilding yards where if the equipment could not be repaired easily. The Indian wars^jps were being constructed for the Soviet Navy, side pointed out that in the context of our submarines Simi|ar considerations affected the Indian side’s requests undergoing refit, the Soviet side had advised it would be ^ Dockyard civilians to be allowed access into equipment quicker and advantageous for us to replace full units and factories for 0n-job-training in the deep repair of complex carry out repairs of machinery and equipment remove
eqUjpment.

from ships / submarines before return to st°<*

^

T overcome this problem, the Soviet side did permit

Indian side reiterated that the delay in supply
q
personnel and Dockyard civilians to learn
quantities of cables, piping and p l a t i n g was seriously Indian nave p

.....................................

how the first Indian submarine underwent Medium
holding up the progress of refits in India.

e ovie

Repairs in Russia at their Vladivostok yard. Arrangements
side stated that these were repair materials an
a
were also made, whenever asked for, for Indian personnel
be ordered on Soviet Industry through the oreign r
to be trained in the deep repair / overhaul of major

Agencies. The Indian side pointed out that t e ma
equipm ent like gas turbines in special training centres set
could be procured through the Trade Agencies o
up for this purpose. In the case of the Rajput class guided
were able to calculate our total requiremen an'

missile destroyers, the Russian side specially arranged a
purpose, we had to depend entirely on t e 1
location away from their usual ship repair yard, for Indian
being provided by Soviet Design agencies.

personnel to learn, hands-on-the-job, how a Soviet Nav b
y
p r o v id with d eig n .ad
destroyer of the same class underwent Medium (i.e. up

6-
of considerable help to the Indian si
yearly) Repairs.

refits.”

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 127

The crux of the problem lay elsewhere. In the Russian

Very little headway could be made on this issue. On
system, a specialist ‘specialised’ in one system or an aspect the one hand, the Indian side’s inadequate knowledge of it. By continuous association, each specialist mastered
of the Russian language and of the codification system
all there was to know about his system. In the Indian system,
of Russian stores resulted in indents being prepared
however, not only were Dockyard civilians not so vertically incorrectly and their rejection by the Russian side as being specialised, but also uniformed officers and sailors were incomprehensible. On the other hand, the time taken for regularly transferred out of the Dockyards to be assessed
the mandatory Indian procedure for financial scrutiny of
for performance in other assignments. Whenever the Navy the costing of each item in each indent was unable to suffered a major problem that it could not tackle, it would
mesh with the Russian side’s stringent procedures for
seek Russian assistance. The Russian side would suggest signing agreements in good time so as to dovetail with sending a large team of vertical specialists. The Indian side the annual production plans of Russian factories. The would demur and suggest fewer specialists. The Russian
enormous, unsuccessful, efforts made by both sides to
side would then send a general specialist. The problem overcome these problems have been discussed in the would linger on until the Indian side agreed to accept the
chapter on Logistics.

appropriate number of deep specialists.

Model Contract

As a long-term solution, the Russian side repeatedly As mentioned earlier, separate contracts had to be suggested that the Indian side should ask for civilian
processed with the G ED and the GTD for ships and for each
experts from their Russian factories to come to India to of the different elements of their associated infrastructure train our Dockyard civilians. This never fructified. In the
like training, training facilities, repair documentation,
first place, our Dockyard civilians were not so vertically repair facilities, repair spares, etc. The Indian side felt specialised as to learn deep repairs on a one to one basis.

Secondly, apart from the financial aspect of accepting so
it essential to formulate a ‘Model Contract’ which, in a
many specialists, dozens of vertical Soviet specialists could
comprehensive document for each acquisition, would
not possibly teach highly technical, deep repair training,
dovetail the delivery of refit spares with the operating and
in the Russian language, via an interpreter, to a handful of refit cycle, with the installation of refit facilities, with the Dockyard civilians whose knowledge of English was limited.

completion of the repair training, with the delivery of repair

Thirdly, six officers and fifty Dockyard civilians had been
documentation in English and so on. Only thus would it be
deputed to the Soviet Union in 1967 for training in Soviet possible to eliminate the serious difficulties that were being yards; a team of 25 officers and Dockyard supervisors had
experienced as a result of these items being processed in
been deputed to Vladivostok in 1975 for a full year to learn
separate un-synchronised contracts.

submarine repairs on-the-job; and a special Training Centre

No headway could be made on this issue. Whilst
had been set up in the Kronstadt Dockyard in Leningrad
the Russian side agreed that there might be scope for
to train Dockyard civilians; all these teams had absorbed
amalgamating some of the separate contracts thereby
very little. Fourthly, the Indian side somehow could not get reducing the total number, detailed consideration of the rid of the suspicion that Russian specialists sought every Indian side’s suggestion had shown that it was not possible opportunity for foreign travel, particularly to warm and to attempt a single contract to cover all aspects. The hospitable India. And last but not least, there was the fear insurmountable problem was that too many ministries and that the Western world would say that the Russians were
factories were involved and under Russian procedure, each
running India’s Navy. Cumulatively, the Navy was severely factory under each different ministry had to draw up its disadvantaged by its inability to overcome its reservations own contract in terms of financial clauses, delivery dates, and resolve this contretemps.3
documentation, guarantee specialists etc.

It took years of perseverance and innovation for our

‘Hybridisation’

specialists to acquire deep repair expertise. Whenever
determined technical officers tackled this problem by personal The first decade of Indo-Russian naval interaction, 1966
involvement, the results were extremely successful.

onwards, had focused primarily on the induction of

Russian ships and submarines and the creation of their

Grappling with the Russian procedures for the supply
support infrastructure. From 1974 onwards, the scope of
o f the various categories o f spares and repair technical interaction widened. In addition to acquiring better ships, documentation to sustain the combat readiness o f the submarines, aircraft, helicopters and weapons from Russia, Russian acquisitions.

interaction involved the installation of Russian weapons

3. This entire problem has also been dealt with in the chapter on the Naval Expert Committee, page 158.

128 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

and systems in Indian built hulls, interfaced with a mix of

Western and indigenous equipment.

time to avoid delays in their construction schedules.

• Soviet factory specialists arrived at the right time for

This 'hybridisation began with the fitment in the I960
equipment trials etc.

vintage, British anti submarine frigate Talwar of surface
to surface missile systems removed en bloc from a non-

A hi? h'IeVGl Joint Indo-Soviet Working Group on
operational Russian missile boat. Talwar's installation

Shipbuilding (JISWOG), chaired jointly by the Deputy
was
completed and successfully test-fired in 1976. The

,nister of Shipbuilding of the USSR and India’s Secretary
confidence so gained clarified the grey areas in synthesising ° f Defence Production, was constituted to meet twice a European and Russian ship borne systems.

year’ alternatelY in Delhi and in Moscow, to foresee and
reso|ve problems. The Indian participants included the

.xt step came when deciding the weapon package Chairmen of the three shipyards, representatives from for the three ships that were to follow the six Leander class Naval Headquarters’ professional directorates and the frigates being built in Mazagon Docks. In 1974, particulars Ministry of Defence. The Russian participants were from became available of the 5,000 tonne destroyers of the the concerned Soviet Ministries, the Heads of the relevant Rajput class and the 800 tonne ocean going rocket boat Design Bureaux, the designers associated with the specific of the Durg class, the contracts for which had been signed Indian Navy Project, representatives of the GED, the GTD, in 1975. In consultation with specialists from the Russian the factories etc.

Design Bureau, consideration began of the installation of

JISWOG held its first meeting in New Delhi in Mar
the Rajput’s radar and the Durg’s surface to surface and 1988, the second meeting in Moscow in Sep 1988 and surface to air missile systems in a new hull design. The so on. In due course, the terms of reference of JISWOG
outcome was the Godavari class missile frigates of Project were expanded to resolve problems of product support for 16. This project has been discussed in the chapter on Russian ships and equipment that had been supplied in Warship Design and Construction.

earlier years. Moreover, with the interaction at JISWOG
meetings yielding better foreknowledge of the equipment

The next step, again in consultation with specialists and weapons for future supply, it became possible to from the Russian Design Bureau, was the installation of augment existing maintenance and repair facilities instead even more modern Russian weapon systems in the new of setting up new facilities.

Corvettes of Project 25 and the new Destroyers of Project

15.4 These Projects too have been discussed in the chapter Indigenisation on Warship Design and Construction.

In the Indo-Russian naval context, indigenisation had two

Licensed Production
phases:

• In the first phase, the 1970s and early 1980s, the focus

Concurrently with this hybridisation, the licensed
was on resolving the logjam in the supply of spares.5
production commenced of the new, fast, 400 tonne, gas

The Russian side repeatedly stated that Indian industry
turbine propelled missile boats of Project 1241 RE. The
was quite capable of making many of the items of spares
first five boats of this class were acquired from Russia. The
and equipment that were being indented from Russia.

production of the remainder was shared between Mazagon

The procedural requirements of licensed production

Docks and Goa Shipyard. This Project has been discusse
of such items were discussed over the years but the
in the chapter on Warship Design and Construction.

quantities involved were never large enough to justify
the investment.

JIS W O G

• By the next phase, in the late 1980s, two things had

By 1987, both the Russian and the Indian sides
happened Firstly, considerable indigenisation had begun
that the widening cooperation in surface wars
to be achieved in the equipment for the destroyers (Delhi
and design required regular overseeing an mom
class), frigates (Godavari and Brahmaputra classes),
high levels to ensure that:

corvettes (Khukri class) and gas-turbined missile boats
f l241 REs)

• Agreements were signed and orders
j

S eco n d ly, the economic restructuring taking
right time so that Russian equipment and material was
place in the Soviet Union had led to the Soviet side
delivered to Indian warship building yard

___

Brahmaputra class frigates of Project 16 A - the

__________________________ __________
f project 25 A, the follow on

4. In the 1990s, similar action was taken
f ^ w o n Bangalore class destroyers of Project
successors of the earlier Godavari class

5. See chapter on Logistics, page 166.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 129

insisting on payment for equipment and spares only in

• Six 2,000 tonne ocean-going

1986 to 1988 Sindhughosh
hard currency or on ‘cash and carry’ basis, particularly

877 EKM submarines
for those items that were required urgently or where we

• Five 450 tonne gas- turbined

1987 to

1989 Veer
were advised to deal directly with the manufacturing

1241
units. The combination of these developments spurred
interest in widening indigenisation.

• Four 490 tonne gas-turbined

1989 to

1991 Abhay

1241 PE A/S Craft

To make indigenisation cost effective, the Indian side

• Eight Long Range Maritime

1988
initiated discussions in the JIS W O G that:

Patrol TU 142 LRMP aircraft

• A large number of equipments for Soviet supplied ships

• Two 2,000 tonne ocean-going

1989 to 1990 Sindhughosh
and submarines had been indigenously developed, like

877 EKM submarines
submarine batteries, electric cables, welding materials
and electrodes, converters, electric motors, control

• A nuclear propelled submarine
panels, pumps, generating sets, distilling plants, deck
on a 3-year lease from 1988 to 1991
machinery etc.

Specific aspects relevant to these acquisitions have been

• Indian industry was keen to export these items to Russia, if discussed in the chapters on the Submarine Arm, the Air these were either in short supply or were being imported.

Arm, Refit Facilities, Logistics, Personnel and Indigenous

• Would the Soviet side consider entrusting to Indian Warship Construction.

PSGs like MDL or BEM L the manufacture of items that
were being obtained from other countries?

In do R u s sia n R e la tio n s a n d N a v a l A c q u is itio n s A ft e r 1 99 0

This interaction was to fructify, a decade later, in the codevelopment, co-production and co-marketing of projects Except for the serious dislocation caused in the availability
like the Brahmos anti ship missile.

of spares and equipment for the earlier acquisitions, Indo-

Russian naval relations continued to flourish in depth and

Acquisitions Between 1976 and 1990
in width.

Vessels/Aircraft

Delivered

Class

In 1994, India and Russia signed an agreement on long

• Eight 200 tonne Improved

1976 to 1977 Prabal/Chapal
term, bilateral, military-technical cooperation till the year

205 ER Missile Boats

2000. In October 1997, this was extended till 2010.

• Three 800 tonne ocean-going

1976 to 1977 Durg

Rocket Boats

In 1995, India acquired a second hand tanker from

Russia.

• Five IL 38 Maritime Recce Anti

1977 to 1983

Submarine Aircraft

From 1997 onwards, the Sindhughosh class 877

• Six 700 tonne Coastal

EKM submarines started being sent to Russia for

1977 to 1980 Pondicherry

Minesweepers
modernisation.

• Three 5000 tonne Guided Missile 1980 to 1983 Rajput

In 1997, a contract were signed for three 3840 tonnes

Destroyers

Krivak III guided missile destroyers of the Talwar class and

• Seven Kamov 25 Anti Submarine 1980 to 1986
two improved 877 EKM submarines.

Helicopters

In October 2000, India and Russia signed the Strategic

• Six 90 tonne Inshore

1983 to 1984

Partnership Declaration pledging that the two nations

Minesweepers
would not join any political or military blocs and avoid

• Four 1,120 tonne Landing Ships 1984 to 1986 Cheetah
treaties that would infringe on each other’s national

Tank Medium
security interests. The declaration highlighted defence
and military technical cooperation, service-to-service

• Two 5,000 tonne Improved

1986 to 1987 Rajput

Guided Missile Destroyers
cooperation and joint R 8- D and training.

• Thirteen Kamov 28 Anti

1986 to 1988

An Inter-Governmental Agreement signed in October

Submarine Helicopters

2000 agreed in principle for the following naval acquisitions,

• Six 700 tonne Coastal

]

the final contracts for which would be negotiated

986 to , 988 Karwgr

Minesweepers
separately:

130 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

• The acquisition, after refit, of the aircraft carrier Admiral

Gorshkov with:

he one hand, as in the previous decade the

-The naval version of the MIG 29 K Short Take Off Land acquisitions^ ^
l° S'°W d0Wn the Pace of

(ST O L) fighter aircraft, armed with air to air, air to S ‘
r r the shortage °f technicai °ficers
surface, and television guided missiles, and capable “
s' " e 9 ,nsettinguprepairfadHtiesandthe
backlog of refits combined to affect the seaworthiness of
of being refueled in-flight by tanker aircraft to extend ships and submarines. On the other hand, there were other strike range,
enderrac causes that affected the Navy's ability to keep the

- Kam cv 28 anti submarine helicopters and,
acquisitions seaworthy and combat ready.

- Kamo 7 31 airborne early warning helicopters.

Until 1966, the Navy’s ships were entirely of British

This c .ract was concluded in 2004.

origin. The machinery, weapons, sensors and other
equipment were of almost the same technological vintage

An In-- Russian Inter-Governmental Commission on
as ships in the British Navy, whose feedback kept the India

M?i:«:ary-T mical Cooperation was set up, headed jointly Navy au fait with the problems encountered in the fields by i:he Indian Defence Minister and the Russian Deputy of operations, maintenance and logistics. Spares were Prime Minister. Two working groups of this Commission readily available off the shelf, often through direct sourcing meet annually. The group headed by the Defence Secretary from the British Navy. Steam driven machinery permitted deals with military-technical cooperation. The group liberal usage. Rarely did anyone feel constricted by ‘hours headed by the Secretary Defence Production deals with of usage1.

warship building.

This changed after 1967. The vessels of various types
procured from Russia were densely packed with equipment

A c q u is itio n s A fte r 1990
whose maintenance routines were governed rigidly by

Surface Vessels

‘hours of usage’. The Russian operating - maintenance -

• A second-hand fleet tanker Jyoti.

refit - logistic system and procedures were designed to keep
vessels at instant readiness for combat in the Cold War with

• Three Krivak III, guided missile destroyers of the Talwar the CIS Navy. This was achieved by strictly regulated usage class.

between refits, backed up by an extensive maintenance and
logistic infrastructure ashore. Repair and refit cycles were

S ubm arines
closely spaced and dovetailed with instant logistic support.

• Two conventionally propelled, missile firing, improved

EKM submarines.

These Russian vessels arrived in India in an ambience
of ‘calendar based’ maintenance, totally different from

Aircraft

'regulated hours of usage’ they had been designed for.

• Kamov 31 A EW helicopters.

The Navy found that the procurement of spares from

Russia required strict conformance with their inflexible,

W eapons & S ystem s
time-consuming process. The Navy was neither used to this

• For indigenously constructed warships of the Delhi, process nor could it comprehend it for want of catalogues Brahmaputra and Khukri classes.

containing spare part reference numbers, difficult.es in
preparing indents in the Russian language, etc.

F a c ilitie s E s ta b lish e d [o r M aintenance, Repair, O verhaul The submarines, inducted from 1968 onwards, required
and Refit o f Russian Acquisitions:

a vew high level of technical monitonng and stronger

At Vishakhapatnam

For ships and submarines.

•

Thev had their own unique pressure

At Mumbai

For ships and submarines. l ? f : y S a U e uiements to ensure safety when U

H Soon thereafter, from 1971 onwards, the thin-

At Kochi

For inshore minesweepers. S? mp6d hth-speed missile boats arrived. They too had At Goa

For MRASW aircraft and ASW l ,miaue support philosophy, involving special to type helicop ters.

S

S

L

' S

complexes fo, .he bets .„d

At Arakkonam

For LRMP aircraft.

their missiles.

Retrospect

In 3 ^

'and logil2 c
and

T h e R u s s ia n a c q u is itio n p ro g ra m m e
period

S

E

’ Sm e unde, pressure. 1»«

“

1 9 9 0 w a s q u a lita tiv e ly differen t from t a
t ra n sitio n t o em in en c e / 131

1 9 6 5 to 1 975.

handled by the Logistics Organisation multiplied and

There is substance in the Russian view, which was stated
the rupee value of material used in the Naval Dockyard to every Indian delegation which complained about the non Bombay zoomed. Cumulatively, the induction of new availability of critical operational spares, that the shortage types of ships and weapons, the new procedures requiring
derived more from what, by Russian norms, was ‘excessive
austere usage, hour-based maintenance and instant usage by the Indian side’ and ‘beyond what the equipment logistics, the inadequate facilities ashore for maintenance was designed to do’.

and refit and continually transferring personnel in and out

The Indian Navy’s dilemma was that it just could not
of ships stressed the prevailing system to its limits.

countenance not giving every officer and sailor equitable

These stresses and strains were compounded by the

‘sea time’. It was a mandatory prerequisite for their next
inability of the Navy to come to terms with the reality that promotion. The perpetual compulsion of taking new crews the only way it could overcome the constraints of austere to sea and the inability to accept that Russian equipment usage and closely spaced refits for which the equipment would break down as soon as its design limits were had been designed, was by indenting substantially more exceeded led directly to ‘over exploitation'. Subsequently, spares than what even the Russian side had recommended
rather ironically, the Navy had to turn a blind eye to the fact
and by having efficient repair facilities. The chapters on
that time spent in ships that barely went to sea would still

Logistics and Refit Facilities have analysed why these could
have to be treated as sea time.

not be achieved.

From the technical angle, it was known that:

There were other compulsions.

• The new Dockyard coming up at Vishakhapatnam

As has been discussed in the chapter on Personnel, an
specifically for the Russian acquisitions would take
over-riding compulsion was the need to give equitable ‘sea
several years to be ready.

time’ to every officer and sailor by rotating ships crews

• Clntil the workshops of the new Dockyard were set up, the
every one to two years.

rudimentary Base Repair Organisation at Vishakhapatnam
could never cope with the annual refit / docking, biennial

From the very outset, the Navy, which was used to
refit and six yearly refit workload of submarines and
unrestricted usage of steam driven ships and auxiliary
ships.

machinery, blithely ignored the repercussions of not
adhering to the limitations laid down regarding the

• Even when, for operational reasons and also to ease
operating hours of critical machinery like diesel engines
the annual refit/docking load on Vishakhapatnam,
and diesel generators.

the minimum essential facilities for annual refit were
duplicated in Bom bay for the Russian vessels based

Vice Admiral A Britto, who retired as the Chief of Material,
there, ships and submarines still had to return to
recalls:

Vishakhapatnam for their major three-yearly and six-

“We had less success in coming to grips with manyearly repairs.

agement of technology in the acquisitions from Russia.

The only way vessels could have been kept combat ready

Firstly, these inductions, significant in number, took place was to minimise the mal-operation of equipment. This was at short notice in the face of manpower constraints, as
best done by conserving the experience of the officers and
well as those that inhibited assimilation of technology as a
men trained in Russia, and avail of the expertise of the
whole. These platforms also necessitated radical changes

Russianguaranteespecialiststhatcame with each newacqui-
in the philosophy of training, operation and maintenance sition. Neither of these resources was effectively harnessed.

and posed a major challenge to policy makers who To save on the costs of training personnel in Russia, the were beset with traditional mindsets due to the Western experienced personnel of the first few vessels were sent experience. Executive officers, in particular, lacked underback to Russia to commission the subsequent vessels, standing of the underlying principles of Soviet design,
much to the detriment of vessels so deprived. As regards
which were based on narrow design margins of equipment,
utilising the services of the Russian guarantee specialists,
restrictions in operating regimes and operational life of the difficulties of interacting in the Russian language and equipment, reduced manning / strong shore reliance and
our fierce pride in ‘not being technically dependent on the
scrupulous demands on procedures for maintenance

Russians’ restrained productive interaction.

and upkeep. We were simply unable for many years to
marry Soviet philosophy and practice into our scheme of

Despite all these vexatious problems, the Russian
things. Violations of technical philosophy, often insisted
acquisition programme between 1976 and 1990 did
upon, had many an undesirable consequence.”

manage to succeed, slowly to begin with and eventually

132 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

beyond everybody s expectations. It was in these trying
years that the solid foundations were laid for future Indo- than what the West had' that ‘India should purchase one Russian interaction.

om the West and give it to us and very soon we would
give India something better!’

After the initial resentment in the 1960s at the temerity

A substantial share of the credit for the success of
of Indian crews to decline the weekly political lectures and Indo Russian naval cooperation must go to the then the persistent questions of Indian officers and artificers State Committee for Foreign Economic Relations and its seeking to master their equipment, the Russian Training much maligned departments - the General Engineering Centres and their Academies accepted, with increasing Department (GED) and the General Technical Department respect over the next twenty years, that they were dealing (GTD). Their enormous patience and tolerance was able to with persons who were not only intelligent and professional bridge the Indian side’s inability to understand the inertia but also diligent and innovative.

of the centrally planned, totally Government owned and
controlled, Russian industrial system.

This professional respect over-arched the complex
procedural constraints of each side. The Russians started

An equally great, if not greater, share of credit must go
feeling proud to see how the crews they had trained, to the Indian Ministries of Defence and Finance (Defence).

meticulously carried out the Delivery Acceptance and Their agility in negotiations and the painstaking discussions Weapon Proving Trials before they confidently sailed their with their counterparts in the State Committee for Foreign vessels back to India. On the Indian side, the moment the Economic Relations belies the widespread naval belief crews commissioned their ships and submarines, they that the Navy was treated like a stepchild. The Navy’s realised how valuable the thoroughness of their Russian incredible technological up-gradation in just twenty-five years after 1965 would not have been possible without the
training had been.

whole-hearted support of these two institutions.

As mutual respect increased at the local fleet level, it

A large share of the credit for laying a sound foundation
percolated upwards to Moscow and got reflected in the for Indo-Russian naval cooperation belongs to Admiral greater width and depth of interaction with Indian naval Gorshkov until the mid 1980s and to his successor delegations to Moscow and Russian delegations to India.

Admiral Chernavin thereafter. They intervened adroitly

A remarkable facet of the high level interactions in at every impasse. The calibrated release of larger better Moscow and in Delhi was that each successive acquisition and more modern ships, submarines and aircraft were not only in step with the larger objectives of Indo-Russian
was an improvement on its predecessor. The Vela class
submarines were better than the Kalvari class and t e

Kilo class submarines were better than the Vela class,
e
second lot of Petyas was better than the Kam orta cass.

The second series of extended range missile boats was
better than the earlier series and the 1241 REs were e e
than both. The Karwar class coastal
the spectacular s
war These attacks not
m inesw eep ers we

Karachi harbour dunng ^

^ Russjan wegpons
better than the earlier Pondicherry class. T e
e Th
class LSTs were better than the earlier Ghorpad class.

only brought acc

^
validated Russian confidence

4th and 5th guided missile frigates were better t an
when well ® pl° ® ’

ence Over the years, whenever the
in Indian naval comp

Defence Ministers and high
three of the Rajput class. The TCJ 142 LRM ^rc
took Pnrn.

se, »„d ,h,» saw
better than the M RASW IL 38 aircraft. The ^ 28 AbW officials from the D

, t down by Russian missiles,
helicopters were better than their predecessor
rs srss?" - - *d,

Much of the credit for this ach ievem en t mu g ^
everybody else.

tth
h e
e tte
e n
n a
a c
c iitty
y a
a n
n d
d d
d e
e x
x te
t e r
r iity
t y wit
i h
th w
w h
hic
ichh suc^ ^d ^of tt^
h e
e rm
e v e r y

, n d m u t u a l r e s p e c t which flowered

VCNS' and COMs pursued the b r i e f s professiona|

,t was this confl^

. tQ joint)y design the sleek, elegant

I t W a S
f l t O I U i i i u y www.0 .- —
by
b
y th
t eir
i
r yo
y ung an
a d
n
d ea
e g
a e
g r
e
r sta
staff
rr ,
in
m

,
t Q

0f
f th
t e
e la
l t
a e
t s
e t
s
t
jn the years that folio.

jded missile corvettes of the
in the
the guided missile con/ettes of the
directorates. The latter were keeping a
t^e
and powerful s h ip s^ e t

9 ^

Qf the Delhl
developments in the Western navies an
studying Khukri class, the>

frj tes of the Brahm aputra
latest developments in the Soviet Navy y

^ ancj

Western naval compendia. The ^USS,an^na||y remark, in r

“

*■
were good humoured enough to occasi
et^jng better c

R

3=“w ”s“ 09lnl,sown
jest, regarding the Navy’s persistence or

TRANSITION t o EMINENCE / 133

None of the above would have been possible without

In retrospect, despite all the procedural limitations of
the close rapport that prevailed between the Indian and the
each side, the induction and absorption of the Russian

Soviet leadership at the highest political level in successive
acquisitions has been as monumental an achievement as

Governments, regardless of the party in power.

the Indigenous Warship and Submarine Projects.

134 / TRANSITION TO EM INENCE

17

Maintenance, Repair And Refit Facilities
opmen s i

5
manpower losses. It gave an example that could still, many

47, when India became independent, the Bombay decades 'ater’

a m°del for today's Dockyards and Ship

Do:..-.yard provided all the maintenance, repair, docking RePairYards:

.it support that the ships of that time needed.

"When a ship comes in for repair in the United States

The Coastal Force Workshops at

Cochin and Navy Yards>for aPProximately thfee or four days no work is Vishakhapatnam (then known in its short form as Vizaq) d° n6 ° " board’and offlcers and men on board shiP wonder had been established during World War II to support the What ‘S haPPenln9-uBeuh,nd 1116 scene’ careful Plannin9 is coastal forces operating against the Japanese in Burma.

^ " 9 wth the requirement of men and material
u ,
c
u-

*

1

.

r

.

,
to the last detail, as to how, when and where an item, for

They had a few machine tods, carpentry faciht.es for
js tQ be

Qn ^ fourth
abou{ g
repairing wooden hulls, a small slipway and basic shops
thousgnd men descend Qn board ^ sh|p

^ bees Qn g
like foundry, electrical repairs etc.

honeycomb, and the ship is ripped to bits, every individual

Between 1947 and 1975, considerable progress was knows exactly what is to be done, and in about three days made in the expansion and modernisation of the facilities

^e ship
is completely repaired.

at Bombay, Vizag and Cochin and the creation of new
rec0mmendation was accepted. In 1948, the
facilities at Port Blair.

British Navy organisation was replaced. Under the Captain

D

,

_

,

Superintendent, came the Industrial Manager, with four
ombay Dockyard
managers - Engineering, Electrical, Construction and

After World War II ended in 1945, the Grace Committee Maintenance - in addition to a Gun Mounting Officer.

was appointed in 1946 to make recommendations about

^
recommendation was that since buildings
the development of the Navys only Dockyard at Bombay.

^ Dockyard’s landward expansion, it should

It submitted its recommendations in 1947. Of t e ^ s^ ed out from Bombay to Nhava Sheva across the Committee’s recommendations, two were far-reaching.

harbour where there was deep water and vacant land

T h e firs, w a s that the Dockyard s t a i d dispense -

.

he ,„r expansion. T O .

^

£

* £
traditional British Navy Dockyard orgamsation, wlhidh re
because
shifting the exjsting Dockyard would
departmental loyalties at lower levels. Instea l s
no ro

’

. expensive, lt would have to be expanded in
adopt the ‘industrialsystem of
states siXithout disrupting the existing repair and refit capability
and tested during World War 1 by the
ated that was s u s ta in in g the tSavy's ships.2

Navy, wherein all industrial activity was

9

AHmiraltv Sir
under one technical head This system ensured high
consultation with the British Admira ty, Sir
a K S r s :

equipment, and above all pinpointing

For details, please see Hlsim

„ „ p * d the

P" P“

2* The sam e reasoning, twenty years later in t h jn *
the mid 1980s, when electricity, fresh water,
a major dockyard from scratch at Karwar.

• Creation of additional berthing facilities by constructing twelve years. Approval in principle was accorded in 1952.

new wharves.

This was modified subsequently to be undertaken in two
stages. The Naval Dockyard Expansion Schem e started in

• Creation of additional dry docking facilities.

1954.

At this point in time, the area enclosed by the Dockyard

By 1975, nearly 5,000 feet of additional wharfage had
was about half a square mile, including the Wet Basin,
been constructed to enable ships to berth alongside the
the Old Bombay Dock and the Duncan Dock. There
was little open space except near the docks. There was
new ‘Barracks and Frigate W harves’ (completed 1956),
only one breakwater. The total alongside wharfage was

‘Ballard Pier Extension (completed 1966) ‘Destroyer Wharf’

2,700 feet of the Wet Basin walls and the inner face of (completed 1967), ‘South Breakwater' (completed 1973).

the Old Breakwater. A cruiser required 600 feet and each All the berths were being provided with appropriate power destroyer / frigate required 400 feet. At these berths, there supplies, fresh water, sea water, compressed air, travelling was only restricted 220 volt DC supply and no permanent cranes, etc. Acres of sea had been dredged and acres of arrangements for the supply of compressed air or for sea
land had been reclaimed. A new ‘cruiser’ graving dock
water to supply the fire mains.

had been built (completed 1962) on the reclaimed land
and space had been earmarked for yet another and larger

In their report submitted in 1950, the consultants

‘graving’ dock. New workshops had been completed for
recommended:

repair of weapon systems, construction of boilers, testing

• Increase the existing land area of 39 acres to 120 acres
of steam machinery, repairing of machinery spares, testing
by reclamation, including a portion of the Ballard Pier of generators and overhauling of diesel engines. Approval and by acquiring land surrounding the Royal Bombay had been obtained for more new workshops as well as the Yacht Club premises.

modernisation of the old workshops.

• Construct 3,200 feet of breakwater to form a Tidal Basin Karanja Basin Bom bay and thus increase the protected water area from 24
acres to 150 acres.

Gntil the mid 1960s, ships used to anchor off Karanja and
embark ammunition brought by barge from the Naval

• Construct new workshops, offices, stores and all Armament Depot. This arrangement depended on the necessary buildings on the extended land.

weather being fair. In the mid 1960s, after detailed studies

• Construct two graving docks of suitable size, and
by the Central Water and Power Research Station Poona, a
increase the total berthing within the area of the Tidal
breakwater-cum-jetty was constructed at Karanja, for ships

Basin for all classes of vessels by about two and a half to secure alongside and embark ammunition.

miles.

Since this created a siltation prone basin, the foot of the

The Master Plan envisaged a new main breakwater jetty was built as a piled-bridge structure to enable water to starting at the Apollo Bunder and enclosing a new outer
flow freely through the basin in both states of tide, thereby
basin. The dredging of this basin would result in the
precluding stagnation of water and siltation.

reclamation of an area to the south of the existing yard,
which would accommodate two new large dry docks and

Unfortunately, heavy siltation still occurred. It is not clear
their associated workshops. Other new wharves were to be why this happened. One obvious reason was that the flow constructed within the existing basin and the area behind
of water through the piled-bridge gap was obstructed by
them reclaimed by dredging the basin.

the material that the contractor did not fully clear. Water
stagnated and the basin became a mud flat.

After discussion with the consultants, the Navy made one
major modification. Of the two new docks, it moved the

In the 1970s, the need increased for ships to embark
second smaller dock to a position inside and parallel to the
missiles and torpedoes. This could only be done at
existing Old Breakwater. This would enable the construction
alongside berths. To avoid these having to be brought by
during the very first stage of the expansion scheme of a
barges across the harbour, a scheme was considered that
dock for the cruiser Delhi, already in service.3
would solve this problem and also decongest the Dockyard
of the smaller vessels by providing them alongside berths

The Alexander Gibbs report envisaged the Naval
and a maintenance unit in an enclosed Wet Basin. Various

Dockyard Expansion Scheme in five stages over a period of
ideas were considered to de-silt the basin and keep it free

3. This Cruiser Graving Dock, as it came to be called, was extended with great agility and initiative just before its completion to take the aircraft carrier Vikrant. In later years, necessity spurred the innovation of concurrent docking of 5,000 tonne destroyers, alongside 1,500
tonne submarines and other 400 tonne attack and patrol craft in the same dock.

136 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

of silt - reopening the piled-bridqe structure , •. .•
silt for the tide to flush it through, creating deep^ater an^hp9? ’ SUn/6y ShipS W0re temP °rarily based in Vizag channels by capital dredging, etc. None of them wa
and
promising enough to follow through.

1 H u S,CT ? aS t3ken t0 Start settin9 UP a naval base
r
oc%ard. Machinery and equipment was procured

Vishakapatnam Dockyard
ipfitS e
nt!?9 .the repair faci,ities t0 enab,e the norm
al
craft
docklng of one modem frigate and four small

After the outbreak of World War II in Europe the Roval

Indian Navy set up a Boat Repair Workshop in Vizaq to

In 1965, two survey ships were permanently rebased at
support the elements of the Indian Army deployed in vizag. For the first time, the annual refit of a survey ship Burma.

was undertaken by the BRO Vizag.4

In December 1941, Japan entered the War that had

In 1965, the decision to acquire ships and submarines
started in Europe in 1939. Within months, Japan had from the Soviet Union was accompanied by the decision occupied Southeast Asia and the Andaman and Nicobar to segregate, for security reasons, these acquisitions islands and was advancing through Burma towards from the western origin ships based in Bombay and, with northeast India and the oilfields of Assam.

Russian assistance, to build a modem dockyard equipped
to maintain, repair and refit Russian origin ships and

The Navy instituted the ‘Coastal Forces Eastern Theatre’ submarines.

in March 1942; initiated action to build coastal forces bases
at Karachi, Trombay, Cochin, Mandapam, Madras and

A basic choice that had to be made at that time was:

Vizag and laid the foundations for coastal force slipways • Whether to build the new base and dockyard in the and workshops at these ports. The Boat Repair Workshop
vicinity of the existing naval base, Circars, inside the at Vizag was augmented with machine tools and blacksmith
existing harbour, the access to which was through a
and carpentry workshops, all of which were located inside
narrow channel which was susceptible to closure, or
the naval base, INS Circars. In 1943, the status of INS • to opt for an altogether new greenfield’ site (where the Circars was raised to that of a Forward Naval Base.

steel plant is now located) which, with its own, new,
wide, entrance, would be less susceptible to closure and

In 1947, this workshop was upgraded to a Centre for
free of the delays caused by the movement of merchant

Care and Maintenance of Ships with a 200-tonne slipway.

ships inside a confined harbour.

In 1953, this Centre expanded into a Base Repair

In
i v
n ie
vi w
e of
w t
ot h
t e
h
eh
ig
m h
g c
n o
c st
o a
st nd
an t
a h
t e
n
et im
u e
m
ed
e
a la
ei ys
ay in
s h
m e
n r
ee
r n
e t
n i.in
in

Organisation (BRO ). An Electrical / Radio Shop, an ICE t^e development of a completely new site that had neither Shop and a Foundry / Welding Shop were created inside raij nQr road connections, Vizag harbour was preferred.

Circars. A new BRO Complex was constructed at the mouth

The 1965 Agreement for the Russian acquisitions
of the Northwest Arm / Channel. Except for the slipway, the included the preparation of a Project Report for the Woodwork Shop and the Blacksmith Shop, all the other

Vishakhapatnam Project that comprised facilities for a

Shops were shifted to the new BRO Complex.

^

^

^ ^

q a_

_

_
naval base and ship support facilities, a submarine base

In 1958, the progress of Bombay Dockyard’s expansion and submarine support

- facilities, a^ ttrraoin
inin
lngn c
i om
m pplle
e x
x f foorr t thhee
repair
scheme was behind schedule. With the imminent arrival Russjan acquisitions and a Naval Dockyar o repair an from Britain of the eight new frigates and the aircraft replt ships a n d submarines.

carrier, Bom bay Dockyard would not be able to berth

A ~oon as the P r o j e c t R e p o r t was received in 1967, the
th e s e sh ips a lo n g s id e . It w as proposed that a naval base Qeneral of Mavaj projects Vishakhapatnam,
be established at Vizag, starting with a new 1,120 foot jetty

^ ^ ^ ^ execute the totai works of the
and a repair w orksh op . The Defence Committee o
e

Cabinet a c c e p te d in principle the establishment o a nava

Committee of the Cabinet accepted
base and d ock yard at Vizag.

>vals were accorded

In 1962, sanction was accorded for the construc 10
the new jetty and the workshop building. Sanction was

^ officer in Uiarc
accorded for the acquisition of 550 acres of lan ro

Captain Superinten<

Port Trust.

~~
j

1077 dry-docking or sn

Until the new Dockyard’s dry dock was ready i

»'

.

0f docking

Vizag P o rt T rust, d e p e n d in g o n d o c k availability and duration TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 137

Base Repair O rganisation Port B la ir

Between 1970 and 1975:

After China’s attacks in October-November 1962, the

• Since the new Dockyard would take years to come up, responsibility for the seaward defence of the Andaman the facilities of the BRO Workshop were augmented and and Nicobar Islands was transferred from the Army to the the BRO itself expanded.

Navy. The first Resident Naval Officer arrived in Port Blair

• The BRO was re-named as Naval Dockyard on 29
in November 1962. In mid 1963, the first Naval Garrison

March 1972.

of five officers and one hundred and fifty six sailors arrived

• The 1,120-foot naval jetty, as well as the new wharves and in Port Blair.

jetties envisaged in the Project Report were completed

Until the Navy’s Seaward Defence Boats arrived, sea
and their approaches dredged.

patrols and inter-island transportation were suppc/ied by

• The Naval Base, the Training Complex, the Submarine craft of the Central Board of Revenue. Soon, the r -;d w :s Base and submarine facilities and the facilities for felt for a maintenance and repair facility to sustcu: the^e weapons were completed and commissioned.

small craft, which were operating so far away from the

Base Repair Organisation Cochin
nearest BRO at Vizag.

After independence in 1947, the Coastal Force Workshop

In 1964, after INS Jaraiua was commissioned as the
and its slipway located inside the naval base, INS parent establishment at Port Blair, the requirements of Venduruthy, evolved into a Base Workshop, having 32 machinery, personnel, buildings and shore supply facilities employees, a 178 metre long jetty and minimal facilities for setting up a BRO were included in the overall plan for for engineering and electrical repair work. Its basic role setting up an advance naval base. This plan envisaged was to help visiting ships seeking assistance to become the construction of a 1,200-foot wharf, half of which seaworthy enough to proceed under their own steam to would be for naval use. In 1966, approval in principle was Bombay Dockyard.

accorded for setting up a BRO and berthing facilities in
three phases.

Over the years, this workshop grew into a Base Repair

Organisation (BRO) with additional facilities like a Machine

From 1966 onwards, as soon as the newly arrived

Shop, Foundry Shop Blacksmith Shop, Battery Charging Russian patrol boats and landing ships started operating and Electro Plating Facilities, and a Weapon Mounting in the islands, the need arose for a support-cum-repair Repair Shop. By 1963, plans had crystallised to augment facility at Port Blair to save the ships from having to go all the BRO and build a new naval jetty on the Willingdon the way across the Bay of Bengal to Vizag for repairs. From Island foreshore.

1967 onwards, the old landing ship Magar was positioned
in Port Blair to provide this support.

In 1963, the Ministry of Shipbuilding decided to set up
the Cochin Shipyard, which would have an 1,800 foot

In 1967, approval was accorded to set up an advance
jetty on the Ernakulam side of the channel. This made it base at Port Blair. Construction of the new wharf necessary to shift the site of the proposed naval jetty closer commenced in 1968.

to the Ernakulam Bridge.

In 1969, the old stores ship, Dharini, which had earlier

In 1965, the three old Hunt class destroyers Godavari, been converted into a repair ship by equipping her with a Gomali and Ganga were rebased from Bombay to Cochin workshop, machine tools and repair materials to support and proposals put up for additional workshop facilities. the coastal minesweepers, was positioned in Port Blair as However, due to the large expenditure on the Bombay an afloat maintenance facility. The arrangement did not and Vishakhapatnam Dockyards between 1965 and 1975, prove satisfactory and Dharini returned to Bombay.

substantial funds could not be allocated for augmenting

BRO Cochin.

In 1972, a Base Maintenance Unit (BMCJ) was set up for
the maintenance of the three Russian patrol boats then

In 1972, the Training Squadron comprising the cruiser stationed at Port Blair. As naval activity increased between Delhi and the frigate Kistna was based at Cochin. In 1973
the mainland and the islands, the BMCI expanded.

an Apprentice Training School was established inside the

BRO and the yard craft in Cochin were placed under the

GLadUa,ly’ 'n*rus*ons increased in the southern group of

BRO. In 1975, approval was accorded for the construction
e icobar Islands. These became easier to deal with if
of the new naval jetty.

patrol boats did not keep returning to Port Blair... In 1973,
a forward operating base, INS Kardip, was commissioned

138 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

on Kamorta and patrol craft started operating from there.

Soon, a small maintenance unit was set up in Kamorta.

and'thP'RM n™

^ eventua,,y commissioned in 1979),
la n d i n n h

WacSuUnable to meet the requirements of the

In 1974, sanction was accorded for establishing a BRO
ding ships, a Ship Maintenance Unit (SMCJ) was set up.

having comprehensive facilities to repair the landing ships

By 1975, the makeshift facilities at Port Blair and Kardip
that were operating in the islands. Since its construction
were managing to sustain the landing ships and patrol
boats operating in the islands

Developments After 1975

The Naval Dockyard At Bombay5

The Naual Dockyard Expansion Scheme (NDES)

The NDES comm- :sd in 1954 and completed thirty years later in 1984. It was undertaken in two stages.

Expansion Works C

Izrtaken in the First Stage

Co

C m
o m
m e
m n
e c
n e
c d
e

Completed

Dredging of the Inne" dal Basin

1954

1967 to 1970

Reclamation of 27 acs :-s in front of Castle

1954

1962 to 1970

Barracks between the old breakwater and

Ballard Pier

Construction of 2,300 feet of wharfage on

1954

1962 to 1970
reclaimed land for the Barracks and Destroyer wharves

Construction of the Cruiser Graving Dock on the

1954

1962
reclaimed land

Extension of the Ballard Pier by 750 feet and

1963

1966
incorporation into the Dockyard the extension of
the inner face of Ballard Pier.

Provision of ship support services

1954

1966 to 1970

(electric power supplies, fresh water,
sea water, compressed air, travelling
cranes etc) for the Barracks, Destroyer
and Ballard Pier wharves

Expansion Works Undertaken in the Second Stage

1967

1974

Construction of Rubble Mound Breakwater
and South Breakwater (Deep Water Wharf)

1972

1977

Capital Dredging of the Outer Tidal Basin
enclosed by the South Breakwater and
reclamation of 39 acres of land in the area
enclosed by this new break water, to provide
space for a new Graving Dock and an additional

2,000 feet of wharfage

1981

1975

Enlarging the old breakwater into a Fitting

O u t W h a rf

1984

1981
ovision of ship support services (electric power

^Jpplies, fresh water, sea water, fuel storage,
t° m^ essed air, mobile rectifiers, steam supply,
cranes, capstans etc) at South Breakwater
and Fittin g Out Wharf

T

^ b ‘St0ry. °{lhe Naual Dockyard Bombay by Rear Admiral K Sridharan p rated lts 250lh anniversary in 1986.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 139

NAVAL DOCKYARD BOMBAY IN 1990

Subsequent Works

Modernisation of Bombay and Duncan Docks

1981

1985

New Main Graving Dock and additional wharves6

1995

Under construction

The Modernisation of the Dockyard
recom m ended the m odernisation of the Dockyard in three
phases, catering for Im m ediate, Interm ediate and Future

C ertain w orks had com m enced in 1965, sanctions for
requirements. Their report, approved in 1975, catered for
which had been obtained separately.

ten workshops / facilities in two phases - four were to be

In 1969, the N ational Industrial Developm ent Corporation
im plem ented in Phase I and six in Phase II.

(NIDC) was appointed as the official consultant to:

W ith expansion and m odernisation being im plem ented
o Evaluate and analyse the Dockyard’s present and future
concurrently, the Director General, Naval Dockyard
workload.

Expansion Schem e, Bom bay was re-designated in August
o Assess the D ockyard’s existing and required capacity.

1978 as Director General Naval Projects Bom bay - D G N P

(B ). As had been done in Vishakhapatnam , he was placed
o Prepare a m odernisation M aster Plan indicating the under the direct administrative control of Ministry of lo cation of each departm ent, shop, road, storage area,

Defence. All the projects in Naval Dockyard, Bom bay -
canteen, toilet, office and shore facility for ships under
the Expansion Schem e, N ID C m odernisation, W E C O R S
m aintenance.

Phase III etc were placed under his purview to centrally

T h e N ID C subm itted two reports, 1971 and 1974. These
coordinate their execution.

M odernisation/Augm entation Works Undertaken

Commenced

Completed

Weapon Control & Repair Shop (W ECO RS) Phase 1

1960

1966

Jo in er Shop

1963

1965

Life Raft Repair Cell

1964

1965

Boiler Erection Shop for Leander boilers

1965

1969

Phased replacement of old machines/machine tools

1966

1968

1967

1970

Augmentation of workshop facilities

1967

1975

W EC O R S Phase 2

1970

Test House for minesweeper Deltic diesel engines

1973

Interim Auto Control Bay for Leander equipment

1974

Light Internal Combustion Engine Workshop

1974

Light Diesel Engine Workshop

1975

Boat Repair Shop

1978

Steam Test House

1978

Submarine Battery Charging facilities

1972

1979

Missile Boat/Durg/Minesweeper Engine Workshop

1977

1981

Auxiliary Machinery Workshop (NIDC Phase I)

1977

1981

Pipe Repair Shop (NIDC Phase 1)

1982

Auto Control Bay

1983

Galvanising Bay

1977

1987

W EC O R S Phase III

1981

1986

Hull Assembly and Steel Preparation Workshop

1982

1984

Controls Engineering Workshop (NIDC Phase I)

1982

1985

Electrical Repair Shop (NIDC Phase I)

_______________________

---------------------

---- o
f

Hrv dock was to be constructed under water using specialised precision 6. 75% of this 236 metre long, 37 metre wide, 8 metre ae p
y

^
concrete was to be laid at a depth of 10 metres, followed by
equipment and 12,000 pre-cast blocks weighing 20 t0" ne;\
ctufe j 000 metres of additional wharfage were to be created. During
placing of blocks and in situ co n cre te ^ creating^

^

Wor|< hgs faeen resumed
construction, a mishap occurred in

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 141

1985

Air Conditioning/Refrigeration Shop (NIDC Phase II)

1986

Submarine Base Complex

1988

Submarine Battery Commissioning Facility

1988

Heavy Diesel Engine Workshop (NIDC Phase II)

1985

1990

Epoxy Coating Shop (NIDC Phase II)

1986

087

Electroplating Shop (NIDC Phase II)

1987

•989

Electrical Test Station (NIDC Phase II)

1988

1990

Dockyard Productivity
of Warehousing (CWH) and Controllerte o. Technical

Services (CTS) came into being.

The availability of spares / machinery replacements is a
basic determinant for completing repairs and refits on time. The Naval Dockyard At Vishakhapatnam In the 1960s, refits started being delayed on this count.7

It was decided to appoint consultants to recommend The Soil Conditions at the Site remedial measures.

The only area available of the size required for the Vizag

The first study to be carried out was by the National Dockyard Project was a swampy, marshy estuary, it had Productivity Council (NPC) in 1963 to suggest ways and been the bed of the Meghedrigedda River that had dried means for improving productivity and obtaining a higher Up several hundred years ago. The soil comprised soft, degree of motivation and training for Dockyard personnel. comPressible’ marine clay that was still consolidating under The NPC studied the stores inventory system of the Naval itS 0W° wei9ht- The load bearing capacity was low - two Stores Organisation (NSO), of the Spare Parts Distribution tonnes per scluare metre - and, when subjected to load Centre (SPDC) and of Naval Headquarters.

conditions, compressed endlessly. The top, weak layers of

T,
clay extended to twenty metres below ground level. A high
me second study pertaining to Quality Control was water table that at places was just one metre below ground carried out by the Indian Standards Institute (ISI) in 1968. level aggravated these soil conditions. And, as was to The NPC and the 1SI studies led to the estahli*hm0nt ^ j ° m.u

'ater during construction, the deep streams
of the Planning & Production Control (PPC) and Qualitv tad'ff T * C3USed 'ateral shiftin9 of the soil leadin9

Control (QC) Departments.8
t0 dlfferentlal s‘"kage in buildings.

The third study was carried out by the Administrate Staff
comP1®* geological and hydrological soil

College of India in 1971 to study the same problem that th
and ' lons comPelled resort to time-consuming, expensive

NPC had studied in ,963 namely the vLT issu T o f^ o n

J ?

techniques-
availability of spares and stores delaying repair of equipment * foundati°n s down to rock level had to be sunk for and refits of ships.. This study recommended that the Nava!

bUi'ding-

(SPDC) be memed T

1116 ^

* * * Distribu*°n Centre * ^ h o p s requjring s
ificall hj h noor |oadi
had

™
i l l f
r^ SUlt' these organisations were

0 be Pr™ ded with suspended flooring at basement
merged into the Material Organisation, Bombay under'a
eve s. The floor was supported on beams resting on

Material Superintendent under whom the four Contro er
enn-hparin^

__ i

. . . . . .

.. i
f n " earing, bored cast-in-site piles. It was called

Organisations, viz. the Controlled of Material Plann „
suspended because the load was directly transmitted

(CMP), Controllerate of Procurement (CPRO), Controllerate
o t e bedrock via the end piles, thereby making it

7. The causes of the malaise have been

-------- |

-n_

- ^

-- pendent

P _ ™ e n t o
o f
f t
h
the
e so
soil
il c
co
on
nd
diittiio
o n
n s
s b
be
en
ne
ea
atth
h..

“The Russian Acquisitions,

Committee Qn Maintenance^

8. The 1979 Report of the Naval Fxnprt r™ —

____ . . .

8. The 1979 Report of the Naval Expert Committee on Maim™*
have passed blunt forthright and highly damaging s t r i c t " ^ a b ^ t T C° " Strained to " ° * « • « > nntkin*.

. L

V®---- u a n w g i n g s t r i c t u r e s a h m . t •------------- The consultants in each case nothing seems to have happened. It appears to L

f . ° “ t 0,6 state

* * • and their m anagem ent in the Dockyard. Even then,
or additional™5 ° ^ appened‘ 11 a P P e ars to the Committee that on lv 61° affairs and their management in the Dockyard. Even then, manpower - are picked up and pursued. Little effort 3ddp Sf e^ted recornrnendations - those pertaining to up-gradation The multitude of problems that the Dockyard had to rn

■
u

^ l°
made t0 COrrect other aspects."

titled The 1979-80 Naval Expert Committee Report on Malm enanc^00 ^ 195° S and the 1970s have been discussed in the chapter 9. The Soviet Project Report had stated that “Due to the unfa

'

158'

of water area, formation of territory and construction of drv^nru^ 9.?0,0gical conditions of the site, expenditure on the development amounting to more than 60 % of the total cost of the Dockyard

’

pway’ berths and other hydro-technical erections are very high,

142 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

The Soviet Project Report
the gate buoyant. The flap gate tilted over before it could be

The Soviet Project Report comprehensively delineated the reinstalled. A second problem was that the Pump House, in which the de-watering pumps were installed, developed
role of the Dockyard for each of its envisaged tasks in ship serious leaks. These had to be gnited underwater. The gates repair:

were handed over formally in December 1979. Overall, it
o As a repair agency,
took 10 years, from the commencement of design in June
o As a manufacturing agency.

1969 to final completion in December 1979, for the South

Dry Dock to be fully operational. In its final configuration, it
g

As a testing centre.

is a two-chamber dock, having three ‘gate grooves’ located

These v . accepted as guiding principles.

24 metres apart in which the caisson can be positioned as
an intermediate gate, depending on the length of vessel

The Cons. :iion o f the Dockyard
being docked. Gp to 9 ships of various sizes can be and

Construction commenced in 1968 as soon as the Report have been docked.

was accepted. In the draft contracts, it was agreed that:

The delay in the completion of the dock had two
o Sizeable designing effort would be undertaken in India.

effects:

© A large proportion of equipment and machinery would • The annual docking of ships became dependant on the be of indigenous origin,
availability of the Hindustan Shipyard and Port Trust
dry docks, which had their own commitments to meet.

o Russian drawings, Russian equipment and Russian

Ships’ hulls suffered.

machinery for the Dockyard would arrive within six
months of signing each contract.

• It aggravated the already dislocated crucial 6-yearly

‘medium repairs’ of submarines because neither of the

• The development of the Naval Base and the Dockyard
above docks could be spared for the long duration that
to provide full logistic support would be spread out over
was essential for the detailed checking of a submarine
ten years.

hull and the dismantling and reinstallation of its heavy

From the outset, delays were experienced for a variety
intricate machinery.11
of reasons. These included civil engineering difficulties, The Steering Committee and the Phases escalations in cost and changes in the scope of some
facilities.

To overcome delays, a high level Steering Committee was
constituted in 1973 to accord approvals and sanctions

The South Dry Dock (Varuna Dock)]0
expeditiously.

The location of this dock was finalised in 1968 with the

Eventually, the Dockyard Project was executed in
help of the Soviet consultants. Design work started in 19
five phases (with approvals being sought and accorded
and completed in 1971. Construction work commenced phase-wise) and, except for ongoing augmentations for in 1972. Work had to stop to enable the dock floor to new acquisitions, was largely completed over the twenty be redesigned because of poor soil conditions. In 1

» year period between 1970 and 1990:

the head wall and entrance cofferdam were damaged, t

Phase I/IA: Setting up core Dockyard infrastructure
was inaugurated in September 1978 after which it starte
and facilities for repairing and refitting:

being used as a single-chamber Dry Dock with a<
ca*s®°^
gate at the entrance. In May 1979, a flap gate was insta e

• The first Russian acquisitions (submarines, Petyas,
at the entrance and the caisson gate shifted to the mi
e
landing ships, submarine depot ship and patrol boats).

groove, thereby dividing the dock into two compartmen s. • Existing ships (wooden-hull minesweepers, frigates, Problems cropped up. One was the flap gate itself, unng
seaward defence boats and survey vessels) so as to
the test operations of this 360-tonne gate, the stee wire
reduce the load on Bombay Dockyard.

parted due to excessive pull on the wires. This recurre
during one of the docking and undocking operations.

Financial approval for Phase 1 was accorded in 1969
and construction of works commenced in 1970. In 1981,

Compressed air had to be pumped under the gate to ma e

___________________ south waU ° f thG d° Ck 15 3 386
l° n9‘

10. The South Dry Dock is 272 metres long, 42 metres

25 metre wide Repair Berth for repairs and fitting out o s
nrr.irred in Medium Repairs. See pages 115. 116.

11 ■

The chapter on the The Submarine Arm" discusses the chain react,on TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 143

Phase V: This phase was taken in hand after 2000. It
the Steering Committee decided that work on Phase
involved setting up facilities for undertaking the 6-yearly

I should be closed by end 1982 and the creation of left ‘medium repair’ refits of the Russian ships and submarines over facilities be carried over to Phase II. The latter were contracted for in the 1980s (877 EKM Sindhughosh class referred to as Phase IB, while those completed in Phase
submarines, coastal minesweepers, gas-turbine-propelled

1 itself were referred to Phase 1A. The South Dry Dock, missile craft of the Veer class and anti submarine patrol completed in 1979, was part of Phase 1A.

vessels of the Abhay class). This phase includes four

Phase II/IB: Started in 1979, this phase was for completion new specialised facilities for Hull Repair of titanium and of facilities carried forward from Phase 1 and augmentation of aluminium-magnesium alloy structures, Hull Cladding core facilities. This phase included progressive construction (removal and re-fixing submarine rubber tiles), HP testing of married accommodation, which extended beyond 1990.

of air bottles and a Test/Calibration Centre for control and
instrumentation systems.

Phase III: Augmentation of existing repair facilities for
undertaking 6-yearIy medium refits of the Rajput class The North Dry Dock (Matsya and Surya Docks) destroyers that had been contracted for in 1975.

Sanctioned in 1980 and completed in 1990, the Dock has

Though the Soviet Project Report for this augmentation two, parallel, separate chambers, sharing the services in was received and defended in 1978, it took two years between.12 The Surya Dock for surface ships is uncovered.

of deliberations to finalise its scope before seeking The Matsya Dock for submarines is the longest covered approvals in 1980. This two-year delay dislocated the dock in India. The Dock was scheduled for completion in commencement of the 6-yearly ‘medium repairs’ of the 1986; however as a result of changes required by NHQ, Rajput class destroyers.

the dock’s completion was delayed till 1990.

Building

Additional/New Facilities in Phase III

The 1984 Master Plan

15

Boiler Combustion Equipment & Cold-Pipe-

Bending Facility.

In 1982, a Board was constituted to identify the requirement

Machining of and bench work on propellers.

of additional berthing facilities, augmentation of ship repair
facilities, shore accommodation for complement of ships

16-A

Main Propulsion Turbine and Turbo Alternator under refit, provision of zonal stores, provider stores section Turbine Repair Shop.

for the Dockyard and for fleet ships, an in-house training

17 & 17B Alternator (and its starter) Repair and Test complex for the yard and pollution control facilities.

Facility. Repair of generators and other electrical
equipment. Repair of ships automatics,

Taking into consideration the total land area of the
instrumentation of main engine auxiliaries, main Dockyard, the area of the co-located units and the area of steering system, testing facility for repaired gas the waterfront, the 1984 Master Plan: turbines and for turbo-alternator turbines.

• Identified the facilities originally envisaged in the Soviet

21

Test Stand for main propulsion turbines.

Project Report but not created. Requirements of water

23

HP Compressor Station (provision of 400 kg/
supply, electrical supply, dredging of channel to maintain
depths etc., were included.

cum air).

25B & C Armament Repair Facility.

• Re-examined the proposal to build ships in the

Dockyard.

Phase IV: Approval was accorded in 1984 for setting up • Recommended facilities for a Commander of the Yard a separately located and administered Marine Gas Turbine

Complex.

Overhaul Centre to overhaul Russian gas turbines and gas
turbine generators. First called MGTOC, it commissioned • Analysed the details of manpower recommended in the eventually in 2000 as

Soviet Project Report.

INS Eksila.

12. Surya Surface Vessel Compartment: 272 metres long, 21 metres wide and 14 metres deep. One flap aate anH
can be fitted in of three grooves. The advantage of having two adjustable chambers is that vessels requirina I ° ne caisson 9ate=the laWer are docked in the inner chamber. Those needing lesser duration of docking are docked in the outer chamber96
i0n of drY-docking

Matsya Submarine Compartment: 272 metres long, 16 metres wide and 14 metres deep. One flap gate and 1

This enables two submarines to undergo 6-yearly ‘medium repairs’ concurrently.

R Sln^ e Pos*tion caisson gate.

The analysis of structures of the dock floor, floor piles and inter-compartmental wall was done bv the IIT n \w t of the dock gates was done by the IIT Kharagpur.

e '*
analysis and design

144 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

• Augmentation of the Commander of the Yard Complex.

. Estimated up to 1992, the details of existing / sanctioned
and proposed facilities.

• Facilities for diesel engine repair and machinery control
repair/ calibration.

The 1991 Master Plan

• A zoning plan for all facilities (Administrative Zone,

A Board was constituted again, in 1989, to prepare a

Repair / Refit Zone, Services Zone, Training Zone etc).

Master Plan for 1991. This Board concluded that almost • Facility to monitor the depths of channel.

90% of the Dockyard Project had been completed and that • Long-term facilities like additional water reservoirs, additional requirements would have to be met by additions /
sewage treatment facility, acquisition of land from the
alterations or demolition of buildings. The 1991 Master Plan

Port Trust for an additional parallel bridge, construction
recommended:

of a jetty between two existing jetties, etc.

• Additional berthing facilities.

Chronology of Commencement and Completion of the Works in the Vizag Dockyard Works Undertaken

Commenced

Com pleted

Construction of wharves and jetties

1968

Energy Block for recharging submarine batteries

1968

1971

Dredging of Northwest Arm

1969

1969

Design of South Dry Dock

1969

1971

Weapon Repair Shop

1969

1973

Dockyard Apprentice School

1970

1973

Jetties No 3 &4 and Main Repair Berth

1976

Main Engineering Workshop (Building No. 16)

1972

1976

Main Electrical Workshop (Building No. 17)

1972

1976

Pipe Fitting Shop

1972

1976

Laboratory (Building No. 43)

1972

1976

Main Repair Berth

1972

1976

Jetty No 5 and other wharves/jetties

1977

Main Hull Shop (Building No. 18)

1972

1977

Wharves 2 and 6

1978

New workshops for Hull, Engineering,

1972

1978/80

Electrical and Submarine auxiliaries, and bays
for Electroplating, Hydraulic Repair

Construction of South Dry Dock (Varuna Dock)

1972

1979

Periscope Repair and Armament Repair/Refit

1976

1983

Captive power generation facilities

Capital dredging to create space for the new

1979

Armament Jetty and the Degaussing Basin

1980

Degaussing Basin and Facility

1979

1989

Design of North Dry Dock

1980

1981

Construction of North Dry Dock (Surya & Matsya)

1980

1990

Augmentation of Weapon Repair Shop

1983

Marine Gas Turbine Repair Workshop

1986

1984

New jetty on the eastern bank

1990

Ammunition jetty

1987

1991

1987

1993

146 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE
f k

At the time of writing, the following major facilities were • Permanent facilities for undertaking 6-yearly ‘Medium under execution:

Repairs’: The Soviet Project Report recommended
o 600 tonne Slipway. Commenced in the mid 1990s, it will
creation of a 100-tonne slipway. It was decided to
accommodate seven ships, two under cover and five in
modify the 40-year old ‘coastal forces’ slipway. This was
the open.

commenced in the late 1980s and completed during
the 1990s.

o Augmentation of facilities for undertaking the 6-yearly

‘medium repair’ refits of 877 EKM Sindhughosh class

In 1985, four new survey craft were based in Cochin,
submarines,
coastal
minesweepers,
gas-turbine- followed by the new cadet training ship Tir in 1986. At the propelled missile craft of the Veer class and anti same time, as the number of ships based in Cochin was submarine patrol vessels of the Abhay class).

increasing, Russian weapon and sensor training equipment
o Overhaul and test facilities at INS Eksila for main had started being installed in Dronacharya and the ASW, propulsion turbines of Delhi class destroyers

ND and Signal Schools in Cochin, all of which would need
periodical maintenance and repair. It was time to review
o Augmentation of training facilities in the Submarine the role of the BRO.

Training School INS Satauahana for the 877 EKM

Sindhughosh class submarines.

New workshops, with special to type equipment were
to be set up for the inshore minesweepers on the land

Today, the Dockyard has a ground area of 704 acres, a adjacent to the old BRO. In the review of the BRO's role, water area of 264 acres and, in round figures, 8,000 officers it was decided to improve the layout and augment the and men. Docking and undocking is not tide-dependent.

equipment of the workshops to enable them to cope with:

The Naval Ship Repair Yard at Cochin

• The refits of frigate sized ships, with docking being done
in Cochin Shipyard.

Growth of the BRO into a Ship Repair Yard

• The maintenance of the Russian training equipment.

From the mid 1970s onwards, the 1950s vintage,

Brahmaputra, Betwa and Beas started being converted into The resultant facilities were a Hull Fabrication Shop, a
cadet training frigates and based in Cochin to replace the Machine Shop with modem machines, an Electrical Shop 1940s vintage training frigates as they decommissioned.

with electroplating facilities, a Weapon and Electronic

Repair Shop, an Auxiliary Machinery and Shafting Shop,

In 1978, sanction was accorded for a new Internal an ICE Engine Repair Bay with fuel injection calibration Combustion Engines (ICE) Workshop and a new Electronics facilities and a Test House Complex to load-test engines Workshop.

and a Mine Sweep Repair Shop. Mobile equipment was
provided to support the yard, the ships based at Cochin

In 1981, the contract was signed for the acquisition and visiting ships.

of 90-tonne, Glass Reinforced Plastic (GRP) inshore
minesweepers from Russia. It was decided to base them

This 1,200 employee, 12-acre, upgraded BRO was rein Cochin. Contracts had already been signed for the designated as a Naval Ship Repair Yard (NSRY). It supports, acquisition of training equipment of the Rajput class repairs and refits the ships based at Cochin. It coordinates destroyers, the Durg class rocket boats and the Pondicherry docking and associated repairs with Cochin Shipyard. And class minesweepers, some of which was to be fitted in the it provides technical support to the training schools and training schools in Cochin.

establishments in Cochin.

In 1983, approval was accorded for augmenting Alongside Berths the BRO’s facilities for undertaking the full scope of The South Jetty. The need for a new jetty had been maintenance, repair and refits of the inshore minesweepers accepted as early as 1975. Its construction could only to avoid their becoming a burden on the Dockyards at commence in 1978 after sanction was accorded, lt was Bombay or Vishakhapatnam. This augmentation was to scheduled to complete in 1981 but labour problems be phased:

afflicted its completion. By 1985, considerable silting had

• Interim to meet the immediate needs of the inshore occurred around the half completed piled structures.

minesweepers: Large mobile cranes for the mine sweeping
equipment, argon arc welding equipment, hydraulic

Construction of the jetty was resumed in 1985. Since
self loader chocks, sling trolleys, high pressure water jet Cochin Shipyard was to undertake the periodic docking cleaning equipment and creation of GRP facilities.

of the aircraft carrier Viraat, the 1,200 foot jetty was TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 147

ships and submarines in service and about to enter service,
strengthened and dredged to berth Viraat alongside The and incorporate these in the design of the BRO and the jetty was commissioned in 1987, together with its allie
new jetty to the extent feasible.

shore facilities - the power house, the pump house and the
de-mineralised water plant. It was named ‘South Jetty’ and

This was to prove valuable from 1993 onwards, when
earmarked for berthing operational ships.

the Flag Officer Sea Training and his organisation were

The North Jetty. The old ‘IN Jetty’ was renamed ‘North eventually established in Cochin.

Jetty'. Being closer to the BRO, it berths ships under refit.

Apart from the support extended to ships coming to

Cochin for work up, the NSRY, in subsequent years, was

The Blossoming of Cochin into a Work Up Base
able to support the increasing number of ships based in

In 1972, a high-level Committee had been constituted in Cochin - six inshore minesweepers (from 1983 onwards), Bombay to recommend organisational changes in the light four survey craft (from 1985 onwards), two training ships of lessons of the 1971 War.13 One of the recommendations (Tir from 1986 onwards and Krishna from 1995 onwards), was that after refit in Bombay Dockyard, ships must:

two survey ships (Jamuna from 1991 onwards and Sutlej

• Get away from Bombay to decongest the Dockyard. from 1993 onwards), two OPVs (Sharda from 1992

This would enable ships companies to shake down, onwards and Sujata from 1993 onwards), Sagardhwani away from Bombay’s ‘home-port 9 to 5 routine’.

from 1994 onwards and sail training ship Tarangini from

• Work up in Cochin where air and surface targets were 1997 onwards.

available and where ships companies could learn to The Naval Ship Repair Yard At Port Blair cope with defects instead of perpetually depending on

Bombay Dockyard for assistance.

The proposals for the procurement of machinery /
equipment and the construction of works that had been

Apart from the reluctance to depart from home-port, the initiated in May 1968 and July 1972 were sanctioned in main argument advanced against this recommendation July 1975 and February 1976 respectively. The wharf was was that since Cochin did not have the workshops to assist ready by 1977. The BRO started functioning from August in rectifying a defect that was beyond the capability of 1980 to sustain the landing ships, SDBs and patrol boats the ship’s staff, the ship would have to return to Bombay that were progressively rebased from Vizag to Port Blair.

Dockyard. It was therefore better that ships work up off

Bombay. There was substance in this reasoning. Ships

By 1983, the specific augmentation required to support
from Bombay continued to visit Cochin only for surface the growing number of ships had been identified. And with and anti aircraft firing practices rather than a full-scale the promulgation of the envisaged 1990 basing plan, it work up.

became possible to rationalise the requirements of repair

In 1985, when the augmentation of the BRO was taking and refit facilities for the A&N Islands.

place to support the inshore minesweepers and work had

At Port Blair, it was decided to:

to recommence on the new jetty, the opportunity was seized • Procure a Floating Dock. A Floating Dock (FDN 1), to give the BRO and the new jetty the kind of facilities that
would attract ships to Cochin for workup - instant support
having the capacity to dock ships of up to 11,500
from new, well equipped BRO workshops and all possible
tonnes was acquired from the Indian firm of Escorts
supplies (electrical, fresh water, fire main, chilled water,
and commissioned in 1987.15 This saved ships from
etc) when berthed alongside, to enable ships’ systems to
having to go back to Vishakhapatnam for their annual
be conserved / maintained.14
docking.

• Augment the BRO facilities.

The technical staffs of Headquarters Southern Naval

Command were deputed to visit the Dockyards at Bombay • Extend the 600 foot naval jetty to 1,200 feet.

and Vishakhapatnam, ascertain the particulars of the kind

At Kamorta, it was decided to build a naval jetty adjacent
of workshop support and shore supplies required by the
to the naval establishment, INS Kardip.

13. The author was Western Heet Operations Officer

^

--------------------- --

December 1987.

g Officer Commanding in Chief Southern Naval Command in Cochin from February 1985 to 1

5
s ; : r kr- r - ”

K .o « f e M

W

Bombay, found , h „ ,, » „ „
coll

^

Sh“

'

148 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Except for the Floating Dock, the remaining three
the design authorities.

proposals had to be deferred due to the cutbacks in budget • On the basis of feedback reports, to ensure remedial after the failure of the 1986 monsoon and the subsequent
measures.

droughts. These proposals were revived in the 1990s after
the financial position improved.

• To provide supporting data/evidence for alterations and
additions and modifications to existing equipment.

At Port Blair, the lack of trained manpower and • To finally vet, with the appropriate design authority, the inadequate BRO facilities made it difficult to fully utilise
contents and the format of technical documentation for
the FDN. This was overcome by docking as many ships
ship-borne maintenance.

as possible in the FDN and bringing them back to Vizag
for the remainder of refit work. The alternative of sending • To ensure that remedies, corrective measures and trained manpower from Vizag Dockyard to assist the work
possible improvements in processes and procedures
at Port Blair was found to be unsatisfactory as it entailed
are published and communicated to all users, training
wastage of time and manpower in transit. To overcome
schools, fleet and administrative authorities.

under-utilisation, commercial ships and craft started being • To analyse and report shortcomings reported in the docked in FDN.

field of logistics, which affect maintenance. Excessive
consumption of particular items should be analysed

On 10 November 1993, the BRO was re-designated as
with a view to determine whether:

the Naval Ship Repair Yard, Port Blair.

- It is due to any defect.

At the time of writing, the NSRY has a complement of

- It is due to faulty usage or operation.

about 350 personnel and with the Floating Dock undertakes

- It is due to incorrect ranging and scaling done at the
the complete refits of the LCUs, SDBs and LSTs based in
initial stage.

the A&N Islands.

-There are any other causes, which need to be

The Ship Maintenance Authority (SMA)

remedied.

The 1980 Naval Expert Committee on Maintenance • To monitor the achievements of Base Maintenance Units recommended the setting up of a Ship Maintenance
and Fleet Maintenance Units.

Authority. Its report stated:

In 1981, Naval Headquarters sought sanction to establish

“There is a need to establish a Ship Maintenance the SMA. It took five years before the Government accepted Authority to perform maintenance support functions, the requirement in 1986 and sanctioned a nucleus unit’ in both on and after introduction of equipment in service. A Bombay and a ‘satellite unit' in Vizag. NHQ promulgated number of repetitive failures would have been avoided or SMA’s charter in April 1987. It encompassed all aspects of better performance obtained from equipments.

upkeep of equipment / systems with the aim of improving
the operational availability of ships, their machinery,

“Some of the functions recommended to be performed weapons and sensors.

by the SMA are:

By 1990, the SMA had:

• To standardise preventive maintenance data and point
out discrepancies, errors and omissions.

• Designed and established a Computerised Maintenance

Reporting System.

• To collect, collate and process operating and usage data
from all ships, Dockyards, special teams and Boards of • Designed an Integrated Support and Upkeep Enquiry to optimise preventive maintenance.

Maintenance System for ships - short title SUMS

(Ships).

• To promulgate amendments to existing maintenance
schedules.

• Started on the creation of a computerised database (to
provide an easily referable ‘Single Point’ repository of all

• To provide feedback on maintenance to Operational
upkeep data on ships) to be called Naval Upkeep Master

Commanders.

Record Centre, short title NUMARC, a constituent of

• To provide feedback affecting maintenance to training

SUMS (Ships). NUMARC was to collate exploitation-
schools to help updating of training and to point out
related data through SRAR and DART returns.

shortcomings and lacunae in training.

• Started to collate the basic data in respect of

• To analyse reports of material shortcomings affecting
equipment / systems - Ship Fit Definition short title
reliability and to communicate collated information to

SFD and to allot codes to all equipment / systems.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 149

“The problem areas that were identified at that point in

• Introduced computer-compatible returns titled:

time were:

-Ship Running and Activity Return (SRAR) for rendition

• Mon-Standardised Maintenance

Schedules.

The
by all ships and submarines in service.

commissioning crew of the first ship of a class produced

-Routines Outstanding for Maintenance Periods
the maintenance schedules. Subsequent crews of sister

(ROMP). ROMP reported, every quarter, the necessity
ships made their own changes in these, based on their
to programme a Maintenance Period to give the ship s
own experience. Different maintenance schedules existed
staff time to complete outstanding work.

for similar equipment fitted in different classes of ships.

-Feedback of Upkeep Support Shortfall (FUSS). FUSS

The Dockyards and the BROs followed maintenance
reported, on 31s1 December every year, the shortfall in
practices, which were not necessarily standardised for
support wherewithal by way of documentation, repair
similar equipment.

facilities, spares, shore facilities etc.

• Absence of Systematic Refinement o f Existing

- Defect and Repair Transaction (DART). DART replaced

Maintenance Schedules. Defects and experiences were
the existing Defect Return rendered by ships. It
analysed in isolation and hence did not always result
streamlined the defect reporting procedure and made
in refinement of maintenance practices, thereby giving
defect data amenable to computerised processing.

way to ‘reinventing the wheel’ situations.

• Introduced quarterly OPDEF analysis reports.

• Non-rationalisation of A & As / Minor modifications.

All these returns were to be analysed by SMA and the

These were carried out in isolation squadron wise,
processed data was to be forwarded to Command and
command wise, fleet wise, without recourse in a

Naval Headquarters for follow up.

systematic manner to either overall in-depth study or
analysis based on overall experience gained / service

By 1990, Condition Based Maintenance had been
operational needs.

introduced on selected ships. To enable the phased •
extension of this concept to all ships sanction had been

Non-Standardised Dockyard Work Package for Refits
sought for additional vibration measuring, recording and
of Ships. Each ship raised its own version of Part I and
analysis equipment.

Part II Defect Lists, based on their own maintenance
schedules and experience and hence were not subject

Commander VS Dixit served in the SMA in the late 1980s
to proper scrutiny based on standards / technical audit
and early 1990s: He recalls:

system and hence accountability.

In the mid 1980s, the Indian Navy quantitatively • Absence of a Central Repository for Upkeep Related consisted of 136 platforms fitted with a total of more

Activities. There was no single line agency to coordinate
than 42,000 equipment / systems. A need was felt
information on upkeep related activities like:

to establish a central repository of all upkeep related

-Collection / preservation of all data in a systematic,
activities of the entire Indian Navy with a view to
easy to retrieve manner.

evolve a modern, efficient, maintenance management
system.

- Policy on standardised maintenance and repair
technology and practices.

“In terms of diversity, the Navy consisted of 35 different
types of platforms fitted with over 7,000 different types

- Coordination of induction trials and defect analyses.

of systems obtained from Russian, Western countries

- Spares consumption policy based on experience
and indigenous sources:

gained.

-Coordinated indigenisation efforts etc with a single

Item

No. of Item

No. of
window approach.

Types

Types

Main Engine Diesels

34

The tasks before the nucleus SMA established in 1987

MF/DF Equipment

62

Prime Movers
were enormous. By 1995, the significance and role of the

68

V/CJHF Equipment

33

SMA became recognisable in the following areas:

Pumps

197

Echo Sounders

19

• The basic database on “Ship Fit Definition (SFD )” ,

Steering Systems

44

Gun Mountings

11
created for all ships and submarines, was a gigantic

Early Warning Radars

13

Logs

14
task involving codification in logical manner for 7,000

Navigational Radars

20

Motors

Over 600
different systems. By 1995, all ships, submarines and
shore support organisations were provided with SFDs.

150 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

O Computerised maintenance schedules (MAINTOPS)

The Committee recommended the opening of
had been designed and promulgated for most classes a Dockyard Apprentice School and recruitment to of ships.

the ‘apprentice cadre’ by an open, competitive all-
o The DART, OPDEF and SRAR dynamic data banks India examination. Bombay’s Dockyard Apprentice formed the basis for evolving a more authentic and School started in 1949. Initially the School provided realistic Dockyard work package for ship refits. They apprentice manpower only for the Dockyard. In 1966, also provided the basis for indent analysis.

the School was brought under the ambit of the Central
o Based on the data bases created, a few important Government, Ministry of Labour’s All India Apprentice Scheme. Thereafter, while the School primarily met the
defect analyses were undertaken and computerised.

requirements of the Dockyard, it also provided skilled

“Acquaints” were promulgated which had a bearing workmen to industry.

on remedial measures in amendments to MAINTOPs,
spares consumption and procurement policy, refit

In Vizag, the Dockyard Apprentice School started in May
practices, A&As / minor modification, etc.

1971 and was formally inaugurated in 1973. In Cochin, the

© The scope for future computerisation of upkeep related Apprentice Training School was established in 1973.

activities was well defined to include amendments to

In their report,16 the Naval Expert Committee on

MAINTOPS, refinement of existing data bases, As&As, Maintenance commented on The Productivity of the modifications, Acquaints, Part III defect lists, spares Dockyard Work Force’ and made recommendations for consumption / holdings in conjunction with logistic ‘Improving Dockyard Productivity’.

modules etc.

o The Material Organisations, Naval Dockyards, BROs

By the 1990s, the Navy had introduced measures to
and Command Headquarters started looking up increase the number of supervisors, to review the trade structures of workmen, to increase consciousness of
information from the database for authentic defect and Quality Control and Quality Assurance and to pre-plan work packages for refits, defect acquaints for nature of annual programmes to upgrade worker skills. All these recurring defects towards remedial measures, spares began gradually to improve the work culture in naval consumption pattern in relation to onboard holdings, industrial establishments.

etc.”

Reminiscences

Dockyard Manpower

Reminiscences of the Bombay Dockyard

Until the late 1940s, dockyard workers learnt ‘on the job'

by understudying their seniors and, over time, were graded Whilst there is no shortage of criticism of the quality of as skilled workers. The Grace Committee Report of 1947 refits carried out by the Dockyard, there is unanimity that had stated:

whenever the occasion demands, the Dockyard achieves
amazing things, and it invariably does so before and during

“There has been no consistent and uniform policy hostilities.

followed in recruiting and training of apprentices. Recently,
the education standard aimed at for recruitment has Vice Admiral Daya Shankar was the Industrial Manager been matriculation, but insufficient candidates presented of the Dockyard from 1952 to 1954 and Chief of Material themselves to fill all the apprenticeships offered. No from 1954 to 1957. In the book “Memoirs and Memories"

entrance examination was set; the candidate s own he reminisced: remarks on his educational attainments being accepted,

“The Dockyard workers respond very readily to
and a statement by a person of standing as to his
challenges. This has been proved time and again, in
character being required. Selection was carried out by

1965 and 1971, apart from other special cases. When
a panel representing the departments interested and
challenged, they really sweat blood to get things done
the Personnel Officer. Previously, departments entered
well and in quick time. They are also human and expect
apprentices direct as and when required, there being no
the management to look the other way when the load is
attempt to adopt a coordinated policy and a common
light.

standard for recruitment. At no time has a set examination

“In 1954, there was an unfortunate collision between
been used as a method of placing the candidates in an
two destroyers, Ranjit and Rana, while the Fleet was on order of precedence. Relatives of dockyard employees are
its way to the Mediterranean. The damage to the ships
given preference whenever possible._____ ______ _______

16. See chapter titled "The 1980 Report of the Naval Expert Committee on Maintenance", page 158.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE/ 151

a member and would suggest a site 10 to 12 kilometres
was extensive and they were limping back to Bombay.

It was assessed that repairs would take at least three
south of the present location.17 The new site had a better
weeks. We did not have that much time even assuming
entrance, better sea face, was not being exposed to
a high-speed voyage to Aden. The work had to be
iron ore dust and had plenty of land to back up various
completed in ten days (to enable the ships to adhere to
infrastructure projects. Naval Headquarters preferred
their prearranged programme). Mr Parmanandan (then
the present site.

Director of Naval Construction in NHQ) was deputed to

“We had a plot of 1,000 acres for the Dockyard. There

Bombay to oversee repairs. There were men on board
was a Russian team consisting of 20 experts and 1 had
cutting away damaged plates as the ships entered the
a team of nine. We sat down for about 5 months to
dry docks, long before they had settled down on the
make out three alternative plans, Option I, 11 and III. At
docks. In the plate shop, there was furious activity cutting
the end of that, we came to Naval Headquarters to give
and shaping plates for the structure, and, in short, the
a presentation at which 1 had requested that Defence
ships were on their way to Aden on the tenth day! The
and Finance should also be invited, so that at the end

Dockyard met the challenge."

of our presentation, we could get a clear directive as

Commodore (then Lieutenant) Franklin recalls how the
to which option we should go ahead with. Option II

Dockyard repaired the submarine Karanj in 1970:

was selected. We went back to Vizag and got down to
detailed planning.

“Karanj had come in for repairs after a very serious
collision with the destroyer Ranjit. (She had inadvertently

“At the 1,000 acre plot it was planned to have
surfaced directly under the Ranjit's bows). No drawings
submarine pens, dry docks, a slipway, repair workshops,
of the damaged portion of the submarine were available
sailors’ accommodation, a diving tower for simulating
in the Dockyard or even in the Navy. (Karanj had but
escape from a sunken submarine, etc.

recently arrived from Russia).

“To start with, 1 learnt that in the M ES costing, five

"The Dockyard decided to make templates from the
per cent of the project cost is allowed for arboriculture.

submarine Kursura, which happened to be in harbour

So I asked my Chief Engineer, a Brigadier, ‘How do you
at that time. Templates were made. Metal was bent and
spend this five percent?’ He said, ‘Oh, we take it on as
shaped and welded. Within months, Karanj was repaired
an extra contingency.’ I said ‘Nonsense, you take out five
and was on patrol during the 1971 War.”

per cent and keep it for arboriculture and grow plants.’

And we did grow lots of plants and trees in Vizag. In my

Reminiscences of the Vizag Dockyard
first year there, I planted 1,000 trees, next year 3,000

Rear Admiral CL Bhandari was the first Director General of
trees, and in the third year 10,000 trees. Today, the

Naval Projects Vizag from 1967 to 1971. He recalls:

Vizag Dockyard is full of trees.

“I was not involved in the site selection at all. The

“In a large project, the essence is to delegate authority.

site was selected by Alexander Gibbs and Partners on

No one man, no matter how capable, can handle a
a cursory visit there and they said, “Build this dockyard
project of that diversity and cost single-handed. It cannot
here.” When I took over as DGNR I found some
be done. Something will slip up. My officers had the
distinct disadvantages in the site and I wrote to Naval
authority to issue letters without my seeing them. I would

Headquarters a one-page letter saying why this site was
see them after they were issued. But signals and telexes
not suitable. The main reasons I gave were:

had my approval. In my time in Vizag, I had an occasion

-The entrance channel was too narrow for all the ships
to cancel only one letter.

to come in. Vikrant could not get through. Mysore

Another interesting aspect was when my Brigadier
could get through only with some difficulty.

and I came up to Delhi and asked for funds for the year

-The site for the Dockyard was situated near the Vizag

1967-68. There was a large meeting. Rear Admiral Kohli
ore handling plant and the iron ore dust would certainly
was there, representing the Navy. Additional Secretary,
not be very friendly to the electronic equipment on

Mr Sheth, was in the chair. The Financial Adviser and
board ships.

the Director General Works were there. Everybody said

Oh give Vizag one crore for the balance of the year. That

“1 suggested that there should be a three-member
team to investigate a new site and that Dr VKRV Rao
should be adequate because their record shows that
the eminent engineer should head the team, I would be

Vizag has the capacity to spend up to one and half crore
a year. Well, give two crores if you like.’ 1 was listening to

17. This site is now the location of the Vizag Steel Plant.

152 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

all this talk without saying a word. So Rear Admiral Kohli

What this project requires is each one of us should do
turned to me and said ‘Why are you not saying anything?

the work of four.’ When Admiral Gorshkov visited the

Everybody is having their say and you are keeping quiet.’

project in 1968, he looked at this writing and told me his

So I said, ‘Normally one is told how to do one’s job. This

English was rather poor, he understood what was written
is the first meeting I have attended where 1 have been
but he did not know what ‘B F’ stood for. When I told
told how not to do my job.’ Everybody laughed and Mr
him, he broke into hearty laughter. But that is a project

Sheth asked, ‘How much money do you want for the
that the Navy can really be proud of. It is the biggest,
first year?’ I said ‘Six crore, Sir. The following year ten
most complex and well fitted-out dockyard between
crore, the year after that 15 crore and thereafter level

Malta and Singapore. It has really got everything.”

out at 15 crore, because unless we do that, this yard will
not be complete in time to receive the submarines.’ So

Vice Admiral (then Commodore) LR Mehta was

Mr Sheth said, ‘Right, you have six crore.’ The Financial associated with the construction of the South Dry Dock Adviser asked him, ‘Sir, from where would you be getting He recalls:

the extra four crore? You only allowed two crores for the

“The Naval Base Project at Vizag was conceived as a

Vishakhapatnam Project’. He said, ‘Yes, I know. The Air
composite project, in the sense that there was a certain

Force never spends their money, so we will reallocate.’

‘Fleet’ element of the project and a certain ‘Base’

“Having got six crore, the Defence Secretary asked
element of the project and a certain ‘Dockyard’ element
me, ‘Why are you insisting on six crore and followed
of the project, besides the other ‘store and logistics’

by 10 crores and then 15 crores?’ I told him, ‘Sir, if
elements.

you keep on giving 2 crore a year, it will take you 20

“The Project Report was prepared by the Soviet
years to complete the project. By that time it will be no

Gnion and its implementation was to be done by the
use, because our submarines would have arrived much

Government of India with the assistance of the Soviet
earlier and there would be no way to refit them. I have
specialists wherever necessary. And for this purpose, the
got a young son in the Navy who is a Lieutenant. 1 do

Directorate General of Naval Project Vishakhapatnam
not think it is a good thing for people to point out to
was created.

my young son and say, ‘Rajan, was not your father the

“The Dry Dock element of the project was left out of
first DG for the Vizag Project. Look at the mess he has
the purview of the Director General at the behest of the
made!’

Army Engineer in Chief. To construct a dry dock was

“So we went back to Vizag with six crore in our pockets
much more technical than building store complexes or
and I started work. By the end of January we could
housing colonies. It needed a special kind of approach
spend only three crore. Three crore were left. So 1 told
and a special kind of organisation to implement it. And
my engineers, ‘We should spend these three crores on
the E in C put in a claim for this project. To strengthen
steel and cement. Make out a list of the steel required
his claim, he cited his past experience of participation in
in various sizes for two crore and cement for one crore.

building the Dry Dock at Bombay under the guidance
of Sir Alexander Gibbs and Partners and subsequently

This list was produced and we placed an order for two
of participation in the construction of the Dry Dock
crore of steel in various sections, 8mm, 10mm and
at the Hindustan Shipyard in Vizag. The Government

12mm and cement on ACC for one crore. The price
accepted this and agreed to a Dry Dock Project under
we got was five per cent to seven percent less than the
a Chief Engineer. Naval Headquarters accepted this but

DGS&D price because we promised the supplier to
felt the need for a naval member in the design team,
make payment within two weeks of the stores being
who would project the naval requirements of operating
landed in our yard.

services, etc, in the Dry Dock and I was appointed

“Another interesting thing was that the Vishakhapatnam
with the designation of Liaison Officer Navy. The Chief
area did not have many contractors who could work. So

Engineer of the Dry Dock Project, a Brigadier, had his
we put an advertisement in the papers to all contractors
own team of designers. He also had a Garrison Engineer
in India to come and visit the Vishakhapatnam Project,
to provide administrative support.

where lots of projects were going to be taken up and

‘The preliminary design of the Dry Dock given in the
come and bid for them. At one time, after mid 19 , we

Soviet Project Report was very massive, more or less sunk
had five projects in hand going on at the same time.

in the soil, at huge cost and time. The Chief Engineer

“Very early in 1967,1 had put a saying in the main hall

Dry Dock was not happy with this design. He felt a better
of the project where the designers used to sit. n a
and cheaper design could be made and he evolved his
wall was written, Any B F can do the work of two men.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 153

a lot of lessons from South Dry dock. These lessons
own design, which was subjected to model testing and
were implemented in the North Dry Dock, which started
simulated testing. This was eventually accepted even by
the Soviet team. The project was implemented under
off in 1981.

the direct supervision of the Chief Engineer. Equipment

“For the North Dry Dock, right from the planning and
specifications were drawn up. The major equipments
design stage, a liaison cell comprising a senior naval
were the dewatering pumps. To empty out a complete
team and my design and structural engineers used to

Dry Dock of that size in about three hours required
meet once a week. The shortcomings in the South Dry
massive pumps of a size never made in the country

Dock were identified. We presented our ‘lessons learnt’

before. Likewise, the design of a Dry Dock gate of that
to the Steering Committee. They decided to send a
size had never been done before. There were many such
combined team to Britain and Germany. We went and
areas, which were undertaken for the first time.

saw all the latest dry docks.

“It goes to the credit of the Chief Engineer Dry

“At the design stage, we also interacted with whichever

Dock, who showed great innovation and professional

Russian specialists were available but not in a full scale
competence in tackling all these issues and in the end
because they were reluctant, not having been associated
producing a very useful facility for the Navy.”

with the construction of the South Dry Dock. But they
did give a lot of information on the pumping system

Major General MK Paul, of the Engineer in Chiefs
organisation was the third Chief Engineer of the Vizag Dry
and the valves that had given trouble in the South Dry

Dock Project. He recalls:

dock.

“The organisation of the Chief Engineer Dry Dock and

“We did lot of improvement in the monoliths. South
the East Coast Zone was created in June 1969 for the

Dry Dock had two pocket monoliths - these have holes

MES to construct its first and largest Dry Dock in India.

in the centre, with the cutting edge at the bottom - all

The initial planning and design was done at Delhi and
the mud is taken out from inside and the monolith sinks
the formation moved to Vishakhapatnam in November
slowly down. In the North Dry Dock, we designed four

1969 to start its work.

blocks so that the dock would not have lateral movement
either way. Another improvement concerned the dirt

“The Naval Dockyard area was developed by
that used to come between the two monoliths - we had
reclamation with dredged material during the deepening
a groove in each with rubber fittings so that there was no
of the adjoining water areas. The typical soil profile
possibility of leakage.’

consists of a top layer of high salinity sand deposited
over a thick layer of marine clay. Under the clay layer the

Vice Admiral (then Commodore) NP Bhalla was the
residual soil deposits were formed of in situ weathering Commodore Superintendent of the Vizag Dockyard from of rocks. These deposits consisted of yellowish clay,

1976 to 1978. He recalls:

then sand conglomerated weather rock and disjointed

“A problem that 1 had in the Vizag Dockyard was
rock. Because of the soil conditions, bored piles resting
that the equipment that had been provided by way of
on hard rock had to be used for the construction of the

Naval Dockyard at Vizag.

machine tools was partly in excess of what was required.

The Soviets had drawn up this scheme thinking that the

"I arrived at a stage when the South Dry Dock was

Dockyard would produce a lot of spares, as was done in

80 per cent complete. It fell on me to hand it over.

the Soviet Union. But when Naval Headquarters asked

Several problems had to be tackled before handing
for the drawings of these spares, they were never made
over. One, was that the Pump House was half under
available. The result was that a lot of the machines
water. It took three months of gniting under pressure
were left idle. I had suggested that we should make the
to stop the leakage in the valves of the pump house.

surplus capacity available to the private sector - let them

Another problem was the dry dock gate. The designed
say what they want, we will produce it for them and cost
arrangement was to pull it up with a steel wire rope from
it according to the norms laid down.”

one side. This gave trouble. It was rectified by putting an
additional pulley. In fact there was an accident when the

Captain (later Rear Admiral) SKK Krishnan was the
gate toppled over and had to be raised. Another problem Manager Quality Control in Vizag Dockyard from 1984 to was the flow of heavy silt towards the dock entrance 1986. He recalls: and the gate support. There was also ingress of water

The interesting thing about the Vizag Dockyard, per
through the dock walls, which had to be remedied by
se, is that officers of the current Navy brought up the
extensive gniting and by the use of chemicals. We learnt

Dockyard, unlike the Bombay Dockyard which has got

154 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

250 years of history. Even today, many things happen
civilian technical personnel for all new acquisitions:

in Bombay Dockyard because they happened like that
elaborately more so for the Russian submarine
some 50 years ago. In some ways it might be a curse,
acquisition programme. Large volumes of Repair
but in some ways it is also a benefit. It depends on how

Technical Documentation also remained to be translated
we use the system.

from Russian to English, adding to the inertia of time

“In Vizag, the local people were not used to the Navy’s
frames. The position, however, started easing from the
type of technology, which was quite different from the
late eighties.

merchant ship technology of Hindustan Shipyard. That

“A large number of Supplementary Agreements were
gap is closing now, but when I went there in 1984 it was
signed for assistance by Russian personnel on know-how
still a big gap. Nevertheless they were trying to adopt
in setting up repair facilities, as also for specialised repairs.

Soviet technology in an orderly fashion.

Although Indian repair specialists more easily achieved

"By the time it got ready, everybody believed that the
mastery of equipment repairs, those of hull structure and

Dockyard had become too big for our use. I believe even
of complex systems (weapons and others), necessitated
the Soviets said that it had become bigger than what
a lengthy and arduous ‘learning curve’. The greatest
they had imagined.

difficulty was in the area of hull repairs of submarines
during Medium Refits, where restoration of circularity of

“Even in those days, there were a lot of Soviet specialists
pressure hull and specialised structural repairs in the way
in the Dockyard. Most of them were fairly useful. But
of torpedo tubes proved major challenges. Time overruns
because many of us did not know their language and
in Medium Repairs of submarines were the order of the
did not know their system, and they in any case were
day.

quite confused about their system, even the sincere

“The availability of Russian specialists for specialised
ones, the actual work we got out of them was definitely
repair know-how during refits was helpful, though not
not optimal.

without its drawbacks. Due to the demands of vertical

“My first feeling when I went to Vizag was that the
specialisation, the composition of such repair teams was

Dockyard did not respond as quickly to some situations
much larger than what one wished for. Moreover, the
as compared to Bombay Later I came to realise that

‘rigidity’ of approach and ‘mindset* of these specialists
things actually got done in a much more reliable and in a
proved unhelpful on many an occasion, apart from
much better and happier way. There was no unnecessary
rubbing off on their Indian counterparts who had been
rancour in my time. That was one very good thing about
groomed in the Russian stream.

the social system in Vizag. Living together in Naval

“A perfect example of such thinking was evident in the

Park, or going to work together or working together,
first major 6-yearly refit of INS Rajput, the new guided
developed a community way of life and people adapted
missile destroyer that had commissioned in 1981. This
to each other. A lot more was done harmoniously than
refit had been programmed at Vizag during 1987 for a
it was in Bombay. For the same thing being done in
duration of 11 months. A team of 54 Russian specialists

Bombay, perhaps there would be a lot of arguments. So
was in position to assist the refit. On numerous occasions,
unit life was definitely good and that I think impinged on
the leader of the team advised the Dockyard against
the working situation also.”

intended refit practices, stating that they were either

‘prohibited’ or ‘inadvisable’. For instance, the lowering

Vice Admiral A Britto was the General Manager of the
of four new propulsion gas turbines as per refit schedule

Dockyard in the late 1980s and retired after being Chief of
was prohibited and advised to be kept in abeyance for

Material from 1996 to 1997. He recalls:

five months till ship systems were buttoned up and the

“On the East Coast, a number of new workshops had
ship brought to standard loading condition as a preto be set up to facilitate repairs of ships of Russian an requisite for aligning propulsion systems. The overruling

East European origin. Large time frames were invo ve
of this view by the General Manager18 and the adoption
in generation of project reports, approvals / funding an
of modified engineering practices saved a good five
project execution. It was generally experienced t at e
months to enable refit completion on schedule.

new facilities became functional, on average, a mos

“Despite the assiduous and w hole-hearted effort
years after the induction of ships and submarines.

of the Dockyard, refit m an ag em en t was beset with a

"Along with the creation of shore infrastru^tu^e:

maze of other complexities that affected tim ely and
specialised training had to be given to uni orme an

18. Com m odore Britto was the General Manager at that tim

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 155

keep its ships and submarines operational, despite the
quality refits. Ageing Kamortas and Foxtrot submarines delays in the completion of maintenance and refit facilities set up spiralling refit workloads in Medium Repairs, that were coming up in the Dockyards and the BROs is a often accentuated by excessive wear and tear due lasting testimonial to the perseverance and innovation of to over-exploitation or inability to conserve systems the technical officers and sailors, afloat and ashore, and during operational phases or in harbour, as adopted the civilian personnel ashore in the Dockyards, the BROs in Russian practice. The tenuous logistics system and the armament and store depots.

was simply unable to replenish material pipelines at
the required pace, resulting in refit bottlenecks. Yard

There was the view, usual in every expanding Navy, that
materials, fast moving consumables and spare parts slower induction would help the repair and refit facilities were often in short supply - some typical items being to catch up. It took time for the proponents of this view to hull and special steels, submarine electrical cables and come to terms with three realities: welding electrodes. Intensive efforts to indigenise these
resulted in some noticeable successes such as in the • There will always be a time lag between the induction production of welding electrodes, hull steels including
of vessels and the setting up of their special-to-type
non-magnetic steels for mine-sweepers, bi-metallic
maintenance, repair, refit and logistic support and
joints for hull, friction pads for gas turbine propulsion
weapon facilities.

clutches, etc. The Defence Materials Research • When vessels are acquired from abroad, it is economical Laboratory at Hyderabad was a major contributor to
to acquire them in sufficient numbers, rather than one

R&D and production efforts.

at a time. Inescapably, the bunching at the time of their

“Adapting to the maintenance and repair philosophies
acquisition leads, years later, to the bunching of their
of Medium Repairs of Russian acquisitions proved most
major refits. Since refit facilities always lag, the effects on
difficult in the Indian context. The concept of degutting
operational availability have to be sagaciously managed
ships and submarines to bare hull, whilst specified and
as best as possible rather than bemoaned.

insisted upon as per Russian practice, was simply not • As the experience between 1976 and 1990 showed, practicable given the material, support system within
indigenously constructed ships, which were neither
the Navy and prevailing industrial infrastructure.

acquired from abroad nor inducted in batches, were

“A number of hard lessons were learnt in the process
afflicted with the same problems.

and progressive revisions made to repair philosophy
and practices. Certain major systems, equipment and

The unusual civil engineering difficulties that were
assemblies like gas turbine propulsion units, generator encountered in the 1970s and 1980s, the sensible decision units, electrical / electronic assemblies continued to to augment facilities already under construction to cater for be returned to the Original Equipment Manufacturers every new induction (rather than create a new facility every (OEMs) in the Soviet Union pending setting up of in-house time), the delays in financial approvals caused by financial facilities such as weapon workshops and the Marine Gas stringency from time to time, all contributed to the delay in Turbine Overhaul Centre at Vishakhapatnam.

the completion of facilities:

“A major factor bearing on lengthening refits appeared • In Bombay, the construction of the new workshops to be the high marine corrosion rates experienced
was linked to land reclamation and demolition of old
in the Indian environment. It appeared that both seastructures.

water and ambient air-corrosion levels were higher • In Vizag, the soil conditions were unable to bear the than experienced in Russian waters - the sulphur and
weight of the heavy floors of critical priority workshops.

ammonia laden atmosphere in Vishakhapatnam, due to

Their floors sank, entailing extensive rework for
the proximity of industries and cargo vessels handling
suspended flooring’. The experienced gained in
toxic materials, also appeared to be major contributors in
overcoming problems faced in the construction of the
pushing up the quantum of hull repairs during refits."

South Dry Dock helped in the construction of the more

Retrospect
complex North Dry Dock. V/hen completed, it emerged
as the largest Dockyard in South Asia.

The chapters on the 1979 Naval Expert Committee on

In Port Blair, all construction machinery and material had

Maintenance, on the Russian Acquisitions, on Logistics
to be ferried from the mainland across the Bay of Bengal.

and on the Reorganisation of Naval Headquarters have

The preparation of a Master Plan, the zoning of areas, land
depicted the diversity and severity of the difficulties that
acquisition, the funding for water supplies and electricity
the Navy had to grapple with. That the Navy was able to
generation etc all had their own gestation times, because

156/TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

it entailed interaction between several ministries involved

1990, reflect the uniquely Indian synergy that was achieved
in the development of the A&N Islands.

between the Steering Committees in Delhi, the Engineer
in Chief’s personnel and the Navy in distant ports, and

Viewed in the context of the national priority of self between the Indian, Russian and European suppliers of reliance and maximum indigenisation, the expansion and specialised machinery and equipment.

modernisation of the Bombay Dockyard, the construction
of the Vizag Dockyard, the construction of the Naval Ship

The experience gained in the creation of these facilities

Repair Yard at Cochin and the BRO at Port Blair, all by
proved to be invaluable in planning the maintenance, repair
and refit facilities for the new Naval Base at Karwar.19

19. See Section titled “The Third Naval Base at Karwar

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 157

18

1979-80 Naval Expert Committee

Report On Maintenance

Preamble

By 1975, the debilitating impact of spiraling inflation
on defence projects made it necessary to appoint another

The year 1971 was a milestone in the Navy’s history. In the high-level Committee to review the recommendations of first half of the year, the nation saw for the first time, the the earlier Committee.

positive role that the Navy could so swiftly play in support
of diplomacy when the Sri Lankan Government sought

The tasks of this Apex II Committee were to review in

India’s assistance to quell an insurgency. In the twelve- depth the needs of the three services in the light of: day Indo-Pakistan War of December 1971, the missile « The compulsions of the economic situation and the rise boat attacks on warships off West Pakistan’s major port
in oil prices.

Karachi and the contraband control on shipping destined
for East Pakistan’s ports in the Bay of Bengal enabled the • The implications for the acquisition programmes of Navy to control the sea within the first four days of the war.

the three services of the latest weapon systems that

For the second time in the same year, the nation saw the
had been fielded in the 1973 Arab-Israel War and the
contribution that the Navy could make towards national
assessments made of their effectiveness by an inter-
military objectives.

service delegation that visited the Arab countries.

In 1972, the Navy analysed the weaknesses revealed • The need to improve fighting capacity as cost effectively as possible.

and the lessons learnt during this war and formulated its
remedies.

For the third task, ‘Expert Committees’ were to be

The Defence Reviews of 1973 and 1975
constituted by each of the three Services to assist the Apex

II Committee.

In 1973, Government constituted an Apex Committee,
headed by the Deputy Chairman of the Planning

The Army Expert Committee

Commission. Its task was to examine the immediate The Army was the first service to appoint its Expert requirements of the three services based on an assessment Committee. It was headed by Major General (later Chief of of the threat and to dovetail its recommendations with the Army Staff General Krishna Rao). In his book, “Prepare or resources likely to be available in the 5th Five Year Plan Perish”, he has stated: 1974-79.

The (Army) Expert Committee held extensive

This Apex 1 Committee recommended special
discussions with the Chairman of the Policy Planning
consideration for naval development and cleared

Committee, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning
the Navy’s proposals for replacing old ships and the

Commission, Defence Secretary, Chief of Aa'my Staff
development of support facilities. The Navy initiated
and Army Commanders, some past Defence Secretaries
discussions with the Soviet side for the next series of
and Chiefs of Staff, Heads of Intelligence Organisations,
naval acquisitions within the framework of the Apex

Heads of Research and Development and Production,

Committee’s recommendations.

Directors of BARC and VSSC, a number of senior

The Arab-Israel War of October 1973, led to a sharp rise
serving and retired officers with experience, and other
in the international prices of oil. This seriously dislocated
important persons concerned with defence, such as

Director, IDSA, apart from visiting the border areas,
projects'131'0" 31 budgeting and d e r a t e d all defence
field formations, defence installations, and other civil
establishments concerned with defence, and making

in depth studies, before preparing its Report. Thus, Naval preparedness, the Expert Committee decided not only for the first time, a long-term plan covering a period of
to give top priority to the study of the Navy’s maintenance

25 years (up to 2000 AD) was made for the defence and logistics sectors, but also to allocate a major portion of the country. The Reports of these Committees were of the time available for the total study to maintenance, accepted by the Government; and subsequent Five Year logistics and training. The Committee took a view that if Plans were generally based on the long-term plans made sound findings and recommendations were identified to by them. (Page 400)

make these sectors most cost effective, the primary tasks

“The recommendations covered strategic aspects, of the Committee to safeguard naval preparedness at force levels over different time frames keeping in view minimum cost would have been achieved.

likely accretion of strength by the adversaries, adoption
of credible posture and maintenance of a deterrent

Due to various constraints and complexity of the issues
capability, modernisation of the Army including reinvolved, the Expert Committee decided to submit two structuring of organisations, acquisition / development separate reports on Maintenance and Logistics. Care has, however, been taken that these two reports intermesh and
of weapons systems and equipment, improvement of supplement one another.”

command and control, re-organisation of logistic set
up, improvement of intelligence, organisation of training

Salient Excerpts From The Committee’s Report
and improvement of teeth to tail ratio.

Adherence to Planned Preventive Maintenance (PPM)

“Implementation of the recommendations so far Routines
carried out, has resulted in significant improvement of the
defence posture. For instance, the armoured formations “Maintenance schedules lay down routines required to be have been strengthened, the regiment of mechanised carried out by ship’s staff with or without assistance by infantry has been brought into being, a mechanised Base Maintenance Unit / Staff and by Dockyards. During division has been raised, infantry and mountain discussions in the field, there was overwhelming evidence divisions have been strengthened, more powerful that PPM routines are being treated with near total neglect medium artillery has been acquired, assault engineers by the ships’ maintenance personnel.

have been raised, communications set up improved and

“Documentation is near non-existent / unreliable.

logistic efficiency enhanced. A number of weaknesses
and imbalances have been set right. The border areas

“PPM returns are not faithful.

are being defended well forward. Indigenous production
of some of the essential weaponry and equipment has

“Little or no analysis is made of PPM returns by
been set up. By virtue of this comprehensive analysis Command / Naval Headquarters.

carried out and recommendations made, the teeth to

“Poor performance in planned preventive maintenance
tail ratio has been further improved”. (Page 406)

is due to several reasons. First is attitudinal i.e. absence

“The main thrust of the Expert Committee was towards of PPM consciousness amongst all levels of on-board developing adequate counter offensive capability. (Page maintenance personnel - officers, skilled and semi skilled 407)

sailors. Secondly, there is a total lack of organisation -
both on board and ashore - for monitoring PPM activities,

The Naval Expert Committee
although personnel have been sanctioned. Thirdly, non

The Naval Expert Committee was not constituted until availability of serviceable test equipment rules out carrying 1979. It was headed by a Commodore to start with out a number of routines. Fourthly, a lot of maintenance time in harbour is taken up - apart from attending to
and called a Study Group. In due course, it came to be breakdown maintenance - by ‘extra-curricular and external headed by a Rear Admiral (X) and comprised a Captain

(E), Captain (L), Commander (X) and Commander (S). By demands.’

this time, the 1974-79 Defence Plan had come to an end

“All these are happening in spite of the fact that all ships
and the 1979-84 Plan had already been formulated. The are grossly over borne in all categories of maintenance Expert Committee was headed by Rear Admiral (later Vice personnel. The conclusion is, therefore, inescapable Admiral) S Mookerji.

that there is something radically wrong with training,

The Introduction of the Naval Expert Committees appointment pattern, monitoring, controlling and directing in the maintenance organisation and personnel

Report stated:

in ships.”

“Because of its serious implications in terms of cost and

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 159

‘functions’ at all levels, Naval Headquarters downwards.

Incidence of O perational Defects D uring O p erational

The growth appears to have been on a piece-meal basis

Period
and there are no reasons to believe that this organisational

“It has been universally acknowledged that the number growth has been based on a clear perception of long-term of defects, which occur during the designated operation
objectives / functions that should and can be carried out at
period, is too high. Besides curtailing the availability of various levels. Consequently, there has been overlapping ships, this creates chaotic situations in Dockyards, as
of functions and diffusion of accountability and in many
scheduled refit work has to be shelved to undertake this
cases, has resulted in ‘non-performance’, in the anxiety to

‘fire fighting’. It must be appreciated that the magnitude justify existing and additional manpower, functions have of the disruption caused is far greater than the actual
been added on; many of which have remained on paper
quantum of work involved.”

only.

Quality of Work Carried Out During Refits

“In so far as staffing pattern is concerned, levels of
management-top, middle and low - have been manned

"Two types of views have been expressed about the quality
of work carried out during refits. The Dockyards have almost exclusively by uniformed officers. Qualitative generally expressed satisfaction about the quality of work Requirements for even key managerial appointments performed. They have also indicated that where the quality do not exist. Officers with no previous experience in of refit had been below par, it was generally attributable to Dockyards / Base Maintenance Gnits (BMGs) have substandard material or spares or need to use the same / been appointed to hold key appointments both in the repaired part due to non-availability or absence of Repair Dockyards and in the Directorate of Fleet Maintenance Technical Documents (RTDs) etc rather than due to poor and Dockyards. To make matters worse, there has been, workmanship.

more often than not, quick rotation of officers at all
levels with debilitating effects on the organisation.”

"The contrary view has been expressed by the ships,
who have pointed out that besides the reasons adduced Tenures in Dockyard Appointments by the Dockyards / Base Maintenance Gnits / Base Repair “It has been categorically asserted that the effect of Organisations, there have been many cases where defects shortages is aggravated by short tenures and lack of or damage has occurred due to poor workmanship.

continuity. Though it has been accepted that it may

"There appears to be considerable validity in the opinion take an incumbent as much as three to six months to that continued non-availability of adequately trained perform effectively, the impact on quality of work, if short manpower to undertake refit tasks is attributable, in large tenures of 18 to 24 months are given, has not been fully measure, to the organisations themselves, as they have appreciated.

failed to provide the necessary training. It also appears
to the Committee that the onus of ensuring quality of

“There can be very little doubt that such frequent
materials used in refit rests with the Dockyards, at least to changes would lead to different tacks being taken in the some extent."

policy of the directive or organisation, which would have
an unsettling effect on lower echelons; lead to poor

Maintenance Concepts
implementation of plans and make accountability difficult,

“Our Navy decided to make unscheduled repairs during if not impossible, to pinpoint.

the operational cycle of the ship a responsibility of the

Non-functioning, malfunctioning and breakdowns of

Dockyards. In the British Navy concept, unscheduled sensors and weapon systems / sub systems are the rule repairs (as distinct from repairs due to accidents) are the rather than an exception in ships at sea.

responsibility of Fleet Maintenance Gnits. In the Soviet

Navy concept, unscheduled repairs are the responsibility

The above state of affairs is a reflection, not merely on
of the Base Complex. Both systems are very rigid about the qualitative and quantitative refit contents of our ships, Dockyards not undertaking refits on unplanned basis or lack of expertise in our Dockyards but, as importantly, lack refit schedules being subjected to frequent changes - of expertise in ships. A change in approach to our training virtues that we lack. It takes time to build up expertise and and manning pattern needs serious examination. Expertise set up facilities for vertical specialisation.

is not being built up, in most cases, to the level necessary.

In cases where the necessary skill has been generated, it

“There has been a considerable growth in the number has been frittered away due to our training and manning and size of units carrying out material / maintenance
pattern.”

160 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Excerpts From the Committee’s Findings

The short tenures given to service officers, which lead

On-Board Maintenance Workload vis-a-vis
to lack of continuity, are a major factor leading to ineffective

Maintenance Manpower
supervision and poor management.

The number of defects, which occur during operational

Short tenures of naval officers have generated the
period, is too high.

following major drawbacks:

• Insufficient continuity, which is necessary in many skilled

“Structured data regarding operational availability and
jobs.

combat effectiveness is not available. Neither monitoring
nor analysis of the state takes place.

• Experience, which has been gained, is not passed on for
successive jobs.

“The material state of ships is bad despite their being • Instability has led to seeking short-term solutions over-borne in number of maintenance personnel.

sometimes at the cost of overall benefits.”

'The usage and deployment of our ships.is less than The Productivity of the Dockyard Work Force designed and as such the maintenance load should also
reduce.

“The Navy is the service with the highest amount of
civilianisation, particularly in the supporting arms. The

“Our operational cycles and deployment are such Naval Repair Organisations and logistics infrastructure are that large amount of shore support would be available primarily manned by civilians, in contrast to the situation in as well as personnel onboard could also be deployed on the other two services. The total number of civilians exceeds maintenance tasks.

that of service personnel in the Indian Navy alone.

“Normal notice for steam for our ships is much greater

“Shop floor supervision is generally ineffective as the
than for comparable ships in other navies and as such it number of officers in production departments is inadequate should be possible for the ship’s staff to undertake greater in Bombay.

amount of maintenance tasks.

“Non-officer supervisors are ineffective due to lack of

“The amount of manpower available onboard for theoretical and practical knowledge. 60% of supervisors maintenance purposes is at least equal to but in most cases are not even SSC passed and 45% have no technical greater than in comparable ships in the British Navy.

qualifications whatsoever. In general, the standard of both
educational and technical qualifications of supervisory

“There is an increasing reliance on repair by replacement grades is poor. The quality of ‘old timer’ supervisors is for first and second echelons of maintenance onboard. poor.

The manpower requirements are lower if this concept is
accepted.’’

“There is a total absence of supervisory training being
accorded as a pre-requisite for promotion to that grade.

Dockyards and the Quality of Refits

“A large number of tradesmen do not know how to read

“Refit plans are not adhered to, both as regards spans of or write and an even larger number cannot read drawings.

refits and refit cycles.

“Workers have no incentive to undertake training courses,

“A number of important defects are not undertaken as it does not confer any additional benefit on them.

during refits by Dockyards. Many defects and rework occur

“Union rivalry is a major cause of industrial strife in
due to bad workmanship or poor quality of work done by
the Dockyards.

Dockyards.

“Collective bargaining and militancy amongst workers

“Dockyards do not have adequate control over their have inhibited the management from taking legitimate and personnel and the powers are vested in Command or firm disciplinary actions.

Naval Headquarters.

“The disparity of wages between those paid in the

“The projected requirements of additional manpower, Naval Dockyards and those paid in public and private indiscriminate use of casual labour and overtime is sector undertakings for workers performing similar or less indicative of management inefficiency The management complex tasks is a major demotivating factor. This also and planning at all levels is unsatisfactory. Generation o
causes problems in attracting and retaining the right kind
skills has been neglected due to lack of structured training of people.

and appointment pattern.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE /161

“A division of PPM routines between ships and BMU

“Till such time as the wage structure of workers and should be on the following basis: supervisors is brought at reasonable parity with their
counterparts elsewhere and incentive schemes introduced, • No routine should be done by BMU more than once in overtime will have to remain to pad up the wage bill.

succession as far as possible.

“The problem of accommodation in Bombay and • Routines of the same periodicity should be divided Vishakhapatnam, the recent boom in Gulf countries
between ship and shore.

where workers can command large salaries and • All routines of longer periodicity should not be off loaded increased industrialisation in the country leading to better
to the shore.

opportunities to skilled workers are contributory factors to

"The following functions should be performed by the
poor retention.

BMU:

“The material handling system in both Dockyards is • To support ships by undertaking defined percentages of archaic and has measurably reduced productivity.

PPM routines.

“Non-availability of transport within Dockyards is a major • To undertake breakdown maintenance which is beyond factor leading to avoidable wastage of man-hours in both
the capacity of the ship staff due to lack of equipment or

Bombay and Vishakhapatnam Dockyards.

lack of time. This should be in the nature of exception.

“The inadequate and unreliable telephone system wastes

An item should be off-loaded to Dockyard by BMU only
a large number of man-hours and adds to coordination
if BMU itself does not have the capacity.

problems.

• To provide workshop facilities and machining efforts as
may be necessary to ships.

“The learning curve is likely to make a substantial impact
on productivity, which would be a further cushion to the • To assist ships / other authorities when special Dockyard. Automation of machinery and replacement of
investigation is required to be carried out on a particular
old equipment by new design is likely to either bring in
defect to ascertain its cause as opposed to mere
more productive machines for the same manpower or
remedial action.

ones which require fewer operators. This is likely to be true • To assist ships during Self Maintenance Period on an particularly for the Bombay Dockyard.”

exceptional basis, if necessary.

Excerpts From the Committee’s Recommendations

• To assist ships during end of refit activity to cut down the
time required to perform. Ships staff would be required

Base Maintenance Units
to keep systems working within defined parameters

“Ships should be supported by BMU only during operational
during operational cycles.

cycles. Ships under refits are not required to be supported • To assist ships in rectification of operational defects on by BMU.

an exception basis provided ships do not have either the
equipment or the time to undertake these. Off-loading

‘Jobs should be off-loaded to BMU only if:

to Dockyard should be on an exception basis.

• The ship does not have the required equipment to repair
the item.

• To provide assistance to very small ships (SDBs and
below), which may be required throughout their

• It is beyond the capacity of the ships staff to complete
operational cycle.

within the specified time.

• BMU would also be required to undertake the function

"Operational Defects be undertaken by BMU / Base
to assist ships to survey their equipment. BMU would

Complex in the first instance (if beyond the ship’s staff) and
undertake the defective declaration of an item, which
only those beyond their capacity should be off-loaded to
is considered Beyond Local Repair. It would, thereafter,
the Dockyards.

assess the type of repair needed and the spare parts
necessary to undertake the repairs.

BMU s support should be extended to ships both for
pre-refit trials and end of refit activities to cut down the • BMU is to undertake repair of those items of repairable time spent in completing these functions.

stores as are within its capacity. Off-loading to Dockyard
is to be done when BMU does not have the capacity or

Ships should be allowed to use equipment held in BMU
when so warranted by load.

to complete their jobs.

• BMU would also assist ships in preservation, packing

162 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

and transportation of items, which are surveyed by it
number of service officers in selected billets.

and are required to be sent to the Naval Stores.

• It would enable greater continuity and build up of

Test Equipment
expertise in jobs requiring higher degree of skill.

• It would ensure that experience, which is gained, would

“There is a need to greatly improve the serviceability of test
equipment.

be passed on for successive jobs.

• It would tend to lead to in-depth examination of the

"Test equipment needs to be calibrated at designed
problems and seeking of permanent or long term
intervals even though a defect as such may not exist.

solutions.

“Users need to be more familiar with the test equipment © It is likely to improve industrial relations in the they are expected to use and must know the correct
maintenance field.

procedures of operation. Monitoring should also be done • It would firmly establish a customer-vendor relationship to ensure that this is actually being performed correctly.

between the operational staff and the maintenance
staff.

Dockyards

• It would enable corrections of certain imbalances

"The objective of the Dockyards should be timely completion
regarding sea time etc, which have crept up in the
of refits, ensuring quality and at minimum cost.

technical cadres of the service.

“The planning function in the Dockyard needs • It may make it possible for a larger number of officers to revamping.

be spared in areas of naval interest in R&D Organisation
and PSUs.

“There is a vital need to standardise refit content.

“It is essential to achieve a reasonable parity in

“The Dockyard should have the final say in deciding emoluments between workers of the Dockyard and those whether an item can be accepted or not. However, engaged in similar jobs elsewhere within the country.

the Dockyard must accept the responsibility of the Monetary incentives and overtime could be used as consequences of deferring routines due.

management tools to this end.

“Dockyards are recommended to be an autonomous

“Civilianisation is not likely to effect more economy.

organisation and be run by a Board of Directors with Second class inducements are likely to attract second-the (numerical) control vested in Naval Headquarters class material. The emoluments and perks, which are to ensuring:

be provided to the civilians, must be comparable with what

• Autonomy (of functioning).

they would be able to get elsewhere in the public sector.

• Effective naval control at the policy making level.

“Greater attention needs to be paid to the training
function. Both tradesmen and supervisors need to be

Improving Dockyard Productivity
taught the theoretical and practical knowledge necessary

Naval Officers Appointed to Dockyards
to undertake the tasks expected of them. The latter also
need to be given management training. To qualify in

“It is essential to ensure at least 3 years tenure for service training courses, incentives should be provided to workers officers in Naval Dockyards. It is desirable to extend it to 4 in the form of assurances of better records, small cash to 5 years at a later date. To enable these measures to be awards and generous publicity for those on the merit list.

implemented, definition of sea time and its requirements
for technical officers’ promotion needs are to be reviewed.

“The supervisory training efforts as well as those

Greater civilianisation is likely to lead to reduced demand necessary for other echelons need to be as much ‘in house’

for service officers, thereby making it possible for as possible.

longer tenures to the smaller number appointed to the

“Qualifying in a Leadership and General Management

Dockyards."

Courses of 4 to 6 weeks be made an essential pre-requisite
for promotion to supervisor grade.

Civilian Personnel in the Dockyards

“There is a need to have increased civilianisation for the

“Internal transportation system is essential to cut down
wastage of man-hours and effort.

following reasons:

• It would enable longer tenures to be given to smaller

"Attention needs to be paid to internal communications

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE/ 163

• On the basis of feedback reports, to ensure remedial
like telephones, which would help in reducing wastage of
manpower, and achieve better inter-centre coordination.

measures.

• To provide supporting data / evidence for alterations and

“Arrangement be made for transport from station
additions and modifications to existing equipment.

to Dockyard for Bombay and from city to Dockyard at • To finally vet, with the appropriate design authority, the Vishakhapatnam at nominal or ‘at cost payment.

contents and the format of technical documentation for

“In adopting measures to improve productivity, the
ship-borne maintenance.

Committee strongly recommends that the Ministry of • To ensure that remedies, corrective measures and Defence and Defence / Finance view the overall package
possible improvements in processes and procedures
in the perspective as enlightened employers. The legalistic
are published and communicated to all users, training
view is likely to be costlier in the long run.

schools, fleet and administrative authorities.

“The Committee strongly recommends that its • To analyse and report shortcomings reported in the recommendations for increase in productivity be viewed as
field of logistics, which affect maintenance. Excessive
a package deal. Though it may be necessary to incur an
consumption of particular items should be analysed
additional expenditure on implementing the suggestions,
with a view to determine whether:

the savings due to increased productivity and thereby

- It is due to any defect.

doing away with the need for additional workers would
more than offset the costs of improvements. It would also

- It is due to faulty usage or operation.

lead to better quality of work and hence greater reliability of

- It is due to incorrect ranging and scaling done at the
weapons and propulsion systems to the ships. Operational
initial stage.

availability of ships is also likely to go up substantially. The

-There are any other causes, which need to be

Committee, therefore, firmly believes that the proposals
are both cost effective and necessary from the operational
remedied.

efficiency point of view and need to be implemented at the • To monitor the achievements of Base Maintenance Units earliest."

and Fleet Maintenance Units.

Ship Maintenance Authority

The Outcome of the Committee’s Report

“There is a need to establish a Ship Maintenance Authority The Committee submitted its Report in two parts -
to perform maintenance support functions, both on and Maintenance and Logistics: after introduction of equipment in service. A number of
repetitive failures would have been avoided or better

The Report on Maintenance stirred a hornet’s nest,
performance obtained from equipments.

particularly the finding that stated:

“Some of the functions recommended to be performed

“The projected requirements o f additional manpower,
by the SMA are:

indiscriminate use of casual labour and overtime is
indicative of management inefficiency. The management

• To standardise preventive maintenance data and point and planning at all levels is unsatisfactory. Generation out discrepancies, errors and omissions.

o f skills has been neglected due to lack o f structured

• To collect, collate and process operating and usage data training and appointment pattern. ”

from all ships, Dockyards, special teams and Boards of

Enquiry to optimise preventive maintenance.

On the one hand, the ‘brutal frankness and objectivity’

of the Report raised hopes within the Fleets that the

• To promulgate amendments to existing maintenance
schedules.

malaise that had been afflicting the material state of ships
and submarines had at last been disclosed and that clear

• To provide feedback on maintenance to Operational recommendations had been made, which if approved by Commanders.

the Government, would help the Fleets towards better

• To provide feedback affecting maintenance to training operational readiness.

schools to help updating of training and to point out

On the other hand, the maintenance fraternity took the
shortcomings and lacunae in training.

Manpower’ aspects of the report as an unjustified and

• To analyse reports of material shortcomings affecting over-critical exposure of systemic infirmities over which reliability and to communicate collated information to it had no control. This fraternity marshalled its energies the design authorities.

to rebutting the Committee’s findings from which the

164 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

recommendations had been derived.

for any proposal had to be sought separately and, when
scrutinised by the Ministry, inescapably got bogged

A major point of disagreement was the Committee’s
down in the web of interconnected problems that the
finding that the Dockyards had adequate manpower

Report had so meticulously delineated.

and that, if properly managed, no further increases in
manpower were called for.

• Only a Committee constituted by the Government
and tasked with a broad mandate to ‘Safeguard Naval

It took considerable time for the dust to settle.

Preparedness at Minimum Cost’ could have had

In due course, many of the Committee’s seminal
the freedom to carry out the kind of wide, in-depth
recommendations were implemented. However, many
analysis that the Committee did. The Findings and
endemic facets of the malaise remained untended.

Recommendations of the Committee provided the

Ministry with a detailed overview of the problem, within

The Report on Logistics resulted in the shifting of the
which framework, Naval Headquarters’ individual cases

Material Organisations and Material Superintendents
for sanctions could be systematically progressed.

in Bombay and Vishakhapatnam from being under the
control of the Dockyards to coming under the control of • Regrettably, the very frankness and courage with the Command Headquarters.

which the Committee analysed the infirmities, and the
objectivity with which remedies were suggested, put

In view of the controversy on the manpower aspects of
the maintenance fraternity on the defensive. Instead
the Maintenance and Logistic Reports, the Committee’s
of ignoring the Findings and whole-heartedly agreeing
recommendations on Personnel & Training were summarised
with the Recommendations, the aggrieved maintenance
in an ‘Executive Summary’. Since all aspects of Personnel
fraternity attacked the veracity of the Findings and the

& Training Policy came within the purview of NHQ,

Recommendations. In the controversy that followed,
implementation was progressed to the extent possible.

the long awaited reforms got subsumed. The result

Retrospect
was that it took years to get obviously logical proposals
sanctioned. Many of the larger issues await resolution to

The following points merit mention about the Naval Expert
this day.

Committee’s Report:

In retrospect, perhaps a more gently phrased presentation

• The Navy’s ‘maintenance’ infirmities were well known to of the same harsh realities may not have raised as many every perceptive seagoing officer in Naval and Command hackles within the Navy as it did and the reform process Headquarters and in the Fleets. Remedies just could not may have started earlier.

be implemented for the simple reason that ‘sanctions

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 165

Logistics

7 don’t know what this logistics is all about... But I want some of it. ”

-

Admiral Ernest J King, GS Navy,

Chief of Naval Operations 1942-1945

Overview

The ensuing chronology summarises the Navy’s efforts,
over the decades, to overcome its logistic problems.

In every Navy, timely logistic support has been imperative for
operational readiness. It has been, also, for every modern Chronology of the Navy’s Efforts to Cope with Logistics Navy, an extremely complex and expensive problem.

1962: In Naval Headquarters (NHQ), the Director of Stores

In the case of the Indian Navy, logistic problems started was placed under the Chief of Material (COM).

becoming vexed from 1960 onwards, soon after the arrival

1967: A Central Equipment Depot (CED) was created at
of the eight new modern frigates from Britain. Within a few Vishakhapatnam to handle the avalanche of stores, spares years, problems multiplied.

and equipment arriving from the Soviet Union.

In the 1970s, the construction of the latest British

Leander class frigates having British and Dutch equipment,

1969: The Public Accounts Committee commented
the steady arrival of acquisitions from Russia of modern adversely on the Navy’s Accumulation of Repairable ships and submarines and the diversity of equipment in Stores.’

indigenously constructed ships strained the logistic system

At NHQ, a Chief of Logistics (COL) was constituted
to its limits. The logistics of these new inductions had to be as an independent Principal Staff Officer (PSO) to be dovetailed, somehow, with the archaic logistic procedures responsible for logistics functions and expedite repairs that had sustained the second hand ships of World War II of repairable stores through departmental and external vintage acquired from Britain after 1947.

repair agencies.

After 1976, when Russian and European sensors

The Director of Stores was moved from under the COM
and weapons started being interfaced with indigenous and repositioned under the COL.

equipment in the Godavari class frigates, logistic problems
became even more complex.

1970: The Administrative Staff College at Hyderabad was
requested to study the Navy’s Organisation and System of

It was not until the 1990s that the innovative New Materials Management, both at NHQ and in Bombay. Its Management Strategy and Integrated Logistic Management major recommendations were: System were able to reduce logistic problems to
manageable levels.

• Amalgamate the Naval Stores Organisation (NSO) and

Spare Parts Distribution Centre (SPDC) under a Materials

The basic problem, however, has yet to be satisfactorily

Superintendent (MS) Bombay who would be directly
resolved. That is whether the maintenance and refit of
responsible to the FOCINC Western Naval Command
ships and submarines would be more timely if the logistics
and be functionally responsible to the COM at NHQ.

function were to be controlled by the Chief of Material

(single point accountability) or whether the Logistics • NHQ would be responsible for policy and liaison with function were better controlled by an independent Chief of

Government.

Logistics (divided responsibility). There are pros and cons • The Materials Organisation (MO) in Bombay would for both points of view. At present, a Controller of Logistic
have three departments - Procurement, Inventories

Support functions under the Chief of Material.

and Technical Services - who between them would

be totally responsible for all procurement action. The

The procedure for survey of stores was modified -

Inventories Department would maintain stocks, raise surveys were permitted to be carried out on board ship by indents, etc. The Technical Services Department would departmental / professional officers.

carry out inspection and provide technical support
like standardisation, ranging and scaling, identifying

This experiment helped in controlling inventories and
disposable stores, clearance for purchase of stores that in cutting down the non-productive effort involved in did have a pattern number, etc.

detailed accounting. Approval was sought for the phased
introduction of the modified procedure in all ships.

1971: The Administrative Staff College recommendations
were implemented.

1978: The Supply and Secretariat Branch was abolished
and the Supply Branch merged with Executive Branch.

At Bombay, SNSO (B) and the SPDC (B) were merged

Excerpt from the Ministry of Defence Annual Report
into the Material Organisation (MO) Bombay under 1977-78 - Merger of Supply and Secretariat Branch with a Material Superintendent (MS). Under the MS, four the Executive Branch: Controller organisations came into being - Planning (CMP),

Procurement (CPRO), Warehousing (CWH) and Technical

“Modem warships are packed with weapon systems

Services (CTS). The Material Organisation, however, was
necessitating utmost economy in the space allotted for
placed under the administrative and functional control of the
personnel. Taking this aspect into account, as also others

Admiral Superintendent of the Naval Dockyard Bombay -
including the fact that officers of the Supply Branch

ASD (B), instead of under the FOC1NC as recommended.

have been performing a variety of diverse functions, it
has been found undesirable to have separate Supply

At NHQ, the Directorate of Stores and the provisioning

Officers on board ships. It has accordingly been decided
elements of the then Directorate of Marine Engineering and
to merge the Supply and Secretariat Branch with the

Directorate of Electrical Engineering were merged to form

Executive Branch of the Navy with effect from 1 January
the Directorate of Logistic Support (DLS) under COL.

1978.

“As a corollary to this, the post of the Chief of Logistics,

At Vizag, in due course, the CED and NSD (V) were also
one of the Principal Staff Officers in Naval Headquarters,
merged to form the Material Organisation Vizag, under a
which was being held by an officer of the Supply and

Material Superintendent. Like its Bombay counterpart, MO

Secretariat Branch, has been abolished. The Chief

(V) was placed under ASD (V).

of Logistics had been responsible for procurement,

1974: Financial powers were enhanced and delegated.

holding and supply of spares and components, while
the responsibility for maintenance and carrying out

Computerisation of naval stores commenced.

repair and fitments was that of the Chief of Material.

This had resulted in a certain amount of divided

1975: Computerisation of air stores commenced.

responsibility. With the abolition of the post of Chief of

Financial powers were further enhanced and

Logistics, it has been decided to entrust to the Chief of
delegated.

Material the responsibility for the provisioning of spares
and components in addition to repair and maintenance.

1976: Financial powers were further enhanced and

For this purpose, the Directorates of Logistic Support
delegated.

and Armament Supply of the erstwhile Logistics Branch
have been placed under the Chief of Material. Two other

A modified procedure for accounting of stores was

Directorates under the Chief of Logistics viz. Directorate
experimented on board one ship. In this procedure,
of Clothing and Victualling and the Directorate of Supply
consumable stores were divided into two groups depending
have been placed under the Chief of Personnel and the
on whether their turn over was high or low. In respect of
third, the Directorate of Naval Armament and Inspection

‘high turn over’ items, an annual quantitative allowance
has been placed under the Vice Chief of Naval Staff.”

was prescribed while the low turn over items could be
drawn on ‘as required’ basis.

With the entrusting to the Chief of Material of the overall
responsibility for logistics and the provisioning of spares

The high turn over consumable stores were accounted and components, in addition to repair and maintenance, for only up to the point of posting the receipt vouchers. technical personnel started carrying out these duties in The low-turn over consumable stores were, on the other the Material Organisations. The Material Superintendents hand, accounted for only up to the point of issue from the at Bombay and Vizag remained under their respective depot to the ship. No stores ledgers were required to be ASDs. Inventory Management techniques and policies were maintained for consumable stores.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE/ 167

“The second major advantage of ASD controlling MS
promulgated for guidance and implementation. Redundant
items of naval stores were identified and their disposal
is the ability to coordinate repair requirements with the
expedited. Stocking and accounting procedure for Soviet
logistic organisation. In theory, it should be possible for

Stores were modified to yield a better and quick result. The

ASD to project and ensure all his stores requirements

Ranging and scaling procedure was streamlined. The review
integral to his organisation. Quicker response and closer
system of machinery and spares was modified on the base
coordination may also be possible within an organisation
of ABC analysis.

rather than between two distinct agencies.

“The relationship between MS and ASD is that of

1979: Excerpt from the 1979 Naval Expert Committee

Customer and Vendor. Most of the time, the ASD is

Report on Maintenance
the Customer. However, where Dockyards are required

In 1979, the Naval Expert Committee examined the
to manufacture items for stocks and for repairs to
pros and cons of Admiral Superintendent Dockyard
repairable inventory, MS is the Customer and as such is

(Bombay) exercising organisational control over Material
in a position to assert himself on the Vendor.

Superintendent Bombay and the Naval Armament Depot

"A somewhat more tenuous advantage lies in the fact
at Bombay. Its report stated:

that since there is a requirement of engineering skills in

“Background. Historically, the Naval Stores Depot
the Material Management, overseeing of MS functions is
was physically situated in the premises of the Bombay
better entrusted to a technical officer.

Dockyard till 1954. Since the Dockyard was not a full-

“Disadvantages of M S Being under ASD. The fledged repair organisation at this time but a fledgling
argument regarding span of control, which holds good
organisation required to extend all type of support to RN
for C-in-C is equally applicable to ASD. Particularly in
and RIN ships during the war, the functions of overseeing
the present organisation structure of Bombay Dockyard,
of stores and ammunition depots were necessary.

more than a dozen officers report direct to the ASD.

Though the functions of the Dockyard have been

This can, at best, be termed unwieldy. It is a moot point
considerably enlarged subsequently and it has grown
whether the C-in-C or the ASD needs to be relieved of
into a full scale repair yard, organisational changes
have failed to keep pace with the added responsibilities.

some of his overseeing functions.

Similarly, the small warehousing organisations of both

“The Committee’s study has found that putting MS

MS’ has been transformed into an All India procurement
under ASD has given rise to certain unwelcome practices.

organisation with capabilities of repairs to inventory as

The chief reason of that being that the Customer /
well. With the result that ASD still continues to control

Vendor relationship becomes blurred. The checks and

MS.

balances, which exist when two independent agencies

“Situation Elsewhere. It would be seen that CSD
are required to carry out two distinct functions, have also

(V) does not control NSD (V). There is no dockyard in
been lost. There is a greater tendency to sweep under

Cochin but the BRO does not have any such links with the
the carpet both failures in forecasting and provisioning.

Stores Organisation. In both these stations, the Stores

An in-house system has given rise to somehow getting a

Organisation reports directly to the Commanders-in-
job done without blaming anybody. The quality of some

Chief.

stores, which are supplied for refits, is stated to be poor
and one of the reasons is that MS is under ASD and as

“Functional Responsibility. Functionally, MS is such, the Customer cannot complain against a fraternal
answerable to DLS at NHQ for his All India functions
of procurement and supply. The warehousing functions
organisation to an external authority.

for the Bombay Command are also undertaken by a

“The most harmful effect of the present organisation
subsidiary organisation under the MS. It would thus be
system can be seen in repairable inventory and
seen that there is certain dichotomy in the functions,
manufacturing for stock. As it is, the Logistic
which are performed by the MS. Some of them pertain

Organisation is not able to assert itself even when it
to the Navy, as a whole, while some are comparable to
is a Customer, as can be seen in Vishakhapatnam.

any local Stores Organisation.

However, when it is an integral part of the organisation,

‘Advantages of MS Being under ASD. One of the the situation becomes far worse. The rapidly increasing
major advantages of having MS under ASD is that if he
repairable inventory in Bombay and the inadequate
were not to be under ASD but under C-in-C, the span of
effort made by Dockyard to manufacture items for
control for C-in-C would become unduly large. Effective
stocks are clear indications that the present system
control of MS may not be feasible for the C-in-C.

is not working well. The Committee also considers

168 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

essential that the checks and balances, which
the years, an increasing number of purchases were being
introduced certain measures of quality control in the
done through Local Purchase and all such purchases
supply of stores, are essential in our environment.

were not inspected by statutory and other agencies like

Recommendations. In view of the foregoing, it is

Dockyard, CTS/MS, users etc.

clear that there is a necessity to remove MS from the

The measures taken to improve the quality of stores
administrative control of the Admiral Superintendent supplied to ships were: Dockyard. There is a greater need for functional control
to be exercised over this organisation by the ultimate • As far as possible, minimise local purchase.

Customer i.e. the ships. Such control would be best © Improve purchases by ensuring that supply orders exercised by interaction of Staff Branch with the Material
catered for adequate time and included technical data

Branch. For association in inspection of Material
and specifications to enable the inspection agency to

Organisation, greater interaction is necessary between
carry out proper testing.

Staff and Material Branches on this aspect also. Though • Institute procedures for reporting defects.

Maintenance Organisation is a large consumer of the
materials, it is not the majority consumer. Even items, © Strengthen testing facilities at the various Naval which are required by the maintenance function, are

Inspection Wings and make good their shortages of
ultimately for the service of the ships. To this end, it
inspecting officers.

would be correct to state that the ultimate Consumer is 1987: The Indian Institute of Management (IIM), Bangalore still the Staff Branch.

was requested to carry out a study on the Rationalisation

“While the details of the organisation proposed to of Inventory Management in the Navy. This study indicted oversee MS are given in the Logistic portion of the every possible facet of the logistics organisation - materials, Committee’s Report, broadly MS would function as armament supply, aviation spares and weapon equipment.

an ex-officio Chief Staff Officer to C-in-C. Greater After its report was presented to the Ministry, the impression functional control would be exercised by DLS to ensure gained ground that the Navy was over-provisioning and that the objectives, which are set for the organisation, over-stocking. Being the largest segment, ‘material logistics’

are met.”

took the brunt of the criticism As a result, the normal
replenishment process was viewed with suspicion. There

1983: As a result of the recommendations of the 1981 was a clampdown on sanctions and release of foreign Naval Expert Committee, the administrative and functional exchange for naval procurement. Imports of stores and control of the Material Superintendents and Material spares suffered, upsetting the regular and continuous Organisations at Bombay and Vizag were removed from replenishment needed to maintain stocks at the right under the ASDs and placed under the FOCs-in-C West and level. It also affected the quick response mechanisms for East.

operational and urgent requirements.

1986: Poor Quality of Indigenised General/Engineering 1988: After the severe national drought of 1986-87, Stores. Complaints had increased that the quality of resources became scarce and procurement of spares was standard engineering stores, e.g., clips, bolts, nuts, locking further cut back.

wire, hoses, washers, seals, pipes, paints, etc, being
supplied to ships were of very poor quality. Material failures 1989: To ‘professionalise’ naval logistics, a ‘Logistics of these basic items were leading to serious damage to Cadre’ was created.

ships machinery, resulting in their non-participation in

In NHQ, the Controller of Logistic Services (CLS) was
exercises or being laid up for prolonged periods. A study created to function under the COM.

revealed that the reasons were:

The Cadre was to have four sub-specialisations -

• Inadequate / incorrect specifications, use of non

‘Material Management’ and ‘Financial Management’ was
standard items, purchasing from substandard firms, fairly close to what the Supply Branch had been doing deficiency in inspection, acceptance under deviation, earlier. The Management Information System / Electronic keeping of time expired stores in depots and inadequate Data Processing (MIS/EDP) and Works Management planning / timely forecast.

functions were new. Two major duties of the old Supply

• ‘Local Purchase’ orders were the main problem, Branch - Secretariat Duties and Naval Law - were not particularly where delivery periods were also short. Over
entrusted to the Cadre.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE 1 169

Development After 1990

The mid 1990s saw the inaugration of the Navy’s

Integrated Logistic Management System (ILMS) and the

Soon after 1990, the fragmentation of the Soviet Onion New Management Strategy (NMS) introduced to improve disrupted the supply of spares and aggravated the cutback the productivity of cost and budget centres, starting with in spares procurement that had started in 1988. Russia’s Naval Dockyards and Material Organisations.

restructured factories started demanding payment for
spares in hard currency. It took time to work out the new
financial arrangements.

170 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

20

Third Naval Base At Karwar

Project Seabird

Background
commission, despite the fact that this would increase the
congestion at Bombay.

When the 1939-1945 World War started, the Royal Indian

Navy had only one base - Bombay. All workshops, dry docks

Since the Bombay Dockyard would not be able to cope
and the six rating training schools - Gunnery, Seamanship, either with the refits or the berthing of the size of the Fleet Signals, Anti submarine, Boys Training Establishment and taking shape, the Navy proposed: Mechanical Training Establishment - were concentrated • Setting up of a major naval base at Vishakhapatnam inside the Naval Dockyard. By 1945, when the war ended,
and made plans for the immediate construction there of
the Naval Dockyard workshops had upgraded but there
an 1,120-foot jetty and a workshop.

had not been any substantial increase in berthing space.

• Decongesting Bombay by basing of some ships at

Before and during the war, new entry ratings used

Cochin, Vishakhapatnam and Calcutta.

to be taken in ships from Bombay to Karwar as it was

By 1961, the second cruiser, eight new frigates, six
found to be the best site for seamanship training. In the new minesweepers, the aircraft carrier, a repair and store early 1950s, it was suggested that Karwar be developed ship and numerous SDBs had arrived in Bombay. The as a naval base. This would avoid the Navy having to congestion, though relieved partly by the re-basing of ships be confined in a siltation-prone Dockyard area and a and a few new berths of the Expansion Scheme, remained congested urban metropolis like Bombay. This suggestion a cause for concern.

could not be pursued because the amount of money
involved in developing Karwar as an independent naval

In December 1961, the possession of Goa was resumed
base/port without some commercial significance was not from the Portuguese. The airfield at Dabolim and the a viable proposition. Moreover, Karwar had no rail and road small workshop at Vasco were taken over by the Navy, connections. Without these connections to back up this who immediately suggested that Goa be developed as naval base, Karwar would be a ‘white elephant’.

an ‘intermediate base’ where ships could operate from
and still not be too far from the Bombay Dockyard for

By the mid 1950s, despite the training schools having repairs. In New Delhi, however, there was difference of been moved out of Bombay to make way for the cruiser, opinion between the Ministries whether Goa should be the six destroyers, the landing ship and the light tanker developed solely as a mercantile port or whether the Navy’s that the Navy had acquired, the Dockyard remained requirement to have an intermediate naval base, half way congested. The Naval Dockyard Expansion Scheme was between Bombay and Cochin, could be accommodated.

initiated to relieve this congestion and also cater for the This discussion continued until 1963.

maintenance and refits of the eight new frigates and the
six new minesweepers that had been ordered from Britain.

Immediately after China’s intrusion in end 1962,

The expectation was that the new ships would replace the Government accorded sanction for the construction of the older ones and congestion could be kept at manageable new jetty at Vishakhapatnam.

levels until the new berths of the Expansion Scheme

During 1963, decisions were taken to set up at
became available. This did not happen.

Vishakhapatnam, the Naval Base and Workshop that the

The rapid expansion of the Pakistan Navy in the end Navy had proposed in 1957 and also to develop Goa as an 1950s compelled the Navy to keep the existing ships in
intermediate naval base.

In 1965, developments occurred in rapid succession:

Conceptual Requirements for the Third Naval B a se

• In April, Pakistan intruded into Kutch.

During the 1970s, the ‘Conceptual Requirements’

• In June, there was an increase in Indonesian intrusions crystallised for the ‘Third Naval Base’ (TNB) on the West into the Nicobar Islands. The Navy recommended an Coast, in addition to Bombay and Cochin. These were: immediate increase in naval presence in the Bay of • Large waterfront.

Bengal to deter further intrusions.

• Sufficient depth of water.

• The need for increased naval presence in the A&N • Tranquil anchorage.

islands precipitated the decision to accept the Russian
offer of vessels that had been pending since September • Sufficient contiguous backup area inland for operational, technical, administrative and logistic facilities.

1964.

• In September 1965, an agreement was signed for • Integrated development.

the acquisition from Russia of four submarines, a • Security considerations.

submarine depot ship, five submarine chasers, two • Exclusiveness.

landing ships and five patrol boats, all for deployment
in the Bay of Bengal and the A&N Islands. These • Defence in depth.

acquisitions were to be based at Vishakhapatnam • Self contained.

to segregate them from the Western origin ships • Rail, road and sea communications.

in Bombay. They were to be supported by a new

Dockyard to be built by Russia.

The Choice of Karwar for the Third Naval B a se

These decisions did little to ease the congestion in The locations considered were Ratnagiri, Pawas Bay, Goa, Bombay, which could only occur after the new berths and Karwar, Tadri, Mangalore and Tuticorin. The short-listed workshops of the Expansion Scheme came up.

options emerged as Mangalore, Tuticorin, and Karwar.

Karwar emerged as the preferred location.

During the 1970s, the new Leander class frigates built
in Mazagon Docks, the new missile boats, the new Russian

Karwar is located 65 km south of Goa and 320 km
rocket boats and the new minesweepers started being north of Mangalore. Its location gave it the benefit of based in Bombay. And to further add to all the congestion, being free from cyclonic devastation. Many small islands, the new guided missile frigates of the Rajput class would including Anjadip, offered protection against natural be arriving from 1980 onwards.

elements from the north, west and southwest. It had deep
waters. The four-fathom line (24 feet) ran extremely close

The fact that all the Navy’s bases were situated in large to the shore all along the coast. The range of tide was 2.5
port cities imposed both growth constraints and security metres (7 feet) during springs and 1.2 metres (4.5 feet) risks. In Bombay particularly, extreme berthing congestion during neaps.

and encroachment problems were becoming difficult to
manage. Moreover, the steady increase in the number of

Two perennial rivers, the Kalinadi River to the north
ships based in Bombay was adding to the load of an overof Karwar Head and the Gangavalli River to the south, burdened Dockyard, to the detriment of the maintenance would provide potable water, uninterrupted water supply and operational availability of ships.

and had hydel potential. The Kalinadi Hydel Power Project
was expected to generate a total of 910+278+128 MW of

It was also imposing hardships on the crews of ships power in its three phases.

because of the difficulties of housing, schooling and
transportation. The number of residential units, both

The Karnataka State Government was developing
for officers and sailors, was far below entitlement. The Karwar commercial port in three stages to become an all Navy had no land in Bombay to build any more housing weather port to handle ships of up to 60,000 tonne DWT
or schools. Disciplinary and domestic problems as a for ore and other general cargo traffic. National Highway consequence of two, or even three, families’ sharing a

17 was being widened and strengthened to take 20-tonne
tiny two-room space were having a negative impact on cargo trucks. The Konkan Railway to the north and south the morale of sailors.

would connect Karwar.

All these reasons added to the urgency of decongesting

It was decided to include the Third Naval Base in the

Bombay.

1980-85 Defence Plan.

172 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

k a r w a r m y

NAVAL BASE UNDER CONSTRUCTION AT KARWAR

A R j K A R W A R T O W N

1OFFICERS ACCOMODATION ZONE

FOREST A R E A

■COMMAND MESS

D.MTKOL&'W

EVENTUAL N A V A L BASE

\

/ & DOCKYARD ZONE

,SAILORS ACCOMODATION ZONE

KAMA'S.

CIVILIAN ACCOMODATION ZONE

BLXAGARW
f u t u r e f a c il it ie s

■Work\

Htrbour

V

KWADABAY

'

DEPOTS/

\

FU T U R E FACH JTIES

BELEKERIBAY

SITE FOR NAY A!

\ AIR ENCLAVE

ARABIAN SEA

\RM

UA.\SE\

A N K O L A

SCALE

5 Km

responded from all over the world, of which five were short

Acquisition of Land
listed. In consultation with Engineers India, M/s Regional

By 1983, the total land requirement had been ironed out.

Engineering Development Consultants of Australia

(Redecon) and M/s Netherlands Engineering Consultants

Laying of Foundation Stone
of Netherlands (Nedeco) were selected as the foreign

In 1985, sanction was accorded for Phase I of the Third consultants.

Naval Base at Karwar. Due to the enormity of the project and

The main tasks of the foreign consultants were to
the fact that no Indian firm had undertaken planning and prepare a Master Plan along with a Detailed Project Report construction of such a major naval base, the Government (DPR) for the marine works. The Indian consultants were to approved inviting global tenders for consultancy. However, prepare a Detailed Project Report for the on-shore works.

it was decided also to select a suitable Indian firm to be
associated with this work.

Studies, Investigations and M odel Test s

For the management of the project, the Government Prior to finalising the Master Plan and the Detailed Project approved the constitution an Apex Body headed by the Report, all the necessary geo-technical investigations, Defence Minister, a Project Management Board headed marine environment investigation, model testing of by the Defence Secretary and a Project Management breakwaters etc had been carried out. The Central Water Authority headed by a Director General, who would be a and Power Research Station, Pune conducted the wave Rear Admiral.

and motion studies of the harbour and its configuration to

On 24 October 1986, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi, evolve an optimal design / configuration of the breakwaters laid the foundation stone for the Third Naval Base and to ensure tranquillity conditions inside the harbour. The christened it as ‘Project Seabird’.

studies for model testing included investigations of
prevailing wave, tide and wind conditions, sediment flow,

From 1986 onwards, DG Seabird started liasing with soil testing etc.

the Ministry of Railways for connecting Karwar by rail to
their network and with the Ministry of Surface Transport for

The Master Plan was prepared by March 1990. The
diversion of the National Highway 17 for meeting security Detailed Project Report for the construction of breakwaters, requirements.

dredging and reclamation was completed in June 1990.

Engineers India submitted the Detailed Project Report for

Selection of Consultants
the on-shore facilities in August 1990.

The first step was to select a suitable Indian consultant to

D evelopm ents After 1990
prepare the broad requirements for inviting global tenders
and draw up the Detailed Project Definition.

The Financial Constraints of 1990-94 and the Revised

Phase I

A Committee of Secretaries was constituted to select an

Indian firm as consultants. From amongst the various firms Due to the financial crisis in the early 1990s, there was a that were pre-qualified, the Committee recommended shortage of resources. Between 1990-94, the project could Engineers India as the prime consultants for Project not progress further.

Seabird. This was approved by the Government.

During this period, discussions were held on how best

Along with Engineers India, a global tender was floated to prune down Phase 1 of the project in view of the financial for inviting consultants for planning and designing Phase constraints. In 1995, Government approved the Revised I of the base. A total of forty-two firms and consortiums

Phase I.

174 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

21

The Indigenous Panoramic Sonar

APSOH

Preamble
processing. During 1971, Lieutenant Jain tried out the

BARC modification kit at sea. The trials were encouraging
in the end 1960s, the Navy evaluated at sea the panoramic and he was working on further improving it when the war sonars fitted in the Russian Petya class submarine chasers. broke out in December 1971. Lieutenant Jain prevailed Concurrently, it was evaluating the European panoramic upon the Command Headquarters at Bombay to let him sonars being offered for the Leander class frigates to be built embark with his modification in Khukri when she was at Mazagon Docks. To achieve self-reliance in shipborne sailed for an anti submarine operation. During the next two sonars, the Navy projected to the NPOL1 its requirement days and until the Khukri was torpedoed and sunk, the for a state-of-the-art, medium range, panoramic sonar, modification kit was connected up. The submarine carried designed specifically for Indian tropical and hydrological out its attack undetected.

conditions.

The morning after the sinking of the Khukri, Lieutenant

The sinking of the frigate Khukri during the December Paulraj was flown to Bombay from IIT Delhi. His assessment 1971 Indo-Pakistan War led to intense efforts to remedy was that the BARC approach for modifying the sonar was the inability of the subsequent Hunter-Killer operation to not likely to be productive. He returned to Delhi and using destroy the Pakistan Navy submarine.

IIT resources developed a different concept for modifying

The successful design, development, production the Sonar 170B. His IIT-developed mod kit performed and testing, between 1976 and 1983, of the Navy’s first successfully during sea trials and was given to Bharat indigenous hull-mounted sonar, which in Indian waters Dynamics (BDL) for production.

performed better than all other sonars of that time, was

In 1972, Paulraj’s innovative research at the IIT led to his
the finale of a combination of unique circumstances. The becoming the first-ever naval recipient of a Ph D without derivatives of that outstanding sonar continue to be fitted having an M Tech degree.

in the Navy’s latest ships.

In 1973, Britain’s Loughborough University learnt

Developments Prior to 1976
of Paulraj’s capabilities and invited him to Britain to
work on their submarine sonar project for 18 months.

In the 1960s, the Navy had been experiencing difficulties in Between January 1974 and September 1975, Paulraj obtaining adequate performance of the Sonar 170B fitted was in Britain to work on this project. During this period, in the new British frigates. The Bhabha Atomic Research Naval Headquarters asked him to visit and assess the Centre (BARC) had been requested to try and improve the effectiveness of the designs of the latest panoramic sonars signal processing.

that manufacturers in Britain and Europe were offering to

In 1969, the Navy had nominated Lieutenant A Paulraj a the Navy for fitment in the future Leanders.

gifted young electrical officer, for the M Tech course in the

Paulraj returned to India in 1975 and helped to install

Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Delhi.

and set to work the mod kit that, during his stay in

In 1970, another young electrical officer, Lieutenant VK Britain, had been produced by BDL for the four British Jain, having just returned from a course in Britain, starte
anti submarine frigates. This hands-on experience of the
working with the BARC Team on improving sonar signa
practical problems of modifying sonars on board ships was

------------------- —

-
rT .h n rato rv one of the three naval laboratories under the Defence Research and Development 1. The Naval Physical and Oceanography Laboratory, one or in

Organisation, specialised in the development of sonar.

The first APSOH was not ready for installation till 1984.

to prove invaluable later when proving the new AFSOH Since it was too late to fit APSOH in any of the Godavari class sonar at sea.

frigates, these three ships were fitted with the British 184 SS

After installing the modification kit in Talwar, Paulraj (solid state) sonar. Eventually, when APSOH was retrofitted was deputed to the NPOL to help in the development of in the Godavari class frigates, it proved to be a total success, the panoramic sonar project.

particularly in detection and echo-classification.

From 1975 onwards, Naval Headquarters commenced its

The time taken to develop APSOH from concept to Sea
detailed comparative evaluation of foreign sonars for fitment Acceptance Trials was six and a half years; reportedly its in future ships. Paulraj participated in these evaluations. closest foreign counterpart had taken ten years.

With his unique theoretical and practical background, he
concluded that the NPOL had the capability to produce a

Commodore Paulraj’s Reminiscences
sonar more appropriate to the Navy’s requirements.

“Early in 1969, I was nominated to attend a selection

NPOL gave a presentation of its sonar to NHQ and interview for the M Tech course at IIT (Delhi). 1 joined IIT in recommended that future ships be fitted with the NPOL July 1969 for the M Tech course, overjoyed at a chance to sonar. The Navy accepted NPOLs recommendation. pursue my interests in a real university.

Sanctions were accorded; teams were assembled.

“Soon Prof Indiresan became impressed with my work

Developments From 1976 Onwards
and asked the IIT and NHQ to allow me to transfer to a

Ph D programme. I did not have a B Tech degree and

In 1976, work started on what came to be called the APSOH therefore normally needed to complete a M Tech before (Advanced Panoramic Sonar Hull-mounted). In two and a starting on a Ph D. Prof Indiresan succeeded in persuading half years, a wire-wrap prototype was ready. Sea trials were the IIT Senate to make a concession, but had much more carried out in 1979 in which APSOH’s basic concepts were difficulty with NHQ. Initially Vice Admiral Krishnan (the proved.

VCNS) gave a fiat no, because, as he put it, he did not

After sea trials, the circuit design was transferred to need scientists in the Navy. But Prof Indiresan persisted Bharat Electronics Ltd (BEL). At BEL, Captain (L) Prabhala and wrote or visited NHQ. VCNS finally relented on the and Paulraj decided that to save development time and condition that I get back to the Navy in the two years enable the APSOH to be fitted in the Project 16 Godavari allowed for the M Tech.

class frigates, it was best to retain the same ‘hull outfit’

“I began my Ph D research in December 1969. After

(for raising and lowering the sonar inside the dome), the an initial start in more applied work, I was successful in same transducers as the Sonar 184 SS, the same standard developing many interesting results in filtering theory cabinets as were fitted in the Leanders and to resolve
shortcomings by adjustments in signal processing.

(extracting signals from noise). During early 1971, Prof

Kailath from Stanford University visited the IIT. Kailath was

In view of the importance of this project, the Navy already a legend. He encouraged my theoretical research decided that:

interests. Prof Indiresan with his emphasis on ‘practice’ and

• The first prototype APSOH sonar would be extensively Prof Kailath on ‘theory’ influenced my professional interests tried out at sea, for one full year in a fully operational and they remain my principal heroes and mentors.

Leander class frigate, across the entire spectrum of

“In August 1971, my two years at IIT were completed,
hydrological conditions prevailing on the West and East and I was posted to Valsura (the Navy’s Electrical School).

coasts of India.

I still needed a mandatory additional year to submit my

• During these sea trials, whatever modifications became thesis. I did have interesting results, but it required more necessary would be carried out in situ by BEL, the polishing and Valsura, lacking a research library, would eventual producer of the sonar.

have killed the Ph D. Once again, Prof Indiresan lobbied

• On completion of trials, BEL would fit an updated sonar NHQ for a New Delhi posting and after a great deal of in whichever of the Godavari class frigates was nearing anxiety, I was assigned to the Directorate of Electrical completion

Engineering at NHQ.

In mid 1982, APSOH was installed in the Leander class The Beginning
frigate, Himgiri and problems were resolved in situ durinq

1983.

One night in early December 1971, during the Indo-

Pakistan War, we lost the frigate INS Khukri from submarine

176 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

action. The next morning, the DEE (Director of Electrical o The paper recorder in 170 B marked the signal as a Engineering, Commodore Chatterjee) asked me whether
raster on chemical paper. With a step-scan search, the

I knew anything about sonars. I don’t remember what 1

echoes appear on several side-by-side traces and a
told him, but later that afternoon, I accompanied him to
similar ping integration gain is available through visual

Bombay. The next day, I became aware of Lieutenant Jain’s
correlation. BARC’s complex electronics added little
association with the BARC experiments. 1 also examined
additional gain to the paper recorder.

some of the hardware developed by BARC. DEE then
asked me if I would take over Jain’s place and pursue the IIT Technology work to improve Sonar 170 B. 1 accepted and suggested “Three distinct techniques were used, each to be cut-in that we do the project at I1T under Prof Indiresan. I was of depending on operational conditions.

course happy to get back to IIT to rescue my Ph.D.

© Linear Frequency Modulation (LFM) pulse. An FM pulse

The Sonar 170B Modification
de-correlated the reverberations and helped the target
stand out. The idea of using LFM was borrowed from

“In March 1972, MHQ assigned me back to IIT Delhi

Sonar 184 M, which had used this to good effect.

to develop a modification kit to improve Sonar 170 B.

NHQ allowed me to use any design approach. BARC was © Noise Reduction using Digital Own Doppler Nullification encouraged to continue its work. I had my misgivings

(DODN). Sonar 170 B used a very wide band receiver to
about the BARC’s approach, but kept quiet because of the
allow echoes that were Doppler shifted from own and
sensitivity of the circumstances.

target motion to enter the receiver. The inherent pulse
bandwidth was only a few tens of Hz, but the receiver

“By March 1972, IIT had a basic prototype and the
was about 2000 Hz wide. Most of this broadening was
team (Prof Indiresan, myself and three Ph.D. scholars) flew
allowed for high own-ship Doppler. The target Doppler
down to Bombay for trials on INS Kuthar. The first trial had
was smaller. In DODN, the mean frequency of the
problems in interface to the sonar. We were back again in
reverberations is estimated using a frequency lock loop

June 1972, with an improved prototype and this time the

(FLL) and then used to centre a narrow receiver band
trials went well. NHQ was enthusiastic. A final prototype
wide enough to pass the target Doppler variations. As a
was built during September 1972 to September 1973.

result, we narrowed the bandwidth by a factor of 10 and

It was cleared for production after extensive trials. BDL
cut noise by 10 db.

Hyderabad was nominated as the production agency. IIT • Notch Filtering (NF). Since we have (from DODN) the handed over the design to BDL in December 1973. I left
reverberation frequency, a NF can be used to reduce
for the UK to work at Loughborough University in January
reverberations. As long the target was higher than 3

1974. The ex-BDL 170 B mod kits entered fleet service in

Knots Doppler, the NF passed the target echo without

1976/77.

loss.

BARC vs IIT Technology

• Another improvement was the addition of an A-scan
storage CRT display. This allowed the closer examination

BARC Technology
of echoes, to improve target recognition.

“BARC used a technique called ping-to-ping integration Performance Figures (PI). Returned signals (after detection) from each ping
are digitised and averaged together. This helped target • Close and low Doppler target: LFM mode improves detection since noise and reverberations are uncorrelated
target visibility in reverbs. Gain 5-7 db.

from ping-to-ping, but target echoes are more consistent. • Close and high Doppler target: NF mode removes Over a number of pings, a weak target, not visible on a
reverbs and passes target echoes. Gain between 3 to 20
single ping, will begin to stand out on the PI output. The
db.

processing gain was between 5 to 8 db for 10 pings. The • Far target (noise limited): NODN mode. Reduces noise drawbacks with BARC’s approach were:

by 10 db. NODN was also used in LFM and NF modes,

• Sonar 170 B was a searchlight sonar. If we use several
but did not help close targets.

(say 10) pings in a given direction to extract gain from • The IIT system does not need multiple pings unlike the PI, the azimuth scan rate becomes too slow. Even a

BARC technique. The single ping performance improved
standard all-round search was too slow and a factor
by an average of 7-12 db, resulting in near doubling in
of 10 further reduction in search would have been
sonar range.

unviable.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 177

• Visit to Plessey: I was told by Plessey that they had Comments on the BARC Project
developed an improved Sonar 170 B. I found that they

“Lieutenant Jain had done a course in the CJK at HMS
had not really improved the sonar, other than adding

Collingivood and had picked up sonar knowledge beyond

LFM. They had not figured how to do DODN.

his Valsura courses. In Bombay, Jain met Dr Phadnis of • Visit to Thompson CSF: This was a strong team building BARC who had returned from Italy where his professor
the Diodon sonar for the Indian Navy. However, they did
had developed an instrument for nuclear scintillation
not know anything new.

logging. Phadnis had learnt in Italy that this technique
can also improve sonars. So Jain and Phadnis, with Dr

"I arrived back in India in November 1975, confident

Dastidar’s blessing, began adapting this instrument for use that we could develop our own major sonar. Initially DEE
with Sonar 170 B. Jain was then at the Naval Dockyard assigned me for sea time. But then somebody intervened Bombay’s Weapon Workshop WECORS and Western Naval and I was assigned to NPOL. NPOL did not have a billet for Command had clearly encouraged his association with me and I was finally posted on a transferred billet.

BARC. I don’t think NHQ was aware of the BARC project.

Jain never visited or worked at IIT. I became aware of his A PSO H
involvement only after the loss of Khukri and his death. "When I arrived in Cochin in February 1976, NPOL was What 1 recollect hearing was that the BARC equipment was already working on a sonar project. This had a budget attached to Sonar 170 B which was operating when Khukri of Rs 14 lakhs. Initially, NPOLs Director, Dr Srinivasan, was hit and Jain was in the Sonar Control Room.

did not involve me with this project. If I recall correctly, a

“I believe that the IIT system design is much superior computer system arrived from the US badly damaged and to the BARC design. Once, during a meeting in Scientific I managed to fix it. This impressed Dr Srinivasan and 1 was Adviser, Dr Ramanna’s office in 1973 to discuss the IIT vs included in the project discussions. It soon became clear BARC technology, I tried to explain why the PI approach of to Dr Srinivasan that I had the best grasp of system design BARC had a problem and suggested alternate approaches. and 1 slowly began to drive the project into high ground.

I am not sure if anyone understood. The BARC project

“Around this time, NHQ started looking for an advanced
went on for a few more years before being shut down. This sonar. Dr Srinivasan and I managed to convince various was a high visibility project at BARC and it was politically people VCNS, DCPT (Captain Hiranandani) and others that hard for BARC to wind up the project on a negative note. we should build our own. It was a leap of faith for us all.

However, BARC and Jain deserve the credit to have taken NPOL had little track record to back up such an ambitious the initiative to start improving Sonar 170 B. Clearly, there
would have been no IIT project (and the improvement of project. And I was a pretty green project leader. A CCPA 170 B) and perhaps even APSOH if not for the BARC-Jain paper was drawn up for Rs 280 lakhs. We had approval by initiative.

end 1976 and APSOH was rolling.

OK and the S eeds of A P S O H

“Our team grew from 10 in 1976 to about 60 by 1982.

Captain Prabhala2 headed the Engineering team at BEL.

“From January 1974,1 spent 18 months at Loughborough Relations between NPOL and B EL were initially good, but University working on signal processing on an Admiralty as deadlines appeared, there was much finger-pointing Under-Water Establishment funded project. I used every and our relations cooled. Looking back, I did a poor job in chance to visit the sonar industry and learn whatever I carrying BEL along and indeed also the DRDO brass. Too could about the technology. Apart from my research into much of the technical leadership was centralised in me passive sonar signal processing, I had lots of fun building and my close relations with the Navy (innocent and indeed a minicomputer. At the end of my stay, I was given 2 vital for the project) were unfortunately misread by many of months to visit sonar companies. This was a revealing my superiors in the DRDO and B E L
experience:

“Serious problems cropped up in 1982 and VCNS and

• Visit to Grasebys: They were, at that point, building CNS had to intervene to keep NPOL - BEL fights in check.

the Solid State version of 184 M for the Indian Navy. I If not for these two senior officers, APSOH could have been discovered that the design team had only minimal grasp stopped dead. Many heads soon rolled in the aftermath.

of sonar signal processing. During my brief stay, I helped
them improve some of their designs.

After a 6-month installation on Himgiri commanded
by Captain (later Admiral) Shekhawat, the APSO H

2. Captain S Prabhala, a talented electrical officer, later rose to be the Chairman and Managing Director of Bharat Electronics Ltd.

178 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

prototype took to sea in mid 1982. On the very first to DRDO, the CNS’s (Admiral Dawsons) clearance was day, we saw 16 km ranges against a submarine target. It needed, and went along with this. 1 was initially a little brought so many others and me great satisfaction. We hesitant, but was willing to be persuaded. Thus, with some had problems with the power amplifiers, which took a surprise, my sonar period ended almost as abruptly as it while to fix. But this aside, the system behaved superbly. had begun, more than eleven years ago on the day after The sonar screens were sometimes unreal in quality we lost the Khukri.

compared to anything known.

“In September 1983, I joined Stanford. It all worked out

APSOH Credits (a personal list)

thanks to Prof Kailath who remembered my Ph D work
o The NPOL and BEL project teams.

and arranged the visiting faculty appointment. At Stanford,

I returned to pure theoretical research in mostly applied

O CNS Admiral Pereira and VCNS Vice Admiral Schunker mathematics, very far from sonars and mostly irrelevant to for backing of the project, sometimes at personal risk to
the DRDO or the Navy. However I came to enjoy Stanford
themselves.

a lot, and therefore in 1992, when I was at a loose end, I
o Dr Srinivasan for giving me near absolute freedom at decided to return here to start a new activity in wireless NPOL to execute the project. This was not easy for him communications for the University.

politically, but he stuck with it almost to the end.

Acknowledgement
o Key NHQ directors (Captain Hiranandani, Khandekar
etc.) who backed APSOH. They believed in indigenous “I was fortunate to have played a role in the early development technology in a time when it was risky and unfashionable of the Indian Navy's sonar capability: Sonar 170 B Mod to do so.

and later APSOH and its variants -1 started the variants but
o Commodore (later Vice Admiral) Ravi Kohli (DNRD) for was out of NPOL before these were completed.

his tremendous personal support.

“I acknowledge the support and encouragement of
o Captain Subbu Prabhala for managing the Bharat many people. Clearly the most important person was Prof Electronics team with integrity and ability. He was Indiresan. His perseverance and faith launched me (an unfortunately transferred in 1980.

ex-NDA officer without a formal university degree or for
that matter any real engineering training) into a world of

© Captain (later Rear Admiral Pramod Datey) for doing a high technology - IIT (Delhi), sonars, parallel computers, fine job of the installation.

wireless networks, Stanford University and the rest.

• Many others in the Navy (Himgiri, Mazagon Docks, Naval

Dockyard), DRDO and BEL who went out of their way to

“Recalling my sonar days, 1 was blessed with tremendous
build a dream.

personal support from the highest levels in the Navy
including every CNS and VCNS from 1972 to 1983. There

Thoughts on APSOH in Retrospect
are many others drawn from Navy, DRDO and BEL, too
numerous to mention here."

“Now that I lead aspects of wireless technology at a
worldwide level, I have a better understanding of the

For his achievement, Commodore (then Commander)

technology development process in the developed Paulraj was awarded the Ati Vishist Seva Medal in 1984.

countries. 1 sometimes compare APSOH with other The citation for his award stated: achievements I see in my new field. 1 am always amazed
as to how such an inexperienced team, with such few

“Commander Arogyaswami Joseph Paulraj, VSM,
resources, pulled off this major project in such a short (50162 B) was commissioned in the Indian Navy on period. APSOH was an impossible dream that came true 1 July 1965. He stood first in the National Defence Academy and was awarded the President of India Gold
for many of us.

Medal. He obtained a Ph D in Electrical Engineering

The End
in 1973 from the Indian Institute of Technology New

Delhi.

“One day in May 1983, as the APSOH trials were concluding,

Dr Arunachalam, the Scientific Adviser to the Defence

“Commander Paulraj served onboard Indian Naval Ship

Minister, asked me to leave the country on sa atica

D a rs h a k and in the Directorate of Electrical Engineering
for two or three years and to do something comp ete y at Naval Headquarters before being nominated to the different. He made it clear that my sonar career was over Research and Development Organisation. From the and 1 should find wider interests. Since I was not seconde
very beginning, he showed a great flair for research,

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 179

tremendous ingenuity, ability for improvisation and operational capability of our ships, was largely possible hard work. He was awarded the Vishisht Seva Medal in because of the selfless devotion to duty, high technical 1974 for designing a new circuit in a record time of six competence, result-oriented management and leadership months.

provided by Commander Paulraj.

“Recently, Commander A Paulraj was nominated

Commander Arogyaswami Joseph Paulraj has thus
project leader of the project for development of APSOH - a rendered distinguished service o f an exceptional order"

hull mounted sonar designed for fitment in ASW frigates.

The Hull-Mounted Variable Depth Sonar - HC1MVAD

From the initial conceptual stage to the installation and
harbour/sea acceptance trials of the system, Commander The Navy had also projected to the NPOL, the requirement Paulraj was totally involved in the project and brought it for a panoramic, variable depth sonar. / : soon as to a successful completion.

Commander Paulraj finished work on the APSOH, he
started work on the HGMVAD. To save development time,

“APSOH is one of the most sophisticated sonar sets
available in the world and ranks very favourably with HGMVAD retained the same towing winches, lov/ing cable those manufactured abroad, but not offered to this country.

and tow cable fairing as in the British Variable Depth Sonar

Through the successful development of the system, self 199 fitted in the first Leander class frigate, the Nilgiri.

reliance has been achieved in the field of surface ship

The towed body and the sonar inside it was a new
sonars and a firm foundation laid for development of design. The hull-mounted sonar was an upgraded version other sonars required by the Navy in the future. Such a of the APSOH. In the 1990s, the HGMVAD was fitted in the tremendous achievement, which will greatly enhance the

Project 15 destroyers of the Delhi class.

180 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

22

Indian Naval Operations

1976- 1990

Preamble
hose about 40 tonnes of water to the frigate Tir because
the Fleet tanker

This chapter narrates the major operations that the Indian

Deepak couldn’t give us water!

Navy was engaged in between 1976 and 1990. These

“On the way to Mauritius, one of Deepak’s pumps,
were:

which.was very crucial for her, packed up for the want
of a small spindle. We immediately sent a signal for that

Year

O p e ra tio n

D u ratio n

Nature of O p eratio n

1976

Godsal

March-April 1976

IN S Godavari’s salvage after grounding in the Maldives

1981

Starling

M ay 1981 to Ju ly 1982

Support o f B S F personnel on New M oore Island

1986

Rajdoot

January-February 1986

Evacuation of em bassy personnel from A den

1987

B ra ss Tacks

Ja n u a ry to M arch 1987

Major Tri Service Exercise

1987

Paw an

J u ly 1987 to M arch 1990

Support of A rm y operations in Sri Lanka

1988

C actu s

Novem ber 1988

Suppression of coup against the Maldives Governm ent

1990

Tasha

Ju n e 1990 to date

Anti militant patrols between India and Sri Lanka

The Salvage of INS Godavari
spindle to be air-lifted to Mauritius. The spindle was
located in Bombay and the Naval Stores Officer booked

INS Godauari sailed from Cochin for the Maldives Islands on
it by an Air India flight to Mauritius. Unfortunately, he

19 March 1976. She was to rendezvous (RAO off Male with
forgot to mention that it was ‘urgent defence cargo.’

INS Delhi and INS Deepak returning from a goodwill visit to As luck would have it, something happened to the

Mauritius. On the night of 22/23 March, she ran aground on
engine of the aircraft on which the spindle was loaded
a coral reef north of Male before she could make the RA'.

and another aircraft was nominated to go to Mauritius
instead. The new aircraft that was nominated was a less

Over the next three weeks, nine attempts were made
powerful aircraft, which could not cariy the entire cargo
to pull the ship off the reef. Eventually, after she had been
load. Therefore, only a limited amount of cargo from
pulled off, she had to be kept afloat, because her bottom
the first aircraft was loaded into the second aircraft, with
plates had been badly damaged. She was towed back to
the result that this particular spindle was left behind.

Cochin, repaired, towed to Bombay and disposed off.

When the aircraft arrived in Mauritius, we found that the

Captain (later Admiral and Chief of the Naval Staff)

spindle had not come and we had to sail without it.

JG Nadkarni was in command of the cruiser INS Delhi and

“Our next port of call was Male in the Maldives and
in charge of the salvage operation. He recalls:

Naval Headquarters sent INS Godavari from Cochin

“
with this spindle to meet us off Male. Godavari did not

Godavari’s salvage operation was quite a unique
carry out her navigation properly. She was way off track.

experience. It was one of those incidents where the

There are fairly strong currents off the Maldives. The
famous poem ‘for want of a nail, the shoe was lost was
next thing she knew, not having taken a proper fix of
very true. In February 1976, Delhi, Deepak and Tir a
her position, was that she was aground. So you can see
gone for a cruise to Mauritius. As it happened, Deepa s
that the whole incident took place for want of that small
material state was extremely poor. We had the unique
spindle and a store officer not marking it properly!

spectacle of the cruiser Delhi having to transfer y wa er

Navy possessed. We recommended the creation of a

“We were supposed to R/V G o davari off Male and take
salvage cell, where all the latest equipment would be
whatever she had brought for us. When we arrived at the
stored. Things like inflatable ‘camels’, which when placed

R/V position, there was no sign of G odavari. We decided
under a grounded ship can lift her using compressed air.

to enter Male harbour. Just as we were entering, there was

We also recommended regular exercises to ensure that
a faint call from G o davari and a signal was received saying
our salvage organisation remained on its toes.

that she had run aground somewhere north of Male.

“We immediately went to that position and found

“Frankly, I don’t think that the Navy bothered to set up
any salvage organisation. People said that where we have

G o d a va ri high and dry. There was absolutely no hope of
her being refloated on her own. She had run aground at a
a ship running aground once in 25 years, why should we
speed of about 10 to 12 knots. She was about nine-tenths
have an organisation for such things. So S don'i think
on land and only the propellers were in the water. The
that to this day, any salvage organisation exists, either in

ship was still having steam. They had tried to go astern to
the Indian Navy or in the Coast Guard.

see if she could come off, but absolutely no hope.

“Recently a tanker went aground off Goa. 1 think

“It took us 21 days to get that ship off the reef. The
they called in a Singapore company to do the salvage
main reason for the delay was that we did not have
operation."

tugs powerful enough to pull the ship off. Initially we

Operation Starling in the Bay of Bengal 1981-1982
had only our naval tug G aj. We tried a lot with G a j to pull G o d a va ri off. But G a j alone could not do it. In the early 1970s, a new low island emerged on a Finally we managed to get a very powerful tug from previously charted sandbank in estuary waters between Mangalore. We managed to pass a towrope to each of India and Bangladesh. Surveys were carried out. It came the tugs and one day, when both of them pulled with to be called New Moore Island.

all their might, G o d a va ri slid off her perch and entered
the water.

New Moore Island lies at a distance of 4,965 metres
from the Indian coast and 7,040 metres from the coast

“That, of course, was not all, because her bottom of Bangladesh on a sandbank that is contiguous to the had been ripped open. She began to take in water and Indian coast. It is separated from the Bangladesh coast by we had a terrible time to make sure that she remained a deep and continuous channel running north and south, afloat. Every available portable pump from the Fleet was leading into the estuary of the rivers Haribhanga, Jamuna commandeered. We found that only one or two of them and Raimangal. In conformity with international law, India worked!

claimed New Moore Island like all the other low elevation

“Fortunately for us, although everything else in islands situated within 12 miles from its coast.

G o d a v a ri was not working, one emergency diesel
generator kept on working throughout. With the use

In June 1981, sentiments in Bangladesh were disturbed
of that emergency diesel electricity generator and one by what was considered to be a unilateral survey carried pump, we somehow managed to keep G o d a va ri afloat out by India and its inability to persuade India to undertake over the next two days whilst she was towed to Cochin a joint survey. To forestall preemptive activity: and berthed alongside.

• The Navy ferried Border Security Force (B SF ) personnel

“We learnt many things. Of course, it was the coto the island and kept them supplied with food and ordination by many ships and their equipment. But the one
water and periodically replaced them with fresh B S F
thing of particular note is that this was on a coral reef and,
personnel from the mainland.

as you know, the water immediately next to a coral reef is • For the next twelve months, shallow draft ships patrolled about 2,000 fathoms deep. All the ships had to steam all
around the island and beached whenever necessary to
the time for 21 days, without any respite to anchor. That
disembark and re-embark B S F personnel and stores.

was quite an achievement. There was a fairly strong current
offshore. We had to keep the ships moving. And in spite of

The operation was terminated after sentiments had
that, we took all the ammunition off from
returned to normal.

G o d a va ri. We
lightened her in many ways and finally, after much effort, Operation Rajdoot off Aden From 28 Jan to 3 Feb 1986
we managed to pull her off the reef.

"We wrote a fairly extensive report on the whole Following news of civil war in Aden in the aftermath of operation. Our report concentrated on the absolute a coup, (the new) G o d a v a ri, along with the fleet tanker primitiveness of the salvage capability that the Indian

S h a k L i, were despatched for the evacuation of Indian nationals who might get stranded there. By the time the

182 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

ships reached Aden, the situation was under control. Both

Over the next twelve months, the Navy held a number
ships patrolled off Aden for a few days before returning to of major exercises, both naval and inter-service, in realistic Bombay.

scenarios.

Exercise Brass Tacks 1987

The first Tri-Service Commanders' Conference convened

The Genesis of the Exercise
in Delhi in October 1986. The three services discussed
their plans. 1986-87 was also the year for the Army’s

The annual ‘Senior Officers’ Conference’ is attended triennial series of large-scale manoeuvres. The exercise by all the Commanders in Chief of a service to discuss that came to be called Brass Tacks was scheduled for the matters with the Principal Staff Officers at the Service early months of 1987. It became the largest inter-service Headquarters. A ‘Tri-Service Commanders Conference
exercise that the Indian Armed Forces had staged since
would be attended by all the Commanders in Chief of the Independence in 1947.

three services at which inter-service operational matters The Unforeseen Escalation During the Exercise could be discussed.

The enormous expense incurred in a huge exercise like

In October 1985, Admiral Tahiliani was the Chief of the Brass Tacks makes it imperative that it has extremely Naval Staff. He recalls:

realistic strategic and tactical objectives. It is imperative

“In the month of October 1985, it was the Navy’s Senior that it is held in terrain that is as realistic as possible, so Officers’ Conference where, for the first time, I had that the lessons learnt are meaningful and justify the cost.

invited the Army and Air Chiefs. From what I had seen of

In end 1986, as part of the preliminaries of the exercise,
past practice, for the Prime Minister’s inaugural address, the Army began moving formations towards the Rajasthan each service would invite the senior bureaucrats, the desert proximate to India’s western border with Pakistan.

Cabinet Secretary, the Defence Secretary, the Financial Pakistan became suspicious and, by January, moved Adviser Defence Services, but the other Service Chiefs its strike corps to positions along the border to counter were only included for social events like the dinner which any misadventure by India. India reacted to the Pakistan the service chiefs traditionally had for the Commanders, Army’s moves and the Armed Forces of both countries where the Prime Minister was also an invitee. So I decided went on Red Alert. The situation was defused in time. Both that it would be better if the Service Chiefs were also countries pulled back from the brink of a war.

present at the inauguration of the Navy’s Conference by
the Prime Minister.

The Naval Aspects of Exercise Brass Tacks

“After my initial briefing, the Prime Minister in his The naval aspects of Brass Tacks created no controversy.

remarks suggested that the services should plan a major The exercise was planned in phases from tactical games exercise which would stretch the nation’s resources to ashore to individual fleet exercises, followed by combined the full as would happen in time of war.”

fleet exercises, culminating in an amphibious operation on
the Saurashtra coast. Training for the amphibious phase,

Several issues arose during the planning stage. Should carried out on a beach near Mangalore, turned out to be the exercise test the entire sequence of procedures to be extremely useful for both the Army and the Navy. During followed by every Ministry of the Government as laid down the amphibious landing phase, useful lessons were learnt in the Union War Book? What would happen if we carried by each of the three services, since it was the first time that out a totally realistic exercise to test every single link of they were exercising together for an integrated operation the civil-military chain in such a way as would highlight on this scale.

the shortcomings to be remedied? How long would it
take to prepare for such an exercise? How long would Operation Pawan - Naval Operations in Support of the it take to recover from the dislocation caused by such a Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka 1987 - 1990
large exercise? How much would it cost in money and in Overview
wear and tear? How long would it take to restore com at
worthiness after this wear and tear? If the three services Operation Pawan started with the induction of the carried out a combined exercise on such a realistic sea e, Indian Peacekeeping Force (1PKF) on 29 Ju ly 1987.

representative of what it would be if hostilities were to The de-induction started in August 1989 and by October erupt on the western front with Pakistan, what precautions 1999, the bulk of the IPKF had withdrawn. The operation should be taken to avoid alarm and misinterpretation y terminated on 24 March 1990, when the final contingent of the IPKF sailed out of Trincomalee on board ships of the

Pakistan and China? And so on.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 183

In the years after 1990, India has been quietly supportive

Eastern Fleet. When the last elements withdrew, there still of every peace-making move for reconciliation between had been no solution of the political problem.

the Sri Lankan Government and the LTTE.1

In round figures, over 1,200 casualties and 3,500 wounded

As soon as the last contingent of the IPKF had been
was the price that the gallant officers and men of the IPKF de-inducted from Sri Lanka in March 1990, ships and paid in life and limb to help a neighbour in distress.

aircraft of India’s Navy and Coast Guard were deployed for

From the point of view of the Navy’s concern for the Operation Tasha to patrol the Palk Straits to prevent the security of India's southern seaboard, Operation Pawan movement of militants and their material.

fulfilled the strategic objectives that had been listed
by Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in his letter to President

Operation Tasha started in June 1990 and continues,

Jayawardene when the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord had been round the clock, to this day.

signed in July 1987:

Sri Lanka’s Strategic Significance

“You had, during the course of our discussions, agreed
to meet some of India’s concerns as follows:

Ceylon is a comparatively modern name for the island,
which at its northern point is separated from the south

Your Excellency and myself will reach an early Indian state of Tamil Nadu by just eighteen miles of sea.

understanding about the relevance and employment of The Ancient Indians knew it as Lanka, the Ancient Greeks foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view knew it as Taprobane, the Arabs as Serendib, which the to ensure that such presence will not prejudice Indo-Sri Portuguese changed, in the 16th century, to Ceilao, which in Lankan relations.

due course became Ceylon. In 1970, Ceylon was renamed

Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not as Sri Lanka.

be made available for military use by any country in a
manner prejudicial to India’s interests.

Sri Lanka is located astride the main shipping route of
the Indian Ocean. Colombo, on its west coast, lies on the

The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee main eastbound international shipping lines through the oil tank farm will be undertaken as a joint venture
between India and Sri Lanka.

Red Sea. Trincomalee, on its east coast, with its fine deep
natural harbour, was a major British naval and logistic base

Sri Lanka’s agreement with foreign broadcasting during World War II.

organisations will be reviewed to ensure that any
facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as

Sri Lanka is strategically significant because of its
public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or geographic proximity to the Indian mainland and to the intelligence purposes.”

sea lines of communication carrying Persian Gulf oil
towards the Strait of Malacca and thence eastward. It is

The wear and tear on naval ships was substantial. The separated from the Indian peninsula by a string of islets exploitation of ships exceeded stipulated norms by 50%. The known as Adam’s Bridge. The Palk Strait, in which the refits of all ships had to be deferred by months leading to their Adam’s Bridge is located, is an area of shallow seas, where bunching beyond the capacity of the Naval Dockyards.

only small craft can operate.

Personnel stood up well to the multifarious tasks of The Historical Background of the Ethnic Problem logistic and operational support for the IPKF, round the
clock ship and air patrols and the transhipment of refugees. According to Sri Lankan sources, colonists from the Ganges Many refugees were given medical attention at sea.

Valley led by Prince Vijaya, from southern Bengal or Orissa

A Sri Lankan point of view was stated by Lakshman Kadirgamar, a former Minister of Foreign Affairs and, at the time of writing, the Senior C iT tfP T ^
eign Affairs t0 ^ President of Sri Lanka. The following excerpts are from his address to the 6th Asian Security Conference held by the Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analysis in New Delhi in end Jan u ary 2004:

“ It is probably correct that no other internal ethnic conflict has spawned a new (LT T E) Navy, replete with surface to surface missiles, fast attack craft and suic.de boats laden with explosives which has fought a State (Sri Lankan) Navy for domination of certain parts of the ocean and poses ind]rectly, if not directly at the moment, a potentially serious threat to international shipping, the security of an adjoining btate - India - and a renowned natural harbour - Trincomalee.

of the. 'ndian Peace Keeping Force ended unsatisfactorily in 1990, India has maintained a studied aloofness indefinitely
a ITTF

6 °
n pr°k |em- But
is becoming clear that this period of disengagement cannot go on

^

-M
yr‘3[0Und Tr!ncomalee harbour
the East Coast of Sri Lanka has taken place over the
threat to the Southern flank ofTndia "

^

^

^

addm° n l° the 9r0Wth ° f itS arm0Ury ° f weaPons Poses a Potential

184 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

came to Ceylon around 500 BC and overwhelmed the political rule until the British defeated the Sinhalese King local population. His descendants married South Indian of Kandy in the late 18th century. In 1785, Ceylon became princesses and thus began the race of the Sinhalas. Over a British possession and the island was unified.

the centuries, they built roads and cities, felled forests,
created irrigation works, and transplanted to Central and

In 1837, finding the Central Highlands of Ceylon ideal

Southern Ceylon the culture of their Indian homeland, for tea plantations, the British brought in large numbers of modified to suit local conditions.

Tamil labourers from India to work the tea gardens. These
labourers were called Indian Tamils to differentiate them

The Tamil presence in northern Ceylon dates back to over from the Ceylon Tamils of the North. In round numbers, 2.000 years. Ceylon became more and more vulnerable the Ceylon Tamils constituted about 13% of the population to the pressures of South Indian political expansion. Tamil and the Indian Tamils about 6%.

incursions forced the Sinhalese to withdraw southwards
into Central Ceylon.

Under British rule, the Tamils availed of Christian
missionary education. This provided avenues for more

The Sinhalese were converted to Buddhism in the third jobs, a higher standard of living and the development of century 3C through the missionary efforts of the monk political consciousness. A large middle class emerged with Prince Mahindra, son of the Buddhist Emperor, Ashoka high aspirations.

of India. Over the next two millennia, the majority of Sri

Lanka’s population became staunch followers of Hinayana

The origins of the present antagonism between

Buddhism. Buddhism gave the Sinhalese a sense of Sinhalese and Tamils lie in the prominence achieved by identity and enriched their culture and literature.

Tamils during the British colonial period. The British found
that the Ceylon Tamils had a higher literacy rate and a

By the 12th century AD, the Tamils predominated in greater capacity for economic performance. The result North and East Ceylon. The northern areas of Ceylon were, was that the Tamils, despite being a minority, became reportedly, part of various South Indian kingdoms. While influential in the management of Sri Lankan political and Ceylon absorbed much of the Hindu culture and all of the economic affairs. The earlier historical, ethnic and religious Hindu people that Tamil intrusions left behind, it remained tension was compounded by the Sinhalese feeling of being a Buddhist state under Buddhist rule.

discriminated against and unfairly treated by the British

Centuries of warfare between the Sinhalese and the with the support of the Tamils.

Tamils and between feeble Sinhalese kings weakened the

Ceylon became independent on 4 February 1948.

kingdom and brought about the downfall of the Ceylonese After independence, the majority Sinhalese wanted the civilisation. For a brief period in the 15th century, a Chinese imbalance to be corrected. The ruling party re-defined army invaded Ceylon and took the Sinhalese king prisoner citizenship in a manner that made the one million Indian to Peking. By the end of 1500, however, the Chinese Tamil plantation workers stateless. In effect, the Tamils occupation ended.

were disenfranchised. This embittered the Tamils.2 The

Till the arrival of the Portuguese and Dutch in the 16th resentment of the Tamil minority was exacerbated by and 17th centuries, a number of Sinhalese kingdoms the introduction of various majority-oriented legislative co-existed with the Tamil kingdom in the north. The measures like declaring Sinhalese as the official language; Portuguese arrived in 1505 AD and founded commercial requiring Tamils and other minority groups to secure higher settlements. A century and a half later the Dutch, who were merits than their Sinhalese counterparts for admission establishing their colonies in the East Indies (now called in universities; conferment of special constitutional Indonesia), drove out the Portuguese.

protection for Buddhism; failure to grant local autonomy
to Tamil majority district councils after promises to grant

Arab traders brought Islam to Ceylon in the 16th centuiy. such autonomy had been made; creation of Sinhalese Muslims settled all over the country, though the majority colonies in predominantly Tamil areas by resettling Sinhala was concentrated in the East.

families with a view, as perceived by Tamils, to altering the

Jaffna was a small independent kingdom from the 17
demographic pattern.

to the 19th century. Ceylon remained under fragmente

-------------------------------------------------------------------------- —

•
a rp u ln n ’q P r im e M inister S irim a v o B a n d a ra n a ya k e s ig n e d a n a g r e e m e n t t o r e s o lv e 2. In 1964, India's Prim e Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri and Leyion

.

franchised Jamil labourers were to be repatriated to India and
the problem of Tamils of Indian origin under which ° v e r ’

ddenly realised that if this vast work force left, the tea industry would granted Indian citizenship. After the pact was signed, the b.nhaiese
grind to a halt. T h e pact died a natural death.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 185

remaining out of sight. After a few weeks, the crisis blew

From the time of its independence, Sri Lanka’s security over and ships returned to their base ports. This was.the dilemma was ‘fear of Big Brother India .3 The Sinhalese, Navy’s first ever deployment in support of a foreign policy despite constituting 80% of the population, viewed the decision to respond to a neighbour’s call for help. Its Tamils not as a minority but as part of the demographic silent success marked the beginning of the awareness in

‘presence’ of the millions of Indian Tamils of Tamil Nadu. the Indian Government of how useful the Navy could be They perceived Tamil Nadu as the natural support base
of the Sri Lanka Tamils and were constantly apprehensive in such sensitive situations.

of India dismembering Sri Lanka under the pressure of

In Sri Lanka, views were divided between gratitude for

Tamil Nadu. This underlay the reluctance of the Sinhalese- India’s assistance and apprehension that India’s role in Sri Buddhists to respond to Sri Lankan Tamil demands for Lankan affairs would increase. The proposal by Sri Lanka devolution of power and for being acknowledged as a in 1971 in the United Nations for the development of "the distinct ethnic group within the Sri Lankan polity.

Indian Ocean as a zone of peace was formulated with India

The Sinhala complaint was that the Tamils never in mind. In subsequent years, it came to be perceived as considered themselves as Sri Lankans and were, in being central to Sri Lanka’s security.

fact, creating a situation where India would be forced

In 1972, Sri Lanka changed its constitution. It stressed
to invade Sri Lanka militarily. The Tamils, while insisting the special position given to Buddhism, asserted Sinhala on their indigenous pedigree, claimed that their growing Buddhist culture and weakened protection for the dependence upon Tamil Nadu was a consequence of the minorities. These policies confirmed the Tamil feeling of Sinhala oppression and not its cause. The Muslims were being treated as second-class citizens and that their future ambivalent; some felt persecuted and alienated; others felt lay in the creation of a separate state, to be carved out the community would benefit if it remained aligned with of northern and eastern Sri Lanka, where they could have the majority.

Tamil as a language and Hinduism as a religion.

Sinhala-Tamil antagonism increased during the 1960s.

From 1972 onwards, the Tamils started resorting to

Agreements were signed by moderate Tamil leaders with violence. The failure of repeated efforts to meet Tamil successive Sri Lankan governments to obtain fair play aspirations was aggravated by economic problems and for the Tamils; these were not implemented. The Tamils rising unemployment. It helped the rise of assertive and felt betrayed and alienated; frustration increased because aggressive Tamil militancy spearheaded by the LTTE, the of political discrimination and lack of opportunities for Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, led by V Prabhakaran.

education and economic well-being.

The emergence of a militant Tamil separatist movement

The JVP (Janata Vimukti Peramuna), a radical political sharpened Sinhalese apprehensions of Indian intervention movement, was made up of those Sinhalese Buddhists who in support of Tamil militancy.

were both anti-Tamil and anti-Indian. Many of its members

Things came to a head when the police broke into the
were political and social reformers drawn from the educated

1973 World Tamil Conference being held at Jaffna. There
unemployed youth of southern Sri Lanka. In 1971, the JVP was arson and looting of Tamil heritage and property. The tried to topple the government to ‘save their country from Tamils saw it as an unforgivable act of cultural vandalism.

eastern imperialism and Indian expansionist designs’; it cut Tamil militancy became more assertive.

off all communications with the rest of the world.

Political options were tried out. The Tamils were unable

In April 1971, Sri Lanka requested India’s help to quell to secure redress. With the failure of political initiatives, the this uprising. The Indian Navy was tasked with preventing Tamils converged into a single national movement in 1976
merchant ships (suspected to be North Korean) from
ferrying arms to the insurgents.

and formed the Tamil (Jnited Liberation Front (TCILF). It
demanded the formation of a separate state of Tamil Eelam

Naval Operations in 1971
in the areas that were considered the Tamil homelands in
the north and the east. This demand paved the way for

Ships of the Western Fleet patrolled Ceylon’s west coast militants to attack Government targets and assassinate remaining out of sight. A frigate entered Colombo moderate Tamil leaders who were associated with the harbour to act as a communication link. Ships from ruling party. Funds were collected by tax, a euphemism Vishakhapatnam patrolled Ceylon’s east coast, also
for ransom or protection money, and by looting banks.

3 ' fndia was a

^

Cey' ° n had t0 be an inte9ral P art ° f lndia's lndia" O cean defence, Ceylon thought W3S 3 hegem° n and entered lnto a defence agreement with Britain ceding Trincomalee to the British Navy.

186 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

it was rumoured that the LTTE were engaged in druq
trafficking.

a
the US began to be perceived by India as strategically
disadvantageous.

The Tamil Front fought the 1977 general election with its

India’s fateful decision to be supportive of the cause of Sri
demand for secession. It was voted in as a major opposition Lankan Tamils was based on these political compulsions and party in the Assembly. The cry for the creation of Tamil strategic perceptions. There were absolutely no illusions that Eelam stimulated the proliferation of militant groups.

anything other than a political solution could meet both Sri

Alarmed over these mushrooming militants and their Lankan and Indian concerns. From 1981 onwards, camps growing popularity amongst the Tamil masses, the Sri sprung up in southern India where training, weaponry and Lankan Government rushed through legislation in 1978, logistic support started being imparted to the Tamil militant banning the LTTE and the main militant organisations that groups.5
were carrying out assassinations, ambushes and forcible

India s expectation was that the leverage gained by
collection of money.

training the militant groups would help to moderate their

For India, the political implications of Sri Lankan policies extremist demands and thereby facilitate a political solution had, by 1980, become quite vexed.

acceptable to both sides. There developed considerable
two-way movement of men and material between Northern

On the one hand, the people of Tamil Nadu had a strong Sri Lanka and Southern Tamil Nadu. This tilt in Indian sense of Tamil political and cultural identity. As early as the policy of extending support to Tamil militant activities in Sri mid 1960s, when attempts were made to impose Hindi Lanka was greatly resented by the Sri Lankan Government as the compulsory national and official language of India, and India started being given the image of a supporter of Tamil Nadu had been the first state in the Indian Republic Tamil militancy.

to threaten secession and demand a separate state of Developments Between 1983 and 1987

Tamil Eelam based on Tamil ethnicity and Tamil language.

During the 1970s, there were insistent demands by the In mid 1983, Sri Lanka commenced intensive security political leaders of Tamil Nadu that India should intervene operations against the Tamil militants. The latter reacted in Sri Lanka, militarily if necessary, to ensure the safety of with ferocity. In July 1983, the LTTE ambushed a police the Sri Lankan Tamils and to compel the Government of patrol, killing 13 Sinhala policemen.

Sri Lanka to modify its policies on the treatment of its Tamil

Sri Lankan retribution was swift; it took the form of
minority. India’s primary interest in the Tamil issue in Sri widespread anti-Tamil riots throughout the length and Lanka was to avoid the revival of secessionist tendencies breadth of Sri Lanka, particularly in Colombo. Over three in Tamil Nadu. Gestures had to be made to appease Tamil thousand Tamils were slaughtered, thousands of Tamil sentiments.

homes were destroyed and nearly 150,000 Tamils fled to

On the other hand, it was undesirable to interfere in the refugee camps. The Sri Lankan Government declared a internal affairs of Sri Lanka and their legitimate reactions state of emergency.

to Tamil militancy. India could not support the extremist Sri

This large-scale massacre led to several developments.

Lankan Tamil demand for a separate homeland because Over 100,000 Tamils sought refuge in Tamil Nadu. Tamil this would lead to incipient separatist demands within India militant youth groups established bases in Tamil Nadu itself.

and selected militant cadres were armed and trained. The
government in Tamil Nadu demanded immediate Indian

Secondly, the cultivation by Sri Lanka of security involvement to stop the genocide of brother Tamils. It and intelligence connections with Pakistan, Israel and

* 0
t h . f c I . . . * «

»• «" ™

“

*

*Ho i mi | J
w lh m

„
p„ btak, „ „

LTTE

5. General Depinder Sin gh ’s book The IPKF in S ri La n ka states, n materiaj assistance from India and were provided training facilities
leader) was to confide that they received massive doses of financia

^
the Research ancj Analysis Wing (two Indian intelligence
in Tamil Nadu. Interestingly, during 1983 and 1984 the Intelligence dj
assistanCe to them. I might clarify here that, rumours
agencies) got directly involved in training the militant ami group

^ ^ trajnjng jmparted to Tamil militant groups. The LTTE
to the contrary notwithstanding, the Indian Army was never_ P n
nerceivinq it as an attempt either to divide and rule or tie them to resented this training and assistance to other Tamil militant groups P
a ^ ^
e|sewhere there can be no denying the fact that

Indian coat tails. W hatever be the scale and degree of assistance me

F
and mat£rial assistance from Tamil Nadu
the m ain m otivation factor that kept the LTTE going was the knowledge would always be forthcoming’’.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE/ 187

In 1984, the Indian Navy started patrolling the Palk
precipitated India's involvement in Sri Lanka s ethnic strife. Bay to prevent violation of the International Boundary India urged Sri Lanka to moderate its attitude to Tamil Line (IBL) by fishermen of either country and to prevent aspirations. Sri Lanka was well aware of the influence of harassment of Indian fishermen by the Sri Lankan side.

Tamil Nadu politics on Indian policy and was not averse to The demarcation, in 1976, of the maritime boundary in the Indian mediation. From 1983 onwards, India tried to bring Palk Strait and the Gulf of Mannar had helped to reduce the two sides together.

tension but did not entirely remove it, partly because of the

The Sinhalese-majority Government concluded that it vexed problem of Katchativu.

could not contain Tamil militancy with its own resources.

Nor could it look towards India for help because it would be

Katchativu is a small island near Rameshwaram and
politically impossible for India to disregard the sympathy of Talaimannar. This island fell on the Sri Lankan side of the Tamil Nadu for fellow Tamils in Sri Lanka. The Sri Lanka IBL after India ceded Katchativu to Sri Lanks. Katchativu Government had therefore started looking for external has only a small temple / church where the Rameshwaram support and:

fishermen and their families used to assemble once a year
to take part in a festival. They also used to rest on the island

• Signed informal, confidential agreements with the in between fishing trips. The ceding agreement permitted Governments of the United States and Britain to bring Indian fishermen to ‘dry their nets’ on Katchativu. Indian their warships into Colombo, Trincomalee and the Gulf fishermen, by habit, were attracted by the ‘king prawns’

of Mannar. The frequency of visits by the warships of available only near Talaimannar as the prawns hesitated to these navies increased between 1983 and 1987.

breed near Rameshwaram. The Sri Lankans disliked these

• Invited British mercenaries and Israeli intelligence ‘intrusions by Indian fishermen’ because they suspected agencies into its intelligence services.

infiltration by the LTTE masquerading as fishermen. Prior

• Sought assistance from Pakistan to train its Home to the escalation of tension, the Sri Lankan Navy used to Guards and its Navy.

turn a blind eye to Indian fishermen visiting Katchativu.

As tension escalated and suspicions increased of LTTE

In October 1983, the media reported that the USA had infiltration, the Sri Lankan Navy tightened their patrols and offered to assist in obtaining Israeli arms supplies and Indian fishermen felt harassed near Katchativu.

intelligence support for Sri Lanka and as a quid pro quo,

Sri Lanka should provide strategic intelligence gathering

In October 1984, India’s Prime Minister, Mrs Gandhi,
facilities against India in Sri Lanka’s Voice of America (VOA) was assassinated. Her son, Rajiv Gandhi, succeeded her broadcasting station.6
as Prime Minister of India.

Sri Lanka also preferred the USA for the contract to

In 1985, India arranged a conference in Bhutan, attended
repair and restore the Trincomalee Oil Tank Farms’. These by all the militant groups and Sri Lankan representatives, were large oil storage facilities constructed by the Allies to discuss a document, jointly prepared by the Indian during the 1939-45 World War in the port of Trincomalee and Sri Lankan governments and the Tamil leaders, for to support the naval operations of their South and meeting their political and constitutional aspirations.

Southeast Asia Command. The oil tanks had fallen into When its recommendations were about to be adopted, the disuse and then into disrepair. India had bid for this project Sri Lankan President backed out due to domestic political but despite being the most reasonable price offered, opposition.

the Sri Lankan Government, taking political and other
factors into consideration, preferred to give the contract

From March to 19 May 1985, there was intense
to a consortium of companies led by the United States. diplomatic activity by India on Sri Lankan issues to retrieve India took the view that this provided the potential for an the situation created by the Sri Lankan President backing American strategic presence based in the sheltered deep- out from the recommendations of the All Party Conference.

water harbour of Trincomalee, which for decades had been India s external intelligence agency, the Research and an important naval base of the British Navy.

Analysis Wing (RAW) held extensive discussions with both
the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Government.

Viewing all these developments with concern, India
conveyed its disquiet to Sri Lanka.

In May 1985, Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi told India’s
ambassador designate to Sri Lanka that while till 1985, India s

6. Reportedly. Sri Lanka authorised the VOA broadcasting against t

Soviet CJnion and offered the USA naval facilities at Trincomalee.

7. In 1974, to defuse tensions, India had ceded the island of Katchi

'u to Ceylon.

188 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Sri Lankan policy was influenced by Tamil Nadu politics and

On 4 June 1987, India sent a stronger message. Transport
ethno-religious considerations, it would henceforth be “An aircraft of the Indian Air Force airdropped supplies over Indian policy responsive to India’s security and strategic Jaffna. The Sri Lanka Government called the air dropping interests and responsive to the principle of not disrupting a violation of international law. International concern for the territorial integrity of a small neighbour”. Within this the people of Jaffna, and the low-key response to these overall framework, India’s endeavour would be to ensure the objections and to Sri Lankan requests for assistance, maximum fulfilment of legitimate Tamil aspirations.8
induced Sri Lanka to halt the SLAF offensive.

In June 1985, Sri Lanka suggested joint Indo-Sri Lankan The Indo-Sri Lanka Accord naval patrolling of the Palk Straits to prevent infiltration into

Sri Lanka of Tamil militants from Tamil Nadu.

Seeing the writing on the wall, the Sri Lanka Government
sought discussions with the Indian Government. The

Meanwhile, the LTTE continued to grow in stature and outcome was the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord that was signed strength, determined to become the predominant militant on 29 July 1987.

organisation. In May 1986, the LTTE went on a rampage
and totally destroyed a rival militant group. Jaffna came

For Sri Lanka, the Accord sought to end the ethnic
under L IT E domination. With the civil administration struggle that had claimed countless lives, damaged totally paralysed and the Sri Lankan Armed Forces (SLAF) property and ruined its economy. Apart from the 150,000
confined to camps along the coast, the LTTE virtually ran refugees, mainly Indian Tamils, who fled their homes to seek shelter in refugee camps, there were over 100,000 Sri
a state within a state. Following their successes, they felt Lanka Tamils who had sought shelter in Tamil Nadu.

emboldened to switch from the classic guerrilla tactics of

‘hit and run’ to those of small set piece battles.

For India, whose armed forces were committed on its

Western and the Northern borders, the Accord sought to

Events Preceding the Accord of Ju ly 1987
safeguard the security of its southern seaboard, to subsume

Stung by their inability to operate effectively in the heart secessionist tendencies in Tamil Nadu and Punjab and to of the Jaffna peninsula, the SLAF decided to attempt avoid the acquisition of footholds in Sri Lanka by foreign a ‘final solution’. Between January and May 1987, in powers.

preparation for a major offensive against the LTTE with

There was another aspect. In the negotiations between
the aim of retrieving control over Jaffna and denying the LTTE representatives and the Indian interlocutors prior entry of men and material assistance from outside, to the Accord, the LTTE sought for their 'Sea Tigers’ the the SLA F placed the Jaffna peninsula under siege. It unfettered right to police the sea-lanes in the vicinity of inducted additional troops, imposed an economic India’s coastline. They proposed the delineation of ‘distinct embargo and in May 1987, launched its offensive. Fierce naval boundaries’ - each area being under the control of fighting ensued in which most of the LTTE casualties the LTTE and the Sri Lankan Navy respectively. India had were caused by artillery fire and aerial attacks by aircraft categorically rejected the suggestion, not only because it and helicopters. What began to hurt the LTTE, and even would undermine Sri Lanka’s authority but also because it more the local population, was the economic blockade would be tantamount to permitting a terrorist outfit to be that snapped electricity supply and, with it, running treated as a legitimate force patrolling the seas adjacent to water and denied entry of supplies and medicines. The India’s coastline.9
mass exodus to India increased.

Relevant Excerpts From the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord

Diplomatic initiatives failed to ease the blockade for
supply of essential medicines and food supplies. The “2.9. The Emergency will be lifted in the Eastern and Indian Government tried to send supplies and medicines Northern provinces by August 15, 1987. A cessation of by sea for distribution to the population of Jaffna. Ships of hostilities will come into effect all over the island within 48
the Sri Lankan Navy stopped a convoy of fishing trawlers, hours of the signing of this agreement. All arms presently flying white flags with a Red Cross, led by Coast Guard held by militant groups will be surrendered in accordance Ship Vikram. To avoid an incident, the convoy returned with an agreed procedure to authorities to be designated by home without unloading its relief supplies.

the Government of Sri Lanka. Consequent to the cessation

8. Assignment Colombo by JN Dixit, (Page 4).

9. Asian Age of 5 May 2003 "Let not the Tigers coast to victory" by M K Narayanan, the Director of the Intelligence Bureau in 1987. The LTTE made the same proposal 16 years later in 2003.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 189

foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view
of hostilities and the surrender of arms by militant groups,
to ensure that such presence will not prejudice Indo-Sri
the Army and other security personnel will be confined to
barracks in camps as on 25 May 1987. The process of

Lankan relations.

surrendering of arms and the confining of security personnel • Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not moving back to barracks shall be completed within 72 hours
be made available for military use by any country in a
of the cessation of hostilities coming into effect.

manner prejudicial to India’s interests.

“2.16 (a). These proposals are also conditional to the • The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee oil Government of India taking the following action if any
tank farm will be undertaken as a joint venture between
militant groups operating in Sri Lanka do not accept this

India and Sri Lanka.

framework of proposals for a settlement, namely, India will • Sri Lanka’s agreement with foreign broadcasting take all necessary steps to ensure that Indian territory is
organisations will be reviewed to ensure that any
not used for activities prejudicial to the unity, integrity and
facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as
security of Sri Lanka.

public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or

“2.16 (b). The Indian Navy / Coast Guard will cooperate
intelligence purposes.

with the Sri Lankan Navy in preventing Tamil militant

“3. In the same spirit, India will:

activities from affecting Sri Lanka.

• Deport all Sri Lankan citizens who are found to be

“2.16 (c). In the event that the Government of Sri
engaging in terrorist activities or advocating separatism

Lanka requests the Government of India to afford
or secessionism.

military assistance to implement these proposals, the • Provide training facilities and military supplies for Sri Government of India will cooperate by giving to the

Government of Sri Lanka such military assistance as

Lankan security forces.”

and when requested.

In his reply to the Prime Minister of India, the President

“2.16 (d). The Government of India will expedite of Sri Lanka stated: repatriation from Sri Lanka of Indian citizens to India who

“This is to confirm that the above correctly sets out the
are resident there, concurrently with the repatriation of Sri understanding reached between us.”

Lankan refugees from Tamil Nadu.

Apart from inviting the IPKF, the Accord envisaged the

“2.16 (e). The Governments of India and Sri Lanka will following sequence of events: cooperate in ensuring the physical security and safety
of all communities inhabiting the Northern and Eastern • Cease fire within 24 hours and surrender of weapons by Provinces.”

militants within the next 72 hours.

• Separate the SLAF and LTTE warring groups. The SLAF

In para 6 of the Annexure to the Agreement, it was stated
that “the Prime Minister of India and the President of Sri
to withdraw to the positions they occupied prior to the

Lanka also agree that in terms of paragraph 2.16 (c) of
offensive they launched in May.

the Agreement, an Indian Peace Keeping contingent may • Immediate formation of an Interim Administrative Council be invited by the President of Sri Lanka to guarantee and
to administer the Northern and Eastern provinces.

enforce the cessation of hostilities, if so required.”

• The election, within 3 months, of an Administrative

Relevant Excerpts From the Letters Exchanged on

Council, which would take over from the Interim

Matters of Bilateral Interest when the Accord was

Council.

Signed

• The holding of a referendum, by end 1988, to decide

In his letter to the President of Sri Lanka, the Prime Minister
whether the Eastern provinces would like to merge with
of India stated:

the Northern provinces.

• Devolution by the Sri Lankan Government of more

2. In this spirit, you had, during the course of our
powers to the Administrative Council.

discussions, agreed to meet some of India’s concerns as
follows:

Indian Prime Minister, Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lanka

• Your Excellency and myself will reach an early

President, Jayawardene signed the Accord on 29 July
understanding about the relevance and employment of

1987 at Colombo.

190 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

I

Ships of the Western Fleet in formation

Operation Cactus November 1988 - hijacked ship ’Progress Light’, having Maldivian VIPs as hostages, being persuaded to stop by small calibre naval gunfire

Landing ship exercising inter-service amphibious beaching

Marine Commandos infiltrating from seaward

Antarctic Expedition Research Vessel berthed alongside the 9-metre high Antarctic ice shelf. Naval Chetak helicopters carry out aerial and photo reconnaissance, ferry personnel and stores, provide medical support and evacuate casualties and assist scientific teams operating in hilly, rough and icy terrain the Soviet Union SG Gorshkov calling on Prime Minister Mrs Indira Gandhi in New Delhi Admiral of the Fleet of

On board the first guided missile destroyer R A JP U T after her arrival from Russia in 1980. Sitting left to right: Mr Rajiv Gandhi, Commanding Officer Captain GM Hiranandani and Minister of State for Defence Mr Shivraj Patil F loating D ock FDN 1 in Port Blair

____ A

INS GODAVARI entering New York harbour to participate in the International Fleet Review on the occasion of the Bicentennial Celebrations of the Statue of Liberty in Ju ly 1986

Nuclear-Biological-Chemical Warfare & Damage Control (NBCD) drill exercised on board warships

‘Beating Retreat’ at the Gateway of India in Bombay after the 1989 Fleet Review

From 1985 onwards, there had been increased

On 5th October, when the SLAF started to escort the
interaction between the GS administration and the Indian prisoners to waiting aircraft, all 17 swallowed cyanide government. American policy had started to become more capsules. LTTE reaction was swift and savage. Over 200
understanding of Indian concerns. The GS was quietly Sinhalese were massacred and over 10,000 rendered supportive of the Indo- Sri Lanka Accord of 1987.10
homeless. The 8 Sinhala prisoners held by the LTTE were
executed on 6 October 1987. Bitter at the inability of the

The Sequel to the Accord

IPKF to protect its cadres, the LTTE decided to fight the

The signing of the accord was followed by violent upheavals IPKF.

in Sri Lanka by the JVR Sri Lanka immediately sought

In his book The IPKF in Sri Lanka, General Depinder

India’s military assistance to stabilise the situation and Singh states: safeguard Sri Lanka’s unity and territorial integrity.

“On 6 October 1987, the Chief of the Army Staff,

In the early hours of 30 July 1987, the Navy commenced

General Sundarji flew into Palaly, where he was briefed
the induction of the IPKF into Sri Lanka. The induction was
about the situation. It was apparent that the political
by specific invitation. Its arrival was welcomed both by the
decision to employ force against the LTTE was already

SLAF and the Tamil population, but not by the Buddhist
taken. However, he was en-route to Colombo where the
population.

Defence Minister, Mr KC Pant was proceeding the same
evening for a meeting with the Sri Lanka President.

During the next two months, the LTTE, which had

Having met the latter on 4th October, 1 had no doubt
initially been associated with the discussions that preceded
about the riot act he would read out to compel the IPKF
the signing of the Accord, became increasingly reluctant
to use force. My recommendation to General Sundarji
to surrender all its arms. It felt that the Accord would not
was that we must not go in for the hard option because,
be honoured by the SLAF. The crisis peaked in the first
if we did, we would be stuck in an insurgency situation
week of October.

for the next 20 years. I was admonished not to adopt a

On 3 October 1987, the Sri Lankan Navy intercepted a
defeatist attitude, to which my reply was that I was not
boat carrying 17 LTTE personnel in Sri Lankan territorial
being defeatist, merely realistic. The Chief then flew off
waters. Among the 17, were the LTTE’s regional military
to Colombo. I am not privy to what transpired there,
commanders of Jaffna and Trincomalee. The SLAF
but next day, HQ IPKF received direct instructions, in
wanted to take the prisoners to Colombo for interrogation
clear, from the Chief in Colombo to use force against
to ascertain where the LTTE personnel were returning
the LTTE.”

from and what they had gone there to do. The LTTE

On 10th October, the LTTE ambushed an IPKF patrol. On
argued that the Sri Lanka Government wanted to take 12th October the IPKF launched operations by helicopters to the prisoners to Colombo where they intended to show capture Jaffna. By 22nd October, Jaffna had been captured.

them on television and compel them to make statements In the ensuing months, the IPKF found itself bogged down damaging to the LTTE cause; therefore, the IPKF should in a guerrilla war in terrain in which the LTTE had the take over the prisoners and not allow them to be taken advantage. Overcoming suspicions and despite difficulties, to Colombo. The SLAF counter argument was that these the IPKF succeeded in establishing peaceful conditions in were SLAF prisoners caught outside the jurisdiction of the Jaffna peninsula and the Eastern province.

the IPKF.

The common perception amongst the Sinhalese was

Indian intervention at the highest levels did not succeed that the IPKF was a threat to the sovereignty of Sri Lanka.

in resolving the impasse.

10. An American perception is reflected in Dennis Kux’s book Estranged Democracies - India and the United States, 1941-1991, Page 412
states:

“In policy terms, Rajiv continued the course Indira mapped out after returning to power in 1980. In addition to seeking better balance in India’s non-alignment through better relations with Washington, Rajiv showed increasing willingness to assert India’s primacy in the subcontinent based on its size and increasing military power. In 1987, India began a major initiative by sending several thousand troops against the insurgency mounted by Tamil separatists in the neighbouring island republic of Sri Lanka to India’s south. Although the Sri Lankan government agreed to the intervention, the action - under which 50,000 troops were eventually deployed - provided a dramatic signal of greater Indian readiness to flex its muscles regionally. Uncertain how the United States would respond, Mew Delhi was relieved when Washington gave its blessing to the venture. Paradoxically, in the light of the accommodating GS reaction, the Indo-Sri Lankan accords made gratuitous reference to ‘outside powers’ seeking to gain a foothold on the island and to foreign radio broadcasts from Sri Lanka. Since the Voice of America had been using a transmitter in Sri Lanka for many years, the criticism of the United States was thinly veiled.”

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 191

In the Sinhala areas, the JV P triggered an insurrection
onshore, the pontoon is a broken down structure and a
that sought to “save the country from an unholy trinity
ship of 1.6 metres draught ran aground two days ago
of American imperialism, Indian imperialism and Tamil
ahead of where we are going to berth - best of luck!

expansionism.” The JV P movement nearly succeeded in

“In adverse sea conditions, Rani Jindan made 13
destroying state institutions but was suppressed by Sri
entries into and exits out of the uncharted and unlit

Lankan security forces.

KKS harbour. She picked up troops and stores of No 1

Battalion Maratha Light Infantry from various ships and

The Buddhist clergy also resented the Accord. In their
disembarked them ashore. The opposition of the Sri
view, the Accord had betrayed the Sinhala people by

Lankan Navy was quite evident.

conceding too much to the Tamils and allowing the Indians
to enter the island as a peacekeeping force.

“My Coast Guard crew was extremely ‘charged’, this
being the fist time that the Coast Guard was called upon

Elections were held in November 1988 and a moderate
to perform an operational task.

Tamil leader became Chief Minister of the Provincial

“Subsequently, post October 1987, we captured the

Government. As required by the Accord, power was to be
first armed boat of the LTTE and escorted it to Indian
devolved to the province. Nothing happened. In January
shores. It was challenging chasing the LTTE and

1989, Sri Lanka elected a new President whose views were
retrieving our injured troops from KKS by night in the
decidedly anti-Indian.

face of heavy gunfire.”

Between February and May 1989, the JV P again went

A rapid build-up followed after 30 July. A sea-borne
on the rampage. Leading a coalition of Buddhist monks logistic support chain was established with Madras.

and students, the JV P launched a nationwide agitation Merchant ships were chartered for troop and cargo against the IPKF and against the Government. Seizing the transshipment. Amphibious Landing Ships ferried opportunity, the LTTE sought talks with the Sri Lankan personnel and stores into the uncharted KKS Harbour government. The tables turned. The SLAF joined hands with and across uncharted beaches.

the LTTE and transferred weapons and ammunition, which
the LTTE desperately needed to fight the IPKF Anti-Indian The Navy's Tasks propaganda spread. The majority Sinhala community, the ® Joint Indian-Sri Lankan naval patrols of Sri Lankan minority Sri Lanka Tamils and the Sri Lanka Government
waters to prevent movement of arms and militants
all developed an aversion for the IPKF. The new President
across the water in and out of Sri Lanka.

confidently called for the withdrawal of the IPKF

© Joint Army-Navy operations to combat militant activity.

The IPKF started withdrawing in August 1989. In • Logistic support for the build-up and maintenance of October 1999, the bulk of the IPKF withdrew. When the
the IPKF in Sri Lanka.

last elements withdrew on 24 March 1990, there still had
been no devolution of power.

• General operations to support the Accord, like ‘transfer
of refugees’.

Operation Pawan - Naval Operations

Coast Guard Support

Operation Pawan commenced as soon as the Accord was
signed on 29 July 1987. The Navy was to induct Army The Coast Guard’s task was to support the Navy. Three units into Sri Lanka and sanitise the offshore sea areas. shallow-draught Inshore Patrol Vessels (IPVs) were placed The first two Army battalions were landed in Kankesanturai under the Navy’s control for inshore patrolling in the Palk (KKS) Harbour on 30 July 1987 - the day following the Bay. The Coast Guard’s F-27 aircraft, operating from signing of the Accord.

Madras, ensured air surveillance extending 100 miles to
seaward of the east coast of Sri Lanka.

Lieutenant Commander (now Rear Admiral) Shekhar

Sinha (a Sea Harrier pilot) was in command of Coast Guard Initial Patrols 1PV Rani Jindan on patrol in the Palk Bay. He recalls:

By 15 August 1987, the Joint Indian-Sri Lankan naval

“The Eastern Fleet anchored off KKS in the early hours patrol had been instituted in the Palk Bay. It aimed at and was greeted by Rani Jindan. The Fleet Commander severing the LTTE conduit between Sri Lanka’s northern called me up on radio and said ‘You need to disembark Jaffna peninsula and the southern coast of Tamil Nadu troops and stores to Jaffna in the next 5 to 6 hours. As by controlling the routes leading to Dhanushkodi, far as navigational information is concerned, there are no Rameshwaram, Vedaranyam and Nagapatnam, all of charts, winds are 30 knots on-shore, the sea is 3 knots
which were known settlements of Sri Lankan Tamils. The

192 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

OPERATION PAWAN (IPKF IN SRI LANKA) 1987 TO 1990

Nagapattinam

1

Pt Calimere „

Vedaranyam

JO IN T P A T R O L L IN G P A T T E R N

PALK STRAIT

A IR S U R V E IL L A N C E B Y IS L A N D E R S 4 C H E T A K S

O P E R A T IN G F R O M R A M N A D

I N D I A

Kankesanturai

KarainagarJ

A</'

LEGEND

INDIAN NAVY/COAST GUARD ▲

SRI LANKAN NAVY

Kachchativu

Pa m b a n

Mullaittivu

Dhanushkodi

Mannar

G U L F O F

Tuticorin

M A N N A R ,

Battici

S RI L A N K A

COLOMBO

disused airfield at Ramnad was activated for air surveillance a special force of 15 ‘armed trawlers’, which operated of the Palk Bay, using Naval Islander aircraft and Chetak from Rameshwaram. This helped to seal the LTTE s helicopters for daylight surveillance. Indian Naval Liaison Dhanushkodi-Talaimannar conduit.

Teams (INLTs) were positioned at four locations in Sri Special Operations

Lanka - Trincomalee (Trinco), Pallaly, Kankesanturai (KKS)

and Karainagar.

The Indian Marine Special Force (IMSF), a newly formed

‘commando’ arm of the Navy, made its debut in August

The LTTE's Reluctance to Abide by the Accord

1987. A 40-strong group of ‘marine commandos’

The induction of troops and their supporting logistics by (MARCOS) participated in 55 combat operations in its very sea from Madras proceeded smoothly during August. By first year. During their raids, they destroyed LTTE boats, end August, problems started surfacing. Sceptical whether ammunition warehouses and militant camps. They also the Accord’s commitment for devolution of power would proved to be a potent force in ‘flushing out' operations in be honoured by Sri Lanka, the LTTE became palpably the islands, lagoons and inlets and were invariably in the van reluctant to surrender its arms.

of amphibious raids.11

Cordon Militaire

The Sri Lankan Scene

On 7 October 1987, the IPKF received orders to ‘Disarm In November 1988, the Presidential elections in Sri the LTTE’. A cordon militaire was established across a 310- Lanka posed a new contingency - the safety of President mile belt. It extended northwards from Talaimannar through Jayawardene in case his party lost the election. As a the Palk Strait and along the east coast of Sri Lanka until precautionary measure, Operation Jupiter was planned to its southern limit at Little Basses Island. Ships and aircraft evacuate the President and his immediate family to safety.

on patrol were directed to use force, if required.

The Navy positioned at Tuticorin a Seaking-capable frigate,

INS Godavari (and later INS Taragiri), with an IM SF team To prevent cross trafficking, a Line of Control (LOC) was embarked. As it happened, the President’s party was reestablished eastward of the international boundary in the elected.

Palk Strait. To curb militant activity on the eastern coast of

Sri Lanka, fishing activity at night was banned.

When Mr Jayawardene’s term expired in January 1989,

Mr Premadasa became the President of Sri Lanka He

Commodore Padmasankar was the Naval Officer-in- had been a staunch critic of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

Charge Madras. He recalls:

He came to power on a political promise that he would

“The Line of Control (LOC), which was drawn to the “Send back the IPKF”. Between March and July 1989, east of Katchativu, was concurred by the Sri Lankan he initiated a dialogue with the LTTE, which is presumed Navy at the Joint Patrol Meeting. This enabled Indian to have resulted in a ceasefire between the LTTE and the fishermen to use Katchativu as envisaged in the ceding SLAF. He then tried to buy peace with the JV P but to no clauses; it also reduced the area to be patrolled by the avail - their subversive activities increased. He then served Sri Lankan Navy. In fact, the LOC enabled our fishermen the Indian Government with an ultimatum to withdraw the to feel more secure in Indian waters and, to an extent, IPKF by 29 July 1989, this being the second anniversary reduced the agitation of the fishermen of Rameshwaram.

of the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord.

Both Navies respected this arrangement until the IPKF
withdrew finally from Sri Lanka in 1990.”

Special Contingency Plans

The cordon militaire effectively sanitised the offshore As the deadline approached, tension mounted. The JVP-incited areas through intensive air and surface patrolling. On a violence intensified. Mr Premadasa announced his intention daily average, the Navy and Coast Guard deployed four to bring out the Sri Lankan Army (from their barracks) on 29
major warships and eight smaller patrol craft, whilst the July 1989, to patrol the Northern and Eastern Provinces. The Sri Lankan Navy provided five to six patrol craft. Naval air led to planning for the contingency of misguided, unprovoked surveillance over the sea was mounted daily from various action against the IPKF by wayward units of SLAF
bases - Madras by F-27s, Madurai by armed Alizes,

Operation Roundup was planned to counter any backlash

Ramnad by Islanders and armed Chetaks and Batticaloa from the SLAF in the Northern and Eastern provinces.

by armed helicopters, which also functioned as a Quick Operation Trojan was planned to evacuate Indian nationals Reaction Force (QRF). In January 1988, the Navy instituted
from Colombo, in the face of opposition.

11. For details, see Section titled MARCOS, page 241.

194 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

The third operation, a modified version of the earlier
tables, tents, and even cupboards! It was a wet and

Operation Jupiter of December 1988, was also planned in
windy day. Regardless of the weather, the men of Viraat
case the need arose to evacuate Indian nationals with the
worked tirelessly for the next six hours to complete the
support of the SIAF.

combat embarkation of the battalion by the afternoon.

Operation Jupiter

With rotors running, 4 to 7 helicopters at a time were
on deck being unloaded, refuelled when required and

The aircraft carrier, Viraal, was at anchor in Bombay. On
quickly launched for the next load. A total of 76 helo

18 July 1989, it was directed to embark all weapons and
sorties of Seakings and Chetaks were carried out that
stores and arrive at Cochin on 20lh July.

day to embark 366 personnel, 36 tonnes of stores, 2
jeeps and a motorcycle with Viraat remaining 8 to 10

Captain (later Admiral and Chief of Naval Staff)

miles from the coast.

Madhvendra Singh was the Commanding Officer of Viraat
during Operation Jupiter. The following excerpts are from

“Overnight, the Viraat had been transformed into a
his recollections recorded in The Magnificent Viraat -
commando carrier. From a strength of about 1,000 in

Decade and a Half of Glorious Flying:

Bombay, her personnel strength rose to 1,800. Each man
had a bunk, the Garhwalis were in their allotted messes

“Throughout that afternoon and early evening,
and we still had 200 bunks kept vacant for evacuees
ammunition barges, ration boats, aircraft launches, and
and 60 bunks for any casualties in an improvised afloat
fuelling barges continued to supply Viraat all that she had
hospital.

asked for and needed. It was a truly remarkable effort and
the monsoon weather did not make it any easier. Viraat

“The next morning, training began of working up the
sailed at three o’clock that night in lashing rain.

soldiers for an airborne assault operation. First dry runs
were conducted with helos switched off on deck. These

“The ship picked up the first two Sea Harriers off
were repeated till the embarkation and disembarkation

Goa on the 19th morning and two more Sea Harriers
times were brought down to a bare minimum. With
off Mangalore on the 20th morning. She entered Cochin
dry runs completed, they practiced embarkation and
on the 21st morning to embark the support equipment
disembarkation with rotors whirring overhead and finally
of the Seaking Squadrons. Helicopters were assembled
they rehearsed the actual assault phase at INS Garuda
from all over the country. One Seaking 42 C and two
with echelons of one company strength repeatedly

Chetaks were embarked in Bombay; two Seakings Mk
practicing airborne assault and evacuation. By the time

42 and two Chetaks. from Cochin and one Seaking
they had completed their training, the 7th Battalion

Mk 42 C each from Coimbatore, Vishakhapatnam and

Garhwal Rifles had transformed from a footslogging

Taragiri. A fifth Seaking Mk 42 C embarked later, as also
infantry battalion into a formidable assault team, which

3 officers and 54 sailors of the Indian Marine Special
had totally integrated itself with its base - INS Viraat.

Force (IMSF). With all 15 aircraft on board, Viraat sailed
from Cochin to begin the work up of her air wing and

“The Viraat and her task group continued to operate
at / off Cochin for another two weeks, ready to execute

IMSF detachment.

the mission if ordered. On 12th August, we were ordered

“While the Viraat was proceeding south, the 7th
to disembark air squadrons, as the mission in Sri Lanka

Battalion of the Garhwal Rifles which was at Pithoragarh
would no longer be required. The aircraft flew away
in the Kumaon Hills12 was ordered to get ready for
as quickly as they had come and the ship returned to
the mission. On 24th July, they moved by road from

Bombay.

Pithoragarh to Bareilly and on the morning of the 26th

“For both the Garhwalis and the Viraat, it had been a
they were airlifted by IL-76 aircraft to Trivandrum, where
very happy and educative association. Both were richer
they arrived in the dead of night. They were immediately
for the experience and both will, for a long time, look back
put into state transport corporation buses and moved
with pride and nostalgia on a mission well executed. While
during the night to INS Garuda in Cochin where they

Operation Jupiter was not launched, both units were fully
arrived early morning of 27th July.

prepared and both believe that in their own small way,

“On the 27th morning, Viraat was asked to embark the
they helped to make the operation unnecessary.

battalion with her helicopters. It was quite a task. When

“In view of this operational association, the Garhwal
an Army battalion moves, it moves with everything to

Regiment was affiliated to INS Viraat on 2 February
sustain itself. Besides the men and their equipment, arms

1990 and this association remains to this day."

and ammunition, this included rations, jeeps, chairs,

12. The Kumaon Hills are amongst the foothills of the Himalayas on India’s northern border.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 195

General VN Sharma was the Chief of Army Staff from Logistic Support

1989 to 1991. He recalls:

Troops transported (to and fro) 1,60,000

2,61,351

“As a result of a deal with the LTTE that he would A r m y vehicles transported

7,000

807
call for the withdrawal of the IPKF, Mr Premadasa Army stores transported 50,000 tonnes 54,000 tonnes
succeeded, in June 1989, in politically displacing Detenus transferred

2,600

330

Mr Jayawardene as the President of Sri Lanka.

Refugees transferred

22,000

3,139 (520 by

Immediately on assuming office, he asked that the
naval ships)

IPKF withdraw. I was firm that under no circumstances
would the Indian Army leave in circumstances that Naval Resources Deployed might, historically, sully its fair name. As and when 1N/CG combat ship-days on 3,676 days

1,994 days
it did leave, it would be with ‘bands playing and patrol
flags flying high’ as appropriate for a friendly army Armed trawler days 2,690 days

5,226 days
departing after rendering assistance.

IN/CG aircraft flying hours

5,115 hours

3.270 hours

“In Sri Lanka, the JVP and the LTTE fomented anti- Merchant ship sorties 220 sorties

285 sorties

India feelings. Political tension mounted. It became
necessary to plan for the evacuation of our High Operation PAWAN in Retrospect Commission officials. I met Mr Premadasa in Sri Lanka
and convinced him of the perilous situation he might be Lieutenant General Depinder Singh was the General Officer placed in if miscreants decided to displace him and how Commanding in Chief of the Army’s Southern Command only the Indian Armed Forces could protect him from and the Overall Force Commander of the IPKF. In his mishap. Mr Premadasa was duly ‘persuaded’.

book, The IPKF in Sri Lanka, he has recorded why things
happened the way they did. The following excerpts refer to

“As tension continued to rise, plans had to be made for naval aspects. 1 have emphasised the lessons to be learnt the contingency that the Sri Lankan Armed Forces might in italics.

oppose the evacuation from the High Commission. A
battalion of troops was embarked in the aircraft carrier

“This was the first time that an operation of this nature

Viraat, which, along with an armada of naval ships,
and magnitude was launched by our Armed Forces
remained out of sight. When tension eased, the armada
involving, as it did, the crossing of a sea obstacle. The
withdrew. In due course, the Army left Trincomalee with
only precedents were the annual Tri Service amphibious
bands playing.”

exercises carried out each year and we were to discover
that there is an enormous difference between an exercise

Political interaction between the two Governments
and the actual thing. For one, the exercise normally
had defused the crisis and the contingency plans were
concludes 12-24 hours after the troops are landed and
deactivated by mid August 1989. De-induction started in
the problems of logistics like procurement over a longer

August 1989 and by October 1999, the bulk of the IPKF
time frame, storage and delivery never came to the
were withdrawn.

fore. Neither did we bother to analyse the operational

Operation Pawan terminated on 24 March 1990, when
problems that would arise once the enemy has got
the final contingent of the IPKF sailed out of Trincomalee
over the shock of the attacker’s arrival and commences
on board ships of the Eastern Fleet.

the inevitable readjustment and move of reserves to
separate the attacker’s teeth from his tail. Additionally,

Statistical Ooeruiew o f Operation PAWAN
in an exercise, loading of stores, equipment and

Tactical Support

Ju l 1987 to

Aug 1988 to
vehicles is from locations where adequate preparation

Ju l 1988

Aug 1989
has been made. In war, such actions take place all over

Militant boats destroyed

76
the country and you suddenly find all loading held up

Suspicious boats apprehended 85
because a particular type of ramp is not available.

54

Militant casualties at sea

336

“In our system of managing defence, all three services
have an equal say: I was very conscious of this and even

Special operations conducted

55

09

(IM SF)

though the functioning of the IPKF was primarily Army
oriented, I tried to ensure that the other two services

Combat landings (LST/LCU)

35

13
were kept constantly in the operational picture and

Incidents/interceptions at sea

152

40-50 per day
received equal importance. Despite this, service ego
cannot be denied for long and, so, within a few days

1 96 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

of the arrival of IPKF in Sri Lanka, resources allotted and their transport and heavy luggage was landed from from the other two services, the Navy and Air Force, the sea in Trincomalee. It took weeks before the road started to be withdrawn; so also was the Naval and communications could be opened to permit the two to Air Force staff representation in HQ IPKF where the marry up. ”

numbers were decreased and ranlts reduced.

Field Marshal Manekshaw’s foreword to General

"When orders for creation of HQ Overall Force Depinder Singh’s book states: Commander (OFC), IPKF were first issued, certain
naval and air force resources were allotted and I had

“Our troops have suffered heavy casualties in the
the Chief of Staff, Eastern Naval Command and an IAF
operations in Sri Lanka. WHY? The operations of the
officer of the rank of Air Commodore as component

IPKF had not been the success they ought to have been.

commanders with their own staffs to deploy these

WHY? The Indian Army is a professional army. It has
resources. After the first flush of enthusiasm was over,
served with great success in various theatres and in
the component commanders were the first to go; then
different kinds of operations in the past, including the
went the resources and, finally, only skeleton staffs were
insurgency operations in the Mizo Hills. Why then did it
left. So much for inter-services integration. We are still
not have the same success in Sri Lanka?

a far cry from achieving really effective inter-services

"All these questions have remained unanswered, and I
integration and serious thought needs to be given to
can only attribute these failures to the following:

this aspect as, at the moment, there is too much of

-The political aim was uncertain, wavering and not
parochialism and possessiveness.

firm.

“We need proper sea craft to transport army units,

-Troops were inducted into the theatre piece-meal,
so that the latter can reach the objective area in
untrained, improperly equipped and without proper
reasonably good shape. What was provided was
logistics.

generally primitive, with troops crammed on the top

-The Fighting Command had too many masters giving
deck subjected to sun, wind and wave, sharing 4-5
different orders and different assessments.

toilets between 400-500 men; no wonder troops used to
disenibark at the destination looking pretty green. One

-Was it the Prime Minister issuing directions, was the
suggestion is for the Shipping Corporation to acquire

Chief of Army Staff giving orders or was it the Director
proper passenger ships so that, during emergencies,
of Military Operations at Army Headquarters?

these can be utilised to ferry army units. Likewise, since

-Were the assessments of the General Officer
we have created for ourselves an amphibious capability,

Commanding in Chief at Headquarters Southern
we must acquire a floating dock to ensure maintenance

Command to be accepted, or the views of the Indian
of sea-landed forces at the earliest, in case suitable

High Commissioner in Colombo?

jetties are not available.

-The Fighting Command and the troops were also

“In the matter of joint operations there is need to
cognisant of the fact that whereas they were operating
refine the provision of naval gun fire support. It was
against the Tamil insurgents, the insurgents were
provided on one occasion during December 1987 north
getting trained in India, were being supplied with large
of Trincomalee and fire was off by over 2 kilometres.

quantities of arms and equipment, money and moral

Commonality of maps needs to be introduced as the
support from Tamil Nadu. Surely, this could not but

Navy operates off charts and the Army, maps.

have had a deleterious effect on their morale.

-And finally, the Fighting Command, which includes

"In Sri Lanka, port facilities were barely adequate to
the soldiery, had the feeling that the Government of
meet Sri Lankan needs; with the IPKF requirement

India was not certain as to what it wanted the IPKF to
added on they proved totally inadequate. Two ports were
achieve.”

utilised by the IPKF - Trincomalee and KKS. The former
was only intermittently available for IPKF use as it was a

For the Army, the IPKF was not a happy experience. It
private jetty of Prima Flour Mills, used mainly for unloading served as an object lesson to India on the perilous political imported flour. The Jetty at KKS was non-functional when under-currents that afflict and endanger well-intentioned induction first took place and it was some time before it peacekeeping operations in neighbouring countries.

became operational and, even then, it could take light
loads only.

For the Navy, Pawan was a valuable experience of

In consequence, after 10 October 1987, we prolonged low intensity conflict and of the organisational had situations where formations arrived by air in Palaly

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 197

OPERATION CACTUS - NOVEMBER 1988

shortcomings to be remedied for future inter-service for which naval Maritime Reconnaissance (MR) aircraft and insurgency operations. Some of these shortcomings ships were deployed around the Maldive islands.

were:

o Of the naval ships, only the LSTs and LCCJs were Naval Deployment
somewhat suitable as troop carriers.

At sea, the nearest ships to the Maldives were the cadet
o The merchant ships (cargo ships) were totally unsuitable training ship Tir and the frigate Godavari. They were for carrying soldiers overnight to and from Sri Lanka.

diverted towards Male at maximum speed. Betwa was
sailed from Cochin.

o The influx of troops after October 1987 was so large and
so frequent that even elementary security checks could

On 3rd morning, Rajput, Ranjit, Gomati, Trishul, Nilgiri,
not be enforced by the Army at the boarding point.

Kumbhir, Cheetah and the fleet tanker Deepak were o The inaccuracy of naval gunfire support by ships directed to prepare to sail for the Maldives and MR aircraft were launched for air patrols.

having large calibre guns against guerrilla targets in flat
coastal terrain. Expectedly, the only ship that received

Operation CACTUS was launched at 1300 hrs on the 3rd.

the Army’s appreciation for naval gunfire support was a Ships sailed from their base ports at best speed. By 1415 hrs, Seaward Defence Boat fitted with a 40 mm anti-aircraft MR aircraft had established surveillance over the Maldives.

gun, because its shallow draught enabled it go close
inshore. Her Commanding Officer was recommended The Flight of the Mercenaries
by the Army for the award of a Vir Chakra!

Indian Air Force aircraft landed troops on the airport at

Hulule Island on the night of 3/4 November. As soon as the

Operation Cactus off the Maldive Islands From
mercenaries heard aircraft landing, they seized hostages and

3 to 7 November 1988
fled from Male in a merchant ship MV Progress Light. The

On the night of 2/3 November 1988, between 300 and hostages included the Maldivian Minister of Transport. Naval 500 armed Tamil / Sinhala speaking mercenaries landed Headquarters received intelligence of the Progress Light at the Male harbour by boats from a mother ship and having left Male harbour at midnight on 3/4 November.

captured key locations in Male. During this attempted Interception of M V Progress Light
coup, Maldivian President Gayoom went into hiding and,
in the early hours of 3 November, sought India’s help and Throughout the night, MR aircraft kept track on radar of all immediate intervention.

ships in the patrol area. At 0925 hrs on the morning of 4th

November, the MR aircraft confirmed the detection of the

Operation CACTUS

Progress Light and homed Betwa (who was coming from

Cochin) towards it. Betwa intercepted Progress Light on In response to this urgent request from the Maldivian the night of the 4th /5th and followed it.13

Government, India launched Operation CACTUS. Its
objective was to ensure the safety of President Gayoom

In the meantime, a negotiating team had been flown
and restore normalcy. The Army / Air Force concept of from Male to Colombo. Godavari’s Seaking helicopter operations was to effect an air landing/ para drop at Hulule embarked this team in Colombo and flew it on board airport, establish a bridgehead and thereafter secure control Godavari. By midday on the 5th, Godavari made contact of the island of Male where the Maldivian Government was with the Progress Light and commenced negotiations for located. The Navy’s task was to establish a cordon sanitaire
the release of the hostages.

13. An American perception is reflected in Dennis Kux's book Estranged Democracies - India a n d the United States, 1941-1991. Page 415 states

"To the south in November 1988 India flexed its muscles once more as Rajiv ordered an Indian Army battalion flown to the Maldives, a thousand miles'from India's southern Up to squelch a coup attempt. Although India was responding to a request from the small island republic, this striking projection of power far into the Indian Ocean - in some ways more dramatic than sending troops into Sr, Lanka - underlined India s growing military capability and its willingness to use this power in a big brotherly fashion.

“The intervention won Washington's approval and was closely coordinated with the United States, from whom the Maldives first sought intervention before turning to New Delhi. A U S Navy ship helped the Indians vector in on the escaping mercenaries and their hostages - a good example of US-lndian cooperation that did not infringe on US interests .

I was the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff in 1988. The American side in Delhi informed the Indian side that some U S Navy ships were heading for Male to assist the Indian Navy The American side was informed that the gesture was appreciated, that the Indian Navy had the situation under control and would not need any assistance. INS Betw a was homed on by the Navy's reconnaissance aircraft made contact with the rebel ship at 0245 on 5th Nov and shadowed it until INS Godavari arrived later that forenoon with a negotiating team embarked. It was wise of the U S

Administration to advise the Maldives to seek India’s assistance - it set a good precedent for Indo-GS cooperation in such crises.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 199

hospitalisation. Hostages with minor injuries were treated on

The Negotiations Phase
board Godavari.

The leader of the mercenaries proved to be intractable.

He insisted that the Progress Light would proceed only to Capsizing of M V Progress Light

Colombo and demanded intervention by an international Efforts by salvage parties from Betwa to extinguish the team. After 15 hours of tension-packed dialogue between fire and control the flooding on board Progress Light were the negotiators and the mercenaries, during which the ship unsuccessful in the adverse weather conditions that prevailed.

continued to head for Colombo, it became clear the rebels Its crew was transferred to Betwa. Progress Light capsized at were not prepared to negotiate and change the destination of 0530 hrs on 7th November, 56 miles southwest of Colombo.

the Progress Light.

Return to Male

Meanwhile, the Sri Lankan Government had intimated
that the rebel ship would not be allowed to enter Sri Lankan Godavari and Betwa proceeded to Male with the captured waters and that if it did, it would be attacked. The Maldivian mercenaries, the rescued hostages and the crew of MV

Government had also made clear its desire that the Progress Progress Light. At a formal ceremony on 8th November, the Light should not be allowed to proceed to Colombo.

Commanding Officer of Godavari handed over the rescued
hostages to Maldivian Government officials. President Gayoom

Pressure Tactics
was personally present at this ceremony.

The safety of the hostages being the primary consideration,

The captured mercenaries were later taken by Godavari to

Godavari was directed to initiate graded pressure tactics an Indian Army detention camp located on Gamadoo Island and stop Progress Light from closing the Sri Lankan coast.

on 9th November.

Vice Admiral SV Gopalachari (then Captain and Lessons Learnt

Commanding Officer of the Godavari) recalls:

"Soon after midnight on 5/6 November, Progress Light The swift success of Operation Cactus was because the was given the choice of returning to Male or heading for Maldives were within easy reach and also because an airfield an Indian port - she refused. A firm warning was issued. was available for the air landing operation. This may not This evoked no response. A warning shot was fired across always be the case. The operation highlighted the need for the bows. It failed to persuade the hijackers. Close range the Navy to possess an integral helo-assault capability.

gunfire was aimed at the forward goal post mast. It

The prompt withdrawal of the Indian forces, at India’s
dislodged the swinging derrick which (fortuitously) fell on
top of their fast speed escape craft.

initiative, was well appreciated.

After dawn on the 6th, pressure was increased.

Operation TASHA in the Palk Strait

Godavari's Seaking dropped two depth charges ahead of After the withdrawal of the IPKF from Sri Lanka in April 1990, the bows. Progress Light continued on her course. Close the protection of the Tamil Nadu coast was entrusted to the range gunfire was aimed at the aft mast and funnel. At Navy and the Coast Guard.

0825, a frantic report from the Master of the Progress

Light indicated that the rebels had surrendered. The

Operation Tasha commenced in June 1990 to continuously
ship however continued to move ahead. Betwa opened patrol the International Boundary Line in the Palk Strait to curb fire - one of her shells hit Progress Light amidships and the smuggling of arms and ammunition, poaching, illegal she stopped.”

immigration and activities of Sri Lankan Tamil militants.

The hit started a fire on board Progress Light, frightened

From the outset, it was clear that Operation Tasha was going
the mercenaries and caused the ship to stop. The mercenaries to be a ‘low intensity conflict’ commitment that was unlikely to surrendered at 0854 hrs on 6th November. A Naval boarding end soon. The hiring of trawlers and arming them with MMGs party seized the ship, brought the hostages to Godavari and for operating from the Naval Detachments at Rameshwaram apprehended the mercenaries.

and Nagapatnam was institutionalised. The earlier ad-hoc
facilities for operating aircraft and helicopters from the Naval

Evacuation of Injured Hostages

Air Detachment Ramnad were gradually improved. Logistic

Eight injured hostages (including the Maldivian Minister of and maintenance infrastructure and maintenance personnel Shipping and Transport) were immediately evacuated by were established at Madras to sustain the SDBs and the other helicopter to the Military Hospital, Trivandrum for urgent
shallow draught ships patrolling the Palk Strait.

200 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

23

Assistance Rendered By The Navy In Peace Time

1976-1990
o

Naval Assistance to Ships in Distress at Sea
o

Search and Rescue
o

Medical Assistance and Evacuation
o

Cyclone, Flood and Earthquake Relief
o

Maintenance of Essential Services
o

Firefighting Assistance

©

Naval Aid to Civil Authority

•

Assistance by Naval Diving Teams

•

Apprehension of Poaching and Smuggling Trawlers

•

W I P/VIP Transportation

Naval Assistance to Ships in Distress at Sea

Month & Year

Assistance Rendered to

Nature of Assistance

Location
by Naval Ships/ aircraft

Feb 76

Barge NANIAMMA

Repaired crack & towed

Oil Rig Sagar

GDAYG1RI
to Mumbai

Samrat

Apr 76

INS Godavari

Salvage of Godavari
off Male

BCJLSAR, DELHI, TIR,

OPERATION GODSAL

(Maldives)

HIMGIRI, GAJ, KESARI &

DEEPAK

South of

Super Constellation MR

May 76

ANDY TH REE

Broken bottom. Search &

Rescue. Survivors to Cochin

Sri Lanka
aircraft, PORBANDER
and PONDICHERRY

Off Andaman &

INHS DHANVANTARI

Ju n 76

Cypriot ship ILAS1A

Medical assistance to
crew members

Nicobar Islands

(Naval Hospital)

Seychelles Port

NILGIRI & TRISHUL

Ju n 76

(JS Ship CAPODANNO

Diving assistance to clear
choked inlets

Veraval

NOIC Karanja

Sep 76

MV Shant Kamal

Ran aground. Assisted
in rescue operations

Crew abandoned ship -

Havelock

PULICAT

Sep 76

MV R A JSH R EE
safely recovered

Island A&N

Provided medical help to

Off Bombay

DEEPAK

Dec 76

Trawler MV DCIRGA
crew & towed to Mumbai

Salvage of grounded trawler

South of Daruva

SHARDUL

Ju n 78

Fishing trawler

BLCJE BANANA

Rescue of stranded crew

Vengurla Rocks

BETW A

Aug 78

MV NAND MAYUR

Search & location of fishing

Off Trivandrum

GARC1DA Islander aircraft

Aug 78

CHITRA LEKHA & CASEW
boat & tug

T R ISH U L

Towed to Bombay

From southwest

Sep 78

Iranian Water
of Bombay

Tanker KAN GAN

Ju n 79

MV AVILES

Medical assistance

Southwest of

DUNAGIRI
to survivors

Bombay

Ju l 79

SEA SPIRIT

Rescue of 27 crew from

Off Kori Creek

Air Force helo assisted
ship aground
by Navy

Aug 79

MV RUKMAVATI

Crew of stranded ship

Gulf of Kutch

DUNAGIRI
evacuated

Sep 79

BU RM ESE CARGO

Crew of stranded ship

Off Port Blair

SH ARD U L
evacuated

(A & N )

Ju n 80

VLCC ANGIL1KI

Transferred stores and

Off Bombay

UDAYGIRI
personnel to effect repairs

Ju l 80

Panamanian Ship

Ship sank. IL 38 launched

Off Pigeon

IL 38 & SHAKTI

Eastern Liberty
for search. Shakti effected

Island
rescue of ships crew

Ju l 80

MV JALADHIR

Location of ship in distress

West Coast

IL 38

Ju l 80

CGV PURI

Located & escorted to Chennai

Off Madras

KAVARATTI, KESA Rl

Nov 80

MV M AHAJOK II

Rendered assistance

Off Kamorta (A&N)

KESA RI

Nov 80

Russian merchant ship

Medical assistance

Off Cochin

BETW A

OSTRODONE

Dec 80

Sea Cadet Ship VARUNA

Towed from Bhavnagar

Off Bhavnagar

HIM GIRI
to Mumbai

Ju n 81

CG Trawler

Towed to Bombay

Off Bombay

A LLEPP EY

Aug 81

MV PRIM E R O SE

Ran aground. Crew rescued

Off North Sentinel

Naval Ships/ Helo

Island (A & N)

Ju n 82

UAE Ship MV

Rescued & towed to Okha

Northwest of Okha

KUTHAR

NAJM A BEAUTY

Ju n 82

MV SUBH ASH INI

Fishing trawler adrift.

Off Paradeep

KADMATT

Rescued & towed into port

Ju l 82

ONGC oil rig SAGAR VIKAS

Blowout. Evacuation, medical

Off Bombay

D EEPAK, DUNAGIRI
assistance & surveillance

Ju l 82

Panama Vessel MV W INNO

Search and Rescue

Hut Bay (A&N)

SDBT-51

Oct 82

Fishing trawler

Rescued & towed

Off Vengurla

R A JPU T

Ja n 83

Fishing Trawler

Rescue & towed

Off Vengurla

R A JPU T

Sep 83

Russian Ship MV M INSK

Medical aid to a heart patient

At Sea

GARUDA aircraft & helos

Aug 84

MV ORIENTAL PEARL

Investigation of wreck. Setting

At Sea

M ITHUN & DARSHAK
up Trisponder camps

Aug 84

MV DOVER

Crew rescued from burning

Off Visakhapatnam

KILTAN
ship & towed to Vizag

Aug 84

MV MAGULI

Location and marking

Off Bom bay

BHAVNAGAR, B ED I
ship’s wreck

Ja n 85

MVF DIM PLE

Towed to Mumbai after

Off Bom bay

MAKAR
drifting for 11 days

Feb 85

MV CHIDAMBARAM

Firefighting Assistance

Off Madras

DUNAGIRI, A N JA D IP

& KADMATT

May 85

SAGAR PRAGATI

Towed to Dubai & personnel

Off Dubai

Naval Ships & helo
evacuated

Ju n 85

Singapore ship

Rescued airlift of injured crew

Off Singapore

SH AKTI

SA L VALOUR

202 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Ju l 86

Norwegian Tanker

Evacuation of sailor

Off Cochin

MGLKI

Dec 86

M VJA G D O O T

Rescued from harassment

Off

MATANGA
by smugglers

Vishakhapatnam

Ju n 87

Dredger MANDOVI

Assistance to Dredging Corpn

Goa

PONDICHERRY

Dec 88

Missing Whaler “Eklavya"

Search & Rescue

Lakshadweep

MITHGN, SHAKTI

GDAYGIRI

Feb 89

MV SGBBALAXM I

Towed into Trincomalee

Off Trincomalee

MAHISH

Ju l 89

MV VISHVA AMITABH

Grounded. Assistance

Lat 18 51 N,

DARSHAK
rendered.

Long 72 53 E

Search and Rescue

M onth & Year

Assistance Rendered to

Nature of Assistance

Location
by IN Ships/ aircraft

Ju n 76

Fishing vessels

Search & Rescue

Off Bombay High

ANDROTH

Nov 77

Fishing boats

Search & Rescue after cyclone

Off Calicut

GARGDA aircraft

Dec 77

Tug A JR A L

Search & Rescue. Towed

A & N

KATCHALL
back to harbour

Nov 78

Marooned personnel

Search & Rescue

Off Trivandrum

Cochin Diving Team

Nov 78

Fishing boats

Search & Rescue

Off Madras

Islander aircraft

Feb 79

Burmese fisherman

Rescued after being

100 miles ME

KESARI
adrift for 20 days
of Sembilian

May 79

Fishing boats

Search & rescue after cyclone

Off Nizamapatnam

LCG L-31

Mar 80

Ferry boat St Xavier

Search and rescue

South of Cochin

GARUDA Helo

Ju l 80

Fishermen

Search & Rescue

Off Bombay

SD B T-53

Ju l 80

Fisherman

Search & Rescue

Off Goa

HANSA Helo

H1MG1RI

Ju n 81

Sri Lankan fishermen

Search & Rescue

240 miles from

Sri Lanka

RAJPGT TARAGIRI

Nov 81

Fishing boats

Search & Rescue after cyclone

Off Saurashtra

And Gulf of Kutch

DEEPAK BHAVNAGAR

A LLEPPEY

Near Ponnani

GARGDA helos

Ju l 82

Fishing boats

Rescue of five survivors
from two capsized fishing boats

Search & Rescue

Off Trincomalee

ANDAMAN

Oct 82

SAMGDRA JYO TI

Search & Rescue

Off Kochi

GARGDA aircraft

Sep 83

Fishermen

Search & Rescue

Off Dabhol

RATNAG1RI

Ju i 84

Fishing craft

Crew Rescued

Off North Sentinel

Naval helos

Ju n 85

MV RCJSLI,

Island (A & N)

(Honduras Cargo ship)

Search & Rescue

Off Bombay

KGNJAL1 helos

Ju n 85

Fishermen

Search & Rescue after cyclone

Off Orissa Coast

MATANGA and

Oct 85

Fishermen

Islander aircraft

Search & Rescue

Off Mumbai

KGNJAL1 helos

Nov 85

Fishermen

Search for survivors/wreckage

North Arabian Sea

RAN JIT

Mar 86

1AF AN 32 aircraft

Search & rescue

Off Bhimunipatnam MATANGA

Ju n 86

Fishermen

Search & Rescue. Towed to port. Off Port Blair

MATANGA,GGLDAR

Ju n 86

Yacht YETI

Search & Rescue of survivors

Off Madras

V1KRANT

Aug 86

T R IPLEX TEXMACO

NIRDESHAK

Search and rescue

Off Kakinada

Mar 87

Fishing boat

KGNJALl helos

Search and rescue

Off Bombay

Ju l 87

Fishermen

BETW A

Search & Rescue

Off Beypore

Aug 87

Fishermen

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 203

T R ISH U L

Towed to Bombay

From southwest

Sep 78

Iranian Water
of Bombay

Tanker KAN GAN

Ju n 79

MV AVILES

Medical assistance

Southwest of

DUNAGIRI
to survivors

Bombay

Ju l 79

SEA SPIRIT

Rescue of 27 crew from

Off Kori Creek

Air Force helo assisted
ship aground
by Navy

Aug 79

MV RUKMAVATI

Crew of stranded ship

Gulf of Kutch

DUNAGIRI
evacuated

Sep 79

BU RM ESE CARGO

Crew of stranded ship

Off Port Blair

SH ARD U L
evacuated

(A & N)

Ju n 80

VLCC ANGILIKI

Transferred stores and

Off Bombay

UDAYGIRI
personnel to effect repairs

Ju l 80

Panamanian Ship

Ship sank. IL 38 launched

Off Pigeon

IL 38 & SH AKTI

Eastern Liberty
for search. Shakti effected

Island
rescue of ships crew

Ju l 80

MV JAUKDHIR

Location of ship in distress

West Coast

IL 38

Ju l 80

CGV PURI

Located & escorted to Chennai

Off Madras

KAVARATTI, KESA RI

Nov 80

MV M AHAJOK II

Rendered assistance

Off Kamorta (A&N)

KESA RI

Nov 80

Russian merchant ship

Medical assistance

Off Cochin

BETW A

OSTRODONE

Dec 80

Sea Cadet Ship VARUNA

Towed from Bhavnagar

Off Bhavnagar

HIMGIRI
to Mumbai

Ju n 81

CG Trawler

Towed to Bombay

Off Bombay

A LLEPPEY

Aug 81

MV PRIM E R O SE

Ran aground. Crew rescued

Off North Sentinel

Naval Ships/ Helo

Island (A & N)

Ju n 82

CIAE Ship MV

Rescued & towed to Okha

Northwest of Okha

KUTHAR

NAJMA BEAUTY

Ju n 82

MV SUBH ASH INI

Fishing trawler adrift.

Off Paradeep

KADMATT

Rescued & towed into port

Ju l 82

ONGC oil rig SAGAR VIKAS

Blowout. Evacuation, medical

Off Bombay

D EEPAK, DUNAGIRI
assistance & surveillance

Ju l 82

Panama Vessel MV W INNO

Search and Rescue

Hut Bay (A&N)

SDBT-51

Oct 82

Fishing trawler

Rescued & towed

Off Vengurla

R A JPU T

Ja n 83

Fishing Trawler

Rescue & towed

Off Vengurla

R A JPU T

Sep 83

Russian Ship MV M INSK

Medical aid to a heart patient

At Sea

GARUDA aircraft & helos

Aug 84

MV ORIENTAL PEARL

Investigation of wreck. Setting

At Sea

M ITHUN & DARSHAK
up Trisponder camps

Aug 84

MV DOVER

Crew rescued from burning

Off Visakhapatnam

KILTAN
ship & towed to Vizag

Aug 84

M VM AGULI

Location and marking

Off Bom bay

BHAVNAGAR, BED I
ship’s wreck

Ja n 85

M VF DIM PLE

Towed to Mumbai after

Off Bom bay

MAKAR
drifting for 11 days

Feb 85

MV CHIDAMBARAM

Firefighting Assistance

Off Madras

DUNAGIRI, A N JA D IP

& KADMATT

May 85

SAGAR PRAGATI

Towed to Dubai & personnel

Off Dubai

Naval Ships & helo
evacuated

Ju n 85

Singapore ship

Rescue& airlift of injured crew

Off Singapore

SH AKTI

SA L VALOUR

202 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Ju l 86

Norwegian Tanker

Evacuation of sailor

Off Cochin

MGLKI

Dec 86

MV JAG D O O T

Rescued from harassment

Off

MATANGA
by smugglers

Vishakhapatnam

Ju n 87

Dredger MANDOVI

Assistance to Dredging Corpn

Goa

PONDICHERRY

Dec 88

Missing Whaler "Eklavya"

Search & Rescue

Lakshadweep

MITHGN, SHAKTI

GDAYGIRI

Feb 89

M VSGBBALAXM I

Towed into Trincomalee

Off Trincomalee

MAHISH

Ju l 89

MV VISHVA AMITABH

Grounded. Assistance

Lat 18 51 N,

DARSHAK
rendered.

Long 72 53 E

__________________________________ Search and Rescue

Month & Year

Assistance Rendered to

Nature of Assistance

Location
by IN Ships/ aircraft

Ju n 76

Fishing vessels

Search & Rescue

Off Bombay High

ANDROTH

Nov 77

Fishing boats

Search & Rescue after cyclone

Off Calicut

GARG DA aircraft

Dec 77

Tug A JR A L

Search & Rescue. Towed

A & N

KATCHALL
back to harbour

Nov 78

Marooned personnel

Search & Rescue

Off Trivandrum

Cochin Diving Team

Nov 78

Fishing boats

Search & Rescue

Off Madras

Islander aircraft

Feb 79

Burmese fisherman

Rescued after being

100 miles NE

KESARl
adrift for 20 days
of Sembilian

May 79

Fishing boats

Search & rescue after cyclone

Off Nizamapatnam

LCG L-31

Mar 80

Ferry boat St Xavier

Search and rescue

South of Cochin

GARGDA Helo

Ju l 80

Fishermen

Search & Rescue

Off Bombay

SD B T-53

Ju l 80

Fisherman

Search & Rescue

Off Goa

HANSA Helo

HIMG1RI

Ju n 81

Sri Lankan fishermen

Search & Rescue

240 miles from

Sri Lanka

RAJPGT TARAGIRI

Nov 81

Fishing boats

Search & Rescue after cyclone

Off Saurashtra

And Gulf of Kutch

DEEPAK BHAVNAGAR

A LLEPPEY

Near Ponnani

GARGDA helos

Ju l 82

Fishing boats

Rescue of five survivors
from two capsized fishing boats

Search & Rescue

Off Trincomalee

ANDAMAN

Oct 82

SAMGDRA JYO TI

Search & Rescue

Off Kochi

GARGDA aircraft

Sep 83

Fishermen

Search & Rescue

Off Dabhol

RATNAG1RI

Ju l 84

Fishing craft

Crew Rescued

Off North Sentinel

Naval helos

Ju n 85

MV RGSLI,

Island (A & N)

(Honduras Cargo ship)

Search & Rescue

Off Bombay

KGNJALI helos

Ju n 85

Fishermen

Search & Rescue after cyclone

Off Orissa Coast

MATANGA and

Oct 85

Fishermen

Islander aircraft

Search & Rescue

Off Mumbai

KGNJALI helos

Nov 85

Fishermen

Search for survivors/wreckage

North Arabian Sea

RAN JIT

Mar 86

1AFAN 32 aircraft

MATANGA

Search & rescue

Off Bhimunipatnam

Ju n 86

Fishermen

Search & Rescue. Towed to port., Off Port Blair

MATANGA,GGLDAR

Ju n 86

Yacht YETI

Search & Rescue of survivors

Off Madras

V1KRANT

Aug 86

T R IPLEX TEXMACO

NIRDESHAK

Search and rescue

Off Kakinada

Mar 87

Fishing boat

KGNJALI helos

Search and rescue

Off Bombay

Ju l 87

Fishermen

BETW A

Search & Rescue

Off Beypore

Aug 87

Fishermen

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 203

Mar 88

Sailing boat Kanoji Angre

Search and Rescue

Off Porto Novo

LCCI L-31

SH ARD U L, S D B T-60

Ju l 88

MV KONDCIL

Search and Rescue

Off Barren Island

( A & N )

Ju l 88

Train accident

Salvage operations

Near Quilon

GARCJDA helos

Aug 88

ONGC Helicopter

Search for wreckage

Off Pondicherry

Naval ships & aircraft

& Rescue of survivors

Sep 88

Customs boat Algasia

Rescue of Customs personnel

Off Bom bay

KCJNJALI helo
from sinking boat

Oct 88

Pawan Hans helicopter

Search and Rescue

Off Madras

SANDHAYAK

Dec 88

Burmese fishermen

Rescued after cyclone

Off Sacram ento Lt

K ESA R l

( A & N )

Jan 89

3 sailors missing from

Search & Rescue. Boat

Off Male (Maldives)

BET W A

IN Detachment
located near Filadu Island

Rameshwaram
after being adrift for 12 days

Mar 89

Lakshadweep Administration

Search & Rescue of survivors

Off Androth Island

TIR
after collision between ISLAND

STAR and MADAD ELAHI

Ju l 89

Fishermen

Search & Rescue

Off Point Pedro

K ESA R l

(Palk Strait)

Ju l 89

Fishermen &

Search & Rescue after

Malad, Raigad and

HAMLA, naval ships and
marooned people
cyclone struck coastal

Santha Ram lake
aircraft from Bom bay

Maharashtra

Tarapore and

Ratnagiri Coast

Medical Assistance and Evacuation

Month & Year

Assistance Rendered to

Nature of Assistance

Location

B y Ships/ aircraft

Jan 76

Civilian patient

Evacuated to Port Blair

From Neil Island

PANVEL

( A & N )

Mar 76

Civilian patient

Evacuated from DARSHAK

Off Hut Bay

PULICAT
off Hut Bay to Port Blair

( A & N )

Mar 76

Civilian patient

Evacuated to Cochin

From Munnar

GARCIDA helo

Dec 77

King Georges

Nursing assistance duties

Bom bay

Medical personnel from

Hospital

IN H S ASVINI

Sep 79

Civilian patient

Evacuated to Cochin

Kavaratti Island

ABHAY

(Lakshadweep)

Jan 80

Civilian patient

Evacuation from merchant ship

Off Alleppey

GARCIDA helo

KEDARNATH

Aug 80

Civilian patient

Medical assistance

Amini island

B E A S

(Lakshadweep)

Mar 81

Police patient

Evacuated to Port Blair

From Narcondum

LC (J L-34

( A & N )

Aug 81

Police patient

Evacuated to Port Blair

From Narcondum

LCCI L-34

Mar 82

PWD Truck

Evacuation of injured personnel

Rangat Bay (A&N)

Naval helos

May 82

Civilian patient

Evacuation to Port Blair

From Hut Bay (A&N) S D B T-51

Jun 82

Patient from Kuwait

Evacuated to Cochin

Off Cochin

GARCIDA helo
ship IMANJCIBAVR

Jul 83

Railways

Medical assistance to derailed

Raigarh-Jersiguda

IN H S NIVARINI
train near Raigarh

204 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Aug 83

Lakshwadweep

Medical assistance to patients

Chetlat Island

Administration

INHS SANJIVANI

Jan/Feb/

Andamans

Evacuation of patients to Port Blair

Mar/Apr/

UTKROSH helos

Administration

1._1 HOC
from A & N villages Belliground,

Ju n l9o5

Dungong Creek, Kadmatalla,

Diglipur, Mayabunder,

Apr 87

MV GOLDEN ENDEAVOUR

Evacuation of casualty

Off Bombay

KCJNJALl helo

Aug 87

Mine workers

Evacuated by helo and treated

Off Sri Lanka

NIRDESHAK
on board

Nov 88

MV ALEXANDER

Treatment of critically ill

Off Port Blair

Naval medical team INHS

ZAWABSZKI
crew members

DHANVANTARI

Dec 88

Injured Maldivian

Evacuated to MH Trivandrum

Off Colombo

GODAVARI Helo

VIP hostages from hijacked

(Operation Cactus)

MV PR O G R ESS LIGHT

Ju l 89

MV CHRISOLM

Evacuation of patient to Cochin

Off Cochin

MULKI

Ju n 90

Indian Army Major of

Evacuated to Bombay

From Tarapore

KCJNJALl helo

Bomb Squad

Nov 90

Civilian patients

Evacuated to Port Blair

From Diglipur

CJTKROSH helo

& Havelock (A&N)

C yclone, Floo d and Earthquake Relief

Month & Year

Assistance Rendered

Nature of Assistance

Location of District(s)

By
to Govt of

Nov 76

Tamil Nadu

Flood Relief operation,

At Madras

Naval helos and Islander
rendered assistance,
rescued 46 persons

Nov 77

Andhra Pradesh

Cyclone Rescue.

Tiruchirapally

Helos, diverse boats,
food drop & first aid

Anakapalli, Kalpeni

Gemini dinghies & naval

& Elamanchilli
teams

Nov 77

Tamil Nadu

Cyclone Relief & Rescue

Tiruchirapally

Helos

Nov 77

Lakshadweep

Food drop

Kalpeni Island

Aircraft

Nov 77

Kerala

Search for missing fishing

Off Calicut

Islander
boats after cyclone

Aug 78

Maharashtra

Tapi River Flood Relief

Jalgaon

Geminis & divers

Nov 79

Tamil Nadu

Flood Relief

Madurai & Ramnad

Boats

Sep 80

Orissa & Andhra Pradesh

Flood Rescue assistance

Srikakulum Koraput Helos. boats & Geminis
to marooned train

Great Nicobar

DEEPAK. SHARDCJL

Jan/Feb 82

Andaman & Nicobar

Earthquake Relief operations.

Carrying stores and personnel

Naval aircraft & helos
to tremor-affected inhabitants in

Campbell Bay

Flood Relief assistance with

Khurda,

Naval teams

Aug 82

Orissa
boats life saving equipment

& medical kits

230 tonnes of food grains &

Paradip

GHARIAL & ARNALA

Sep 82

Orissa

PO L from Vizag to Paradip for
flood affected people

Flood relief operations

Off Porbandar

NILGIRI

Ju n 83

Gujarat

Flood relief operations &

Visakhapatnam

CIRCARS & helos

Oct 83

Andhra Pradesh
food drop
and Tuni

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 205

Mar 88

Sailing boat Kanoji Angre

Search and Rescue

Off Porto Novo

LCU L-31

I IUI V/W

Search and Rescue

Off Barren Island

SHARDCJL, S D B T-60

Ju l 88

MV KONDUL

( A & N )

Ju l 88

Train accident

Salvage operations

Near Quilon

GARUDA helos

Aug 88

ONGC Helicopter

Search for wreckage

Off Pondicherry

Naval ships & aircraft

& Rescue of survivors

Sep 88

Customs boat Algasia

Rescue of Customs personnel

Off Bom bay

KUNJALI helo
from sinking boat

Oct 88

Pawan Hans helicopter

Search and Rescue

Off Madras

SANDHAYAK

Dec 88

Burmese fishermen

Rescued after cyclone

Off Sacram ento Lt

KESARi

( A & N )

Jan 89

3 sailors missing from

Search & Rescue. Boat

O ff Male (Maldives)

BET W A

IN Detachment
located near Filadu Island

Rameshwaram
after being adrift for 12 days

Mar 89

Lakshadweep Administration

Search & Rescue of survivors

Off Androth Island

TIR
after collision between ISLAND

STAR and MADAD ELAH I

Ju l 89

Fishermen

Search & Rescue

Off Point Pedro

K ESA R I

(Palk Strait)

Ju l 89

Fishermen &

Search & Rescue after

Malad, Raigad and

HAMLA, naval ships and
marooned people
cyclone struck coastal

Santha Ram lake
aircraft from Bom bay

Maharashtra

Tarapore and

Ratnagiri Coast

M e d ica l A s s is ta n c e an d E v a c u a tio n

Month & Year

Assistance Rendered to

Nature of Assistance

Location

B y Ships/ aircraft

Jan 76

Civilian patient

Evacuated to Port Blair

From Neil Island

PANVEL

( A & N )

Mar 76

Civilian patient

Evacuated from DARSHAK

Off Hut Bay

PULICAT
off Hut Bay to Port Blair

( A & N )

Mar 76

Civilian patient

Evacuated to Cochin

From Munnar

GARUDA helo

Dec 77

King Georges

Nursing assistance duties

Bom bay

Medical personnel from

Hospital

IN H S ASVINI

Sep 79

Civilian patient

Evacuated to Cochin

Kavaratti Island

ABHAY

(Lakshadweep)

Jan 80

Civilian patient

Evacuation from merchant ship

Off Alleppey

GARUDA helo

KEDARNATH

Aug 80

Civilian patient

Medical assistance

Amini island

B E A S

(Lakshadweep)

Mar 81

Police patient

Evacuated to Port Blair

From Narcondum

LCU L-34

( A & N )

Aug 81

Police patient

Evacuated to Port Blair

From Narcondum

LCU L-34

Mar 82

PW D Truck

Evacuation of injured personnel

Rangat Bay (A&N)

Naval helos

May 82

Civilian patient

Evacuation to Port Blair

From Hut Bay (A&N) S D B T-51

Ju n 82

Patient from Kuwait

Evacuated to Cochin

Off Cochin

GARUDA helo
ship IMANJUBAVR

Ju l 83

Railways

Medical assistance to derailed

Raigarh-Jersiguda

IN H S NIVAR1NI
train near Raigarh

204 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Aug 83

Lakshwadweep

Medical assistance to patients

Chetlat Island

Administration

INHS SANJIVANI

Jan/Feb/

Andamans

Evacuation of patients to Port Blair

Mar/Apr/

UTKROSH helos

Administration
from A & N villages Belliground,

Ju n 1985

Dungong Creek, Kadmatalla,

Diglipur, Mayabunder,

Apr 87

MV GOLDEN ENDEAVOUR

Evacuation of casualty

Off Bombay

KUNJALI helo

Aug 87

Mine workers

Evacuated by helo and treated

Off Sri Lanka

NIRDESHAK
on board

Nov 88

MV ALEXANDER

Treatment of critically ill

Off Port Blair

Naval medical team INHS

ZAWABSZKI
crew members

DHANVANTARI

Dec 88

Injured Maldivian

Evacuated to MH Trivandrum

Off Colombo

GODAVARI Helo

VIP hostages from hijacked

(Operation Cactus)

MV PR O G RESS LIGHT

Ju l 89

MV CHRISOLM

Evacuation of patient to Cochin

Off Cochin

MULK1

Ju n 90

Indian Army Major of

Evacuated to Bombay

From Tarapore

KUNJALI helo

Bomb Squad

Nov 90

Civilian patients

Evacuated to Port Blair

From Diglipur

UTKROSH helo

& Havelock (A&N)

C yclone, Flood and Earthquake R elief

Month & Year

Assistance Rendered

Nature of Assistance

Location of District(s)

By
to Govt of

Nov 76

Tamil Nadu

Flood Relief operation,

At Madras

Naval helos and Islander
rendered assistance,
rescued 46 persons

Nov 77

Andhra Pradesh

Cyclone Rescue,

Tiruchirapally

Helos. diverse boats.

food drop & first aid

Anakapalli, Kalpeni

Gemini dinghies & naval

& Elamanchilli
teams

Nov 77

Tamil Nadu

Cyclone Relief & Rescue

Tiruchirapally

Helos

Nov 77

Lakshadweep

Food drop

Kalpeni Island

Aircraft

Nov 77

Kerala

Search for missing fishing

Off Calicut

Islander
boats after cyclone

Aug 78

Maharashtra

Tapi River Flood Relief

Jalgaon

Geminis & divers

Nov 79

Tamil Nadu

Flood Relief

Madurai & Ramnad

Boats

Sep 80

Orissa & Andhra Pradesh

Flood Rescue assistance

Srikakulum Koraput Helos, boats & Geminis
to marooned train

Earthquake Relief operations.

Great Nicobar

DEEPAK, SHARDUL

Jan/Feb 82

Andaman & Nicobar

Carrying stores and personnel

Naval aircraft & helos
to tremor-affected inhabitants in

Campbell Bay

Flood Relief assistance with

Khurda,

Naval teams

Aug 82

Orissa
boats life saving equipment

& medical kits

230 tonnes of food grains &

Paradip

GHARIAL & ARNALA

Sep 82

Orissa

PO L from Vizag to Paradip for
flood affected people

Flood relief operations

Off Porbandar

NILG1R1

Ju n 83

Gujarat

Flood relief operations &

Visakhapatnam

CIRCARS & helos

Oct 83

Andhra Pradesh
food drop
and Tuni

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 205

Cyclone Relief supplies of food,

Coastal Tamil Nadu

N IRD ESH A K &

Nov 84

Tamil Nadu

& South Andhra,

SH ARA BH Helos &

Andhra Pradesh
diesel & clothing to cyclone
hit areas. Food drops, airlift
over Pulicat area

Naval Divers
of medical teams & diving
assistance

Godavari

C1RCARS Naval teams

Aug 86

Andhra Pradesh

Flood Rescue operations,
food drops, evacuation and

& helos
medical assistance

Bhadrachalam

C1RCARS

Ju l 88

Andhra Pradesh

Flood Relief operations

C IRC ARS

Ju l 89

Andhra Pradesh

Rood Relief assistance

Eluru &Warangal

May 90

Andhra Pradesh

Cyclone Relief & rescue

Tuni, Ankapalle

CIRCARS
of marooned people

Elamanchilli &
helos & divers

Bhimunipatnam

Nov 90

Andamans

Cyclone relief

Rangat Island

LCU L-36

Maintenance of Essential Services

Oct/Nov 76

Bombay Port Trust

Merchant ship movements

Bombay

A N G RE
during a strike

Dec 77

King Georges Hospital

Nursing assistance

Bombay

ASVINI

Dec 77-

Maharashtra Govt

Running Bombay’s milk

Worli, Goregaon

A N G RE

Feb 78
supply schemes
and Kurla Dairies

Aug/Sep79

Mazagon Docks

During a strike

Bombay

A N G RE

Oct 79

Andaman & Nicobars

To guard VAs & VPs during

Port Blair

JARAW A
police agitation

Dec 79

Andaman & Nicobars

Transportation of personnel

To Car Nicobar

Naval ships

& stores from Port Blair

& Campbell Bay

Nov 81

ONGC A & N

Transportation of ONGC

To Teressa Island

SH ARABH
personnel & stores from Port

Blair

Jan 82

Bharat Petroleum

Operate & maintain essential

Chembur Refinery

AN G RE
machinery during strike

Nov 82

Goa

Ease tension between local

New Vasem, Goa

GOMANTAK

& immigrant labour

Mar 84

Bombay Port Trust

Movement of merchant ships

Bombay

GODAVARI, CIRCARS,
carrying vital cargo during port

AN G RE
workers strike

Mar 84

Madras Port Trust

Movement of merchant ships

Madras

ADYAR
carrying vital cargo during port
workers strike

May/Jun 84

Maharashtra Govt

Maintenance of peace during

Bombay

VIKRANT, NILGIRI,

Bombay riots (Operation

AN G RE

Suraksha)

Apr 89

All Major Ports

Merchant ship movements

All major ports

By local Naval
during strike by Port Trust
establishments
workers

Mar 90

Mauritius Govt

Restoration and manning of

Mauritius

Teams from the Navy,
power supply in Mauritius after

Public Sector Units &
it was disrupted by a strike of

Special Mobile Force
workers of the electricity department

Oct/Nov 90

Govt of Maldives

Installation of communication

Male

N aval te a m
equipment for the SAARC

Conference

206 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Firefighting Assistance

May 79

Bhangarwadi Village

Fire fighting assistances

Lonavla

SHIVAJI

Ju n 79

Kurunda Village

Fire fighting assistance

Lonavla

SHIVAJI

Sep 79

M/s Bhandari Crossfield

Fire fighting assistance

Vadgaon

SHIVAJI

Feb 81

Binny’s Godown

Fire fighting assistance

Cochin

VENDGRGTHY

Oct 84

SCI Tanker

Fire fighting assistance

Butcher Island jetty

Naval Tug Balbir

MV Lala Lajpat Rai
supplied 8000 litres of foam
in Bombay

Ju n 87

Bom bay Port Trust

Controlling the fire in a truck

Ballard Pier

V1KRANT team
loaded with jute
godowns

Apr 90

Bombay Fire Dept

Air-rescue from terrace after

Bombay

KGNJALI helos
fire in multi-storey Hotel

Oberoi Towers

Aug 90

Bom bay Fire Dept

Air-rescue from terrace after

Bombay

KGNJALI helos
fire in multi-storey Regent

Chambers

Naval Aid to Civil Authority

Month & Year

Assistance Rendered to

Nature of Assistance

Location

By IN Ships/ aircraft

Mar 76

A & N Administration

Release of Burmese

Narcondum Island

PGLICAT
fishermen captured by police

Ju n 76

Drilling ship Haakon

Spares were flown to

GDAYGIRI

Magnus
drilling ship by ship's helo

Ju n 76

ONGC

Assisted in the location of

Himgiri
a metal well head and carried
out a bottom search around the
last position of the well head
by using its sonar

PANVEL

Mar 77

A & N Administration

Election commitments

Nancowry Group
of Islands

Andamans &

Army Bomb disposal

Mar 77

A & N Administration

To dispel a bomb scare
created by the discovery

Nicobar

Gnit under the aegis
of aviation fuel drums
of the Indian Navy
left behind by the Japanese
during the World War II

From sea

TGNIR II

May 78

Recovery of dead body

Bombay Police

To search a dhow abandoned
off Calicut

Ships

Mar - Apr 80

Customs Authority Cochin

Transportation of a bulldozer

Port Blair to

GHORPAD

Feb 81

Forest Dept Port Blair

Little Andaman

ANDAMAN

Provision & rations

For outpost at

Feb 81

Andaman Police
transportation

Narcondum

Transporting 76 settlers &

Port Blair to

GGLDAR

Apr 81

Yeoman service

142 cattle in two trips

Campbell Bay

Aircrew divers of

Rescue & Salvage work

Bagmati river

Ju n 81

Indian Railway
near Samastipur

KGNJALI
of train accident

LCG L-34

50 drums of kerosene oil

Great Nicobar

Dec 81

Ex-servicemen

Campbell Bay
settlers of Island

Survey Party & boats

Surveying assistance for

Karanja

Ju n 83

Scientists of CW PRS Pune
from DARSHAK

Seismic observations

Survey Party from

Laying, Monitoring, &

Karanja

Dec 83

Scientists of CW PRS Pune

DARSHAK

Recording of data from

Wave Rider Buoy

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 207

Distance measurements

Bom bay High

Survey party f

Apr 84

ONGC

D ARSHAK
off Visakhapatnam

S D B T-53

Ju n 86

Customs

Seized smuggled
items worth Rsl50 lakhs

Karwar

D ARSHAK

Sep 87

Geological Survey of India

Two survey parties assisted
survey project

Ezhimala

MAKAR

Dec 88/

Scientists of CW PRS, Pune

For position fixing during the
conduct of seismic survey

Jan 89

Ja n 88

Custom authorities

Rendered necessary assistance

Off Cochin

G A J

Narcondum

S D B T-60

Aug 88

Civil Adm

Rendered assistance to police
post at Narcondum

Palk Strait

Naval vessels

Apr 89

Ms Arti Pradhan

Swimming from Dhanushkodi

(aged 16 Yrs)

to Talaimannar

Assistance by Naval Diving Teams

Month & Year

Assistance Rendered to

Nature of Assistance

Location

Ja n 76

Maharashtra Govt

Inspection of capsized dredger

Bom bay

Ja n 76

Coal India

Inspection of flooded coal mine

Dhanbad

Jan 76

Air Force

Recovery of bodies from crashed helicopter

Nasik

Feb to

Pong Dam

Assistance during construction

Pong

May 76

May to

PWD Goa

Inspection of Zuari River bridge foundations

Panjim

Ju n 76

Ju n 76

S S Capodanno

Clearing choked inlets of sea weeds

Seychelles

Ju n 76

Kerala Constrn Corp

Inspection of bridge foundations

Ernakulam

Ju l 76

Andhra Govt

Inspection of submerged idols

Rajamundry

Sep 76

Maharashtra Electricity

Underwater repairs at power station

Tarapur

Dec 76

Fisheries Project

Calibration of sonar transducers

Cochin

Ja n 77

Eastern Railway

Inspection of damaged bridge piers

Daulatganj

Apr 77

Vizag Port Trust

Recovery of wire recorder

Visakhapatnam

May 77

Kerala Electricity

Lifting of Dam's emergency gates

Sengulam Dam

Sep 77

Kerala Constrn Corp

Salvage of pontoon from under bridge

Cochin

Sep 77

PW D Goa

Inspection of collapsed Zuari Bridge

Panjim

Oct 77

Cochin Shipyard

Fitting anodes on piles

Cochin

Ja n 78

DGCA &

Recovery of bodies, and salvage of engine, tail

Off Bom bay

Air India
piece, digital flight & cockpit voice recorders

Airport
from crashed Air India 747 Jum bo Je t

‘Emperor Ashoka’

Ja n 78

Kerala Engineering

Repair of slipway gate on water barrage

Tellicherry

Ja n 78

Rajasthan Electricity

Underwater repairs at Rana Pratap Sagar Dam

Kota

Feb 78

Andhra Electricity

Inspection of Nagarjuna Sagar Dam gates

Nagarjuna

Mar 78

Kerala Electricity

Inspection of dam gates

Phozhassi

Apr 78

Kerala Police

Recovery of bodies from the sea

Trivandrum

Apr 78

Cochin Port Trust

Salvage & demolition of sunken dredger

Cochin

May 78

Bombay Police

Search and recovery of weapons dumped by

Bom bay
criminals in Bassein Creek

May to J u n 7 8

R ajasth an Electricity

Clearing obstructions in Rana Pratap Sagar Dam

Kota

208 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Ju n to Ju l 78

PW D Bihar

Inspection of River Ganga bank near Patna

Narainpur/Rahimpur
for flood control

Aug to Sep 78

National Thermal

Recovery of suction pump and inspection

Power Corporation

Delhi
of sumps of Badarpur Thermal Power Station

(NTPC)

Aug 78

Andhra Electricity

Underwater inspection of Nagarjuna Sagar Dam

Nagarjuna

Dec 78 to

Andhra Govt

Recovery of sunken car and body

Godavari

Ja n 79
from canal near Rajamundary

Delta

Feb 79

Maharashtra Transport

Recovery of bus and tanker from Thana Creek

Bombay

Apr 79

PW D Madhya Pradesh

Inspection of Narmada River bed strata

Indore
on National Highway No.3 near Indore

May to

Bhakra-Beas Dam

Removal of eroded concrete from stilling basin

Nangal

Ju ly 79

Management Board
of Bhakra Dam and repair

Sep 79

Kerala Police

Recovery of police jeep from dam reservoir

Iddikki

Oct to

Andhra Electricity

Inspection/repair of stilling basin of

Nagarjuna

Nov 79

Nagarjuna Sagar Dam

O ct 79

Eastern Railway

Salvage of submerged bogie from River Falgu

Jangipur

Nov 79

Underwater

Therapeutic treatment of civilian divers

Goa

Engineers Ltd

Nov 79

Andhra Govt

Recovery of bodies from bus fallen into river

Gudur

Dec 79

Shipping Corporation

Recovery of anchor and cable of Vishwa Apuva

Bombay
of India

Ja n 80

Cochin Shipyard

Fitting aluminum fenders on jetty

Cochin

Ja n to

Srisons Fisheries

Recovery of fishing nets off Cochin

Cochin

Feb 80

Karnataka

Feb 80

Fortune Seiners,

Re-floating of fishing trawlers

Cochin

Ranjak & Java Durga
hijacked by miscreants from fishing
harbour and sunk off Fairway Buoy

Bombay

Mar 80

Bombay Customs

Seabed search for silver dumped by
smugglers off Bombay

Hirakud Dam

Mar 80

Orissa Govt

Underwater inspection, photography and
repair of cracks in up stream side of Dam

Seabed search for dhow sunk after being

Calicut

Mar to

Cochin Customs

Apr 80
chased for smuggling silver

Salvage of launch sunk off Bombay

Bombay

Apr 80

Mazagon Docks

Search and recovery of arms and ammunition

New Delhi

Ju n 80

Central Bureau of
dumped into River Jamuna by assailants after

Investigation
committing murder

Recovery of body in Goa harbour

Goa

Aug 80

Goa Port Trust

Inspection & repairs to the turbines

Kota

Aug to

Rajasthan Electricity
at Rana Pratap Sagar Dam

Sep 80

Salvage of container from marshes

Tarapur

Feb 81

Maharashtra Govt

Unloading of limestone from sunken dhow

Bombay

Mar 81

Bombay Port Trust

Visakhapatnam

Salvage of sunken dredger

Ju n 81

Dredging Corporation

Recovery of submerged bogies from the

Samasthipur

Ju n 81

Eastern Railway

Bagmati River in Bihar

Salvage of sunken channel buoy

Madras

Ju l 81

Madras Port Trust

Underwater repairs of hopper dredger doors

Madras

Nov 81

Madras Port Trust

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 209

Underwater inspection of jetty piles

Cochin

Nov 81

Cochin Shipyard

Underwater demolition

Beypore (Calicut)

Dec 81

Steel firm

Bom bay

Apr 82

Bombay Port Trust

Salvage of dhow

Periyar Lake

May 82

Kerala Forests

Underwater tree cutting

Seabed search for metal/explosive detonating

Bom bay

Ju n 82

ONGC
device in the vicinity of damaged undersea pipe line

Paradip

Ju n to Ju l 82

Paradip Port Trust

Salvage of trawlers sunk by cyclone

Cochin

Ju l 82

Cochin Shipyard

Underwater Inspection of jetty piles

Cochin

Ju l 82

Cochin Municipality

Recovery of body fallen from ferry boat

Saurashtra

Oct 82

Gujarat Fisheries

Underwater survey of breakwaters under

Harbour Project
construction at Veraval and Mangrol

Oct 82

Punjab Govt

Recovery of bodies after boat sank

Nangal
in Nangal Reservoir

Oct 82

Punjab Govt

Recovery of bodies from bus fallen into canal

Sirhind Nirvana Canal

Nov 82

ADE Bangalore

Recovery of pilotless target

River Kaveri

Jan to

Calcutta Port Trust

Salvage of sunken trawlers and clearance of

Haldia

Mar 83
jammed caisson gate of basin

Mar 83

Madras Customs

Salvage of fishing vessel

Off Madras

Apr 83

Indian Army

Recovery of submerged tank

Ramgarh

Apr 83

Bharat Petroleum

Isolating submerged jetty pump

Bom bay

May/Jun 83

Indian Army

Underwater survey of canal bed

Suratgarh

May to

PWD Madhya

Underwater work on canal discharge pipes

Itarsi

Ju n 83

Pradesh Tawa Project

Sep 83

MV MARTINI TORMS

Clearance of fouled propeller

Off Cochin

Sep 83

Kerala Govt

Recovery of bodies after ferry boat accident

Off Emakulum

Sep 83

North Eastern Railway

Recovery of bodies from Girija Barrage

Gorakhpur

Oct 83

MP Government

Recovery of body from Narmada River

Hoshangabad

Nov 83

Central Fisheries Institute

Clearance of fouled propellers

Cochin

Dec 83 to

Gujarat Fishery

Inspection of breakwaters under construction

Saurashtra

Jan 84

Harbour Project
at Veraval and Mangrol ports

Feb 84

Punjab Govt

Recovery of bodies from bus fallen into the

Nangal

Bhakra Canal

Ja n 84 to

NTPC

Underwater inspection of Badarpur Power Station

Delhi

Feb 85
intake channel, cleaning of debris and installation of
water screens

Apr 84

Uttar Pradesh Govt

Underwater repairs to dam

May 84

Rajasthan Electricity

Underwater repairs at Rana Pratap Sagar Dam

Kota

May 84

Sirvani Dam

Underwater inspection and repairs

Palghat

Ju l 84

N E Railway

Recovery of sunken track

Kumedpur

Aug 84

Bharat Petroleum

Survey of seabed

Bom bay

Sep 84

Air Force

Location of ditched trainer aircraft and recovery

Hyderabad
of body from Hussaini Sagar lake

Dec 84

Cochin Customs

Recovery of sunken boat

Cochin

Ja n 85

PW D Goa

Underwater inspection of bottom strata on which

Goa
new pillars of Berim Road Bridge rested

Ja n 85

Paradip Port Trust

Removal of sunken trawler

Paradip

210 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Ja n 85

NTPC

Underwater repairs at Badarpur Power Station

Mar to

Delhi

Rajasthan Govt

Clearance of underwater concrete obstructions in

Apr 85

Mahi Bajaj
the penstock gates of the main dam and clearance

Hydel Project
of grooves of emergency sluice gate in depths
between 90 to 100 feet

Apr 85

Chakiat Agencies

Inspection of stern gland of MV Teckler Dosinia

Cochin

Apr 85

Central Fisheries

Assistance to remove ropes from fouled shaft

Institute

Cochin

Ju n 85

Kerala Electricity

Underwater recce of the Kakki dam site

Kakki

Ju l to

Cochin Port Trust

Underwater inspection of bottom strata on which

Cochin

Aug 85
first, third and fourth pillars of the Link Road

Bridge rested

Sep 85

Kerala Boat Association

Recovery of sunken boat

Kerala

O ct 85

Cochin Shipyard

Underwater inspection of jetty piles

Cochin

Feb 86

Cochin Port Trust

Underwater inspection of dredger

Cochin

Ju n 86

Electricity Board

Underwater repairs of dam

Munnar

Ju l 86

NTPC

Underwater repairs of Badarpur power station

Delhi

Ju n - Ju l 86

Orissa Govt

Underwater inspection and repairs of Dam

Hirakud dam

Sep 86

Air Force

Salvage of submerged MIG 21 aircraft

Feb 87

UP Water Board

Inspection and sealing of underwater pipes

Lucknow

Ju n 87

Orissa Govt

Rescue of survivors and recovery of bodies

Near Cuttack
from ferry sunk in Brahmini River

Ju l 87

Border Security Force

Recovery of bodies, arms and ammunition

Teju (Assam)

of B S F men after boat accident in Brahmaputra river

Ju l 87

Southern Railway

Rescue of passengers from bogies of derailed train

Kazipet (AP)

Ju l to Nov 87

Karnataka Govt

Underwater repair of leaks in Dam

Talakalale Dam

Aug 87

Delhi

Delhi Police

Recovery of body from Yamuna river

Sikkim

Sep 87

Sikkim Govt

Recovery of bodies from sunken truck
in Raman river

Idamalayar Dam

Dec 87

Kerala Electricity

Underwater inspection and repairs

Talwara

Apr 88

To locate the debris of a MIG aircraft that had

Air Force
crashed in Pong Dam reservoir near Talwara.

(Punjab)

Attempts by divers in Sep 86 were not successful

Diving assistance was again requested in Apr 88

Diving team located and recovered half a tonne
of debris (tail pipe, stabiliser etc)

Under water inspection and clearance of under-water

Apr to

Madhya Pradesh
obstructions at a Hydroelectric Project

May 88

Electricity Board

Underwater inspection of sunken dredger

Cochin

Ju n 88

Cochin Port Trust

Rescue of passengers and recovery of bodies

Quilon

Ju l 88

Southern Railway
from, and salvage of, bogies submerged in

Ashtamudi Lake after derailment

Recovering of body from Meenarial river

Kottayam

Aug 88

Kerala Govt

Manihari Ghat

Salvage of sunken motor launch

Aug 88

Bihar Govt

Clearing fouled wire ropes from shafts and

Cochin

May to

Integrated Fisheries
propellers of fishing vessels

Oct 88

Project

Rescue from boats that capsized during the

Allahabad

Feb 89

U P Govt

Kumbh Mela

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 211

Recovery of bodies after boat capsized in

Udaipur

Mar 89

Rajasthan Govt
in Jaisam und Lake

Survey, repair and plugging leaks upstream of

Bangalore

Apr 89

Karnataka Electricity
the main wall of Talakalele Dam s balancing
reservoir. (Saraswathi Valley Project)

Recovery of silver dumped into the sea

Bom bay

Ju n 89

Bombay Customs

Recovery of bodies from submerged car

Pannikkode

Ju l 89

Kerala Police

Recovery of body from river Yamuna

Jagarpur

Ju l 89

Delhi Police

Recovery of body from river Yamuna

Delhi

Aug 89

Delhi Police

Recovery of bodies from wreckage of Vayudoot
near Pune

Sep 89

Vayudoot Ltd

Dornier aircraft crashed in (Jjani Lake

Oct 89

Andhra Marine

Search and salvage of the Vishakheswara Temple

Archeological Department

Patna

Dec 89

ONGC

Recovery of bodies from, and salvage of, Pawan

Hans Dauphin Helicopter sunk in the river Ganga

Mar 90

AP Govt

Recovery of bodies and submerged Buddha

Hyderabad
statue from Hussaini Sagar Lake

Ju l 90

DRDL

Recovery of weapon

Chandipur

Oct 90

Haryana Electricity

Underwater repairs to gate of Yamuna Nagar

Yamuna Nagar

Power Station

Oct 90

Goa Govt

Recovery of bodies from under collapsed

Goa
span of new Mandovi Bridge during construction

Dec 90

Kerala Govt

Recovery of bodies from capsized tourist boat

Pappara Dam

A p p reh en sio n o f Po ach in g and S m u g g lin g T raw lers Month & Year

Number of Trawlers

Action Taken

Location

B y Naval S h ip (s)

Apr 76

Two Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended & escorted

Off Krishnapatnam

ANDAMAN
to Madras

Aug 78

Two Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended & escorted

Off Cochin

UDAYGIR1 & T R ISH U L
to Cochin

Oct 78

Two Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended

Off Sandheads

AMINI.TR1SHUL

& ARNALA

Oct 78

Five Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended & escorted

Three off

ABHAY with KRISHN A,
to Cochin

Trivandrum & two

G A J
off Muttam Point

Nov 78

One Thai trawler

Apprehended

Off Sandheads

S D B T 53

Apr 79

One Taiwanese trawler

Apprehended & escorted

Off Porbandar

BU LSA R
to Porbandar

Apr 79

One Foreign trawler

Apprehended & escorted

Off Veraval

BH ATKAL
to Porbandar

Apr 79

Two foreign trawlers

Apprehended & escorted

Off Mangrol

S D B T52
to Porbandar

May 79

Two Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended & escorted

Off Cochin

KUTHAR
to Cochin

Ju n 79

Two Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended & escorted

Off Cochin

KR ISH N A
to Cochin

Ju l 79

One Taiwanese trawler

Apprehended & escorted

Off Cape Comorin

DARSHAK
to Cochin

Aug 79

Two Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended

Off Cochin

KRISH N A

212 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Aug 79

Two Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended

Off Muttam Point

ABHAY

O ct 79

Two Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended

Off Cochin

KRISHNA

Ju l 80

Three Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended

Two off Beypore

BEAS
one off Cape

Comorin

Ju l 80

One Taiwanese trawler

Apprehended

Off Tuticorin

SHAKTI

Aug 80

Two Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended

Off Beypore

BEAS

Sep 80

Four Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended

Off Quilon

BEAS

Nov 80

Four Thai trawlers

Apprehended

Off Sandheads

KAVARATTI

Feb 81

One Taiwanese trawler

Apprehended

Off Okha

TALWAR

Mar 81

Two Thai trawlers

Apprehended and

Off Mayabandar

(JDAYGIRI
escorted to Port Blair

Nov 81

One Taiwanese trawler

Apprehended & escorted

Wedge Bank

BRAHMAPUTRA
to Cochin

Nov 81

Seven Thai trawlers

Apprehended & escorted

Off Sandheads

KILTAN, NILG1RI
to Haldia

KESARI

Nov 82

One Thai trawler

Apprehended & escorted

Off Narcondum

Islander &
to Port Blair

SANDHAYAK

Mar 83

Three Taiwanese trawlers

Apprehended & escorted

2 off Narcondum

LCU L-32
to Port Blair

1 off Kamorta

LCU L-34

Ju l 84

Two foreign trawlers

Apprehended

Off Campbell Bay

Islander & CGS vessels

LCU L-34

O ct 85

MV LUCKY III PANAMIAN

Apprehended. Ship

Off Barren
loaded with electronics &

Island
unregistered goods. Escorted to

Port Blair

Off Vizag

KESARI

Ju l 86

M VJAGLAD AK!

Apprehended - suspected to
be involved in smuggling
activities. Handed over to

Customs

Off New Moore

AMINI

Sep 86

One Bangladesh

Apprehended & escorted
to Sandheads & handed

Island
fishing boat
over to CGS vessel

SD Bs T-53 & T-55

Apprehended - involved in

Jackson Creek

Mar 90

Three foreign
illegal activities &

Bumila Creek
boats
crocodile hunting

Sunderbans

W IP / V IP Transportation

Transit/Island

B y Naval ships &

From - To

M onth & Year

W IP/V lP s

Territories
helicopters

Transit

VIKRANT

Goa to Bombay

Dec 76

Defence Minister

Lakshadweep

VIKRANT

Bombay to Minicoy-

Dec 76

Prime Minister

Kavaratti- Androth

Indira Gandhi

SHAKTI &

Cochin-Kavaratti-Cochin

Lakshwadweep

Ja n 79

Prime Minister

DUNAG1RI helos

Morarji Desai

Cochin-Kavaratti-Cochin

Lakshwadweep

DEEPAK, DUNAG1RI

Feb 81

Prime Minister

UDAYGIRI, Seakings

Indira Gandhi

A & N

DEEPAK & Chetak

Car Nicobar to Great

Ja n 82

A&N Chief Secy,
helos

Nicobar & back for

Chief Commissrelief operations after
ioner & MLAs of

Great Nicobar earthquake

A&N

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE/213

A & N

D EEPAK

Feb 82

Chief of Air Staff

Car Nicobar to Kamorta
and back

A & N

DCINAGIRI

Mar 82

Defence Minister

Car Nicobar-Little

Dy Defence Minister

Andaman-

Cabinet Secretary

Car Nicobar

Scientific Adviser

& 3 MPs

Apr 82

GOCinC East

Car Nicobar-Campbell

A & N

DUNAGIRI

FOCinC East

Bay-INS KARDIP-

Car Nicobar

Oct 82

Chief of Army Staff

Cochin-Minicoy-

Lakshadweep

SH AKTI

GOCinC South

Kavaratti-Agatti-

DMO

Androth

Dec 82

Defence Minister

Cochin-Minicoy

Lakshadweep

SH AKTI

-Kavaratti-Agatti

-Androth

Feb 85

President Zail

Port Blair-Car Nicobar

A & N

VIKRANT

Singh

Apr 85

Vice President

Bombay to Goa

Transit

VIKRANT

R Venkataraman

Nov 85

Prime Minister

Cochin to Lakshadweep

Lakshadweep

GODAVARI

Rajiv Gandhi

1986

President Zail

Cochin-Minicoy-

Lakshadweep

Western

Singh

Kavaratti-Cochin

Fleet

1986

Prime Minister

Cochin-Kavaratti-

Lakshadweep

Western

Rajiv Gandhi

Bingaram-Cochin

Fleet

Dec 86

Prime Minister

Port Blair to Nicobar

A & N

Eastern

Rajiv Gandhi

Islands and back

Fleet

Nov 87

Governor General

Port Louis to Rodriguez

Transit

T1R
of Mauritius

(Mauritius)

Dec 87

Prime Minister

Trivandrum-Kavaratti-

Lakshadweep

VIRAAT

Rajiv Gandhi

Agatti-Bingaram-Minicoy

Dec 87

Defence Minister

Goa to Karwar to view

Transit

VINDHYAGIRI

VCNS,

Project Seabird from seaward

FOCinC SOUTH

Jan 88

Prime Minister

Helo lifted from Bingaram to

Transit

Western Fleet

Rajiv Gandhi

Kadmat and embarked on
board for passage to Mangalore

Dec 89

President

Cochin-Minicoy-

Lakshadweep

TARAGIR1

Venkataraman

Kavaratti-Bingaram-

Cochin

\

214/ TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

24

Goodwill Visits To Foreign Ports 1976-90

1 he recr. 'd that is given to every nation by other countries is ships and their ships companies have, during goodwill
to an extent dependent on the impression its armed forces cruises and goodwill visits enhanced the regard in which
make in the matter of strength, equipment, efficiency, India is held, courtesy and discipline. Without exception, the Navy’s

F le e t Sh ip s and Subm arines

Ships

Ports Visited

Year

Remarks

Abhay (Old)

Colombo

Apr 1977

Homeward after Commissioning

Abhay (New)

Varna, Athens, Port Said, Djibouti

Mar/Apr 1989

Agray

Varna, Athens, Port Said, Djibouti

Feb 1991

Homeward after Commissioning

Ajay

Varna, Izmir, Port Said, Djibouti

Feb 1990

Homeward after Commissioning

Akshay

Varna, Istanbul, Port Said

Jan 1991

Homeward after Commissioning

Jul-Aug 1980

Homeward after Commissioning

Alleppey
a)

Gdynia, Le Havre, Lisbon, Bizerte, Aden

Dec 1990
b)

Male

Sep-Oct 1981

Amba
a)

Colombo, Male

May 1982
b)

Trincomalee

May 1983
c)

Singapore

Nov 1985
d)

Hongkong, Danang, Penang

Jan 1986

W

Apr-May 1982

Amini
a)

Singapore, Ho Chi Minh City, Bangkok

May 1983
b)

Singapore

Oct 1988

Pnrt Kpiann

V

Dec 1977

Andaman
a)

Ahu Dhabi, Bahrain

May 1983
b)

Singapore, Bangkok

May 1984
c)

Sabang, Belawan

Sep-Oct 1987

Penang, Kuchina, Muara, Belawan, Lumut
d)

1 , 1 QOfi
ju n iyou

Androth

Port Kelang

_________________ ________ Apr-May 1982

Anjadip
a)

Singapore

Apr 1985

Operation Octopus
b)

Sinqapore, Kota Kinabalu

Ju n 1986

Surabaya, Martia, Singapore, PortKelang-----
c)

May 1984

Amala

Port Kelana. Penang

_______ ____ ______

Notes

* Seychelles Independence Day 29 June 1976

* Mauritius Independence Day 12 March 1968

Gdynia, Le Havre, Bizerte, Port Said, Port

May-Jul 1979

Hom eward after Commissioning

"

Bedi
a)

Sudan, Aden

Dec 1983
b)

Male

O ct 1989
c)

Male

Bhavnagar

Gdynia, Le Havre, Bizerte, Port Sudan, Aden

May-Jul 1979

Hom eward after Commissioning

Cannanore

Colombo

Ja n 1979

(Old)

Cannanore

Gdynia, Kiel, Le Havre, Lisbon, Malta, Alexandria Jan-Feb 1988

Hom eward after Commissioning

(New)

Massawa

Chakra

Singapore, Penang

Ja n 1988

Hom eward after Commissioning

Cheetah
a)

Le Havre, Tunis, Alexandria, Port Said, Aden

Dec 1984-Jan 85

Hom eward after Commissioning
b)

Chittagong

May 1990

Cuddalore

Gdynia,

Kiel,

Le-Havre,

Lisbon,

Bizerte, Nov 1987-Ja n 88

Hom eward After Commissioning

Alexandria, Port Said, Massawa

Darshak

Penang

Apr 1976

Deepak
a)

Port Louis

Mar 1976

Mauritius Independence Day
b)

Doha & Kuwait

Dec 1977
c)

Port Victoria, Dar-Es-Salaam, Mombasa

Ju n 1978
d)

Montara (Malagasy)

Ju n 1979
e)

Port Victoria

Ju n 1981

Seychelles Independence Day

0

Port Victoria

Ju n 1982

Seychelles Independence Day
g)

Port Victoria, Dar-Es-Salam, Mombasa, Diego

Ju n 1987

Seychelles Independence Day

Suarez
h)

Male

Nov-Dee 1988

Operation C A C T U S
j)

Male

Feb-Mar 1989

Operation CACTCJS

Dunagiril
a)

Bandar Abbas, Basra,

Dec 1977
b)

Colombo, Male

Sep-Oct 1981
c)

Singapore, Ho Chi Minih City, Bangkok

Apr-May 1982
d)

Port Kelang, Penang

May 1984
e)

Singapore, Bangkok, Jakarta

Apr-May 1985

Operation Octopus

0

Kuching, Muara, Belawan, Lumut

Sep-Oct 1987
g)

Singapore, Penang

Nov 1987
h)

Singapore, Penanq

Ja n 1988

RV & Escort CH AKRA

Gaj
a)

Colombo
b)

Aden

O ct 1976
c)

Aden

Mar 1977

To tow VIJA YD U RG to Bom bay
d)

Aug 1977

To tow SIN D H U D U RG to Bom bay

Port Sudan, Aden

Apr 1978

To tow PO RBA N D A R and
e)

Aden

PO N D IC H ER R Y

0

Djibouti

Ja n 1989

To tow NIPAT to Bom bay
g)

Jeddah

Nov 1989

To tow N ISH A N K to Bom bay

Ja n 1990

To tow NIRGHAT to Bom bay
a)

--------- '

b)

Oct-Nov 1986

^
g" . « « l=.Tol j o .H „„sK o l,g,portM > ng
c)

Jul-Sep 1987

For EX PO in Tokyo

May 1990

For Royal Malaysian Navy’s

Ghorpad
a)

belawan

--------
b)

Sabang, Belawan

Mar 1977
c)

Penang

Mar 1978
d)

Port Kelang, Penanq

Feb 1979

May 1984

216/ TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Godavari
a)

Port Victoria, Mombasa

Nov 1985
b)

Djibouti, Suez (Egypt), Sevastopol (USSR) May-Sep 1986

To America to participate in the

Algiers (Algeria), Ponta Delgada (Azores Island

International

Fleet

Review
on

Portugal), Norfolk (USA), Alexandria (USA),
the occasion of the Bicentennial

New York, Havana (Cuba), Kingston (Jamaica),

Celebration of the Statue of Liberty

Port of Spain (Trinidad), Georgetown (Guyana),
in New York(GSA). on 14 Ju ly 1986

Recife (Brazil), Accra (Ghana), Lagos (Nigeria),

Luanda (Angola), Mocamedes (Angola), Maputo

(Mozambique),

Port

Victoria

(Seychelles)

c)

Surabaya, Freemantle, Melbourne, Sydney, Sep-Nov 1988

For

International

Naval

Review

Port Moresby, Darwin, Port Kelang, Male

Bicentennial Naval Celebration at

Sydney.

Gomati

Mina Qaboos, Ashuwyakh, Doha

Nov 1989

Guldar
a)

Helsingborg, Le Havre, Malaga (Spain),

Jan-Feb 1986

Homeward after Commissioning

Alexandria, Port Said, Aden
b)

Padang

Sep-Oct 1989

Himgiri
a)

Aden, Port Said, Odessa (GSSR), Split Sep-Oct 1976

Paschim cruise

(Yugoslavia), Athens, Sili (Turkey), Alexandria,

Aden
b)

Singapore, Ho Chi Minh City, Jakarta

Apr 1978
c)

Trincomalee

Ju l 1981
d)

Colombo

Jul-Aug 1987

Operation PAWAN
e)

Port Victoria

Ju n 1988

Seychelles Independence Day

Operation PAWAN
f)

Trincomalee

Nov 1988

Operation CACTUS
g)

Male

Nov-Dee 1988

Exercise Arjun
h)

Penang, Surabaya, Padang

Sep-Oct 1989

Hosdurg

Gdynia, Le Havre, Algiers, Benghazi, Aden

Feb-Mar 1978

Homeward after Commissioning

Kadmatt
a)

Colombo

Jan-Feb 1976

Mar 1977
b)

Penang
c)

Penang

Mar 1978

May 1983
d)

Singapore

Sep-Oct 1987
e)

Penang, Kuching, Muara, Belawan, Lumut

Jan 1988

RV & Escort CHAKRA
f)

Singapore, Penang

Apr-Jun 1987

Homeward after Commissioning

Kakinada
a)

Gdynia, Kiel, Le Havre, Algiers, Alexandria, Port

Said, Massawa

May 1990
b)

Chittagong

Jan 1975-Ju n 1976 Refit

Kalvari
a)

Vladivostok

Aug-Sep 1976
b)

Manila, Port Swettenham

Feb 1979

Homeward after Refit
c)

Penang

May 1984
d)

Port Kelang, Penang

Jan-Feb 1976

Kamorta
a)

Colombo

Apr 1978
b)

Singapore

Apr 1985

Operation Octopus
c)

Belawan, Penang

Jan-Feb 1976

Karanj
a)

Colombo

Mar 1977
b)

Penang

Dec 77-Jan 1978

To Russia for Refit
c)

Port Swettenham, Hong Kong, Kobe

Mar 78-Oct 1979

Refit
d)

Penang, Vladivostok

Nov 1979

Homeward after Refit
e)

Penang

Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Port Qaboos (Oman)

Mar 1983
f)

Apr 1985

Operation Octopus
g)

Belawan, Penang

Sep-Oct 1987
h)

Kurhina. Muara, Belawan, Lumut

Jan 1979

Karwar (Old)

Colombo

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 217

Karwar (Mew)

Gdynia, Le Havre, Cagliari, Port Said, Massawa,

Aug-Sep 1986

Port Sudan

Homeward afterCommissionhw

Chittagong

M ay 1990

KatchaJI

Port Kelang

Mar 1979

Singapore, Bangkok, Jakarta

Apr-May 1985

Ope
on Oc
jjs

Port Kelang, Martia, Surabaya

Ju n 1986

Kavaratti

Singapore

Apr 1978

Singapore

Feb-Mar 1980

Kesari

Bela wan

Mar 1977

Sabang, Belawan

M ar 1978

Penang

Feb 1979

Trincomalee

Oct-Nov 1979

Port Kelang, Penang, Sabang, Belawan

May 1984

Belawan, Penang

Apr 1985

Operation O ctopus

Khanderi

Ho Chi Minh City, Bangkok

May 1982

Singapore

May 1983

Singapore, Port Kelang, Martia. Surabay*

Khukri

Ju n 1986

Penang, Labuan

May 1990

For Royal M alaysian Navy

Kuantan (Malaysia)

International Fleet Review

Kiltan

Ju n 1990

Colombo

Penang

Jan-Feb 1976

Penang

Mar 1977

Port Kelang

Mar 1978

Konkan

Mar 1979

Oct-Dec 1988

Hom eward after Com m issioning

Kozhikode
a)

Ja n 1989

Hom eward after Com m issioning

Kumbhir

Pot°Kn; , r apleu Wexandria’ Port Said, Aden

Port Kelang, Ho Chi Minh Citv

Oct-Nov 1986

Hom eward after Comm issioning

Kursura

O ct 1988

Colombo

-----

Magdala

Male

Jan-Feb 1976

Mahe

Male

O ct 1989

Mahish

Dec 1990

Jul-Aug 1985

Homeward after Commissioning

Nov 1990

O ct 1989

May 1987

To tow V E E R to Bom bay

Penang

Dec 1990

Penang

Mar 1977

Nilgiri
a)

Mar 1978

Port v ictoria7Mornbasay
b)

Bahrain, Abu Dhabi
c)

Jurt-Jul 1976

Seychelles Independence Day

Port Kelang

Dec 1977
d)

Port Victoria

Mar 1979
e)

Ju n 1980

0

PortbV w Djib0Uti’ Hodeidah,

Seychelles Independence Day

Feb-Mar 1982
g)

Ju n 1983
h)

Seychelles Independence Day

O ct 1988
j)

Jakarta, Singapore

Dec 1988

Operation CACTUS

Oct-Nov 1990

218 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

HOMEWARD PASSAGE OF SHIPS AND SUBMARINES

FROM EUROPE TO INDIA - 1976 to. 1990

FRANCE
l

Odessa

YUGOSLAVIA

BULGARIA ,

BLACK SEA

\

Vania o)

TouJon

ITALY

\

TURKEY (

SPAIN

-• Lisbon

GREECE

PORTUGAL

TURKEY

Cartegana

Palermo*-^/*

Malaga Q

® Jt unis^-^
j

M alta 6 " ' - ,

ALGERIA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

Port Said °\)

LIBYA

EGYPT

St Petersburg

^ / o R ig a

B R IT A IN
r i>Baltiysk

Moscow

Gdynia
f Kiel

Antwerp

'Le Havre

Vladivostok

Black Sea

SPAIN

KOREA/

EGYPT m
v

KofcaiaO —

SAUDI

INDIA
y / V

SUDAN

ARABIA

Port Sudan O r g \
i Mumbai ^Vishakhapatnam

PHII.IPINES

ETHIOPIA \ % \
i

/

Bay o f Bengal

\

Massswa &$>} YEMEN,

Manila

Arabian

Sea

Djibouti O^^A^en^-

I Hi

/Ho Chi

MinhCity,

AFRICA

(SRI LANK A

Bclawan;

INDIAN OCEAN

Aug-Sep 1986

Homeward after Commissioning

Karwar (New)

a)

Gdynia, Le Havre, Cagliari, Port Said, Massawa,

Port Sudan

May 1990
b)

Chittagong

Mar 1979

Katchall
a)

Port Kelang

Apr-May 1985

Operation Octopus
b)

Singapore, Bangkok, Jakarta

Ju n 1986
c)

Port Kelang, Martia, Surabaya

Kavaratti
a)

Singapore

Apr 1978
b)

Singapore

Feb-Mar 1980

Kesari
a)

Belawan

Mar 1977
b

Sabang, Belawan

Mar 1978
c)

Penang

Feb 1979
d)

Trincomalee

Oct-Nov 1979
e)

Port Kelang, Penang, Sabang, Belawan

May 1984
f)

Belawan, Penang

Apr 1985

Operation Octopus

Khanderi
a)

Ho Chi Minh City, Bangkok

May 1982
b)

Singapore

May 1983
c)

Singapore, Port Kelang, Martia, Surabaya

Ju n 1986

Khukri
a)

Penang, Labuan

May 1990

For Royal Malaysian Navy

International Fleet Review
b)

Kuantan (Malaysia)

Ju n 1990

Kiltan
a)

Colombo

Jan-Feb 1976
b)

Penang

Mar 1977
c)

Penang

Mar 1978
d)

Port Kelang

Mar 1979

Konkan
a)

Gdynia, Kiel, Le Havre, Malaga, Alexendria, Port

Oct-Dec 1988

Homeward after Commissioning

Said, Massawa

Kozhikode
a)

Gdynia, Kiel, Le Havre, Malaga, Alexendria, Port Ja n 1989

Homeward after Commissioning

Said, Djibouti

Kumbhir
a)

Lisbon, Naples, Alexandria, Port Said, Aden

Oct-Nov 1986

Homeward after Commissioning
b)

Port Kelang, Ho Chi Minh City

O ct 1988

Kursura

Colombo

Jan-Feb 1976

Magdala

Male

Oct 1989

Mahe

Male

Dec 1990

Mahish
a)

Le Havre, Palermo, Alexandria, Port Said, Aden

Jul-Aug 1985

Homeward after Commissioning
b)

Jakarta

Nov 1990

Malpe

Male

Oct 1989

Matanga

Djibouti

May 1987

To tow V EER to Bom bay

Mulki

Male

Dec 1990

Mysore
a)

Penang

Mar 1977
b)

Penang

Mar 1978

Nilgiri
a)

Port Victoria, Mombasa,

Jurt-Jul 1976

Seychelles Independence Day
b)

Bahrain, Abu Dhabi

Dec 1977
c)

Port Kelang

Mar 1979
d)

Port Victoria

Ju n 1980

Seychelles Independence Day
e)

Berbera, Djibouti, Hodeidah,

Feb-Mar 1982

0

Port Victoria, Diego Suarez, Moroni

Ju n 1983

Seychelles Independence Day
g)

Port Kelang, Satahip, Ho Chi Minh City

O ct 1988
h)

Male

Dec 1988

Operation CACTCJS

J)

Jakarta, Singapore

Oct-Nov 1990

218 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

H O M EW A RD PASSAGE OF SHIPS AND SUBMARINES

FROM EUROPE TO INDIA - 1976 to 1990

FRANCE

YUGOSLAVIA

BULGARIA J

BUCK SEA

Varna o>

Toulon

ITALY

TURKEY (

SPAIN

IstambuloY^

GREECE

TURKEY

Cartegana

Palermo

Bizcrtc*

Algiers

Malta

ALGERIA

MEDITERRANEAN SEA

PortSaid°%

Suez

LIBYA

EGYPT

% Canal

St. Petersburg

^ / o R ig a

B RITAIN

P j^Balriysk

Moscow

Gdynia
f Kiel

Antwerp

’Le Havre

FRANCE

Vladivostok

Black Sea

SPAIN

EGYPT

\

KoIkaUO/^

SAUDI

INDIA
r

V

SUDAN

ARABIA

> Mumbai g/Vishakhapa

PHILIPINES!

Port Sudanol ’

o f Bengal

Manila

ETHIOPIA \ % \

"Arabian

Massawa

YEMEN,

/

*

Sea

/HoChi
f)

Djibouti

Mmh C it y ^

AFRICA

1RI LANKA

INDIAN OCEAN

Dec 1988

Homeward after Commissioning

Nipat

Varna (Bulgaria), Athens, Port Said, Massawa,

Aden

Nirbhik

Varna (Bulgaria), Athens, Port Said, Aden

Feb 1988

Homeward after Commissioning

Nirdeshak

Jan 1985
a)

Port Louis
b)

Port Kelang

Jun 1987

Nirghat

Varna, Athens, Port Said, Jeddah

Dec 1989

Homeward after Commissioning

Seychelles Independence Day

Nirupak
a)

Port Victoria

Jun 1988
b)

Male

Nov-Dee 1988

Operation CACTCJS

Nishank

Varna, Athens, Port Said, Djibouti

Oct 1989

Homeward after Commissioning

Pondicherry
a)

Gdynia, Le Havre, Bizerte, Port Said,

Mar-May 1978

Homeward after Commissioning

Port Sudan, Aden
b)

Male

Sep 1985
c)

Male

Dec 1990

Porbandar
a)

Gdynia, Le Havre, Bizerte, Port Said, Port Sudan, Mar-May 1978

Homeward after Commissioning

Aden
b)

Male

Dec 1983
c)

Male

Sep 1985

Rajput
a)

Athens, Aden

Sep 1980

Homeward after Commissioning
b)

Aden,Jeddah

Feb 1982
c)

Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Port Qaboos

Mar 1983
d)

Port Victoria

Jun 1984

Seychelles Independence Day
e)

Port Victoria

Jun 1985

Seychelles Independence Day

0

Penang, Surabaya, Padang

Sep-Oct 1989

Exercise Arjun

Rana
a)

Varna, Athens, Split, Aden

May-Jun 1982

Homeward after Commissioning
b)

Port Victoria, Diego Suarez, Moronil

Jun 1983

Seychelles Independence Day
c)

Port Victoria

Mar 1986
d)

Port Victoria, Dar-Es-Salaam, Mombasa, Diego Jun 1987

Seychelles Independence Day

Suarez

Ranjit
a)

Varna, Split, Alexandria, Aden

Nov-Dee 1983

Homeward after Commissioning
b)

Massawa, Port Sudan, Jeddah

Oct-Nov 1986

Ranvijay

Varna, Athens, Aden

Mar 1988

Homeward after Commissioning

Ranvir
a)

Varna, Athens, Port Said, Aden

Jul-Aug 1986

Homeward after Commissioning
b)

Mina Salman, Mina Jebel Ali

Nov 1988

Ratnagiri
a)

Gdynia, Le Havre, Lisbon, Bizerte, Port Said, Jul-Aug 1980

Homeward after Commissioning

Aden

Sandhayak
a)

Singapore, Bangkok

May 1983
b)

Singapore, Kota Kinabalu

Apr 1985

Operation Octopus

Shakti
a)

Port Victoria, Zanzibar

Jun-Jul 1976

Seychelles Independence Day
b)

Hong Kong, Kobe, Vladivostok, Manila

Dec77-Feb 1978

Escorting KARANJ to Vladivostok
c)

Port Victoria

Jun 1978

Seychelles Independence Day
d)

Kelang

Mar 1979
e)

Port Victoria

Jun 1979

Seychelles Independence Day

0

Port Victoria

Jun 1980

Seychelles Independence Day
g)

Aden, Jeddah

Feb 1982
h)

Massawa, Jeddah

Mar 1983
j)

Port Victoria, Diego Suarez, Moroni

Jun 1983

Seychelles Independence Day
k)

Singapore, Bangkok, Jakarta

Apr-May 1985

Operation Octopus

I)

Port Victoria

Jun 1985

Seychelles Independence Day
m)

Port Victoria, Mombasa

Nov 1985
n)

Berbera, Port Sudan

Nov 1986
o)

Mina Salman, Mina Jebel Ali

Nov 1988

P)

| Mina Qaboos, Ashshuwaykh, Doha

Nov 1989

220 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Shankush

Kiel, La Corunna,Tunis, Alexandria, Port Said

Djibouti

Dec 1986

Homeward after Commissioning

Sharabh
a)

Le Havre, Tunis, Alexandria, Aden

Feb-Apr 1976
b)

Singapore

Homeward after Commissioning

Apr 1978
c)

Belawan, Penang

Apr 1985

Operation Octopus

Shardul
a)

Gdynia, Le Havre, Tunis, Alexandria, Aden

Jan 1976
b)

Singapore

Homeward after Commissioning

Apr 1978
c)

Singapore

Feb-Mar 1980

Singapore

Apr-May 1982
e)

Singapore, Bangkok

May 1983

0

Port Kelang, Martia, Surabaya

Jun 1986

Shishumar

Kiel, Le Havre, La Corunna, Algiers, Alexandria, Dec 1986

Homeward after Commissioning

Port Said, Djibouti

Sindhudurg

Gdynia, Le Havre, Bizerte

Aug-Sep 1977

Homeward after Commissioning

Sindhudhvaj

Kiel, Le Havre, Cartagena, Palermo, Port Said, Aug-Oct 1987

Homeward after Commissioning

Djibouti

Sindhughosh

Le Havre, Cartagena, Palermo, Port Said, Aden Jul-Aug 1986

Homeward after Commissioning

Sindhukesari

Kiel, Cartagena, Naples, Port Said, Djibouti

Jan 1990

Homeward after Commissioning

Sindhukirti

Kiel, Le Havre, Malaga, Alexandria, Port Said, Dec 1989

Homeward after Commissioning

Djibouti

Sindhuraj

Kiel, Le Havre, Cartagena, Port Said, Djibouti

Dec 87-Jan 1988 Homeward after Commissioning

Sindhuratna

Cartagena, Naples, Port Said, Djibouti

Jan-Feb 1989

Homeward after Commissioning

Sindhuvir

Kiel, Le Havre, Cartegena, Port Said

Jul-Aug 1988

Homeward after Commissioning

Subhadra

Masan, Ho Chi Hi Minh City, Singapore

Feb 1990

Homeward after Commissioning

Sukanya

Sep 1989

Homeward after Commissioning
a)

Masan, Manila, Muara, Belawan

To tow AJAY to Bombay
b)

Djibouti

Feb 1990

Jun 1990

Seychelles Independence Day
c)

Mahe

Suvarna

Masan, Manila, Muara, Penang

Jun 1990

Homeward after Commissioning

T51,T52,T53

Colombo

Apr 1981

Talwar
a)

Bandar Abbas, Basra

Jul 1981
b)

Trincomalee

Feb-Mar 1982
c)

Berbera, Djibouti, Hodeidah

Feb 1982

Taragiri
a)

Aden, Jeddah

Mar 1983
b)

Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Port Qaboos

Nov 1985
c)

Port Victoria, Mombasa, Dar-Es-Salaam

Seychelles Independence Day

Jun 1987
d)

Port Victoria, Dar-Es Salaam, Mombasa, Diego

Suarez

Nov 1989
w

Jun-Jul 1976

Seychelles Independence Day

Trishul

Seychelles Independence Day
a)

Port Victoria, Mombasa

Jun 1978
b)

Port Victoria, Dar-Es Salaam. Mombasa

Nov 1985
c)

Port Victoria, Mombasa

Oct-Nov 1986
d)

Port Sudan, Berbera

__ ___ _____— L

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 221

May-Aug 1977

To Britain to participate in the

Aden, Suez, Naples, Toulon, Lisbon,

Udaygiri
a)

Gotesborg, Kiel, Portsmouth, London,

International Fleet Review on the
occasion

Amsterdam, Liverpool,
o f the Silver Jubilee of the

Algiers, Tripoli, Suez, Port Sudan

Jun 1978

Queen of E n g la n d ’s coronation.

b)

Port Victoria, Dar-Es Salaam, Mombasa

Feb-Mar 1980

S e y c h e lle s In d e p e n d e n c e D a y
c)

Singapore

Feb 1983
d)

Port Kelang

May 1984
e

Port Kelang

Jun 1986

0

Surabaya, Martia, Port Kelang

Sep-Oct 1987
g)

Penang, Kuching, Muara, Belawan, Lumut

Jan 1989
h)

Male

Vaghsheer
a)

Doha, Kuwait

Dec 1977
b)

Colombo

Oct 1978
c)

Singapore, Hong Kong, Kobe

Dec 82-Jan 1983

To Russia for Refit
d)

Vladivostok

Feb 83-Sep 1985

Refit
e)

Hong Kong, Danang, Penang

Nov 1985

Homeward after Refit

0

Port Victoria, Dar-Es Salaam, Mombasa, Diego Jun 1987

Seychelles Independence Day

Suarez

Vagir
a)

Colombo

Dec 1977
b)

Port Victoria

Nov 1985

Vagli
a)

Penang, Hong Kong, Kobe,

Sep-Oct 1981

To Russia for Refit
b)

Vladivostok

Nov 81-May 1984

Refit
c)

Hong Kong, Singapore

Jun 1984

Homeward after Refit
d)

Massawa, Berbera, Jeddah, Port Sudan

Oct-Nov 1986

STS Vaaina
a)

Colombo

Apr 1982
b)

Padang, Cilacap, Bali,

Oct 1987

To participate in Australian

Port Headland, Carnarvon, Geraldton, Lincoln, Jan 1988

Bicentennial Celebrations

Melbourne, Sydney, Fremantle

Veer

Varna, Athens, Alexandria, Port Said

Apr-May 1987

Homeward after Commissioning

Vela
a)

Singapore, Manila, Kobe,

Jul-Aug 1980

To Russia for Refit
b)

Vladivostok

Aug 80-0ct 1982

Refit
c)

Danang, Port Kelang

Nov 1982

Homeward after Refit

Vijaydurg
a)

Gdynia, Le Havre, Bizerte, Port Sudan, Aden

Mar-Apr 1977

Homeward after Commissioning

Vindhyagiri
a)

Massawa, Jeddah, Port Louis

Mar 1983
b)

Port Victoria

Jun 1984

Seychelles Independence Day

Port Victoria

Jun 1986

Seychelles Independence Day
d)

Port Victoria, Dar-Es-Salaam, Mombasa, Dieqo

Suarez

Jun 1987

Seychelles Independence Day
e)

Port Louis

Sep 1987

International Ocean Festival Mauritius^

Viraat

Plymouth, Maples, Athens, Port Said

Jul-Aug 1987

Homeward after Commissioning

222 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

T ra in in g S h i p s

Ship

Ports Visited

Year

Remarks

Betwa
a)

Singapore, Jakarta, Port Darwin, Suva (Fiji), May-Jul 1976

Spring Cruise

Lautoka, Brisbane, Surabaya
b)

Port Victoria, Dar-Es-Salaam, Mombasa

Jun 1978

Seychelles Independence Day &

Spring Cruise
c)

Jakarta, Surabaya, Bangkok

Nov 1978

Autumn Cruise
d)

Bangkok, Jakarta, Surabaya, Belawan

Oct-Nov 1979

Autumn Cruise
e)

Male, Port Louis, Port Victoria

Apr 1980

Spring Cruise

0

Port Louis .

Nov 1980

Autumn Cruise
g)

Male

Oct 1982

Autumn Cruise
h)

Port Louis, Colombo

Mar 1983

Spring Cruise
i)

Port Kelang

Sep-Oct 1983

Autumn Cruise
j)

Port Louis

Apr 1984

Spring Cruise
k)

Singapore, Bangkok

Oct 1984

Autumn Cruise

1)

Djibouti, Berbera, Port Qaboos

Apr-May 85

Spring Cruise
m)

Diego Suarez, Port Louis, Moroni

Sep 1985

Autumn Cruise
n)

Penang

Apr 1987

Spring Cruise
o)

Male, Gan, Port Victoria, Port Louis, Rodrigues

Oct-Nov 1987

Autumn Cruise

Beas
a)

Port Victoria, Port Louis,

Apr 1978

Spring Cruise
b)

Male, Port Louis, Port Victoria

Apr 1980

Spring Cruise
c)

Port Louis

Nov-Dee 1980

Autumn Cruise
d)

Benoa, Jakarta, Singapore

May 1981

Spring Cruise
e)

Mombasa, Dar-Es-Salaam, Diego Suarez

Sep-Oct 1981

Autumn Cruise
f)

Port Kelang

Apr 1982

Spring Cruise
g)

Male

Oct 1982

Autumn Cruise
h)

Colombo

Mar 1983

Spring Cruise
j)

Port Kelang

Oct 1983

Autumn Cruise
k)

Djibouti, Berbera, Port Qaboos

Apr-May 1985

Spring Cruise

1)

Diego Suarez, Port Louis, Moroni

Sep 1985

Autumn Cruise
m)

Port Victoria, Port Louis, Male

Sep-Oct 86

Autumn Cruise
n)

Penang, Port Kelang

Apr 1987

Spring Cruise
o)

Colombo, Male, Gan, Port Victoria Port Louis, Oct-Nov 1987

Autumn Cruise

Rodrigues

To tow ABHAY to Bombay

P)

Djibouti

Apr 1989
r /
q)

Mombasa, Dar-Es-Salam, Port Louis

Oct-Nov 1989

Autumn Cruise

Brahmaputra
a)

Port Victoria, Port Louis

Apr 1978

Spring Cruise
b)

Bangkok, Jakarta, Belawan

Oct-Nov 1979

Autumn Cruise
c)

Benoa, Jakarta, Bali, Singapore

May 1981

Spring Cruise
d)

Mombasa, Dar-Es-Salaam, Diego Suarez

Sep-Oct 1981

Autumn Cruise
e)

Port Kelang

Apr 1982

Spring Cruise
f)

Male

Oct 1982

Autumn Cruise
g)

Massawa, Jeddah, Port Louis

Mar 1983

Mauritius Independence Day

C 0/
h)

Port Kelang

Sep-Oct 1983

Autumn Cruise
j)

Port Louis

Apr 1984

Spring Cruise
k)

Singapore, Bangkok

Oct 1984

Autumn Cruise

1)

Port Louis, Djibouti, Berbera, Port Qaboos

Apr-May 1985

Spring Cruise
m

Diego Suarez, Port Louis, Moroni (Comoros)

Sep 1985

Autumn Cruise

Cauvery

Colombo

Mar 1977

Spring cruise

Delhi
a)

Port Louis, Male

Mar 1976

Mauritius Independence Day
b)

Colombo

Mar 1977

Spring Cruise

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 223

Kistna
a)

Male

May 1977

Spring Cruise

'

b)

Colombo

Apr 1978

Spring Cruise
c)

Colombo

Oct 1978

Autumn Cruise
d)

Colombo

May 1980

Spring Cruise

Hr (Old)

a)

Port Louis, Male

Mar-Apr 1976

Spring Cruise
b)

Singapore

Mar 1977

Spring Cruise

Tir (New)

a)

Port Victoria, Port Louis, Male

Sep-Oct 1986

Autumn Cruise
b)

Penang

Apr 1987

Spring Cruise
c)

Male, Gan, Port Victoria Port Louis, Rodrigues

Oct-Nov 1987

Autumn Cruise
d)

Surabaya, Jakarta

May 1988

Spring Cruise
e)

Port Kelang, Port Louis, Diego Suarez, Oct-Nov 1988

Autumn Cruise

Mogadishu, Male

0

Male, Port Victoria

Apr-Jun 1989

Spring Cruise
g)

Mombasa, Dar-Es-Salaam, Port Louis

Oct-Nov 1989

Autumn Cruise
h>

1

Fremantle

May 1990

Spring Cruise

224 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

25

The Navy’s Participation In The Expeditions To

Antarctica

The Continent of Antarctica

Antarctic Research

The continent of Antarctica comprises one tenth of The first recorded contacts with Antarctica date from the the earth’s land surface. The Antarctic seas comprise 1780s. Serious investigations of the continent began after one tenth of the world’s oceans. It is estimated that the sixth International Geophysical Congress in 1895, Antarctica’s six million cubic miles of ice amount to 70% which urged the promotion of Antarctic Research. Within of the world’s fresh water and more than 90% of the 20 years, the South Pole had been reached and scientists world’s ice.

began to explore the interior of the continent. At the
conclusion of the International Geophysical Year (1957-

Antarctica is a desolate isolated plateau, the coldest 58), the 12 nations that had participated in Antarctic work and windiest blizzard affected region of the earth. It has 14 formally recognised the cooperative spirit of the venture million square metres of ice-covered land (approximately
by drafting the Antarctic Treaty in 1959. They agreed that

5 million square miles), with an average altitude of 8,000 “Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only” and feet. The lowest temperatures in the Antarctic winter are “banned any measure of a military nature”.

around -50 degrees Celsius in August and the highest
temperatures in the Antarctic summer are around +5

India launched its first Antarctic Expedition in December
degrees Celsius in January. It is the only continent with no

1981.2 In August 1983, India was admitted to Consultative
inhabitants apart from animals like penguins. However, life Status in the Antarctic Treaty system. A year later, in 1984, has existed there from time immemorial in the form of the India was admitted to the Scientific Committee on Antarctic most primitive living beings, the microbes.

Research. Two years later, in 1986, India became a party
to the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine

The Antarctic ice sheet is considered to be one of Living Resources.

the important driving forces behind global atmospheric
circulation. It is also a reference point for environmental

The broad objectives of India’s Antarctic Research
and pollution studies because of its remoteness and the Programme have been to foster and promote scientific climatic conditions which restrict human activities.

studies in atmospheric sciences, geology, geophysics,
meteorology, biology, oceanography, geomagnetism and

The Antarctic Ocean is considered the most productive study of the ozone hole.

ocean in the world in terms of chlorophyll and organic
compounds in the water that are of primary importance to

Specifically, Indian Antarctic Research covers the
maintain chemical and biological processes in the world’s following long-term scientific programmes/activities: oceans. Millions of tonnes of ‘krill’1 (a valuable marine food • Ice-ocean atmosphere system in Antarctica and global product) can be harvested out of the ocean to combat
environment.

protein deficiency in developing countries. There is an • Antarctic lithosphere and Gondwanaland reconstruction, embargo on commercial exploitation of minerals from
framework for delineating plate tectonic processes and

Antarctica till the year 2040.

assessment of mineral resources and hydrocarbons. The

1. ‘Krill’ is a Norwegian whaling term for small fish, which is the basic food of whales. It is estimated that Antarctica has a billion tons of krill, of which 50 million tons can be harvested annually without endangering the stock.

2. The first Indian to set foot on Antarctica was Lt Ram Charan, a Met Officer of the Indian Navy, who accompanied the 1960 Australian South Pole Expedition.

Global P o s itio n in g System (GPS) in Maitree has helped

• M e te o ro lo g ic a l p e rs o n n e l fo r w ea th e r prediction, for scientists to postulate that the Indian tectonic plate is
briefing pilots on weather conditions and for research,
moving annually 5 cms northward and northeastward.

# Naval cooks, both for the voyage to and from Antarctica

• Antarctic ecosystems and environmental physiology.

and for th e w in terin g tea m .

• S o la r terrestrial processes.

In the initial years, the Navy also provided a medical

• Innovative technologies for support systems. team to deal with medical emergencies.

• Environmental impact assessment.

In dia’s A n tarctica E x p ed itio n s

• Generation and structuring of databases (geological,
f lL .

, u
topographic, thematic mapping and
ecosystems The width of the ,ce be t around Antarctica ranges from changes, environmental parameters and health care.)

600
l° 3’000 km' Meltin9 of the lce start* in November;
rapid melting commences in December and continues til

In addition to regular annual expeditions, India launched March. Freezing of the sea commences in end March and an expedition to the Weddell Sea in 1989 and an expedition the area covered by pack ice increases, until by October for krill in 1995.

it is more than double the area of Antarctica. It is during

The Department of Ocean Development under * e Period November ‘o M a rc h e a c h year that specially the Ministry of Science and Technology plans India's d^ n e d ships can reach the Antarctic coast. The mobility Antarctica expeditions. Organisations participating in these ° th6 ^

'Ce> Under the pr6SSUre ° f the Sh'PS momentum’

expeditions include the Geological Survey of India, National

S
pS t0 Penetxate rt-

Geographical Research Institute, India Meteorological The expeditions were conveyed by ‘special expedition epartment, National Institute of Oceanography, Physical vessels of the highest ice class’ under the system of uniform esearc Laboratory, National Physical Laboratory, Indian time charter. An expedition vessel has a double skin, 25-ns tute o
eomagnetism, National Remote Sensing tonne cranes, extremely large bunker capacity, a bow A g e n c y R e s e a r c h and Development Organisation, thruster, a heated hull, modern communication systems, Tprhnr»ir» ^ ^ i a^ ^ommiss,on’ Indian Institutes of a helicopter deck, air conditioned accommodation for 100

Denartmpnt f ^

^
anc^

Force and the expedition members and box-shaped holds that are used Department of Ocean Development.

as hangars Qr for carg0
has'been^n^on^^in'cfoa311

Research Centre'

The stores carried by each expedition include fuel food

(from India’s Food Technology Research Institute, Defence

The other countries maintaining a presence in Antarctica F° ° d Research Laboratory, MAFCO and Modern Food are the USA, Russia, Britain, Australia Japan German

Industries), construction material, spares for vehicles,

South Africa and China.

'

vrermai* clothing, camping equipment, hydrogen gas cylinders,

Thp Naw’c
i

.

medical supplies, LPG cylinders, scientific equipment,
vo vement in Antarctic Expeditions
communication equipment, etc.

expedition^ in IQR^
commenced with the first

The expedition vessel departs from Goa in end November/
each expedition thp na^i con*inued till 1994-95. During early December. After a few hours halt in Mauritius to stoc c expedition, the naval contingent comprised:

up provisions, it reaches Antarctica in end December. It

■

, .e 1C0Pter detachment of two Chetaks- the Naw’<; starts on the return journey in early March, spends a day in ships aTdov^the s e f

° Peratin9.heli^pters from Mauritius and arrives at Goa in end March / early April.

co m m u n icatio n ^
the cl°c k
to 40 days. The pace of activity perforce has to be hectic.

the wintering team who stay behind in Antarctica durinn

After arrival at the pack ice, facsimile charts and route
e Antarctic winter from March (when the research shin
reconnaissance flights by helicopters help to navigate the
leaves for India) till December (when the research 2 n shiP tro ug h the pack ice (which is formed from the freezing returns wth the next expedition).

shlP
of the sea surface) until the vessel reaches the ‘fast ice’ where

3. From the 20th (2000/01) Expedition onwards

---- ---------------------------- ------- ---------

It
reduced the journey time to Antarctica from 25^ays to°9 d a y ^ ^ fr° m Cape T° Wn S Ůth AfriCa’ inStead ° f

G° a be° aUSe

226 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

INDIAN ANTARCTIC STATIONS

Global Positioning System (GPS) in Maitree has helped • Meteorological personnel for weather prediction, for scientists to postulate that the Indian tectonic plate is
briefing pilots on weather conditions and for research.

moving annually 5 cms northward and northeastward.

• Naval cooks, both for the voyage to and from Antarctica

• Antarctic ecosystems and environmental physiology.

and for the wintering team.

• Solar terrestrial processes.

In the initial years, the Navy also provided a medical

• Innovative technologies for support systems.

team to deal with medical emergencies.

• Environmental impact assessment.

India’s Antarctica Expeditions

• Generation and structuring of databases (geological, The width of the ice belt around Antarctica ranges from topographic, thematic mapping and ecosystems 600 km to 3,000 km. Melting of the ice starts in November; changes, environmental parameters and health care.)

rapid melting commences in December and continues till

In addition to regular annual expeditions, India launched March. Freezing of the sea commences in end March and an expedition to the Weddell Sea in 1989 and an expedition the area covered by pack ice increases, until by October for krill in 1995.

it is more than double the area of Antarctica. It is during
the period November to March each year that specially

The Department of Ocean Development under designed ships can reach the Antarctic coast. The mobility the Ministry of Science and Technology plans India’s of the pack ice, under the pressure of the ships momentum, Antarctica expeditions. Organisations participating in these allows ships to penetrate it.

expeditions include the Geological Survey of India, National

Geographical Research Institute, India Meteorological

The expeditions were conveyed by ‘special expedition

Department, National Institute of Oceanography, Physical vessels of the highest ice class’ under the system of uniform Research Laboratory, National Physical Laboratory, Indian time charter. An expedition vessel has a double skin, 25-Institute of Geomagnetism, National Remote Sensing tonne cranes, extremely large bunker capacity, a bow Agency, Defence Research and Development Organisation,
thruster, a heated hull, modern communication systems,

Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Indian Institutes of a helicopter deck, air conditioned accommodation for 100

Technology, the Indian Navy, Army and Air Force and the expedition members and box-shaped holds that are used Department of Ocean Development.

as hangars or for cargo.

From 1992-93 onwards, an Antarctic Research Centre’

The stores carried by each expedition include fuel, food
has been functioning in Goa.

(from India’s Food Technology Research Institute, Defence

Food Research Laboratory, MAFCO and Modern Food

The other countries maintaining a presence in Antarctica Industries), construction material, spares for vehicles, are the USA, Russia, Britain, Australia, Japan, Germany,
clothing, camping equipment, hydrogen gas cylinders,

South Africa and China.

medical supplies, LPG cylinders, scientific equipment,

The Navy’s Involvement in Antarctic Expeditions
communication equipment, etc.

The Navy’s involvement commenced with the first

The expedition vessel departs from Goa in end November/
expedition in 1981-82 and continued till 1994-95. During early December. After a few hours halt in Mauritius to stock each expedition, the naval contingent comprised:

up provisions, it reaches Antarctica in end December, lt
starts on the return journey in early March, spends a day in

• A helicopter detachment of two Chetaks; the Navy’s Mauritius and arrives at Goa in end March / early April.3
pilots were experienced in operating helicopters from
ships and over the sea. Since Antarctica has no roads,

Of the 70 to 75 days that each expedition can stay in
most movements of personnel and stores between the Antarctica, over half is afflicted by storms, blizzards and ship and the camps have to be done by helicopter.

very strong winds. The effective working season is only 30

• Communication personnel to provide round the clock to 40 days. The pace of activity perforce has to be hectic.

communication with India, during the expedition and for
the ‘wintering’ team who stay behind in Antarctica during

After arrival at the pack ice, facsimile charts and route
the Antarctic winter from March (when the research ship reconnaissance flights by helicopters help to navigate the leaves for India) till December (when the research ship ship through the pack ice (which is formed from the freezing returns with the next expedition).

of the sea surface) until the vessel reaches the ‘fast ice’ where

3. From the 20* (2000/01) Expedition onwards, expeditions depan
from Cape Town in South Africa, instead of from Goa because it
reduced the journey time to Antarctica from 25 days to 9 days.

226 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

INDIAN ANTARCTIC STATIO NS

The expedition landed in Antarctica in January 1982
it berths alongside the approximately 9-metre high Antarctic
and built a “ refuge hut” at a rudimentary “base camp”

ice shelf near Latitude 70° South and Longitude 12° East.

Immediately after arrival, helicopters start ferrying personnel
on the ice shelf close to the ship not far from the Soviet
and stores to the camps in the interior.

station at Novolazerskaya.

• Second Expedition - 1982-83. The 28-member

Helicopters are used also for ferrying personnel and
expedition had a Naval contingent of 6 officers and 3
stores to the scientific teams in the various camps, for aerial
sailors.

and photo reconnaissance, for casualty evacuation and for
medical support, for landing on icebergs and for assisting

The objectives were for the Army to assemble two
the teams operating in hilly, rough and icy terrain.

huts at a permanent base camp and start setting up the
equipment at the Dakshin Gangotri site.

The 1st expedition started from Goa in December 1981.

An ice runway was set up 5 miles from the base

It set up a base camp near the ice shelf and carried out
camp for helicopter operations. Close relations were
air surveys for a suitable site for constructing a permanent
established with the Soviet and East German camps.

research station (later called Dakshin Gangotri) where a
small team could spend the winter. The 2nd expedition

The Navy provided the same teams as in the 1st
ferried the materials and stores required to construct
expedition.

Dakshin Gangotri. The 3rd expedition commissioned

Problems
were
experienced
in
establishing

Dakshin Gangotri. From the 3rd expedition onwards, the
communications between the base camp and the

Navy established and maintained permanent wireless

Dakshin Gangotri site and with New Delhi - the latter
communication with Mew Delhi. The 8th expedition of
had to be maintained via the ship with the Navy at

1988-89 commissioned India’s second permanent station

Bombay. The Russians at Novolazerskaya advised that a

“Maitree” in an ice-free area.

highly directional rhombic antenna would overcome the

There were other Antarctic Research Stations in the area
problems affecting communications with India.

where India set up its camps:

The Air Force sent a Wing Commander (fixed wing)

• Soviet Union: The Novolazerskaya camp was the
and two Squadron Leaders (one rotary wing and one
nearest, 10 km from Dakshin Gangotri. Its runway,
physician) to assess the extent to which the Air Force
which could land Russian IL 14 aircraft, was 6 km away
could assist the activity in Antarctica and to recce a site
from Dakshin Gangotri.

for a runway. On 18 February 1983, an Argentine Air

Force C 130 aircraft, captained by the Argentine Air

• East Germany: Georg Forster camp was sited on the

Force, and having a crew from the Indian Air Force,
periphery of Novolazerskaya.

flew over the Indian base camp and para-dropped eight

• West Germany: George von Neumayer camp.

boxes containing provisions and newspapers brought

• Britain: Hailey camp.

from India. After circling the camp for 15 minutes, the

•
aircraft flew back to Argentina.

South Africa: SANE camp.

The expedition set up an automatic weather station

Chronology of Expeditions till 1990
and carried out land survey, mineralogy and petrography
surveys and ozone layer observations.

Gist of Expedition Objectives and Naval Participation

• First Expedition -1 9 8 1 -82. The 2 1 -member expedition

• Third Expedition -1983-84. The 82-member expedition
had a Naval contingent of 5 officers and 3 sailors.

had a naval contingent of 8 officers and 5 sailors.

The objectives were to select a site on the ice shelf

The objectives were to complete construction of the
for a permanent station, which would in due course
permanent station and leave behind the First Wintering
be called Dakshin Gangotri, establish an unmanned

Team of 12. The Navy provided similar teams as in the
weather station, record geomagnetic intensity and

1st and 2nd expeditions.

measure magnetic storms.

The Air Force sent two MI 8 helicopters, of which one,

The Navy provided a detachment of two Chetak
unfortunately, crashed but whose crew was rescued by
helicopters (specially modified for ice operations), a
a Naval Chetak helicopter.

medical team and naval cooks. The helicopters recce’d

On 13 January 1984, the first permanent station
a site for Dakshin Gangotri on a rock outcrop on the ice

“Dakshin Gangotri” was established on the ice shelf in
shelf, 100 kms inland in a flat area proximate to a fresh
position 70° South, 12 ° East. A communication link
water lake.

was established with Naval Headquarters in New Delhi.

228 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

The First Wintering Team included naval cooks.

The two naval Chetak helicopters were modified

Fourth Expedition - 1984-85. The 85-member
to carry under-slung Magnetic Anomaly Detection
expedition had a naval contingent comprising 9 officers
equipment to conduct aeromagnetic surveys.

and 8 sailors.

• Eighth Expedition - 1988-89. The 100-member

In addition to research activities, reconnaissance
expedition had a naval contingent of 19 persons for
commenced for a second ice-free permanent station
the same tasks as the previous year. The expedition
on firmer rocky ground and Maitree was identified as a
had two naval Chetak helicopters and three Army MI 8
possible site.

helicopters.

Since the efforts made by other agencies, including

Prefabricated structures and materials had continued
the Army, to establish a communication link had not
to be brought from India for the construction of Maitree.

succeeded during earlier expeditions, the Department

Naval helicopters made a notable contribution through
of Ocean Development had requested the Navy to

“under-slung operations” for the expeditious airlift of
establish the HF communication link with New Delhi.

heavy machinery like boilers, generators, motors and

The Navy established permanent round the clock
the satellite communication dome from the ship to
communications with New Delhi on 18 January 1985.

Maitree 100 kms away. Equipment for the water supply

These have sustained thereafter without a break.

system was lowered from helicopters directly into the
fresh water lake near Maitree.

From the Second Wintering Team onwards, the Navy

A 5-member communication team shifted to Maitree,
sent a communication team every year to man this HF link
all the new communication equipment from the ship and
and the entire radio communication network in Antarctica,
the old equipment from Dakshin Gangotri and established
which included helicopters, ships, vehicles and mobile
communications with Delhi on 13 February 1989.

parties and also the mobile communication equipment for
the reconnaissance mission to the South Pole.

On 25 February 1989, the second, indigenously
designed, pre-fabricated, permanent land station

Fifth Expedition -1985-86. The 88-member expedition

“MAITREE" was established at an altitude of 117
had a naval contingent of 7 officers and 11 sailors.

metres in the 7-km long and 2-km wide valley of the

Air Force helicopters conjoined for the first time with

Schumacher Ranges, 70 kms from Dakshin Gangotri,

Naval helicopters. A series of incidents afflicted the
at Latitude 70°46’ South, Longitude 11°45’ East.

operation of the Air Force MI 12 helicopters.

Naval aircrews provided ferry flight facilities to the

Scientific activities were extended into the interior

GSI and NGRI teams collecting rock samples from the
areas of Antarctica. The expedition was tasked to probe

Wolthat and Peterman mountain ranges.

aspects of the first Indian expedition to the South Pole.

Seven naval personnel were left behind to man Maitree

Repair and maintenance was carried out of the
and Dakshin Gangotri as the Sixth Wintering Team.

permanent structures of Dakshin Gangotri.

• Ninth Expedition - 1989-90. The final transfer of stores

Sixth Expedition - 1986-87. The 90-member
from Dakshin Gangotri to Maitree was completed by end
expedition had a naval contingent of 7 officers and 11

January. On 25 February 1990, Dakshin Gangotri was
decommissioned as a permanent base and converted
sailors.

into a supply base.

Its scientific objectives were to study geology,
geo-physics, meteorology, the upper atmosphere,

In January 1990, The India Meteorological Department
geomagnetism and non-conventional sources of energy.

discontinued meteorological observations from Dakshin

Gangotri and established a full-fledged Meteorological

Seventh Expedition - 1987-88. The 92-member

Observatory at Maitree to study ozone depletion in the
delegation had a naval contingent of 6 officers and

Antarctic spring and solar radiation.

12 sailors. Prefabricated structures and materials were
brought from India for the construction of the second

The First Weddell Sea Expedition surveyed the area east
permanent station at Maitree.

of Berkner Island for a future station.

The naval tasks were helicopter operations,

The hazards of operating single-engine Chetak
maintaining uninterrupted communications with India, helicopters in Antarctica’s sub-zero conditions for with the ship and between the station and the various exploratory missions that were increasingly distant from camps, collection of meteorological and oceanographic the base camp led to the decision that only twin-engine research data and provision of domestic services.

helicopters should be sent on future expeditions.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 229

26

Naval Hydrography And Marine Cartography
monetary allowances to compensate for the difficult nature

Overview
of survey duties, personnel shortages persisted.

The British East India Company first established the Marine

Survey of India in 1770 to carry out its hydrographic surveys.

Hydrographic training started in Bombay in 1959. The

Over a century later, in 1874, the British Government of India school shifted first to Cochin in 1961 and later to its present created the Marine Survey Department at Calcutta under location in Goa in 1978. Substantial UNDP assistance and a Surveyor-in-Charge. Seven years after Independence in the excellence of its training helped to make it the Regional 1947, this department shifted to Dehra Dun in 1954. In Hydrographic Training Centre for uniformed and civilian 1964, it was renamed as the Naval Hydrographic Office. In personnel from Southeast Asia, South Asia, West Asia and 1997, it was renamed as the National Hydrographic Office Africa.

in keeping with the national responsibilities entrusted to it.

Developments Until 1975

INS Investigator was the sole survey ship in 1947. When the Navy was partitioned at the time of Independence By the mid 1970s, approval had been obtained for new in 1947, the Investigator, was the only survey ship with survey ships and modem survey equipment began to enter the Indian Navy. Its very first tasks were to survey the service. Today the survey flotilla comprises eight ships, of approaches to the naval berths at Bombay and Cochin.

which five have entered service after 1990.

In those early years, because of the disruptive effect

Surveys were carried out of both coasts and of the of the monsoon months, sea surveys were done in the island territories. Special surveys were undertaken for the ‘survey season between November and April. The ‘drawing new Naval Dockyard coming up in Vishakhapatnam, for season’ from May to September was spent in converting underwater degaussing ranges and for submarine exercise the surveys into drawings in the Drawing Office at Conoor areas. Survey ships were also employed for defence in the Nilgiri Hills of South India. Until 1953, the results of oceanographic surveys and marine resource surveys the surveys used to be forwarded to Britain’s Hydrographic with the Naval Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory Office for publication. The charts received from Britain (NPOL), the National Institute of Oceanography (NIO) and were issued to ships from the Chart Depot located in the the National Geographic Research Institute (NGRI).

Naval Dockyard Bombay.

In the early days, the originals of charts used to be

On 1 June 1954, a new Hydrographic Office was
engraved on copper plates. Later, charts were hand drawn established at Dehra Dun in north India, proximate to the in the Hydrographic Office. By the mid 1970s, the chart office of the Surveyor General of India; it started producing production facilities had been modernised. Today, charts new charts, issuing Notices to Mariners1 and publishing are generated on computers and paper charts have been Sailing Directions, the Indian List of Lights, etc.

supplemented by paperless Electronic Navigation Charts
for use with the latest Electronic Chart Display Information

On 1 April 1956, India became a member of the

System (ECDIS).

International Hydrographic Bureau in Monaco.

To remedy the paucity of officers volunteering for the
the mid 1960s, some progress had been made

Hydrographic cadre, direct recruitment of Survey Officers in Parting Indian waters and streamlining the Navy’s had to be resorted to. Despite the upward revision in Hydrographic Department. In 1965, the survey flotilla ______________________________ ________ ________________ comprised four ships2 three converted from old frigates and J . The first Indian Notice to Mariners was issued in 1958.

2. In 1949, Investigator was joined by the converted minesweeper, INS Rohilkhand, and two Seaward Defence Motor Launches (SDMLs 3110 and 3111). As the latter three decommissioned, Investigator was joined by Sutlej in 1953, Jum na in 1956 and Darshak in 1964.

INDIA’S EXCLUSIVE ECONOMIC ZONE

[------ — -------- — [ E xclu sive E c o n o m ic Z o n e B o u n d a ry

[H_____ i------- 1-----•] M aritim e Bound ary

I

1 Exclu sive E c o n o m ic Z o n e (2 0 0 N M )

one new indigenously constructed ship,
the permanent Hydrographic School in Goa. The School

Darshak, designed
specifically for survey work. Steps had been initiated to shifted from Cochin to Goa in 1978.

overcome the shortage of survey officers, survey recorder

By the mid 1970s, approval had been accorded for
sailors and civilian surveyors and hydrographic assistants three new survey vessels and four survey craft. Modern but availability remained short of the requirements.

survey equipment had begun to enter service. The chart

Surveys had been carried out in the approaches to ports production facilities of the Naval Hydrographic Office had on the east and west coasts, in the Gulfs of Kutch and been modernised. Despite the upward revision in monetary Cambay, Bombay Harbour, the Mahanadi River entrance allowances, personnel shortages persisted.

and the offshore island territories in the Andaman, Nicobar

Developments 1976 to 1990
and Lakshadweep Islands. In 1964, the Chief Hydrographer
was re-designated as the Chief Hydrographer to the The 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea Government of India.

The deliberations of the Third Conference on the Law of

The intake of officers into the Hydrographic Cadre used the Sea spread over nine years. The Conference adopted to be from General Service volunteers. Since surveying the Convention on 30 April 1982. However, it formally duties were arduous, far too many officers reverted to came into effect twelve years later on 16 November 1994, General Service after a short stint of surveying. From 1965 only after all the countries had ratified it.

onwards, officers started being directly recruited for the

Survey Cadre.

The essential features of the convention were:

• Twelve miles as the uniform width of territorial waters.

In 1971, the International Hydrographic Bureau (IHB)

assigned to the Naval Hydrographic Office the responsibility • An Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) of two hundred of preparing nine bathymetric plotting sheets, based on

(200) miles within which the coastal state exercised
source material received from data centres the world over.

sovereign rights and jurisdiction for specified economic

These were incorporated in the General Bathymetric Chart
activities. (India’s EEZ of two million square kilometres
of the Oceans (GEBCO).

is the twelfth largest in the world.)

• A continental shelf extending to the outer edge of

After the 1971 war, to assist the restoration of shipping
the continental margin with reference either to three
traffic, surveys had been carried out of the entrances to the
hundred and fifty (350) nautical miles from the baselines
riverine ports of Bangladesh. Normal surveys continued on
both coasts and in the island territories.

of territorial waters or to one hundred (100) nautical
miles from the 2,500 metre isobath.

The Environment Data Unit was established at the • Regimes for the abatement and control of marine Hydrographic Office in 1974. During 1975, this unit
pollution, for marine scientific research and for
processed, analysed and interpreted the data received
unimpeded transit passage through straits used for
from:

international navigation.

• Darshak’s Oceanographic Expedition of 1973-74.

Passage of Foreign Warships Through Territorial

• The USA’s National Oceanographic Data Centre.

Waters

• The International Indian Ocean Expedition.

From the naval point of view;, the main issue left undecided

In 1975, the Naval Hydrographic Office was nominated was that of the passage of foreign warships through territorial by the Government of India as the National Centre for waters. In 1958, India had proposed that the passage of archiving and dissemination of Bathythermograph (BT) foreign warships through the territorial sea of a coastal state Data. BT data collected by all vessels of national agencies should be subject to prior authorisation by, and notification was required to be forwarded to the Hydrographic Office.

to, the coastal state. This proposal was not accepted and

The fledgling Hydrographic School that had been started therefore, not incorporated in the 1958 General Convention in Mumbai in 1959 shifted to Cochin in 1961 to overcome on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zone.

constraints of space. In 1965, approval was obtained for

In protest, India declined to ratify any of the Geneva
establishing a permanent school in Cochin. Cochin was conventions. By 1973, India’s stand mellowed. The not an ideal location and at one stage, it was decided requirement for prior authorisation was watered down that the school should be located in Vishakhapatnam. to prior notification for the innocent passage of foreign Eventually, in 1975, sanction was accorded to establish
warships through territorial waters.

232 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

MARITIME BOUNDARIES IN THE BAY OF BENGAL

BANGLADESH

I N D I A
i .

■

NfYANM AR

Sandheads

J

TH A ILAN D

Visakhapatnam

J
f
i

S^~XJ

Nicobar ^ ,

Islands

S j Greal Nicobai

^ ^

^
r

/

/ ____ - t

100

200

300

/

(Nautical Miles)

the boundaries of the EEZ and continental shelf between

In the 1970s, the Cold War between the USA and the

Soviet Onion was at its peak. Both these super powers ‘adjacent’ and ‘opposite’ states should be based on vehemently opposed every proposal that might jeopardise ‘equitable principles’ or based on the ‘equidistance’ line.

the secrecy of their warships’ movements. There is,

Despite the ambiguity inherent in the word ‘equitable’,
therefore, no provision in the 1982 Convention that India concluded maritime boundary agreements with the requires foreign Navies to notify, in advance, the passage five ‘opposite’ states: of their warships and submarines through the territorial
waters of a coastal state. The operational implications • India and Sri Lanka signed their agreement on maritime of this problem have had to be dealt with in each Navy s
boundaries in the Gulf of Mannar and the Bay of Bengal on

23 March 1976 and another agreement on 22 November

‘Rules of Engagement’.

1976 extending their maritime boundaries in the Gulf

Meanwhile,
between

1974
and

1977,

India s
of Mannar up to the tri-junction of India, Sri Lanka and
neighbouring coastal nations - Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri

Maldives.

Lanka and Myanmar enacted maritime legislation requiring • India and Maldives signed their maritime boundary prior authorisation and notification for the passage of
agreement on 28 December 1976.

foreign warships through their respective territorial seas.

India’s Maritime Zones Act of 1976 required only prior • India and Indonesia signed their agreement on maritime notification (but not prior authorisation). It did, however,
boundary in 1974 and another agreement in 1977
require submarines and other underwater vehicles to
extending the boundary up to the tri-junction point with
navigate on the surface and show their flag while passing

Thailand.

through Indian territorial waters.

• India and Thailand signed their boundary agreement in

1977.

After the 1982 Convention, the Governments of the

United States, Britain and West Germany lodged diplomatic • India and Myanmar signed their boundary agreements protests, the gist of which was that two provisions of India’s
in 1982 and 1984.

Maritime Act 1976 were against established International

In these agreements, the ‘equidistance’ principle was

Law and not covered by the Law of the Seas, namely:

used and minor modifications were negotiated amicably

• Requirement of ‘Prior Notification’ by foreign war vessels, to meet the needs of equity or for other special reasons.

before passage through India’s territorial waters.

India has yet to delineate its maritime boundaries with

• India’s right to declare certain areas in the continental Pakistan and Bangladesh. The reference in the 1982
shelf and EEZ as ‘Security Areas’.

UN Convention to ‘equitable principles’ appears likely to

To date, India has adhered to its stand.

prolong settlement of maritime boundaries with these two

‘adjacent’ states.

Surveys of National Importance

The Naval Hydrographic School, Goa

The Deep Water Route in the Gulf o f Kutch to the

Salaya Oil Terminal

The Hydrographic School moved from Cochin to Goa in

1978. Courses for Direct Entry officers and sailors and

In 1974, surveys had commenced for a deep water channel for Civilian Field Assistants, including some from foreign to the off-shore oil terminal at Salaya for use by the 270,000 countries, continued to be conducted using facilities tonne Very Large Crude-oil Carriers (VLCCs) that brought borrowed from other naval units at Cochin.

crude oil from the Persian Gulf to the refineries in Gujarat.

The channel was declared open in 1978.

The new Hydrographic School was constructed within

Maritime Boundary Agreements

INS Gomantak and commissioned in three phases
between 1978 and 1989 - Wing I in 1977, Wing II in 1983

Maritime boundaries are based on charts prepared after and Wing III in 1989.

detailed hydrographic surveys. After technical discussions
and mutual consent on the boundary between the countries

In 1980, the School received a UNDP grant of $ 3.5
concerned, these charts are annexed to each Maritime million to acquire the modern survey training equipment Boundary Agreement.

that would equip it to become a Regional Training Centre.

In 1982, the School received Category A certification from

The 1982 Conference was unable to reconcile the the International Hydrographic Organisation (IHO) for the opposing viewpoints of whether the criteria for delimiting
conduct of the Long Hydrographic course, making it the

234 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

third institution in the world to get this recognition (the The Survey Flotilla other two being the Royal Naval Hydrographic School in

Britain and the Ecole National Superiere des Ingenieurs Between 1976 and 1990, four new survey ships were des Etudes et Techniques d’Armament (ENSIETA) of the commissioned of the six sanctioned. To the extent Service Hydrographique et Oceanographique de la Marine possible, every successive ship of the Sandhayak class was in France).

equipped with the latest available equipment and facilities
for hydrographic work; the old survey ships were retrofitted

In 1984, the School was designated as the Regional with the same survey equipment that was being fitted in Hydrographic Training Centre for South East Asia and the new survey ships under construction. The older survey African countries.

ships, Sutlej, Jamuna and Darshak continued on survey
duties until they decommissioned.

Hydrographic Surveys for Continental Shelf Claims

Construction was also completed of four 185-tonne

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the survey craft. These were to work in coastal waters in Sea (UNCLOS 82) had adopted:

conjunction with survey ships and also independently
o A 200 mile Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) within which carry out surveys of ports, harbours and their approaches.

every coastal state could exercise sovereign rights and The hull design of these survey craft could not provide jurisdiction for certain specified economic activities.

the stability required for survey work, except when the
o A continental shelf extending to the outer edge of the weather was calm. Despite the limitations of their craft, the continental margin, to be delimited with reference to perseverance of their young crews often succeeded in their either 350 nautical miles from the base line of territorial completing offshore surveys, which were the task of the waters or 100 miles from the 2,500 metre isobath.

larger, more stable survey ships.

The latter clause entitled coastal states to

New Survey Ships Commissioned

Class

Shipbuilder
claim a continental shelf over and above the
and Craft
on

200 mile EEZ. Claims were to be submitted

Sandhayak

26 Feb 1981

Sandhayak Class

Garden Reach
to the United Nations within ten years. This

Nirdeshak

04 Oct 1983

Sandhayak Class

Garden each
time limit has been extended from time to
time (from 1994 to 1999 and presently to

Makar

31 Ja n 1984

Survey Craft

Goa Shipyard

May 2009) to enable the coastal states to

Mithun

31 Mar 1984

Survey Craft

Goa Shipyard
carry out the extensive surveys on which

Meen

23 Ju n 1984

Survey Craft

Goa Shipyard
their claims could be assessed.

Mesh

31 Oct 1984

Survey Craft

Goa Shipyard

Nirupak

14 Aug 1985

Sandhayak Class

Garden Reach

To substantiate claims, two types of

Investigator

11 Ja n 1990

Improved Sandhayak Garden Reach
surveys had to be carried out:

Old Survey Ships

Commissioned

Decommissioned

Years in Service

© Bathymetric surveys, which depicted

SU T L EJ

23 Apr 1941

31 Dec 1978

37
the topography of the seabed.

JAMUNA

13 May 1941

31 Dec 1980

39

(The Navy’s survey ships completed

DARSHAK

28 Dec 1964

15 Ja n 1990

26
these surveys in 2001).

Milestones & Major Inductions of Technology in

• Seismic surveys, which mapped the sedimentary Hydrographic Services thickness below the seabed to delineate the continental
shelf. (These surveys, undertaken by the Department of Year

Milestones

Ocean Development, are still in progress).

Hydrographic Office

Survey Ships

1981

Computer-assisted Plotting

Geodetic Transit Satellite

To undertake these extensive surveys of the continental

System

System
shelf, new naval survey ships were sanctioned to replace

1982 West Coast of India Pilot

Electro-optical Distance
the ageing survey ships.3

Measuring Electronic

Position Fixing4
in 1982 an Experts Group under the chairmanship of the Nautical Adviser to the Government of India recommended a plan to overcome the serious inadequacies and deficiencies of ship and other resources provided to the Hydrographic Department. The plan quantified the additional ship essential for undertaking the delineation of the Continental Shelf and the Exclusive Economic Zone, as required under the Convention

[*0SOUrC6S

_____
w
the Law of the Sea, within a period of 10 years. This would enable India to place its claims for these areas before the United Nations.

on ’

This Syledis system replaced the old Hifix system.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 235

then served as a Director in the Bureau till 1982, having

Rescheduling o f the Survey Season
been re-elected for two successive terms.

As a result of refit programmes and employment on other
naval duties, it was found that survey ships and craft were

Rear Admiral FL Fraser served from 1982 to 1987 as the
not always available in the ‘survey season. Deployments,

President of the Directing Committee.

therefore, started being made in locations where survey

At present, the Chief Hydrographer represents India on
work was feasible even during the monsoon season.

the following:

Developm ents A fte r 1990

• Committees
of the

International

Hydrographic

Organisation:

Surveys o f National Im portance

-Strategic Planning Working Group;

The Sethusamudaran Project

-Worldwide Electronic Navigation Chart D

'ase-

In 1985, an exploratory survey was carried out to find a

- Chart Standardisation Committee;
suitable stretch of seabed between India and Sri Lanka that

- IHO-FIG International Advisory Board on . . .dare. :>f
could be deepened sufficiently to enable medium draught

Competence of Hydrographic Surveyors ' cderav n
vessels to transit between the west and east coasts of India,

International des Geometres - FIG);
without having to go all the way around Sri Lanka. The
project is still under consideration.

-Commission on Promulgation of Radio Navigational

Warnings.

C ontinental S helf Surveys

• United Nations Commission on the Limits of the

In view of the constraints in the naval budget in the 1990s,

Continental Shelf (CLCS).5
the Ministry of Shipping and Transport provided the funds • North Indian Ocean Hydrographic Commission for the construction of two ships to carry out the urgent

(NIOHC).

surverys of the Continental Shelf.

The NIOHC was formed in 2000 by the initiatives of the

India’s R epresentation at International H ydrographic

Naval Hydrographic Department under the aegis of the

Fora

International Hydrographic Organisation to encourage

India’s Chief Hydrographers have had the distinction of hydrographic cooperation among the countries of the being elected to the International Hydrographic Bureau in Indian Ocean littoral region. India has retained the Monte Carlo.

chairmanship of the Commission since its inception. It has
been having annual meetings.

Commodore DC Kapoor was the first Chief Hydrographer
to be elected to the Directing Committee in April 1972. He

5' * e iem C L o T Pher RCar Admira‘ FL FraSer'S r° le ^ enSUrinS th£ ri9htS ° f the N° rth ‘ndian ° Cean States was rec° 9"ised at the time of formulating S

S

T

S

S

' "

"

.

‘

1CLCS

“

—

" " , ™ » l, i n S

236 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

27

Naval Oceanology & Meteorology

Overview

The objective of MONEX was stated as follows:

The Navy's involvement in oceanography sharpened after the

“A very important component of the fully developed

1971 war in which a frigate was sunk by a submarine that
summer monsoon circulation is the monsoon depression
subsequently managed to escape the hunting force. ‘Met’

forming in the Bay of Bengal. It is not known whether
officers were sent to Britain and the (JSA to undergo training
monsoon depressions propagate from further east or
in oceanographic forecasting and sonar range prediction.

form in situ over the Bay of Bengal and, if in situ, what role barotropic instability of the low level flow plays in

By the mid 1980s, Oceanographic Forecasting Cells
such formation. In the presence of these disturbances,
had been established in the Command Headquarters,
the low level flow over India and the Arabian Sea is
sonar atlases had been produced and a Directorate of
strengthened. Once developed, these disturbances

Naval Oceanology and Meteorology created in NHQ.

can bring major portions of the monsoon rainfall over
northeastern / north central India. In this respect, the

By the end 1990s, data was being received from
three-dimensional structure of the monsoon disturbance
numerous national agencies, collated and disseminated to
and the monsoon trough over the sea and over land
meet the needs of a variety of national users.

needs to be ascertained.”

Developments Until 1975

As a forerunner of Monex 79, an experiment on a smaller

In the early 1970s, a Met officer was sent to Britain’s scale called Monex 77 was conducted in 1977.

Royal Naval School of Meteorology and Oceanography

(RNSOMO) for training in oceanography. On return, he Monex 71
was appointed to the Naval Hydrographic Office where Monex 77 was aimed to collect meteorological and he helped to produce a document on oceanography and oceanographic data over the Arabian Sea, the Bay of sonar range prediction. Soon thereafter, a second officer Bengal and the equatorial Indian Ocean.

was deputed to the US Naval Oceanographic Office in

Washington DC for training in oceanography. On return,

Indian Naval frigates Beas and Betwa, together with he was appointed to the naval air station at Cochin, INS four Soviet research ships, were equipped with appropriate Garuda, where the Seaking anti submarine helicopters meteorological and oceanographic equipment. Scientists were based.

from the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, the Tata Institute
of Fundamental Research, the India Meteorological

In 1974, oceanography was introduced as a topic for Department and the Naval Physical and Oceanographic study in Met sailors’ specialist courses and in Observers’ Laboratory took part in this Monex.

and Sub Lieutenants’ courses. Oceanographic forecasting
was made the responsibility of Met officers.

The observation programme was divided in three
phases - Phase I from 26 May to 19 June 1977, Phase II

Developments 1976 to 1990
from 26 June to 15 July 1977 and Phase III from 4 to 19

August 1977. During the first two phases, ships operated

Monsoon Experiments
in the Arabian Sea. In the last phase, Beas operated in In the early 1970s, the World Meteorology Organisation the Bay of Bengal and Betwa in the Arabian Sea.

(WMO) decided to study weather on a global scale. As part
of this programme, a regional experiment called Monsoon

In the post Monex 77 meetings, it emerged that the

Experiment (MONEX) was to be conducted in the Indian results of the experiment could not be satisfactorily collated because not enough attention had been paid to

Ocean during 1979.

organise the teams for the various research projects and • The International Indian Ocean Expedition 1975.

the production of a report.

In 1975, the Government nominated the Naval

Hydrographic Office as the National Centre for archiving

Monex 79
and dissemination of Bathy Thermograph (BT) data and

The aim of Monex 79 was to study aspects of the Southwest directed that BT data collected by all vessels of national Monsoon like onset and withdrawal, dynamic and agencies be forwarded to this Centre. An Oceanographic thermodynamic structure, and formations of depressions Centre was set up in 1977. Data was received from: in the Bay of Bengal.

• International agencies like the National Oceanographic

For Monex 79 between May and August 1979, the

Data Centre (NODC), USA and the Intergovernmental

WMO used earth satellites, instrumented aircraft,

Oceanographic Commission (IOC).

dedicated ships, balloons and ocean buoys for collection • National agencies like the National Institute of of meteorological data. The Environmental Data Unit

Oceanography (NIO), the Central Marine Fisheries
of the Naval Hydrographic Office arranged the fitment

Institute (CMFRI), the Oil and Natural Gas Commission
of Expendable Bathy Thermograph (XBT) equipment

(ONGC), the Indian Meteorological Department (IMD),
on board selected merchant ships plying in the Arabian
the Geological Survey of India (GSI), the Naval Physical

Sea, to help acquire physical oceanographic data for
and Oceanographic Laboratory (NPOL), survey ships
subsequent dissemination to various national agencies.

and fleet ships.

Survey ship Darshak, frigate Betwa and tanker Deepak On request from national agencies, the Centre collated
were fitted with the latest meteorological and oceanographic and disseminated temperature, salinity, current, swell, equipment and the Navaid Sounding System for accurately wave and wind data. The CJnit provided the Navy with Sonar determining upper winds at sea. For the first time, a vast Atlases and Oceanographic Charts containing information amount of upper air data over the Arabian Sea and the Bay on Sea Surface Temperature, Mixed Layer Depth, Below of Bengal was collected.

Layer Gradient, Sonic Layer Depth, surface current, wind

The collation of meteorological and oceanographic data and wave data.

obtained during Monex 79 was better than that of Monex Bathymetric Charts 77 and proved valuable in deriving:

• Monsoon dynamics and modelling experiments.

In 1966, the International Hydrographic Bureau assigned
to the Naval Hydrographic Office the responsibility of

• Ocean currents and large scale aspects of monsoon preparing nine bathymetric plotting sheets, based on source circulation.

material received from data centres the world over. These

• Regional scale of monsoon circulation
were incorporated in the General Bathymetric Chart of the

• Variability of monsoon e.g. ‘Break monsoon’.

Oceans (GEBCO), which were published in 1970-71. In
the following year, responsibility was accepted for ten more

• Monsoon disturbances.

sheets. At the time of writing, the National Hydrographic

• Heat source and energy calculations.

Office has published sixteen GEBCO charts.

The severe tropical revolving storm (cyclone), which

In the 1980s, oceanographic data started being acquired
devastated the coast of Andhra Pradesh on 11 and 12 May
by participation in the cruises of the Department of Ocean

1979, was first reported by Betwa on 6 May 1979. Betwa's Development’s Oceanographic Research Vessel (ORV) early warning helped the Government of Andhra Pradesh Sagarkanya.

to evacuate over 200,000 coastal people in good time.

In 1987, a facility was set up at NHQ and equipped

Oceanographic Data
to provide data for Meteorological and Oceanographic

The Environmental Data Unit and Forecasting Cell was first Briefings.

set up in the Naval Hydrographic Office in 1974 to provide Oceanographic Forecasting At Naval Command Level oceanographic information to the fleet for anti submarine
operations. The unit processed, analysed and interpreted In January 1981, an Oceanographic Forecasting Cell (OFC) the data received from:

was established at Cochin under the operational control

• Darshak's Oceanographic Expedition of 1973-74.

of the FOCINCSOUTH. This marked the beginning of
oceanographic studies and forecasting in the Navy. The

• The USA’s National Oceanographic Data Centre.

OFC was located in the premises of the Met School and

238 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

headed by the officer who had been trained by the American Formation of the Directorate of Naval Oceanology and Navy. The OFC’s terms of reference were to liase with the Meteorology (DNOM) in 1982

National Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory (NPOL)

located in Cochin and:

By 1982, it became necessary to establish a dedicated
o Provide a general description of the major oceanographdirectorate for ‘Oceanology in Naval Headquarters: ic and acoustic factors affecting a specified area of © Oceanographic forecasting was vitally important for anti operation for a specified forecast period, the sea state
submarine warfare.

at the beginning of the forecast period and significant © It was necessary to safeguard the security aspects changes expected during the forecast period.

arising out of the increased oceanographic activity in
o Collect and store processed oceanographic data in the

Indian waters.

form of atlases, charts and reports issued by the NPOL © The Navy’s existing arrangements to plan, coordinate and the Chief Hydrographer.

and progress oceanographic tasks were inadequate.

o Collect oceanographic information, records and research © The Navy felt that it must be involved in ‘ocean outputs from agencies like the National Institute of
development’.1

Oceanography, OSTA and ONGC.

The ‘meteorology’ component of the Directorate of
o Provide forecasts of thermal structure and salinity Naval Education and Meteorology was transferred to a new profiles based on the available past data and current Directorate and the disciplines of Meteorology, Oceanology oceanographic observations received from fleet ships
during exercises.

and Oceanographic activity were re-grouped.

o Devise and standardise codes for transmission of ocean

The new Directorate of Naval Oceanology and Meteorology
ic data and forecasts.

(DNOM) was established in May 1982 under CNS’ powers,
o Undertake selective studies in oceanography to update concurrently with the creation of the Department of and validate the forecasting techniques developed by Ocean Development and the first expedition to Antarctica.

NPOL.

Thereafter, DNOM became the single nodal agency dealing
with all aspects of naval oceanology and meteorology.

o Undertake studies on air-sea interaction in collaboration
with NPOL and other agencies.

DNOM’s tasks were to:

© Assist the Met Training School in the training of naval • Coordinate all oceanology and meteorology activity.

personnel in oceanography.

• Systematise the collection of oceanographic data, its

Although

Met
officers
studied

‘Introductory
computerisation and its forecasting.

oceanography” as a topic during their Advanced Weather • Represent the Navy and liase for oceanographic Forecaster's training, it was realised that they needed to be
research data, training, publications etc. with the
trained in oceanographic forecasting. The Cochin University

Department of Ocean Development, National Institute
conducted the first capsule course in Oceanography in April
of Oceanography, Geological Survey of India, Naval

1981. The Indian Institute of Technology Delhi conducted

Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory, Department
the second Oceanography capsule course in March 1982.

of Science and Technology and the Indian Institutes of

Technology who were dealing with oceanography.

In 1981, sanction was received for three digital electronic
systems to be installed at Naval Air Stations Garuda and • Coordinate the naval component of the Indian Scientific Hansa to enhance safety during landing and take off.

Expeditions to Antarctica and help develop plans for a
polar research ship and for airborne survey.

These were:

• The Ceilograph, which gave digital printouts of the • Coordinate the security of oceanographic data.

heights of lowest cloud over an air station.

Scrutinise the security implications of requests for
oceanographic data pertaining to Indian waters and

• The Skopograph which gave digital printouts of runway
the EEZ and for security clearance of oceanographic
visibility; and
surveys by foreign ships.

• The Current Weather Instrument System (CWIS) • Monitor security of oceanographic data by ensuring that which gave digital printouts of weather parameters like
foreign agencies carrying out oceanic research / survey
humidity, temperature, wind direction and speed.______

1

As early as 1972, a Committee under the Scientific Adviser to the Raksha Mantri recommended the formation of a national body for oceanography.

The proposal took shape by 1975 for the formation of an Ocean Science and Technology Agency. The Department of Ocean Development was established in 1981.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 239

in collaboration with national agencies collect only that Section was established in the Naval Air'Station INS
data which is cleared from the security angle.

Garuda at Cochin on 3 June 1968 to impart training to

‘Met’ sailors in marine meteorology, aviation meteorology,

• Coordinate atmospheric data collection and research and meteorological equipment.

with specific reference
to predicting
anomalous
atmospheric conditions on naval radio, radar and EW

On 18 October 1974, this Met Training Section was
systems (ANAPROP).

renamed as the Meteorology Training School and started

• Participate in oceanographic cruises.

imparting ‘Met Training’ to officers of the Naval Air Arm.

Since its inception, the Directorate has contributed to

The Meteorological Training School was inaugurated
and undertaken the following:

at INS Garuda at Cochin on 25 April 197~. The School
conducts Met courses for officers and saii;''1

• Co-coordinated the Navy’s help for Indian Scientific

Antarctica Expeditions.

On 1 November 1985, the Mei:

g Sc' >oI

• Rendering consultancy for the design of polar research was renamed as the School of Nava! ('

olog;
id
vessels for the Department of Ocean Development.

Meteorology (SNOM).

• Monitored the progress of oceanographic research

Developments After 199
undertaken by the DRDO and by CSIR’s scientific
organisations.

Monsoon Experiments

• Participation in UNESCO's Inter Governmental Oceano

Experiments to study the vagaries of the monsoon were
graphic Commissions at Paris.

resumed under the aegis of the Indian Climate Research

• Organised the oceanographic course in the Centre for Programme: Advanced Studies in Atmospheric and Fluid Sciences at

Collection, Collation and Dissemination of

I I I

New Delhi.

Oceanographic Data

• Functioned as a think-tank for oceanographic data
collection, its utilisation and application for naval The Navy’s need is for instant, accurate and reliable activities.

predictions of anomalous propagation above the sea

• Interacted with the India Meteorological Department in surface and of acoustic propagation below the sea Conferences of Forecasting Officers.

surface.

School of Naval Oceanology and Meteorology

At the national and international level, considerable
cooperation continued to take place to coordinate

Meteorological services for the Navy commenced in
oceanographic and meteorological data from as wide a

Cochin on 11 September 1952. A Meteorology Training
spectrum as possible.

240 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

28

The Marine Com mandos

The Creation of the Indian Marine Special Force

Area who was responsible for the defence of Bombay.

When the IMSF was sanctioned for the defence of offshore

The Navy had acquired Swimmer Delivery Vehicles assets, it was based in Abhimanyu.

(chariots) in 1975 for two basic purposes:

o To determine the measures to defend Bombay and

Role and Training
offshore oil rigs / platforms from attack by such craft.

Role
o To regularly exercise naval ships in harbour in defence o To conduct clandestine operations, surveillance and against chariot attack.

reconnaissance missions combating maritime terrorism.

In due course, selected qualified divers developed skills © To support amphibious operations and air and sea borne as charioteers.

missions.

In 1980, the “Interim Chariot Complex” at Bombay was Training
commissioned as INS Abhimanyu.

The first eight batches of IMSF personnel underwent 10

In 1983, Naval Headquarters initiated the proposal for weeks basic commando training followed by three weeks creating an Indian Marine Special Force (IMSF) as the of Para Basic course. The course content was basically land

“marine commando” arm of the Navy, comprising officers warfare, handling of arms, ammunition and explosives.

and sailors who were not only trained divers but also trained Kayaking, combat diving, airborne operations, photography, in other skills of Special Operations Forces.

making of improvised explosive devices, charioteering, ship
intervention drills and hijacking of oil rigs / platforms were

Three developments took place whilst the IMSF proposal conducted in-house at INS Abhimanyu.

was still under consideration:

• The measures for the Defence of Bombay High against

The day-to-day training curriculum includes close
clandestine attack were finalised, one component of quarter battle, jungle warfare tactics, making of Improvised which was naval commandos to evict terrorists who might Explosive Devices (IEDs).

have already taken over an oil production platform.

Some of the skills that MARCOs specialise in are:

• In 1985, sanction was formally accorded for raising • Advanced weapon handling.

the IMSF. Sanction was also accorded for specialised • Intervention / hostage rescue.

equipment and three Seaking Mk 42 C Commando • Recapture of and destruction of offshore installations - i.e. to version helicopters for the IMSF.

recapture own platforms and destroying enemy platforms.

• The Navy liased with the other national agencies that • Counter Insurgency warfare - this is a war of brains and were training Special Forces. It commenced deputing
guerrilla warfare.

selected personnel in 1986 to undergo commando • Handling of the latest IEDs.

training with the Army’s Special Frontier Force.

• Unarmed combat, Karate, Para Jumping and Sky Diving all

Marine commandos accompanied the IPKF to Sri Lanka
of which are compulsory for all Special Forces personnel.

in end July 1987 to deal with the LTTE elements operating • Special Boat Section (SBS) operations.

in the lagoons.

• Chariot operations.

In August 1987, sanction was formally accorded for a

On completion of the above training, MARCOs join
force of 38 officers and 373 sailors.

designated Prahars for ‘on job’ and advanced training.

The advanced training is based on the principle of vertical

Meanwhile in 1986, INS Abhimanyu had been placed specialisation in the following: under the operational control of Flag Officer Maharashtra

“We had very limited resources - two Gemini dinghies

• Language and culture training of enemy areas so that

MARCOs can operate and survive behind enemy lines.

and some oxygen sets. We had no explosives. We took
explosives on temporary loan from the Sri Lankan Navy.

• Sniper training and training on shoulder-launched

We managed to place explosives on all six speedboats
missiles, MMGs etc.

and withdrew successfully. It was a well-coordinated

• Sky diving with water-para jump capability.

operation as Army troops were closing in from the

• Counter insurgency.

landward side and the destruction of the speedboats

• Making of IEDs with readily available items.

took the LTTE completely by surprise.

After 1990, all training was shifted to INS Abhimanyu.

“Two days later, we were tasked to destroy another set

The Army’s Para Training School at Agra has continued to
of speedboats in the same location. We knew that this
conduct the para-drop segment of commando training.

time the LTTE would not be taken by surprise. We went
ahead, did a similar operation and managed to blow up

Operations Between 1987 and 1990'

about eight boats that night.”

Operation Pawan

Commander (then Lieutenant) PS Chandavarkar was

The IMSF made its debut in August 1987. A 40-strong awarded the Vir Chakra. His citation read: group participated in 55 combat operations in its very
first year. During amphibious raids, they destroyed the

“On 17 November 1987 at about 0400 hours in pitch

LTTE’s boats, ammunition dumps and camps. They darkness, Lieutenant PS Chandavarkar led a boat patrol proved invaluable during ‘flushing out’ operations in the to intercept the militants in the Jaffna Lagoon in Sri islets, lagoons and inlets and were invariably in the van of Lanka. While traversing four miles in highly restricted these raids. They were awarded a Maha Vir Chakra, two Vir and hostile waters, the boat patrol detected a high-speed Chakras and several Nao Sena Medals for gallantry during boat dashing out of the lagoon. Lieutenant Chandavarkar Operation Pawan.

and his team pursued the boat and opened fire to prevent
its escape. Prior to sinking of the boat, the four militants

Commander (then Lieutenant) Arvind Singh was in the boat were seen dumping objects into the Jaffna awarded the Maha Vir Chakra. He recalls:

Channel.

“On 19 October 1987, my team had to traverse through
roads heavily mined with booby traps laid by the militants

After
apprehending
the
militants,

Lieutenant
and in the face of militant fire from buildings and rooftops. Chandavarkar carried out immediate diving operations The exemplary courage and valour of my team helped and recovered a box of improvised detonators. The secure the area and the link up of 41 Brigade with 1 diving operations were conducted under extremely trying Maratha Light Infantry on 20 October 1987.

conditions and in very hostile waters.

“On the night of 21/22 October, despite limited

He persevered for two days and was successful in
demolition equipment, our team destroyed the Guru locating a box of high explosives. He then proceeded Nagar Jetty and the militant speedboats in Jaffna to tow the box away to a safe area and neutralised it, Lagoon. Gnder cover of darkness, we swam underwater thereby clearing the Channel for safe navigation. ”

for a distance of two kilometres and destroyed eleven
speedboats that were kept ready for hard-core militants Operation Cactus - December 1988
to escape. During this operation, we came under heavy The hijacked merchant ship ‘Progress Light’ carrying the fire from the militants.”

fleeing mercenaries and the hostages taken by them in

Commander (then Lieutenant) Anoop Verma was Male had been forced to stop by naval gunfire. A Naval awarded a Vir Chakra. He recalls:

boarding party that included IM SF personnel seized the

“Our group was embarked on board Aditara for watership, apprehended the armed mercenaries and rescued borne operations to support Army operations off Jaffna the hostages.

Lagoon. On 21-22 night, we were tasked to destroy six Operation Jupiter - 1989
speedboats, which the LTTE had been using to carry
their personnel, arms and ammunition into the Jaffna IMSF personnel and their Seaking Mk 42 C helicopter were Lagoon. These boats were secured at Guru Nagar Jetty, embarked on board Viraat in case it became necessary to which was one of the LTTE’s prominent possessions.

evacuate High Commission personnel from Colombo.

1. For details, see chapter titled 'Naval Operations’, page 183.

242 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

29

The Foundering Of SNS Andaman

Synopsis of the Incident
both port and starboard stabiliser fin housings, which had

The 1,000-tonne Petya class submarine chasers acquired been cold-repaired and strengthened through cementing from Russia between 1968 and 1974 were among the most and shoring. From April onwards, the ship had participated in the Fleet’s exercise programmes.

remarkable vessels of their time. They were propelled by
gas turbines driving independent propellers to enable them

On 17 August 1990, the Eastern Fleet sailed from the
to reach the reported position of an enemy submarine at Andaman Islands for Vishakhapatnam on the east coast of very high speed. They had a diesel engine driving a centre India. On the 20th, the Fleet ran into heavy weather. Andaman shaft with a controllable pitch propeller (CPP) to provide suffered flooding and breakdowns and foundered. Two the long endurance required for stalking and hunting a frigates of the Eastern Fleet were standing by her when she submarine. They were densely packed with electronics - sank on the 21st August, 140 miles east of Vishakhapatnam.

sonars, radars and computer systems to control the fire of Of the total of 132 officers, sailors and civilians, 117 persons their anti submarine and anti aircraft weapons. To reconcile were rescued. The bodies of two persons were recovered.

the need for speed with the need for maximum possible The remaining 13 persons drowned.

combat capability, the thickness of the steel plates of their
hulls had been so minimised as to keep them seaworthy

The Commanding Officer was court martialled and found
during the six-year period between major refits, provided guilty of ‘causing his ship to be lost at sea negligently or by the hulls were regularly inspected and properly maintained default.’ He forfeited six months seniority and was severely during the annual dockings.

reprimanded. This lenient sentence undoubtedly took
into account the operational, technical and administrative

Because of numerous unforeseen civil engineering circumstances that had compelled the Navy to continue difficulties, the new Naval Dockyard being constructed to operate its ships despite the considerable frailties that at Vishakhapatnam, specifically for refitting Russian develop as ships age. He resigned from the Navy. In his ships, took much longer to get ready to commence the view, instead of letting the Andaman incident herald the mandatory six-yearly refit programme of the Petyas. Due institution of remedies to prevent the neglect of ships’ hulls, to the bunching caused by acquiring five Petyas at a time the Navy, by holding him culpable and not those sitting and the delays in starting their six-yearly refit programme, ashore, had sent the wrong message to Commanding decisions had to be taken as early as 1979 to postpone Officers afloat.

and reschedule these important major refits. The effect of

Sequence of Events - August 1990
this postponement was particularly harmful for the hulls of
the Petyas.

18th August, 1500 hrs

Andaman was the ninth ship of its type to be acquired

The Eastern Fleet comprising Dunagiri (FOCEF embarked),
from Russia in 1973. She joined the Eastern Fleet based Himgiri, Trishul, Anjadip and Andaman sailed from Port at Vishakhapatnam and, like the other ships of her class, Blair to rendezvous Magar (FOCINCEAST embarked) participated in Fleet exercises every year. During 1989 and and Arnala 200 miles east of Vishakhapatnam. The early 1990, except for a short refit between September and FOCINCEAST’s exercises on the 20th were to be followed December 1989, Andaman was deployed off the eastern by a simulated attack by Eastern Fleet on Vishakhapatnam coast of Sri Lanka during the winding down of Operation port, in the face of submarine and air opposition, before Pawan. After December, there had been repeated leaks in
entering harbour on the 21st.

* This chapter is based on information in the public domain, namely documents preceding and leading to the court martial, documents produced at the court martial, the verdict of the court martial, the recollections of personages involved and memoirs.

Forward Engine Room and the Aft Engine Room

Andaman participated in the day's exercise programme
were not shored.

without any breakdown.

2130 hrs Water level in the ASP had risen to five feet above

19th August
the floor plating (well above the waterline). ASP

Andaman continued to participate in the exercise
evacuated (without establishing the source of
programme without any breakdown.

flooding, without appreciating that the flooding
could be internal and without shoring the

Sea State 4 to 5. Wind Speed 20 to 25 knots. Long
adjacent compartment). Flooding reported in

Swell.

Stabiliser Compartment.

20th August A M

2145 hrs Stabiliser Compartment submersible pump
failed. The submersible pump from the ASP was

A depression commenced to form in the Bay of Bengal
shifted to the Stabiliser Compartment. This also
and move in a north westerly/westerly direction towards
failed within half an hour due to short-circuiting

India. It crossed the coast near Paradip on 21st August.

of its motor winding. Since the third submersible

1000 hrs: The Fleet rendezvoused Magar. FOCINCEAST
pump was defective even before sailing from Port
exercised the ships as planned and, at 1620 hrs,

Blair, the ship now had no portable submersible
commenced his return to Vishakhapatnam in Magar.

pumps to pump out flooded compartments.

This was reported to FO C EF four hours later at

Sequence of Andaman's Problems

0231 hrs.

20th August

2200 hrs Depth Charge Compartment (above waterline)

0950 hrs Main diesel fuel pipe burst.

found flooded. It was evacuated (without

1030 hrs Defect rectified and rejoined Fleet
assessing that the flooding could be internal or
through an opening above the waterline).

1545 hrs Main steering gear failed. Resorted to manual
steering from the Aft Steering Position (ASP). 2230 hrs With all three portable submersible pumps non-Water level in ASP found to be six inches above
operational, the fire pump located in the Stabiliser
the floor plating. Pumping out commenced.

Compartment had been started to pump it out.

Submersible pump got choked frequently with

It failed within minutes due to ingress of water
jute and rags. By 2000 hrs, water had risen to
short-circuiting its motor winding.

waist level.

2300 hrs Efforts to start the main diesel were unsuccessful

1940 hrs Level of bilge water in the Aft Engine Room (AER)

and were attributed to contamination of the
rose to flywheel level. It was assumed that this
fuel tank in the Stabiliser Compartment. It was
was caused by the choking of the AER ejector.

decided to lock the centre shaft and start the gas

The main diesel was stopped to clear the ejector
turbines (GTs). Centre shaft was locked by 2330
suction strainer and the bilges were pumped out.

hrs.

The possibility of water having ingressed into the 21st August

AER was not visualised. On receipt of the ship’s
report regarding this flooding, FO CEF detached 0100 hrs The 100 kw Diesel Alternator (DA) in AER

Trishul to remain in the vicinity of Andaman.

switched off due to fluctuation in frequency. The

FO C EF proceeded ahead in Dunagiri, with

400 kw DA was started.

Himgiri and Anjadip to take up position for the 0112 hrs Report made to FO CEF of non-starting of main next morning’s attack on Vishakhapatnam.

diesel, of switching off of 100 kw DA, of water

2100 hrs Bilge water in AER cleared. Efforts commenced
level in ASP at waistline and of intention to get
to restart the main diesel.

underway on GTs by 0200 hrs.

Bilge water level in Stabiliser Compartment 0200 hrs Water level in Stabiliser Compartment had risen observed to be three feet above the bilges.

up to the deck head level, on top of which was the

Started pumping out using the fixed ejector in the

Aft Switch Board (ASB). The source of flooding

Forward Engine Room (FER) and the portable
had still not been established. The port GT was
submersible pump. Source of flooding was not
started but it soon tripped due to interruption of
established. The adjoining compartments - the
power supply.

244 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

0230 hrs The Aft Switch Board became non-operational 0600 hrs During morning rounds: due to water level in the Stabiliser Compartment

- It was observed that the water level in the
reaching the panel. The ASB was made dead.

Aft Engine Room had again come up to the

Thereafter, no attempt was made to take supply
bottom end of the main diesel flywheel as it
from the Forward Switchboard and start the GT
had the previous evening at 1940 hrs. It was
again. By this time, water from the Stabiliser
not appreciated that after the ASB was made

Compartment had entered the Machinery
dead at 0230 hrs, the ejectors in the AER had

Control Room (MCR) from behind the MCR
stopped working and the ingress of water
panels. The Duty ERA secured the MCR and
continued unabated.

secured all the compartments aft of the

Forward Engine Room - namely the Stabiliser

- It was also observed that the water level in the

Compartment, the AER and the CPP post. He

CPP Compartment was two and a half feet
then left the MCR.

above the keel.

0650 hrs Tow rope parted.

By making the ASB dead, three things happened:

0820 hrs Tow rope passed - tow recommenced at speed

- The 200 kw DA became inoperable. With the 100 kw
five knots. To provide a catenary for the tow,

DA having been switched off at 0100 hrs, the ship

Andaman started manually hauling cable up on
now had only the 400 kw DA to supply power.

to the foxle.

- Number three and number four fire pumps became 0930 hrs The water level in the AER rose to eight inches non-operable. Of the four fire pumps fitted, one had
above the floor plating.

been non-operational before the ship had sailed for

Port Blair, one had failed at 2230 hrs and the remaining 1000 hrs-The CPP Compartment was found fully flooded.

two were now non-operable.

- The ejectors in the AER stopped working and flooding

- Knee-deep flooding was observed in the aft
mess.

resumed in the AER.

- No effort was made to establish the likely cause

Of the three salvage pumps fitted, one was fitted in the
of flooding in the AER, the CPP Compartment

AER and had been non-operational before the ship sailed.

and the aft mess.

The remaining two were not designed to take suction from 1030 hrs The Commanding Officer held a meeting with the aft section of the ship.

his Heads of Department. It was realised that

From 0230 hrs onwards, the ship had no means of
the situation was deteriorating. The state of the
pumping water out from any of the compartments aft of
flooded compartments was:

the Forward Engine Room. All these compartments were

- ASP flooded up to five feet above the grating
left as they were, without posting any sentries or doing any
level.

shoring.

- DC post flooded with one and a half feet of

0335 hrs Report made to FOCEF regarding flooding of
water at the aft end.

the Stabiliser Compartment stating that the

- Stabiliser Compartment and Aft Switch Board
cementing over the holes acquired in 1989
flooded up to the bottom edge of the MCR
appeared to have given way.

door.

0400 hrs On receiving the signal about flooding in the

- CPP compartment full and Aft Mess

Stabiliser Compartment, FOCEF detached
compartment knee deep.

Himgiri to proceed to render assistance to

- Aft Engine Room flooded up to eight inches

Andaman.

above the floor plating.

0511 hrs Trishul took Andaman in tow using a nylon tow rope and built up to a speed of six knots.

1103 hrs Report was sent to FOCEF via Trishul that 50
tonnes of water had been shipped in the ASP

0530 hrs The 400 kw DA tripped. The cause was suspected
and Stabiliser Compartment and the Aft Mess,
to be contamination of the tank that supplied
and that there was water in the Aft Engine Room
fuel to the DA. The ship was now without power
up to the grating level. (Subsequent analysis
and could only communicate with FOCEF via
revealed that by this time 350 tonnes of water

Trishul.

must have been shipped).

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 245

on the 20th, Andaman had not reported any defect. He was

1 2 1 5 h rs Tow ing s t o p p e d . C a b le c o n n e c t e d t o to w r o p e .

to host a previously arranged seminar in Vishakhapatnam

T rishu l r e s u m e d to w - s p e e d f o u r k n o ts .

on 21st August being attended by the CMS and other

1328 hrs Andaman started yawing whilst being towed. dignitaries. Before FOCEF departed at 1940 hrs on the Speed reduced to zero.

20th to take up position for the next morning’s exercise

1355 hrs The ship heeled over dangerously to port.

attack, he had detached Trishul to standby Andaman.

Everybody on board suddenly realised that
disaster was imminent. The Commanding

Invariably, whenever a catastrophe occurs, the first

Officer ordered ‘Abandon Ship’.

questions are usually based on gut reactions. How can a
warship sink in peacetime? Was she sea-worchy? If not, had

1359 hrs Trishul saw that Andaman was about to sink and the ship reported it to superior authority? If not, why not? If signalled Himgiri to immediately close her.

the ship had reported that she was not sea-worthy, why did

1401 hrs Trishul saw Andaman starting to go down and superior authority sail the ship? Concurrently, everybody cut the tow rope.

concerned begins to ensure that no blame should be

1403 hrs Andaman sank stern first.

attributed to him. It takes time for the dust to settle and for
a clear picture to emerge.

The Court Martial Findings

Andaman’s material state and sea-worthiness were

The Court Martial found the Commanding Officer guilty of known. Concern had been recorded at all levels: causing his ship to be lost at sea, negligently or by default,
for the following reasons:

• As regards the Naval Headquarters and Command
level, two significant letters were presented at the Court

• Failure to fight the initial flooding with all means at his

Martial as exhibits:

disposal and failure to adopt all the damage control
measures as laid down.

-In October 1989, Naval Headquarters (NHQ) had
written to Headquarters Eastern Naval Command

• Failure to ensure that all possible means and resources

(HQENC). Its gist was that Andaman’s six-yearly refit
at his disposal were employed to establish the source of
was scheduled to commence in October 1990, having
flooding in the Aft Engine Room and Controllable Pitch
been already delayed by nine years. Since her material

Propeller Compartment and subsequently to maintain
state, particularly hull and fittings and systems, would
vigilance in these compartments to prevent recurrence
of flooding.

have deteriorated beyond repair, this would enhance
the work package extensively. It was therefore

• Failure to exercise adequate vigilance in the Stabiliser
essential to review the desirability of giving the ship

Compartment which was a suspected area of weakness
a six-yearly refit. HQENC was requested to assess
and failure to take timely action to contain flooding in
the present material state of the ship and forward
this compartment, as a result of which the ship lost her
recommendations on the desirability or otherwise of
propulsion and power generation capability.

giving the ship a six-yearly refit.

• Failure to analyse and respond to a steadily deteriorating

-In November 1989, HQENC’s reply to NHQ stated
situation from 1600 hrs on 20th August onwards which
that compared to other Petyas of the same period,
resulted finally in the loss of the ship at about 1403 hrs

Andaman’s hull had required more attention as
on 21 August 1990.

indicated in two successive Docking Reports.

Reactions to the Foundering of the Andaman

Whereas the machinery and equipment would not
pose major problems to achieve a life of six years after

The Navy and the nation were aghast at the sinking of
the forthcoming two-year refit, the hull would have
the Andaman, 140 miles from Vishakhapatnam, in broad
to be attended to. On balance, it was desirable that
daylight, before the eyes of two frigates standing by to

Andaman be refitted.

assist her, just a day after the Commander in Chief and

• Andaman’s Quarterly Letter of Proceedings dated July
the -Fleet Commander had been at sea exercising with

1990 had stated that the hull state, by and large, did
these ships. There was adverse comment in the media
not cause anxiety, though age was evident. The holes of
and misinformed speculation that Andaman had been

‘deserted’ in her hour of need.

December 1989 in the stabiliser housing did have ingress
of water at the rate of a bucket every four hours, but

The fact was that when FOCINCEAST completed
meticulous rounds were being ensured. Strengthening
exercises and departed for Vishakhapatnam at 1620 hrs
of the area was done under the direct supervision of

HQENC. Doors, hatches and latches were in a bad state

246 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

with watertight integrity being compromised constantly. professionalism of the ships’ crew s. Andaman had been What was constantly put as "Defer to Next Refit” now operating in Sri Lankan w aters for 283 days for O peration perforce would have to be taken up by the Naval Dockyard Pawan.

Vishakhapatnam during the three-month Short Refit
scheduled to commence on 1 October 1990.

From one point of view, the foundering of the Andaman
was an accident waiting to happen. For years, no meaningful

At the time of Andaman’s foundering, Rear Admiral solution has been found to the problems experienced in Vishnu Bhagwat was the Chief of Staff in Western Naval the maintenance of the hulls of the thin-skinned ships of Command. He had earlier commanded a Petya. In later Russian origin. Hull corrosion is known to be greater in the years, he had been FOCEF, FOCINCWEST and CNS. warmer and more saline seawater of the tropics than it is in In his book Betrayal of a Nation”, Admiral Bhagwat has the cooler and less saline seawater of the northern seas for stated:

which the Russian thin-skinned hulls have been designed.

The Navy had lost Andaman, a Petya class patrol Unless full-scale refit facilities are available, which can vessel, in August 1990. The Petyas were superbly remove and replace weakened hull plates and also, within designed, combined diesel and gas turbine driven ships the time frame of the ship’s refit, cope with the removal and with a design philosophy, stability and damage control replacement of the dense wiring and electronic equipment features amongst the best in the world for a warship. on the inner side of the plates being replaced, there is Even if one third of the forward end and one third of no alternative to either ‘adding doubler plates’ or ‘fixing the aft section of the ship suffered complete damage, cement boxes’ to deal with leaks in the hull. When such the ship could still float. However, INS Andaman had improvised measures are resorted to, there have to be been neglected for almost 10 years - essential refits and continuous and rigorous checks to see if they are holding.

defect rectification work were deferred from refit to refit. Andamans signal sent at 0335 hrs on 21st August shows These included underwater defects in the hull and subhow she was overtaken by events.

systems connected to the sea. The ship’s officers and

From another point of view, like all other ships of the
crew had given up the practice of preparing for Task same vintage, Andaman was seaworthy but not perfectly so.

I, Task II and Task III work-ups and inspections. The Given the Navy’s insufficient and overloaded refit facilities, Commanding Officers were interested in clocking days its shortfalls in spare parts availability and its overstretched at sea. “Staff-inspections”, mandatory on completion operational commitments, ships have learnt to live with the of refit, and “Staff sea-checks” were shelved. Even the Dockyards’ recommendation to “Defer To Next Refit” and refit completion signal, which must be preceded by a Command Headquarters’ “approval" thereof. Commanding joint certification by the Heads of Departments of the Officers press on loyally with the operational tasks assigned ship, the Captain and the Refitting Dockyard - at the to them and rely on the training, experience, seamanship General Manager’s level - had become a mere formality. and good judgment of their officers and sailors to cope Hull surveys were carried out perfunctorily and the with emergencies at sea.

report itself did not reach the ship until months after
the “completion” of the refit. The staffs in Command

The sequence of events and the findings of the court

Headquarters were only too happy to defer rectification martial indicate how Andaman’s officers and sailors were of serious defects, which directly affected the safety of snowed under by the emergency. The speed at which the ship, till the next refit, thus taking unauthorised short crisis after crisis struck them overwhelmed them to such an extent that even the most elementary measures were
cuts. (Page 47)

forgotten:

“A document titled “Lessons learnt from INS Andaman’

was formally promulgated by the Flag Officer Sea • Like trying to pinpoint the source of flooding - was it internal from a burst fire main or external from a leak in

Training. (Page 48)"

the hull?

In Retrospect

• Like positioning sentries to report the rate of flooding in

As can be seen from the other chapters in this volume,
each affected compartment and,
the Dockyard in Vishakhapatnam had serious limitations. • Like shoring adjacent compartments to safeguard The bunching of refits was being compounded by the
against their being flooded.

requirements of Operation Pawan. It was not that the Navy

Some continue to believe that the fatal blow to Andaman
did not know what Admiral Bhagwat has stated. The basic came from an unusually high wave that fell with full force reality is that the Navy has to press on and depend on the

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 247

on the 20th, Andaman had not reported any defect. He was

1 2 1 5 h r s T ow ing s t o p p e d . C a b le c o n n e c t e d t o to w ro p e .

to host a previously arranged seminar in Vishakhapatnam

Trishul r e s u m e d to w - s p e e d fo u r k n o ts .

on 21st August being attended by the CNS and other

1328 hrs Andaman started yawing whilst being towed. dignitaries. Before FOCEF departed at 1940 hrs on the Speed reduced to zero.

20th to take up position for the next morning’s exercise

1355 hrs The ship heeled over dangerously to port.

attack, he had detached Trishul to standby Andaman.

Everybody on board suddenly realised that
disaster was imminent. The Commanding

Invariably, whenever a catastrophe occurs, the first

Officer ordered ‘Abandon Ship’.

questions are usually based on gut reactions. How can a
warship sink in peacetime? Was she sea-worthy? If not, had

1359 hrs Trishul saw that Andaman was about to sink and the ship reported it to superior authority? If not. wr not? If signalled Himgiri to immediately close her.

the ship had reported that she was not so.---worthy, hy did

1401 hrs Trishul saw Andaman starting to go down and superior authority sail the ship? Concurr. Jy, e ybody cut the tow rope.

concerned begins to ensure that no oi; . 2 sr, :!d be

1403 hrs Andaman sank stern first.

attributed to him. It takes time for the dusi ':o setu- ,nd for
a clear picture to emerge.

The Court Martial Findings

Andaman’s material state and sea-worthiness were

The Court Martial found the Commanding Officer guilty of known. Concern had been recorded at all levels: causing his ship to be lost at sea, negligently or by default,
for the following reasons:

• As regards the Naval Headquarters and Command
level, two significant letters were presented at the Court

• Failure to fight the initial flooding with all means at his

Martial as exhibits:

disposal and failure to adopt all the damage control
measures as laid down.

-In October 1989, Naval Headquarters (NHQ) had
written to Headquarters Eastern Naval Command

• Failure to ensure that all possible means and resources

(HQENC). Its gist was that Andaman’s six-yearly refit
at his disposal were employed to establish the source of
was scheduled to commence in October 1990, having
flooding in the Aft Engine Room and Controllable Pitch
been already delayed by nine years. Since her material

Propeller Compartment and subsequently to maintain
state, particularly hull and fittings and systems, would
vigilance in these compartments to prevent recurrence
have deteriorated beyond repair, this would enhance
of flooding.

the work package extensively. It was therefore

• Failure to exercise adequate vigilance in the Stabiliser
essential to review the desirability of giving the ship

Compartment which was a suspected area of weakness
a six-yearly refit. HQENC was requested to assess
and failure to take timely action to contain flooding in
the present material state of the ship and forward
this compartment, as a result of which the ship lost her
recommendations on the desirability or otherwise of
propulsion and power generation capability.

giving the ship a six-yearly refit.

• Failure to analyse and respond to a steadily deteriorating

-In November 1989, HQENC’s reply to NHQ stated
situation from 1600 hrs on 20lh August onwards which
that compared to other Petyas of the same period,
resulted finally in the loss of the ship at about 1403 hrs

Andaman’s hull had required more attention as
on 21 August 1990.

indicated in two successive Docking Reports.

Reactions to the Foundering of the Andaman

Whereas the machinery and equipment would not
pose major problems to achieve a life of six years after

The Navy and the nation were aghast at the sinking of
the forthcoming two-year refit, the hull would have
the Andaman, 140 miles from Vishakhapatnam, in broad
to be attended to. On balance, it was desirable that
daylight, before the eyes of two frigates standing by to

Andaman be refitted.

assist her, just a day after the Commander in Chief and • Andaman’s Quarterly Letter of Proceedings dated July the -Fleet Commander had been at sea exercising with
these ships. There was adverse comment in the media

1990 had stated that the hull state, by and large, did
and misinformed speculation that
not cause anxiety, though age was evident. The holes of

Andaman had been

‘deserted’ in her hour of need.

December 1989 in the stabiliser housing did have ingress
of water at the rate of a bucket every four hours, but

The fact was that when FOCINCEAST completed
meticulous rounds were being ensured. Strengthening
exercises and departed for Vishakhapatnam at 1620 hrs
of the area was done under the direct supervision of

' HQENC. Doors, hatches and latches were in a bad state

246 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

with watertight integrity being compromised constantly. professionalism of th e ships’ crew s. Andaman had been What was constantly put as "Defer to Next Refit” now operating in Sri Lankan w aters for 283 days for O peration perforce would have to be taken up by the Naval Dockyard Pawan.

Vishakhapatnam during the three-month Short Refit
scheduled to commence on 1 October 1990.

From one point of view, the foundering of the Andaman
was an accident waiting to happen. For years, no meaningful

At the time of Andaman’s foundering, Rear Admiral solution has been found to the problems experienced in Vishnu Bhagwat was the Chief of Staff in Western Naval the maintenance of the hulls of the thin-skinned ships of Command. He had earlier commanded a Petya. In later Russian origin. Hull corrosion is known to be greater in the years, he had been FOCEF, FOCINCWEST and CNS. warmer and more saline seawater of the tropics than it is in In his book Betrayal of a Nation”, Admiral Bhagwat has
the cooler and less saline seawater of the northern seas for
stated:

which the Russian thin-skinned hulls have been designed.

“The Navy had lost Andaman, a Petya class patrol Unless full-scale refit facilities are available, which can vessel, in August 1990. The Petyas were superbly remove and replace weakened hull plates and also, within designed, combined diesel and gas turbine driven ships the time frame of the ship’s refit, cope with the removal and with a design philosophy, stability and damage control replacement of the dense wiring and electronic equipment features amongst the best in the world for a warship. on the inner side of the plates being replaced, there is Even if one third of the forward end and one third of no alternative to either ‘adding doubler plates’ or ‘fixing the aft section of the ship suffered complete damage, cement boxes’ to deal with leaks in the hull. When such the ship could still float. However, INS Andaman had improvised measures are resorted to, there have to be been neglected for almost 10 years - essential refits and continuous and rigorous checks to see if they are holding.

defect rectification work were deferred from refit to refit. Andamans signal sent at 0335 hrs on 21st August shows These included underwater defects in the hull and subhow she was overtaken by events.

systems connected to the sea. The ship’s officers and

From another point of view, like all other ships of the
crew had given up the practice of preparing for Task same vintage, Andaman was seaworthy but not perfectly so.

I, Task II and Task III work-ups and inspections. The Given the Navy’s insufficient and overloaded refit facilities, Commanding Officers were interested in clocking days its shortfalls in spare parts availability and its overstretched at sea. “Staff-inspections", mandatory on completion operational commitments, ships have learnt to live with the of refit, and “Staff sea-checks” were shelved. Even the Dockyards’ recommendation to “Defer To Next Refit” and refit completion signal, which must be preceded by a Command Headquarters’ “approval” thereof. Commanding joint certification by the Heads of Departments of the Officers press on loyally with the operational tasks assigned ship, the Captain and the Refitting Dockyard - at the to them and rely on the training, experience, seamanship General Manager’s level - had become a mere formality. and good judgment of their officers and sailors to cope Hull surveys were carried out perfunctorily and the with emergencies at sea.

report itself did not reach the ship until months after
the "completion” of the refit. The staffs in Command

The sequence of events and the findings of the court

Headquarters were only too happy to defer rectification martial indicate how Andaman’s officers and sailors were of serious defects, which directly affected the safety of snowed under by the emergency. The speed at which the ship, till the next refit, thus taking unauthorised short crisis after crisis struck them overwhelmed them to such an extent that even the most elementary measures were
cuts. (Page 47)

forgotten:

“A document titled “Lessons learnt from INS Andaman
was formally promulgated by the Flag Officer Sea • Like trying to pinpoint the source of flooding - was it internal from a burst fire main or external from a leak in

Training. (Page 48)”

the hull?

In Retrospect

• Like positioning sentries to report the rate of flooding in

As can be seen from the other chapters in this volume,
each affected compartment and,
the Dockyard in Vishakhapatnam had serious limitations. • Like shoring adjacent compartments to safeguard The bunching of refits was being compounded by the
against their being flooded.

requirements of Operation Pawan. It was not that the Navy

Some continue to believe that the fatal blow to Andaman
did not know what Admiral Bhagwat has stated. The basic came from an unusually high wave that fell with full force reality is that the Navy has to press on and depen on t e

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 247

on the 20th, Andaman had not reported any defect. He was

1 2 1 5 h r s T o w in g s t o p p e d . C a b le c o n n e c t e d t o to w r o p e .

to host a previously arranged seminar in Vishakhapatnam

T ris h u l r e s u m e d to w - s p e e d f o u r k n o ts .

on 21st August being attended by the CNS and other

1328 hrs Andaman started yawing whilst being towed. dignitaries. Before FOCEF departed at 1940 hrs on the Speed reduced to zero.

20th to take up position for the next morning’s exercise

1355 hrs The ship heeled over dangerously to port.

attack, he had detached Trishul to standby Andaman.

Everybody on board suddenly realised that
disaster was imminent. The Commanding

Invariably, whenever a catastrophe occurs, the first

Officer ordered ‘Abandon Ship’.

questions are usually based on gut reactions. How can a
warship sink in peacetime? Was she sea-worthy? If not, had

1359 hrs Trishul saw that Andaman was about to sink and the ship reported it to superior authority? If not, why not? If signalled Himgiri to immediately close her.

the ship had reported that she was not sea-worthy, why did

1401 hrs Trishul saw Andaman starting to go down and superior authority sail the ship? Concurrently, everybody cut the tow rope.

concerned begins to ensure that no blame should be

1403 hrs Andaman sank stern first.

attributed to him. It takes time for the dust to settle and for
a clear picture to emerge.

The Court Martial Findings

Andaman’s material state and sea-worthiness were

The Court Martial found the Commanding Officer guilty of known. Concern had been recorded at all levels: causing his ship to be lost at sea, negligently or by default,
for the following reasons:

• As regards the Naval Headquarters and Command
level, two significant letters were presented at the Court

• Failure to fight the initial flooding with all means at his

Martial as exhibits:

disposal and failure to adopt all the damage control
measures as laid down.

-In October 1989, Naval Headquarters (NHQ) had
written to Headquarters Eastern Naval Command

• Failure to ensure that all possible means and resources

(HQENC). Its gist was that Andaman’s six-yearly refit
at his disposal were employed to establish the source of
was scheduled to commence in October 1990, having
flooding in the Aft Engine Room and Controllable Pitch
been already delayed by nine years. Since her material

Propeller Compartment and subsequently to maintain
state, particularly hull and fittings and systems, would
vigilance in these compartments to prevent recurrence
have deteriorated beyond repair, this would enhance
of flooding.

the work package extensively. It was therefore

• Failure to exercise adequate vigilance in the Stabiliser
essential to review the desirability of giving the ship

Compartment which was a suspected area of weakness
a six-yearly refit. HQENC was requested to assess
and failure to take timely action to contain flooding in
the present material state of the ship and forward
this compartment, as a result of which the ship lost her
recommendations on the desirability or otherwise of
propulsion and power generation capability.

giving the ship a six-yearly refit.

• Failure to analyse and respond to a steadily deteriorating

-In November 1989, HQENC’s reply to NHQ stated
situation from 1600 hrs on 20th August onwards which
that compared to other Petyas of the same period,
resulted finally in the loss of the ship at about 1403 hrs

Andaman’s hull had required more attention as
on 21 August 1990.

indicated in two successive Docking Reports.

Reactions to the Foundering of the Andaman

Whereas the machinery and equipment would not
pose major problems to achieve a life of six years after

The Navy and the nation were aghast at the sinking of
the forthcoming two-year refit, the hull would have
the Andaman, 140 miles from Vishakhapatnam, in broad
to be attended to. On balance, it was desirable that
daylight, before the eyes of two frigates standing by to

Andaman be refitted.

assist her, just a day after the Commander in Chief and • Andaman’s Quarterly Letter of Proceedings dated July the Fleet Commander had been at sea exercising with

1990 had stated that the hull state, by and large, did
these ships. There was adverse comment in the media
not cause anxiety, though age was evident. The holes of
and misinformed speculation that Andaman had been

December 1989 in the stabiliser housing did have ingress

‘deserted’ in her hour of need.

of water at the rate of a bucket every four hours, but

The fact was that when FOCINCEAST completed
meticulous rounds were being ensured. Strengthening
exercises and departed for Vishakhapatnam at 1620 hrs
of the area was done under the direct supervision of

' HQENC. Doors, hatches and latches were in a bad state

246 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

with watertight integrity being compromised constantly. professionalism of the ships’ crew s. Andaman had been What was constantly put as “Defer to Next Refit” now operating in Sri Lankan w aters for 283 days for O peration perforce would have to be taken up by the Naval Dockyard Pawan.

Vishakhapatnam during the three-month Short Refit
scheduled to commence on 1 October 1990.

From one point of view, the foundering of the Andaman
was an accident waiting to happen. For years, no meaningful

At the time of Andamans foundering, Rear Admiral solution has been found to the problems experienced in Vishnu Bhagwat was the Chief of Staff in Western Naval the maintenance of the hulls of the thin-skinned ships of Command. He had earlier commanded a Petya. In later Russian origin. Hull corrosion is known to be greater in the years, he had been FOCEF, FOCINCWEST and CNS. warmer and more saline seawater of the tropics than it is in In his book “Betrayal of a Nation”, Admiral Bhagwat has the cooler and less saline seawater of the northern seas for stated:

which the Russian thin-skinned hulls have been designed.

“The Navy had lost Andaman, a Petya class patrol Unless full-scale refit facilities are available, which can vessel, in August 1990. The Petyas were superbly remove and replace weakened hull plates and also, within designed, combined diesel and gas turbine driven ships the time frame of the ship’s refit, cope with the removal and with a design philosophy, stability and damage control replacement of the dense wiring and electronic equipment features amongst the best in the world for a warship. on the inner side of the plates being replaced, there is Even if one third of the forward end and one third of no alternative to either ‘adding doubler plates’ or ‘fixing the aft section of the ship suffered complete damage, cement boxes’ to deal with leaks in the hull. When such the ship could still float. However, INS Andaman had improvised measures are resorted to, there have to be been neglected for almost 10 years - essential refits and continuous and rigorous checks to see if they are holding.

defect rectification work were deferred from refit to refit. Andamans signal sent at 0335 hrs on 21st August shows These included underwater defects in the hull and subhow she was overtaken by events.

systems connected to the sea. The ship’s officers and

From another point of view, like all other ships of the
crew had given up the practice of preparing for Task same vintage, Andaman was seaworthy but not perfectly so.

I, Task II and Task III work-ups and inspections. The Given the Navy’s insufficient and overloaded refit facilities, Commanding Officers were interested in clocking days its shortfalls in spare parts availability and its overstretched at sea. “Staff-inspections", mandatory on completion operational commitments, ships have learnt to live with the of refit, and “Staff sea-checks” were shelved. Even the Dockyards’ recommendation to “Defer To Next Refit” and refit completion signal, which must be preceded by a Command Headquarters’ “approval” thereof. Commanding joint certification by the Heads of Departments of the Officers press on loyally with the operational tasks assigned ship, the Captain and the Refitting Dockyard - at the to them and rely on the training, experience, seamanship General Manager’s level - had become a mere formality. and good judgment of their officers and sailors to cope Hull surveys were carried out perfunctorily and the with emergencies at sea.

report itself did not reach the ship until months after
the “completion” of the refit. The staffs in Command

The sequence of events and the findings of the court

Headquarters were only too happy to defer rectification martial indicate how Andaman’s officers and sailors were of serious defects, which directly affected the safety of snowed under by the emergency. The speed at which the ship, till the next refit, thus taking unauthorised short crisis after crisis struck them overwhelmed them to such an extent that even the most elementary measures were
cuts. (Page 47)

forgotten:

“A document titled “Lessons learnt from INS Andaman” • Like trying to pinpoint the source of flooding - was it was formally promulgated by the Flag Officer Sea
internal from a burst fire main or external from a leak in

Training. (Page 48)”

the hull?

In Retrospect

• Like positioning sentries to report the rate of flooding in

As can be seen from the other chapters in this volume,
each affected compartment and,
the Dockyard in Vishakhapatnam had serious limitations. • Like shoring adjacent compartments to safeguard The bunching of refits was being compounded by the
against their being flooded.

requirements of Operation Pawan. It was not that t e avy

Some continue to believe that the fatal blow to Andaman
did not know what Admiral Bhagwat has stated. The basic came from an unusually high wave that fell with full force reality is that the Navy has to press on and depen on

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 247

on the 20th, Andaman had not reported any defect. He was

1 2 1 5 h r s T o w in g s t o p p e d . C a b le c o n n e c t e d t o to w r o p e .

to host a previously arranged seminar in Vishakhapatnam

Trishul r e s u m e d to w - s p e e d fo u r k n o ts .

on 21st August being attended by the CMS and other

1328 hrs Andaman started yawing whilst being towed. dignitaries. Before FOCEF departed at 1940 hrs on the Speed reduced to zero.

20th to take up position for the next morning’s exercise

1355 hrs The ship heeled over dangerously to port.

attack, he had detached Trishul to standby Andaman.

Everybody on board suddenly realised that
disaster was imminent. The Commanding

Invariably, whenever a catastrophe occurs, the first

Officer ordered ‘Abandon Ship’.

questions are usually based on gut reactions. How can a
warship sink in peacetime? Was she sea-worthy? If not, had

1359 hrs Trishul saw that Andaman was about to sink and the ship reported it to superior authority? If not, why not? If signalled Himgiri to immediately close her.

the ship had reported that she was not sea-worthy, why did

1401 hrs Trishul saw Andaman starting to go down and superior authority sail the ship? Concurrently, everybody cut the tow rope.

concerned begins to ensure that no blame should be

1403 hrs Andaman sank stern first.

attributed to him. It takes time for the dust to settle and for
a clear picture to emerge.

The Court Martial Findings

Andaman’s material state and sea-worthiness were

The Court Martial found the Commanding Officer guilty of known. Concern had been recorded at all levels: causing his ship to be lost at sea, negligently or by default,
for the following reasons:

• As regards the Naval Headquarters and Command
level, two significant letters were presented at the Court

• Failure to fight the initial flooding with all means at his

Martial as exhibits:

disposal and failure to adopt all the damage control
measures as laid down.

-In October 1989, Naval Headquarters (NHQ) had
written to Headquarters Eastern Naval Command

• Failure to ensure that all possible means and resources

(HQENC). Its gist was that Andaman’s six-yearly refit
at his disposal were employed to establish the source of
was scheduled to commence in October 1990, having
flooding in the Aft Engine Room and Controllable Pitch
been already delayed by nine years. Since her material

Propeller Compartment and subsequently to maintain
state, particularly hull and fittings and systems, would
vigilance in these compartments to prevent recurrence
have deteriorated beyond repair, this would enhance
of flooding.

the work package extensively. It was therefore

• Failure to exercise adequate vigilance in the Stabiliser
essential to review the desirability of giving the ship

Compartment which was a suspected area of weakness
a six-yearly refit. HQENC was requested to assess
and failure to take timely action to contain flooding in
the present material state of the ship and forward
this compartment, as a result of which the ship lost her
recommendations on the desirability or otherwise of
propulsion and power generation capability.

giving the ship a six-yearly refit.

• Failure to analyse and respond to a steadily deteriorating

-In November 1989, HQENC’s reply to NHQ stated
situation from 1600 hrs on 20th August onwards which
that compared to other Petyas of the same period,
resulted finally in the loss of the ship at about 1403 hrs

Andaman’s hull had required more attention as
on 21 August 1990.

indicated in two successive Docking Reports.

Reactions to the Foundering of the Andaman

Whereas the machinery and equipment would not
pose major problems to achieve a life of six years after

The Navy and the nation were aghast at the sinking of
the forthcoming two-year refit, the hull would have
the Andaman, 140 miles from Vishakhapatnam, in broad
to be attended to. On balance, it was desirable that
daylight, before the eyes of two frigates standing by to

Andaman be refitted.

assist her, just a day after the Commander in Chief and • Andaman’s Quarterly Letter of Proceedings dated July the Fleet Commander had been at sea exercising with

1990 had stated that the hull state, by and large, did
these ships. There was adverse comment in the media
not cause anxiety, though age was evident. The holes of
and misinformed speculation that Andaman had been

December 1989 in the stabiliser housing did have ingress

‘deserted’ in her hour of need.

of water at the rate of a bucket every four hours, but

The fact was that when FOC1NCEAST completed
meticulous rounds were being ensured. Strengthening
exercises and departed for Vishakhapatnam at 1620 hrs
of the area was done under the direct supervision of

' HQENC. Doors, hatches and latches were in a bad state

246 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

with watertight integrity being compromised constantly. professionalism of th e ships’ crew s. Andaman had been What was constantly put as “Defer to Next Refit” now operating in Sri Lankan w aters for 283 days for O peration perforce would have to be taken up by the Naval Dockyard Pawan.

Vishakhapatnam during the three-month Short Refit
scheduled to commence on 1 October 1990.

From one point of view, the foundering of the Andaman
was an accident waiting to happen. For years, no meaningful

At the time of Andaman’s foundering, Rear Admiral solution has been found to the problems experienced in Vishnu Bhagwat was the Chief of Staff in Western Naval the maintenance of the hulls of the thin-skinned ships of Command. He had earlier commanded a Petya. In later Russian origin. Hull corrosion is known to be greater in the years, he had been FOCEF, FOCINCWEST and CNS. warmer and more saline seawater of the tropics than it is in In his book “Betrayal of a Nation”, Admiral Bhagwat has the cooler and less saline seawater of the northern seas for stated:

which the Russian thin-skinned hulls have been designed.

The Navy had lost Andaman, a Petya class patrol Unless full-scale refit facilities are available, which can vessel, in August 1990. The Petyas were superbly remove and replace weakened hull plates and also, within designed, combined diesel and gas turbine driven ships the time frame of the ship’s refit, cope with the removal and with a design philosophy, stability and damage control replacement of the dense wiring and electronic equipment features amongst the best in the world for a warship. on the inner side of the plates being replaced, there is Even if one third of the forward end and one third of no alternative to either ‘adding doubler plates’ or ‘fixing the aft section of the ship suffered complete damage, cement boxes’ to deal with leaks in the hull. When such the ship could still float. However, INS Andaman had improvised measures are resorted to, there have to be been neglected for almost 10 years - essential refits and continuous and rigorous checks to see if they are holding.

defect rectification work were deferred from refit to refit. Andamans signal sent at 0335 hrs on 21st August shows These included underwater defects in the hull and subhow she was overtaken by events.

systems connected to the sea. The ship’s officers and

From another point of view, like all other ships of the
crew had given up the practice of preparing for Task same vintage, Andaman was seaworthy but not perfectly so.

I, Task II and Task III work-ups and inspections. The Given the Navy’s insufficient and overloaded refit facilities, Commanding Officers were interested in clocking days its shortfalls in spare parts availability and its overstretched at sea. “Staff-inspections", mandatory on completion operational commitments, ships have learnt to live with the of refit, and “Staff sea-checks” were shelved. Even the Dockyards’ recommendation to “Defer To Next Refit” and refit completion signal, which must be preceded by a Command Headquarters’ “approval” thereof. Commanding joint certification by the Heads of Departments of the Officers press on loyally with the operational tasks assigned ship, the Captain and the Refitting Dockyard - at the to them and rely on the training, experience, seamanship General Manager’s level - had become a mere formality. and good judgment of their officers and sailors to cope Hull surveys were carried out perfunctorily and the with emergencies at sea.

report itself did not reach the ship until months after
the “completion” of the refit. The staffs in Command

The sequence of events and the findings of the court

Headquarters were only too happy to defer rectification martial indicate how Andaman’s officers and sailors were of serious defects, which directly affected the safety of snowed under by the emergency. The speed at which the ship, till the next refit, thus taking unauthorised short crisis after crisis struck them overwhelmed them to such an extent that even the most elementary measures were
cuts. (Page 47)

forgotten:

“A document titled "Lessons learnt from INS Andaman” • Like trying to pinpoint the source of flooding - was it was formally promulgated by the Flag Officer Sea
internal from a burst fire main or external from a leak in

Training. (Page 48)”

the hull?

In Retrospect

• Like positioning sentries to report the rate of flooding in
each affected compartment and,

As can be seen from the other chapters in this volume,
the Dockyard in Vishakhapatnam had serious limitations. • Like shoring adjacent compartments to safeguard The bunching of refits was being compounded y t e
against their being flooded.

requirements of Operation Pawan. It was not that.the Navy

Some continue to believe that the fatal blow to Andaman
did not know what Admiral Bhagwat has stated. The basic came from an unusually high wave that fell with full force reality is that the Navy has to press on and depen on

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 247

on to the ship’s waist, which was awash, broke through
or even know how to cope with damage control or
the soft patch on top of the Aft Engine Room, flooded it
serious flooding will know how to apply that knowledge
instantly and eroded whatever little stability was left. They
to the specific systems of the ships they happen to be
believe that but for this wave, Andaman might just have
serving in. The Regulations for the Navy make it explicitly
made it back to port. Such beliefs are speculative. Warships
mandatory for ships’ officers and sailors to be rigorously
are designed to withstand very heavy weather. The essence
trained, on board, for every possible eventuality in their
of seamanship is never let a ship get into such a parlous
ship. The very first of every warship’s three priorities: To
situation that an unusual wave can sink it.

Float - To Move - To Fight - is To Float. The glamour of,
and the over-emphasis on peacetime spit and polish,

Apart from the technical aspects, the most basic of the
ship handling at high speed and the pressure to excel
lessons to be learnt from the foundering of the Andaman
in weaponry must never be at the cost of the utterly
are:

unglamorous and backbreaking priority of seamanlike

• Never to take for granted that improvised repairs to the
ship husbandry to ensure that the ship’s floatability is
hull would withstand rough weather. In Andamans case,
intact.

the holes in the stabiliser fin housings were known to be • Always to check, again and again before leaving harbour, an area of weakness. The conclusion that their cement
that all the ship’s pumps are fully serviceable. Twelve
boxes had failed came twelve hours too late.

hours before Andaman sank, not a single pump was

• Never to take for granted that officers and sailors who
operable to pump out water that was steadily flooding
have been trained “genetically” or have the experience
compartment after compartment.

248 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Defence Of Offshore Assets

P r e a m b l e
devices’. Discussions commenced on coordinating the

The Oil and Natural Gas Commissions (ONGC) activity in responsibilities for the safety and protection of the offshore the continental shelf off Bombay started in 1963 with an installations between the ONGC, the Coast Guard and the Navy.

experimental seismic survey by the vessel SS Mahindra.

Reconnaissance surveys by the Soviet ship Akademik

An Offshore Security Coordination Committee was

Arkhangellskey between 1964 and 1967 located promising established in 1978. In 1983, an Offshore Defence oil and gas deposits in an area 75 to 100 miles northwest Advisory Group (ODAG) was constituted under a Rear of Bombay. This area was named Bombay High.

Admiral (FODAG) to plan and advise the Navy and the

ONGC on the security and defence of Bombay offshore

In 1973, following the Arab-lsrael War, the oil producing infrastructure.

nations of West Asia raised the price of oil. This precipitated
a worldwide financial crisis, lt sharpened the urgency to

In 1985, approval was accorded for the resources required
develop Bombay High to minimise the outflow of foreign to counter the peacetime threats to the installations in exchange to pay for oil imports.

Bombay High, which, in view of the increasing number of
oil and gas fields, came to be called the Western Offshore

Drilling in Bombay High commenced on 30 January Region.

1974 using the Japanese built oil rig ‘Sagar Samrat’.

Oil was first struck on 18 February 1974. A year later,

1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - Safety
another oil-bearing reservoir was struck at a depth of

Zones around Offshore Structures

1,300 metres. ONGC intensified its surveys. These led After the first (1958) United Nations Conference on the over the years to the discovery of oil and gas fields that Law of the Sea, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the were named Heera, Panna, Ratna, Neelam, Mukta, Continental Shelf had provided for a safety zone of 500

Bassein and Daman. The installation of offshore metres around offshore structures and installations in platforms commenced in 1976.

which appropriate measures could be taken to ensure the

At the time of writing, the offshore production facilities safety, both of navigation and of the offshore structures include nearly 30 ‘Process’ and ‘Well-cum-Process’ and installations.

platforms and over a hundred and twenty 'Well platforms.

At the third (1972 to 1982) United Nations Conference

Pipelines on the seabed carry oil and gas from the well on the Law of the Sea, India had stated that considering platforms to the process platforms and from there to the size and speed of modern tankers and the time taken to onshore terminals at Gran and Hazira.

stop or divert such huge vessels, a 500 metre safety zone

The Defence of Offshore Assets
was totally inadequate. India, therefore, advocated enlarged
safety zones around oil installations and structures. This

The magnitude of capital investment and the consequences suggestion found place in the 1982 Convention on the of interruption in oil and gas production focused attention Law of the Sea but in a modified form. The Convention on protecting Bombay High from terrorist action during incorporated an enabling provision ‘allowing a coastal state peacetime and enemy action during war.

to promulgate safety zones in excess of 500 metres around
artificial islands, installations and structures, if authorised

The Coast Guard Act enacted in 1978 enjoined the by generally accepted standards or as recommended by Coast Guard to 'ensure the safety and protection of the competent international organisation.’

offshore terminals, installations and other structures an

on to the ship s waist, which was awash, broke through
or even know how to cope with damage control or
the soft patch on top of the Aft Engine Room, flooded it
serious flooding will know how to apply that knowledge
instantly and eroded whatever little stability was left. They
to the specific systems of the ships they happen to be
believe that but for this wave, Andaman might just have
serving in. The Regulations for the Navy make it explicitly
made it back to port. Such beliefs are speculative. Warships
mandatory for ships’ officers and sailors to be rigorously
are designed to withstand very heavy weather. The essence
trained, on board, for every possible eventuality in their
of seamanship is never let a ship get into such a parlous
ship. The very first of every warship’s three priorities: To
situation that an unusual wave can sink it.

Float - To Move - To Fight - is To Float. The glamour of,
and the over-emphasis on peacetime spit and polish,

Apart from the technical aspects, the most basic of the
ship handling at high speed and the pressure to excel
lessons to be learnt from the foundering of the Andaman
in weaponry must never be at the cost of the utterly
are:

unglamorous and backbreaking priority of seamanlike

• Never to take for granted that improvised repairs to the
ship husbandry to ensure that the ship’s floatability is
hull would withstand rough weather. In Andamans case,
intact.

the holes in the stabiliser fin housings were known to be • Always to check, again and again before leaving harbour, an area of weakness. The conclusion that their cement
that all the ship’s pumps are fully serviceable. Twelve
boxes had failed came twelve hours too late.

hours before Andaman sank, not a single pump was

• Never to take for granted that officers and sailors who
operable to pump out water that was steadily flooding
have been trained “generically" or have the experience
compartment after compartment.

248 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

30

Defence Of Offshore Assets

P r e a m b le
devices’. Discussions commenced on coordinating the

The Oil and Natural Gas Commissions (ONGC) activity in responsibilities for the safety and protection of the offshore the continental shelf off Bombay started in 1963 with an installations between the ONGC, the Coast Guard and the Navy.

experimental seismic survey by the vessel SS Mahindra.

Reconnaissance surveys by the Soviet ship Akademik

An Offshore Security Coordination Committee was

Arkhangellskey between 1964 and 1967 located promising established in 1978. In 1983, an Offshore Defence oil and gas deposits in an area 75 to 100 miles northwest Advisory Group (ODAG) was constituted under a Rear of Bombay. This area was named Bombay High.

Admiral (FODAG) to plan and advise the Navy and the

ONGC on the security and defence of Bombay offshore

In 1973, following the Arab-lsrael War, the oil producing infrastructure.

nations of West Asia raised the price of oil. This precipitated
a worldwide financial crisis. It sharpened the urgency to

In 1985, approval was accorded for the resources required
develop Bombay High to minimise the outflow of foreign to counter the peacetime threats to the installations in exchange to pay for oil imports.

Bombay High, which, in view of the increasing number of
oil and gas fields, came to be called the Western Offshore

Drilling in Bombay High commenced on 30 January Region.

1974 using the Japanese built oil rig ‘Sagar Samrat’.

Oil was first struck on 18 February 1974. A year later,

1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - Safety
another oil-bearing reservoir was struck at a depth of

Zones around Offshore Structures

1,300 metres. ONGC intensified its surveys. These led After the first (1958) Gnited Nations Conference on the over the years to the discovery of oil and gas fields that Law of the Sea, the 1958 Geneva Convention on the were named Heera, Panna, Ratna, Neelam, Mukta, Continental Shelf had provided for a safety zone of 500

Bassein and Daman. The installation of offshore metres around offshore structures and installations in platforms commenced in 1976.

which appropriate measures could be taken to ensure the

At the time of writing, the offshore production facilities safety, both of navigation and of the offshore structures include nearly 30 ‘Process’ and ‘Well-cum-Process
and installations.

platforms and over a hundred and twenty ‘Well’ platforms.

At the third (1972 to 1982) Gnited Nations Conference

Pipelines on the seabed carry oil and gas from the well on the Law of the Sea, India had stated that considering platforms to the process platforms and from there to the size and speed of modem tankers and the time taken to onshore terminals at (Jran and Hazira.

stop or divert such huge vessels, a 500 metre safety zone

The Defence of Offshore Assets
was totally inadequate. India, therefore, advocated enlarged
safety zones around oil installations and structures. This

The magnitude of capital investment and the consequences suggestion found place in the 1982 Convention on the of interruption in oil and gas production focused attention Law of the Sea but in a modified form. The Convention on protecting Bombay High from terrorist action during incorporated an enabling provision ‘allowing a coastal state peacetime and enemy action during war.

to promulgate safety zones in excess of 500 metres around
artificial islands, installations and structures, if authorised

The Coast Guard Act enacted in 1978 enjoined the by generally accepted standards or as recommended by Coast Guard to ‘ensure the safety and protection of the competent international organisation.’

offshore terminals, installations and other structures an

INDIA'S OFFSHORE OIL BASTNS

B A N G LA D ESH

K O L K A T A

Anfcleshwar
r }

V ; (M YA N M A R

( B U R M A )

PA RA D ]

Bom b ay High

MUMBAI

V IS H A K H A P A T N A M .

C H E N N A I

K O C H I

SRI J

LANKA

NICOBAR ISLANDS

COLOUR CODE

: Offshore Oil Basins on tho Continental Shelf.

: Deep Offshore beyond 200 metres depth (1.35 million Square Kilometres).

Traffic Regulatory Scheme

Regular exercises are conducted with the Air Force, the

Coast Guard and the ONGC to update contingency plans.

The Western Offshore Region straddles the customary
route into Bombay Harbour. A Traffic Regulatory Scheme

Developments in the 1990s
was promulgated in 1985. It required vessels destined
for, or departing from, Bombay to follow ‘recommended Surveys indicated that India’s continental shelf had routes’. Since these were ‘recommendatory’ rather than potentially rich oil and gas resources in the Palk Bay, mandatory, these routes were not always followed. A Cauvery and Krishna-Godavari River Basins and gas mandatory Vessel Traffic Separation Scheme is under reserves in the Andaman Offshore.

consideration.

As part of the liberalisation reforms, private oil companies,

Resources for the Protection of Offshore Assets
both Indian and foreign, were permitted through joint
ventures with the national oil companies to explore new

After studying how other nations were dealing with the oil and gas reserves, develop proven reserves, lay pipelines threats to their offshore installations and considering the and establish refineries.

nature of the threat in our environment, forces were built

The extension of offshore activities to both coasts and
up for protecting the offshore installations. These included into deeper waters increased ODAG's responsibilities.

offshore patrol vessels (OPVs), Dornier maritime patrol
aircraft, helicopters to fly in Marine Commandos of the

Quick Reaction Force and radars.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 251

31

Personnel

• To conserve expertise despite this endless movement of

P r e a m b l e
personnel.

Personnel management policy was driven by a wide range

• To rationalise trade structures to keep abreast of
of considerations:

technological change.

• To overcome shortages by constantly innovating the • To optimise the utilisation of personnel and, in view of schemes of intake.

the costs involved, to minimise their movement across

• To raise the educational standards of intake so that
the subcontinent of India.

personnel could cope with the rising technological levels
of naval equipment.

Even though Manning and Training are at the core of the

Personnel function, they have been discussed in separate

• To enhance allowances like flying bounty, submarine chapters to facilitate better understanding. This chapter pay, diving money and survey allowance as incentives discusses the issues that have not been discussed in those to attract talent into volunteering for these arduous
specialisations.

two chapters.

• To juggle these considerations within the overarching

O fficers
constraint of avoiding disparity with the Army and the Air

Force in educational, physical and medical recruitment Increasing Officer Intake standards, pay scales, length of colour service, pension The schemes of officer intake that had been initiated in benefits and equivalence with civilian trades at the time earlier years continued to evolve: of resettlement.

• The Direct Entry Scheme that had started in 1965 was

• To reduce durations of courses, so as to increase the
made more attractive in 1971 by offering Executive
manpower available for manning new acquisitions.

candidates ‘permanent’ commissions instead of short

• To induce personnel to remain in service and minimise
service’ commissions. In 1975, this scheme started
the exodus of trained and experienced manpower to
offering permanent commissions to Engineering and
the better paid Merchant Navy / civil sector by offering

Electrical candidates also.

longer careers, better emoluments, subsidised

• In 1965, the University Entry Scheme, which till then
domestic accommodation, subsidised schooling
was applicable only to commissions in the Electrical
for children, canteen facilities, Group Insurance

Branch, was extended to the Engineering Branch.

Schemes and generous loans from the Indian Naval

Benevolent Association to meet pressing domestic • The Revised Special Entry Scheme (R SES) had been requirements.

introduced in 1968 for cadets who had reached the

Intermediate standard in education. In 1969, a Naval

• On board ships, to minimise disparities between

Academy was temporarily established at Cochin to train
departments and specialisations / trades in terms of

80 R SES cadets annually. In 1971, intake was increased
workload and the less-relished duties like clean ship and
through this scheme.

ship husbandry.

• In 1974, to maintain parity with the NDA graduate

All these considerations had to be harmonised:

cadets, the educational level of the Naval Academy s

• To keep officers and sailors ready for combat despite
intake was raised. Science graduates started being
their having to be periodically rotated into and out of
taken in for the Executive Branch under the Graduate
ships.

Special Entry Scheme (G SES). The Union Public

Service Commission’s Combined Defence Services

(CDS) Examination was introduced in 1974 to replace
in operational ships were less than the number required
the separate examinations, which used to be held for
for each rank.

cadets to join the Naval Academy’s GSES entry, the

Indian Military Academy, and the Air Force Academy.

© What should be the optimum duration of a sea tenure?

Should it be long enough for expertise to develop? The
o In 1982, short service commissions were revived for
longer this duration, the fewer the sea billets that would

University Entry Technical Graduate Scheme and the
be available.

Direct Entry Scheme for the Engineering and Electrical © What should be done if there were no seagoing billets at Branches. Moreover, the disciplines of Aeronautical
all in some specialisations and their ranks?

Engineering, Production Engineering, Metallurgical

Engineering and Control Engineering were included in the o How should parity be maintained between the officers eligibility for Direct Entry into the Engineering Branch.

in ships and those in the Air Arm and the Submarine

Arm? For example, in the Air Arm, how was sea time
o In 1983 and 1984, to further increase the induction of
to be counted for pilots and observers of flights
officers into the technical branches, new schemes of
embarked on board and not actually employed on
entry were introduced:

watch keeping duties vis-a-vis pilots and observers

-Naval Sponsorship Scheme: Gp to 50 candidates
performing operational duties in shore-based front-line
could be selected from amongst l sl and 2nd year
squadrons?

students in the Indian Institutes of Technology and o To overcome this problem of billets, should Executive selected Engineering Colleges and granted permanent
branch officers in the rank of Commander and Captain
commission on successful completion of their
be subdivided into Post List (‘seagoing stream',

Engineering Course. Their tuition fees would be paid
colloquially known as the ‘Wet List’) and General List1
by the Government and they would also be paid a

(4non-seagoing stream’, the ‘Dry List’)?

stipend of Rs.400/-per month whilst in college.

© Could tenures in specified shore billets be ‘equated’ to

- 10+2 Technical CadeL Entry Scheme: 30 cadets
sea time?

per year could be inducted from amongst students,
completing the 10+2 stage. These cadets would © Was there a need to codify the weightage to be given to sea reports for promotion to higher ranks? The
undergo a 4-year Basic Engineering Course at the
weightage, if given to sea-time as opposed to shore

Naval College of Engineering.

time would work to the disadvantage of officers in high
o In 1987, following on from the success of the 10+2
profile appointments ashore.

Technical Cadet Entry Scheme, the 10+2 Executive • Did the existing ACR appraisal form have enough inputs Cadet Entry Scheme was implemented for recruiting
to enable the Initiating Officers to form a valid opinion

80 Executive Branch cadets every year to undergo three
regarding the suitability of the officer for sea-time / sea
years training at the Naval Academy.

command?

Professionalism at Sea and its Linkage with

Rationalising the ‘Rules of Sea Time’

Promotions

Each of the issues listed above was worked through to

By the mid 1970s, new Leanders, Petyas and submarines rationalise the rules for sea time: had entered service. Helicopters were being embarked in
ships. Attention turned to the linkage between promotions • Duration of Sea Tenure. Officers of the rank of Lieutenant Commander would be given a minimum of 12 months
and professionalism performance at sea.

sea time until such time as it became feasible for this

Several considerations had to be balanced:

duration to be increased to 18 months.

• To be eligible for promotion, an officer was required to have

All officers in command would be given 18 months’

gone to sea in the previous rank. There were not enough
sea time.

billets in ships to fulfil this requirement for each rank.

• Statutory Sea Time in the Rank of Lieutenant

• How was sea time’ to be interpreted? Appointment to a

Commander. This could be done either in the rank
ship? Or appointments only to operational ships? Billets
of Lieutenant Commander or after attaining six years

1 In naval parlance, the expression 'General Lisf has two different meanings depending upon the context: i. Those who joined as officers as opposed to the 'Special D u t t e s l^ c o ^ ^
o f f ic e r lo f T h e 'C e Branch as opposed to the 'Post List' of seagoing officers of this Branch.

ii. The non-seagoing

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 253

the officer cadre. It was decided that Promotion Boards
seniority in the rank of Lieutenant. For this purpose sea would recommend officers’ suitability or otherwise for time’ was defined as follows:

sea time / sea command. The Chief of Naval Staff would

-General List 4

E x e c u tiv e ‘Engineering’ & ‘ Electrical' give due consideration to these recommendations when Officers 2 Only billets on board ship / submarines, in deciding afloat appointments.

fleet staff and in fleet support appointments would
count as sea time.

Aircrew Officers in Embarked Flights

- Pilots / Observers. Time in embarked squadrons/ flights The problems faced by aircrew officers serving in would count as sea time provided these officers carried helicopter flights that embarked only when ships went out watch-keeping and other ship’s duties. Commanding to sea continued to persist for several years. Due to the Officers were required to make specific mention in the shortage of qualified aircrew and of operation^ aircraft, ACRs of these officers of their performance as watch- they were constantly transferred from ship to ship. Since keepers and in ship’s duties. Officers of shore-based
front-line squadrons would be appointed to afloat billets these moves were classified as a ‘temporary transfer’, they disqualified flight crew from being reported upon whilst
for sea time.

temporarily embarked unless they were able to serve the

-A ir Technical Officers. Air technical appointments mandatory three months in a ship to ensure the initiation afloat and appointments in all air squadrons, including of an ACR. To avoid ACR injustice to aircrew’, all flight /
appointments as flight engineers, would count as sea aircrew transfers started being promulgated by NHQ to give time.

these inter-ship moves a semblance of ‘permanence’. This

• Statutory Requirement for Sea Time in the Rank of did not work too well. In due course, it became possible to Commander. This was removed for both Executive and

‘base’ embarked helicopter flights in the proximate naval

Technical officers. The guidelines promulgated for their air station where the ships were based - INS Kunjali in career planning and promotion were:

Bombay, INS Garuda in Cochin and INS Vega in Vizag.

-Promotion boards for Commanders and Captains
would recommend executive branch officers for Improvements in Annual Confidential Report (ACR) appointments afloat, including fitness for command Forms
afloat. Due weightage would be given to such officers ACR forms were reviewed to improve the inputs regarding for their subsequent promotion.

the determination of suitability for sea-time / sea

- For promotion to the next higher rank, Commanders command.

and Captains of the Technical branches should have
held one of the following appointments:

Linking the Command Examination and the Staff

Course

* Appointment afloat.

* Appointment in Dockyards, Base Maintenance The ‘Command Examination’ had been instituted in 1974

Units (of ships and submarines), Base Maintenance to encourage Executive Branch officers to improve their Facilities (of aircraft), Afloat Support Teams (ASTs),
professional knowledge. Subsequently, for the respective

Naval Aircraft Repair Organisation, Technical Position branches, the Technical Management and Logistic (TP) or a similar maintenance / repair organisation.

Management Examinations were instituted as equivalents

* Staff appointment in Command Headquarters, air of the Command Examination.

station / squadrons or squadron staff of ships.

In 1977, qualifying in the Command / Technical

* Special naval projects as approved by the Chief of Management / Logistics Management Examinations was the Naval Staff.

made a prerequisite to selection for the Staff Course. To

‘Wet’ and ‘Dry’ Lists
dovetail with the Staff Course annual programme, from

1978 onwards, these examinations started being held in

The proposal for the formal classification of officers into February - March every year.

Wet (Post) and Dry (General) Lists was not pursued because Career Prospects and Cadre Reviews3
of the apprehension that would arise that the promotion
prospects of officers in the Post and General Lists would From the mid 1970s onwards, the Defence Services vary widely and this would adversely affect the morale of
found that they were no longer attracting candidates of

2. As opposed to Special Duties List.

3. The Navy’s rationale and the after effects have been discussed i Reviews’’, page 299.

greater detail in the Historical Reference Data section titled “Cadre 254 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

th e re q u isite c alib re . D e sp ite lo w e rin g o f intake stan d ard s

© Offsetting the impact of the above through measures
th e s e rv ic e s w e re , at tim e s, fo rce d to leave q u o tas unfilled to enhance the official status and improve upon the

S e r v ic e H e a d q u a rte r s started fo rm u latin g p ro p o sals to economic condition of defence personnel.

m a k e th e S e r v ic e s m o re attractive. T h e s e p ro p o sals led to the Cadre Reviews.

© Project the eroding attractiveness of the Armed Forces
and the immediate need for reversing this trend.

A major proposal was to reduce the gap in career
prospects between Defence personnel and those of other

The proposals put up by the Navy for consideration in
the Second Cadre Review were:

Central Government services. There were large differences
in (.he percentage of officers promoted to the corresponding © Up-gradations in various ranks and pay promotions.

grades in the civil vis-a-vis service cadres. An equally wide © Time scale promotion to the rank of Commander.

gap existed in the number of years taken to attain these © De-linking of pay and pension from rank.

grades.

© Improvements in the Special Duties List Cadre.

j he First Cadre Review

There were misgivings in the Navy regarding the effect

The Navy’s case for the First Cadre Review comprised that the up-gradations would have on the traditional proposals for better promotion prospects for officers and hierarchy on board ships. However, since the Army had men and for improved perquisites like increase in sailors’ decided to go for large-scale up-gradations and since Authorised Married Establishment (AME), facility to hire the Air Force had fallen in line with the Army, the Navy accommodation in places other than at duty station, subsumed its misgivings.

higher percentage of jobs in the CPO/PO ranks, increase Officer Up-gradations in the Second Cadre Review in the Special Duties (SD) Cadre (the Special Duties cadre
comprises promotees from sailor rank to officer rank). Approval was accorded for the creation / upgradation Because of inter-service implications, the above proposals of the following to be phased over a period of two years were deferred for further consideration.

commencing from the financial year 1984-85:

© Vice Admirals

-

26

Flag Rank Up-gradations

© Rear Admirals

-

57

Discussions in 1979 centred on cadre review for Flag • Captains

-

45

Rank. Approval was accorded for upgradation of three

Rear Admirals to Vice Admirals4 and eight Captains / © Commanders

-

100

Commodores to Rear Admirals3, to be phased over a Additional Concessions Approved as Part of the Second period of three years commencing 1980.

Cadre Review

The Second Cadre Review

• Promotion to the rank of Commander (Time Scale) on
completion of 21 years commissioned service.

The aims of the Second Cadre Review were:

• Promotion from Lieutenant to Lieutenant Commander

• Restoration of the post-Independence parity in the

(Special Duties List) by time scale on completion of 11
official status of Armed Forces personnel vis-a-vis the
years commissioned service.

All India Civil Services.

• Ratio for promotion to the rank of Sub Lieutenant

• Recognition of the high risk career, personal hardships
enhanced by 20%.

and sacrifices, strict code of discipline, devotion above The Special Duties List and beyond the call of duty, and the qualifications of the

Armed Forces personnel being commensurate with the In 1976, the existing provision for the re-employment of technological advances.

retired officers of the General List up to the age of 56 years

4. These were Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral Superintendent Naval Dockyard Bom bay and R ag Officer Commanding Western Fleet'

N r h . f
f s t ff of ^ Western and Eastern Naval Com mands and in N H Q the Assistant Chief of N avaf Staff (^ ^ ra to n s )^ tlw M s is te n tC h ie f of Naval Staff (Air), the Assistant Chief of Personnel (Career Planning), the Assistant Chief of M aterial (Dockyards and Refits), the Assistant Chief of Material (System s).

These were C hief of Logistics and Controller of Warship Production & Acquis.tion.

These were Ch ef of

^

^

^
ch ief Staff officer

W estem Nava,

These were C hief o f Staff, Sou th ern n av
t ch ief of Personne| (Civilians).

Com m and, Flag O fficer Bom bay and .n NHQ , Assistant u n e

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 255

cadre of Commander (SD) and Captain (SD). Promotions
was extended to officers of the Special Duties List. Also, as to these ranks were made in exceptionally deserving cases a temporary measure for two years, approval was accorded only and against vacancies to the General List Cadre.

for re-employed SD List officers to be appointed against
vacancies in the General List.

Honorary Commissions in the SD List

In 1978, the promotion rules for SD List officers were An Honorary Commission in the rank of Sub Lieutenant and liberalised:

Lieutenant in the Special Duties List was instituted as an

• SD List officers could attain the rank of Lieutenant (SD) award that deserving MCPO l/lls could aspire for at the end of on completion of 3 years of commissioned service as their service. The Honorary rank gave recipients some officer against 5 years.

status and privileges and also certain monetary benefits8 and

• The number of vacancies in the rank of Lieutenant was something that sailors who had seived the Navy hard and Commander (SD) was increased from 10% to 20%. This long could look forward to at the end of their careers.

would ensure that the rank of Lieutenant Commander

The awards are made on Republic Day and Independence

(SD) would be available to 90% of eligible SD List officers Day each year at the discretion of the Chief of the Naval Staff.

as against 30% in the past.

In selecting sailors for an award of Honorary Commission,

To widen the promotion avenues, the age limits of some of the factors that are considered are length of sailors were lowered in 1982 from 30 years to 20 years service, sea service record, performance on instructional for appearing in the Special Duty List examination for duties, annual ‘superior’ assessments, participation in extra promotion to the officer cadre.

curricular activities and recommendations. The award of
an Honorary Commission is an expression of appreciation

In 1983, eligibility for commission in the Special Duty

List was extended to non-artificer technical sailors.

and its nature entails that it be given to the deserving sailors
just prior to their retirement.

The Second Cadre Review enhanced by 20% the ratio
for promotion to the rank of Sub Lieutenant and authorised

In 1984, the ratio for promotion for Honorary Sub
promotion from Lieutenant to Lieutenant Commander (SD) Lieutenant was increased from 10 per thousand to 12 per by time scale on completion of 11 years commissioned thousand sailors sanctioned.

service.

Naval Officers Computerised Management

In 1984, approval was accorded for SD list Commanders Information System with four years seniority to be be considered for promotion
to the rank of Captain (SD).

The computerisation of officers’ personal records
commenced in end 1980 and completed in mid

The end position that emerged was:

1983. The Naval Officers Computerised Management

• Sub Lt (SD) to Lt (SD) - 3
years*
commissioned

Information System (NOCMIS) contained confidential
service as Acting Sub Lt/ information like course grading, flying assessments Sub Lt (SD).

and data from confidential reports. The Management

Information System was designed to assist in deciding

• Lt (SD) to Lt Cdr (SD)

- 11 years’ commissioned
placements, selection for courses and key appointments,
service.

career and appointment planning, awards, retirements,

• Lt Cdr (SD) to Cdr (SD) - 3 years’ seniority as Lt Cdr
post retirement placements.

(SD).

• Cdr (SD) to Captain (SD) - 4 years’ seniority as Cdr

Sailors

(SD).

Increasing the Period of Engagement

Promotions up to the rank of Lieutenant Commander Until 1965, a sailor’s initial period of engagement had been in the SD List Cadre were by time scale, subject to a ten years. On completion, he could re-engage for five years satisfactory record of service, on completion of requisite and for two years thereafter up to a total of seventeen years.

number of years of service as indicated above.

The authority for re-engagement beyond seventeen years

Promotions to the rank of Commander SD and Captain vested in Naval Headquarters. Normally, all sailors were (SD) were by selection. There was no separate sanctioned
re-engaged up to twenty years of service if recommended

■ l'” d m IH0" “

U -

■"« Hon L, - Rs 1.100, * n S * »

256 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

by their Commanding Officer. Re-engagement beyond
twenty years was on a selective basis.

-Serving sailors who were already matriculates would
re-muster into Group B and those who qualified

In 1966, to meet the increase in manpower for the
subsequently would also re-muster into Group B.

Russian acquisitions, sailors were allowed to re-engage up to

-The age of entry for Boys was revised to 16 - 18 years
a total period of twenty five years or age of superannuation
and that for Direct Entry sailors to 18-20 years.

whichever was earlier, subject to the Commanding Officers’ © Abolition of Boy Entry: With the introduction of Matric recommendation. This helped to promote a greater sense

Entry recruitment, it was decided to abolish the Boy
of security of employment amongst sailors and ensure a

Entry and have only one Sailors Training Establishment
longer career for those who volunteered for further service.

(STE).

In 1973, re-engagement was permitted for five years at ® Time Scale Promotion to Leading Rank: To improve a time up to the compulsory age of retirement.

the career prospects of sailors, it was decided in 1977
that all sailors would be promoted to Leading Rank on

In 1976, the period of initial engagement was increased
completion of five years of service in man’s rank, subject
from 10 to 15 years to provide for a longer tenure of service
to having qualified in the prescribed examinations.

and better utilisation of trained manpower resources. This ° Increase in Retirement Ages: Time Scale promotion to also enabled all sailors to earn the minimum pension on
leading rank ensured that all sailors would be able to
completion of their initial engagement. Sailors wishing to
serve up to at least 45 years of age. The new retirement
continue their engagement could do so as per the rules in
ages became 45 years for Leading Seaman and below,
force.

50 years for Chief Petty Officers and Petty officers and

55 years for Master Chief Petty Officers.

In 1987, approval was accorded for the enrolment of
sailors for an initial period of 20 years (instead of the earlier Change in the Educational Qualification for Matric 15 years). This was particularly significant in the case of Entry Recruitment artificers because their employability now increased to 15 In 1987, the educational qualification for Matric Entry years after their initial training of 5 years.9

Recruitment was revised in order to meet the challenge of

Changes in Sailors’ Conditions of Service
operating and maintaining sophisticated equipment and
machinery:

In July 1976, in consonance with the recommendations • General Candidates: Matric or equivalent with 55% or of the Third Pay Commission, several changes were
above marks.

implemented in sailors’ conditions of service:

• For sons and blood brothers of Naval Personnel: Matric

© The educational qualification for entry was raised to
or equivalent with 45% or above marks.

Matriculation for Boy Entry sailors of all branches and
for Direct Entry Seaman and Engineering branch sailors.

Policy for Transferring Sailors into and out of Ships

As a result:

The driving wheel of the Navy’s management of its sailor

- Direct Entry Seamen and Communication sailors, cadres was its ‘transfer’ policy. The Annual Training Engineering Mechanics, Electrical Mechanics, Writers, Programme for higher rank courses, the annual programme Stores Assistants and Medical Attendants all came on of Fleet Exercises during which sailors got ‘sea time’, the par, educationally and pay wise. All future entrants Annual Refit Programme and the closing of childrens would receive the higher Group B scale of pay.1
academic year were all dovetailed.

- Non-matriculate Direct Entry Stewards, Cooks,

On the one hand, the promotion regulations required

Musicians and Topasses could join on the lower Group sailors to qualify in higher rate professional courses and to C scale of pay.

be given adequate sea time. On the other hand, this policy

—— --------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------; f period of 10 years on completion of initial Apprentice training of 4 years, i.e. after

9. Prior to

' " 1 1 %

The 1976 increase in the period of initial engagement to 15 years did not really achieve the desired objective becoming Artificer 5l Class. The 1976 inc £ ^
jn mQSt case5i they were now required to serve only one or two years more of increasing the useful service or artificers app
y
than they were expected to serve prior to 1976

^
tQ Defence Minister BablJ jagjivan Ram. His rationale was that in the

10. The credit for this financially significant weltar

^ persons (himself, his wife and three children) and also looks after his Indian milieu, every sailor, soldier and airman ee
scales of pay, over five million families would benefit,
parents. By raising this segment from Group C to Group B

P *

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 257

- For Leading Seamen / equivalents From 80% to 90%
of continuously transferring sailors into and out of ships
conflicted with the consolidation of expertise.

- For Seamen I/II / equivalents

From 35% to 50%

The Drafting Office (later named as the Bureau of Artificers

Sailors) had the onerous task of balancing these conflicting With new technologies entering service with the Russian requirements and of providing equal opportunity. It took acquisitions and the Leander class frigates, the inability several years to arrive at the right balance and evolve a to make up the shortage of artificers remained a constant system based on computerisation of sailors records and cause of concern. The better emoluments and perquisites systematising feedback from ships of individual sailor offered by private industry and the Merchant Navy could capabilities, limitations and expertise.

not be matched by the Navy. Most experienced artificers

This issue has been dealt with in greater detail in the left the Navy after having served minimum time.

chapter on the Manning of Ships and the Conservation of

Several schemes were initiated to remedy the shortage.

Expertise.

One was to recruit holders of diplomas from polytechnics

The Master Chief Petty Officer (MCPO) Cadre
as ‘direct entry artificers’. Whilst this helped to meet the
immediate need by avoiding the long four-year initial

In 1968, as an inducement for sailors to re-engage for training that artificer apprentices underwent, it had the longer service, the MCPO cadre was created as the naval disadvantage of insufficient naval indoctrination of an age equivalent of Junior Commissioned Officers (JCOs) of group that would become Petty Officers on board ships the Army and Warrant / Master Warrant Officers of the Air within a few years of joining.

Force. The MCPO Cadre was sanctioned as a percentage
of the sanctioned cadre of CPOs:

In 1966, recruitment commenced of diploma holders as

Technical

Non-Technical
artificers to be trained for 1 V2 years instead of the 4 years
training given to regular entry artificer apprentices.

MCPO Class I

15%

12 ]/2 %

MCPO Class II

25%

25%

In 1967, Direct Entry Artificer intake was increased to

120.

Second Cadre Review Sailor CJpgradations

In 1970, the shortage of artificers in the Submarine Cadre

Artificers

To Chief Artificers

59
led to the induction of Direct Entry Artificers Acting 4th class

Non-Artificers To Master Chief / Chief Petty

39011
of three / four year diplomas in mechanical, electrical and

Officers
aeronautical engineering. Simultaneously, this entry was

To Petty Officers

60
permitted for engineering and electrical artificers.

Additional Concessions Approved as part of the

By 1971, the deficiency in the artificer cadre had been

Second Cadre Review
brought down from 30% to 10%. From 1972 onwards,
the artificer shortage persisted at 10%. In 1983, approval

• Increase in ratio for the award of Long Service and Good

Conduct Medal and Meritorious Medal increased to 4 was accorded for the recruitment, on a regular basis for a per 800 sailors.

period of 5 years, of artificers from amongst candidates
holding diplomas in the various engineering disciplines.

• Authorised Married Establishment for the grant of Cash
in Lieu of Quarters increased:

In 1987, the initial engagement for artificers was
increased to 20 years. In 1988, shortages started reducing

11. Vice Admiral VL Koppikar served in the Personnel Branch from Deputy Director all the way up to Chief of Personnel, interspersed with appointments at sea. Writing in the Navy Foundation’s annual publication ‘Quarterdeck 2000', he stated: Perhaps one of the most hastily implemented decisions of those years was the creation of two additional ranks, MCPO I and MCPO
in the Sailor Cadre For a while, it threw the Navy completely off balance. There appeared to be no justification for these two ranks at the apex level without enhanced responsibilities or accountability. There were problems galore of manning and m a n a g e m e n t, of ftCn n ^ T tha„ h>hanrt

,al1 9 partif f° r r ioUS tasks- A" of 3 Sudden there were 'to° many Chiefs and very few Indians'. Above all.

.t pushed the hitherto prest,glous ranks of CPO and PO into the shade. That, in my view was the saddest part."

saitors5of r a n t T a U h T ir A r m y a n d

° n *,he ° ne h a n d ' ilis u n ju stto d eP " V e f
and in numbers accordina tn functional

,
f
hand, sailors accom m odation on board ships is graded rank-wise
arise not only of habitability but also of their having to'dTwork that was e ^ r S b d n f d ^ e b 5 '

t ^ l° ° m3ny Seni° r Sai' ° rS’ pr° blemS
was that the ratio of senior sailors (Petty Officers and above) to junior sailors (Leading ran/andbelow ) hailed fro m l 4 ^ : f 258 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

and the Direct Entry Scheme was discontinued When Radar Instructor (PR I). These ‘Instructors’ were a highly shortages recurred, the scheme had to be revived.

dedicated group of senior professional sailors backed up

The Navy-Entry Artificers Scheme
by specialised ‘instructor’ qualifying courses. Their major
role was operational training on board ships and instruc

This scheme was started in 1987, as part of the measures tions at various professional schools. In addition, they were to revitalise the Navy’s manning and training systems. Its responsible through their respective departmental officers aim was to improve the career prospects for young, bright for the conduct of the sailors in their department and the and technically oriented Matric Entry sailors of all branches overall efficiency of their department. In the course of their and to reduce artificer shortages.

duties, these instructors shouldered extra responsibility and

_ Non-artificer sailors from the Seaman, Communication, grew in stature. Although they did not get any monetary Engineering and Electrical branches including the Survey benefits, they had an edge over their counterparts and were looked up to with awe and respect.

and Aviation cadres were made eligible to become
artificers. To be eligible, a sailor had to secure 65% marks

In the 1970s, with the induction of the Leander class
during initial training, be under 25 years of age, have frigates and Soviet origin ships, weapon systems proliferathree years service including one year at sea, have passed ted. Vertical specialisation and the Pre Commissioning a written examination in English, General Knowledge, Training were adopted to man and operate the complex General Science and Mathematics. Selected sailors new systems. These led to the conclusion that an Instructor underwent conversion / professional courses, on successful could not possibly master the variety of systems in his completion of which they could be promoted to the rank of specialisation and in 1979 led to the restructuring of the Acting Artificer Fourth Class.

Instructor Cadre.

432 MER sailors of all branches appeared in the first

From 1980 onwards, sailors with aptitude for
written examination held in January 1990 in which 53 instructional duties and having the requisite professional sailors qualified, from which 27 were finally selected, based knowledge were supposed to be selected to undergo a on merit and the vacancies available.

newly introduced instructors’ course before appointment
for training duties. The new scheme was not successful in

Changes in the Sailor Structure
attracting volunteers for instructional duties.

After the arrival from Britain of the cruiser Mysore in For the next ten years, very few instructors were trained.

1957, the eight new frigates between 1958 and 1961 and The previously trained Instructors continued to man key the aircraft carrier Vikrant in 1961, it was clear that the posts on board and ashore and their contribution continued increase in sophistication of ships and equipment called to be found invaluable. With the passage of time, most of for a comprehensive re-look at the existing ranks, rates and these sailors retired.

trades of the Navy’s sailors. A committee was appointed to

By the end 1980s, there was a growing consensus for
review the sailor structure.

the re-introduction of the Instructor Cadre in the Seaman

By the time this committee convened in 1966, the Branch not only to rejuvenate training ashore but also first of the Russian acquisitions arrived and sharpened consolidate and improve professional training afloat. In the assessment that there was going to be a shortage of 1990, the Navy re-introduced the Instructors Cadre for all bunks on board. At this time, sailors were being selected branches.

to undergo training in Russia to man the submarines, the Computerisation of Sailors’ Service Records Petyas and the Submarine Depot Ship and problems had
arisen on how to accommodate the Navy’s numerous The computerisation of Sailors’ Service Records trades in the fewer bunks.

commenced in 1979 and completed in 1982. This
personnel management information system was designed

These and associated aspects have been dealt with in to ensure effective management of sailors’ appointments, the chapter on the Manning of Ships and the Conservation training and promotions.

of Expertise.

The Revised Commissions and Warrants Scheme

The Instructor Cadre

The number of sailors who became officers under the

Up to 1979, the Navy had an Instructor Cadre in the Old Commissions and Warrants (CW) scheme was found Seaman Branch, namely Gunnery Instructor (GI), ° rPe 0 to be very meagre. In 1978, a revised CW scheme was Anti Submarine Instructor (TAS I) and Plotting

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 259

introduced for granting permanent commission to eligible © In Naval technical functions life draftsmen, naval sailors, both artificers and non-artificers, who had the
technical specialists in DRDO laboratories.

minimum qualification of matriculation.

© In Naval Store Depots, Naval Armament Depots and

Weapon Equipment Depots - for the storage, upkeep,

Distance Education Programme for Sailors’

accounting, repair and indenting of their respective

Educational Tests ET1/ET1 (M)

stores.

In 1990, Naval Headquarters launched the Distance

© In shore offices for secretarial and clerical duties.

Education Programme for sailors preparing for their ET1

© In Naval shore establishments for motor transport driver

& ET1 (M) examinations. Graded lessons in Language and
and general conservancy duties.

General Knowledge and Mathematics were despatched to
ships and establishments where sailors had registered for

In the case of the civilian personnel performing store-
this programme.

keeping duties, very little systematic career progression

The Navy’s Civilian Personnel
training had been attempted to enhance their productivity.

The results of this neglect began to show from the 1960s

The basic advantage of civilian personnel has been their onwards. The induction of new technologies in the Russian greater continuity in shore assignments, as opposed to uniacquisitions and the Leander class frigates greatly increased formed personnel whose assignments afloat and ashore the importance of the duties entrusted to civilian personnel.

change frequently. From the functional point of view, the It did not take long for the infirmities in the civilian cadres Navy’s dependence on civilian manpower lay principally in to affect the operational availability of ships, particularly in the following fields:

the field of spare parts. This compelled the institution of the

• In Nava! Dockyards and Base Repair Organisations systematic training programmes that in subsequent years, for the maintenance, repair and refit of ships and helped to improve productivity in the shore depots.

submarines, and for manning yard craft.

As can be seen from the ensuing overview, the numbers

• In the Aircraft Repair Yard - for the maintenance, repair of civilian naval personnel have remained more or less and refit of aircraft.

equal to the number of naval personnel in uniform from

1968 onwards.

Overview of the Navy’s Borne Strength Between 1965 and 1990

In round figures, the comparative increase in the Navy’s borne strength between 1965-1975 and 1976-1990 can be seen from this tabulation:

Naval Personnel

C ivilian Personnel

As on

Officers

Officers

Sailors

Total in

Gazetted

Non-Gazetted

Total

31 Dec

General

SD

Uniform

Industrial

Non-

Civilians

List

List

Industrial

Growth 1965 to 1975

1965

1520

410

16,930

18,870

300

12,390

10,550

23,240

1966

1590

430

18,350

20,380

320

13,340

10,900

24,560

1967

1660

470

20,460

22,580

320

13,820

11,300

25,440

1968

1740

490

22,790

25,020

310

13,990

11,730

25,730

1969

1850

530

25,130

27,510

330

14,000

11,890

26,220

1970

1970

540

26,150

28,660

410

14,040

12,250

26,700

1971

2250

580

26,860

29,680

28,450

1972

2470

600

26,440

29,500

1973

2550

600

26,290

29,440

510

16,430

13,130

30,070

1974

2690

600

26,860

30,150

1975

2880

600

27,270

30,750

_

260 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Growth 1976 to 1990

1976

2970

600

27,120

30,690

1977

3060

640

27,440

31,140

.

1978

3110

620

27,410

31,140

.

1979

3270

670

27,660

31,600

1980

3440

660

28,730

32,830

655

15,640

14,690

30,980

1981

3570

670

27,940

32,180

740

16,970

14,630

32,340

1982

3700

730

28,400

32,840

860

17,180

16,060

34,100

1983

3960

760

28,520

33,240

860

18,140

18,090

37,090

1984

4090

750

30,020

34,860

940

19,360

18,900

39.200

1985

4310

800

31,630

36,740

880

19,330

18,130

38,340

1986

4480

840

34,700

40,020

910

20,020

18,700

39,630

1987

4630

850

37,010

42,490

920

20,160

18,530

39,620

1988

4910

880

39,550

45,330

950

19,840

19,390

40,180

1989

5080

840

41,680

47,610

940

20,320

19,210

40.470

1990

5370

800

43,130

49,300

960

21,510

19,580

42,050

General
every alternate year was not serving any useful purpose.

Cinder the new scheme, all sailors on release would be

Controlling Manpower Costs From the Mid 1970s
subject to recall to active service for a period their service

Onwards
fell short of 17 years for non-artificers and 18 years for
artificers. During this period, released sailors would not be

In the 1950s and 1960s, manpower costs had not been a entitled to any monetary benefits nor would they undergo cause for concern. The emphasis had been on recruiting refresher training.

manpower as swiftly as possible to cope with acquisitions
and their infrastructure. In the mid 1970s, these costs Discipline and Morale started spiralling as a result of:

The rapid expansion of personnel affected the quality of

® The recurring increases in Dearness Allowance to leadership, particularly at the Chief Petty Officer and Petty neutralise inflation after the global 1973 oil crisis.

Officer level. Curtailed training programmes to cope with

® The cost of implementing the Third Pay Commissions shortages eroded basic, time-tested traditional leadership practices. Both training and discipline suffered. This
recommendations.

has been discussed in greater detail in the chapter titled

To keep manpower costs under control and ensure ‘Erosion of Leadership Values’.

the best utilisation of available manpower, every single The Merger of the Supply & Secretariat and Executive proposal for increase in manpower had to be cleared by Branches the concerned Principal Staff Officer in Naval Headquarters
before it could go to the Ministry of Defence.12

This topic has been discussed in the chapter titled The

Merger of the Supply and Secretariat Branch with the

Abolition of the Indian Naval Reserve and Indian Naval Executive Branch in 1978 and the Creation of the Logistics Volunteer Reserve

Cadre in 1989’.

In 1976, consequent to the introduction of the 15 year The Merger of the Engineering and Electrical Branches initial engagement for sailors, transfers to the Fleet Reseive In 1985 consideration commenced of the proposal to merge were discontinued. In 1977, it was decided to abolis t e the Engineering and Electrical Branches. The rationale was: reserve cadre because training for a period of one mon

------------------------ ----------------------- -

-

_ .eVe|) requirement was that if a proposal could survive several

12. The rationale for this draconian (and muchres*entedat thfe rni
layers of rigorous scrutiny then only would it e wo

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 261

• The instrumentation in diesel electric propulsion in Retrospect submarines and gas turbine propulsion in ships had Vice Admiral (then Captain) P S Das recalls: increasingly becoming electrical and electronic in nature

“In 1984, just before taking over, the CNS designate
where sensors, amplifiers and digital displays had replaced

Admiral Tahiliani constituted a three-member committee
the erstwhile mechanical and pneumatic instruments.

of Captain (E) (later Vice Admiral) MB Ghosh, Captain

With this incursion of electrics and electronics in the

(L) (later Rear Admiral) PK Sinha and myself to take a
controlling elements of main propulsion machinery and
dispassionate look at the Navy and suggest measures
auxiliaries, the division of responsibility between the two
that could be implemented swiftly within NHQ’s
departments had overlapped and blurred.

powers. On its recommendation, the following were

• The functions of the technical cadres had diversified.

implemented:

No longer were the two branches concerned only
with maintenance. Their functions had widened to

- More than 60 Lieutenant Commanders were removed
include equipment evaluation and selection, design of
from Naval Headquarters and sent to the Commands.

installations and layouts, system interface, ship design,

They were replaced by 30 Commanders.

consultancy and guidance to equipment manufacturers

- Lieutenants of 6 years seniority were made eligible for
and shipbuilding yards. A systems approach had to be
promotion to Acting Lieutenant Commander.

applied to all facets of their functions, be they in the field

-Commanders replaced Captains in command of the
of maintenance, system engineering or ship design. A
first four Leanders and the Trishul. The number of
new organisational structure was required in which all

Lieutenant Commander/Lieutenant commands was
disciplines recognised their inter-dependence without
increased.

jealousy, rivalry and competition.

-Operational activity was decentralised from Naval

• Future technological changes would require closely

Headquarters to the Command Headquarters. Day
integrated functioning of the existing Engineering and
to day reports like Birdstates, Birdefs, Opstates and

Electrical Branches. This would best be achieved by

Opdefs were kept at the Command level.

amalgamating these Branches into a single composite
cadre.

-Technical officers were informally ‘streamed’ so
that only experienced people were appointed to the

The proposal was discussed for several years. Technical

Dockyards and the Base Maintenance Units.”

officers’ opinions were divided. Since no consensus could
be found, the proposal was not pursued.

Given the ambit within which ‘Personnel Policies’ have
to function, the achievements in the field of personnel

Naval Service Selection Boards
management were impressive.

In 1982, the Navy initiated its proposal to set up an exclusively

Many believed that with the Navy already fully stretched

Naval Selection Board. In 1983, the proposal was modified in inducting and coping with new acquisitions, personnel to taking over two of the existing Services Selection Boards policies should not be tinkered with. Many believed that (SSBs) to be operated under the direct control of the Navy. the reforms being recommended in manning and training In 1984, Number 12 SSB at Bangalore and Number 33 required manpower in such numbers that the shortages SSB at Bhopal were taken over for a trial period of one year. would only be aggravated. Many believed that the reforms During the trial period, the Navy found that by focusing on were filibustered by inter-branch tussles. There was truth in naval requirements, it was able to increase the intake in the each of these points of view.

various branches of the officer cadre.

No perfect solution could be found. The very same

Thereafter, both these SSBs were made available for issues arose whenever the complements had to be decided selection of naval candidates, whilst their administrative for the new ships being acquired from Russia. The same control continued to vest with the Army Headquarters. Both sub-optimal compromises had to be resorted to.

SSBs were to continue with the selection of candidates
for the National Defence Academy and of the Combined

These issues were not unique to the Indian Navy. In

Defence Services Examination.

one form or another they manifest themselves in every
professional Navy. In his memoirs, German Grand Admiral

Raeder stated:13

13' during'^939r4 RWotld Wa'r n 6 Chief ° f Staff of the German Hi9h Seas ^ e t in 1914-1918 World War II and the Chief of the German Navy 262 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

On the ‘Appointing of Officers’:

On ‘Morale and Discipline':

“One of the most critical duties in the Navy is the

“One reason for the deterioration in discipline in ships was
assignment of officers to the particular duties for which
that as the finer officers in the middle grade - Commanders
their personal and professional qualifications best fit
and Lieutenant Commanders - were promoted to more
them.

responsible positions elsewhere, their less experienced

"Not every officer is qualified for duties to which his
replacements were not of the same high calibre.

age and previous training would normally entitle him.

“These occurrences impressed all responsible officers

The responsibilities of the positions he has held, as well
that for them, particularly in times of political upheaval,
as his performance in those positions, must be carefully
there was only one straight path - the path of complete
analysed.

abstinence from every type of party politics, and of

“Considering the differences in character, intelligence,
unconditional loyalty to the State and to the government
zed and health of any half dozen officers, and the
chosen by the people.

impossibility of knowing them all equally well personally,

"Only through firm but friendly discipline can a crew
it i: Inevitable that errors of judgment in selection and
be expected to achieve a high standard of efficiency.

assignment of officers will occur at times.”

The prerequisite for such a state of discipline is a well-
disciplined corps of officers and petty officers.

“A modest but definite feeling of pride and self-respect,
commensurate with the officer’s rank, must be instilled
into the officer corps if it is to fulfil its duties.”

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 263

Manning Of Ships And Conservation O f Expertise

This system worked tolerably well until the end 1950s.

Pream b le

This was because in the first series of acquisitions from

The Navy’s procedures for manning ships had been Britain of second hand World War II ships (a cruiser and six inherited from the British Navy. In both navies, the destroyers) the mainly mechanical equipment was robust specialisations of officers and the trade structures and simple.

of sailors were analogous. The number of bunks in

British origin ships was dovetailed with their ‘Schemes

Within a few years of the arrival from Britain of the second
of Complement'. No major manning problems were cruiser, M ysore in 1957, the eight new frigates between encountered either with the ships acquired from Britain

1958 and 1961 and the aircraft carrier, Vikrant in 1961, it or with the indigenously built ships.

became clear that the existing sailors’ trade structure could
not cope with the increasing electronics in equipment.

These procedures experienced difficulties from 1966
onwards when deciding the complements of ships being

The benefit of the promotion-based system was that it
acquired from the Soviet Union. The number of bunks had minimised sailor discontent. But the cost of this benefit in Russian ships had been dovetailed with the Russian was the heavy wear and tear on electronic equipment Navy’s officer specialisations and sailors’ trade structure. caused by the unending annual flow of sailors into and out The latter were different from those of the Indian Navy of ships, all striving to excel in manning sensitive, expensive, and the bunks fell far short of what the Indian Navy operational equipment. Improper use of equipment led required.

to equipment breakdowns. Demands for spares and
equipment replacement were of such high volume that

The manning of ships has a direct bearing on combat they could not be met. Sub optimal performance of readiness and on conservation of expertise. This chapter equipment defeated the very purpose that sea time was discusses how the Navy grappled with the problem of meant to serve. All these ill effects were widely recognised developing and conserving expertise.

but no consensus could emerge on a better system.

The Sailors Trade Structure in 1947

The system came under further strain with the imminent

The Navy inherited its sailors’ ‘trade structure’, ‘training arrival of the new Russian acquisitions from 1966 onwards programme* and ‘career progression system’ from the when it became abundantly clear that there was going to be British Navy. A sailor could be promoted only after:

a severe shortage of bunks; these ships had been designed

• He had qualified in a higher rank course in his trade, to accommodate crews of the Russian Navy’s trade and;
structure. The Indian Navy’s trade structure compelled a
larger crew. A committee was appointed to re-look at the

• He had performed competently during his sea time in a existing ranks, rates and trades of the Navy’s sailors.

seagoing ship.

The C R O S S Com m ittee o f 1966

To avoid disgruntlement due to delays in promotion,
the Navy’s Annual Training Programme was tailored to The Committee for the Reorganisation of the Sailors schedule sailor s higher ranks qualifying courses just before Structure (called the CROSS Committee) started its they were due for promotion. To avoid disgruntlement at deliberations in 1966. It was headed by Commodore SS
delays in promotion due to lack of timely sea time, the Sodhi. He recalls: Annual Block Transfer programme was tailored to sending

The basic point that we made in our Report was that
sailors to ships as soon as possible after the higher rank
course.

user and maintainer should be interlinked. It was no
use saying that a maintainer was responsible for total

m aintenance from A to Z and the user was only to be
an operator. The two had to be linked. That basically
rocket boats (Durg class), minesweepers (Pondicherry
m eant that the educational and the technical inpul
class) and guided missile destroyers (Rajput class). It
into the user had to be enhanced and the m aintains
tackled the extension of the operator-maintainer concept
to the other ships of the Navy.

had to have faith in the user’s capability to handle the
sophistication of the equipm ent. That was basically the

• MAT III of 1976 led to the Operator-Maintainer Progress
recom m endation that we made. The educational level

Committee Report.

of the seam en had to com e up. Their training had to be
m odified to take on at least the first line maintenance of

There were two later committees - the 1985 Manpower
the equipm ent that they were operating.

Optimisation Committee and the 1986 Report on the Trade

Structure of Seam an Sailors. These have been discussed

"W e also felt that the Topass trade could be abolished.

in the chapter on Personnel.

O u r experience showed that our own sailors, when they
w ere operating with other navies, had no inhibitions MAT I
about cleaning their toilets, and generally being

Manning and Training Committee No I (MAT I) was
responsible for the hygiene of the surroundings.”

constituted in 1966 to decide how the Landing Ships and

C om m and er V F Rebello was the Deputy Director of Petyas were to be manned so as to accom m odate the Personnel (M anpow er Planning) in Naval Headquarters

Navy's numerous trades in the fewer bunks.

from 1967 to 1969 when the recomm endations of the

When the first two Petyas arrived in India in end 1968,

C R O S S C om m ittee w ere examined. He recalls:

the Navy was able to see, at first hand, the seriousness

“T h e C ross C om m ittee went into the whole manning
of the problem that the C R O SS Committee had tried to
problem of the N avy with great thoroughness. They solve:

also exam ined the m anning structure in the American
and other W estern navies and cam e up with very good

© The Petyas were very densely packed with electronic
equipment.

suggestions on how to reorganise the manpower of
ou r Navy. It w as ‘operator-m aintainer’ and ‘vertical

• The entrenched branch responsibilities inherited from
sp ecialisatio n . Unfortunately, the training requirements
the British Navy were that the seaman branch user' used
for such a schem e w ere so very expensive and extensive
the equipment and the electrical branch ‘maintainer’

that it w as beyond the scope of the Navy of that time to
maintained the equipment. Since a Petya had such a
im plem ent. W e would require a large number of schools
lot of electronic equipment, it needed more electronic
and a very big training schedule, lt was estimated that
maintainers. Since a Petya had so many more weapons,
at an y one tim e about one-third of the sailors would
it also needed more users.

be undergoing training and conversion and this the

• Since a Petya had fewer bunks than were needed

G o vern m en t sim ply could not afford to have. Therefore,
even for a normal Indian ships company, it could not
the recom m end ation s of the Cross Com m ittee were
accommodate the increased numbers of users and
kept in abeyance.

electrical maintainers.

“A b olition o f Topasses was the only recom m endation

Various options were considered - ‘reduce the number
o f th e C ro ss C om m ittee w hich was taken up.

of cooks and stewards', ‘abolish topasses’, ‘adopt two
watch steaming at sea instead of the usual three w atch es,

Manning the Russian Acquisitions

‘convert all maintainers into users’, ‘teach seamen basic

From 1966 onw ards, several com m ittees were constituted
maintenance so as to reduce the number of non-artificer
to try and resolve the m ism atch between the Indian
electrical sailors on board’, ‘transfer the less com plicated

N avy’s sailo r trade structure and the numbers required to
power electric duties of the junior electrical sailors to the
efficien tly m an, operate and m aintain the new ships being

Engineering Department' and so on.

acq uired from Russia, w hose num bers of bunks were fewer

The abolition of topasses on board ships was attempted.

than required:

It led to unrest. This option had to be revoked.

• M AT 1 of 1966 (M anning and Training Comm ittee No

After arrival in India, each Petya was being manned by

I) tackled the m anning of the Russian LSTs and t e

120 sailors instead of the sanctioned complement of 95

Petyas.

sailors, despite the lack of bunks. It was decided to re

• M A T II o f 1975 w as constituted after the implementation
allocate branch responsibilities.

o f the operator-m aintainer concept for manning t

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 265

"C om m and ing O fficers are to ensure that every

Re-Allocation of Branch Responsibilities and Duties in
opportunity is taken by them and their heads o f departm ents

Petya Class Ships
to explain the im plications of these revised responsibilities

The directives issued in 1969 stated:

to their ship’s co m p an ies.”

“Taking a broad perspective, it is important that the various Branch Responsibilities branches of the Navy develop with equitable distribution of
workload and responsibility. With increasing sophistication Transfer of Power Electrical Duties from Electrical to Engine Room Branch Sailors in “Petya” Class of Ships:

of weapon systems, sensors and data processing, it is
imperative that the Electrical Branch concentrates its

“It has been decided to cross-train all the Engineering
energies to master these new fields.

Mechanic sailors of the Petya class of ships in power electrical duties up to the rate of LME. For the present, sailors

“Other branches must be made capable of dealing of the rate of POEL (P) will be provided to the Engineering with the diagnosis of faults and the maintenance of less Branch in the above class of ships from the existing cadre complicated items of systems and equipment.

of electrical sailors.

“This entails the Engineering Branch shouldering more

“It is not intended to cross-train POMEs in electrical
responsibilities with regard to the generation, distribution duties. POMEs for power electrical duties will be found, of electric power and allied equipment, the Seaman in due course, from amongst the LMEs who have already Branch being entrusted with the non-artificer care and been converted to power electrical duties.

maintenance of the weapons, radar, and AlO equipment
and the Communication Branch looking after the W/T, RyT “Electrical Equipm ent to be m aintained by the and V/S equipment.

Engineering Branch in the Petya class o f ships:

"In addition, the seaman and communication branch

"Power electrics will be transferred to the Engineering
es must substitute the lower levels of power and radio Branch, in two phases.

electrical sailors in assisting the artificers.

• Phase I: Lighting, ventilation motors and starters and

“The Electrical Officer will, however, continue to be the
sound powered telephones.

expert technical adviser to the Commanding Officer on

• Phase II: Pump motors and starters, except those
electrical and electronic matters.

directly
associated
with
weapons,

Compressor
motors and starters, Cold Room and Air-conditioning

“In the initial stages, there may be no saving in
machinery motors, Domestic Equipment, Capstans
manpower, but as experience is gained and personnel
and Controllers, Motor Boat Equipment and Batteries,
become more confident, the complement of modem ships
excepting those used with weapons, including charging
will show a reducing trend, which will be an added advansets and panels.”

tage. Consequent on this review, detailed instructions will
issue from time to time on the measures necessary for the

“The transfer o f responsibilities fo r pow er electrics from
revised training schemes and programme of assumption the Electrica l to the Engine Room branch w ill be im ple
of new responsibilities.

mented in stages:

“As a first step, the new measures will be applicable • Pre Commissioning Training (PCT) (Engineering) - Eight Weeks.

only in the "Petya cadre” and, based on the experience
gained, will be extended in steps to cover the rest of

“On joining the Petya Training School, all Engine Room
the service. A start has been made by cross-training a
sailors of LME and M E rates are to undergo a PCT for
number of engine room personnel of two Petya class
engineering duties. The duration will be eight weeks.

ships in looking after certain electrical equipment of • Harbour Training (Engineering) - Four Weeks.

these ships.

“After the PCT (Engineering) sailors will be given four

“It cannot be over-emphasised that the success of this
weeks of harbour training to enable them to operate and
measure will depend largely on the spirit in which this
maintain engineering equipment.

change is undertaken, and the ready cooperation and • Basic Training in Electrical Engineering - Sixteen Weeks.

willingness on the part of all concerned to work to the

“On completion of the above training, sailors will be
ultimate goal which will result in added efficiency and well
trained in the basic elements of electricity for a period of
being in the service.

sixteen weeks.

266 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

° S “
ten

^eSe'C

O
m
m
iSi0n
in
g

To avoid disrupting the acquisition programme, it was
decided to maintain status quo.

“O n com pletion of the basic training in electrical

MAT II of 1975 and the Introduction of the Operator-
engineering, these sailors will undergo familiarisation

Maintainer Concept
training and PC T in electrical duties for a period of twenty
weeks. During this period, they are to be instructed by Soon after the contract was signed in early 1975 for the the electrical departm ent of the Petya Training School to
acquisition from Russia of ocean-going rocket boats (Durg
enable them to carry out the m aintenance and operation
class), minesweepers (Pondicherry class) and the guided
of electrical m achinery covered by Phase I and Phase II of missile destroyers (Rajput class), analysis indicated that the schem e, on board a Petya class of ship.

there were not going to be enough bunks to accom m odate
the numbers that the Navy wanted. B y end 1975, the

‘At the end o f this period, they are to be examined as to complements of these three classes of ships were finalised theii competence to undertake the responsibilities to be on the basis of the Operator-Maintainer Concept.

entrusted to them, (em phasis added)

Mid-level Electrical officers immediately expressed

Task 1 and II Training (in harbour)

apprehensions regarding the loss of their departmental

“ The first two weeks of each phase will be devoted to Task I status on board these ships. To dispel these apprehensions, training and the next two weeks to Task 2 training pertaining Naval Headquarters promulgated the rationale of the to the equipment relating to the particular phase.

concept. It also constituted the MAT II Committee to
carry out an in-depth study on how to consolidate the

‘At the end of this period, the Engineer Officer is to satisfy concept and extend it to other classes of ships and also himself that the sailors are capable of undertaking the to recommend measures to allay the apprehensions of maintenance functions relating to the particular phase.

Electrical officers.

“Thereafter, the equipment is to be taken over by the

Naval Headquarters’ directive promulgating the Operator-

Engine Room Branch.

Maintainer concept was issued under the signature of the

Chief of the Naval Staff. It stated:

Phase I

“Advance of technology and the basic and integral role

“During this phase, the equipment referred to in Phase I that electrical engineering plays in all facets of naval warfare earlier will be taken over.

calls for a thorough review of our manning and training
system. It will no longer suffice for a few to shoulder the

“During Phase I, sailors are to be given dog watch burden of maintaining and repairing shipboard equipment instructions in equipment for Phase II and may be utilised for the many users, nor is there a place for the un-skilled or to assist the Electrical Branch sailors on maintenance of the pure operator type in the complex ships that comprise Phase II equipment, as mutually convenient to the two deour fleets.

partments.

“It has been clear for some time that the existing system

Phase II
of manning and training in the Service by which ships

“During this period, sailors will continue to be responsible are manned department-wise by the respective branches for the Phase I equipment. On completion of Task I and necessitates large complements on board, leading to Task II training, sailors are to take over the responsibilities conditions of overcrowding and all its attendant problems in life afloat. The present manning pattern by branches and
in respect of the remaining equipment."

cross-departmental employment also leads to a dilution of

The Ele ctrica l Branch did not take kindly to these accountability and inter-branch stresses and strains.

directives. They saw them as erosion of their domain.

“Naval Headquarters has therefore decided to adopt, as

Views still differ on whether a ll the junior Engine a permanent measure, the Operator-Maintainer concept Room sailors who underwent training in compliance for the Executive Branch and the transfer of power w ith the above directives were deliberately failed in engineering to the Engineering Branch. The two schemes t-he exam ination conducted by the Electrical side aftei
will be implemented in phases to minimise dislocation,
im parting tw enty weeks fam iliarisation training 01
maximise absorption of skills and ensure adequate
w hether the non-m atriculate Engine Room sailors lacked protection of careers of officers and sailors of all branches.

the m ental ab ility to comprehend the prescribed syllabus It is emphasised that Naval Headquarters do not visualise for electrical training, (em phasis added).

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 267

abolition o f any o f the existing branches, though there Electrical personnel maintaining or operating a fire-control w ill be a gradual change in the relative role and shape system will be integrated into the Gunnery department of branches and their employm ent pattern, as w ell as a
and will function with the operator-maintainer sailors of
shift o f the higher echelons o f m aintenance from afloat to
that department, and be also employed on duties of ship
ashore, (emphasis added)

husbandry and seamanship, under the Gunnery Officer.

“Naval Headquarters have had the problem examined in Training in In d ia depth and the working parties appointed to find solutions “The general pattern of training for the Seaman and to the problem have recommended that in order to provide Communication sailors, for the implementation of the for better operational efficiency, achieve greater economy above scheme of manning, will comprise the following: in training and better conditions of habitability on board
ships, department should be formed on a ‘functional’

o Training in basic technology and workshop practices in
basis. This implies officers and sailors of different branches
the Electrical School at Valsura followed by
working in functionally oriented composite departments.

o Professional training at the respective specialist school.

A degree of functional integration amongst the existing
responsibilities of the various branches is, therefore,

“The pattern of training of electrical sailors to be
required to be introduced in the Service.

integrated into the Engineering, Gunnery, Communication,

Torpedo and Anti Submarines, and Navigation and

“A corollary of the above will be that erstwhile operators Direction departments will comprise the following: on board ships will have to acquire skills in maintenance

© Training as maintainers at Valsura, Shivaji, Satavahana
functions and the erstwhile maintainers would also need
and Agnibahu.

to be trained in ship husbandry, seamanship and other
operator tasks.

© Operator and requisite seamanship training at the
respective specialist school.

M anning & Control

Program m e o f In tegration

“It is intended to commence this process of integration by
manning the ships now proposed to be acquired from the “Naval Headquarters considers that the implementation USSR on the basis of the following functional departments:

of the measures outlined in this letter is the first step in
the process of integration. Further steps in this direction

• Gunnery
will be promulgated from time to time, as experience is

• Torpedo & Anti Submarine
gained and the pay structure of sailors is rationalised. It

• Navigation & Direction
must necessarily be a process of evolution.

• Communication

“I would like Flag and Commanding Officers to

• Engineering
personally ensure that the purpose, purport and spirit of

• Supply
this policy directive and the programme of its evolution
and implementation are understood by all officers and

• Medical
men under their command.

“Electrical personnel, who are a common factor in

“I am confident that in this bold departure from our earlier
all the above mentioned functional departments except manning and training pattern, the Service shall receive the Supply and Medical, will be integrated with the respective dedication and loyalty from all ranks and all branches, which functional departments and would be trained for all alone can make the scheme of integration a success. The functions of operators, and become an integral part of the cause is our Navy, which is higher than self.”

respective departments.

The Introduction of Stream Training

“In order to effectively exercise total system control, the
head of the functional department will control, administer In pursuance of the NHQ directive: and supervise personnel of all branches that form his
department.

• “Stream Training" was introduced. A’ stream for the
new Leander class frigates and ‘C’ stream for the Soviet

“For example, Electrical personnel working on power
acquisitions. ‘B’ stream, the remaining Western origin
generation, distribution and allied duties will be integrated
ships, were to be gradually converted to 4C or A’.

into the Engine Room department and the Engineer • Seaman sailors started being imparted maintainer training Officer will exercise control over them. Similarly, the
at the Basic Operator-Maintainer School (BOMS).

268 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

These m easures were strengthened by the Governm ent’s

Operator-Maintainer concept?

acceptance of the Third Pay Com m ission recom m endation

-Should he act as an adviser to the Captain of the ship
that at the tim e of entry into the Navy, m atriculation should
or should he be designated as head of department?

be the m inim um educational qualification for sailors of all
branches, except cooks and stewards,

-What should be the chain of command as regards
the Electrical officers and sailors on board, taking into

The
first
rocket
boat (Vijaydurg),
minesweeper
account that they would be all employed under the

C Pondicherry) and destroyer (Rajput) were manned on the control of functional departments?

above basis.

o What are the specific apprehensions of the Electrical

Apprehension arose again in middle rank Electrical

Branch, if any, which may inhibit its involvement with

Branch officers whether their status as a ship’s Electrical
the Operator-Maintainer concept and measures that the

O fficer was being diminished. It began to be seen as a

Committee recommend to allay the same?

contest for ‘turf’ between the officers of the Executive and
o Whether feedback from the experience gained from the

Electrical branches.1
operation of functional departments in the first rocket
boat ( Vijaydurg) would be adequate to review the policy

The Electrical Officer Opposition to the Operator-
of extending the Operator-Maintainer concept to other

Maintainer Concept
ships of Soviet origin or should the review be carried out

The apprehensions of Electrical officers about the Operator-
after the first destroyer {Rajput) has been commissioned,

M aintainer concept centred on three issues:

i.e. mid 1980 or so?

o Erosion of the traditional responsibilities of the Electrical

In its deliberations, the Committee is to bear in mind

Branch.

the same principle enunciated in MAT III also, namely that
o When weapons failed to perform, the pinpointing of there is no dilution in the expertise of the Electrical Branch responsibility and accountability for failure between to meet our known commitments."

the Executive and the Electrical Weapon Maintenance

The Committee’s Report started by restating the basic

Officer, and between seaman “user’ sailors and electrical nature of the problem:

'maintainer' sailors.

© As equipment becomes more automated, it needs fewer

© Fears of diminution in their career prospects.

men to operate it. Cumulatively, the men required for

MAT III of 1976 and the 1978 Operator-Maintainer
operating the equipment in a ship are now much less

Progress Committee Report
than the number needed for its sustained maintenance.

The number of equipments installed, their compactness,

In 1976, Naval Headquarters appointed a Committee to
their complexity and the paucity of bunks make it more
report on the progress of the Operator-Maintainer concept
necessary than hitherto, that the maintenance and defect
that had been implemented in 1975.2 The Committee’s
rectification workload be shared between the ship’s crew
terms of reference were:

and a support agency. The extent of this sharing will
vary with equipment complexity. Simple equipment can

“To examine:

be maintained / repaired by the ship's crew, complex

9 Commander (L) nominated for the first destroyer is
equipment much less so, both being dependent on the
designated as Officer-in-Charge of Afloat Maintenance
man-hours available for maintenance.

Team and is charged with the function of providing • The men manning each item of equipment must know maintenance support. Would it be desirable for him to
their equipment as intimately as possible to get the
be based ashore with the maintenance team or should
desired results from it. This entails ‘action post manning
he be embarked on board himself and the bulk of his
and training’, wherein each man is trained to operate and
team continue to operate from ashore?

maintain the equipment in his action post. In so doing,

• If it is necessary to embark Commander (L) on board
a man’s expertise gets deeper but his employability on
the first destroyer:

equipment other than his own becomes less flexible.

When he goes on long leave during a slack period, the

-What should be his specific responsibilities, without
ship may be able to do without his ‘operator’ function.

eroding the working of functional departments and the

1

There is no evidence that the sailors of the Electrical Branch had any apprehensions about the N H Q directive.

2 The commissioning Commanding Officer of the Vijaydurg, the author as Commanding Officer (designate) of the R ajput and the

' Commander L (designate) of the R ajput were members of this Committee.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 269

But the equipment has to continue to be maintained
not have arisen if it were feasible to have more junior
and, therefore, a relief who has been action post
electrical sailors on board, who, by their training and
trained on the same equipment and knows it as well,
employment, are capable of normal non-complicated
must be provided ‘on call’ from a support agency. This
defect rectification e.g. changing components, testing
requirement is particularly critical for the artificer type of
valves, tracing earths, etc.

maintainer who undertakes the skilled maintenance. It o Even though the operator-maintainer system was to is much less so for the junior operator-maintainer who
apply up to the level of ‘Leading’ ranks, action-post
does the more elementary maintenance.

manning made it necessary for all senior seaman and

• In addition to being a platform whose equipment requires
communication sailors to be trained and employed on
efficient maintenance, the ship is also the home of the
maintenance on board these ships. These senior nonship’s crew. This results in clean-ship, part of ship, watch-technical sailors assisted the senior electrical sailors in
keeper and general ship’s duties, which do not require
maintenance functions to the extent that their duties
equipment expertise, butdo consume considerable junior
permitted.

sailor man-hours. A ship’s company, whose numbers © Under present conditions, the trainability and are restricted by the bunks on board, has perforce to
employability in even routine maintenance of the nondivide its man-hours between continuation training for technical sailors of any rank was only up to the level
combat, maintaining equipment and general duties. Of
equivalent to EMR or at most up to an LEMR.

these three activities, training and general duties have to © The ability of the non-technical sailor in maintenance be done by embarked crew; for the reasons described in
the earlier two paragraphs, the maintenance workload
was relatively more in the field of hydraulic and ordnance
has to be shared with the support agency.

equipment than in electronic or electrical equipment.

• Where maintenance requiring artificer skills can only ® All senior electrical artificer and non-artificer sailors be done in harbour and these skills are not required at
on board were employed on operator duties (action
sea, it is more practical to position that artificer in the
post functions) in addition to their maintenance
support agency than in the ship, and embark the junior
responsibilities on their equipment. They had no
operator-maintainer whose skills / training meet the
difficulty in undertaking these functions competently.

operator requirement at sea and meet the requirements ® The ship’s sophisticated missile, gunnery and ECM
of general duties in harbour. When deciding a scheme
equipments were maintained by electrical personnel
of complement, a judicious balance has perforce to be
with the assistance of Seamen and Communication
struck on the above basis, together with the customary
sailors, who also carried out operator functions on these
ones of ratio of senior sailors to junior sailors, senior
equipments.

sailors' accommodation, catering for domestic staff • After arrival in India, the availability of the non-technical etc. The temptation to include the maximum number
sailors to assist in maintenance was limited, in view of
of maintainers to maximise on board maintenance

‘part-of-ship’ and other responsibilities that they had to
capability has to be eschewed because the number of
perform.

senior sailors that would be required would result in the
ship having too few junior sailors for general duties.

The clear benefits and merits of the system were also
discerned:

As regards the working of the concept in the first rocket
boat, Vijaydurg, in which the concept had first been

• The knowledge of the non-technical sailors about
implemented, the Committee found that:

their equipment had improved, thus enhancing their
involvement and efficiency in the operator activity. This

• The non-technical sailors could carry out maintenance
would lead to fewer breakdowns on account of mal-
routines up to the monthly level without supervision
operation.

and up to the quarterly level under the supervision
and guidance of senior electrical sailors. They were,

• The ability and employment of the non-technical sailors
however, unlike junior ‘L sailors, not capable of any
in maintenance functions, even to the limited extent,
defect rectification. Since defect rectification in
added to their morale and gave them a sense of greater
electronic equipment is almost invariably interlinked
participation.

with maintenance routines (wherever readings, results • The responsibilities and role of the maintainer as and performances are found outside limits in the course
an operator had provided for greater interest and
of maintenance checks), this resulted in the senior
involvement on his part with the functions of the
electrical sailor being more heavily loaded; this would
department whose equipment he was maintaining.

270 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

• The interaction and understanding between the user

-Making him responsible for dealings with outside
and maintainer sailors was also better, thus leading to
authorities and organisations on the above matters.

smoother inter-personal functioning.

-Making the Electrical officer / senior sailor of the

The Committee found that the apprehensions of

(functional) department responsible to the ship’s

Electrical branch personnel centred on:

Electrical officer for the material state of the equipment
o Aspects of morale of Electrical officers arising from the
in the department.

removal of the Electrical Department and the loss of

In addition to the above suggestions, the Committee

‘head of the department' status on board.

recommended that a detailed study should be carried out,

° The adverse effects of restricting sea employment of as soon as possible, to recommend the steps necessary Electrical officers in rigid functional departments on to create expertise and experience in personnel on board their growth and development and ultimately on the ships and across the service. Some of the essential areas, capabilities of the Electrical Branch in general and the which needed to be covered in the study, were: shore support organisations in particular.

o The ‘progression’ of training of officers and sailors in
o The adverse effects, of non-centralised maintenance
service.

arrangements on board, on the material state of the o The relative content of technology, equipment knowledge ship's operational systems.

and technical management know-how in the training
scheme to provide the correct mix of width of knowledge

The Committee concluded that the system of on-board
and depth of expertise required at the appropriate rank,
manning and maintenance that would fulfil the requirement
for officers and sailors. This should include a revised
could be achieved by:

narrower grouping of the equipment, which electrical
o Implementation
of the Operator-Maintainer and
personnel are required to maintain, based on the depth

Maintainer-Operator concept for sailors to obtain the
of expertise that each equipment requires for efficient
best utilisation of the personnel carried on board.

maintenance and the numbers of such equipments that
one man can efficiently maintain.

o Having electrical personal on board employed department-
wise in G, ND, TAS, C and E departments, minimising o Reassessment of the (Power. Control and Radar) trade across-the-department employment. This would ensure
grouping of electrical sailors and creation of additional
build-up and conservation of technical expertise.

trades, if necessary.

© Making an electrical officer / senior sailor responsible © Reappraisal of ‘stream training’ and creation of a system to the head of the (functional) department to ensure
of ‘pre-joining (equipment) training' (after identifying
that the equipment was defect-free and available when
whether such training should be ship-oriented or system
required. This would enable the head of the department
oriented), to provide the concentrated ‘dose’ of equipment
to be fully responsible for the operational readiness and
knowledge required in the next appointment.

efficiency of his equipment.

® A system of transfers, which ties up with the above

• Continuing to have an Electrical Department with an
training and minimises manpower turbulence on

Electrical officer on board the ship, to ensure correct
board.

standards of maintenance and provide for adequate • A system of career planning of personnel: flexibility in meeting the requirements of the ship as a

-Where emphasis is on the needs of the ship and
whole and, as at present:

the service, without detriment to the career of the

-Making him responsible to the Commanding Officer
persons.

for the total material state of all electrical (including

-Where training, employment and grooming will provide
power generation and distribution) and weapon
the depth of expertise at the sailor and junior officer
equipment.

level, and the width of experience at the middle and

- Assigning to him the responsibility to control, coordinate
higher management officer level.

and provide guidance to the electrical personnel in

The Outcome of the ‘Operator-Maintainer’ Scheme
the functional departm ents on all technical, material,
personnel and logistic aspects pertaining to electrical

In the first guided missile destroyer IN S Rajput that
and weapon equipment.

commissioned in 19803, the Commander (L) was retained

3. The author was the commissioning Commanding Officer of IN S R ajput.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 271

Two basic issues were required if expertise was to be
as the Head of the Electrical Department. An Assistant effectively ‘conserved’: Electrical Officer (ALO) was appointed to each functional
department, and was responsible not to the head of the • The duration of sea tenure for expertise to develop.

functional department but to the Commander (L).

• The compulsion of shuffling of sailors into and out of
ships to give sailors sea time to qualify for promotion.

This via media worked smoothly and until 1990 was
adopted for all new guided missile destroyers, frigates and

Since fixed commissions were not feasible and rotating
corvettes.

personnel between ship and shore was inescapable, the
gaining and conservation of expertise depended on random

The Inability to Implement Fixed Com m issions
variables like whether the ship was operational or under

In the British Navy, a ship commissioned for two years maintenance, or whether the equipment was operational could be deployed to one of Britain’s fleets anywhere in or defective or whether targets were available or not. This the world. On completion of two years, the ship returned same aspect in regard to rotation of technical officers to her homeport in Britain, decommissioned, underwent found mention in the Naval Expert Committee’s Report.

a thorough refit and then re-commissioned with another
crew for the next fixed commission. The advantages of a

The 1979-80 N aval Expert C o m m itte e R eport on
fixed commission were that officers and men remained

M aintenance - Excerpts
together for the full commission, got to know each others’ “Tenures strengths and weaknesses, got to know the capabilities
and limitations of their ship’s equipment and acquired It has been categorically asserted that the effect of shortages expertise.

(of technical officers) is aggravated by short tenures and
lack of continuity Though it has been accepted that it

The Indian Navy neither had worldwide commitments,
may take an incumbent as much as three to six months to
nor the number of ships, nor sufficient manpower to adopt perform effectively, the impact on quality of work, if short Fixed Commissions. Ships remained permanently ‘in tenures of 18 to 24 months are given, has not been fully commission’ until they were finally ‘decommissioned’. For
the reasons already discussed, officers and men changed appreciated. Frequent transfers also bring in their wake round every twelve to eighteen months for sea time.

problems of accommodation, schooling, etc, which do
have an unsettling effect on the officers resulting in sub

Successive

Fleet

Commanders
had
repeatedly optimal performance. The problem is stated to be due to:

recommended the adoption of a Fixed Commission,

• Requirements of sea time for promotion.

at least for operational ships. The following excerpt is
representative of the dilemma:

• Promotion policy, which results in an officer becoming
acting Commander with 12 to 13 years of service.

FOCIF furnished statistics to show that a large number • Need to rotate officers between attractive and non-of transfers of officers and sailors from ships continued
attractive stations.

throughout the year. Transfer of key personnel after the
work-up of the ships deprived them of the benefit of the • Shortage of billets at Vishakhapatnam / Cochin in the work-up, which had virtually to start again with the arrival
higher ranks.

of new personnel.

Continuity in Key Billets

While the difficulties of the Fleet were appreciated, it Non-functioning, malfunctioning and breakdowns of sensors was generally realised that so long as the present shortand weapon systems / sub systems are the rule rather than ages continued, it was not possible to plan fixed commisan exception in ships at sea. This unsatisfactory material sions in ships. The appointment of a new ship’s company state was recently dramatised when a Fleet Commander after every refit presupposed the availability of a suffihad to abandon operational readiness inspection of a 5-cient number of officers and sailors in the service, which,
unfortunately, was not the case.

year old Leander frigate. After a long refit lasting nearly one
year, this ship spent the major part of the subsequent year

Common agreement, however, was found to a in harbour for defect rectification. Yet, during the inspection, suggestion that in spite of the present difficulties, a fixed combat systems in the ship became non-operational within commission for one of the ships of the Fleet be tried as 2 hours of sailing. The story is not different with the first an experiment. No change in the ship’s company was Leander, which after a 10-month refit is yet to complete thereafter to be made at least for a year."

Harbour Acceptance Trials and is being programmed for
deployment without Sea Acceptance Trials.

272 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

"T h e above state of affairs is a reflection, not merely on
sometime back, the introduction has been delayed in
the qualitative and quantitative refit contents of our ships,
order to ensure that all concerned are made fully aware of
lack of expertise in our Dockyards but as importantly, lack the implications so that doubts may be cleared before this of expertise in ships. A change in approach of our training
concept is implemented and later institutionalised.

and m anning pattern - to be discussed in the appropriate
volum e of the Com m ittee s Report - needs serious

“Since the Stabilised Operations Manning Cycle has to be
exam ination. Expertise is not being built up, in m ost cases,
linked with refit of ships, it is of the utmost importance that
to the level necessary. In cases where the necessary skill
the Drafting Office is kept informed of the refit programme
has been generated, it has been frittered away due to our
and the changes to it as and when they occur.

training and m anning pattern."

“With a view to assess the effectiveness of the programme

The Advent of the Stabilised Operational and
and to improve on it, a review will be carried out after one

Maintenance Cycle (SOMC) to Build (Jp Expertise
cycle is over. Administrative Authorities are requested to
forward their comments after 30 September 1980.”

The Trickle Drafting’ that had been the practice for a
number of years gave way eventually to the Stabilised

In the initial stages, the tendency was for ships to ask for

Operational Manning Cycle (SOMC) for Fleet Ships that key sailors to be retained despite SOMC. In some cases, a was promulgated by NHQ in 1979. SOMC was to apply group of key technical sailors came into being who continued to seven types of front-line ships and the period was to be to be held on to by successive Commanding Officers.

between 18 to 22 months.

By the late 1980s however, SOMC had taken root. The

“There can be no doubt that a high level of operational best that could be achieved was for 50% of officers and efficiency and combat readiness in a ship are directly 33% of sailors to be changed every year.

related to a stabilised crew, not subjected to changes after

The 1985 Report on Manpower
workup.

Optimisation - Excerpts

“After a detailed study, Naval Headquarters have In 1985, NHQ constituted a Committee to recommend decided to implement Stabilised Operational Manning measures to optimise the existing manpower of the service Cycle for Fleet ships with effect from 7 September 1979. by assigning priorities for placement of manpower, critically To start with, only the sailors complement will be stabilised. analysing manpower requirement in various sectors for The scheme will eventually encompass officers. Since a efficient functioning and examining subjects concerning certain amount of short term career planning will have to training, manning, SOMC and courses.

be done for individual sailors to implement the Stabilised

Operational Manning Cycle, the concept is also expected

In its introduction, the Committee’s report stated:

to reap an improved employment pattern for sailors.

“Early during the course of the study, the Committee

“Ships will be manned in accordance with Manning appreciated that training was a very key area for two conflicting requirements. Firstly, it must be extensive and

Plan 31 under issue. As this plan has been prepared after effective enough to permit skill development and secondly detailed dialogue between Naval Headquarters, Fleet

Commanders, Commanding Officers and Drafting Office, it must be done in the shortest possible time to permit optimum utilisation of manpower. It is also well known in
it should be acceptable to all concerned.

the service that many transfers are necessitated by training

"Since the concept is being deliberately implemented in requirements. The effects of this turbulence also need to the Navy, numerous queries on the execution of the scheme, be considered.

modalities, its effect on future prospects, promotions and

There are two distinct schemes of training. One for
courses, are bound to arise. Commanding Officers of ships artificers and the other for non-artificers. In case of artificers, and establishments in your command may, therefore, be most of all inputs are given at the beginning of the service directed to educate their sailors about the details of the career. Thereafter, the Engine Room Artificers never need stabilised operational manning concept with a view to go back to Shivaji. However, Electrical Artificers return removing any doubts that may exist, particularly in respect to Valsura for the EAP 3 / EAR 3 course as well as for the of promotions, courses affecting promotion, safeguarding Chief Artificer attachment. Interestingly, the same pattern is of seniority, transfers in relation to academic year, etc.

repeated on the aviation side where only the Air Electrical

"Although preparatory work in implementing the /Air Radio sailors get inputs. There do not seem to be Stabilised Operational Manning Cycle was completed
compelling reasons for this difference in basic pattern.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 273

All non-artificers follow basically the same pattern. They

Even though ‘Savings’ of a large magnitude shall
have a relatively short initial course followed by repeated accrue, the Committee reiterates that its primary concern inputs to qualify for / immediately after qualifying for a is effective manpower and not savings per se.”

higher rank. The occasions and durations vary from branch

The 1986 Committee to Review the
to branch. Seaman branch has another complication of

Trade Structure of Seam en Sailors - Excerpts
specialist qualifications, which are in addition to qualifying
for higher rate.

In January 1986, whilst the revitalisation of training was
in progress, NHQ constituted a Committee to review the

Skill Development
trade structure of seamen sailors.

The Committee has all along given the highest priority
for skill development. To re-state the obvious, skill

Excerpt from the NHQ letter constituting the
development comes from two major factors. Training Committee:

inputs and meaningful experience to consolidate that

“The present training pattern is essentially promotion
knowledge. Repeated courses, which teach the same thing based, mainly to fulfil the requisites of NI 2/S/61 rather than do not achieve very much. The Committee does not feel need based. The time scale promotion of leading rank has confident that inputs given in the beginning of a service further compounded the problem of giving the second rate career will suffice till its end - twenty or more years after. A courses to meet the promotion requisite.

via media has been sought, which permits one course at

Leading level after about 7 to 8 years of service experience

This has resulted in some sailors going for the second
for all non-artificers. It would also permit election of rate course for only a short tenure on a ship in the previous Mechanician candidates at a reasonably early stage. No professional rate. A time scale promotion denied on the further formal courses have been recommended till about date for want of not qualifying in the part II course also the 13th or 14m year of service when those who sign on for causes certain disgruntlement and affects morale. There another five years could be given a staff course conjoined is, therefore, a need to examine the de-linking of courses with MCPO ‘Qualifying* course.

from promotion and other associated issues.

Promotion Linked Courses

The present system of manning Soviet acquisition

A major procedural hurdle to be overcome in restructuring vessels, where a sailor is first trained in normal fashion the training of sailors is the fact that their promotions in his parent school followed by PCT, poses tremendous are linked with the passing of various examinations. In constraints on the limited manpower resources. Further, many cases, the place and in some cases, the duration the concept of vertical specialisation may be desirable is also specified. After a close and careful study of the when a sailor can remain on equipment throughout his Advancement Regulations, the Committee is of the view career in the Navy and there are enough avenues for that most of the measures laid down therein are likely to his promotion in this narrow confine. However, with the have been at the instance of the Navy in the first place The current shortages, considerable constraints are placed changes recommended are intended to reduce turbulence on manpower utilisation because of restricted usability and increase effective time. Since the service and the of sailors in other fields due to his narrow training. There State will be the gainer in the monetary aspect and the is, therefore, a requirement to evolve a suitable training individual in effectiveness, not much difficulty is foreseen pattern to meet the changing requirements of the Navy."

in getting the changes through the Government There
are many changes, which can be implemented without Terms of Reference specific Government approval. For example, since course

There has been a large scale induction of sophisticated
contents and durations are not statutory obligations, PCTs
could well be equated to Specialist Qualification courses ships and equipment in our Navy during the last few years.

for Seamen sailors.

As a consequence of this sophistication, it has become
necessary to examine the trade structure, training and

Substantial savings are likely to accrue, which would
promotion pattern of seamen sailors.

cTtenn50

^

^ “ mUCh

40 Weeks for so m e

Seamen sailors have been following the old trade
and Sectric!reT en ^

2° W6ekS f° r Communication
and Electrical sailors and 10 weeks for Engineerinq sailors
structure inherited by us from the erstwhile Royal Indian

Navy. The only two changes that have taken place are:

“ if accrue f h r a T h *

Greater benefit
ill accrue through better continuity and on the iob

• Abolition of the GL rate.

e fectiveness. This will not be immediately quantifiable.

• Abolition of the QM rate.

274 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE
i

While these two rates have been abolished, no new rates on the equipment that the sailor is required to man in his have been introduced. It is also known that the abolition of immediate next sea assignment.

QM rate met with growing dissent from the Commanding

Officers as well as from the Fleet Commanders.

The Soviet Navy has Task III & IV which is harbour and
sea training respectively and was followed in our navy with

Based on the above and taking into account the the setting up of the Integrated Type Training Establishment requirements of the Service, it is necessary to carry at INS Satauahana. However, in the case of the new Durg out a detailed examination of the Trade Structure of and Rajput class ships, the concept changed to 'the old seamen sailors (including Physical Training), and forward Commanding Officer and crew carrying out man-for-man recommendations on changes that are necessary to meet training of the new crew.'

the futuristic requirements of the Navy.

The period styled as ‘On the Job Training’ (OJT) was

The examination is also to take into account the initially 4 weeks, and is currently 3 weeks. In the earlier following:

stages, when the Rajput, Durg and missile boat training
o Whether there is a need to introduce specialised missile was at Bombay, the expert teams from Agnibahu consisting rates?

of officers and sailors, who had served on that class of
o Should the QM rate be re-introduced especially in view ship and were subsequently appointed to that training of the Action Post Manning?

establishment embarked, along with the old and new crews
and actually carried out drills followed by system firings.

o Is there a need to re-introduce instructor rates? If so, for
which discipline and what incentives need to be given to

In the earlier Task III and Task IV concept, the number of
these sailors?

drills, exercises and firings for each sensor, equipment, fire
o The need or otherwise to reorganise courses to cater to control, and finally system, were laid down and the Officer-the manning requirements of ships.

in-Charge Submarine and Surface Training Schools,
actually cleared the submarine and ship crew respectively
o Should the courses be de-linked from promotion? If so, for taking over from the old crew. It is believed that this is what are the ramifications?

still followed by the submarine wing of Satauahana. This
o Is there a need to re-examine the contents of NHQ is the only way an efficient crew can be trained. If after this, letter dated 7 September 1979 regarding the SOMC results are not very satisfactory the fault can be traced to Concept?

the training team.

© Whether PCT can be substituted for Higher Rank

In the present system of the old crew training and
courses for purposes of promotion?”

handing over to the new crew, the standards of sea training

Conclusions and Recommendations - Excerpts
are variable and the level of knowledge is only as good as
the keenness and zeal of the Commanding Officer, heads

“With the acquisition of Soviet origin ships, extensive of departments and the old crew. If a ship has a bad track thought was given to bringing in the Operator-Maintainer record, that gets perpetuated.

concept. After a lot of study and for reasons best known
to the then naval hierarchy, a good concept did not find

Further, miscellaneous sailors (who comprise lower
fruition and the Navy lapsed into another decade of quarters crews), engine room sailors, communication and status quo. Stream Training was the order of the day. The RP sailors, cannot possibly get the advantage envisaged by Navy missed the opportunity of bringing in the Operator- getting together a crew, as at present, for eight weeks of Maintainer concept as in the United States Navy and PCT, followed by three weeks of O JT at each stage without the limited ‘maintainer to operater philosophy as in the an expert team guiding and testing them. The Royal Navy French, Soviet and British Navies.

does this under Flag Officer Sea Training and his band of

‘Sea Riders’. The CIS Navy has a similar system. Nowhere

The inevitable conclusion is that ‘We must train for has the old crew the responsibility of training the new efficiency and manning / utilisation of equipment, and
not train for promotion.’ Albeit the man is important and crew.

accelerated promotions might lead to better morale, but

It was also gleaned that for purposes of administrative
efficiency will not necessarily follow.

convenience, in a number of cases, sailors across all
rates in a specialisation were grouped together for PCT

Systems Training / PCT / O JT
instruction. A number of sailors, when interviewed,

The only efficacious form of training for seaman (operators) expressed frustration, particularly when the same things is a methodology, which culminates in 'hands on training

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 275

were being taught all over again, when they came round a Conclusion second time to the PCT School, in the next commission.

It is considered that as a very workable via m edia, in This has already been pointed out and the PCT School SOMC ships, the concept of ‘PCT training’ should give way at Cochin which now houses all the course schemes for to ‘Systems training’ of users and maintainers, followed various classes of ships of Soviet origin has been asked by O JT on board the ship, the sailors being appointed as to revert to separate courses of instruction for each rate. before, for training en bloc. Application of Systems training This is, however, to some extent wasteful of effort, because to communication and RP sailors, however, is debatable the strength of classes would be small and the number and needs to be reviewed.”

of instructors required has to be considerably increased.

It would be, therefore, prudent to gang together at least

1989 Report on Economy Measures with Regard to
two ships teams of the same class / system to make the

Personnel Movement - Excerpts
training cost effective.

Courses

Stabilised Operational Manning Cycle (SOMC)

“In a study carried out by DNT in April 1988, the requirement

Concept
and duration of each of the courses, presently in existence,

Trickle drafting which had been the practice for a number were analysed in great detail and recommendations of years gave way to the SOMC concept in 1977. The were made to rationalise them with a view to reduce the SOMC concept has been kept going by CABS, at great movement of personnel. These recommendations have effort by providing additional manpower as and when since been approved and are being implemented. However, asked for by the Commanding Officers of these ships, the Committee is of the opinion that movements in respect creating in some cases a pampered lot of key sailors who of CO/XO Courses and PCTs have not been examined continued to be held on to by successive Commanding adequately and there exists scope for further reduction of Officers, the situation being more acute in the case of movements in these areas. 468 officers have undergone technical sailors.

CO/XO Courses and 559 officers have undergone PCTs.

This amount of movement is exceedingly high. It not only

The current thinking is to retain sailors on SOMC ships results in financial burden to the State but also results in for three years, changing one third of the sailors every a loss of a large number of man-days for operations. The year. This inhibits fixed commissions but is conducive to a Committee recommends the following measures to reduce Systems Training concept.

these movements:

PCT/System Training For Communication/EW/Radar

© CO/XO Courses. It is the general opinion of the officers

Sailors
who have undergone CO/XO Courses that the curriculum
covered during these courses is repetitive and is more

Currently PCTs are in full cry. PCT / System type of training
to refresh the memory. In view of the current situation,
is given to all sailors. Whereas the necessity of consolidated
it is recommended that these courses may be held in
systems training for gunnery and ASW systems is accepted,
abeyance for LSTs / OPVs / SD Bs / IPVs / Coast Guard
the necessity of PCT training in respect of RP and
ships / Tankers / Kamortas / Leanders. Further, officers

Communication / EW sailors is debatable, and wasteful of
who have done XO’s time on a particular class of ship
effort. Equally good, if not better, training can be given in the
be exempted from the CO's course for the same class of
parent school in charge of an officer of the rank of Captain
ship.

than in a PCT School particularly as by policy, equipment
has been spread out to parent schools. Therefore, though • PCTs. Presently, in many cases, there is a wide gap a systems approach is called for generally, it does not
between the conduct of PCTs and the officers taking up
appear to be beneficial for these two specialisations,
their appointments on board ships. This is because PCTs
particularly as PCT training is considerably wasteful of
for various classes of ships are conducted only once a
training effort without commensurate advantages. What
year and it is not possible, in most cases, to coincide
the sensor schools require is simulator training on the type
the completion of PCTs with the officers’ appointment
of audiovisual presentation they are likely to encounter on
dates. Therefore, the very purpose of PCTs is defeated.

their consoles. In the case of console operators, training is

It is strongly recommended that the PCTs be done as a
individualistic and repetitious. And in the case of plotters,
part of the Basic and Long Courses. DOP should inform
it is sheer plotting practice. This aspect may, therefore, be
the concerned Establishments / School as regards
studied in depth.

streaming of the officers in advance, so that the required

PCTs may be conducted accordingly. The duration of

276 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

the Long Course may be extended if necessary. Before © Naval Air Photo and Naval Air Met trades could well form joining the ship, 4 weeks of O JT be conducted in order
one combined trade.

to update the officer on the equipment of the ship.

© Naval Air Handlers could imbibe the same training as
o As far as possible, Officer PCTs should be done as

Naval Airmen Safety Equipment sailors.

part of Basic and Long courses. Four weeks of OJT be
conducted before officers assume appointments.

o EMP and EMR functions could easily be combined into
one.

o The number and duration of Sailor PCTs be reduced by
conducting PCTs as part of the higher rank courses as © Mechanicians (Power) and Mechanicians (Weapons) can far as possible."

also be rationalised into one trade.

© Mechanicians Air Electrical and Air Radio can merge

The 1990 Study by the College of Defence Management
into one.

to Rationalise the Sailors Trade Structure

So far the reference has only been towards the merger

Whereas the 1986 Committee had considered the of the various trades as existing today in the Navy so that

‘Rationalisation of the Trade Structure of Seamen Sailors’ we can rationalise and reduce the number of such trades.

from an ‘efficiency’ point of view, pressures built up a few There are, however, certain areas therein there may be a years later to rationalise the entire sailor trade structure requirement to introduce new trades - ‘hull maintenance’

from an ‘economy’ point of view. The rationale was:

is one such example. To improve the expertise in this area,

“We are currently faced with a severe resource crunch, we may have to introduce a new trade known as Hull necessitating optimisation of manpower as one of the Mechanics. There may also be other such areas, which measures of economy. It has now become essential, not require a detailed study.

just desirable, to resort to a lean and efficient manning

Prima facie the existing trade structure in the Navy is
policy, which would mean a breakaway from the narrow amenable to rationalisation on a broader basis."

vertical specialisation resorted hitherto.

It was decided that a Committee should be appointed

When hi-tech had suddenly hit us in the 1970s, vertical to study the problem covering all branches. As a first specialisation and dedicated equipment training was step, the study was entrusted to the College of Defence understandably essential in order to absorb and exploit the Management, Secunderabad as a project for a study team.

new equipment in the shortest time. It is now nearly two Its Report was under consideration by Naval Headquarters decades that we have been operating the new generation in 1991.

weapons, sensors and machinery. The need for vertical
specialisation must therefore reduce in intensity.

Retrospect

Computer
based
technology
in
management Operator-M aintainer
information systems, weapons and sensors has helped to Lieutenant Commander (later Commodore) IJ Sharma link and integrate various systems on board warships. This had undergone training in the Soviet Union in 1970 for development lends itself to integration of existing fields of commissioning and commanding the new missile boats, specialisation.

he commanded the missile boat that sank the Pakistan

There is scope now to rationalise the trade structure of Navy destroyer Khaibar in the 1971 Indo Pakistan War sailors with a view to reducing the number of specialisations and later, as Commander, underwent training in Russia and consequently the manning norms in ships.

and commissioned in the second Durg class rocket boat

Sindhudurg. He recalls:

Some apprehensions were expressed when the QM and

RP were integrated into the RP specialisation or when GLs

“Throughout my tenure on board Sindhudurg, we
were merged with the RCs. The fears have subsided over
followed the Operator-Maintainer concept to the letter
the years, as these measures were well conceived. Similarly
and the equipment remained very healthy. We did not
the Streaming concept, at one time a necessary measure,
find any difficulty between the technical and the executive
staff; no one was trying to brow-beat the other. In fact,
is no longer relevant to the same extent.

the Weapon Maintenance Officer depended very heavily

The present trade structure in the Navy is amenable to
on the s eaman Radar Control sailors and they really
rationalisation and integration with a view to reducing the
knew how to tune the system and how to carry out first
effective manning of ships. Some areas are h.ghlighted as
line maintenance.

follows:

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 277

their equipment much better. I remember when

“I remember, Rear Admiral KR Menon who came as

1 was
withdrawing from Karachi after the missile attack in
one of the Electrical Branch members of the Review

Committee to interview us on board asking me ‘What

1971, 1 did 29 knots for several hours. By the time 1

do you think of the Operator-Maintainer concept?’ I
reached the refuelling tanker off Saurashtra, I was
said, ‘You can examine any one of my sailors or officers
practically sucking air from my fuel tanks and this was
from the Executive side and see for yourself how we are
possible because the engineers really knew what they
implementing it.’ He questioned a number of sailors
were doing on board.”

and officers of the Executive branch and they all came

Vice Admiral (then Commander) VL Koppikar had
out with flying colours.

undergone missile boat training in the Soviet Union in 1970

“When the concept was found successful, it started and in subsequent years served in the Personnel Branch a controversy. Instead of trying to keep those crews in almost all capacities from Deputy Director all the way together and build up on their expertise, there were up to Chief of Personnel. Writing in the Navy Foundation’s objections from various quarters that this would mean annual publication, 'Quarterdeck 2000', he stated: that only some people were going to have knowledge
of these latest systems, whereas the earlier policy was

“A change of considerable significance was the
that each man gets an exposure to new systems. There
introduction of the “operator maintainer" concept in our
were demands that vertical specialisation should not
ships. It aimed at more effective manning and utilisation
be allowed to take place. Whereas we, in the missile
of on-board manpower after a degree of cross-training
boat squadron and later on in Sindhudurg who had
to fulfil both these functions. We also hoped that the
commissioned these ships after training in Russia, felt
move would reduce, if not eliminate, over-crowding in
very strongly that there was a lot of merit in vertical
our Soviet origin ships, which had extremely limited
specialisation. This was the feeling not only amongst
accommodation. However, while everyone talked glibly
the Executive officers, but also amongst the Electrical
about the novel concept, its wholehearted acceptance
and the Technical officers who had undergone training
was something else again. It not only threatened our
with us.

age-old Branch structure, but also clashed with the ‘spit

“Electrical officers who had not been exposed to the
and polish’ culture we had inherited. It was an uphill task
rigorous Russian system of training felt that once the
to make Commanding Officers of ships accept reduced

Executive officers knew their fire control systems and
complements. The scheme was eventually pushed
firing circuits thoroughly, they might ask searching
through by providing some sops by way of additional
questions from the Weapon Maintenance Officer as to
floating manpower - just in case you landed up in the
why such and such had not been checked or why so and
same ship as her next Commanding Officer!’’

so had failed. This would impinge on their authority and
their domain. That I think is the basic reason why they

There is a view that the dilution of expertise ought
did not want operator-maintainer to succeed.

to have been better tackled. As has been discussed,
acceptance of concepts like vertical specialisation, SOMC

“Whilst the opposition was mainly from the Electrical and pre-commission training took time to gain acceptance Branch, I think there were some Seamen officers also, and to implement.

who were opposed to the concept because they had
not had the opportunity to be rigorously trained in the

At times, ‘economy’ was invoked as a reason for diluting /

Soviet systems as we had been.

abolishing PCTs!4

“The Engineering Department, who traditionally
have been operator-maintainers, always maintained

4. Report on Effecting Economies in the Movement of Personnel.

278 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

33

Training

P r e a m b l e

In 1969, approval was accorded for the institution of the

The concepts for manning of ships and the training of Revised Special Entry Scheme. Under this scheme, naval officers and sailors to exploit the combat potential of the cadets in the age group 17 to 20 years who had passed ships they are to man in compliance with these concepts the Intermediate examination could be recruited in the are inseparable faces of the same coin. To simplify for the Executive Branch. This scheme was identical to the NDA lay reader what was attempted and how much was achieved ‘Special Entry Scheme' except that the initial training of one year would have to be conducted at Cochin in the
in each of these inter-related areas, ‘Manning and Training' Naval Academy.

have been discussed in separate chapters.

RSES training commenced in January 1970 and the

The chapter on ‘Manning’ discusses the changes that first batch of 36 executive cadets passed out of the Naval were attempted in the procedures for manning the ships Academy on 14 December 1970. They joined the NDA’s acquired from Russia. Some changes like Transfer of 39th batch of regular cadets for sea training on board the Power Generation and Distribution from the Electrical training ships Tir and Cauuery.

Department to the Engineering Department’ and

Seaman-Electrical-Operator-Maintainer’ could not gain The GSES Scheme
wholehearted acceptance. Some changes like ‘Functional

Departments’ succeeded. Some changes like ‘Stabilised In 1973, when the National Defence Academy got affiliated to the Jawaharlal Nehru University in Delhi, all NDA cadets,

Operating and Manning Cycle’ (SOMC) took time to settle on successfully passing their final examinations, received a at an achievable level.

‘Bachelor’s Degree’. As a result, the RSES candidate of the

This chapter on Training discusses the fundamental Naval Academy was out of step with his NDA counterpart.

changes that the Navy’s training organisation and policies It was decided that instead of taking in pre-graduate underwent during the period 1976 to 1990.

candidates, it would be more cost effective to recruit

Science graduates only and thereby reduce the duration of

Officers
their training at the Naval Academy.

The Naval Academy

The Naval Academy discontinued the training of RSES

Cadets after June 1974 and in July 1974, the first batch

The RSES Scheme
of GSES cadets entered the Naval Academy for an initial

By 1968, the shortage of General List officers had become training period of 6 months. Whereas the original sanction a cause of concern. The anticipated strength of 3,500 was for a total of 80 cadets to be trained every twelve officers by 1975 required an annual intake of at least 150 months, the Naval Academy now started training 80 cadets cadets. Since the NDA could not take more than 65 naval every 6 months.

cadets every year, it became necessary to start a Revised

As part of the 1974 reforms of Naval Training, it was

Special Entry Scheme' (RSES) and set up a separate Naval decided that: Academy.

• The Naval Academy should undertake the training of all

To provide space for this academy, it was decided:

officer courses hitherto conducted by the B&D School.

• To move the sailors' Basic & Divisional (B&D) Training • The B&D School in Cochin was to be closed down School from Cochin to Goa.

after the shift of Direct Entry Seamen training to Goa as

. To set up a temporal Naval Academy at Cochin to meet
soon as the new Seamen Training Establishment (STE)

immediate needs until a permanent location was chosen.

commissioned in 1976.

classrooms nor the infrastructure to cope with the increase

From 1974 onwards, the Nava! Academy, in addition
to training GSES cadets, started conducting the following in its training load.

officers’ courses:

After the acceptance in 1976 of the Third Pay

• In itial Training for Direct Entry officers of the Engi

Commission’s recommendations regarding changes in
neering and Electrical branches.

sailors’ conditions of service, the Boy Entry was discontinued

• N aval Science Orientation Course for officers of the and only Direct Entry matriculate sailors were recruited.

Supply Branch and officers from foreign navies.

Since training effort and costs could be minimised by
having only one Sailors’ Training Establishment (the new

• Special Duties (SD ) List] Post Promotion Course for IN S Chilka was expected to commission in 1980), it was sailors on initial promotion to Acting Sub Lieutenants decided to: (SD).

© Re-locate the temporary Naval Academy from Cochin

• Divisional & Management (D&M) Course. The BSD
to IN S M andovi in Goa as soon as possible after the course done by all Executive Sub Lieutenants during

ST E moved from Goa to IN S C hilka, and after the
their technical courses was re-designated as the D&M

ST E constructed for sailor-training at Goa had been

Course when it was transferred from the B&D School to
re-modelled with cadets’ cabins, a cadet’s mess, etc to
the Naval Academy.

function as a Naval Academy for training cadets.

• Lieutenants War Course. The B&D School used to

© Obtain sanction for a new permanent Naval Academy
conduct a War Course of four weeks duration for

.3

Acting Sub Lieutenants of the Executive branch. In

By end 1985, when the Naval Academy shifted from

1974, it was decided that this course was better suited Cochin to Goa, it had been entrusted with additional to a Lieutenant. The course was re-designated as courses:

Lieutenants’ War Course and conducted bi-annually at © Assistant Commandants of the Coast Guard from 1980
the Naval Academy.

onwards.

• Upper Yardmen Course. Sailors who showed early © Short Service Commission Direct Entry Technical promise at sea of being officer material used to
be designated ‘Upper Yardmen

Officers from 1982 onwards.

’2 and given special
assignments to test their potential. In end 1974, Upper © 10+2 Technical officers from 1984 onwards.

Yardmen of all branches started being sent to the Naval

In the years after the Academy functioned from Goa

Academy for their initial training.

starting January 1986, it commenced training:

• Commanding Officers and Ju n io r Com m anders’ © Medical officers from 1986 onwards.

Course. In end 1974, two new courses were instituted -
the Junior Commanders’ Course and the Commanding

• 10+2 Scheme Executive officers from 1987 onwards.

Officers’ Course. These courses were conducted at the Sea Training of Junior Executive Officers Naval Academy in 1974, 1975 and 1976.

The increase in officer intake increased the requirement

By 1976, the Naval Academy found that it was not cost for ships to impart training at sea after passing out from effective to carryout, separately, the initial training of cadets the Naval Academy. The ageing cruiser, Delhi underwent a and of Acting Sub Lieutenants of various branches. It was major refit from May 1971 to August 1972 for conversion to decided that all initial training for cadets of the Executive the training role. Delhi, Kistna, Cauvery and Tir comprised Branch and Acting Sub Lieutenants of all technical
branches should be of the same duration, should have a the Training Squadron till the late 1970s.

common syllabus and should run concurrently. This was

From the beginning of 1975, the Naval Academy started
implemented from 1976 onwards.

sending 80 cadets every six months to the Cadet Training

With the steady increase in the number of trainees, the Ships (CTS). To effectively train this number, there had to Naval Academy (set up in temporary buildings in 1970),
be a training squadron of three ships of which a minimum
found that it neither had the accommodation nor the
of two had to be operationally available every term. This
led to the decision to convert the three diesel-engined

1.

Sailors promoted to officer rank constituted the ‘Special Duties (SD )1 List / Cadre.

hazardouT^k nf

^ e.” V0S,[r0™ lf*e days of sailin9 ships when only the most competent, agile and fit sailors were entrusted with the
hazardous task of furling and unfurling the highest sails in the ship in all weather conditions.

3.

See Historical Reference Data section for the development of the new academy at Ezhimala in Kerala, page 323.

280 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

I

frigates, Brahm aputra, Beas and Betwa to the training Officers. There is too much of 'guidance* and ‘looking
role to take over from the older training ships as they
over the shoulder’ with the result that junior officers
decommissioned.

do not find scope for discharging their responsibilities

In 1975, the duration of initial training of Junior Executive
independently.

Officers was reviewed and reductions were made:

“In short, somewhere along the line, the continued

Duration in/of

Until 1975

After 1975
process of grooming an officer to function independently
has been lost track of after the initial training at school.

C adets Training Sh ip

6 months

6 months

This could well be attributable to the ‘play safe’ tendency

M idshipm en Afloat Training

12 months

6 months
that has crept in at all levels which is bound to erode

S u b Lts Courses

52 weeks

40 weeks
deeply into the offensive spirit of our Navy, an essential

S e a Attachm ent for
component of a fighting force. The solution needs to be

W atch keeping Certificate

3 to 6 months

6 months
corrected by delegating greater responsibility to junior
officers and encouraging them to perform independently

Beas and Betw a commenced cadettraining dutiesin 1976.

wherever possible."

Cauuery and Tir decommissioned in 1977. Brahmaputra commenced cadet training and Delhi decommissioned in

There were no easy solutions:

1978. Kistna decommissioned in 1981.

o Fleet ships with their complex systems imposed

By 1981, deterioration was being reported in the
restrictions on their usage at sea compared to their
standard of seamanship and watch keeping amongst
counterparts of the past, with the result that officers at
junior executive officers. The complaints were that they
sea, particularly the younger ones, suffered from lack of
were not conversant with fleet ship duties when they went
adequate sea time and experience.

to sea after their Sub Lieutenants courses for their watch o Cadets and Midshipmen had become insulated from keeping certificates. Their earlier sea time had been only
operational ships until they arrived in Fleet ships to obtain
in training ships. The sea time for midshipmen had been
their watch-keeping certificate as Sub Lieutenants.

reduced from one year to 6 months. In short, inadequate o Increasing sea time for Midshipmen was not practicable sea time had resulted in the sea training of junior officers
because it would aggravate the already acute
being insufficient in quantity and quality to give them a
accommodation problem on board operational ships.

professionally sound base.

o The motoring hours of Soviet origin ships were

In 1983, a Fleet Commander was constrained to
restricted.

observe:

© Due to the shortage of training ships in 1981, NDA and

“In the context of junior officers, I am constrained

NAVAC cadets were conjoining for 6 months sea training
to confess that there is marked decline in their
on board the non-seagoing cruiser Mysore. Batches of
professional standards. Professionalism and pride in

70 to 80 cadets were being given short sea trips of a
self and service seem to be the prime casualties. It calls
total of only 15 to 20 days in a fleet ship, a minesweeper
for a soul-searching look at our present day training
and in the submarine depot ship Amba. The balance
concepts.

time was being spent in Bombay harbour alongside the
breakwater.

“There exists lackadaisical attitude with a total lack
of keenness to keep abreast of events of professional

In 1982, orders were placed on Mazagon Docks for two,
interest. It is not incurable, but warrants consistent quick-delivery, low-cost, diesel-engined Cadet Training efforts by those concerned to nip it in the bud and to Ships (CTS) to be built to commercial Lloyds standards (as bring about a greater professional awareness and identity opposed to warship standards), having accommodation am ong the new entrants. M ay be we could take a leaf and facilities for 120 cadets, having long endurance for from the inner fuhrung activities of W est Germ any and
prolonged sea training cruises and having a flight deck for
m odel our m otivation classes in a like manner. W hatever
operating a helicopter, but no hangar.

be the m eans or methods we adopt, it should have t e

The first CTS, Tir, commissioned in 1986 and
solitary aim of eradicating the present unconcerned

Brahmaputra decommissioned in the same year. The
attitude of the junior officers.

second CTS had to be shelved due to financial constraints.

"O n e of the contributing factors to the attitude of

From 1986 onwards, the Training Squadron comprised Tir,
junior officers could be the poor confidence reposed

Beas and Betiua.

in them by their im m ediate seniors and Comm anding

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 281

Since Betw a and Beas were ageing, two alternatives on the professional career prospects of Gunnery and TAS
were examined for their replacement. Convert the first officers. Streamed officers were not fully competent to Leander class frigate, N ilgiri, to the training role or utilise carry out training, trials and staff duties of both streams a recently acquired Offshore Patrol Vessel (OPV) for the because of their training and appointment patterns and 42-day seagoing commitment. Whilst the conversion of this made it increasingly difficult to find suitably qualified N ilgiri was still being examined, Betw a decommissioned specialist officers for Fleet, Command and NHQ duties”. It in 1991 and Beas in 1992. The seagoing commitment was suggested that instead of streaming, the syllabi of long started being met by Tir and an OPV
courses be modified to include a thorough study of one

‘basic' system by all officers, to be followed by PCT and

In 1994, the opportunity arose of acquiring the 1968 O JT to be introduced for those appointed to a Leander vintage, British Leander class frigate Andromeda for cadet class ship or a Russian origin ship.

training. Its condition was better than that of N ilgiri and its cost was cheaper than converting N ilgiri. Andromeda

The acceptance of this suggestion would have entailed
was acquired and commissioned as IN S Krishna in the formalisation of the PCT concept for all classes of ships.

1995. Thereafter the Training Squadron comprised At that point in time, manpower shortage and resistance to Tir and Krishna with an OPV helping with the seagoing change were against such formalisation.

commitment whenever required.

Though the proposal for discontinuing the streaming

Sea Training Requirements of Cochin Schools
of Long Gunnery and Long TAS courses was accepted
in principle, NHQ directed that PCT courses were to be

One problem to which no lasting solution could be found conducted in lieu and till such time these were instituted, was that there were never enough operational ships the syllabi for the Long Gunnery and Long TAS courses present at Cochin for providing practical sea experience were to be modified to include more time on Leander and to the Gunnery and ASW long courses whilst undergoing Kamorta equipment. Whilst the de-streamed syllabus for training. This lack was compounded by the diversity of new the Long Gunnery course was implemented, that for the systems entering service in the new acquisitions.

Long TAS course could not because in the absence of PCT

It was only after PCTs, OJTs and closed-loop-manning for all classes of ships, it was found difficult to de-stream were introduced in the 1980s that trainees were able to see the syllabus.

the action posts that they would be manning and get the Committee for the Review of Training of Officers of feel of what would be required of them at sea.

the Armed Forces

The Streaming and De-Streaming of Long Courses

In 1986, the Chiefs of Staff Committee constituted an inter

Three streams had been introduced in the Training Reforms service committee of the three Vice Chiefs to examine the of 1975 - A Stream for the Leander class ships fitted with training profile of officers consistent with the requirements West European systems, ‘B ’ stream for the older ships fitted of modern warfare and to devise new training syllabi starting with West European systems and ‘C’ stream for systems from the NDA right up to the NDC with two aims: fitted with Russian systems. All four Executive Branch • To increase the technical content of services' training.

long course specialisations were streamed - officers were
required to learn their respective equipment in the greatest • To increase inter-service interaction in training.

detail.

The Committee made several recommendations:

After a few years, the streaming of the long Navigation- • The recommendations implemented right away were Direction and Communications courses was discontinued
conjoining of segments of the Higher Command
in response to a plea that the diversity and complexity of

Courses of the three services - the Navy established
systems in these specialisations did not justify streaming.

the College of Naval Warfare in Bombay; naval officers

The real reason was apprehension that narrow stream’

started attending equivalent Army and Air Force Colleges
specialisation might adversely affect career progression
of Warfare.

and the variety of appointments.

• The Long Defence Management Course was equated to

In 1981, the Gunnery and TAS Long Courses
the Higher Command Courses and accorded university
specialisations suggested that their streaming also be
recognition.

discontinued on the grounds that “streaming was leading

A recommendation on which a consensus could not be
to dilution of professional expertise and adverse effects
obtained was to raise the NDA’s entry to B Tech level. The

282 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Navy was keen to implement it in the new Naval Academy. base with a new Dockyard, it was decided to shift the BTE

The Army and the Air Force were reluctant to accept this out of Vishakhapatnam.

recommendation. Another recommendation that could
not find acceptance was the introduction of an Honours

In 1969, the Navy chose a 1,600-acre site for the BTE

Course in the NDA and that cadets wishing to take the on the bank of the Chilka Lake4 in Orissa, where 1,200

Honours Course should be allowed to do so and be boys could be trained at a time. The Prime Minister laid the awarded seniority in proportion.

foundation stone of the BTE. Construction commenced in

1973 and it was commissioned as IMS Chilka in 1980.

The recommendation for the establishment of a

National Defence University had to await an identical The Sailors Training Establishment recommendation of the Group of Ministers on the 1999 In the 1950s, direct entry sailors started being trained at Kargil Report and is now nearer to implementation.

the Basic and Divisional School at Cochin. As the Navy

In 1996, in an effort to reduce manpower costs, expanded, the numbers increased and the search started proposals were formulated to ‘technicalise’ all naval for an alternative location. As in the case of the BTE, the officers by their undergoing a four-year course to obtain a primary requirement was proximity to a waterfront, where B Tech degree (two years basic training at the NDA / Naval young sailors could be taught boat work, sailing and basic seamanship.

Academy followed by two years technical training at the

Naval Academy / the respective Army and the Air Force

In 1968, the Navy's proposal was accepted to site the
service academies). The proposal too did not find support new Sailors Training Establishment (STE) at Goa. In 1969, and was not pursued.

approval was accorded for the construction of the STE on
a 230-acre site on a hill at Reis Magos, five miles from

Sailors

Panaji, close to the northern bank of the River Mandovi.

The Boys Training Establishment

The STE was envisaged to train 500 direct entry sailors

(including apprentices) at a time.

The Navy’s procedure for the intake and initial training of
ratings had been adopted from the British Navy. Its basic

On 9 October 1969, the Prime Minister laid the
premise was that ratings should be inducted when young foundation stone of the STE. In January 1976, the new and given long periods of initial training to indoctrinate STE commissioned as IN S Mandovi and commenced naval discipline and to familiarise them with life at sea.

training direct entry sailors and apprentices.

Accordingly, ratings were recruited as ‘boys’ and trained

In consonance with the recommendations of the Third
in a Boys Training Establishment (BTE) for two years before Pay Commission, the educational qualification for entry was going to sea. Artificers were recruited as 'apprentices’ and raised to Matriculation for Boy Entry sailors of all branches trained for four years before going to sea.

as well as for Direct Entry Seaman and Engineering branch
sailors. It was decided to:

Surges in demand for sailors were met by resort to • Abolish the Boy Entry and have only one STE.

‘direct entry’ recruitment, curtailing the duration of initial
training and accepting the attendant consequence of • Move the STE from Goa to Chilka Lake as soon as construction there was completed.

reduced naval indoctrination.

The establishment at Chilka Lake was commissioned

Before the partition of the Navy in 1947, the only BTE as INS Chilka on 21 February 1980. It commenced the of the Royal Indian Navy was located in Karachi. After initial training of all Direct Entry Matriculate Entry Recruits partition, a temporary BTE was set up in Vishakhapatnam. (MERs).

Training was carried out in a New Entry Camp and a Main

Camp, both of which were located in temporary barracks

IN S Mandovi continued to train direct entry apprentices
at IN S Circars.

till 1982, after which their training shifted to Chilka.

In 1962, the BTE started getting congested. In

IN S Circars continued to train Non Matriculate Entry

1965, when the decision was taken to base the Russian Recruits (NMERs) until 1986 when, as part of the measures acquisitions in Vishakhapatnam and build a major naval
to rationalise training, their training also shifted to Chilka.

a

Thills I ake is the larqest brackish water lake in Asia and a well-established sanctuary for migratory birds. From its inception, INS Chilka has meticulously fulfilled the Navy's commitment to safeguard the ecology of the lake and the environment of that part the bird sanctuary falling under its jurisdiction.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 283

The scheme did not work too well due to a shortage of

From 1986 onwards, IN S Chilka became the Navy's NIETT trained sailors and was modified in 1986. For the sole establishment for imparting initial training to sailors next few years, previously trained Instructors continued to on entry.

man key posts on board and ashore. As the Instructors of

The Abolition and Reintroduction of the Seam an and
yester-year started retiring, their absence started affecting

Communication Instructor Cadre
training both ashore and afloat.

The Navy’s Seaman Branch sailors’ and communication

The proposal for the reintroduction of Instructors was
sailors' structure always had an ‘Instructor’ specialisation first made in 1985. It took four years to accept that the at the apex. These Gunnery Instructors (GIs), Torpedo Anti abolition had been a mistake and that Instructors were Submarine Instructors (TASIs), Plotting & Radar Instructors necessary to rejuvenate training ashore and to consolidate (PRIs), Signal Instructors (Sis) and Wireless Instructors (WIs) and improve professional training afloat.

were a specially selected, highly dedicated, dependable
group of senior sailors, trained in all the systems of their

Eventually in 1990, a directive was issued to reintroduce
specialisation. Their major role was operational training on Instructors. Their new nomenclature was GI (Weapons) board ships and imparting instructions in their professional and GI (Sensors), ASWI (Weapons) and ASW I (Sensors), SI schools ashore. On board ships, they were responsible and WI. These Instructor cadre sailors were to be selected through their respective departmental officers, for the during their 1st rate courses and would have to undergo an conduct and specialist efficiency of the sailors of their Instructors Course after a sea tenure. The Instructor Cadre department. In the course of their duties, these instructors Sailors would be posted to sea billets as well as to training invariably shouldered extra responsibility and grew in establishments. They would also have better prospects for stature. They did not get any monetary benefits. They were promotion in the form of seniority and additional weightage looked up to by their sailors with respect and respected by for promotion to CPO and MCPO ranks.

their departmental officers.

Revised Training Pattern for Logistic C a d re Sailors

By the late 1970s, the vintage and diversity of sensors
and weapons in ships had led to the introduction of Stream With the introduction of the Logistic Cadre in 1987, the Training and Pre Commissioning Training. The logical training pattern of logistic cadre sailors was revised to conclusion should have been that the more complex the make it more responsive to job requirements and based system, the greater the need for an Instructor specialisation on a three-tier training pattern of ‘New Entry Courses’, at its apex. However, the scarcity of senior sailors’ bunks on ‘Leading Rank Qualifying Courses’ and ‘Petty Officer Rank board Soviet-built ships and the diversity of systems led to Qualifying Courses’.

the conclusion that an Instructor could not possibly master

Promotion linked courses were discontinued. Promotion
the multiple systems in each discipline.

to the rank of Chief Petty Officer was to be on roster basis.

In 1979, a NHQ letter stated:

For selected CPOs / MCPOs, specialised capsule courses
were introduced like ‘Office Management’ for writers,

“With the introduction of new weapon systems and ‘Inventory Management’ and ‘Preservation of Stores’ for sensors in the Navy, the traditional concept of giving Store sailors and ‘Catering Management’ for stewards.

Instructor qualification only to sailors of Seamen and

Communication branches is no longervalid. In order to meet

The Training R eform s o f 1974 - 1975
present day and future requirements, it has been decided
to discontinue the present system of training Instructor In the early 1950s, the Navy acquired from Britain sailors and to restructure the Instructor Cadre with a view second hand destroyers, followed in the late 1950s, by a to introduce formalised training for sailors of all branches second hand cruiser and new frigates, followed in 1961
assigned for instructional duties. Selected sailors will be by an aircraft carrier. Starting in the mid 1960s, the Navy trained at NIETT and thereafter appointed as Instructors acquired from Russia submarines, submarine chasers in training billets. As incentives, the new scheme was to and landing ships, followed from the early 1970s onwards award recommendations for accelerated promotion5 on by more submarines, submarine chasers, missile boats, successfully completing the Instructor ‘qualifying’ course minesweepers, landing ships and destroyers. Added to this and grant of two years ante-dated seniority for promotion was the requirement from the early 1970s onwards to man to MCPO II on satisfactorily carrying out Instructional the indigenously constructed Leander class frigates and duties for two years”.

their successors.

5. Known in naval parlance as ‘Red Recommendations'.

284 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

To man these acquisitions, the Navy had to resort to stream. Cross training was allowed at certain senior levels measures like increasing the number of trainees per class, to safeguard career prospects.

reduce the durations of courses and deny the training
schools of good instructors because the best men were

The variations in streams and sub-streams as applicable
needed to man the newest ships. Over the years, this had to branches were: tended to de-motivate the schools and training had settled © Engineering branch artificers were streamed into into a rut.

‘Steam’ and ‘Internal Combustion Engines (ICE)’. The
latter was sub-streamed into Brahmaputra ICE or Petya

Lessons were learnt in the 1971 war. In 1974, measures

ICE, since the diesel engines in these two types of ships
were taken to remedy the ennui that had enveloped naval
were entirely different.

training. The Director of Naval Training and the Director
of Combat Policy and Tactics
o Electrical branch artificers were streamed into ‘Power’,

,6 under the direct guidance
of the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff and four flag officers

‘Radar’ and ‘Control’ and sub-streamed into specific
equipment systems.

formulated what, by 1975, became a major reform of the

Navy’s training practices.

In most cases sub-streamed syllabi led to reduction in
duration of courses and economy in effort.

Major Decisions

Organisational Changes in Training Schools in Cochin

The major decisions were:

© All officer training was taken away from the B&D School
o Vertical specialisation to be achieved by the introduction
in preparation for its shift to STE Goa. The Naval
of ‘streams’ and ‘sub streams’ for both officers and

Academy was re-organised into two wings: Cadets and
sailors.

Other Officers.

o Institution of Professional Courses / Examinations for © To minimise bureaucratic delays in the ‘chain of Executive and Supply Branch officers.

command’, the parent schools were allowed, as a trial

© Commencement of Seamanship courses for Leading
measure, to correspond directly with outside authorities

Seaman (Qualifying) and Petty Officer (Qualifying)

on routine matters. Their responsibilities were specified
courses at the Technical Schools.

in an updated charter of duties.

© Training Establishments to carry out improvisations • A work-study of the Signal School and the TAS School to cope with the backlog in training created by the
was ordered to improve their internal management of
introduction of the 15-year engagement and the
training.

automatic advancement to Leading rank.

• As was being done for sailors, Naval Psychological

• Training aids to be produced indigenously by our officers

Research Gnit (NPRCI) Aptitude Tests were instituted
and sailors.

to select Executive Officers for the different
specialisations.

• Training aids of entire systems to be fabricated ashore
so as to make up for the limited sea training then • In the Gunnery specialisation, in view of the diminishing requirement for visual aiming, the Gun Layer (GL) and
available.

Radar Control (RC) trades were merged.

Stream Training

• To keep abreast with the latest developments in

The aim was to usher in vertical specialisation and
technology and to exercise quality control, intensive
short courses were introduced at five-year intervals. For
consolidate expertise, ensuring that career prospects were
officers, these were the Lieutenants War Course and the
not adversely affected. Three ‘streams’ were instituted:

Junior Commanders Course. For sailors, these were the

• ‘A’ stream for the equipment in the new Leander class
revised PO and CPO Leadership Course and the MCPO
frigates.

(Qualifying) Course.

• ‘B’ stream for the equipment in the old Western origin • The career and training pattern of Executive officers from ships.

midshipman to the rank of Captain was recast with:

• ‘C’ stream for the equipment in the Russian ships.

-

A twelve-week, post-Long Course training period.

Officers and sailors would be assigned to one of the

-A five-week Junior Commanders course.

streams and be trained for selected equipment in that

-A five-week Commanding Officers Course.

6. The author was the Director of Combat Policy and Tactics.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 285

• The gain and loss of seniority rules for all branches were

This debate meshed, in 1985, with Naval Headquarters’

standardised. In the case of cadets and midshipmen,
larger proposal for having only two operational naval
the training period afloat was reduced from 18 months commands, Western and Eastern, whose Commanders to 12 months. Midshipman's time was reduced to
in Chief would be relieved of the problems of the training

6
establishments to enable them to devote their full attention
months.

to operational matters. The Southern Command would

Introduction of the Operator-Maintainer Concept
become the Navy’s Training Command.

Soon after the contract was signed in early 1975 for the

Views were divided on this concept:

acquisition from Russia of ocean-going rocket boats (Durg • In one view, making ‘Training’, as a function, the primary class), minesweepers (Pondicherry class) and the guided
responsibility of a Commander in Chief, and placing all the
missile destroyers (Rajput class), analysis indicated that

Navy’s training establishments under him, would ensure
there were not going to be enough bunks to accommodate
that the training establishments* problems v/ould get
the numbers that the Navy wanted. By end 1975, the
swifter attention. Training policy and procedures could
complements of these three classes of ships were finalised
be standardised and Naval Headquarters would receive
on the basis of the Operator Maintainer Concept. Naval
well-considered suggestions to improve training.

Headquarters expectation was that it would lead to better
training and rational utilisation of manpower.

• The opposite view was that it would be untidy for training
establishments, which were physically located in the

The gist of the NHQ letter that promulgated this concept
territorial jurisdiction of Western and Eastern Commands
was:

to be under the control of the distant Southern

“It has been clear for some time that the existing system

Command. Similarly, it would be untidy for the Naval
of manning and training in the Service by which ships

Officers in Charge (NOICs) Goa, New Mangalore, Cochin
are manned department-wise by the respective branches
and Tuticorin, who were administratively under Southern
necessitates large complements on board, leading to

Command to be operationally under Western and Eastern
conditions of overcrowding and all its attendant problems

Commands. Moreover, the Air and Submarine Arms felt
in life afloat. The present manning pattern by branches
that the problems and proposals of their respective training
and cross-departmental employment also leads to a
establishments would be better understood ‘functionally’

dilution of accountability and inter-branch stresses and
by Flag Officer Naval Aviation and their parent Submarine
strains.

Directorate in NHQ than by Southern Naval Command.

For the same reasons, the Engineering and Electrical

“Naval Headquarters has therefore decided to adopt, as

Branches felt that their alm a m ater schools, Shiuaji a permanent measure, the Operator-Maintainer concept for
and Valsura, would receive better attention from their
the Executive Branch and the transfer of power engineering
parent’ professional directorates in Naval Headquarters
to the Engineering Branch. The two schemes will be
than from Southern Naval Command. Last, but not least,
implemented in phases to minimise dislocation, maximise
was the view that it was unwise to create two grades of
absorption of skills and ensure adequate protection of

Commander in Chief, namely ‘operational’ and ‘training’,
careers of officers and sailors of all branches."

because it would lead to invidious distinctions in the

The apprehensions of mid-level Electrical officers
highest ranks of the Navy.

regarding loss of status on board ships and the eventual

In October 1985, Naval Headquarters sought approval
uia m edia that was found have been discussed in the to streamline the Navy’s Command and Control structure.7
chapter on Manning.

The features of that restructuring, relevant to this chapter,

The Creation of the Training Command in 1985
were to:

The Rationale

• Reduce the Operational Control Authorities from three
to two and make them accountable for all operational

In 1982, NHQ began considering the creation of a Training
activity in their areas:

Command and the reorganisation of the Directorate of

-FO CIN CW EST for the Western seaboard and the

Naval Training. The pros and cons of whether it was better to

Arabian Sea.

strengthen this Directorate or whether it was better to create a

- FOCINCEAST for the Eastern seaboard and the Bay of

Training Command were debated for the next few years.

Bengal.

7. See Historical Reference Data for section titled 'Changes in Command and Control Structure', page 362.

286 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

© Place the control of all Training Establishments hitherto Naval Commands to prepare the Navy for the intended under FOCINC W EST and EAST under FOCINCSOUTH revitalisation of training. All officers of Commander’s rank and place the accountability for all training policy and above were to be present at these presentations and formulation and implementation under one authority, clarify their queries.

leaving the Directorate of Training in Naval Headquarters
with the responsibility for interacting with the Ministry of

Despite these presentations and the clarification of all

Defence and the other services.

queries, there was resistance to change. It took some
months for the scepticism to abate about the untidiness

Naval Headquarters’ proposals were approved and the of ‘a Command in the South exercising administrative revised Command Structure was implemented from 1 July
control over training establishments in the West and the

1986.

East’, which for decades had been under their respective

Delegation for Studying the US Navy’s Training System

Commanders-in-Chief.

As a prelude to this restructuring, a delegation headed by

The 1986-1989 Revitalisation of Training
the FOCINCSOUTH and comprising the Commanding The measures implemented between 1986 and 1989 laid Officers of Sh ivaji (the Marine Engineering training school), the foundation for the revitalisation of training that yielded Valsura (the Electrical Engineering training school) and an results in the 1990s. These measures took into account Executive branch Commander representing the seaman the best features of the British, Russian and American and communication training schools was deputed to the systems of training and adapted them for the Indian USA to study the United States Navy’s training system and, context, keeping in mind all the difficulties that had been on return, to put up recommendations for reorganising the experienced in the past and the manning and training of Indian Navy’s training system.8
foreseeable acquisitions. The erstwhile system of training

After visiting all the US Navy’s relevant officer, petty ‘jacks of all trades’ and therefore ‘appointable’ to any class officer and sailor training establishments and after of ship was finally dispensed with.

detailed discussions on their basic concepts of training, Over-riding Principles the delegation made several basic recommendations, the
most important of which were:

The three over-riding principles of the revitalisation were:

• Each officer and sailor must be trained ashore specifically • Every officer and sailor was to be trained for his next job for his next job at sea.

at sea.

• In view of the hi-tech diversity in the Navy’s ship systems, • Officers were to acquire ‘width’ of knowledge and broad-brush courses were counterproductive. During
sailors were to acquire ‘in-depth’ knowledge and vertical
his career, every sailor should acquire expertise in one
expertise. Sailors were to specialise in one system /
system / systems fitted in one type of ship. During an
systems fitted in a class of ship.

officer’s career, he should progress from expertise in • Officers and sailors in ships under Stabilised Operational one system to broader knowledge of ship systems.

Manning Cycle / Pre Commissioning Training (PCT)

• Personnel trained on the above principles should stay
were to be recycled for the same system in successive
long enough on board to acquire expertise and, to
sea tenures.

enable them to develop and deepen expertise, their Specific Measures next sea tenure should be to a ship having the same or
similar systems.

In conformance with these principles, NHQ promulgated

• To foster and nurture the esprit d’corps of officers the following directives from 1986 onwards: serving in ships, they should wear the ‘Surface Warfare General

Officer’ insignia, analogous to the ‘wings worn by
naval pilots and observers and the ‘dolphins’ worn by • Ships be divided into PCT / non PCT category. PCT
submariners
ships to follow a closed-loop manning so as to recycle

.9
personnel on the same system. Non PCT ships to be

Naval Headquarters directed the delegation to make
manned on trickle transfer basis.

presentations of its recom m endations in the three

8

T h e author, as F O C IN C S O U T H , led this d elegation and subsequently im plem en ted the revitalisation or training during 1986 and 1987.

9. It to o k tw enty years fo r this recom m en d a tion to be eventually im p lem en ted on the 26 January 2004.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 287

• Theoretical training to be reduced and greater em phasis
with a curriculum structure towards Naval Technology
inputs. Duration of 10+2 (Executive) Scheme to be
laid on practical training.

of 3 years. The curriculum to be pitched somewhere

• Su rface W ing of IN S Satauahana. at Vishakhapatnam
between B Sc and B Tech syllabus in keeping with the
to be shifted to the specialist schools at C ochin and
futuristic requirements of the Service.

equipm ent reinstalled to the extent feasible.

• Sub Lieutenant Courses

• Russian ‘C Stream training to be discontinued.

- The Executive Sub Lieutenant courses to be modified

• W estern A Stream to be redesignated ‘G iri’ (Leand er
to train officers for effectively performing as OOW/
frigate) Stream .

OOD for carrying out duties in ships where no specialist

• C oast W ing Sch o o l to be shifted from IN S Trata in officers were authorised;

Bom bay to IN S Dronacharya at Cochin.

-Greater emphasis to be laid on service writing for

• M issile B o a t Training C entre (M B T C ) to be shifted from
officers of the Executive and Technical Branches.

Karanja in Bo m b ay to IN S D ronacharya in C ochin

• Long Courses. Duration of the Long Courses to
and equipm ent reinstalled to the m axim um extent
be reduced and syllabi modified to ensure greater
possible.

emphasis on tactics, operational analysis and computer

SO M C fo r Ships H aving Pre Com m issioning Training
application. Officers to be given an exposure on

• Tenure of officers on Per C om m issioning Training
representative equipment of all systems concerning

(PC T ) ships to be increased to 2 years with 50 per cent
their specialisation.

changing every year.

• CO/XO Course Non PC T Ships. A 6-week duration

• Tenure of sailors on P C T ships to be 3 years with 33 per

CO/XO Refresher Course to be introduced for officers
cent changing every year.

appointed to non PCT ships.

• O n com pletion of PCT, a com posite m odule of 2-week

• B a sic Training-Technical O fficers. Present training

O n Jo b Training (O JT ) followed by 2-week Task 1 to be
pattern to be restructured in accordance with the
introduced instead of only O JT as hithertofore.

decisions taken at the Senior Officers’ Conference.

• Rajput class destroyer P C T to be conducted from Ju ly

• M id-Career N aval Com m and Course. FOC-in-C
to mid N ovem ber every year followed by O JT / W orkup

South to examine the introduction of a mid-career
till mid Decem ber.

Naval Command Course for junior Captains / senior

Commanders.

• G odavari class frigate D urg class rocket boat /

M inesw eeper / Veer class P C T to be conducted from

• Long E D P Course. FOC-in-C South to evolve a long D ecem ber to early April every year followed by O JT /

EDP Course syllabus to be conducted at IN S H am la.

W ork Up till early May.

• Education Officers initial training to be revised and

• The duration of P C T for C om m anding O fficer (C O ) /
duration to be reduced to 50 weeks. Eight-week

Executive O fficer (X O ) to be revised as follows:

sea training syllabus to include Navigation and

- Rajput class destroyers

8 w eeks

Meteorology.

- Godavari/Durg class /M inesweeper /

6 weeks

• M idshipm en’s Board. In order to have uniformity in Veer class
standards, the Midshipmen’s Examination / Board to be
conducted by FOC-in-C South.

• M issile B o ats / Trishul (S S M crew ) P C T to be conducted
in Ju ly and D ecem ber followed by O JT / W orkup from

S a ilo rs
m id N ovem ber to m id D ecem ber and early April to early

• Training at C hilka. The following changes to be

May.

introduced:

O fficers

- Basic Training of MERs to be reduced to 16 weeks;

• B a s ic T rain in g - Ex ecu tive O ffice rs. 10+2 (Executive)

- Sea training on completion to be reduced to 8 weeks;
scheme to be introduced at Naval Academy w.e.f. August

- Recruitment of sailors to be made every four months to

1987 if possible, but not later than January 1988. Intake
coincide with the revised training pattern as stipulated
per term to be examined by NHQ (COP). Action to be
above;
initiated by FOC-in-C South to process affiliation to a

University for the award of a Bachelor of Science Degree

- B&D training of Non Matric Entry Recruits (NMERs) to
be shifted from IN S Circars to IN S C h ilka.

288 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

S e a m a n s h ip T rain in g . Seam anship training for Seam an

• Training of Seamen. The need to avoid infructuous

M ER , D E Artificers and NCC personnel to be undertaken
training was accepted in principle.

at Seam anship School Cochin. Seam anship training for

M ER s to be reduced to 4 weeks.

• Introduction of Seamen Master Operator. For optimum
exploitation of modern sensors and weapon systems, a

P T III C o u rse. FOC-in-C South to introduce PT III Course Master Operator Cadre with Special Grade Pay was to
at IN S H a m la (PT School).

be introduced in the Seaman Branch.

M e d ic a l A s sista n t (M A ) C ourses

• PO Leadership Course. The aim of making qualification

- Sp ecialist Q ualification and Higher Rank Courses for in PO Leadership Course at Agrani a mandatory

MAs to be conducted at the sam e time;
requirement for confirmation in the rank of Petty Officers
for non-artificer sailors and a pre-requisite for Artificer

- Syllabi for M A courses to be reduced and revised by
sailors for promotion to Artificer 3rd Class was accepted.

D M S (N ) by end 1986.

To minimise turbulence, the conjoining of PO Leadership

C P O M a n a g e m e n t C o u rses. A C PO Managem ent Course with PO (Q) Courses to be examined.

C ourse for all C PO s of a suitable seniority to be

© Standard Swim m ing Test. Southern Naval Command
introduced. M C PO Pre-Prom otion Course to cease
proposed that passing of the Standard Swimming Test
thereafter.

(SST) be made mandatory for the promotion to the rank

H ig h e r R a n k C o u rses.

Periods on ‘Management
of Petty Officer. The aim of encouraging qualification in

Techniques’ to be included for all higher rank courses.

the Standard Swimming Test (SST) before promotion
to Petty Officer rank was accepted but making it

A b o litio n o f C o u rses. The following courses / schemes mandatory for promotion was not accepted. It was,
to be discontinued with im m ediate effect:

however, agreed that certain incentives could be given

- Paint Application Course;
for passing this test. FOC-in-C South was to forward

- N avigator Yeoman’s Course;
suitable recommendations for incentives.

• Increasing the Em ployability ofTopass Sailors on Board

- S S M E Schem e;

Ships. Topasses on board ships were under-utilised and

- E A 3 ‘Q ’ Course;
they could be usefully employed for ship maintenance

- P O E L ‘Q ’ Courses.

after a small capsule course on ship husbandry. Topass

In tro d u c tio n o f N e w C ourses/Stream /Board.

The
sailors, on completion of their initial training in Chilka to
be given four weeks of training at the Shipwright School
following new Courses/Stream /Boards to be introduced:

on ship husbandry, plumbing, painting, fire fighting and

- Ch E L and EA ‘Q ’ Courses at IN S V alsu ra;
damage control.

- Ch M E/ERA/Mech ‘Q ’ Courses at IN S S h iu a ji;

• Damage Control Training. In the context of the

- G as Turbine Stream for Engine Room sailors;
foundering of the Andaman in August 1990 and the
weaknesses identified of inadequate knowledge of

- E A 3 ‘Q ’ Board at Com m and level;
damage control, there was an immediate need to

- P O E L Board at Com m and level.

enhance NBCD training in IN S Shiuaji. Additional

A rtific e rs .

instructors to be positioned at IN S Shiuaji to overcome

- A n open examination to be conducted at
the present shortages.

IN S C h ilk a
for selection of Artificers from am ongst the M ERs,

• Training of Seamen. In 1988, FOC-in-C South
proposed that Part II qualification should not be made

-Stand ardisation of Artificer / M echanician training
a mandatory requirement for promotion for seamen
as recom m ended by FOC-in-C South, approved ‘in
sailors. The issue was examined and NHQ decided to
principle’;
maintain status quo.

- Revised trade structure of Electrical Artificers as
recommended by FOC-in-C South, approved ‘in

The national drought of 1986 was followed in the end

1980s by a serious shortage of resources. A Committee was
principle’;
appointed to recommend economy measures with regard

- FOC-in-C South to forward com prehensive proposals
to the movement of personnel. Some of this Committee’s
f o r s e l e c t i o n o f M e c h a n i c i a n s a n d W e a p o n M e c h a n i c i a n s recommendations tried to reduce Pre Commissioning
through an open examination and introduction of Training to minimise the cost of travel.

Seam an Artificers.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 289

Ex ten t o f R e vita lisa tio n A ch ie ve d by E n d 1989

Action completed.

- Division of ships into PCT/ Mon PCT Category

Implemented

- Reduce theoretical training

- Shift Surface Wing of Satauahana from Vizag to Cochin

Action completed

- Discontinue ‘C Stream training

Action completed

- Re-designate A’ Stream training as ‘Girf Stream

Action completed

- Shift Coast Wing School from Trata to Dronacharya

Action completed

- Shift Missile Boat Training Centre from Karanja to

Action completed

Cochin

- Revise tenure of officers and sailors on PCT Ships

Action completed

- Introduce composite module of 2-week O JT

Module proposed to FOCWF and 2-week Task I

- Conduct of PCT

Action completed

- Commence 10+2 (Executive) Scheme at IN S Mandoui

Scheme introduced

- Revise syllabi of Sub Lieutenants Courses

Syllabi modified and War Course introduced for Sub Lieutenant

(X) Courses

- Revise and reduce Long Course syllabi

All Long Course durations reduced to 40 weeks

- CO/XO Course for non PCT ships

FOC-in-C South recommended CO/XO course for PCT as well
as non PCT ships. Details being finalised at NHQ.

- Revise Basic Training of Technical Officers

Revision of Electrical officers training pattern approved. Proposal
to combine VI and VII term BEC and VIII term NEC with MESC was
scrutinised at NHQ. Combining the training was not possible

- Revise Education Officers’ Training

Initial training of 50 weeks duration implemented. Revised
syllabus includes Navigation and Meteorology subjects during
sea training

- Midshipmen’s Board

Common board being conducted by FOC-in-C South

- Mid-Career Naval Command Course

The first Naval Higher Command Course of 24 weeks duration
commenced in Bombay in September 1988

- Long ED P Course Syllabus

Implemented

- Seamanship Training

Action completed

- PT III Course

Action completed

- Medical Assistant (MA) Courses

Combining of Higher Rank & Specialist Qualifying courses not
feasible in view of constraints of manpower and instructors

- CPO Management Courses

Implemented

- Higher Rank Courses - Management Techniques

Implemented

- PO Leadership Course

Conjoining of PO Leadership course with PO ‘Qualifying’ courses
can only be considered for implementation after backlog is
cleared of 2,100 POs and equivalents, waiting on the roster for
the PO Leadership course

- Abolition of courses

Implemented

- Introduction of New Courses/Boards

Boards being introduced in a phased manner

- Introduction of Gas Turbine Stream

Implemented

- Artificers — Selection, Training, Revised Trade structure

Proposals in respect of standardisation of Artificer/Mechanician
training, revision of trade structure of Electrical Artificers,
selection of Mechanician and Weapon Mechanicians as also the
introduction of Seaman Artificers have been received by NHQ
from HQ SNC. Under scrutiny at NHQ. Follow up action will be
initiated.

290 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

- Selection of Artificers from MERs

Navy Entry Artificers Scheme' introduced.

- Training of Seamen

To facilitate sailors to be recycled in ships for successive sea tenures to enhance operational capabilities and also to avoid
in ructuous training, sailors have been grouped for higher rank
courses, depending on the equipment fit of ships for which they
are being trained.

- Standard Swimming Test

No consensus between the Commands and NHQ on the
incentives to be given for passing of Standard Swimming Test.

The three Commands were, however, in favour of awarding a
red recommendation and three months ante-dated seniority for
passing this test. NHQ directed that the concept of Duty Sea

Swimmer should be followed and exercised frequently as this
would encourage sailors in qualifying SST

- Introduction of 'Seaman Master Operator’

Held in abeyance by NHQ for three years

- Increasing the Employability of Topass sailors in Ship

Implemented

Husbandry on board ships

- Damage Control Training

Additional instructors appointed to Shiuaji

Training Equipment

Project VAJRA

Leander Training Equipment

Vajra was the name of the project to install training
equipment for the weapon, sensor, electrical and

The British radar and weapon systems of the first Leander, engineering equipment of the Rajput class destroyers, N ilgiri, were not replicated from the second frigate Himgiri the Durg class rocket boats and the Pondicherry class onwards, which had Dutch equivalents. The Leander minesweepers contracted for in 1975.

Training equipment installed in the schools conformed to
that fitted in Him giri.

Three considerations limited the extent to which there

• Radars, sonars, weapon control systems and electronic could be duplication of equipment between the parent systems were installed in the respective parent training ‘user’ schools in Cochin and the ‘ maintained Electrical schools in Cochin for imparting user training. Installation School IN S Valsura as had happened in the case of the was completed by 1979.

Leander training equipment:

• Radars, sonars, electronics, weapon control and/ • The prohibitively high cost of live radar, sonar, missile electrical systems were installed in the Electrical School
and weapon control systems.

IN S Valsura for imparting maintenance training. • The implementation of Operator-Maintainer and Installation was completed by 1979.

Functional Department concepts in the manning and

• Steam Demonstration Room and Controls Training
training of Russian built ships.10

Building were set up in the Engineering School IN S • The cost of new buildings and civil works.

Shiuaji.

Later Taragiri and Vindhyagiri also had changes in Eventually, the Vajra Project at Cochin was sanctioned
some of their systems and minimum essential training at a cost of Rs 36 crore for providing training facilities in equipment was installed in the respective schools.

the parent ‘user’ schools in Cochin.11 This did not include
either the cost of the minimum essential duplication at the

Type Training

Electrical School or the cost of the propulsion gas turbines,

In 1977, it was decided that IN S Shiuaji should extend the power generation gas turbine generators and other engineering ‘type training’ of ships, which was hitherto engineering equipment installed in the Engineering School restricted to a limited category of ships, to the Durgs and IN S Shiuaji. Installation was complex. When completed in the new minesweepers in the field of machinery controls 1990, it was ten years after the first ships had arrived in and systems. This would enable ‘On Job Training’ (OJT) to India.

be conducted ashore prior to change over of ships’ crew.

10. T h e s e have b een discu ssed in the chapter o n ‘Manning o f Ships and Conservation o f Expertise, p a g e 264.

11. Ministry o f D e fen c e Annual Report 1987-88.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 291

In 1988, it commenced its first 24-week Naval Higher

T r a in in g S c h o o l s

Command Course for Executive and Technical officers

The New Schools
of the rank of Captain / Commander.'

Some schools were relocated, some new schools were

The E D P School. In 1987, a rudimentary EDP School
established and one school has yet to come up:

started functioning in IN S H am la. The first 24-week

• The Shipw right School. Located in the Naval Dockyard,

Long EDP course commenced in 1987 and completed

Bombay since 1947, it moved to its new premises in
in February 1988. The full-fledged EDP School was

Vishakhapatnam in 1981 and commenced training
inaugurated on 27 December 1989 to:

shipwright apprentices.

-Impart computer literacy programmes on Personal

• The Pre Commissioning Training School. This new

Computers with their associated languages for officers,
school was established as one of the core measures to
sailors and civilians.

revitalise training. It started functioning at Cochin from

-Conduct system-manager-oriented EDP training

25 April 1986.

for officers who would man key positions in logistic

• The N avy's Physical Training School. Established in IN S
organisations, which had their own EDP system.

Angre in Bombay since 1951, it shifted to IN S Ham la

-Conduct short duration modules of ‘language /
in 1978. However, the sports infrastructure planned to
package’-oriented courses for updating the knowledge
be created on the land that had been acquired for the
of personnel already working in EDP environments.

purpose could not be progressed due to environmental

The Am phibious W arfare School. In 1984, approval in
litigation. In 1987, the school shifted from Bombay to
principle was accorded for setting up an Amphibious

IN S Venduruthy in Cochin where the required sports

Warfare School in the Andaman & Nicobar Islands.

fields and infrastructure were readily available.

The Siting Board concluded that it would be better for

• The College of N aval Warfare. As part of the approved
the School to be located on the east coast of India.

recommendations of the inter-service Vice Chiefs

Waterfront land was identified at Kakinada. The Siting

CORTOS Committee to institute mid-career professional

Board found the site unsuitable. A suitable site has yet
courses, this new College was set up in Karanja in 1987.

to be identified.

The Training Schools in 1990

Branch

Specialisation

Nam e & Location

Parent Scho ol for:

Seamen

Gunnery

IM S D ro n ach arya

Gunnery officers S- sailors. PCTs of seamen

Fort Cochin, facing the sea for
missile gun & weapon system operator and
firing practices
electrical maintainer action post

Torpedo & Anti

A S W S ch o o l

A SW officers & sailors. PCTs of seamen sonar

Submarine

Within IN S Venduruthy
and weapon operator and electrical maintainer

Willingdon Island Cochin
action posts

Communication

S ig n a l S ch o o l

Communication officers & sailors. PCTs of

& Electronic Warfare

Within IN S Venduruthy,
communication and electronic warfare operator

Willingdon Island Cochin
and electrical maintainer action posts

Navigation,

/YD Sch o o l

Navigation & Direction officers,

Direction

Within IN S Venduruthy,
radar plotters, quartermasters.

Willingdon Island

PCTs of seaman operator and electrical

Cochin
maintainer Ops Room & AlO action posts

Diving Cadre

D ivin g S ch o o l

Divers and marine commandos

Within IN S Venduruthy

Willingdon Island, Cochin

Physical Training

P T S ch o o l

Physical Training officers and sailors

Cadre

Within IN S Venduruthy

Willingdon Island, Cochin

Marine Engineering

IN S S h iv a ji

Engineering officers, artificers, m echanics &

Lonavla in
basic training of all artificers. PCTs of Engineering

Maharashtra
and Damage Control action posts

292 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Electrical

IN S Valsura

Engineering

Electrical officers, artificers & mechanics.

Jamnagar in Gujarat

Technical training for all electrical electronic &
weapon systems

Logistics

IN S Ham la

Cadre

Logistic and EDP officers, writers, stores

Marve in Suburban
assistants, cooks and stewards

Bombay

Air Arm

Observers

O bserver School

Willingdon Island, Cochin

Air Technical

N aval A ir Technical

Air Engineer & Air Electrical officers, Air Artificers

Scho o l Within IN S
and air technical sailors

Venduruthy

Willingdon Island, Cochin

Airmen

School fo r N aval Airm en

Non-technical sailors of the Air Arm

Within IN S Venduruthy

Willingdon Island, Cochin

Submarine Arm

School for Submarine Warfare

Submarine cadre officers and sailors,

IN S Satavahana
submarine PCTs and Escape training

Vishakhapatnam

Hydrographic

H ydrographic School

Hydrographic officers and sailors

Cadre

Within IN S Gom antak

Vasco da Gama, Goa

Education

School o f N aval

Meteorology and Oceanology

O ceanology & M eteorology

Within IN S Garuda

Willingdon Island, Cochin

N aval Institute o f Ed ucational

Teaching Methods and & Training Technology

Training Technology

Within IN S Venduruthy

Willingdon Island, Cochin

Shipwright Cadre

Shipw right School

Constructor and Shipwright officers, shipwrights,

Visakhapatnam
shipwright apprentices and shipwright mates

(topasses)

Provost officers and sailors

Provost Cadre

Regulating School

IN S K unjali, Bombay

Musician officers and sailors

Musicians Cadre

Scho ol o f M usic

IN S K un jali, Bombay

Leadership School

Petty Officers Leadership Course

All Petty Officers

IN S A grani, Coimbatore

Retrospect
expertise. Sailors were to specialise in one or more
systems fitted in a class of ship.

It took two decades from the time of the CROSS Committee
of 1966 to the Revitalisation of Training in 1986 for the • Officers and sailors in ships under Stabilised Operational Navy to adjust gradually to the new compulsions resulting

Manning Cycle / Pre Commissioning Training (PCT) were
from ships densely packed with a multitude of electronically
to be recycled for the same systems in successive sea
interlinked sensors (radars, sonars, EW systems), weapons
tenures.

(missiles, rockets, guns) and weapon fire control systems.

For every new acquisition, a balance had to be struck

By 1990, three over-riding principles were established:

between the cost of setting up new training facilities ashore
or learning ‘on the job’. The problem with the latter was

• Every officer and sailor should be trained for his next job that the wear and tear caused by ‘learning on the job at at sea.

sea’ degraded the life of operational equipment. Eventually

• Officers should develop ‘width’ of knowledge and PCT came to be accepted as preferable to OJT.

sailors should develop 'in-depth' knowledge and vertical

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 293

Despite the high cost of live equipment for training
logic. This intensive training, and the resulting critiques,
personnel in schools ashore, each of the branch schools
made every man on board feel a joint responsibility and
were provided with the minimum essential live equipment
largely accounted for the reliability of our Navy in the
and simulators they needed to train personnel for their

First World War.

next job at sea.

“The rigid programme of training, inspection and

As the following excerpts from
cruises, with no ship’s captain permitted to deviate in

‘M y L ife , the memoirs of

German Grand Admiral Raeder
the slightest, did speed up the men’s purely mechanical

12 show, the German Navy
experienced analogous (though not identical) problems
actions, but just as inevitably destroyed any originality
as early as a hundred years ago. His reflections remain
or independent thinking on the part of the commanding
relevant today:

officers. Eventually a revaluation was made in an attempt
to bring about more flexibility and variety in the training

“Each training year began on 1st October, at which
programme.

time that one third of the crews, which had completed
its three-year enlistment, was replaced by new recruits.

“The practice of all ships receiving their year’s quota

This date synchronised with the shift of officers and
of recruits on board simultaneously on 1st October
petty officers, who, however, were rotated on a two-year
inevitably impaired the battle efficiency of the fleet as
basis.

a whole for some time. Now it was proposed that one
of the fleet’s three squadrons was to receive all the

“Thorough and comprehensive battle training,
recruits each October, while the other two squadrons,
including damage control, with wartime conditions
with relatively few changes in personnel, would be able
closely simulated, began after Christmas. Rapid,
to maintain a high state of readiness. In addition, the
efficient action was demanded of every one and, in the
discussions held after the drills, each officer and man
commanders of the individual ships were to be given
was required to present his ideas and back them up with
much more independence in the matter of training.”

the 1939-45W ^dW arS

Chief ° f Staff of the G«™an High Seas Reel in the 1914-1918 World War and the Chief of the German N avy during 294 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

34

Merger Of Supply & Secretariat Branch With

Executive Branch In 1978 &

Creation Of Logistics Cadre In 1989

Preamble
reports from the Fleet Comm anders of the unreliability of

The chapter on ‘'Russian Acquisitions” has discussed the ship performance during exercises.

complex interaction with the Russian side on the timely

Since the causes of this state of affairs were many
supply of spares. The Historical Reference Data section and varied, the refitting authority blamed the provisioning titled “Changes in NHQ Organisation” has discussed what agency that the spares required for the thorough refit was attempted at the NHQ decision-making level. The of equipment were not available at the right time. The chapters on “Maintenance, Repair and Refit Facilities" provisioning agency blamed the Dockyards for not and on "Logistics” have discussed how the lack of spares forecasting their requirements more thoroughly and in delays refits.

good time. The refitting authority countered by suggesting
that only “single branch responsibility for Repair / Refit

This chapter discusses the events that led to the and Logistics" could yield better results. Many had no abolition of the Supply and Secretariat Branch by hesitation in stating that the Supply Branch was structured merging it with the Executive Branch and, when it was for Secretarial functions rather than for modern logistics.

found that this aggravated the situation, recreating a

Logistic Cadre.

The 1972 Reorganisation of NHQ made a few changes
in the Chief of Logistics’ responsibilities. The Directorate

The Events Leading to the Merger
of Civilian Personnel and Civil Engineering were shifted
to other PSOs and the Directorate of Naval Armament

From the mid 1960s onwards, the Navy constantly wrestled Inspection was shifted to COL. The Directorate of Stores with the problem of Logistics. By 1968, it had become was renamed as the Directorate of Logistic Support. From clear that placing the Directorate of Stores directly under 1972 onwards, the Chief of Logistics was in charge of the Chief of Material was unable to cope either with the the Directorates of Logistic Support, Armament Supply, management and replenishment of Russian spares or the Armament Inspection, Clothing and Victualling and Supply delays in the indigenisation of spares.

Branch.

In the 1969 ‘Reorganisation of NHQ’, a new PSO was

None of these changes resolved the basic malaise.

constituted, the Chief of Logistics, in the rank of Rear The Navy’s repair, refit and logistic structure continued to Admiral in charge of the Logistics Branch. In this new remain stressed.

Branch were placed all the Directorates that could, in
semantic terms, be considered logistics namely the

In the mid 1970s, rising manpower costs compelled

Directorates of Stores, Armament Supply, Clothing and a re-look at the Navy’s organisational structure. There Victualling, Supply Branch, Civilian Personnel and Civil was avoidable duplication in some areas. Other areas remained understaffed. There was constant pressure

Engineering.

for more manpower. A study was initiated whether the

In the late 1960s, the Harbour Acceptance Trials and Sea organisation could be rationalised and, to the extent Acceptance Trials that each ship had to undergo after refit possible, not only enable staffing requirements to be met started revealing the unreliability of equipment performance within existing manpower resources but also provide for despite prolonged refit. These were substantiated by
better accountability.

“As a corollary to this, the post of the Chief of Logistics,

This study resulted in two major conclusions:

one of the Principal Staff Officers in Naval Headquarters,

• The Supply and Executive Branches should be merged.

which was being held by an officer of the Supply and

Junior officers of the Supply Branch could volunteer

Secretariat Branch, has been abolished. The Chief
to convert to the Executive Branch and those found
of Logistics had been responsible for procurement,
fit would undergo conversion courses.1 During the
holding and supply of spares and components, while the
transition, officers of the Supply Branch in ships and
responsibility for maintenance and carrying out repair
establishments would be withdrawn without any relief. As
and refits was that of the Chief of Material. This had
regards Supply Branch sailors, the adoption of ‘Operator-
resulted in a certain amount of divided responsibility

Maintainer’ and ‘action post’ manning on the new rocket
boats (Durg class), minesweepers (Pondicherry class)

“With the abolition of the post of Chief of Logistics,
and guided missile destroyers (Rajput class) restricted
it has been decided to entrust to the Chief of Material
the number that could be accommodated in the limited
the responsibility for the provisioning of spares and
number of bunks.

components, in addition to repair and maintenance.

For this purpose, the Directorates of Logistic Support

• The ‘Logistics' function, which had been set up under a
and Armament Supply of the erstwhile Logistics Branch
different PSO, would be more functional if amalgamated
have been placed under the Chief of Material. Two other
with the Material and Personnel branches. This would

Directorates under the Chief of Logistics viz. Directorate
result in a more streamlined organisation at NHQ. And,
of Clothing and Victualling and the Directorate of Supply
with the logistic functions coming under the Chief of
have been placed under the Chief of Personnel and the

Material, establish tighter material control of refits.

third, the Directorate of Naval Armament Inspection has

Merger of the Supply and Secretariat Branch with the
been placed under the Vice Chief of Naval Staff”.

Executive Branch

The Intervening Years

The rationale for the merger was:2

By 1981, it had become clear that there was no significant

“Modern warships are packed with weapon systems improvement in the basic problem of timely availability of necessitating utmost economy in the space allotted for spares.

personnel. Taking this aspect into account, as also others
including the fact that officers of the Supply Branch

In 1982, the ACOM (Logistics), who functioned under
have been performing a variety of diverse functions, it the Chief of Material, recommended the immediate has been found undesirable to have separate Supply formation of a Logistic Cadre to revitalise the Logistics Officers on board ships. It has accordingly been decided Organisation.

to merge the Supply and Secretariat Branch with the

In October 1984, a new ‘Logistics Branch’ was created.

Executive Branch of the Navy with effect from 1 January At NHQ, a new PSO was created, Chief of Logistics & 1978.

Administration (COLA)3, and assisted by the erstwhile

“The existing officers of the Supply and Secretariat ACOM Logistics, now re-designated as ACOL. The Branch with up to four years seniority as Lieutenant Directorates placed under the new Logistic Branch were would be given an option to undergo an Executive the Directorate of Logistic Support (DLS), the Directorate conversion course. The remaining officers would be of Supply (DOS), the Directorate of Administration (DOA), eligible for non-operational appointments currently the Directorate of Management Services (DOMS), the held by the Executive Branch, in addition to the Supply Directorate of Works (DW), the Directorate of Armament appointments tenable by them.

Supply (DAS) and the Directorate of Transport (DOT)

“The proposed reorganisation, besides ensuring when formed.

better utilisation of the erstwhile Supply and Secretariat

The Creation of the Logistics Cadre in 1989

Officers, would also ensure reasonable promotional
avenues to them.

From 1984 till 1989, discussions continued regarding the
creation of a Logistic Cadre. The two basic issues were:

1. In the mid 1970s, Britain’s Royal Navy attempted to amalgamate its Supply Branch with its Executive Branch. After the Indian Navy had merged these branches in 1977, it came to light that the Royal Navy had abandoned its attempt because of difficulties in the modus operandi to be adopted for a smooth changeover.

2. Ministry of Defence Annual Report 1977-78.

3. COLA was created as a PSO in the rank of Vice Admiral in the Second Cadre Review.

296 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

I

0
beSt t0 UtiliSe the existin9 “erstwhile Supply
met the DOP and apprised him of what had happened.

Officers - senior ones in the new Cadre and the
junior ones who were surplus to the requirements of

Along with DOR I proposed to pursue the subject
the new cadre.

with the Commands and carry the whole Navy with us.

But the Chief of Logistics, Rear Admiral K Sridharan,
o The career profile of officers in the new Logistic Cadre.

preferred to move fast, hit the nail on the head while it

In July 1986, as part of the restructuring of the Navy and
was hot and in hindsight, 1 think he was right. The COL

NHQ organisation, the logistic function was restored to the
toured the three Commands and addressed the S&S

Material Branch. The Chief of Logistics was re-designated
officers and declared at the next PSO’s meeting that
as Controller of Logistic Support under the COM.

90% of the officers of the Supply & Secretariat Branch
were in favour of the merger.

In 1989, sanction was accorded for the formation of the

“The CNS discussed the case again at a meeting with

Logistics Cadre as part of the Executive Branch and the first
the Cs-in-C of the three Commands and the Senior
list of officers forming part of the Cadre was promulgated.

Officers at NHQ and the merger was finally decided

Reminiscences
upon. Subsequently getting Government approval for
the merger was a mere formality."

Writing in IN S Ham la's Golden Jubilee 2004 Logistics

Journal, Commodore SK Sinha recalls:

Rear Admiral K Sridharan was the Chief of Logistics at
the time. He recalls:

“In 1976-77, a brain-wave in certain quarters caused

“I was appointed Chief of Logistics on 1 March 1975.

the S& S Branch to merge with the Executive Branch

Now during that period, there was a paper put up by Naval
and further entry to the S&S Branch was stopped.

Headquarters that they wanted to re-organise Naval

Although the aim behind the merger was apparently to

Headquarters. The idea was they wanted to introduce
afford better / higher career prospects to deserving S&S
the Assistant Chief of Personnel, Assistant Chief of Naval
officers, the ground reality remained as before - not that

Staff and Assistant Chief Material (Logistics). They felt
there were no deserving S&S officers to claim higher
that ‘Logistics’ should go under the Material Branch.

Executive billets!!

They, therefore, wanted to abolish the Chief of Logistics

“The only change that S&S officers saw was that they
and that had a lot of implications. I happened to be the
came into the Executive Cadre in the new Navy List with
incumbent. They of course reassured me that it would
their seniority fitted in the appropriate level but they
not be done until I completed my tenure.

continued in their old career placements".

"I was unhappy that if the Supply and Secretariat

Writing in IN S H am la’s Golden Jubilee 2004 Logistics

Branch cannot aspire to have the commanding heights

Journal, Commodore V Janardan recalls:

of logistics then they have no star to aim for. 1 felt that it
would not be fair for the Branch to be told that you can

“Discontent and unhappiness among the General
aspire to become Assistant Chief of Material (Logistics),

List of Supply Officers had been simmering ever since
be an Assistant PSO.

I remember, as their job opportunities and promotion
prospects (apart from the glamour) were considerably

“So I felt that if that was the position, lets have a look at the
less than their Executive Branch counterparts. Often
entire branch and its organisation and its responsibilities
these officers were required to serve under their Executive
and let us re-examine whether the branch if at all should
exist. There were lots of discussions between the PSOs.

Branch counterparts.

Finally it was conceded that if the Chief of Logistics

"I was appointed Commanding Officer IN S Hamla
is abolished, the Supply and Secretariat Branch itself
in 1973. During the visit of the C-in-C, Vice Admiral
should not exist as it stands. I was given the task of re

Cursetjee to Ham la in 1975,1 submitted to him the need
organising the Branch.

for doing something for the revitalisation of the Branch
or merger with the Executive Branch to improve the

“I had a difficult time trying to decide which was the right
path, because
prospects and morale of General List Supply Officers.

1 would be held responsible by posterity
for having taken a decision which was not in favour with

“In early 1976, Admiral Cursetjee took over as CNS and
the majority of my Branch. So I volunteered to the Chief

I was appointed Director of the Supply Branch. After
of the Naval Staff that I should go around and talk to all
one of the meetings in the CNS’ office, 1 reminded him
the Commands and explain to them what was really on
of my submission to him in IN S Ham la. He smiled and
the cards as proposed by Naval Headquarters.

said, ‘We will ask the Personnel Branch to examine it’. I

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 297

“I went round talking to the Supply Officers in each

Branch was statutorily responsible for all accounting

Command. I called all the Supply Officers for the
matters of cash and material to the Financial Adviser
meetings. All who were not involved on duty were to

Defence Services and to the CNS for personnel
attend. I repeated, like a parrot, the proposal and the
administration and discipline of personnel of the Supply
pros and cons of the proposal. And 1 clearly told them,

Branch. The Naval Store Depots, the Naval Pay Office,
finally, ‘Please raise your hands, for or against. My
the Base Victualling Yards were functionally accountable
secretary and various others in the team counted the
and responsible to the C O L
hands. So if there was an under-current and they did

“The then Fleet Commander had a Fleet Supply Officer
not want to lift the hand but they have lifted, or if some
who oversaw all supply functions of the Fleet and was the
people have lifted two hands, I can’t say.

professional adviser to the Fleet Commander. On board

“Some people did get up and say ‘Well this Branch
ships, the Supply Officers were Heads of Department,
was introduced during World War II for a reason. That
reporting to the Commanding Officer. The Supply Officer
reason still stands. Why should it be abolished now?’

was in fact the principal adviser for general administration,

It is true that such a requirement still stands. I am not
welfare of the ships’ company, law and discipline, besides
saying that the Logistics Branch should not be there
normal supply duties and responsibilities. The presence
but it should be there with some amount of opportunity
of the Supply Officer for Captain's Requestmen and
for officers to grow. Whatever you say, in any service,

Defaulters Table was mandatory.

personal advancement is nearest to your heart. So the

“The revamping of the Supply functions culminated in
personal aspects and their ambitions should not be

1978 with the abolition of the Supply and Secretariat
forgotten. That is one of the main reasons why our sea

Branch. Unfortunately, whilst we did away with the
time was being curtailed. The decrease in our number
expertise to undertake the supply and logistics functions,
of jobs afloat was because of Supply Officers not going
and not the functions themselves, in a matter of three
to sea.

short years, it was realised that a reverse swing would be

“I then suggested a Logistics Branch comprising
essential.

engineer, electrical and executive branch officers with

“By 1981, the Long Logistics Management Course
special inclination for logistics, to be brought together
was introduced to restore some degree of specialisation
and given specialist training in logistics. The Logistics
amongst junior officers in supply and logistics functions.

branch could then be a conglomerate of all three
branches because each branch had logistics problems of

“By the mid 1980s, enormous problems of adequat e /
their own. They agreed with that suggestion. It was then
effective Material Logistic and Financial Management were
put to the Government. On
faced.

1 January 1978, the Chief
of Logistics was abolished, the Logistics specialisation as

“In 1986, these problems were examined by the Indian
such was introduced and specialist training was started.

Institute of Management, Bangalore at the behest of the

“What NHQ’s intentions were for proposing to abolish

Ministry of Defence. Its report to the Ministry revealed
the Logistics Branch within the short period of six to
that the Material Support and Financial Administration
seven years of its institution I cannot tell.

in the Navy were in a Virtual mess’.

“After I left the service, people started accusing me. Well

“This led to the Navy proposing the revival of a

I don’t know whether posterity will support me or curse
specialised group of officers to undertake Materials and
me. People from the Supply branch have proved their

Financial Management, Transportation and Civil Works.

worth.

“To save face that there was to be no backtracking

“The late Admiral Pereira even said in his introduction
to the revival of the Supply and Secretariat Branch
to my book on the “History of the Supply and Secretariat

(we were not going to follow the British Navy), NHQ

Branch that one day an ex Supply Officer may even
proposed that initially a Logistics Cadre within the
command the Fleet at sea’.”

Executive Branch be created, which after stabilising
in two to three years, could convert to a full-fledged

Writing in IN S H am la’s Logistics Journal of January

Logistics Branch. The Navy would thus ‘recover from

2003, Vice Admiral Barin Ghose, Controller of Logistics
the enormous damage done by the overnight winding
recalled:

up of the erstwhile Supply and Secretariat Branch

Prior to 1978, at NHQ the Chief of Logistics (COL)

several years ago.’

was directly responsible to the CNS for all Logistics and

“The proposal was approved in Ju ly 1989 and the

Supply matters. In addition, the Director of the Supply

Logistics Cadre came into being.”

298 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

35

The Cadre Reviews

P r e a m b le
manpower, particularly at managerial levels. The Navy

In the 1970s, the Army, Navy and Air Force started and the Services in general have begun to experience experiencing difficulty in attracting volunteers of the serious difficulties in this regard. Witness our inability desired calibre. For the Navy, three issues became a cause to fill officers’ intake quotas without lowering selection for concern:

standards and contrast it with the stampede to join
the Civil Services. Similarly, if there were no curbs on
o First, the promotion factor from the rank of Commander premature retirements, there would be a mass exodus to Captain had become so low that large numbers of from the Navy today. This problem may not be so acute fine, experienced Commanders were leaving the Navy in the other two services because of the lesser market to join the Merchant Navy and elsewhere.

demand for the skills they possess, but that does not

• Second, experienced artificers, who had reached the alter the basic fact that the service officer today is getting apex of the technical sailor structure after years of more and more disenchanted with his service conditions training and service at sea, were leaving the Navy for and would quit the service if given a chance.

better prospects in the Merchant Navy and elsewhere.

In order to rectify this situation, which has long-term

• Third, agreements had been signed in 1975 for a major implications on National security, Naval Headquarters had acquisition programme. The advanced technology of the put up a paper on 'Determination of Career-Factor / Ratio ships and aircraft being acquired from the Soviet Gnion between Ranks - Defence Services Officers' Structure’

required to be manned by experienced personnel. With for consideration of the PPOs Committee. This paper experienced Commanders and experienced artificers was discussed on 17 March 1977 by the PPOC but a leaving the Navy for better prospects elsewhere, the consensus did not emerge. The underlying reason for Navy had to improve the incentives for retention.

this appeared to have been the feeling that large-scale
proliferation of senior ‘ranks’ was not perhaps desirable.

Two thrust areas crystallised:

The Committee also appears to have been influenced by

• Pay Commissions. The Navy’s endeavours have the possibility of career improvement as a result of the been discussed in the section titled The Fourth Pay case for ‘Deputation of Service officers to the Ministries Commission”.

of Government of India and State Governments and

• Cadre Reviews. In March 1977, the Navy sought an Public-Sector Gndertakings’ then pending with the Senior inter-service consensus but without success. A year and Selection Board. Nothing significant has emerged from a half later, in November 1978, the Navy tried again. that case even today.

Its reasoning is reflected in the ensuing paper on “The

That the Defence Services must offer career and

Cadre Review of the Defence Services”. It was possible remuneration prospects fully comparable to the highest to obtain a measure of consensus. It led to the First civil services in the country is a fundamental fact of life Cadre Review of 1980 and was followed by the triennial which has been accepted in all countries, and there is Second Cadre Review in 1983.

little need to specially justify it in the Indian context. This
being so, the argument that “Civil Services happen to have

The Navy’s Paper on the
better career prospects than Defence Services because of

‘Cadre Review of the Defence Services’

differing job requirements" is untenable. The contention of
differing job requirements is itself highly arguable, but if it

“Introduction
were indeed so, then it is necessary to find an alternative

The vitality and verve of an organisation depends approach to solve the problem.

upon its ability to attract, motivate and retain quality

Career Factor

Civil-Military Comparison

Promotion prospects stem from the interacting relationship Career factor is a crucial ingredient in the personnel between pay-grades. As far as promotion prospects prior to structure of any organisation. This has been accepted in 1947, the Services were on par with Indian Administrative all the civil services down to Class IV level. Unfortunately, Service (IAS) / Indian Civil Service (ICS) in respect of both in the Armed Forces, no career factor has been laid down factors. Later the Services lost ground and came down to to date and whatever factor exists de facto has evolved in a the level of the Indian Police Service (IPS) with regards to haphazard manner from post-by-post sanctions.

pay grades. As far as promotion is concerned, the Services
in India, the entrants to the defence services, the civil
have over the years plummeted so far down that not only services, the public sector undertakings and the private IAS and IPS, but also nearly every Class I Civil Service industry come from the same manpower pool. In such and even a Class II Service like the Central Secretariat a situation, if the career factor of one of the competing Service (CSS) has an edge over them. Since remuneration groups falls far behind the rest, it cannot but have the is a function of promotion prospects, this has led to the gravest repercussions on the quality and motivational level Services becoming disadvantaged economically and status of its personnel.

wise in relation to the civil services with which they are on
par pay scale wise. The higher leadership of the country

The top and middle levels of the defence services today
appears to be quite unaware this state of affairs, which has are manned by officers who joined when the servicemans come about because of the differing yardsticks that have career prospects were roughly at par with his civil service been and are being adopted in the creation of senior posts counterparts. That is why there is as yet no deterioration in the civil and defence services.

in the quality of defence leadership. But if the present
position where the Services are not able to attract calibre

Promotion prospects are essentially a function of personnel continues, it cannot but affect national security vacancies in higher ranks including deputations. The in the long run. To quote General Omar Bradley, “Inferior despairingly bleak situation of the Services in this respect inducements attract second rate men. Second-rate men at is clear from the following statistics:

best provide second best security. In war, there is no prize

Services

IPS

IAS
for the runner-up.”

Rear Admiral and above

202

85

805

The need for an adequate career factor has already

Captain

1,260

420

175
been recognised in the case of the medical officers in the

Commander & below

42,500

1,650

2,558

Defence Services. Non-practicing allowance to the tune of

Rs. 600 per month, time-scale promotion to Commander

The same figures, when converted into percentage
after 16'/2 years of service, one to two rank higher staff
basis, with Commander and below as 100, are:

appointments when compared to other branches, career

Services

IPS

IAS
based flag rank vacancies for specialists, have all been

Rear Admiral and above

0.48

5.15

31.47
granted in recognition of the need to attract scarce

Captain

2.96

25.45
manpower. Is it correct to say that the same considerations

6.84
are not applicable to other branches merely because

Some of the manifestations of the unfavourable grade second-rate men are available and willing to fill the jobs structure of the forces vis-a-vis the civil services can be spumed by first-rate men?

seen from the following which compares the prospects of
the ‘regular entry’ officers of defence and civil services:

J o b -G ra d e -P a y N exu s

• While about 1.5% and 4% of service officers make In any organisation there is a trilateral nexus between jobs, Captain and flag rank, 95% and 50% of IPS officers and grades and pay levels. The problem facing the defence 100% and 98% of IAS officers make equivalent grades.

services today is that while the civil services have been able

• While service officers take about 21 and 27 years to to raise the grade levels of their jobs, the services have been reach those ranks, IPS officers take 14 and 21 years and held back because of certain cultural constraints. There IAS officers 17 years.

were only a handful of Secretaries to the Government of

India in 1947; today there are over 60 of that grade. There

• While service officers spend on an average about 5 years were only 5 officers of the rank of Inspector General of in flag ranks, IPS officers spend about 15 years and IAS Police (IGP) in 1947; today there are nearly 200. All this officers 19 years.

has been done basically by dividing and upgrading jobs
and creating new ones.

300 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

The Services have not been able to match the civil
services in this regard because of the interposition of a determined the worth of each job in the Defence Services unique fourth factor called ‘rank’ and certain constraints or for that matter in the civil services. There can be no of tradition. The ranks of certain basic jobs in the Services
conceptual objection, therefore, to the OC of a battalion
drawing a Brigadier’s pay if that is what is required to
like the Officer Commanding a battalion being a Lieutenant be offered to attract the requisite calibre of personnel.

Colonel or the Commanding Officer of a frigate being a Second, the Government has accepted career factor as a Commander, have come to be fixed over the years. Since personnel structure consideration quite independent of job these act as bench marks, the Services find themselves requirements in regulating promotions. IAS and several unable to upgrade appointments in terms of rank to the other civil cadres have been, and continue to be, the extent required for obtaining an adequate career factor.

beneficiaries of such career factor based upgradations.

T he nexus between grades and job is not strong in the

Another objection could be that laying down of pay
civil services. The nature of jobs that are being done by grade percentages for the defence services could lead officers of the Joint Secretary / Inspector General’s grade to similar demands from other sectors. This again is today and those done by such officers 30 years ago bears untenable because: testimony to this. In the Defence Services, however, because • Provision for the cadre review of civil services is already of the interposition of the additional factor called rank, we
in existence.

have a problem. Our internal culture would not accept the
creation of several thousand additional posts of Generals • All civil services, unlike the Armed Forces, have their and Brigadiers, which is what would be necessary if we
associations’ to project the career interests of their
were to attain career parity with the Civil Services through
members.

upgradation of ranks. But then, while we may not want to • Defence Services are unique in having a ‘rank’

break the nexus between rank and job, there is no reason
structure.

why we cannot snap the link between rank and pay grade.

• Defence Services can improve their retention rate and
reduce turn over rate by bettering the career prospects

The crux of the problem is that on the one hand, the
of its members. The resultant savings in training

Services require officers of a calibre and motivational level
costs would be more than the financial cost of career
at least as high as the top civil services and, therefore,
betterment.

must offer career prospects fully at par with the latter. On
the other hand, we have an organisational structure, which A Suggested Approach makes large-scale rank upgradations difficult. In the present The problem of improving the personnel structure of the circumstances, the best way to get round the problem Services has to be tackled in three planes. First, there is would, therefore, be to enhance the career prospects in the functional need to upgrade a large number of jobs terms of pay grades of ranks, instead of ranks themselves. from their present ranks. Defence Services over the years Thereafter, on the basis of career factor requirements, have grown in functional complexity and their horizons the Government may be requested to lay down the ratios have greatly widened. The planning for acquisition and between the various pay grades. This would enable us utilisation of contemporary weapon systems and their to grant pay to officers on the basis of the number of supporting infrastructure requires the highest standards vacancies in each pay grade, without having to confer the of management. Also, the middle level and senior level rank that goes with it. For example, the ratio among pay Service executive no longer functions in a sheltered grades laid down by the Government may entitle the Navy environment, but has to interact constantly with civil to have 1,200 vacancies in the Commander’s pay grade services and the mainstream of public life. All this calls for while the billets for Commanders may be only 500. In such considerable strengthening of the decision-making levels a situation, while only 500 officers will hold the rank of in the armed forces. At present, the cases for upgradations Commander, 700 Lieutenant Commanders will be able to put up by individual services are stymied by the Ministries draw the pay of Commander.

on the grounds of inter-service repercussions. Once it

An argument that may be
is established that inter-service comparison amounts
a d v a n c e d
against the
proposed concept could be that 'pay' is based on function
to quibbling over trifles, and the valid comparison in so
and, therefore, it would be incorrect to grant the pay of a far as the career factor is concerned is between the Civil rank to a person who is not performing the job of ha

Services on the one hand and the Defence Services on
rank. A moment's thought would, however,
the other, then the cases for these functionally necessary
s h o w that
upgradations cannot be stalled.

this is a specious, syllogistic objection. First, nobody

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 301

Second, there is the question of giving the Services their • Consequently, every officer will be entitled for the pension due share of non-cadreised vacancies in the Ministries of
of a Captain Indian Navy. This is of critical importance
the Central and State Governments as well as in the Public
because very few realise how the Defence Services have

Sector Undertakings (PSCJs). The basic rationale for the
been overtaken in the pension field by the Civil Services
non-cadreisation of the senior posts in Ministries and PSCJs
during the last 3 years. An IAS officer with 20 years
is that they should be filled by the best available talent in
service can retire today with a pension of at least Rs.

the country. This being so, it should be a matter of national

781 while a Service officer can hope to get Rs. 685 at
concern that only an infinitesimally small fraction of the
best.

nearly 60,000 highly trained officers (in disciplines ranging • Since Civil-Military equivalence in status is predicated on from specialised engineering fields like micro-electronics
pay scales, this would enable many more service officers
and high speed turbines to general management fields like
to be eligible for non-cadreised posts in the civil sectors
personnel, material and finance) are currently employed
which their ranks do not entitle them today.

on non-cadreised jobs. The door to jobs in the Ministries • Once the above proposal is accepted, there will and PSCJs, which at present has been opened only a crack
be no financial implications to upgradation in / of
for the Services, has to be opened wider in the interests
appointments and a major objection currently raised
of national development as well as the legitimate career
against upgradation proposals will be removed.

aspirations of Defence officers.

• With the improvement of the career factor, it would

However, it is important to realise that even when
be easier to raise retirement ages, as the pressure on
the functionally necessary upgradations and increased

‘creating vacancies’ would be reduced.

deputations to Ministries and PSCIs visualised earlier above
are carried out, it still will not be possible for the Services Mechanics of the Schem e to achieve a career factor comparable to the Civil Services. The number of posts in various ranks would continue Towards this end we should, as brought out earlier, request to be determined on the basis of functional needs. The the Government to determine on the basis of civil / number of vacancies in each pay-grade will, however, be military career-factor equivalence, the number of officers determined by the Cadre Review Committee on the basis who should hold each of the pay-grades in the Services.

of career equivalence with the Civil Services. Each officer

Each officer thereafter should have both a rank and a pay will have a rank as well as a pay-grade. The audit authorities grade. The numbers, which can be held against each will
be limited by what has been separately authorised by the shall monitor the number of officers in each pay-grade and Government. To give a concrete example, an officer may not the number of officers holding each rank.

be holding Commanders rank but may at the same time

Promotion Committees will clear officers in two
hold the pay grade of a Captain.

categories as follows:

A collateral advantage of this scheme would be that the • A small group of officers for both rank and pay. Their Services would be able to promote its bright officers to
numbers would depend upon the vacancies in ranks.

positions of responsibility much earlier and there would

• A larger group of officers for pay only. Their numbers
be greater zest and youthfulness in the middle and senior
would be dependent upon vacancies in pay-grades. The
levels of the services hierarchy. The basic concept would
elimination rate for this group would be something like
be that the low intensity jobs will be filled by officers who go
that of civilian Departmental Promotion Committees
up only in pay-grades and not in ranks while the key jobs

(DPCs).

requiring dynamism and vision will be filled by a smaller
group of officers who will be promoted rapidly through the

Officers will move from one pay group to the next higher
ranks.

pay group on the basis of rank and service in the rank.

There will be no question, therefore, of a junior officer

Benefits from the Proposal
drawing more pay than a senior officer because of greater

The above proposal will result in the following benefits:

length of service.

• Although many officers may not be promoted beyond

Financial Im plications
the rank of Commander / Time-Scale Commander, there
will be a steady rise in the pay-grades of every officer.

It has been estimated on the basis of rank-wise capitation
rates, that the proposal to delink pay and rank would cost

• Every officer will be able to reach the pay grade of at
the exchequer about Rupees three crore. This amount
least Captain Indian Navy by the time of his retirement.

pales into insignificance when viewed in the context of

302 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

a total Defence Budget of nearly Rupees 3,000 crore.

Further, by cutting down on premature retirements and

The First Cadre Review
increasing the retirement ages, which should be possible The Navys case for the First Cadre Review comprised under the present proposal, we should be able to reduce proposals for better promotion prospects for officers the turnover in the Defence Services considerably and thus and men and for improved perquisites such as increase effect annual savings in training costs of much more than in Authorised Married Establishment (AME), facility to Rupees three crore a year.

hire accommodation in places other than at duty station,
higher percentage of jobs in the CPO / PO rates, increase

Cadre Review
in the Special Duties Cadre (SD) cadre etc.

The approach outlined above needs to be converted into

The discussions in 1979 centred on a cadre review
a detailed implementation plan. Also, the percentages for Flag Rank. The Committee of Secretaries agreed to of officers in each pay grade on the basis of career nine additional Rear Admirals and three additional Vice equivalence with the civil service should be worked out. Admirals.

This task can best be entrusted to an inter-service Cadre

Review Committee with representatives of the Ministries of

These upgradations of three Rear Admirals to Vice

Defence and Finance and the Department of Personnel. Admirals and nine Captains / Commodores to Rear There is already a provision for the cadre review of civil Admirals were to be phased over a period of three years commencing 1980.

services, and the Department of Personnel Cabinet

Secretariat Office Memo No. 5/1/71/PP/Vol VI dated 6 May

The remaining proposals were postponed for further

1972 stipulates that cadre reviews are to be carried out discussion.

every three years. This has been amplified by the Ministry

The Second Cadre Review
of Finance resolution F.I1/35/75-IC (Published in the

Government of India Extraordinary Gazette Notification

The aims of the Second Cadre Review were:

No. 105 dated 1 May 1974), which states that, The Cadre • The restoration of the post-Independence parity in the Review Committee shall review on a priority basis the
official status of Armed Forces personnel vis-a-vis the All
cadre strengths of Central Class One Services in order

India Civil Services.

to improve, where necessary, the promotion prospects • Recognition of the high risk career, personal hardships of these services.’ The mechanism for cadre reviews is
and sacrifices, strict code of discipline, devotion above
already in existence in the case of civil services and the
and beyond the call of duty, and the qualifications of the
proposal merely mounts to its extension to the Defence

Armed Forces personnel being commensurate with the

Services.

technological advances.

As a first step towards cadre review, it is proposed that • Seek to offset the impact of the above through measures the PPOC appoint a small Inter-Services Sub-Committee to
to enhance the official status and improve upon the
prepare a joint Paper on the lines proposed above. After the
economic condition of the personnel.

Paper has been approved by the PPOs, it may be formally • Project the eroding attractiveness of the Armed Forces presented to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and thereafter to
and the immediate need for reversing this trend.

the Government for the initiation of a cadre review.

The proposals put up by the Navy for consideration in

Conclusion
the Second Cadre Review were:

In a country of vast unemployment like ours, some • Upgradations in various ranks and pay promotions.

aspirants can always be found regardless of the career • Time scale promotion to Commander.

prospects offered by an organisation. This fact s ou no , • De-linking of pay and pensions from rank.

however, blind us to the steadily deteriorating quality o
our officer entrants, the declining motivational level and • Improvements in the SD List Cadre.

the impact of these two on national security.

e na 1

There were misgivings in the Navy of the effect of
leadership cannot fail to see the logic c° m^ a 'We.C^
upgradations on the traditional hierarchy on board ships.

prospects, and the need to remedy the lopsided s tuaon However, since the Army had decided to go for large-today. This is particularly so when it can be s own
scale up-gradations and the Air Force had decided to fall
proposed changes can be effected not at just no cost,
in line with the Army, the Navy decided to subsume its
with net savings to the national exchequer.

misgivings.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 303

• Consequently, every officer will be entitled for the pension

Second, there is the question of giving the Services their
due share of non-cadreised vacancies in the Ministries of
of a Captain Indian Navy. This is of critical importance
the Central and State Governments as well as in the Public
because very few realise how the Defence Services have

Sector Undertakings (PSUs). The basic rationale for the
been overtaken in the pension field by the Civil Services
non-cadreisation of the senior posts in Ministries and PSCIs
during the last 3 years. An IAS officer with 20 years
is that they should be filled by the best available talent in
service can retire today with a pension of at least Rs.

the country. This being so, it should be a matter of national

781 while a Service officer can hope to get Rs. 685 at
concern that only an infinitesimally small fraction of the
best.

nearly 60,000 highly trained officers (in disciplines ranging • Since Civil-Military equivalence in status is predicated on from specialised engineering fields like micro-electronics
pay scales, this would enable many more service officers
and high speed turbines to general management fields like
to be eligible for non-cadreised posts in the civil sectors
personnel, material and finance) are currently employed
which their ranks do not entitle them today.

on non-cadreised jobs. The door to jobs in the Ministries • Once the above proposal is accepted, there will and PSUs, which at present has been opened only a crack
be no financial implications to upgradation in / of
for the Services, has to be opened wider in the interests
appointments and a major objection currently raised
of national development as well as the legitimate career
against upgradation proposals will be removed.

aspirations of Defence officers.

• With the improvement of the career factor, it would

However, it is important to realise that even when
be easier to raise retirement ages, as the pressure on
the functionally necessary upgradations and increased
creating vacancies’ would be reduced.

deputations to Ministries and PSUs visualised earlier above
are carried out, it still will not be possible for the Services Mechanics of the Schem e to achieve a career factor comparable to the Civil Services. The number of posts in various ranks would continue Towards this end we should, as brought out earlier, request to be determined on the basis of functional needs. The the Government to determine on the basis of civil / number of vacancies in each pay-grade will, however, be military career-factor equivalence, the number of officers determined by the Cadre Review Committee on the basis who should hold each of the pay-grades in the Services.

Each officer thereafter should have both a rank and a pay of career equivalence with the Civil Services. Each officer grade. The numbers, which can be held against each will will have a rank as well as a pay-grade. The audit authorities shall monitor the number of officers in each pay-grade and
be limited by what has been separately authorised by the

Government. To give a concrete example, an officer may not the number of officers holding each rank.

be holding Commander’s rank but may at the same time

Promotion Committees will clear officers in two
hold the pay grade of a Captain.

categories as follows:

A collateral advantage of this scheme would be that the

• A small group of officers for both rank and pay. Their

Services would be able to promote its bright officers to
numbers would depend upon the vacancies in ranks.

positions of responsibility much earlier and there would

• A larger group of officers for pay only. Their numbers
be greater zest and youthfulness in the middle and senior
would be dependent upon vacancies in pay-grades. The
levels of the services hierarchy. The basic concept would
elimination rate for this group would be something like
be that the low intensity jobs will be filled by officers who go
that of civilian Departmental Promotion Committees
up only in pay-grades and not in ranks while the key jobs

(DPCs).

requiring dynamism and vision will be filled by a smaller
group of officers who will be promoted rapidly through the

Officers will move from one pay group to the next higher
ranks.

pay group on the basis of rank and service in the rank.

There will be no question, therefore, of a junior officer

Benefits from the Proposal
drawing more pay than a senior officer because of greater

The above proposal will result in the following benefits:

length of service.

• Although many officers may not be promoted beyond

Financial Im plications
the rank of Commander /Time-Scale Commander, there
will be a steady rise in the pay-grades of every officer.

It has been estimated on the basis of rank-wise capitation
rates, that the proposal to delink pay and rank would cost

• Every officer will be able to reach the pay grade of at
the exchequer about Rupees three crore. This amount
least Captain Indian Navy by the time of his retirement.

pales into insignificance when viewed in the context of

302 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

a total Defence Budget of nearly Rupees 3,000 crore.

Further, by cutting down on premature retirements and

The First Cadre Review
increasing the retirement ages, which should be possible The Navy’s case for the First Cadre Review comprised under the present proposal, we should be able to reduce proposals for better promotion prospects for officers the turnover in the Defence Services considerably and thus and men and for improved perquisites such as increase effect annual savings in training costs of much more than in Authorised Married Establishment (AME), facility to Rupees three crore a year.

hire accommodation in places other than at duty station,
higher percentage of jobs in the CPO / PO rates, increase

Cadre Review
in the Special Duties Cadre (SD) cadre etc.

The approach outlined above needs to be converted into

The discussions in 1979 centred on a cadre review
a detailed implementation plan. Also, the percentages for Flag Rank. The Committee of Secretaries agreed to of officers in each pay grade on the basis of career nine additional Rear Admirals and three additional Vice equivalence with the civil service should be worked out. Admirals.

This task can best be entrusted to an inter-service Cadre

Review Committee with representatives of the Ministries of

These upgradations of three Rear Admirals to Vice

Defence and Finance and the Department of Personnel. Admirals and nine Captains / Commodores to Rear There is already a provision for the cadre review of civil Admirals were to be phased over a period of three years commencing 1980.

services, and the Department of Personnel Cabinet

Secretariat Office Memo No. 5/1/71/PP/Vol VI dated 6 May

The remaining proposals were postponed for further

1972 stipulates that cadre reviews are to be carried out discussion.

every three years. This has been amplified by the Ministry
of Finance resolution F.II/35/75-1C (Published in the

The Second Cadre Review

Government of India Extraordinary Gazette Notification

The aims of the Second Cadre Review were:

No. 105 dated 1 May 1974), which states that, The Cadre • The restoration of the post-Independence parity in the Review Committee shall review on a priority basis the
official status of Armed Forces personnel vis-a-vis the All
cadre strengths of Central Class One Services in order

India Civil Services.

to improve, where necessary, the promotion prospects
of these services.’ The mechanism for cadre reviews is • Recognition of the high risk career, personal hardships and sacrifices, strict code of discipline, devotion above
already in existence in the case of civil services and the
and beyond the call of duty, and the qualifications of the
proposal merely mounts to its extension to the Defence

Armed Forces personnel being commensurate with the

Services.

technological advances.

As a first step towards cadre review, it is proposed that • Seek to offset the impact of the above through measures the PPOC appoint a small Inter-Services Sub-Committee to
to enhance the official status and improve upon the
prepare a joint Paper on the lines proposed above. After the
economic condition of the personnel.

Paper has been approved by the PPOs, it may be formally • Project the eroding attractiveness of the Armed Forces presented to the Chiefs of Staff Committee and thereafter to
and the immediate need for reversing this trend.

the Government for the initiation of a cadre review.

The proposals put up by the Navy for consideration in

Conclusion
the Second Cadre Review were:

In a country of vast unemployment like ours, some • Upgradations in various ranks and pay promotions.

aspirants can always be found regardless of the career • Time scale promotion to Commander.

prospects offered by an organisation. This fact s ou no , • De-linking of pay and pensions from rank.

however, blind us to the steadily deteriorating quality o
our officer entrants, the declining motivational level and • Improvements in the SD List Cadre.

the impact of these two on national security,
e na lona

There were misgivings in the Navy of the effect of
leadership cannot fail to see the logic of c° mpara^
upgradations on the traditional hierarchy on board ships.

prospects, and the need to remedy the

However, since the Army had decided to go for large-
today. This is particularly so when it can be sho
scale up-gradations and the Air Force had decided to fall
proposed changes can be effected not at just no cost,
in line with the Army, the Navy decided to subsume its
with net savings to the national exchequer.

misgivings.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 303

Area (FOMA), the Tamil Nadu Area (FOTNA) and the

Officer Upgradations in the Second Cadre Review

Bengal Area (FOBA). These proposals were pended during

Approval was accorded for the creation / upgradation the 1986 changes in the Navy’s Command and Control of the following to be phased over a period of two years organisation.

commencing from the financial year 1984-85:

In 1988, proposals were put up for the creation of Area

• Vice Admirals

-

2

Commanders at Cochin, Madras and Vishakhapatnam on

• Rear Admirals

-

5
the same lines as FOMA, particularly for Madras in view of

• Captains

-

45
increased naval activity during Operation Pawan in support
of the IPKF in Sri Lanka. NHQ was advised to include these

• Commanders

-

100
in the proposals for the next Triennial Cadre Review.

Sailor Gpgradations in the Second Cadre Review

Since an inter-service consensus was not in favour of

Artificers

To Chief Artificers

59
another Cadre Review, these proposals remain pending.

Non-Artificers To Master Chief / Chief Petty Officers 390

There have been no further Cadre Reviews after 1983.

To Petty Officers

60

Retrospect

Additional Concessions Approved as part of the

Writing in the Navy Foundation’s annual journal

S econ d Cadre Review

‘Quarterdeck 2000’, Vice Admiral Koppikar, who had

• Promotion to Commander (Time Scale) on completion served in the Personnel Branch in almost all capacities of 21 years commissioned service.

from Deputy Director to Chief of Personnel, stated:

• Promotion from Lieutenant to Lieutenant Commander

“ Rank up-gradation was another controversial measure

(Special Duties) by time scale completion of 11 yeaers
which made people happy or heated depending on
commissioned service.

how it affected them. The Cadre Review bonanza was

• Ratio for promotion to the rank of Sub Lieutenant
achieved after a tough fight with the Government in
enhanced by 20%.

order to overcome serious promotion bottlenecks in the

• Increase in ratio for the award of Long Service and Good
three services.

Conduct Medal and Meritorious Medal increased to 4

“The downside was that the large-scale up-gradation
per 800 sailors.

had in fact resulted in a serious rank devaluation. Some

• Authorised Married Establishment for the grant of Cash
even advocated going back to the status quo ante.

in Lieu of Quarters increased:

Perhaps there was some substance in their argument
because a number of upgraded billets did not merit

For Leading Seamen From 80% to 90%
such favourable treatment.

For Seamen I / II

From 35% to 50%

“Also, a big chunk of the up-gradation went to the

D evelopm ents After 1984
shore sector because of the inherent limitations and
rigidity of rank and structure in ships.

In 1984, NHQ put up proposals to create additional Naval

Area Commanders’, (analogous to Flag Officer Goa Area -

“Basically it was a question of ‘too much too soon,

FOGA), for the Saurashtra Area (FOSA), the Maharashtra
and, therefore, we took steps to spread the bonanza
over a period of time.”

304 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

36

The Fourth Pay Commission

P r e a m b l e

The gist of the Commissions outcome, as applicable to
the Navy, is summarised below.

The parameters under which the Third Pay Commission
had structured its recommendations envisaged that they Officers
would be valid for the next ten years. The oil crisis of the
mid seventies and the high inflation thereafter neutralised For the first time, an integrated pay scale (also known as ‘the these parameters. The Government therefore introduced a running pay band’) was introduced, starting from the rank series of ad hoc measures. These did not alleviate matters, of Acting Sub Lieutenant up to the rank of Commodore.

especially for officers. The economic position of officers This ensured that officers in these ranks would be eligible worsened, affecting morale and the quality of intake. By for annual increments and could reach the maximum of the late seventies, remedial measures became essential.

the scale, irrespective of whether they were promoted to
the next rank. The rationale was that an officer’s domestic

In 1982, the Chiefs of Staff Committee (COSC) forwarded financial commitments (for example the cost of childrens to Government their paper on ‘Quality and Morale’ whose education, marriage etc) were, by and large, the same and major recommendation was the extension of free rations not linked with rank.

to peace areas for officers up to the naval rank of Captain.

In addition, to the running pay band, ‘rank pay’ was

The Government was inclined to grant this in cash. Admiral made admissible from the rank of Lieutenant to Captain.

RL Periera, the Chairman COSC, was able to persuade Increases were made, also, in all the allowances like Flying Government to sanction free rations in kind.

Pay, Submarine Pay, Technical Pay, Hard Lying Money, Dip

Re-mustering of Seamen and Engineering Mechanics

Money, Diving Allowance, City Compensatory Allowance,

Qualification Grants, Outfit Allowance, Submarine

In 1977, the Ministry of Defence accepted Naval Allowance and Test Pilot Allowance.

Headquarters recommendation that to keep abreast with
the growth of technology in the Navy, the educational Sailors
qualification for recruitment of Seamen and Engineering The pay scales of sailors were increased. The rates of Flying Mechanics be raised to matriculation. The Government not Pay, Submarine Pay, Survey Pay, Good Conduct Badge Pay only approved this up gradation in educational qualification, and other allowances were also enhanced.

but also directed that they be paid matriculate rates of pay.

Seamen and Engineering Mechanics were remustered The New Pension Structure from Group ‘C’ to Group ‘B\ This linkage between pay
scales and educational qualification eventually became the Officers. The earlier system of ‘standard pension, based keystone for the rationalisation of the sailor s trade and on rank at the time of retirement, was abolished. Instead, retiring pension was based on 50% of average basic pay
pay group structure’ after the Fifth Pay Commission.

plus rank pay drawn during the ten months preceding

The Fourth Pay Commission
retirement, the actual qualifying service rendered plus the
weightage in years of service.

The Fourth Central Pay Commission was set up in 1983. It
submitted its Report in 1986. The Government accepted Sailors. The prevailing system of standard rate of pension its recommendations, effective from 1 January 1986.

for each rank with the existing weightage of 5 years
remained unchanged.

Excerpts from the Report pertaining the Armed Forces
are reproduced as an Annexure. These excerpts reflect, Officers and Sailors: accurately, the perceptions of the mid 1980s.

• The rates of Disability pension, Special Family pension,

the nature of the cadre structure in services is different

Ordinary Family pension, Liberalised Family pension for as the number selected for advancement in every rank is battle casualties and War Injury Pay were enhanced.

limited in view of the command and control structure of

• The upper limit of Death-cum-Retirement Gratuity was the services. As a result, officers who cannot be promoted raised.

are entrusted with other assignments requiring skill and
experience. It has been suggested that it will be desirable

Pensioners W ho Retired On or Before 1 January 1986
to provide necessary incentives to such officers also.

• The improvements made in their pensions fell far short In a rank oriented organisation like the Armed Forces, of their expectations. This issue became politically and Cadre Reviews, which result in upgradation of posts, financially contentious because of the demand of these cannot always achieve the desired effect. It has been pensioners for 'one rank, one pension. After sustained pointed out that although the Cadre Reviews carried out efforts by the Ex Servicemen Associations over the next in the past brought about some improvement in career decade, the Fifth Pay Commission eventually conceded progression of service officers, they created problems in this demand.

the organisational structure. It has been emphasised that

Developm ents After 1990
it is not possible to undertake any further large-scale Cadre

Reviews without unacceptable aberrations in the functional

The Fifth Pay Commission was appointed in 1994. Its terms hierarchical structure. It has therefore been suggested of reference were wider in their ambit and scope than those that the pay structure for defence services should be of its predecessors. For the first time, the Commission was such that a fair share of the talent is attracted and kept asked to examine the terms and conditions of service of motivated throughout their service. In the joint proposals, Armed Forces personnel and to recommend the reforms the Services have proposed a ‘running pay band’ for all necessary to bring about desirable changes in work officers covering a time span of 33 years. Separate ‘rank methods, environment and attitudes, aimed at promoting pays’ have been proposed for each successive rank on a efficiency in administration, reducing redundant paperwork cumulative basis. It has also been suggested that separate and optimising the size of Government machinery.

pay scales in respect of specialised cadres, Flying Branch

In its deliberations, the Commission considered the in the case of Air Force and Aviators and Submariners in following major issues that were specific to the Armed the case of Navy, may be dispensed with.

Forces:

28.12. We have given careful consideration to the joint

• What steps could be taken to make entry into the Defence proposals of the Services Headquarters. We appreciate that Services more attractive, so as to maintain the morale of the organisation structure and requirements of services are personnel and to ensure their continued retention?

different. We also think that the pay structure should be

• Keeping in view the changed geo-political and strategic such that it makes armed forces attractive as a career and environment and the lessons of recent wars, was there a provides a reasonable pay progression to the officers of the scope for restructuring of the Armed Forces with greater services. Taking all factors into account, we recommend emphasis on technology than on manpower?

the following integrated pay scale for all officers up to the
rank of Brigadier and equivalent in the three services:

• Could changes in pay structure and promotion policies
help to keep the Armed Forces young and meet • Rs 2,300-100-4,200EB-100-5,000
aspirations for faster and assured promotions?

28.13. We also recommend that, in addition to pay in

• Was it feasible to have one-rank-one-pension?

the above integrated scale, the following rank pays may
be given to officers in the Army and their equivalent in the

ANNEXCIRE
other services:

Excerpts From the Fourth Pay Com m ission’s Report

A m ount of rank pay (Rs/pm)

Pertaining to the A rm ed Forces

— Lieutenant (Captain and equivalent)

200

Officers

— Lieutenant Commander (Major and equivalent)

400

— Commander [Lt Colonel (Selection) and equivalent] 600

Page 284 Para 28.11 to 28.15 of Fourth Pay

— Captain (Colonel and equivalent)

800

Commission Report Part I June 1986

— Commodore (Brigadier and equivalent)

1 >200

28.11. It has been urged that the pay scales of service
officers should be determined with reference to the

In the Navy, a Captain, on completion of three years
requirements of the services. It has been pointed out that
service in that rank, will draw the rank pay of Rs 1,200 p.m.

recommended for Brigadier.

306 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

28.14. With the adoption of the integrated pay scale
recommended above, the existing selection grades in the Of service officers. We are not therefore recommending a separate military service pay.

ranks of Major and equivalent and Lt Colonel and equivalent
should be abolished. The integrated pay scale will be Personnel Below Officer Rank applicable to all officers in the three services including
officers in the specialised cadres of AMC, ADC and RVC. 25.25. The Personnel Below Officer Rank (PBOR) in the For officers of MNS, we have recommended separate pay armed forces belonging to different trades are grouped scales.

together and a separate pay structure is prescribed for
different ranks in each group. There is, however, no uniformity

28.a.

The integrated pay scale recommended by us in regard to the number of trades and the pay groups into covers a span of 28 years. It is necessary to ensure that the which these are categorised in the three services: selection process for promotion at all levels is effectively • In the Army, there are 197 trades, excluding 9 trades objective. There should be periodic reviews for those
held by Junior Commissioned Officers (JCO) only,
constituting the non-select stream so that such of them
which are distributed in five pay groups.

who can no longer be useful are not allowed to continue • In the Air Force, there are 45 trades, which have been in the integrated pay scale up to the prescribed ages
allocated to four pay groups.

of retirement. There has to be selectivity, and we have
suggested an efficiency bar after 20 years of service. We • In the Navy, there are three pay groups, which cover 68
trades.

recommend that Government should review the existing
rules relating to selection procedure and premature

There are special groups like those of ‘flight engineer’

retirement of officers so that, at this stage, officers who do and ‘flight signaller’ in the Air Force and Navy and of sailors not make the grade are not continued in service.

belonging to the Naval Aviation and Submarine Arms in
the Navy. There are differences in the entry qualifications,

Page 286, 287, 288 Paras 28.22 to 28.37 of Fourth
the prescribed training periods, terms of engagement,

C en tral Pa y Com m ission Report P a rti Ju n e 1986
qualifying service for promotions and the rank and

28.22. It has been suggested that in the services training appointment structure, etc., for personnel below officer institutions, the trainees should be given the pay of an rank in the three services.

officer during the last 12 months of training. Keeping in 28.26. We have been informed that- it has not been view the existing facilities available to the trainees at the possible for the services to achieve a consensus in regard service institutions, we do not recommend that the pay to the pay structure for personnel below officer rank.

of an officer should be paid prior to commissioning. Separate proposals have therefore been received from the However, on the analogy of the midshipman in the Navy, three services headquarters.

we recommend that during last 6 months of training at the
respective service institutions, the trainees may be paid a 28.27. Army Headquarters have suggested that JCOs fixed amount of Rs.1,500/- p.m. This will also be admissible may be taken out of the group structure and given a to midshipman in the Navy in place of the existing rate of separate pay scale. It has also been proposed by them that the existing five pay groups for other ranks should be

Rs. 560/-.

reduced to three by abolition of the existing lowest Groups

28.23. It has been brought to notice that the number ‘D’ and ‘F\ The proposals involve reclassification of about of officers for the combat arms like infantry, artillery and 130 trades from one group to another. The reclassification armoured corps is gradually decreasing. It has been of trades has been suggested on the basis of a study suggested that by way of incentive, qualification grant
undertaken by the Institute of Defence Management,
may be given to officers on passing the specified courses Hyderabad Similar studies were undertaken at the same for infantry, artillery and armoured corps. We accept the institute for some of the trades in the Air Force and Navy, suggestion and recommend that Government may identify but no proposals have been made by Naval and Air the courses for artillery, infantiy and armoured corps, which Headquarters for reclassification of any trades based on would qualify for sanction of qualification grant.

these studies. In a subsequent proposal received from
the Army Headquarters in May 1986, a special pay group

28 24 In the joint proposals, it has been suggested that

'

.

,
nf
nav should ha
h s
a be
b e
e n
e
n pr
p o
r p
o o
p s
o e
s d
e
d in
i
n aaaiu
additon
ion iu
t
o m
t e
h
e mi
th c
r e
e
e yu
p y
a groups
military service pay at the rate of 25% of basic pay:should
dFearlier for certain high profne army trades. A

S v S ' a » ou, » ,se d distribution o, .rad.s - i n * . proposed .our p,y

« ™ d a « t n s regarding .he pa, ,nd allowance,
groups l » also been suggested.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 307

was moved from Group ‘C’ to Group ‘B ’. The necessity

28.28. We have been informed by Air Headquarters that of a change in the skill requirement due to application of a high level committee was appointed by Government improved technology to arms and weapons exists in each in 1982 to examine the various aspects relating to flight
safety in the Air Force. Based on the recommendations of the three services. As technology development and of the Committee, it has been proposed to upgrade five consequent changes shall continue to take place in the trades from the existing pay group II to pay group I of Air services, there is need for a suitable mechanism, which Force. Air Headquarters have also informed that in respect should continuously monitor the technology changes of four trades included in the existing group IV, the entry taking place and take steps for updating of skills. Such qualification has been modified for three of the trades. It an arrangement already exists, which should not only be has therefore been suggested that all these four trades continued but also strengthened so that remuneration is may be included in Group 111 of Air Force.

related to the skills applied at identified levels of functioning
in the three services. We notice that trades, which prima facie

28.29. We have given careful consideration to the appear to be similar in the three services, are grouped and suggestions of the Army Headquarters and Air Headquarters remunerated differently. We recommend that such cases for reclassification of the existing trades. We find that there should be examined by the ATQC or any other expert body is a standing arrangement in the Army Headquarters on an inter-service basis so as to bring about uniformity for review of trade structure of other ranks. There is an between the three services for comparable trades. Until Army Trade Qualification Committee (ATQC), which is then, the existing pay groups in the three services may mainly entrusted with the responsibility of examining continue with the present distribution of trades in these the various proposals and making recommendations groups.

regarding introduction of new trades, abolition of existing
trades and grouping and re-grouping of various trades. 28.31. The Third Pay Commission had recommended Such recommendations of the Committee, which have that a fully trained infantry soldier with three years’ service inter-service repercussions are referred to a Joint Special should be placed somewhere between the semi-skilled Committee. We have been informed that based on the and skilled workman. This was an improvement over the recommendations of ATQC, some trades were deleted, approach of the Post War Pay Committee (1947), which merged or regrouped in the past. We find that in addition,
had equated a fully trained infantry soldier with 3 years’

a Manpower Evaluation Committee was constituted by service to a worker classified as semi-skilled. Following the Government in August 1983 comprising officers of the approach of the Post War Pay Committee, the Third Pay Ministry of Defence and Services Headquarters to, inter Commission added an amount to the pay of a soldier on alia, assess the need for reclassification of certain trades of account of ‘X’ factor as a compensation for the hardships fighting arms to higher groups because of the requirement of service life but made a deduction from his pay for of higher skills due to modernisation of weapon systems. home saving element. The pay of an infantry soldier was It was also required to analyse the need for and feasibility determined by the Third Pay Commission as follows: of building into the present system of ‘rating of skills’

and their consequent placement in various pay groups,

Pay of corresponding civilian

Rs 225.00
the additional factor based on risk or hazard of trades in Add 5% for ‘X’ factor

+

Rs 11.25
fighting arms, which have to bear the maximum brunt
in any war. It appears that this Committee did not even

=

Rs 236. 25
start functioning and, apparently, it was decided to entrust Less 20% for ‘home saving element’

-

Rs 47.25
the study for ‘Reclassification of Trades’ to the Institute of

=

Rs 189.00

Defence Management, Hyderabad.

Based on the above, a pay of Rs 175 was recommended

28.30. Modernisation of technology and upgradation for an infantry soldier in the pay scale of Rs 175-2-195, of skills is a continuous process in the armed forces and which after 3 years service and on earning one classification Government have been taking appropriate decisions pay of Rs 7.50 would bring an infantry soldier on par with whenever necessary in the past. For example, in 1976,
a worker falling between semi-skilled and skilled. The
the trades of Radio Operator (Group II) and Flight Plotter Commission was in favour of a slight edge to an infantry (Group III) in Air Force were merged into a single trade of Air soldier over a constable in central police organisation like Defence System Operator and placed in Group II. Similarly,

Border Security Force (BSF).

three new missile trades were created in Group I. In the

Navy, the entry qualification for the Seaman Branch was 32.32. Government modified the recommendation of the modified to matriculation in 1976 and the seaman trade

Third Pay Commission ab initio and prescribed the pay

308 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

scale of Rs 200-5-260 for the infant^ soldier. This scale
gave the infantry soldier an edge of Rs 5 at the start over to change the entry qualification for Seaman Branch from the pay of Rs 195 for a BSF constable (Rs 210 minus Rs pre-matriculation to matriculation and simultaneously the 15 deducted for rations). We have been informed by the oeaman trade was upgraded from pay Group ‘C to pay Defence Ministry that the starting salary of Rs 200 for an Oroup B . Similarly, in 1977 the then existing two classes infantry soldier includes X factor of
of aircraftsman viz., Aircraftsman II and Aircraftsman I

12'/2% as against 5%
recommended by the Third Pay Commission.

were merged into one rank of aircraftsman. We have been
informed by Air Headquarters that merger of Aircraftsman II

28.33. As regards the deduction of ‘home saving and I did not make any change in the qualification, method element’ from the pay of a soldier, it has been stated by of recruitment, training and time taken for promotion to the services headquarters that provision of free rations, the Leading Aircraftsman.

accOi nmodation and clothing is a service requirement and Group D Civilian Personnel it will not be proper to make any deduction on account of
savings resulting from the provision of these facilities. It has Page 309 Para 29.12 to 29.15 of Fourth Pay also been pointed out that on account of this deduction, Commission Report the entitlement of dearness allowance over the years, of 12.12. Group D posts in the scale of Rs 196-232
an infantry soldier has also gone down thereby nullifying consist largely of peons, messengers, helpers, orderlies, the differential, which the infantry soldier had over the etc. As their promotional avenues are limited, we have constable in the BSF. We have examined this matter. We recommended a longer pay scale for them in place of the find that the concession of free rations has since been existing ordinary and selection grades. These employees extended to officers up to the rank of Brigadier in peace are at present eligible for promotion to 10% of the clerical areas without any deduction for home saving element. We posts if they are matriculates. Since the recruitment therefore recommend that there should be no deduction qualifications vary from 4th to 8th standard, many of them on account of the home saving element in determining the are not eligible for promotion. In the Railways and P&T, pay of an infantry soldier.

they are eligible for promotion to some specified cadres. In

Railways, the percentage of promotion ranges from 25 to

28.34. An infantry soldier is required to possess skills for 331A and it is much the same in P&T. We think it desirable handling modern weaponry, performing duties like laying that the utility and career progression of these employees mines, erection and destruction of the various types of should be improved so that they may have something to obstacles and handling of electrical equipment and high look forward to. They may be entrusted not only with the degree of combat skill. It has also been brought to notice duty of running errands, opening mail and distribution of that the minimum qualification for enrolment of infantry dak, etc., but also with operating minor office machines soldier has been raised to Class 10. It has been urged by and clerical work of a routine nature. Training facilities Army Headquarters that an infantry soldier is in no way less may be provided to upgrade their knowledge and skill and, than a skilled worker.

wherever possible, they may be sent to vocational training
institutions where they may develop necessary skill in

28.35. In our view, the duties and responsibilities of an operating some simple office machines. Arrangements infantry soldier are such that he cannot really be compared may also be made to provide in-house training facilities with any other category of employees. After taking all the so that they may acquire multi-functional skills suited to factors into consideration, we recommend that starting the requirements of their office or organisation. They may salary of an infantry soldier should be fixed at Rs 9
be allowed to compete for departmental examinations if

28.36. The Third Pay Commission had obseived that the
they otherwise become eligible for higher posts, and the
fully trained infantry soldier should be viewed as equivalent question of relaxing the age limit may also be examined to the Leading Aircraftsman of Group IV o t e r o

, where necessary.

with a small differential in favour of Able o le

^

Integrity in Government Employees
of Group ‘C of the Navy considering the relativeyg _ _
hardships inherent in sea life. The Commission wa

29.13. There is a general feeling in the country that
view that adoption of the above broad equation would there is lack of integrity in some spheres of public service.

lead to greater uniformity in pay scales among the three

Concern has been expressed in this respect both in

Parliament and the press. The Service Rules, including
services.

Government Servants Conduct Rules, may therefore

28.37.

be examined with care and tightened up. A sense of
the Third Pay Com m ission. In iy/o , uuv

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 309

was moved from Group ‘C’ to Group ‘B\ The necessity

28.28. We have been informed by Air Headquarters that of a change in the skill requirement due to application of a high level committee was appointed by Government improved technology to arms and weapons exists in each in 1982 to examine the various aspects relating to flight of the three services. As technology development and safety in the Air Force. Based on the recommendations consequent changes shall continue to take place in the of the Committee, it has been proposed to upgrade five services, there is need for a suitable mechanism, which trades from the existing pay group II to pay group I of Air should continuously monitor the technology changes Force. Air Headquarters have also informed that in respect
of four trades included in the existing group IV, the entry taking place and take steps for updating of skills. Such qualification has been modified for three of the trades. It an arrangement already exists, which should not only be has therefore been suggested that all these four trades continued but also strengthened so that remuneration is may be included in Group III of Air Force.

related to the skills applied at identified levels of functioning
in the three services. We notice that trades, which prima facie

28.29. We have given careful consideration to the appear to be similar in the three services, are grouped and suggestions of the Army Headquarters and Air Headquarters remunerated differently. We recommend that such cases for reclassification of the existing trades. We find that there should be examined by the ATQC or any other expert body is a standing arrangement in the Army Headquarters on an inter-service basis so as to bring about uniformity for review of trade structure of other ranks. There is an between the three services for comparable trades. Until Army Trade Qualification Committee (ATQC), which is then, the existing pay groups in the three services may mainly entrusted with the responsibility of examining continue with the present distribution of trades in these the various proposals and making recommendations groups.

regarding introduction of new trades, abolition of existing
trades and grouping and re-grouping of various trades.

28.31. The Third Pay Commission had recommended

Such recommendations of the Committee, which have that a fully trained infantry soldier with three years’ service inter-service repercussions are referred to a Joint Special should be placed somewhere between the semi-skilled Committee. We have been informed that based on the and skilled workman. This was an improvement over the recommendations of ATQC, some trades were deleted, approach of the Post War Pay Committee (1947), which merged or regrouped in the past. We find that in addition, had equated a fully trained infantry soldier with 3 years’

a Manpower Evaluation Committee was constituted by service to a worker classified as semi-skilled. Following the Government in August 1983 comprising officers of the approach of the Post War Pay Committee, the Third Pay Ministry of Defence and Services Headquarters to, inter Commission added an amount to the pay of a soldier on alia, assess the need for reclassification of certain trades of account of ‘X’ factor as a compensation for the hardships fighting arms to higher groups because of the requirement of service life but made a deduction from his pay for of higher skills due to modernisation of weapon systems. home saving element. The pay of an infantry soldier was It was also required to analyse the need for and feasibility determined by the Third Pay Commission as follows: of building into the present system of ‘rating of skills’

and their consequent placement in various pay groups,

Pay of corresponding civilian

Rs 225.00
the additional factor based on risk or hazard of trades in Add 5% for ‘X’ factor

+

Rs

11.25
fighting arms, which have to bear the maximum brunt
in any war. It appears that this Committee did not even

=

Rs 236. 25
start functioning and, apparently, it was decided to entrust Less 20% for ‘home saving element’ -

-

Rs

47.25
the study for ‘Reclassification of Trades’ to the Institute of

=

Rs 189.00

Defence Management, Hyderabad.

Based on the above, a pay of Rs 175 was recommended

28.30. Modernisation of technology and upgradation for an infantry soldier in the pay scale of Rs 175-2-195, of skills is a continuous process in the armed forces and which after 3 years service and on earning one classification Government have been taking appropriate decisions pay of Rs 7.50 would bring an infantry soldier on par with whenever necessary in the past. For example, in 1976,
a worker falling between semi-skilled and skilled. The
the trades of Radio Operator (Group II) and Flight Plotter Commission was in favour of a slight edge to an infantry (Group III) in Air Force were merged into a single trade of Air soldier over a constable in central police organisation like Defence System Operator and placed in Group II. Similarly, Border Security Force (BSF).

three new missile trades were created in Group I. In the

Navy, the entry qualification for the Seaman Branch was 32.32. Government modified the recommendation of the modified to matriculation in 1976 and the seaman trade

Third Pay Commission ab in itio and prescribed the pay 308 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

scale of Rs 200-5-260 for the infantry soldier. This scale
gave the infantry soldier an edge of Rs 5 at the start over to change the entry qualification for Seaman Branch from the pay of Rs 195 for a B S F constable (Rs 210 minus Rs pre-matnculation to matriculation and simultaneously the 15 deducted for rations). We have been informed by the oeaman trade was upgraded from pay Group ‘C’ to pay Defence Ministry that the starting salary of Rs 200 for an Group -B1. Similarly, in 1977 the then existing two classes infantry soldier includes X factor of
of aircraftsman viz., Aircraftsman II and Aircraftsman I

12'/2% as against 5%
recommended by the Third Pay Commission.

were merged into one rank of aircraftsman. We have been
informed by Air Headquarters that merger of Aircraftsman I

23.33. As regards the deduction of ‘home saving and I did not make any change in the qualification, method element’ from the pay of a soldier, it has been stated by of recruitment, training and time taken for promotion to the services headquarters that provision of free rations, the Leading Aircraftsman.

accommodation and clothing is a service requirement and Group D Civilian Personnel it will not be proper to make any deduction on account of
savings resulting from the provision of these facilities. It has Page 309 Para 29.12 to 29.15 of Fourth Pay also been pointed out that on account of this deduction, Commission Report the entitlement of dearness allowance over the years, of 12.12. Group D posts in the scale of Rs 196-232
an infantry soldier has also gone down thereby nullifying consist largely of peons, messengers, helpers, orderlies, the differential, which the infantry soldier had over the etc. As their promotional avenues are limited, we have constable in the BSF. We have examined this matter. We recommended a longer pay scale for them in place of the find that the concession of free rations has since been existing ordinary and selection grades. These employees extended to officers up to the rank of Brigadier in peace are at present eligible for promotion to 10% of the clerical areas without any deduction for home saving element. We posts if they are matriculates. Since the recruitment therefore recommend that there should be no deduction qualifications vary from 4th to 8th standard, many of them on account of the home saving element in determining the are not eligible for promotion. In the Railways and P&T, pay of an infantry soldier.

they are eligible for promotion to some specified cadres. In

Railways, the percentage of promotion ranges from 25 to

28.34. An infantry soldier is required to possess skills for 331A and it is much the same in P&T. We think it desirable handling modern weaponry, performing duties like laying that the utility and career progression of these employees mines, erection and destruction of the various types of should be improved so that they may have something to obstacles and handling of electrical equipment and high look forward to. They may be entrusted not only with the degree of combat skill. It has also been brought to notice duty of running errands, opening mail and distribution of that the minimum qualification for enrolment of infantry dak, etc., but also with operating minor office machines soldier has been raised to Class 10. It has been urged by and clerical work of a routine nature. Training facilities Army Headquarters that an infantry soldier is in no way less may be provided to upgrade their knowledge and skill and, than a skilled worker.

wherever possible, they may be sent to vocational training
institutions where they may develop necessary skill in

28.35. In our view, the duties and responsibilities of an operating some simple office machines. Arrangements infantry soldier are such that he cannot really be compared may also be made to provide in-house training facilities with any other category of employees. After taking all the so that they may acquire multi-functional skills suited to factors into consideration, we recommend that starting the requirements of their office or organisation. They may salary of an infantry soldier should be fixed at Rs
be allowed to compete for departmental examinations if

28.36. The Third Pay Commission had observed that the they otherwise become eligible for higher posts, and the fully trained infantry soldier should be viewed as
question of relaxing the age limit may also be examined
to the Leading Aircraftsman of Group IV of the Air Force
where necessary.

with a small differential in favour of Able o le

Integrity in Government Employees
of Group ‘C of the Navy considering the relat,v^ 9 f h

29.13. There is a general feeling in the country that
hardships inherent in sea life. The ^om™ISSIon.

view that adoption of the above broad equation would
there is lack of integrity in some spheres of public service.

Concern has been expressed in this respect both in
lead to greater uniformity in pay scales am

Parliament and the press. The Service Rules, including
services.

Government Servant’s Conduct Rules, may therefore

28.37. Some changes have^occurred
be examined with care and tightened up. A sense of
the Third Pay Commission. In 19/o, uo

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 309

self-respect, integrity and patriotism should be generated Summary of Main Recommendations and Conclusions and developed in government employees, and one way of Page 322 Paras 127 to 154 o f Fourth C entral Pay doing so is to recognise integrity as an important factor for Com m ission Report career progression and to give it very high weightage while
selecting officers for promotion. Lack of integrity should

127. We recommend that all industrial employees should
be considered a serious defect and treated as such. So have the same leave entitlement and encashment as also, if there are instances of indiscipline, the defaulting admissible to industrial employees of railways. All other employee may be passed over for promotion or even for kinds of leave available to industrial employees at present grant of increments in his pay scale.

but not available to non-industrial employees may be
discontinued. (26.61)

29.14. We have tried to improve the pay structure to
enable a government employee to lead a clean, honest and

128. Government may consider whether the present
respectable life at a standard compatible with what his likes scheme of Joint Consultative Meetings (JCM ) and attain or accept as reasonable at his level of living. It may be compulsory arbitration should be modified as to require that the pay scales recommended by us may not enable a that reasons for the recommendations of the Board of government employee to lead an ostentatious life, but we Arbitration should be given as far as possible. (20.68) have attempted to give him what we consider reasonable
and to protect his real income within certain practical norms,

135. To provide pay progression to all commissioned
which should go a long way in giving him satisfaction. It officers in Army, Navy and Air Force, an integrated pay has to be appreciated by every government employee that scale (Rs 2,300-5,000) has been recommended for all he has undertaken to discharge a duty in the service of his officers up to the rank of Brigadier and equivalent in place country to the best of his capacity and with a high sense of of existing separate scales of pay. (28.12) integrity and discipline. He has in fact undertaken to serve

136. In addition to pay in the integrated scale, service
his fellowmen, and it should be his effort to do so with a officers up to the rank of Brigadier and equivalent may be sense of respect and consideration for them.

given a rank of pay ranging from Rs 200 to Rs. 1,200.

29.15. If we may venture to say so, the work of a Pay (28.13) Commission is laborious and takes time. Moreover, Pay 137. Separate pay scales have been recommended Commissions come at intervals of 10 years or so. A great for officers of the rank of Major General and above and many changes take place in the meantime, both in regard equivalent. (28.16) to the system of pay determination and the promotion
policies, etc. Such changes take place quite fast in the case

138. Army Commanders and equivalent and Vice Chiefs
of compensatory allowance and other similar payments.

in the three services may be given pay of Rs 8,000 (fixed).

An allowance that is considered sufficient today may not (28.17)

be reasonable if changes take place quickly. It is, therefore,
necessary that there should be a permanent machinery 139. Officers of the AMC, ADC and RVC may be given to undertake periodical review of the pay, allowances higher start in the integrated scale of pay. (28.19) and conditions of service of the central government 140. For officers of MNS, a separate pay structure has employees. That will also enable government to oversee the been suggested. (28.20) implementation of its pay policy in an effective, systematic
and coordinated manner. In their joint proposals, the

141. The officers passing the specified courses for Infantry,

Service Headquarters have suggested that a permanent Artillery and Armoured Corps may be given qualification review body should be set up to monitor the implementation grant. (28.23) of pay proposals and to review and update entitlements
for pay, allowances and pension within the framework laid

142. The starting pay of an infantry soldier may be Rs 900
down by the Pay Commission and the Government. In the per month. (28.35) Gnited Kingdom, pay review bodies undertake review of 143. The rates of classification pay admissible to pay of both civilian and defence officers. We suggest that servicemen in Army may be doubled. (28.41) Government may set up such a body which should be
responsible for maintaining and updating the basic data

144. The rates of appointment pay admissible to
on pay and allowances of government employees and to servicemen in Army may be doubled. (28.42) review the pay scales and rates of allowances and other
related matters.

145. The service officers posted to field areas may be
paid an amount at prescribed rates if their families are not

310 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

occupying government owned / hired accommodation

(28.61)

and honesty will be rewarded and inefficiency, dishonesty
and indiscipline will not be tolerated.

146. The rates of Compensation In Lieu of Quarters (CILQ)

for personnel below officer rank have been rationalised and

What is important is the need for a positive approach to
public service with a feeling that working in government is
composite rates, including compensation for furniture, water a profession of the highest order. In fact, there should be and electricity / kerosene, have been suggested. (28.71)

an unwritten but well-recognised code of conduct to be

147. The rates of outfit allowance admissible to service affirmed and observed by every employee that: officers may be increased. (28.72)

• Primary duty of a public servant is to serve the public.

148. The facility of free rations in peace areas may be • Pay is to be earned on full day's work.

extended to officers of the rank of Major General and above • Endeavour should be to get work done in most economic and equivalent. (28.85)

way.

• No special favour or privilege is dispensed to anyone.

149. The existing separation allowance (peace) of Rs 200
per month admissible to officers of the rank of Major General • Public office is treated as public trust.

and above and equivalent may be discontinued. (28.28)

Acknowledgements

150. The rates of specialist pay for the AMC / ADC / RVC We have been able to complete this part of our report may be improved. (28.92)

with the help and assistance of all concerned. We are
grateful to the former Governor of Rajasthan, Air Chief

151. The rates of Non Practicing Allowance for medical Marshal OP Mehra (Retd) for giving us the benefit of his officers of the AMC, ADC and RVC may be revised. (28.93)

views. We are obliged to the Chief Ministers and Ministers

152. The rates of good service / good conduct pay / good of State Governments who were kind enough to respond conduct badge pay for personnel below officer rank in to our invitation for discussion with us on various issues.

three services may be improved.

We are grateful to the former Cabinet Secretary, Shri CR

Krishnaswamy Rao Sahib, the present Cabinet Secretary,

153. The rates of flying pay may be revised.

Comptroller and Auditor-General, Secretaries of Ministries
and Departments, heads of various organisations and

154. The rates of submarine pay for officers and sailors other officers for their suggestions. The three Service may be improved.

Chiefs and other officers of the armed forces favoured us

Page 324 o f Fourth C entral Pay Commission Report
with their views on different issues and we are grateful to
them. We would like to express our thanks to the officers

P a rt I Ju n e 1986
of ministries, departments, state governments, union

Concluding Observations
territories and public sector undertakings who gave us all
the necessary assistance in the completion of our work.

In our country, ‘public service’ functions in a social setting We are also thankful to representatives’ of the unions where traditions, physical factors, geography, etc play an and associations of central government employees and important role. We should not be very much concerned with others who gave us their views both in writing and during management of pay systems and public service abroa , as discussions on various matters. We thank the Director, conditions are not only different but often incompara e. National Informatics Centre, for processing our basic staff We have felt that our problems are peculiar to our sociostatistics. Our advisers and consultants, Shri CM Malik and economic system and solutions have to be foun
y us Shri Shiva Nath and Lieutenant General Dr ML Chibber
within our own confines.

(Retd) gave useful suggestions and advice and we are
thankful to them. We also thank Shri SP Gugnani and Prof

Those who work in public office must

1

BB Bhattacharya for some special studies.

government office is a public trust where goo per

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 311

37

Gallantry Awards 1976 - 1990

During the period 1976 to 1990 Gallantry Awards were station miles inland. For details, please see section on given for individual acts in three areas:

Expeditions to Antarctica.

• Saving the lives of others in hazardous conditions.

Operation Pawan

• The Antarctica Expeditions, which started in 1981/82.

The Navy’s Operation Pawan in support of the Indian Peace

• Operation Pawan, which started in 1987.

Keeping Force (IPKF) in Sri Lanka commenced in Ju ly 1987

Antarctica Expeditions
and terminated in March 1990. Due to the shallow depths
in the Palk Strait, the induction and de-induction of troops,

Naval Chetak helicopters were used to transport personnel, vehicles and stores was done in LSTs. Operational Patrols stores fuel and construction material. Of the average of 70 were carried out by shallow draught, minor war vessels like to 75 days that a research ship stays in Antarctica, there SDBs, LCGs and Coast Guard patrol craft placed under are storms, blizzards, very strong winds and zero visibility operational control of the Navy. Naval and Coast Guard conditions for 35 to 40 days, leaving only 30 to 40 days for aircraft and naval helicopters carried out air patrols. For the helicopters to ferry men and material to the permanent
details, please see the chapter titled “Operation Pawan”.

Abbreviations used in the table

LST:

Landing Ship Tank

Div:

Diver

SDB:

Seaward Defence Boat

SD:

Ships Diver

LCG:

Landing Craft Utility

PTI:

Physical Training Instructor

CGV:

Coast Guard Vessel

SAR:

Search and Rescue

CD:

Clearance Diver

O i/c:

Officer-in-Charge

ACD:

Air Crew Diver
i/c:

In-Charge

Rank, Name, Personal No

Appointment / Function Action performed under hazardous

Gallantry Award

/Activity / Event
conditions and risk to life

1 9 7 6

Cdr SK Bhalla

O i/c FirefightingTeam

(40044 H)

Extinguishing fire in a merchant ship in

Nau Sena Medal

Bombay Harbour

CH Mech PD Kholia
i/c Firefighting Team

(66736)

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

Cdr Gulab Israni

Vampire Pilot

(00364 A)

Safe landing after engine failure during

Nau Sena Medal
test flight

Cdr SC Issacs

O i/c Diving Team

(00414 R)

Diving operations Badarpur Thermal

Nau Sena Medal

Power Station New Delhi

CrU (Div II) AD Mehta
i/c Diving Team

(48894)

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

Cdr PA Debras

Seahawk Pilot

(00417 Y)

Successful ejection from underwater

Nau Sena Medal
after aircraft sank immediately after
launch from Vikrant

LAvwU Majnarul Hasan

Aircrew Diver

(91982)

Rescue of ditched naval pilot after

Nau Sena Medal
successful ejection from underwater

Cdr Sushil Issacs

Commanding Officer

(00449 W)

Removal of sunken wreck obstructing

INS Ghorpad (LST)

Nau Sena Medal
jetty at Kamorta Island

Lt Cdr GAD Duke, NM

Executive Officer INS

-do-

(00621 K)

Bar to Nau Sena

Ghorpad and O i/c Diving

Medal

Team

Lt VP Kapil, VrC

O i/c Diving Team

Demolition of sunken wreck in Bhavnaaar

(00667 R)

Nau Sena Medal

Port

POCD 1 Diwan Singh

Diving Team

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(63814)

Cdr RC Jagota

O i/c Oil Salvage Team

Salvage of oil from oil tanker stranded on Nau Sena Medal

(40066 H)

Kiltan Island

Lt Cdr George Martis, VrC, NM O i/c Diving Team

Refloating of oiler Purak grounded whilst Bar to Nau Sena

(00445 K)

savaging oil from tanker Kiltan Island

Medal

CPO Mahesh Kumar

INS Magar

Rescue of sailors trapped in fire on board Nau Sena Medal

(65127)

INS Magar (LST)

LS CD 2 AC Singh

Diving Team

Diving operations beyond permissible Nau Sena Medal

(93112)

depths. Ramganga Project Kalagarh

Dam

1977

Cdr N Radhakrishnan (Retd)

Cabinet Secretariat

Successful completion of a national Shaurya Chakra
security operation

Nau Sena Medal

Capt JG Nadkarni, VSM

Commanding Officer

Salvage of INS Godavari stranded in the

(00086 W)

INS Delhi (Cruiser)

Maldive Islands. 1976

Cdr Gupteshwar Rai

Commanding Officer

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(00528 Z)

INS Kesari (LST)

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

Lt Cdr Lokendra Kumar

Commanding Officer

(00270 N)

INS Gaj (Tug)

Lt Cdr (SDME) M Lai, VSM

Salvage Team

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(85029 Y)

Lt (SDB) Mewa Singh

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(83181 V)

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

LS BD Chaudhary

-do-

^ 0 3 0 1U)

Nau Sena Medal

-do-

SEA 1 VP Patil

-do-

(oJUb/ )

Rescue of two Air Force pilots off Bombay Nau Sena Medal

INS Vikrant SAR

Lt SS Kahion
after their helicopter ditched

F iiq h t C o m m a n d e r

(00826 A)

-------"

i1 y to

---------

Saving the life of a drowning jawan dunng Nau Sena Medal

O i/c B each in g O perations

Cdr MS Narayanan
amphibious beaching operation

INS Shardul (LST)

(U U 4 1 5 I )

-do-

Beaching Party

PO (CD 1) Shyam Singh

(91064)

Safe forced landing after engine flameout Nau Sena Medal

Seahawk Pilot

Lt Sarvottam Handa

(00887 R)

TRANSITION TO EM IN EN C E/313

Rescue of ditched pilot in stormy weather

Nau Sena Medal

Lt K S Aulakh

INS Vikrant SAR Helicopter

(01070 F)

Flight

Nau Sena Medal

CPO JC Xavier

Rescue Team

Rescue of marooned villagers after floods

(47205)

in Tamil Nadu. Nov 1976

CPO CK Nair

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(65543)

LMA (ORT) MM Ameen

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(68141)

Sea IA P J Solomon

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(92159)

1 97 9

Cdr HDM Gori, NM

Helicopter Pilot

Medical evacuation by helicopter in Shaurya Chakra

(00452 A)

stormy weather from a ship in distress.

Ju n 1978

Lt Cdr PB Chaudhary

Helicopter Pilot

Rescue by helicopter of villagers stranded Shaurya Chakra

(00575 T)

after Andhra Pradesh Cyclone. Nov 1977

Lt Cdr S S Deodhar

O i/c Rescue Team

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(00626-Y)

SWA3 R B Singh

Rescue Team

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(51528)

Lt Cdr RK Sharma

O i/c Diving Team

Diving operations Naqarjuna Saqar Hydel Nau Sena Medal

(0094 7-A)

Complex. 1978

Sea I (CD2) GD Khuspe

Diving Team

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(54944)

Lt Cdr KM Thomas

Seaking Pilot

Safe landing on Vikrant despite major Nau Sena Medal

(00999-W)

gearbox oil leak during night

Lt PD Gpponi

O i/c Diving Team

Prolonged
diving
amidst
hazardous Shaurya Chakra

(01152 T)

wreckage of Air India Boeing crashed off

Bom bay Ja n 1978. Successfully located

Digital Flight Recorder

Sea 1 CD 3 A S Sawant

Diving Team

Prolonged
diving
amidst
hazardous Shaurya Chakra

(95957)

wreckage of Air India Boeing crashed off

Bom bay Ja n 1978. Successfully located

Cockpit Voice Recorder

M CPO II (CD) AD Mehta,

Diving Team

Diving operations in wreckage of Air India Nau Sena Medal

NM (48894)

Boeing crashed off Bombay. Ja n 1978

C PO (C D l) Dewan Singh,

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

NM (63814)

Sea I (CD3) Sardul Singh

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(95432)

Sea 1 (CD2) Jagm al Singh

Diving Team

Demolition of sunken wreck in Cochin Nau Sena Medal

(94485)

Port

SEA I D Singh

IN S Betwa

Passing of heavy tow wires to stranded Nau Sena Medal

(202393)

merchant ship in rouqh seas

1 9 8 0

Lt D S Dalai

O i/c Diving Team

Diving operations to extricate bodies from Nau Sena Medal

(01625 T)

bus fallen into Thane Creek. Feb 1979

PO (SR I) Rattan Singh

Detached Survey Party

(84135)

Rescue of drowning sailor in
the Nau Sena Medal

Sunderbans. Feb 1979

314 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

1981

Lt SV Purohit

Seaking Pilot

(01066 Y)

Safe and skilful ditching 120 miles from Shaurya Chakra

Cochin after total engine failure and
disintegration of tail section 1981

LVS ACD M L Kathat

Aircrew Diver

(054925 F)

Rescue in rough weather of drowning Shaurya Chakra
fisherman off Goa Jul 1980

Lt AV Vaidya

SAR Helicopter Pilot

-do-

(01462 Y)

Nau Sena Medal

U S CD 3 D S Sidhu

Clearance Diver

Rescuing an elderly civilian lady, whohad

(96898 Z)

Shaurya Chakra
accidentally slipped into the water whilst
boarding a boat, from being crushed
between the boat and the pontoon

Lt Cdr PB Chowdhury

Helicopter Flight

Flying operations in stormy weather

Nau Sena Medal

(00575 F)

Commander

Lt Cdr RS Kanwar

Helicopter Flight

Medical evacuation from merchant ship Nau Sena Medal

(00995 K)

Commander
in rough seas. Jul 1979

Lt Cdr S K Chandna

Helicopter Flight

Rescue of ditched pilot and medical Nau Sena Medal

(01060 H)

Commander
evacuation from merchant ship in stormy
weather

LS Puran Chand

Salvage Team

Recovery of heavy naval hardware from Nau Sena Medal

(084369 Z)

deep depth. Mar 1980

M E 1 NN Roy

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(057098 W )

1 98 2

Nau Sena Medal

Lt Cdr PD (Jpponi, SC

O i/c Diving Team

Extricating bodies from the sunken
wreckage of the passenger train that fell

(01152 T)

into the Bagmati River in Jun 1981

Lt O P Sindhu

Diving Team

-do-

Shaurya Chakra

(01591 R)

L S (CD1) Balbir Singh

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(085252-F)

Nau Sena Medal

L S (CD1) Jagm al Singh

-do-

-do-

(094485-R)

Nau Sena Medal

-do-

L S (CD1) Rameshwar Jh a

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

-do-

L S (CD2) S K Vayangankar

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

-do-

L S (CD2) Puran Mai

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

-do-

S E A I (SD ) J J Chelath

-do-

(200856-T)

Rescue of crew who had abandoned their Shaurya Chakra

Ships Diver

NA 1 AH 3 G S Chauhan
boat after it caught fire. Bombay Harbour

(107377 R)

Sep 1981

Salvage and recovery of stranded whaler Nau Sena Medal

Salvage Team

Lt Cdr RLR Kshirsagar
in stormy weather. May 1981

(00939-H)

____

Numerous occasions of rescue of ditched Nau Sena Medal

Helicopter Flight
pilots and medical evacuations in stormy

Lt Cdr KD S Sandhu

Commander

(01067-Z)

weather

--------

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 315

Nau Sena Medal

Lt Pradeep Roy

Flag Lt to FO C W EF

Rescue of sailors from Himgiri’s boiler
room after massive leak of superheated

(01824 W )

steam. Mar 1981

NAM I M S Bali

IN S Dunagiri (Frigate)

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(142324 R)

Nau Sena Medal

PO M E G S Ja t

-do-

Timely shutting down of Himgiri’s boilers

(055566 N)

to control leak of superheated steam

PO JN Murthy

IN S Sandhayak (Survey

Saving survey boats whilst hoisting during Nau Sena Medal

(088359-T)

Ship)

sudden storm

LS KK Bajpai

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(097736-B)

Sea I (CD2) Rati Ram

Rescue Team

Rescue of passengers from train stranded Nau Sena Medal

(103669 N)

by flash floods in Andhra Pradesh. 1981

PO RS Chauhan

Rescue Team

Rescue of villagers after flash floods in Nau Sena Medal

(085140 A)

Andhra Pradesh. 1981

1 98 3

Lt Cdr MAR Subhan

Fire in Missile Boat after As Commanding

Officer,
personally Shaurya Chakra

(01115 H)

missile explosion during ensuring safe survival of his boat and practice firing
crew. 1982

SLt HD Motiwala

-do-

Personally
directing
fire
fighting Shaurya Chakra

(02015 B)

operations

EAP Ja i Prakash

-do-

Personally
assisting
fire
fighting Shaurya Chakra

(052484 H)

operations

Lt Cdr AH Chitnis

Kamov Flight

Location of fishermen in cyclonic weather Nau Sena Medal

(01208 W )

Commander IN S Rajput
leading to their rescue. Nov 1981

Lt Cdr K S Sandhu, NM

1st AntarcticaExpedition As Flight Commander, flying in harsh Shaurya Chakra (01067 Z)

1981/82
weather conditions to establish base
camp

Lt Cdr K S Samra

-do-

As Flight Pilot, reconnaissance for base Nau Sena Medal

(01219W )

camp in harsh weather conditions

Lt Cdr DK Chandani

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(01269 H)

CHEAAR M Mahapatra

-do-

As Flight Maintenance Team, defect Nau Sena Medal

(051957 K)

rectification in harsh weather conditions
despite limited resources

CHAA GVR Shirsat

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(094983 Y)

Cdr D S Brar

-do-

As O i/c Naval Contingent, ensuring safety Nau Sena Medal

(60090 T)

of vital stores and helicopters that were
breaking loose during sudden cyclone on
passage to Antarctica

Surg Lt Cdr Salim J Thomas

-do-

As Surgical Specialist and O i/c Medical Nau Sena Medal

(75142 A)

Team, providing medical emergency
and surgical operating facilities for the

Expedition

P O M A JS Saini

-do-

As Medical Team, Operating Room Nau Sena Medal

(059233 Y)

Technician, setting up medical and
operation facilities for the Expedition

Lt Shekhar Sinha

Kiran Pilot

Safe forced landing despite engine and Nau Sena Medal

(01480 N)

control failure in flight. Sep 1982

316/ TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Kamov Flight

Safe landing onboard after engine failure

Commander INS Rajput

Shaurya Chakra
in stormy weather and low visibility

Lt Ravinder Kakar

Clearance Diving Officer

(01835 W)

Removal of sunken trawler wrecks in Shaurya Chakra

Paradip Port after Orissa Cyclone. June

1982

Lt Rajan Gupt

-do-

•do-

(01836 Y)

Nau Sena Medal

Cdr AN Karve

Coast Guard HQ Madras

Interception of smugglers and salvage of Nau Sena Medal

(00593 Y)

contraband from sunken sabotaged craft

Lt Cdr R S Gill

2nd Antarctica Expedition. As Right Commander, flying in harsh Shaurya Chakra (01120 W )

1982/83
weather conditions and rescue of
stranded members of the Expedition
during blizzard

Lt Cdr K S Randhawa, NM

-do-

As Flight Pilot, flying in harsh weather Shaurya Chakra

(01189 A)

conditions and saving helicopter from
blizzard damage

Lt Cdr K S Sam ra, MM

-do-

As Flight Pilot, flying in harsh weather Shaurya Chakra

(01219W )

conditions and rescue operations

Lt Cdr R Sethi
do-

As Right Pilot, flying in harsh weather Shaurya Chakra

(01232 Z)

conditions and ensuring safe recovery of
stranded helicopter

Nau Sena Medal

Surg Lt Cdr D B Rao
do-

As leader of the Naval Contingent, O i/c

Medical Team and anesthetic specialist

(75157 K)

providing emergency medical services to
the Expedition

__________________

As Flight Maintenance Team, defect Nau Sena Medal

C HEAA I Khan

-do-
rectification during blizzard despite

(094344 W )

limited resources

_______

Air Mech III B S Thakur
dodo-

Nau Sena Medal

(093474 T)

do-

PO EA R (E L) RK Kapoor

-do-

(097141 A)

Rescue of drowning sailor and recovery

Lt AR Vardhan

OOD, INS Taragiri
of swamped boat in rough weather, Goa.

(01498 B )

(Frigate)

Apr 1983________

Diving operations in Periyar Lake to remove

LS (CD II) Jagdish Chand

Diving Team
submerged stumps using explosives

(094801 H)

Rescue of drowning old man after flash Nau Sena Medal

Rescue Team
floods in Orissa. Sep 1982

Locating source of flooding, repairing

Diving Team

Sea I (CD3) M Sarkar
leaks in INS Guldar aground in Car

(201882 Z)

Nicobar to help refloat the ship. Ju l 1982

19 8 5

^Emergency assistance to shut the bow

Nau Sena Medal

INS Dunagiri (Frigate)

Cdr Kesho Ram
doors of LST Gharial in rough seas. Apr

(00669 W )

1984

________________

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 317

Emergency assistance to shut the bow

Nau Sena Medal

IN S Dunagiri (Frigate)

MCPO I D Chand
doors of LST Gharial in rough seas. Apr

(046109-W)

1984

CHSWA BR Choudhary

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(052389)

Rescue and resuscitation of crashed Ml 8 Shaurya Chakra

Surg Lt Cdr A Banerjee

3rd Antarctica Expedition helicopter pilot and, as medical specialist, (75248 T)

1983/84
coping with medical emergencies of the

First Wintering Team

As Leader of the Naval Contingent, Nau Sena Medal

Cdr VP Sathiamoorthy

-do-
timely setting up of permanent station at

(00977-W)

Dakshin Gangotri

Bar
to

Nau

Sena

Cdr SR Chandna, NM

-do-

As Flight Commander, flying in adverse
weather conditions for transportation of Medal

(01060 H)

heavy stores

Nau Sena Medal

Lt Cdr MS Khela

-do-

As Flight Pilot, flying in adverse weather

(01380-K)

conditions for transportation of heavy
stores

Lt Cdr AS Chouhan

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(01440-Y)

Lt AA Khan

-do-

As Flight Maintenance Team, maintenance Nau Sena Medal

(40581-B)

and defect rectification in adverse weather
conditions despite limited resources

CHEAA HP Kunchibuduka

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal(

(052351)

Mech (AAL) III H Singh

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(097109 B)

PO EAR RK Kapoor, NM

-do-

-do-

Bar
to

Nau

Sena

(097141 A)

Medal

Lt Cdr NP Singh

-do-

As Met Officer, timely setting up Met Nau Sena Medal

(70114-Z)

facilities at Dakshin Gangotri

CK (O) I C Venugopal

-do-

Cooking for the Expedition in adverse Nau Sena Medal

(1107958 K)

weather conditions

CK (O) I Devassy Sebastine

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(107755 Z)

Cdr SK Dutt

Seaking Pilot

Rescue
of
personnel
and
medical Nau Sena Medal

(00993 F)

evacuation in stormy weather conditions

Cdr G P Chalakka!

Command Engineer

Firefighting operations in the devastating Nau Sena Medal

(40194 Z)

Officer, H Q Southern
fire in Cochin Refinery. Mar 1984

Naval Command

M CPO (AH) II Dal Chand
i/c Crash Tender, Naval Air -do-

Nau Sen a Medal

(048487-Z)

Station Cochin

Lt Cdr Sunil Batra

Helicopter Pilot

Repeated rescue of personnel and medical Nau Sena Medal

(01127-K)

evacuations in stormy weather

Lt Cdr CIS Ghura

Seaking Pilot

Rescue at sea in stormy weather of crew from Nau Sena Medal

(01169-F)

merchant ship engulfed in fire. Aug 1984

Lt Satyendra Sharma

O i/c Rescue Team

-do-

(01664-F)

Nau Sena Medal

Lt UK Gautam

Executive

Officer

IN S -do-

(01754-K)

Nau Sena Medal

Matanga (Tug)

3 1 8 /TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

POCD 1 Rameshwar Jha

Rescue Team

(096338 A)

Rescue at sea in stormy weather of crew from Nau Sena Medal
merchant ship engulfed in fire. Auq 1984

POCK (S) G Paswan

-do-

-do-

(080847 W)

Nau Sena Medal

SEA 1 (CD2) N Sahoo

-do-

-do-

(106847 K)

Nau Sena Medal

SEAI (CD2) HS Rathore

-do-

-do-

(203271 F)

Nau Sena Medal

Lt Cdr GS Gill

Seaking Pilot

Repeated rescue of ditched pilots and Nau Sena Medal

(01211-A)

medical evacuations in stormy weather

CPO Jagdish Ram

NCC Cadets Ocean Sailing Safe survival in stormy weather, after Nau Sena Medal (090998 F)

Expedition
getting lost

LS (PTI) BS Sheoran

INS

Shivaji

(Shore Rescue and successful resuscitation of Nau Sena Medal

(202542 Z)

Establishment)

drowned sailor. Apr 1984

SEA I Raj Singh

INS Alleppey (Coastal Successful rescue of drowning civilian in Nau Sena Medal (146515 R)

Minesweeper)

Madras Harbour. Feb 1984

SEA 1 AK Pradhan

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(110748 H)

1986

Lt Cdr AS Manaise

4th Antarctica Expedition As Right Pilot, flying in stormy weather Nau Sena Medal (01244 A)

1984/85
conditions for transporting stores and
personnel.

Nau Sena Medal

Lt Cdr AK Khanna

-do-

As Flight Pilot, flying in stormy weather
conditions for transporting stores and safe

(01439 W)

landing on an iceberg in an emergency

As Flight Maintenance Team, defect Nau Sena Medal

Mech (AW) 3 SH Mohamed

-do-
rectification in harsh weather condition

(097353 H)

despite limited resources

As Expedition Met Officer performance of Nau Sena Medal

Lt Cdr APA Robin

-do-

Met tasks in harsh weather condition

(70132 R)

As O i/c Communications of Second Nau Sena Medal

Lt (SDC) Dharampal Prashar

-do-

Wintering Team, instal ation of equipment

(81937 W)

for maintaining communications between

Dakshin Gangotri and India throughout
the winter

As
i/c Wintering

Communication Nau Sena Medal

CPOELR Kamal Dev

-do-

Team, maintenance of communication

(200385 Y)

equipment despite limited resources

As a member of the Communication

POR (TEL) Chand Singh

-do-

Team, installation and maintenance of

(096240 B)

communication equipment in harsh
weather conditions

Cooking Services for the 82 member

LCK (O) Bisna Ram

-do-

Broedition in harsh weather conditions

(106912 H)

Safe crash landing in Sunderbans after Nau Sena Medal

Helicopter Pilot

Lt HK Sinha
emergency during flight. Jan 1984

(02339 R)

First Deep Saturation Diving Experiment

LSCD I Pratap Singh

Diving Team
nINHSAsvini. 1985

(140539)

Nau Sena Medal
do-

SEA I CD I T Vinod Rao

Diving Team

(201754)

-----

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE/ 319

1987

Rescue and resuscitation of six drowning Shaurya Chakra

Lt KS Chundwat

Special Action Group INS picnickers entangled in fishing nets off (01997 N)

Hamla

Marve. Bombay Mar 1986

Lt MS Chillar

Special Action Group INS -do-

Shaurya Chakra

(02191 B)

Kunjali

Cdr Vishnu Singh

Executive

Officer,

INS Safe retrieval of radar antenna dangling Nau Sena Medal

(00682-Z)

Taragiri (Frigate)

from foremast and emergency repairs on
yardarm in rough seas

Lt Cdr HS Oberoi

5th Antarctica Expedition As Flight Pilot, transporting scientists to Nau Sena Medal (01441 Z)

1985/86
distant sites in harsh weather conditions

Lt Kunhiraman Ravindran

-do-

As Flight Maintenance Team, defect Nau Sena Medal

(4074 7 F)

rectification in harsh weather condition
despite limited resources

Lt Cdr Surinderjit Singh

-do-

As

Expedition

Met

Officer,

Met Nau Sena Medal

(70138-B)

experiments in distant sites in harsh
weather conditions

POELR SR Malvade

-do-

As Third Winter Communications Team, Nau Sena Medal

(202765 F)

maintenance and defect rectification
of radio equipment in harsh weather
condition despite limited resources

Lt Cdr VB Naik

Diving Team

Second

Deep

Saturation

Diving Nau Sena Medal

(01706 A)

Experiment in INHS Asvini. 1986

Lt Dilip Baijal

Kiran Pilot

Safe landing after serious damage caused Nau Sena Medal

(01943 R)

by bird hit. Nov 1985

Sea I CD 3 RA Yadav

Clearance

Diver

INS During towing of missile boats, diving in Nau Sena Medal

(143206 W)

Matanga (Tug)

rough seas to clear propellers fouled by
parted tow ropes. Jan 1986

Sea I CD 3 G Kumar

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(148117 H)

1988

Lt Arvind Singh

O i/c Marine Commando Operation Pawan. Destruction of LTTE Maha Vir Chakra (02283 N)

Team
militant speed boats during flushing out
operations

Lt A Verma

2 i/c Marine Commando -do-

Vir Chakra

(02293 K)

Team

Lt PS Chandavarkar

Marine Commando Team

Operation Pawan. Diving to retrieve and Vir Chakra

(01928 F)

neutralise LTTE militant explosives during
flushing out operations

Lt Cdr Deepak Agarwal

Commanding Officer

Operation Pawan. Landing of marine Vir Chakra

(01527W)

SDB T 56
commandos in uncharted waters during
flushing out operations

Cdr KC Kaushal, NM

Diving Team

Operation Pawan. Salvage of sunken

(01056 Z)

Bar to Nau Sena
pontoon and removal from Kankesanturai Medal
jetty to enable to landing of urgent IPKF
stores

PO (CD1) Y Pandey

-do-

-do-

(096333 R)

Nau Sena Medal

320 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Lt Cdr Shekhar Sinha, NM

Commanding Officer,

(01480 N)

Operation Pawan. Anti militant patrols in Bar to Nau Sena

CGS Rani Jindan
uncharted waters & capture of arms and Medal
ammunition

Lt Cdr S Prakash

Commanding Officer,

(01696 B)

Operation Pawan. Destruction of militant

LCU 31

Nau Sena Medal
boats during Hushing out operations

Lt Cdr P Mehra

Commanding Officer,

(01809 K)

Operation

Pawan.

Successful Nau Sena Medal INS

Guldar (LST)

disembarkation of IPKF vehicles in
uncharted waters despite militant fire

Lt Cdr KR Nair

Commanding Officer,

Operation Pawan Patrol. Anti militant

(01829 F)

Nau Sena Medal

LCU 36
patrols in uncharted waters

Lt Cdr S Biswas

Commanding Officer,

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(02377 A)

SDB T 57

Lt Cdr M Nair

Commanding Officer,

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(02400 B)

CGS Awayyar

Lt Cdr SS Moharir

Commanding Officer,

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(02403 K)

CGS Kittur Chinnamma

Lt JS Gill

6th Antarctica Expedition As Flight Pilot, transportation of scientists Nau Sena Medal (02198W)

1986/87
to distant sites in harsh weather
condition

Lt DK Jetly

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(02538 T)

Lt SK Ramesh

-do-

As Flight Pilot successful rescue of Nau Sena Medal

(02560 T)

stranded Soviet expedition members in
harsh weather conditions

Lt SM Yusuf

Engineer

Officer,

INS Swift damage control after ship entangled Nau Sena Medal

(40863 W)

Porbandar

(Coastal with an uncharted wreck. Dec 1986

Minesweeper)

LS (CD2) CD Yadav

Diving Team

Operation Pawan Diving to retrieve and Nau Sena Medal

(143003 H)

neutralise LTTE militant explosives

Sea I (CD3) JS Shanmugam

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(148940 A)

1989

Operation Pawan. Seizure ot LI It militant Nau Sena Medal

Cdr DS Johal

0 i/c Naval Detachment explosives, documents and stores.

(00903 A)

Rameshwaram

Mar 1988

Operation Pawan. Anti militant patrol Nau Sena Medal

Cdr SS Rfci

Commanding Officer CGS and transportation of IPKF troops in

(01010W)

Vikram
uncharted waters

Operation Pawan. Transportation of IPKF Nau Sena Medal

Cdr SD Sharma

Commanding Officer INS troops and stores in uncharted waters

(01089 Z)

Mahish (LST)

Nau Sena Medal

Cdr RK Singh

Alize Pilot

Operation Pawan. Anti militant Armed Air

Patrols

/'O i 125 F)

Helicopter Detachment in -do-

Nau Sena Medal

Cdr Y Choudhary

Sri Lanka

S/Lt AK Vaideeswaran

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

154 T)

Nau Sena Medal

7lh Antarctica Expedition As Flight Pilot, casualty evacuation

Lt PS Dhillon
and rescue missions in harsh weather

87/88

(02530 Z)

conditions

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 321

1990

As Flight Commander, emergency life Shaurya Chakra

Cdr Pradeep Dixit, NM

8th Antarctica Expedition saving medical evacuation in extremely (01442 A)

1988/89
hazardous conditions

Nau Sena Medal

Lt Cdr Sudhir Pillai

-do-

As Co-pilot, emergency life saving medical
evacuation in extremely hazardous

(02140 N)

conditions

Lt Arvind Gupta

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(02453 Z)

Lt UK Sondhi

Ajeet pilot with IAF

After failure of controls, managed to Shaurya Chakra

(02897 H)

avoid crashing his aircraft into a village.

In saving innocent lives, suffered severe
burns and loss of a leg

Cdr HA Gokhaie

Commanding Officer

Operation Cactus Nov 1988

Nau Sena Medal

(01075 T)

INS Betwa (Frigate)

Cdr AH Chitnis, SC, NM

Flight Commander INS -do-

Bar to Nau Sena

(01270 K)

Godavari Right

Medal

Lt Cdr R Gulati

Gunnery Officer INS

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(01741 F)

Godavari

Cdr Nagasubramanian

O i/c Naval Detachment Operation Pawan. Capture of LTTE Nau Sena Medal (01349 R)

Rameshwaram
militants and stores. 1988

Cdr NK Bhardwaj

Commander of Helicopter Operation Pawan. Anti militant Armed Air Nau Sena Medal (01388 B)

Flight Detachments in Sri Patrols

Lanka

Lt Cdr Ashvini Kumar

Alize Observer

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(01583 Y)

Lt J J Nijhawan

Alize Pilot

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(02137 F)

Lt S Kohli

Helicopter Detachment in -do-

Nau Sena Medal

(02795 A)

Sri Lanka

PO SK Lonkar

Naval

Detachment Operation Pawan. Survival for 14 days Nau Sena Medal

(105594 N)

Rameshwaram
without food and water adrift at sea after
failure of engine whilst attempting to
capture militants

LS AM Lokhande

-do-

-do-

Nau Sena Medal

(147055 T)

SEA 1JP Urawn

-do-

-do-

(162257 T)

Nau Sena Medal

CHME RK Mishra
i/c Control Room Hold INS

(091296 T)

Swift damage control after sudden pipe Nau Sena Medal

Chakra (Submarine)

burst

322 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

38

The New Naval Academy At Ezhimala

Developments Until 1975

By 1968, the shortage of officers became a cause of

Sailor Training Establishments
concern. And, as in the case of sailors, intake had to
be stepped up to meet the requirements of the Russian

Traditionally, there used to be two streams of sailor entry acquisition programme. The required strength of 3,500
into the Navy - a younger ‘Boy’ entry and an older ‘Direct’ officers by 1975 necessitated an annual intake of at least entry. The ‘Boy’ entry underwent longer training and was 150 cadets. Since the NDA could not take more than 65
better inculcated in naval discipline. ‘Direct’ entry was naval cadets every year, it became necessary to start a resorted to whenever there were surges in the demand for Revised Special Entry Scheme (RSES) and set up a Naval manpower and shortages had to be made good. Direct Academy, separate from the NDA. Until a location could be entry sailors always underwent shorter training.

found for a permanent Naval Academy and until it could
be constructed, a temporary Naval Academy needed to be

Prior to Independence in 1947, the Navy’s Boys Training set up for the RSES.

Establishment (BTE) was at Karachi. After 1947, a temporary

BTE was set up at Vishakhapatnam to train the ‘Boy’ entry

In 1969, approval was accorded for the commencement
sailors. The ‘Direct’ entry sailors started being trained in of the RSES. Under this scheme, naval cadets in the age the Basic and Divisional (BSD) School in Cochin. In 1965, group 17 to 20 years who had passed the Intermediate when it was decided to base the Russian acquisitions in examination could be recruited in the Executive Branch.

Vishakhapatnam, it became necessary for the BTE to shift This scheme was identical to the NDA’s ‘Special Entry out. Chilka Lake in Orissa was chosen in 1969 as the site Scheme’, except that the initial training of one year would for the new BTE. Prime Minister (Mrs) Indira Gandhi laid the be conducted at Cochin.

foundation stone. Construction commenced in 1973 and

A temporary Naval Academy was set up in Cochin in

//VS Chilka was commissioned in 1980.

May 1969. RSES training commenced in January 1970

In 1968, intake had to be stepped up to meet the and the first batch of executive cadets passed out of the requirements of the Russian acquisition programme. Naval Academy in December 1970. The Naval Academy It was decided to move the ‘Direct’ entry sailors training continued training RSES cadets until January 1974.

from the BSD School in Cochin to a new Seamen Training

In 1973, the NDA got affiliated to the Jawaharlal Nehru

Establishment (STE). The Government accepted the Navy’s University (JNU) in Delhi. Thereafter, all NDA cadets, on proposal to site the new STE at Goa. In October 1969, successfully passing their final examinations, received Prime Minister (Mrs) Indira Gandhi laid the foundation a Bachelor of Science degree of the JNU. The RSES
stone. Construction commenced on a 230-acre site on a cadet of the Naval Academy became out of step with his hill at Reis Magos, five miles north of Panaji, close to the NDA counterpart. It was decided that instead of taking in northern bank of the River Mandovi. The STE was designed pre-graduate candidates, it would be more cost effective to to train 500 direct entry sailors at a time.

recruit only Science graduates and thereby further reduce
the duration of their training at the Naval Academy

Officer Training Establishments

In July 1974, the first batch of Graduate Special Entry

Before the National Defence Academy (NDA) was set up Scheme (GSES) cadets entered the Naval Academy for in the early 1950s, ‘Regular’ entry officer cadets unde™ ent an initial training period of only 6 months. Whereas the four years training with the British Navy an re
original sanction was for a total of 80 cadets to be trained

India as Sub Lieutenants. ‘Direct’ entry Sub Lie^ tena
every year, the Naval Academy now trained 80 cadets every
underwent basic training in the officer wing o

6 months.

School in Cochin.

Branch and Acting Sub Lieutenants of all technical

As part of the 1974 reforms of Naval Training, it was branches should be of the same duration, should have a decided that:

common syllabus and should run concurrently. This was

• All officer courses should be conducted by the Naval implemented from 1976 onwards.

Academy and it take over all the courses being conducted
by the B&D School.

After 1976 and the acceptance of the Third Pay

Commission’s recommendations regarding changes in

• The B&D School in Cochin was to be closed down after sailors’ conditions of service, the Boy Entry was dispensed the shift of Direct Entry Seamen Training to Goa as soon with and only Direct entry matriculate sailors were recruited.

as the STE commissioned in 1976.

Training effort and costs could be minimised by having

From 1974 onwards, the Naval Academy, in addition to only one sailor training establishment (STE) at INS Chilka, running basic courses for cadets, commenced conducting which was expected to commission in 1980.

the following officer courses:

With the steady increase in the number of trainees in the

• Initial Training for Direct Entry officers of the Engi1970s, the Naval Academy found that it neither had the neering and Electrical branches.

accommodation, nor the classrooms nor the infrastructure

• Naval Science Orientation Course for officers of the to cope with its training load. It was decided to: Supply Branch and officers from foreign navies.

• Obtain sanction for a new permanent Naval Academy.

• Special Duties (SD) List Post Promotion Course for
sailors promoted to officers in the rank of Acting Sub

• Re-locate the temporary Naval Academy from Cochin to

Lieutenants in the SD Cadre.

INS Mandoui in Goa as soon as possible after the STE
moved to INS Chilka, and after the ‘sailor-training ST E’

• Divisional & Management (D&M) Course. The B&D
at Goa had been re-modelled to function as an ‘officer-
course done by all Executive Sub Lieutenants during
training Naval Academy'. The Naval Academy eventually
their technical courses was re-designated as the D&M
shifted to INS Mandoui in 1986.

Course when it was transferred from the B&D School to
the Naval Academy.

Conceptual Requirements for the New Naval Academy

• Lieutenants War Course. The B&D School used to The ‘essential’ requirement was for a site of 100 acres, conduct a War Course of four weeks duration for in the vicinity of the sea or a lake for seamanship and Acting Sub Lieutenants of the Executive branch. In waterman ship training, near a railhead yet removed from 1974, it was decided that this course was better suited the township. The ‘desirable’ requirements were that the to a Lieutenant. The course was re-designated as a location should be within a short distance of a naval port Lieutenants War Course and conducted bi-annually at
the Naval Academy.

and have a bracing and moderate climate.

• Upper Yardmen Course. Sailors who showed early The Choice of Ezhimala promise at sea of being officer material were designated The sites considered for the new Naval Academy were

‘Upper Yardmen’ and given special assignments to Aruvankadu in the Nilgiri Hills near Wellington and the test their potential. In end 1974, Upper Yardmen of all Pykara Dam Lake, the Lloyds Dam (Bhatgarh) situated branches started being sent to the Naval Academy for
their initial training.

off the Poona-Kolhapur road, Hassergate Lake near

Bangalore, Porbandar on the Saurashtra coast, Chingleput

• Commanding Officers and Junior Commanders near Madras and Ezhimala on the Kerala coast.

Course. In end 1974, two new courses were instituted:

the Junior Commanders’ Course and the Commanding

In 1979, the Government accepted the need for a

Officers’ Course. These courses were conducted at the permanent Naval Academy. The Kerala Government Naval Academy in 1974, 1975 and 1976.

offered the Navy 960 hectares of land at Ezhimala, north
of Kannur (Cannanore) in northern Kerala. All essential

Developments From 1976 to 1990
infrastructure facilities like drinking water, water for

The Interim Naval Academy at Mandovi
construction, electricity, approach roads and bridges,
capital dredging of the Kawayi backwaters (for basic

By 1976, the Naval Academy found that it was not cost waterman ship training), building of a seawall to prevent effective to carry out, separately, the initial training of cadets erosion, augmentation of the nearest railway station at and of Acting Sub Lieutenants of various branches. It was Payyanur etc, would be provided by the Kerala Government decided that all initial training for cadets of the Executive
at no cost to the Navy.

324 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

In 1982, the Government approved the site at Ezhimala1
under the Defence Secretary.

and gave the Kerala Government a soft, medium term loan
ror acquisition of land and rehabilitation of evacuees.

In 1988, a two-stage, all-India, architectural design
competition was conducted without the involvement

Selection of Design Architects
of the MES. It was however ensured that the adjudging

Naval Headquarters took the view that a Naval Academy jury, headed by the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff and is built by a nation only once. From this institution would comprising eminent private architects, had from the MES
come the Admirals of the future. Therefore, the nations side, the Director General Works and the MES' Chief best private architects should be invited to compete for the Architect. The winning firm was appointed as consultant to the project.

design of the prestigious Naval Academy

In 1989, the MES agreed to supervise the project

This led to a contretemps in 1985. The Navy insisted provided it was done under ‘Engineer in Command'. The that the Army’s Military Engineering Service (MES) not Navy declined to agree to the MES’ stipulation to exercise be associated with this project because of its mandatory, total control over the project and recommended that a procedural constraints, which had evolved over the years for Public Sector Undertaking (PSCI) management consultant austere, economical, standardised, defence construction. supervise the project. The Navy’s recommendation was These constraints conflicted with the Navy’s vision for how approved.

the newest Naval Academy in the world should look. Even
the Prime Minister desired that the new Naval Academy

By 1991, the MES was persuaded to relent - it was too
should be a national monument, which the entire nation prestigious a project. The MES offered to supervise the should be proud of. The MES expressed its inability to construction, even though private architects had designed be associated with the project on this basis or even to it. In the larger interest, the Navy agreed to associate the compete with the private architects. The MES* stand was MES with the project but under the control of a Project that they would only undertake supervision of the project if Management Board. This was accepted.

they were associated right from the design stage.

Commencement of Training

Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi laid the foundation stone on

At the time of writing, the Academy is planned to

17 January 1987 and in 1987 itself, Government approved commence training in July 2005. with minimum essential the Navy’s proposal that the Naval Academy be designed training facilities completed.

by private architects and constructed through consultants.

In 1988. a Project Management Board was constituted
that F7himala had been a landfall for Arabian and Chinese seafarers since time im m em orial. Vasco da G a m a s pilot knew tha J h e t s t i a

" e s ig n e d on the Indian coast would be 'a great mountain which is on the coast o f the Kingdom o f C annanore.

t,

I Frhirmla with Mount Dilli abutting on the Arabian Sea has. since ancient times, inspired the local people to weave a number The topography of Ezhima a. w i t M o u n t ^ (he R
na tradition. At one stage in the war between Rama and Ravana. many of of legends. The most popular ;s the one co

^

^

Jambavan the senior most in ,he Vanara sena. It was

Rama's forces, including his birather Ukshma .

sandhana karan| and mri(ha sar,jivani from the Himalayas for removing the decided to bring four medic,nah^ bs; sh^ya k
npa„ J

,
the dead t0 life. Hanuman was entrusted with the task of collecting1 these herbs arrows, healing the wounds, stitching the cute and

V

^ S

Hanuman realised that he was unable to recognise the ayurvedic
and he at once set out for the Himalayas.

Mountain itself and (lew back. On his way southwards a piece of the herbs. So he did the next best thing - h
e
p

^

^

be|ieve tha( E ^ ^ ia still possesses these rare ayurvedic herbs,
mountain fell down near the sea ana rnai

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 325

THE NEW N AVAL A C A D E M Y AT EZH IM A IA

SOUTHERN ENTRY

FROM CANNANORE

\\

GUARD HOUSE
v-.

\

ETf>:<U LA M B A Y

JETTY

F O R E S T R E S E R
fitv.MNCED WATERMANSHIP

\

TRAINING AREA

C(
i M A N D ANT i

S A IL O R S A C C O M M O D A T IO N ZO N E

PRINCIP:.

•:,v'lDEPU -Ui'Y

A C C O M M O D A T IO N

*’& .C O M j VIVJANOANT

^

ZONE

• CCOMM'O ( • -/

Of;] Z O N E

MOUNT DILLI

LIGHT HOUSE

SAILOR’S

INSTITUTE

OFFICER’ R'S

' !> L } Nursery-'

INSTITIH JTE

KENDRIYA', School

W MAIN

^VIDYALAYA'— ==<

SHOPPING

COMPLEX

OFFICER’S

COMMUNITY

MESS

ACADEMY

HALL

'(STATION

GUEST HOUSE

ENGINEERING

COLLEGE

AUDITORIUM

INFORMATION

,SEWAGI
yV\ ^VETERNARY

TREATMENT

, f HELIPAD,/^ COMPLEX

'ATHLETIC

PLANT
y I HOSPITAL

\

PARADI

TRACK ,
p’oLC LO CLUB /

/

\
iROUND

TRAININIG

II (V *

EQUi UITATIOW-ONES \pOLO GROUND

COMPLEX

SPORTS COMPLEX

1WIMMING

POOL

NORTHERN ENTRY

FROM PAYYANUR

/CADETS MESS

& ACCOMMODATION

INSET

COMPLEX

II

MANGALORE

AREA BLOWNUP

BOAT CLUB/SHEDS

ENGINEERING

/ AUDITORIUM

COLLEGE

■ EZHIMALA

BASIC WATERMANSHIP

TRAININIG AREA

KANNUR

1CANNANORE]

KOZHIKODE

(CALICUT)

KA W A Yl BACKWATER

ACAD EM Y CO M PLEX

NAVAL TRAINING

INFORMATION

COMPLEX

COMPLEX

SCALE 1:3 802 088

39

Welfare

The Ministry’s stand was that more accommodation

P r e a m b l e
could be built within available funds by reducing the square

The Navy’s bases are located in large populated cities. The footage per dwelling unit. The Service Headquarters two major problems that affect morale in densely populated stand was that the existing square footage was barely cities are housing and the education of children. These two adequate and should not be scaled down, even as a aspects have received high priority in naval welfare activity.

temporary measure. Eventually, financial reality prevailed

On other welfare fronts, the Navy has set up welfare and construction on the reduced footage resumed in centres, family clinics, computer centres and children’s

1977.

parks and benefits from non-public funds have steadily

Financial sanctions for new married accommodation
improved.

increased from Rs 8 crore in 1980 to Rs 21 crore in 1981

Housing
to Rs 25 crore in 1983. It was anticipated that, by 1990,
the percentage satisfaction would be 52% for officers and

The fundamental difference between the Navy and the 72% for sailors.

sister services has been that the majority of the Navy’s
personnel perforce are stationed in major ports where

Schooling
the cost of living is high and hiring civil accommodation

Prior to the commencement of the Kendra Vidyalaya
is beyond their means. Officers and sailors in Bombay
or Cochin had to wait several months till they got some Scheme, Naval Kindergarten (KG) Schools had been sort of accommodation. By the time they were allotted started in naval establishments where such schooling accommodation, it was time for them to be transferred.

facilities were not available.

Some headway could be made at Bombay and Cochin.

Kendriya Vidyalayas

Shortages at other ports had to be made up by hiring The Second Pay Commission initiated the idea of having houses and using old, temporary, wartime hutments and

Secondary Schools with a common syllabus and medium of
buildings. Proposals for building new accommodation instruction to avoid disruption in the education of children usually took time to resolve over where and how much was of Central Government employees and defence personnel to be built.

who were liable to frequent transfers and sudden transfers

After the 1965 War, a comprehensive review had been in the public interest.

carried out of the shortages of family accommodation in
the Army, Navy and Air Force. The deficiencies were found

Government approved the scheme in November 1962.

to be so large that it was decided that the aim should be to The Central Schools Organisation started as a unit of remove them over a period of 20 to 25 years.

the then Ministry of Education (now redesignated as the

Ministry of Human Resources Development). In 1963, the

By 1975, the shortages in Bombay, Goa, Cochin, Armys Regimental Schools were taken over as Central Vishakhapatnam, Shivaji and Valsura had decreased.

Schools.

In mid 1975, differences in perception arose between
the Ministry of Defence and the Service Headquarters

1965, the Central Schools Organisation was
regarding revision of the scales (i.e. square footage) redesignated as the Kendra Vidyalaya Sangathan and, as of married accommodation. CJntil this issue could be
resolved, no progress could be made on the construction
dy Wh° " y f'nanced bV the Government,
of accommodation already sanctioned.

renampH ^ ° P ening and managing the Central Schools
renamed as Kendra Vidyalayas (KVs).

KVs were set up, both at defence stations and at stations

© To initiate and promote experimentation and innovation
having a concentration of transferable Central Government
in collaboration with the Central Board of Secondary
civilian employees.

Education (C B SE) and the National Council of Education

Research and Training (NCERT).

CJntil the end of academic year 1975-76, the children of
defence personnel enjoyed first priority for admission to KVs
o To inculcate national integration and a sense of ‘Indian-
throughout the country. In 1976, KVs were divided into two
ness’.

main sectors - the Defence Sector and the Civilian Sector.

In pursuance of these objectives, the KVs:

Children of defence / civilian personnel were accorded

© Have common textbooks and bilingual English and
first priority for admission in their respective sectors. This

Hindi medium of instruction.

division worked adversely for defence personnel in that
they were given a lower priority for admission in schools
o Give preferential admission based on highest number of
other than those in defence sectors.

transfers during the preceding seven years.

When the question was taken up to restore the original
q Are affiliated to the C B SE.

priorities, the difference in priority between defence

© Are co-educational.

and civilian personnel was done away with effect from

© Teach Sanskrit
academic year 1977. Thereafter, ‘transferability’, decided

© Maintain a judicious teacher to pupil ratio to ensure the
by the number of transfers during seven years preceding
quality of teaching.

the admission, was made the sole criterion for admission
to KVs.

© Waive tuition fees for boys up to Class Vlll and waive
tuition fees for girls and scheduled caste / schedule tribe

Although naval personnel posted to stations not served
children up to Class XII.

by Defence Sector schools stood to benefit by this rule,
the revised priority adversely affected naval personnel

To date, 950 KVs have been set up, of which 29 are
who were stationed mainly in large metropolitan cities

Naval KVs.

having a considerable population of transferable Central

Naval Public Schools and Naval Kindergartens

Government civilian employees. It was clear that in these
cities, a substantial number of admissions would be those As mentioned above, the Naval Public Schools were set of civilian personnel even though naval land had been
up in the major naval stations. They function under the
made available for these KVs and all the initial facilities had
aegis of the Navy Education Society and are affiliated to
been provided by the Navy.

the Central Board of Secondary Education. They are run
on a self-sustaining basis. For infrastructure development,

Problems arose also for the admission of naval children they are given grants from the IN Amenities Fund (INAF).

in stations where the KVs were not sited within the campus
of naval establishments.

Statistics of Grants From IN A F to Naval Public Schools
and Naval Kindergartens

To overcome these problems, the Navy decided to
establish its own Naval Public Schools in its major naval

From 1988 to date, the Amenities Fund has made grants
bases at Bombay, Cochin and Vishakhapatnam as had
totalling Rs. 12.4 crore to Naval Kindergartens and Naval
earlier been successfully done in New Delhi. Since these

Public Schools:

schools had to be self-sustaining, personnel would be Year

Amount in Lakhs

Year

Amount
required to pay fees higher than those in the KVs. On the

1989-89

30.00

1989-90

17.11
other hand, though KV tuition fees were less, admission

1991-91

12.00

1991-92

41.25
was uncertain. In Naval Public Schools, admission policy
would be under naval control and naval children would

1993-93

75.00

1993-94

74.70
always be assured of admission.

1995-95

56.09

1995-96

67.30

1997-97

137.81

1997-98

186.22

KVs have four objectives:

1999-99

115.29

1999-2000

141.01

• To provide a common programme of education 2001-01 56.76

2001-02

63.32
to children of transferable Government employees
including defence and para-military personnel.

2003-03

61.82

2003-04

103.23

• To set the pace of excellence in Secondary School

Total: Rs 1239 lakhs
education.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 329

39

Welfare

The Ministry’s stand was that more accommodation

P r e a m b l e
could be built within available funds by reducing the square

The Navy’s bases are located in large populated cities. The footage per dwelling unit. The Service Headquarters'

two major problems that affect morale in densely populated stand was that the existing square footage was barely cities are housing and the education of children. These two adequate and should not be scaled down, even as a aspects have received high priority in naval welfare activity.

temporary measure. Eventually, financial reality prevailed
and construction on the reduced footage resumed in

On other welfare fronts, the Navy has set up welfare
centres, family clinics, computer centres and children’s

1977.

parks and benefits from non-public funds have steadily

Financial sanctions for new married accommodation
improved.

increased from Rs 8 crore in 1980 to Rs 21 crore in 1981

Housing
to Rs 25 crore in 1983. It was anticipated that, by 1990,
the percentage satisfaction would be 52% for officers and

The fundamental difference between the Navy and the 72% for sailors.

sister services has been that the majority of the Navy’s
personnel perforce are stationed in major ports where

Schooling
the cost of living is high and hiring civil accommodation

Prior to the commencement of the Kendra Vidyalaya
is beyond their means. Officers and sailors in Bombay Scheme, Naval Kindergarten (KG) Schools had been or Cochin had to wait several months till they got some
started in naval establishments where such schooling
sort of accommodation. By the time they were allotted
accommodation, it was time for them to be transferred.

facilities were not available.

Some headway could be made at Bombay and Cochin. Kendriya Vidyalayas

Shortages at other ports had to be made up by hiring The Second Pay Commission initiated the idea of having houses and using old, temporary, wartime hutments and Secondary Schools with a common syllabus and medium of buildings. Proposals for building new accommodation
instruction to avoid disruption in the education of children
usually took time to resolve over where and how much was of Central Government employees and defence personnel to be built.

who were liable to frequent transfers and sudden transfers

After the 1965 War, a comprehensive review had been in the public interest.

carried out of the shortages of family accommodation in
the Aj-my, Navy and Air Force. The deficiencies were found

Government approved the scheme in November 1962.

to be so large that it was decided that the aim should be to The Central Schools Organisation started as a unit of remove them over a period of 20 to 25 years.

the then Ministry of Education (now redesignated as the

Ministry of Human Resources Development). In 1963, the

By 1975, the shortages in Bombay, Goa, Cochin, Armys Regimental Schools were taken over as Central Vishakhapatnam, Shivaji and Valsura had decreased.

Schools.

In mid 1975, differences in perception arose between
the Ministry of Defence and the Service Headquarters

In 1965, the Central Schools Organisation was
regarding revision of the scales (i.e. square footage) redesignated as the Kendra Vidyalaya Sangathan and, as of married accommodation. Until this issue could be

0.U ° ^ m0l^S kQCty wholly financed by the Government,
resolved, no progress could be made on the construction
of accommodation already sanctioned.

rpnam a

° PGnin9 and mana9in9 th^ Central Schools
renamed as Kendra Vidyalayas (KVs).

*

KVs were set up, both at defence stations and at stations

© To initiate and promote experimentation and innovation
having a concentration of transferable Central Government
in collaboration with the Central Board of Secondary
civilian employees.

Education (C BSE) and the National Council of Education

Research and Training (NCERT).

Until the end of academic year 1975-76, the children of
defence personnel enjoyed first priority for admission to KVs

© To inculcate national integration and a sense of ‘Indian-
throughout the country. In 1976, KVs were divided into two
ness’.

main sectors - the Defence Sector and the Civilian Sector.

In pursuance of these objectives, the KVs:

Children of defence / civilian personnel were accorded

© Have common textbooks and bilingual English and
first priority for admission in their respective sectors. This

Hindi medium of instruction.

division worked adversely for defence personnel in that
they were given a lower priority for admission in schools

© Give preferential admission based on highest number of
other than those in defence sectors.

transfers during the preceding seven years.

© Are affiliated to the C BSE.

When the question was taken up to restore the original
priorities, the difference in priority between defence

© Are co-educational.

and civilian personnel was done away with effect from

© Teach Sanskrit
academic year 1977. Thereafter, ‘transferability’, decided

© Maintain a judicious teacher to pupil ratio to ensure the
by the number of transfers during seven years preceding
quality of teaching.

the admission, was made the sole criterion for admission
to KVs.

© Waive tuition fees for boys up to Class VIII and waive
tuition fees for girls and scheduled caste / schedule tribe

Although naval personnel posted to stations not served
children up to Class XII.

by Defence Sector schools stood to benefit by this rule,
the revised priority adversely affected naval personnel

To date, 950 KVs have been set up, of which 29 are
who were stationed mainly in large metropolitan cities Naval KVs.

having a considerable population of transferable Central

Naval Public Schools and Naval Kindergartens

Government civilian employees. It was clear that in these
cities, a substantial number of admissions would be those As mentioned above, the Naval Public Schools were set of civilian personnel even though naval land had been up in the major naval stations. They function under the made available for these KVs and all the initial facilities had aegis of the Navy Education Society and are affiliated to been provided by the Navy.

the Central Board of Secondary Education. They are run
on a self-sustaining basis. For infrastructure development,

Problems arose also for the admission of naval children they are given grants from the IN Amenities Fund (INAF).

in stations where the KVs were not sited within the campus
of naval establishments.

Statistics of Grants From IN A F to Naval Public Sch oo ls
and Naval Kindergartens

To overcome these problems, the Navy decided to
establish its own Naval Public Schools in its major naval

From 1988 to date, the Amenities Fund has made grants
bases at Bombay, Cochin and Vishakhapatnam as had totalling Rs. 12.4 crore to Naval Kindergartens and Naval earlier been successfully done in New Delhi. Since these

Public Schools:

schools had to be self-sustaining, personnel would be Year

Amount in Lakhs

Year

Amount
required to pay fees higher than those in the KVs. On the

1989-89

30.00

1989-90

17.11
other hand, though KV tuition fees were less, admission

1991-91

12.00

1991-92

41.25
was uncertain. In Naval Public Schools, admission policy
would be under naval control and naval children would

1993-93

75.00

1993-94

74.70
always be assured of admission.

1995-95

56.09

1995-96

67.30

1997-97

137.81

1997-98

186.22

KVs have four objectives:

1999-99

115.29

1999-2000

141.01

• To provide a common programme of education

2001-01

56.76

2001-02

63.32
to children of transferable Government employees
including defence and para-military personnel.

2003-03

61.82

2003-04

103.23

• To set the pace of excellence in Secondary School

Total: Rs 1239 lakhs
education.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 329

Indian Naval Benevolent Association

At the time of writing, there are twenty-nine Naval

Kindergarten Schools in naval establishments and The objective of the Indian Naval Benevolent Association (INBA) is to relieve hardship and distress among serving
nine Naval Public Schools located in Delhi, Mumbai

Kochi, Vishakhapatnam, Goa, Port Blair, Arrakonam and
and retired naval personnel and their families. Requests for
assistance received are examined every week by the Relief

Lonavla.

and Finance Committee chaired by the Director hon-

Navy Education Society

Public Funds to decide cases as per approved norms.

The Mavy Education Society was formed in October 1986. The Evolution of the Family Assistance Scheme into Its objective is to promote education, science, culture the Naval Group Insurance Scheme and fine arts amongst the children and families of naval Concerned about the financial security of bereaved naval personnel. The Society governs the Naval Public Schools families, the Navy made a modest beginning with a self-and the KG Schools at naval stations, lt is responsible help Family Assistance Scheme in 1969. In this scheme, an for the formulation of broad policies, standardisation of officer contributed Rs 10 per month and a sailor Rs 2 per curricula and administration / setting up of educational month. The bereaved family received a modest sum that institutions at naval stations.

was clearly inadequate but nevertheless it was a beginning.

Welfare Funds

In December 1975, the Navy initiated its Naval Group

The Directorate of Non-Public Funds

Insurance Scheme 1975 under the aegis of the INBA in
association with the Life Insurance Corporation of India

In July 1985, a new Directorate of Financial Planning (Non (LIC). In 1976, on the advice of the then Controller of Public Funds) was established under the Chief of Personnel. Insurance in the Ministry of Finance,2 the three services It was to be guided by an Investment Advisory Committee proposed that they be permitted to run departmentally chaired by the Vice Chief of the Naval Staff and comprising individual Group Insurance Schemes under Section 44 (0
the Chief of Personnel, the Assistant Chief of Logistics and of the LIC Act 1956. Approval was accorded. This approval the Director of Non-Public Funds for profitable investment provided the much-needed flexibility for the schemes to of non-public funds namely the Naval Group Insurance be improved as socio-economic conditions changed.

Fund, the INBA, the IN Amenities Fund, the Naval Officers The remarkable improvement over the years in the Group Contributory Education Fund, etc.1

Insurance Scheme covering all naval personnel can be
seen from the table below:

Improvements in the Naval Group Insurance Schem e

OFFICERS

SAILORS

Scheme

Period

Contribution

Insurance Cover

Contribution

Insurance Cover

(Rs)

(Rs)

(Rs)

(Rs)

GIS-76

Jan 1976 to Jun 1978

30

30,000

10

15,000

GIS-78

Jul 1978 to Jun 1980

60

60,000

25

30,000

GIS-80

Jul 1980 to Jun 1981

65

65,000

30

35,000

GIS-81

Jul 1981 to Feb 1985

100

1, 00,000

45

50,000

GIS-85

Mar 1985 to Dec 1988

200

2 ,00,000

70

GIS-89

75,000

Jan 1989 to Mar 1991

225

2,50,000

GIS-91

120

Apr 1991 to Mar 1994

1,50,000

250

3,00,000

GIS-94

120

Apr 1994 to Oct 1996

1,50,000

250

3,50,000

GIS-96

120

Nov 1996 to Aug 1997

1,75,000

275

4,00,000

GIS-97

Sep 1997 to Nov 2003

130

2 ,00,000

500

7,00,000

GIS-03

Dec 2003 onwards

250

3,50,000

750

10, 00,000

5,00,000

1. T h e H a w o w f i s a q r P * t H g ai ^ t h r lnvr- tmrnt ft i •

------- ----------5 5 5 ____________
rAdmis
ral in r

2004.u
bic^ ^

, commodore Bhasin was constituted Honorary Rear

2. The Services have much to be grateful for to the Late Mr BK m i, ■
also for advice after he retired.

* % RK MahaJan, not only for this advice when he was in the Ministry of Finance but 330 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Being risk-cum-saving schemes, Group Insurance Pi GIF H ousing Loan Scheme Schemes are intended to provide a meaningful amount
to bereaved families and to those invalided out of service.

In 1987, Government expressed its inability to extend

To facilitate smooth rehabilitation in civil life, the avowed the benefit of a housing loan of Rs 2.5 lakhs to service personnel as was being given to civilian central government
objective is also to give a reasonable amount to naval
employees. To meet the essential requirement for a
personnel on their retirement / discharge from service.

dwelling unit, a Housing Loan Scheme, directly financed

Apart from the increased insurance cover shown in the
from NGIF, was introduced in 1988.

above table, there were other improvements:

In November 1997, the quantum of housing loan was
o The disability cover was introduced for the first time in
increased to Rs 7 lakh for officers and Rs 3.5 lakh for

1980.

sailors, subject to repayment capacity. The quantum of
o Additional group insurance schemes for Aviation,
loan has been enhanced to Rs 10 lakh for officers and Rs 5

Submarine and IM SF personnel were introduced at lakh for sailors w.e.f. 1 Ju ly 2002 due to the increased cost the behest of the Government from 1 September
of construction.

1981 to provide additional cover for these high risk

IPiBA S u b s id ia ry Fund
groups.

o The Post-Retirement Death Insurance Scheme was In 1988, a separate 1NBA Subsidiary Fund was instituted introduced in 1982.

for the welfare of ex-naval personnel and their families.

It started with an initial corpus of Rs 1 crore from the IN

Major improvements in the scheme were effected after Amenities Fund and marked a watershed in the history of the first comprehensive actuarial review in 1988. The the INBA to alleviate financial distress and provide succour salient features of the revised scheme, introduced from to naval pensioners in distress.

January 1989, were:

The fund is given an annual allocation from the IN
o Higher insurance cover with a relatively smaller increase Amenities Fund to augment its resources. Existing schemes in monthly premium.

have been improved and new schemes introduced:

© Parity in insurance cover for death in peace and in war

© The enhancement in a phased manner of financial
time.

assistance for specialised medical treatment from

® Payment of saving element in addition to the insurance

Rs 10,000 to Rs 2 lakh each for member and spouse
cover for death and invalidment.

towards surgery and treatment for cardio-vascular
diseases, cancer, renal transplant and complete hip /

Since over 99.8% of naval officers and sailors retire hale
knee joint replacement.

and hearty, the thrust of the schemes has been to improve

• Enhancement in a phased manner of the ex-gratia grant
the saving element substantially.

on death to the next of kin to Rs 15,000 for officers and

After the award of the Fifth Pay Commission and taking

Rs 7,500 for sailors.

into consideration the erosion in the purchasing power of • Introduction of ex-gratia grant for the marriage of the rupee:

daughters of widows of naval personnel who die in

• The insurance cover was increased as shown above.

service or as pensioners.

• The Post Retirement Death Insurance Scheme, which

• Enhancement in the annual scholarship for higher educaprovides insurance cover for death up to 15 years after tion to the children of naval pensioners to Rs 3,000 for
retirement or 70 years of age, whichever is earlier, was
day scholars and Rs 6,000 for boarders.

enhanced to Rs 2.5 lakh for officers and Rs 1.5 lakh Enhancement o f IPiBA Benefits w.e.f. 1 July 2002
for sailors with a one-time term premium of Rs 8,000
and Rs 2,700 respectively. This has been improved Reason for Loan Officers

Sailors
w.e.f. 1 November 2003 to provide cover for 20 years

@ 8% Interest

(Rs)

(Rs)

after retirement or age 72 years, whichever is earlier.

Daughter’s Marriage

40,000

30,000

The sum assured is Rs 3 lakh for officers and Rs 1.5 Sister’s Marriage 20,000

15,000
lakh for sailors with a one-time, non-refundable term Self Marriage 20,000

15,000
premium of Rs 19,650 and Rs 10,575 respectively.

Higher Education

100,000

100,000

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 331

Indian Naval Amenities Fund (IN A F)

Loans are recoverable in 25 instalments, except higher
education in 36 instalments.

The contribution rates have been progressively revised. The
present rates of contribution effective September 1997 are

INBA Benefits to Retired Naval Personnel

Rs 60 per quarter by officers and Rs 18 per quarter by

• Scholarships for Post 10+2 Education.

sailors.

• Scholarships for Handicapped Children.

Welfare Projects Financed From the IN A F

• Lump Sum Grant on Death.

• Augmentation of Kindergarten and Naval Public

• Travel / Incidental Expenses of naval pensioners required

Schools.

to be transferred from one service hospital to another
out station service hospital for medical treatment.

• Modernisation of service hospitals.

• Rehabilitation Grant to sailors invalided due to TB / • Augmentation of MI Rooms and Dental Centres for Paraplegia / Leprosy etc.

ex-servicemen and their families.

• Assistance for Self Employment.

• Promotion of sports and adventure activities.

• Grant for Marriage of Daughters of Widows.

• Improvement of Officers and Sailors Institutes and

• Treatment for serious Diseases in Civil Hospitals. The

Welfare Centres.

INBA Medical Benefit Scheme considers reimbursement • Improvement in 1NCS Complexes and canteen facilities of balance of medical expenses incurred on serious
in ships and establishments.

diseases depending upon the financial status of the ex-
naval personnel.

• Loans for purchase of buses.

• Special scholarship for education of children of naval • Furniture and furnishings in messes.

personnel who die in harness. The full cost of education
is reimbursed under this scheme.

Statistics of Disbursements for Welfare and Amenities (in Rupees Lakhs) (Other than to Naval Kindergartens and Naval Public Schools)

Year

Western Naval Eastern Naval Southern Naval NHQ

Sports & Adventure

Command

Modernisation of Hospitals

Command

Command

Activities

& Medical Equipment

1977-78

6.61

3.24

7.10

0.73

2.44

332 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Year

Western Naval Eastern Naval Southern Naval NHQ

Sports & Adventure Modernisation of Hospitals

Command

Command

Command

Activities

& Medical Equipment

1995-96

64.00

71.50

64.00

32.00

107.86

-

1996-97

137.00

125.23

86.00

39.00

90.05

-

1997-98

128.00

82.00

92.00

55.52

53.80*

1998-99

147.83

82.72

80.70

54.53

30.03

24.61

1999-00

80.00

80.00

80.00

290.27

28.90

184.72

2000-01

75.00

70.00

70.00

123.74

37.05

112.53

2001-02

70.00

70.00

92.00

83.75

32.75

119.62

2002-03

90.00

87.00

66.00

65.00

40.00

145.84

2003-04

95.00

78.00

77.00

215.00

40.00

94.00

TOTAL

1467.03

1308.31

1244.43

1235.49

934.57

883.99

■■'From 1997 - 98 onwards, most of the expenditure on Sports and Adventure activities is being met from public funds.

Resettlement
assist ex-servicemen and their families in making a
smooth transition to civil life and expeditiously deal with

The Directorate o f Ex-Servicem en Affairs
their problems like settlement of pension and other dues,

In June 1988, a new Directorate of Ex-Servicemen Affairs release of land and accommodation and finding suitable (DESA) was established under the Chief of Personnel to
avenues for resettlement.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 333

40

The Erosion Of Leadership Values
of communications and the technique of giving commands, these are secondary the great

essential of proven character as a leader in practice.

- German Grand Admiral Raeder

The Malaise

The post-war demobilisation in 1945 and the partitioning
of the Navy in 1947 created a serious shortage of officers.

The Navy was not, and could not be, immune to the To meet this shortage, large batches of ‘cadets’ were sent

‘careerism’ that was prevalent in the other segments of to Britain to undergo training for four years. Concurrently, society. The following depiction of the ‘careerist’ helps in large batches of ‘Direct Entry Sub Lieutenants’ were understanding the malaise that afflicted the Navy during inducted to undergo much shorter training in India. The the period 1976 to 1990 and what followed in the 1990s:

social backgrounds of both types of entrants were diverse.

“The careerist officer believes that he has a job to The time available for them to develop high qualities perform within a corporate bureaucracy, that the true of leadership was short of what it should have been.

measure of success is how far and how fast he can climb Nevertheless, it was possible to keep the system going what he perceives as the ladder of success. His credo by strict adherence to the Navy’s Regulations and to the is risk avoidance and promotion of self, his loyalty is procedures that had been modelled on those that the entirely personal, his ethics situational. If he manages British had evolved over the centuries for their Navy.

to manoeuvre himself into a command position, he

Viewed in retrospect, several factors that were not clearly
uses subordinates to advance his career with little visualised at the time began to erode the leadership system understanding or appreciation of his role as a leader, a in the decades after 1947: teacher and example to his subordinates. This tragedy
of the careerist is that he is self replicating, for which he • Increasing Technology of

Naval

Acquisitions.

drives off many of the very type of officer needed in the

Between 1948 and 1958, the Navy acquired second
armed forces. ”

hand warships from Britain - two cruisers, six old
destroyers and several minesweepers. Between 1958

Overview
and 1961, eight new frigates and an aircraft carrier

At the time of independence in 1947, the highest rank held by
entered service, whose equipment required higher
the senior-most Indian officer was Acting Captain. Those who
skills than the older ships. The initial training of the
were ‘Regular Entry’ officers, and had undergone extended
large number of personnel required to man these
training with the British Navy and had imbibed, to a greater
acquisitions had to be minimised to cope with the surge
or lesser degree, the attitudes and value scales of their British
in manpower requirements. These British acquisitions
counterparts. Those who had joined the Navy and participated
were followed by the acquisitions from Russia, starting
in World War II as ‘Reserve’ officers had brought into the Navy
in 1965, of ships and submarines densely packed with
the value scales of the civilian sectors from which they came.

equipment, whose technology was more complex than

Overall, the qualities of leadership that prevailed at the end
i cv7
was added the induction in the
of the war were those that evolve during every long war -

1970s of modern indigenous Leander class frigates and
unquestioning obedience and survival.

minor war vessels. Gradually, time-tested values of naval
leadership were subordinated to technical proficiency.

V

© The Compulsion of Sea Time. The statutory
and management, of accommodation and of detailing
promotion regulations required officers and sailors to
parties for various tasks. All of a sudden there were ‘too
have performed satisfactorily in seagoing ships before
many Chiefs and very few Indians’. Above all, it pushed
they could be considered for promotion. With the
the hitherto ‘prestigious’ ranks of CPO and PO into the
rapid growth of manpower, and despite the increase
shade. That, in my view was the saddest part.”

in the number of ships, it became increasingly difficult
to give every officer and sailor ‘equitable’ sea time.

Two events in the early 1970s aggravated the malaise:

Administrative measures like the adoption in the 1960s

© With good intentions, the Navy started withdrawing
of ‘Wet Lists’ (those who would go to sea) and ‘Dry Lists’

topasses from ships. When confronted with the sailors’

(those who would not go to sea) were not well received.

resentment and unrest, the Navy had to back off and

Nor did ‘Deep Selection’ (promoting a meritorious officer
abandon the attempt.

over the heads of his contemporaries) find acceptance
o The unrest in the flagship Mysore when the command
because it was felt that seniority should receive respect.

implemented an unscheduled intensive work up

In what was essentially a peacetime Navy, it became
programme at a time when sailors had already arranged
a matter of professional survival for officers to ‘prove’

domestic commitments. The sailors’ unrest led to
themselves during their appointments in seagoing ships,
the replacement of the entire command and ship’s
by adopting whatever shortcuts were necessary, to get a
company.

‘good report’. This attitude did not set a good example
to either young officers or to sailors.

By 1975, erosion had occurred in the quality of leadership
o Favouritism .

Compounding
these
factors were at all levels - between senior officers and junior officers, delays in the availability of spares and the lags in
between officers and sailors and between senior sailors
setting up maintenance and training facilities for the and junior sailors. Ostentation and showmanship began new acquisitions. Those officers who, despite these
replacing competence and professionalism. Double-speak,
difficulties, managed to do well at sea soon became
clever-clever talk and physical, mental, and professional
proteges. In a short space of time, ambitious officers
laziness began to creep in and replace exemplary conduct.

became ‘mentors’, ‘networked’ their clans, identified

Publicly, the Navy was lauded as an example for the rest
the proteges they could depend on, and carried them of India to emulate because all castes and communities upward to the mutual benefit of their careers.

lived and worked on board ships as one family. Within
the Navy, favouritism set in and factions formed based on

• M aster Chief Petty Officers. On the one hand, the
caste, community, religion, language, cadre, department
creation of MCPOs brought the Navy in line with the
and specialisation.

Army’s JC O s and the Air Force’s Master Warrant

Officers. On the other hand, the traditional function

Perceptive and upright officers, who could sense what
of senior sailors as the ‘vital link between officers and was happening and resisted the deterioration that was sailors’ atrophied. On board ships, MCPOs were neither becoming endemic, found themselves being sidelined. The working hands nor effective supervisors. Their utilisation alibi trotted out was that the Navy could not be immune took time to work out. Leadership at the sailor level from the erosion in values that was afflicting society as a suffered.

whole.

Vice Admiral VL Koppikar served in the Personnel

The greatest damage was done by those officers who

Branch at NHQ as Deputy Director of Personnel, Director violated the basic tenet of desisting from involvement of Personnel Services, Director of Personnel, Assistant with the political establishment. Ambitious senior officers Chief of Personnel and finally as Chief of Personnel from started going out of their way to cultivate bureaucrats in the 1988 to 1990. In the Navy Foundation’s annual journal, Ministry and politicians of the party in power. Ostensibly, Quarterdeck 2000, he reminisced:

it was to obtain support and sanctions for naval projects.

“Perhaps one of the most hastily implemented

Not everyone could resist the opportunity it provided for
decisions of those years was the creation of two additional personal advancement.

ranks, MCPO I and MCPO II in the Sailor Cadre. For a

The events between 1976 and 1990 were the
while it threw the Navy completely off balance. There manifestation of this unfortunate malaise that had set in appeared to be no justification for these two ranks at earlier and which culminated in the dismissal of a Chief of the apex level without enhanced responsibilities or the Naval Staff in 1998.

accountability. There were problems galore of manning

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 335

The following excerpt is from a letter reproduced in the

The Deterioration From 1976 Onwards
book Vishnu Bhagwat’s Fiasco by Thorat and Halbe. The
letter was written by the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief

All the excerpts that follow are from statements in the Western Naval Command to the Chief of the Naval Staff public domain:

in 1990:

Writing in the Navy Foundation’s annual journal

“Of late, in the Service, a very insidious personality cult

'Quarterdeck 2000’, Vice Admiral Awati, who was the
has been developed by encouraging loyalties of officers

Navy’s Chief of Personnel in 1979 and 1980 stated:

to an individual rather than the Service. This ethos has

“The management of our personnel, their recruitment,
reached alarming proportions. Groupism, favouritism
rank structure and training for war took a quantum
towards some and vindictiveness and victimisation
jump during the 1970s. Looking back, there seems
towards others will be much in evidence in future. In this
no doubt that in some areas at least, the change was
respect, it is quite easy to make a forecast of events and
too fast. It gave rise to distortions and the resultant
developments. Officers are being encouraged to spy
disquiet, especially in the lower deck. The absence of an
adequate feedback from the fleet caused complacency
and report on perceived rivals. This is unprecedented
in the command. This led to a succession of unfortunate
and a most un-officer-Iike behavioural pattern that has
incidents in the fleet, which can only be termed ‘mutinies’

come to stay and will thoroughly vitiate the traditional
by future historians. Fortunately, these were handled with
camaraderie and esprit-de-corps in the Service to its
both firmness and imagination. The resultant pull-back
great detriment.

from some unthinking changes, followed by reforms in

“The culture of cultivating politicians, high officers,
rules governing advancement, pay and allowances, the
senior civil servants and other influential persons has,
quality of catering on board, in housing and even in the
irretrievably been established which will continue to
age-old pattern of sailors’ uniform enabled the service
plague the Service in future. It will do inestimable harm
to break out of a redundant mould of functioning.

to the fighting efficiency of the Navy because senior

"Unfortunately, the flip side of this welcome change was
officers will devote time and energy to such activities at
to become evident all too soon during the 1980s. The
the expense of their primary responsibilities.

self-serving conduct of a few officers, both senior and

“Press and influence peddlers have been cultivated
middle rank, in seeking the intervention of the courts to
and pampered.”

obtain redressal of grievances was a slap to a disciplined
service. Almost every one of these grievances pertained

Vice Admiral RB Suri was the Navy’s Chief of Personnel
to promotions and appointments. The real cause of this from 1993 to 1995. His article in Quarterdeck 2000
malaise is yet to be analysed.

stated:

The attitudinal change in some officers, miniscule

“The structure of the service... has inherent
though their number might be today, has become the
drawbacks. The very large base with a narrow top
cause of much disquiet in the service which it must do
everything possible to dispel.”

leads to a pyramidical structure where stagnation and
supercession become inbuilt features. This results in

Vice Admiral Koppikar served in the Personnel Branch
unethical tendencies of a ‘rat race’ with its consequential
in almost all capacities from Deputy Director to Chief of
adverse effects on values and discipline. Then comes

Personnel. Writing in Quarterdeck 2000, he stated:

the problem of equation with other services, most of

“Tried and tested over long years, the system does
which have a cylindrical structure. It is a question of
work well except when someone tries to tinker with it for
izzat. Many measures taken to cope with this situation
whatever reasons. That can set you back by years and
have distorted the problem. Cadre Review exercises
the process of confidence building has to start all over
in the past have resulted in upsetting staff and line
again. My general experience has been that an average
relationships. They also ended up ‘degrading’ ranks and
officer is mature, understanding and disciplined. If he
it is not unusual to see Flag Officers doing the jobs done
is truly unhappy, he will seek redressal of his grievance
by erstwhile Captains. In the Indian ethos, everything is
through established channels. Unfortunately, you do
unfortunately linked to rank. Status, success, respect
come across an odd case, when someone driven bv
is equated to rank. Under these circumstances, the
overweening ambition or a vast sense of self-importance
gamsational goals were given a go-by. Increase of
obstructs the process by going to court or approachinq
the retirement age and doing away with the 'tenure’

the court directly. The damage caused to the Navy is
enormous and not easily retrievable.”

c L c k T a n d V ^ t6nUre SyStem dis'0dged the inbuilt
checks and balances. ...many bright officers get left

336 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE
i

out since no other profession has such a high degree other hand, one can spend time on preserving the status-of supercession. The best of the officers thus lose their quo, not rock the boat, encouraging a ‘Cozy Club’ where motivation.”

the whole purpose is to make oneself as comfortable as
possible, grab the privileges, strut around, globe-trot when

Excerpts from "Betrayal o f the Defence Forces - The you can, and be a part and parcel of the soft-state. (Page Inside Truth” by Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat, Chief of the 49) Naval Staff 1997-98:

“Merit and substantive contribution are not always easy

"Professional standards in the Indian Navy had been to reward, without ruffling feathers. Some people had only falling since the 1971 war with Pakistan. ‘Bean count’ of become just too smart to take only the advantages from the number of operational ships on paper was what had the system. They had made an art of studying and then mattered. In any case, in a non-professional environment,
pandering to the wishes and desires of their seniors. The
non-events like Navy Balls, extraneous social activities,
smart ones appeared always to edge out the ‘good ones’.

golf, personal comforts, ships’ anniversaries and all that is That ‘bad money drives good money out of circulation’ is associated with a peacetime Navy took precedence. INS not a new phenomenon but 25 years of a relatively easy Andaman sinking in August 1990 and almost a repeat life had bred a culture, which tended to negate the kind of it of a submarine in August 1996, again in the Eastern
of professionalism innately required in a service like the

Command, were a chilling reminder, if a reminder was at Navy.” (Page 51) all needed, that professionalism needed to be recognised
and acknowledged as priority Number One, across the

Developments After 1990
board in the service, if we were not to disgrace ourselves The malaise peaked in 1990 at the time of the change yet again. Far too long, had the ‘smart ones’ climbed the of the Chief of the Naval Staff. Allegations and counter ladder adopting dubious means, generally at the cost of allegations, published in the media, cast serious aspersions honest and committed professionals. A quarter century of that shook the confidence of the Navy in its leadership.

peace had taken a heavy toll on the Navy. (Page 46)

After the waves of disquiet had settled down, the Navy set

“It takes a lifetime of professional preparation, thinking up a Centre for Leadership and Behavioural Sciences to through of a strategic vision, concept and ideas to be able re-instil the leadership values that distinguish the Armed to really contribute in the senior ranks of the service. On the

Forces from the civilian society around them.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 337

41

Defence Procurement

-I recall that most revered public servant, Mr Dharmavira, telling me as to how as Cabinet Secretary, he had led ^delegation abroad for the purchase of some essential defence equtpment.

"After the negotiations had concluded, his counterpart on the other side of the table h o w would you like to take the kickback? In whose name shall 1 make out the cheque for the dtscount?

"Dharamvira promptly answered: ‘Excellency, make it out in the name o /^e Gouemment o//nd|a. ’ And he carried the cheque back to India and presented it to the Prime Minister, Pandit Jawaharlal Hehru.

“The Prime Minister was furious. ‘What! You accepted a kickback - it is a disgrace.

“Dharamuira kept his cool. He only said, ‘Panditji, what did you expect me to do? Take it in my name, and put the money in a Swiss account?’

“The point was well made. Panditji was silent.,,]

An Overview of the Defence Procurement Process

From the 1960s to the 1980s, all defence acquisitions
from the Soviet Onion were solely through Government-

In the early years after independence, in the end 1940s to-Govemment interaction. Likewise, the large new and early 1950's, the large acquisitions were second hand acquisitions from Europe like tanks, aircraft and helicopters ships, aircraft and tanks from Britain. In the end 1950s, from France and Britain invariably involved Government-India embarked on the path of self-reliance. The 1960s to-Government interaction. The less costly equipments saw the fruition of major indigenous projects with British like radars, sonars, torpedoes, ammunition, etc were assistance - the Navy’s Leander frigate project at Mazagon

Docks, the Army’s tank project at Avadi and the Air Force’s usually negotiated with individual firms but always after Avro project at Kanpur. All these were negotiated at clearances and assurances of the supplier government Government-to-Govemment level.

were incorporated in an lnter-Govemment Memorandum
of Understanding (MOU).

For the acquisition of smaller defence equipment, the

Service Headquarters scanned whatever was available

Over the years, pragmatic procedures evolved to
worldwide and initiated enquiries through the attaches institutionalise defence procurement from abroad. Two of accredited to embassies abroad. The supplier firm would the basic procedures were: appoint a local representative who would act as the link to
clarify queries. Since this representative was remunerated First - Not to interfere in the Service Headquarters’ process for his services, he came to be called a ‘commission agent’. of short-listing the contenders, and to ensure, as far as There was no ban on commission agents. They were an possible, that there were always two contenders in the fray essential link with suppliers trying to sell the latest defence to facilitate competitive price negotiations.

technologies that India wanted.

Second-Afterthe Service Headquarters had recommended

In the end 1970s, the Government promulgated precise their short-list, the Government would consider: instructions for commission agents - they were to provide • The larger ‘strategic’factors like: their name, address, income tax particulars, bank account
particulars etc so that it could be verified that they were

-The likelihood of the supplier government imposing an
paying income tax on the commissions they received.

embargo in a crisis.

Excerpt from a newspaper article by Mr Fali N aT^^Solicltor Gener’^ i ^ :

-Obtaining safeguards, by an assurance at a

PNCs were well aware that to win the contract, contending

Government-to-Government level, of spare parts firms would reduce the basic cost of the main acquisition support and updates / modifications to cover the life and make up for the reduction when supplying spares and cycle of the acquisition.

other life cycle support.

-Whether the supplier was agreeable to transfer of

The media and the public were not, and could not
technology, whether such transfer was cost effective in
be, privy to these considerations. To win the contract,
the context of the overall objective of self-reliance, etc.

the contending firms would do their utmost to sway the
o The larger ‘financial’ and ‘econom ic’ aspects like:

choice in their favour. One way of achieving this was to

-The availability from the supplier government of disparage the competitor and allege kickbacks. This favourable financial terms (like soft / deferred credit,
provided the basis for the suspicion of, and speculation
the initial moratorium before commencing repayment,
in, the public mind regarding ‘pecuniary malfeasance’ in
the terms of repayment, long term loans at low rates of defence procurement. The faction that did not win the interest etc) in the context of the nations overall debt contract could allege that kickbacks had been the primary burden.

determinant of the choice.

-The possibilities for counter trade, whereby a portion

Contending firms had to have a local representative (the
of the payment for defence equipment could be paid

‘commission agent’) to be the link between the Service
in goods (like machine tools) and commodities (like Headquarters and the parent company. At the short-listing tea).

stage, he would convey technical queries to his principals

-The
possibilities for ‘offsets’,
i.e.

commercial and they would send their replies to him to convey to the
arrangements that would obligate the seller to buy-back customer. At the negotiations stage, the agent’s eagerness (e.g. spares/components manufactured indigenously)

to earn commission was a double-edged weapon. The
so as to counter the expenditure required for the sale.

customer could leverage it to obtain better technology

The percentage of offsets would depend on factors and lower cost. The parent company could use him as like:

the conduit to decry the competitor. The media could be
availed of to project the differing points of view in an effort

*The number being purchased. The larger the number,
to tilt the final decision. The primary aim was to win the
the larger the offset that could be demanded.

contract. After a contract was signed, during ‘after sales

★The capability of Indian industry to cope with the service’, he would be the link for interaction regarding level of offsets.

documentation, training, spares, modifications and

* Whether there were possibilities of Indian firms being
improvements to equipment etc.

given sub-contracts in the global market.

The Large Naval Procurements From Europe 1976-90

After considering the short list recommended by Service

During the period 1976-90, there were three major naval

Headquarters, the Cabinet Committee on Political Affairs
procurements from Europe. The first two were from

(CCPA) would accord approval in principle for the number Britain - there was no controversy regarding the Sea to be acquired and the commencement of negotiations Harriers - there was controversy regarding the Seakings by a Price Negotiating Committee (PNC) comprising Mk 42 B. The third procurement was the German senior representatives of the Ministry of Defence, Ministry SSK Submarine Project - there was considerable of Finance-Defence, Service Headquarters, the Defence controversy.

Public Sector Undertaking concerned, DRDO and whoever
else was concerned.

In the case of the Sea Harriers there was no contender.

Government-controlled British Aerospace and Rolls

It was only after price negotiations commenced that

Royce were the only sources of supply. In the case of the
each firm would make available the detailed documentation
helicopters, the contenders were the British Seakings
about their product that would enable detailed technical
made by Westland Helicopters and the French Super
examination and comparison. During negotiations, grey Pumas made by Aerospatiale. In the case of the SSKs, areas would be clarified and costs calculated of spares,
the contenders were HDW of Germany and Kockums of
training, documentation, and delivery schedules. From

Sweden and, as emerged during the course of research,
these negotiations would emerge the cost-effective choice the majority shareholders of both these contenders were to be considered by the CCPA, whose final decision would their respective Governments.

be based on all the above strategic, political, economic
and financial considerations.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 339

advantage. Whilst the Super Puma was not yet operational

The Sea Harrier Aircraft Acquisition From Britain
in any Navy in the ASW role, the ASW equipment being

In October 1977, the CCPA approved the acquisition offered for fitment met the Navy’s staff requirements and of eight Sea Harrier aircraft, including two Trainers. A was operational in the French Navy's MRASW aircraft and Memorandum of Understanding (MOCJ) was required to their Dauphine helicopters. However, the French could not cover the British Governments support in training and offer their Exocet anti ship missile with the Super Puma maintenance, as well as quality assurance. The primary because of a commitment they had given to the Pakistan issues that required resolution prior to signing of the Navy, when supplying them Exocet anti ship missiles for contract were the fixation of a base price and an escalation their Seaking helicopters. Nor were the British agreeable to formula, waiver of the R&D levy, which amounted to about let their Sea Eagle anti ship missile be released for fitment 10% of the total cost and a contractual clause to safeguard in the French Super Puma.

our interest in the event, however unlikely, of a cancellation
of the Sea Harrier Programme by the British Government.

The updated version of the Seaking, named 42B, was
still on the drawing board and none of the avionic systems

The clause about continued and uninterrupted supplies being offered had yet been proven. On the other hand, the was the subject of considerable discussion. The best that Indian Navy had acquired ten years experience in operating could be achieved was that ‘subject to overriding national the Seakings and both infrastructure and expertise had interests, the British Government would not impose any been built up. The Sea Eagle anti ship missile was under restrictions on the continued supply of aircraft, equipment, development and yet to be proven in test firings.

information and other services.’

Sonars

In 1998, twenty one years later, when the US imposed
sanctions after India’s nuclear tests, the supply of some The Navy decided to carry out, in Indian waters, of the CJS origin / patented parts were embargoed by the simultaneous evaluations of the dunking sonars being (Jnited States. At the time of writing in 2004, some items offered.

are still in the repair loop.

Commander (later Commodore) S Purohit,
an

The Seaking Mk 42 B ASW/ASV Helicopter
experienced Seaking test pilot, participated in these trials.

Acquisition From Britain

He recalls:

The Navy’s staff requirements had stipulated both an

“We evaluated, very systematically, three dunking
anti submarine warfare (ASW) and an anti surface vessel
sonars. These were the American Bendix, Plessey’s

(ASV) role. For the anti submarine role, the requirements
modification of their British sonar 195 and the French
were for a better dunking sonar and a system to monitor

Thomson CSF HS 12. NPOL was extensively involved
sonobuoys. For the ASV role, the requirement was for an
in these trials, which were conducted off Cochin in the
anti ship missile.

early 1980s.

International tenders were floated. Four proposals were

By this time, we had considerably improved upon
received:

the procedures of the early 1970s for evaluating and
testing helicopter sonars and had learnt the technique

• The British Sea Lynx was not found suitable.

of making the manufacturers accept our demands

• An updated version of the British Seaking.

that their sonar be tested in our own waters. We had

• The Italian Agosta. It transpired that this was the Italian
realised that the hydrological conditions in their waters
version of the British Seaking; it was therefore excluded
and overall sonar performance in their temperature
from further consideration.

were different from those in India. Equipment often

• The French Super Puma.

gave problems because of heat and humidity and did
not perform as well because of our peculiar hydroloqical

The choice thus lay between the British Seaking and the
conditions.

French Super Puma. In March 1982, the CCPA accorded
approval for the acquisition of 20 ASW/ASV helicopters.

“For the first time, we had three Seakings fitted with

'^erent sonars and pinging against the

The Comparative Evaluation of the British Seakina

ThiQ6 S U ™ fi" e *n
same hydrological conditions.

and the French Super Puma
his enabled their performance in identical conditions
to be scientifically compared.”

The Super Puma's fuselage and rotor blades were made of
the latest composite material. This was considered to be an

H S n ^ ! T an f 6ndiX performed better than the French

12, which performed better than the British 195.

340 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Radars

Commodore Purohit recalls:

There were two competing radars - the French and the

“The big problem was of developing the software

British. The British were not agreeable to put the French
for the Tactical Mission System. The Navy sent a multi
radar on the Seaking nor were the French willing to fit the
disciplinary team to the UK consisting of air engineers,

British radar in the Super Puma.

air electricals and experienced Seaking aircrew. This
team actually did the work of defining and developing

Sonobuoys
the parameters and algorithms for the entire software

The competing French and British sonobuoy systems were
for this helicopter and we should be proud of it. In the
flying in their respective MRASW aircraft but both would
process, we acquired the confidence to interface air
require to be miniaturised for fitment in a helicopter.

weapons with air platforms. We have today a helicopter
whose punch and capability is the best in the world. We

The Decision in Favour o f the Seaking Mk 42 B
could not have had it if we had not taken the bold step of
contracting for something which nobody had and which

In the light of the pros and cons of these options, views
was still in the concept stage.”

became divided, both in the Air Arm and in the Navy, for
and against the Seaking and the Super Puma. Eventually, The S S K Submarine Project Collaboration with when the choice was made in favour of the Seaking Mk Germany

42B, there was speculation that the choice had been made
on extraneous considerations.

The technical evaluations which led to the short-listing of
the Swedish Kockums and German HDW submarines have

Reportedly, one of these considerations was that the been discussed in the chapter on the S S K project.

British firm of Westland Helicopters, which made the

As per standard procedure, the governments of both

Seakings, was in danger of having to close down for want contenders had been informed that in the event of being of orders. This would have meant loss of jobs in that selected for collaboration, the Indian side would like the constituency. The British, therefore, tried their best for the following points to be included in an Inter Government contract to be awarded to Westland.

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU):

In retrospect, it seems likely that what determined

• Their shipyard had the necessary authorisation of its
the choice in favour of Westland was the advantage of

Government to sell submarines to India.

standardising on Seakings to minimise the cost of additional

• Their shipyard was authorised to collaborate with India
infrastructure and capitalise on the ten years experience
for constructing submarines in India under license
of operating Seakings in India’s tropical conditions. It is
and with provision for incorporation of subsequent
also likely that the Seaking A EW helicopter, then under
improvements and modifications.

development, appeared a promising option to meet the

Navy’s pressing need for an A EW platform for anti missile

• Assurance of the supplier’s Government for continued
defence.

product support in all its aspects for the life cycle of the
submarines or for 25 years.

In Ju ly 1983, agreements were signed with:

• Similar assurances that no prohibitions or restrictions

• British Westland for the helicopters;
would be imposed by the supplier Government on the

• British Rolls Royce for the engines;2
supply and services and continued flow of product

• British Marconi for the Hermes Electronic Warfare ESM
support for that period.

systems;

• Authorising the shipyard for transfer of the full range of

• French Thompson C S F for the H S 12 sonars;
technology for the construction of submarines in India.

• Italian Whitehead Motofides for the A 244 S torpedo

• Transferring from the suppliers navy the full range of
installations;
design technology for the development of submarine

In making these choices, the Navy had opted for the
design capability in India.

latest systems that were available at that time, some of • Government clearance for sale to India of connected which were still under development and had yet to be deweapons, armament, sensors, machinery and systems.

bugged and integrated into a coherent system.

2. The Seaking gearboxes were of American patent. In 1998, when the OS imposed sanctions after India’s nuclear tests, some of these gearboxes were in Britain for major overhaul. Their return to India was embargoed by the United States. At the time of writing in 2004, partial deliveries have been made. However, some items are still under repair.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 341

Operationally, even though both Kockums and HDW

• Support by the supplier's navy for the training of:

w e r e more or ^ess on par, the Chief of the Naval Staff

- Indian Naval and Dockyard personnel for the operation, preferred Kockums. He felt that the Navy should start its maintenance, repair and overhaul of submarines an
submarine construction programme with the best available
the related systems.

technology. Desk-top evaluations had shown, unanimously,

-Indian Naval crew in all aspects of submarine warfare that Kockums technology was more advanced than that including tactical doctrines, ESM, ECM consistent with of HDW His preference was supported by his feeling that national commitments,
the Germans were less candid than the Swedes when
answering queries on sensitive operational parameters like

-Indian personnel for the logistic support for the self-noise and indiscretion rate.

submarine and its systems.

• Quality control, certification, trials and acceptance of

Years later in the end 1980s, when enquiries were
the submarine and its related systems by the supplier’s instituted into the HDW contracts, the following excerpt navy and supply of necessary documentation.

appeared in the public domain, reportedly from a letter

• Assurance by both sides regarding security of information from the then Chief of Naval Staff, Admiral Pereira to the and equipment.

Public Accounts Committee of Parliament:

• Consultations between the two Governments to resolve

“West Germany, in my personal view, was half as open
problems, if any, arising out of the implementation of
and they gave a very definite impression that they were
the collaboration project.

doing us a favour. They also left me with an impression
that they always tried to cloud the transfer of technology

The German side had made it known that it could not
in legal wording. In fact, 1 remember that the evaluation
export weapon platforms or weapons to areas of tension.

team and the Naval Headquarters were not often very

After the 1971 Indo-Pakistan War, the Indian subcontinent
sure of what West Germany was exactly trying to give us.

had been declared an area of tension. Moreover, Germany

As far as technical evaluation of both was concerned,
was reluctant to supply defence equipment to non-NATO
there was not a great deal of difference. I still preferred
countries because it felt that such equipment might be

Sweden as I was most concerned with the transfer of
eventually used against their own allies.

technology which was the hub of the whole problem

The Swedish side had no such reservations.

and (their) offer was loud and clear on the transfer of
technology.”

The Choice

In end 1979, Naval Headquarters informed the

Within the Indian side, views were divided:

Government that Kockums was higher in the matrix and

• The evaluations and ‘matrix analyses’ had placed was preferred. If, however, the Government preferred HDW

Kockums marginally ahead of HDW. The Chief of Naval for other reasons, HDW was acceptable to NHQ.

Staff preferred Kockums because its technology was
superior to HDW and Kockums had no reservations on

NHQ s reasoning was that having spent so many years
transfer of submarine design technology to India.

in getting the project so near to finalisation, it would be not
be in the Navy s interest to say that if Kockums was not

• A segment of the Navy’s submariners preferred HDW. acceptable to the Government, then the Navy was willing They felt that the Kockums technology was too advanced, to forego the present SSK project and start evaluations all many aspects of which had not been proven. HDW had over again.

built and exported a number of submarines designed by

Dr Gabler, the highly reputed and experienced designer

In April 1980, the CCPA approved the commencement
of German submarines during World War II.

of price negotiations with HDW and Kockums. Throughout

• Mazagon Docks, already selected as the yard that this period, the media was full of claims and counter claims would build submarines in India, had already invested regarding the operational, technical, logistic and life-cycle-resources in establishing the infrastructure for submarine cost advantages / disadvantages and assessments of the construction, preferred HDW. The Kockums design was HDW and Kockums options.

still on the drawing board and it would take Kockums

In Ju n ® ^ 80>
the CCpA approved the selection of the
tu°nger ! T e than HDW t0 deliver to Mazagon German HDW option.

Docks the production drawings that would enable

Mazagon Docks to commence construction.

'n .,View. . of the German side’s resection s, India
considered ,t essential that before any contracts were signed,

342 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

there should be some agreement at the Government-to-
increase in price. Discussions commenced in India on an

Government level to safeguard Indian interests. It took item-wise analysis of the escalation. Many improvements over a year of discussions to arrive at an agreement that were dropped from consideration to stay within the budget.

met India’s requirements. Between April 1980, when the

Gradually the differences narrowed.

CCPA approved the collaboration with HDW for the SSK

Project and December 1981 when the contracts were

When HDW were unable to reduce the price any further,
signed, there were detailed discussions to formulate the the Indian Ambassador in Germany was asked to take up Agreement on Technical Assistance’ that was signed in the matter officially and make a final effort to bridge the Ju ly 1981 between the German and Indian Ministries of gap, since failure to sign the contract would result in the Defence. The agreement covered the following points:

loss of the skills and expertise that Mazagon Docks was
building up in submarine construction.

o Designing and preparing planning documents for
construction of submarines.

In end 1986, serious political differences had developed
o Evaluation of trials data and support in torpedo trials.

between the Finance Minister, Mr VP Singh and the Prime

Minister, Mr Rajiv Gandhi. To defuse the tension during
o Execution of associated contracts.

Exercise Brass Tacks, the Prime Minister shifted Mr VP
o Release of classified military information.

Singh from the Finance Ministry to the Defence Ministry
o Quality Assurance for submarines and torpedos by the in January 1987.

German Government’s Quality Assurance Department.

On 24 February 1987, the Indian Ambassador in
o Training.

Germany sent a cable to the Defence Secretary to the
effect that the German side had expressed the hope that

Four contracts were signed on 11 December 1981:

the final price for the SS K submarines could be negotiated
o Construction by HDW of the first two submarines in satisfactorily but regretted that seven per cent commission Germany as per the German Submarine Construction
payable to the Indian Agents of HDW under the terms of

Rules of 1979.

an open ended agreement had caused a great financial
o Supply of Material Packages to MDL for the construction liability.

of two submarines.

The sequence of events that can be speculated from

© Gave India the option to order/buy two more material what has appeared in the public domain appears to be: packages for SSK s 5 & 6 within 12 months i.e. 11

• On 27 February 1987, three days after the Ambassador’s

December 1982.

cable arrived, German officials arrived in Delhi for a

• With AEG Telefunken for the supply of torpedos.

meeting after which the Indian side took the official line
that no commissions had been paid.

Events Between 1982 and 1987

• On learning of this, the Indian ambassador in Germany

Construction in Germany of the first SS K began in March
sent a telegram in March 1987 recommending that

1982. 54 months later, she commissioned as Shishumar

HDW be punished for falsely declaring that there was no
on 22 September 1986. The second SSK , Shankush
agent in the deal.

commissioned two months later on 20 November 1986.

• This came to the Defence Minister’s notice on 9 April

Both submarines were evaluated after arrival in Bombay

1987. On seeing this cable:

and were found to be entirely satisfactory. Meanwhile, the

-H e asked the Defence Secretary to conduct a full
construction of the 3rd and 4th submarines was progressing
investigation of the HDW case;
in Mazagon Docks.

- He sent the file to the Prime Minister’s office;

The contract signed in December 1981 had an option

- Issued a press release about it;
clause for two more submarines to be exercised by

December 1982. Extensions were sought whilst evaluations

• The file arrived on the Prime Minister’s desk after the
progressed on the extent to which better and more modern
newspapers had already published the Defence Minister’s
equipment could be fitted in the 5th and 6th submarines.

press release, disclosing the payment of commissions
in the HDW deal of December 1981.

Eventually, in 1986 when price negotiations commenced,

• There was a political furore.

it was found that the cost of improvements that the Navy
sought and the adverse deterioration in the Rupee-

• On 12 April 1987, the Defence Minister resigned from

Deutsche Mark exchange rate resulted in a seven-fold
the cabinet.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 3 43

Enquiries were commenced by the Public Accounts The case alleged that Ministry of Defence and Naval officials Committee of Parliament and by the Comptroller and had accepted gratifications for manipulating figures to Auditor General of India. Neither of them commented sway the award of the SSK contract to HDW in 1981.

adversely on the Navy’s rationale for recommending HDW.

According to a press report in October 2002, the

Both passed strictures on the negotiating process but CBI had decided to drop the case because the German could not pinpoint culpability.

Government had declined to give any further information.

The enquiry ordered by the Ministry of Defence in 1987 This has yet to be officially confirmed.

went on till 1990, awaiting responses from the German

It was not until the end 1990s that it became possible to
side to the information sought by the Indian side. After Mr consider resumption of submarine construction in India.

VP Singh became the Prime Minister in 1989, he enquired
about the progress of the HDW investigation.

From the Navy’s point of view, the S S K Project met all

In March 1990, the Criminal Bureau of Investigation the objectives of transfer of technology for construction registered a case against the members of the Price in India of submarines having the latest silent design Negotiating Committee, the representatives of the German and fitted with the latest proven equipment that could be supplier companies and their commission agents in India.

obtained from Western sources.

344 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

42

Checks And Balances In The

NHQ-Oeffenee Ministry Relationship

Preamble

“ Defence planning is based on the capabilities that likely
adversaries are developing and not on their intentions.

One of the facets in the evolution of systems of governance,

Intentions may change but capabilities do not.”

whether imperial, colonial, totalitarian or parliamentary, has
been the method and degree of control to be exercised over

“The security of the state does not depend on military
the Armed Forces’ by the ‘civil side’ - ‘civil’ being interpreted
strength alone. It must be inter-laced into a larger
sometimes as ‘the political component of Government’

perspective of diplomatic, commercial and economic
and sometimes as ‘the civil service-bureaucrat component
inter-relationships.”

of Government’.

The list is endless. Each reflects a facet of the truth.

The Armed Forces have always been the ‘ultimate Many reflect serious dilemmas.

power’ of the state. During war, the state expects the Armed

In the Indian context, tension has been markedly vexed

Forces to win. During peace, the state expects the ‘power’ in two areas: of the Armed Forces to be credible enough to deter war.

•

Understandably, there has always been apprehension in the

Financial Control. In the Indian system, the Ministry of Defence and the Service Headquarters operate

‘civilian’ mind that if the Armed Forces are permitted too
separately. Plans are made by the Service Headquarters
much power, they might be tempted to take over the state,
and the Ministry controls the budgets. The view of
as indeed has happened in the countries neighbouring

Service Headquarters has been that Financial ‘Advisors’

India. All systems of governance, therefore, have devised
to the Ministry of Defence tend to perform the role of
checks and balances to manage this inherent tension

Treasury Control’. This results in considerable delays in
between the military and civilian arms of the state. The
the sanctioning of vital projects due to endless queries on
antiquity of this tension is reflected in innumerable cliches
technical and professional aspects of case projections. In
and aphorisms:

some cases, the very need of projects, already approved,

“War is too serious a matter to be left to the Generals
are questioned by Finance (Defence). This is not cost
and the Admirals.”

effective as far as defence spending is concerned.

“War is too serious a matter to be left to the politicians

Service Headquarters should be ‘departments’ of the
and the bureaucrats.”

Ministry of Defence, so that decisions are taken jointly
and the implementation of approved projects speeded

“The resources of the state must be judiciously
up.

apportioned between ‘development’ and ‘defence’.”

• Approval of ‘Promotions and Appointm ents'Above a

“A developing country like India must give priority to the

Certain Rank. The system is that all promotions to the basic needs of the people like drinking water, health care,
rank of Major General, Rear Admiral, Air Vice Marshal,
education etc, even if it be at the cost of defence.

and above require to be approved by the Ministry. Their

“The Armed Forces should be told how much money
appointments can be made only after approval by
they will get and they in turn will tell the Government
the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. Due to
how much ‘defence’ that money will buy.”

manipulative pressures and pulls, this system has led

“Defence planning is a long term process. Resources
to an increase in the number of senior officers seeking
have to be given now to prepare for threats that are

‘Redressal of Grievance’, recourse to the courts and
anticipated several years in the future.”

consequent adverse publicity.

-The amount of expenditure involved is insignificant; or

This chapter discusses the evolution till today of the

-A claim for the amount could be enforced in a court of
system of checks and balances that Britain had established
to control, from London, the Armed Forces of color|ia| _
law; or
and which India inherited at the time of independence,

-The expenditure is in pursuance of a recognised policy
examines the effect that these checks and balances have
or custom.

had on the Navy.

Another overarching canon of financial propriety laid

Financial Control
down in the Financial Regulations Defence Services 1983

(which derive from the Government of India's General

In the Navy, it is widely lamented that the interminable Financial Regulations - GFR) states the "The expenditure queries of Finance (Defence) on Naval Headquarters
should not be more than the occasion demands” .

proposals result in inordinate delays. It is true that in
many cases, these delays have been deleterious to naval

These canons in the GFR were amended in 1989 by the
development - particularly because naval development addition of a sixth canon, which brought in the concept of is of long gestation. However, it is not widely known that accountability by the person who spends.

this constricting role of Finance was not meant to be
malevolent. Its genesis goes back to the rigorous British The D uty o f the F in a ncia l A d vise r system of controls on the ‘spending of public money’.

The financial control exercised by a Financial Adviser and

The British Legacy
his officers is basically a careful and intelligent scrutiny of
all proposals involving expenditure from public funds. The

In India, the Finance Division of Defence came into being objectives are the safeguarding of the economy, efficiency in 1906. It became part of the Finance Ministry and was and propriety in public finance.

known as the Finance (Defence) Division. The Financial

Adviser Defence Services (FADS) was one of the most

Before according financial concurrence to any proposal
important functionaries of the Finance Ministry. Even involving fresh expenditure, it is the duty of a Finance though the Commander in Chief India was, after the Officer to seek justification of the proposal. He may even Viceroy, the second senior most official in India, and even challenge the necessity for spending so much money though his mandate came from the War Office in London, or on such a scale to secure a given object, (emphasis defence expenditure in India came firmly under the control added). He asks: of the Ministry of Finance. This control was exercised by
the Finance (Defence Division).

• Whether the proposal is really necessary?

• Whether the same results could not be obtained in some

The British had laid down certain ‘basic canons of
other way with greater economy?

financial propriety’ and the ‘duties of the Financial Adviser’

appointed in every Ministry of the Government of India.

• Whether the expenditure involved is justified in the
circumstances?

The Canons o f Financial Propriety

• Whether individual items are in furtherance of the

• Every public officer should exercise the same vigilance
general Government policy?

in respect of expenditure incurred from Government
revenue, as a person of ordinary prudence would exercise • Whether the canons of financial propriety have been observed?

in respect of the expenditure of his own money.

• No authority should exercise its power of sanctioning

In fact, he aslts every question that might be expected
expenditure to pass an order, which will be, indirectly or from an intelligent taxpayer bent on getting the best directly, to its own advantage.

value for his money.1

• The amount of allowances, such as travelling allowances, Developments 1965-1975
granted to meet expenditure of a particular type, should
be so regulated that an allowance is not, on the whole

The decade 1965-1975 witnessed substantial naval
a source of profit to the recipient.

expansion. At the macro level, the new Leander project and

Government revenues should not be utilised for the
e new Russian acquisitions requiring new production,
maintenance, repair, refit and logistic infrastructure involving
unles^
partlCU,ar person or secti°n of the community
arge expenditure over several years were overseeable by

1. This became incongruous with the imDlempnt*ti™

"I-------------- ------------------
became Defence (Finance), totally integrated with the

Finance Concept introduced

Defence Ministry an d lost th e role of T r e a ^ i ^ C on tro r.

^

* * * " *

346 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

financially empowered Steering Committees chaired at could prove their worth was the quantum of savings effected Secretary level and assisted by the Additional Finance by their scrutiny and that the only way to obtain a sanction Adviser.

was t0 deliberately inflate the proposal to allow for the cut

Problems were mainly at the micro level. Sanctions

^'nance (Defence) would invariably make,
sought for personnel to man critically important small Reminiscence new units like Testing and Tuning Teams, Acceptance

Trials Teams, Work Gp Teams, Weapon Analysis Teams, The new Vishakhapatnam Dockyard was one of the Navy's Base Maintenance Cl nits, Ship Maintenance Authority etc lar9est projects that spanned the decades between 1967
invariably got so entangled in protracted discussions with and 1990' Rear Admiral CL Bhandari was the first Director Finance (Defence) that the adverse effects of the delays in General Naval Projects Vishakhapatnam. He recalls: sanctions began to snowball.

“From the inception, I felt that the Vizag Project had to
be handled in a way different from the normal projects

The Governments consistent view was that the Navy
that we pursue on a file. So I approached the Defence
should have a manpower ceiling’ and until this was arrived

Secretary and said, This is not the way to progress the
at, proposals for additional manpower should either ‘be

Vizag Project - put up a file to the Defence Ministry, then
met from within sanctioned manpower’ or ‘by matching
get a sanction from the Finance Ministry and send a file
savings elsewhere’. The Navy’s consistent view was that an
up and down between Vishakhapatnam and Delhi.’ He
expanding service could neither have a manpower ceiling
agreed with me and he said, ‘All right you go and talk to
nor find ‘matching savings elsewhere.’ This contretemps
the Finance Minister, Mr Morarji Desai.’ So I went to Mr
was compounded by the financial crisis caused by the

Seth who was the Additional Secretary. He said, ‘Right,
sharp rise in oil prices in 1974.

go up to the Finance Minister and get it sanctioned.’ I

It became Government policy to control spiralling
said, ‘No, he is your jaatiuala2, you go.’ So ultimately,
manpower costs by strict control on every proposal
both of us went and saw the Finance Minister. We
for additional manpower. The impact of absorbing the
explained to Mr Morarji Desai that this was one project,
costs of the Fay Commission recommendations and the
which would neither materialise nor function if we were
costs of recurring instalments of ‘Additional Dearness
going to pursue every case on file. Mr Morarji Desai

Allowance’ from ‘within existing budget’, together with
was a very patient listener. He listened to us for five
the Government’s strict control and the mushrooming
minutes without interruption and in the end he said to
requirements generated by the new acquisitions, placed
me, ‘All right Admiral, you have made your case. Push

Naval Headquarters in a cleft stick.

the project there. What financial powers do you want?’

I said, ‘Sir, I want the normal financial powers of a Chief

In the case of the large projects, the disadvantages of

Engineer of a military project, but I will have a Financial
delaying manpower sanctions soon became evident in

Adviser whose advice I shall abide by, just as is done
non-productive cost and time over-runs and Government
in the Army. You appoint whoever you like for that.’ So
constituted Steering Committees to monitor these
he said, ‘Right, I will appoint a Financial Adviser and I
projects and ensure timely sanctions for men and material.

will go one step further in that you will have the power

The sterling work done by the Leander Project Steering
to over-rule his financial advice if you wish to or if you

Committee and the Vishakhapatnam Project Steering
have to.’

Committee contributed immeasurably to the eventual

“In my four years there in the Vishakhapatnam Project,
success of these projects, albeit delayed by several years.

1 had only one occasion to disagree with the Financial

Their deliberations, when seen in retrospect, reveal

Adviser because the Engineers, the Brigadier and his
how harmoniously the Ministry of Defence, the Finance
team and the FA, Mr Sablok, they could not agree on

(Defence) Division and Naval Headquarters worked to
a certain payment to the dredging firm. So I told Mr
overcome the complex and conflicting issues involved in

Sablok, Take the file home and come back on Monday
large projects spanning decades.

and tell me whether you still disagree with the Engineers.’

He brought the file back on Monday and said he had no

It was at the small project and small manpower sanction
disagreement.

level that naval resentments were greatest. Cynicism began
to spread about the role of Finance (Defence). Many came to

“To my way of thinking, no project worth its salt, if it is
believe that Finance (Defence) could only justify its existence
viable, will be turned down by the Government, either by
by pruning proposals, that the only reliable statistic that

Defence or by Finance.

2. Jaalwala is th e Indian ex p re ssio n for ‘c o m m u n ity .

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 347

their Financial Advisers and to enable the latter to play a

“I remember one particular incident when we set up more effective and constructive role. Under this scheme, DSP (Navy). I had made a list of the officers andI other the Financial Advisers became a part and parcel of the staff that I needed both for headquarters at Delhi and Administrative Ministry concerned and thereby became the staff at Calcutta and Bombay. The file went up and closely associated with the formulation and implementation down three times without sanction. In the end I got fed
of proposals.

up. 1 went to the Chief of Material, Rear Adm.ral Daya

Shankar and said, ‘I spent two weeks on preparing a

This policy was not introduced in the main Ministry of
case and the Finance Ministry at the level of Assistant Defence. In May 1976, the Integrated Financial Adviser was Financial Adviser turned it down.’ He replied,‘Right, go introduced in the Department of Defence Supplies and and talk with the Additional Financial Adviser.’ I rang up Defence Production, the Defence Research & Development the Additional FA and asked him for a suitable time when Organisation and the Director General of Quality Assurance.

he could give me half an hour without interruption. He The question of introducing the Integrated Finance System said, ‘Six o’ clock in the evening.’ I said, ‘Mr Krishnan, in the Department of Defence continued to be under have you seen my case?’ He replied, ‘Yes.’ I continued,
discussion, presumably on the grounds that it should

‘But you have not signed on file.’ He responded, ‘We
never sign/ I asked, ‘Do you find anything wrong with continue its mandate of examining the necessity aspects of my case?’ He replied, ‘Well, I have been informed that proposals involving the largest expenditure.

you have asked for too much staff. Can you reduce

In August 1983, it was ultimately decided to introduce
some?' I said, ‘Mr Krishnan, I spent two weeks on this the Integrated Finance System. Thereafter, there was case. Please do not think that the prerogative of saving
complete integration of the former Defence Division of the
money lies only with the Ministry of Finance. We too are
interested in having viable projects, in saving money for Finance Ministry with the Defence Ministry.

the Government, for the country. You tell me where to

Whereas earlier, the designation Financial Adviser
reduce and I will reduce. Convince me.’ He said, ‘Please connoted the restrictive function of Treasury Control’, reduce one peon.’ So I reduced one peon and the file the new connotation emphasised the Advisory’ function went through, without any problem. In my opinion, if
by his participation in all high-level committees whenever
you develop a personal rapport with the concerned
officers at a high level, all your cases will go through.

proposals having a financial bearing were discussed.

“There was another Financial Adviser, Mr Jai Shankar.

The Points o f View

He was the only officer in the Ministry of Finance (Defence)

who had the personal power of sanctioning projects of 10 A Naval Point o f View lakh each. Rupees 10 lakhs was a lot of money in those Admiral Tahiliani had been Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff days and any time we had difficulty, we would go to Mr Jai (1980-81), Vice Chief of the Naval Staff (1984-85) and, Shankar and after a chat, the case would be approved.

finally, the Chief of the Naval Staff (1984-87). In his article,

“I do not contribute to this theory that the Ministry was

In Choppy Waters” in the Times o f India in January 1999,
trying to starve the Navy. If the Navy had got a good he wrote: case and had done its homework and worked out all the
pros and cons, then the case would go through.”

Because the Service Headquarters are treated as
subordinate formations outside the Ministry of Defence,

Developments 1976 - 1990
the Ministry maintains separate files on which the

In October 1975, the Government introduced the concept
bureaucrats record their recommendations before
of Integrated Financial Adviser' to help bring about closer

Service Headquarters proposals are put up to the
association between the Administrative Ministries and
political leadership for final approval.3

3. In discussions with Financial Advisers, it emeraed that th ---- :-------------------- —

______ ____
been continued for many reasons, two of which are quite weTghty^ ^ maintaining sePara*e files was established by the British and has oTs0uUcrhTnternIl™ bLrsarSh^ere WŮ'd
be m0re than one Point ° f vhW
succinct itstetM th°MKed ^ th'S lnternal debate to be disclosed It fc f

^

P,3Ce ° R the Finance side’s ^ f ° r subsequent

- > » * * * - »

■

*

-

—

< * * .

the original proposal not bei

P araHd L h Jln th p*
mterna' nie in w h ich the pros and c o n s h ad been
t o *

„
c e
p

F ™ n“ SWe *

» ' =■">«»■

“Therefore, there is a total and deliberate lack of
proper examination of the proposals at all levels. It
communication in an institutionalised manner between
should be remembered that the structure of Defence
the uniformed fraternity and the bureaucracy. If the

Finance (or Finance Division as it was known before),

Service Chief happens to enjoy a good equation with the
parallels the structure of the Defence Department
political leadership, his proposals are accepted and this
to allow examination and clearance at various levels
results in a smooth working relationship. If, however, this
depending on the nature of the case and the amounts
is not the case, the Service Headquarters concerned has
involved.

to live with the Ministry’s decisions.

- The Comptroller and Auditor General can always

“One can cite instances without number where the
call for files. A convention is followed that Defence
country’s defence preparedness has been seriously and

Finance files are not called for by administrative
adversely affected because of the complex system which
departments. One good reason for that is that the
obtains in higher defence management.

Finance Minister’s approval is obtained on the parallel

“The uniformed fraternity over the years has been
file maintained by the Finance Division and the compleading that the Service Headquarters become an ments of the Finance Ministry are recorded in the files
integral part of the Ministry of Defence. This has been
of the Finance Division.”

stalled time and again because the politician does not A Ministry of Defence Point of View have the time to come to grips with such organisational
changes and the bureaucrats are dead against it since Though not necessarily involved in the financial sense, the they would lose a great deal of their authority and Ministry of Defence can and does play a role, particularly also become accountable, along with their uniformed where contentious issues remain unresolved, even at the colleagues, for any failure of defence preparedness in an level of the Chiefs of Staff Committee. The Navy’s proposal Integrated Ministry of Defence.

for command and control of Maritime Reconnaissance is
a case in point.4

“If we continue to put such serious matters on the
backbumer, then the country will continue to get sub-

Mr Govind Narain was the Defence Secretary in 1976.

optimal defence preparedness out of the investments He recalls:

it makes and reduce the attractiveness of the armed

“The control of the air reconnaissance system over the
services as a career still further.

sea was in the hands of the Air Force. The Navy wanted

“With a total sense of responsibility, I can say that
this control to be transferred to itself. This matter
our poor country has not got the optimum in defence
had been pending with the Government for nearly 10
preparedness because of our defective higher defence
years and it could not get resolved. In the 1971 war,
organisation.”

all the three wings of the defence Forces played a very
significant part and all concerned could observe their

A Finance Defence Point o f View
respective roles. The performance of the Navy in Karachi

Mr AK Ghosh was the Financial Adviser in the Ministry of
was brilliant and the whole country was very impressed.

Defence in the 1990s. His views give some insights into

“Pressure continued to mount from the naval side that
the problem.

they would do even better if their operators felt more

“The relevant Appendix in the Defence Services Esticonfident, if the air recce system was also within their mates, brought out every year, clearly states the role
own control. On the other hand, the Air Force pleaded
of Defence Finance. The following points need to be
that they had all the airfield arrangements, they had
noted:

all the know-how, they knew which aircraft from which
country could be best for what purpose, and they had the

- The Finance Division’s mandate is to examine
maintenance facilities. All these were very strong points.

scrupulously the need aspect for every proposal
sent to it for examination. The necessity aspect has

“When this matter came repeatedly to the Defence
to be examined not only from the point whether it is

Ministry, what we did was to send the whole problem to
required or not, but also whether so much is required
the Committee of the three Chiefs of Staff and told them
to deliberate afresh on these problems. We gave them
as proposed or a lesser amount would do.

two months time to come back to the Defence Ministry

- The tradition of having parallel files was, to some
with an agreed solution. Whatever agreed solution was
extent, a corollary of being part of the Finance
found would be acceptable to the Defence Ministry.

Ministry and also for allowing adequate scope for

Air Arm provides th e b a c k g ro u n d for th is excerpt, p a g e 100.

4 . T h e M aritim e R e c o n n a iss a n c e se c tio n o f th e c h a p te r o n th e Naval TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 349

In the 1980s there was a marked increase in the number

"At the end of the two months, no solution was of cases where senior service officers started seeking the forthcoming. In individual discussions, the three Chiets intervention of the courts to redress the injustice that they expressed their helplessness that no agreement could felt had been done to them. These court cases attracted be reached. We gave them another two months time adverse media attention. In some cases, the judicial to reconsider this matter as it was very urgent, very process redressed the grievance. In some cases, the important and required their considered views. But judicial process passed strictures on the system.

again the matter remained with them for hvo more
months and there was no solution forthcoming. Then

One outcome of this trend was the appearance in the
we discussed with the three Chiefs that if they could media of articles by knowledgeable people of how the not reach any conclusion, would they like the Defence system actually worked.

Ministry to consider the whole matter objectively and find
a solution. All the three Chiefs agreed that this should be The Points of View done.

A Ministry o f Defence Point o f View

‘Thus the matter came to be considered in the Defence Excerpt from an article titled “Does Bureaucracy Shackle Ministry. We collected the necessary information from
the various countries of the world, which had developed the Services?” by NN Vohra in the Sunday Times of a system of maritime reconnaissance. Then we analysed January 1998.

our own position. We went into great details of the

(NN Vohra held high office in the Ministry of Defence as
points of view of the Navy. We went into great details Additional Secretary Defence (1987-89), Secretary Defence of the points of view of the Air Force. Then we in the Production and Supplies (1989-90) and Defence Secretary Defence Ministry prepared an elaborate note of 20 or 25 (1990-92). He went on to become Home Secretary 1992-pages, putting down all points of view and reached the 94 and then Principal Secretary to the Prime Minister.) conclusion that it would be more prudent if maritime
reconnaissance was put under the control of the Navy

“Among the varied reactions to the Government’s
but the maintenance of the aircraft could be left with the decision to remove the Naval Chief is the demand for Air Force. Naturally the Navy was jubilant and the Air the urgent ‘liberation’ of the defence services from the Force was unhappy, but this solution was accepted by ‘bureaucratic control’ of the MoD and for the Chiefs to deal the Defence Minister, by the Political Affairs Committee directly with the Raksha Mantri (RM) and the Prime Minister of the Cabinet and finally by the Prime Minister and was (PM). Some of the comments create the impression that enforced as a Government order.”

the services have been under siege till now. The Defence

Minister plans to reorganise the Ministry within a month,

Promotions and Appointments
keeping in view the recommendations of the Chiefs.

The other cause of tension between the Service

The Services’ Headquarters are large organisations,

Headquarters and the Ministry of Defence was senior
officers’ promotions and appointments. The procedure especially Army Headquarters. They have extensive inherited from the British was that, above a certain rank
interface with the MoD, which comprises the Departments
the recommendations of every Promotion Board had to of Defence, Defence Production and Defence Research.

be approved by the Ministry of Defence and, as a further

The two major areas of intensive relations concern

‘safeguard’, senior appointments had to be approved by promotions and appointments above a certain rank, and the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet. The Service
inancial approvals for incurring expenditures beyond

Headquarters’ view was that they knew best who should prescribed limits. All appointments of Major General, Air be promoted and, for career progression, where a senior
ice Marshal and Rear Admiral rank require the approval of
officer was best posted.

the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet.

In the normal course, the system worked well

Each service has laid down procedures for the redressal

Problems arose either when the Ministry found that
comp aints of its personnel. Those dissatisfied with the
the recommendation of a Promotion Board was not outcome of their petitions can move the MoD through a supportable by the Confidential Reports of a particula
statutory complaint.

officer or when an officer had put up a statutory pet tion
for Redressal of Grievance’ or when the civil' a „th „■?

cnm1i
ab, Ůt
c*ecac*es a9°> very few personnel filed
political or bureaucratic, sought to promote another office!’ which

' Sti" sou9ht relief through the courts
or deny promotion to the aggrieved officer.

changed1

CaS6S’ ^ec,inec^ to interfere. All this has

350 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

“The number of complaints and court cases has

"In case this does not happen, the case is put up to the
increased manifold; the courts are no longer unwilling

RM who takes a view after hearing both sides.

to intercede; and those moving the courts today include
the highest ranking defence officers. Quite obviously, the

“After the ACC has accorded approval, the list of officers
services have been shedding their centuries-old traditions found fit or unfit to be elevated to the higher rank is and honour codes. These trends, reflecting on internal notified.

discipline, are beginning to affect the command and

“Based on the number of vacancies arising in the ensuing
control of the Chiefs.

6 to 12 months, the Chief forwards his recommendations

“As regards appointments, the Chiefs have been to the MoD, suggesting specific appointments for each of demanding enhanced authority. While, understandably,
the officers proposed to be promoted. While evolving his
they object to their recommendations being modified proposals, the Chief considers the seniority of the select unilaterally, it is altogether incorrect to suggest that they officers under view, their career profiles and professional do not accept the Appointment Committee’s authority.

and personal qualities. After examination at Defence

Secretary’s level and clearance by RM, the proposals are

“Our defence services are apolitical and have made vital
forwarded for ACC approval.

contributions to maintaining the country’s integrity. The

“In case the Defence Secretary / RM finds difficulty in
functioning of the services is based on high discipline.

endorsing a particular proposal, the same procedure is

This vital ingredient must not be eroded at any cost, and followed as earlier described in regard to the approval of indiscipline must be harshly put down irrespective of the select lists recommended by the Chiefs.

rank at which it occurs.

“It is also relevant to note that as per the Transfer of

“While considering restructuring, the Defence Minister Business Rules of the Government of India 1964, all would need to take a frontal view about the Ministry’s future appointments of Major Generals, Air Vice Marshals and role and responsibility.

Rear Admirals (equivalent to Joint Secretary on the civil

“The services are extremely rank conscious. If, in the side) and above can be made only with the ACC’s approval.

revised set up, the Defence Secretary is still required to The Cabinet Secretary is responsible for submitting cases play a role, it would be necessary to upgrade his position to the ACC.

to resolve the unwillingness of the Chiefs to deal with a

“For years, the aforesaid procedure has been followed
functionary junior to them. The working of the defence for seeking approval to senior appointments in the apparatus, so vital to national security, must not be three services. It is relevant to record that the process subjected to frequent changes.”

followed has been essentially founded in not tinkering

Excerpt from NN Vohra’s article ‘Between the Lines’ in with the judgment of the concerned Chief and in cases the
of disagreement, resolving the issue through discussions

Indian Express of 24 December 1998.

with the Chief or over-ruling his view.

“In the Navy, and in the Air Force and Army, the claims
for promotion of all officers in a given zone of seniority

“The Chief’s recommendations in regard to senior
are examined by authorised Selection Boards (SBs). As per appointments in the services are invariably sustained.

the laid down procedure, lists of officers to be appointed Situations have, however, arisen from time to time, when the MoD is compelled to disagree with a particular
to General rank and above, in each service are evolved
by SB s chaired by the Service Chiefs. Such lists, along
recommendation.

with the dossiers of the officers considered by the SB, are

“Disciplined thought and conduct is what distinguishes
forwarded to the Ministry of Defence (MoD). The Defence the Defence Services from all others. If this most vital Secretary examines the recommendations and submits element of the national security apparatus is to continue to them to the Raksha Mantri (RM) for approval, where after enjoy the most honoured position in the entire hierarchy of the case is forwarded to the Appointments Committee of government, it would be necessary that any deviation from the Cabinet (ACC) for final approval.

the norm is dealt with severely, irrespective of rank.”

“In the event of the Defence Secretary being unable A Presidential Point of View to endorse one or more of the officers recommended for
rejection / promotion, the matter is discussed by him with

Excerpt from My Presidential Years by R Venkataraman

(Finance Minister 1980-82, Defence Minister 1982-84,
the Chief and resolved.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 351

remained in force, he was entitled to attend Ramdas took

Vice President 1984-87, and President of India 1987-92,
over as Chief of the Naval Staff on 30- November and

Pages 452 et seq).

except for stray references in the Press, the matter died

“The choice of the Chiefs of the Army, Navy and Air out.”

Force Staff is made by the government after assessment Civil Service Points of View of their service records by the Defence Minister and the

Prime Minister. Admiral Nadkarni, Chief of the Naval Sta , These views are of Senior Civil Servants who have held was to retire on November 30, 1990. Earlier, Nadkarni high office in the Ministry of Defence and who did not wish had extended the services of Vice Admiral Jain who was to be quoted.

retiring before the CNS so that he would be eligible for • “The sad truth is that far too many Senior Officers have consideration for the post of Admiral when time for choice
their eyes fixed on how to promote their own prospects
came. This was nothing new. Similar action had been taken
for the next higher job, by prejudicing the chances or
in the case of Air Marshal Katre and Vice Admiral Tahiliani.

their contenders. It is astonishing how many allegations

The natural expectation was that Vice Admiral Jain might
are received by MoD to queer the pitch of peer groups
be promoted as CNS over the next senior, Vice Admiral
for criteria appointments. Inputs from the intelligence

Ramdas.

agencies are primarily negative feedback. The Defence

“Prime Minister VP Singh had discussed the matter with

Secretary does not do the empanelling of names for
me and said that he preferred Vice Admiral Ramdas for the

Service Chief. Only the RM, if he considers it necessary
post of Chief. 1 had told VP Singh that 1 had no personal
and then only informally, depending on the personalities
preferences and that he could communicate his proposal
involved and their inter-personal equations, seeks the
for my approval. On receipt of the file, I perused the records
views of the Chiefs regarding their successors.”

and approved it.

• “The civil servants of the MoD are essentially a buffer

“After Chandra Shekhar became Prime Minister, he
between the ‘political deciders’ and the ‘service
asked me whether the appointment of Ramdas could be
proposers’. By training and by experience, civil servants
reconsidered. He also sent Defence Secretary Vohra to
take an overall, national view of each proposal.

explain the reasons to me. 1 told the Defence Secretary

“As regards keeping a watchful eye on the activities of
that orders for the appointment of Ramdas had already
the Armed Forces, it is a matter of abundant caution to
been issued and gazetted and any attempt to overturn
forestall anything untoward rather than forestall a coup.

the decision, except on very serious charges of fraud,
misrepresentation' or suppression of material facts,

“The expectation that ‘integrating’ Service Headquarters
would seriously damage the morale of the services. 1 also
with the MoD will improve their leverage in swifter
expressed doubt whether an order already passed could
decision-making or obtaining higher budget allocations
be revoked. Vohra enquired if Nadkarni could be given an
is, by and large, wishful thinking. Those elements of
extension for one month and the matter reviewed. I replied

Service Headquarters that do integrate with the MoD
that it would set a bad precedent and every Chief of Staff
as a result of the post Kargil reforms will either become
would try to wrangle an extension in future. I also felt that
buffers themselves or become an ‘additional input’.

a Chief on extension would suffer a serious loss of prestige • MoD s role is to help the Services, to the extent possible, as the officers and men would look upon him as a lame
to get what they seek, in terms of budget and in terms
duck chief.

of inductions, on the best possible financial terms and

“On 27th November two Cabinet ministers called on me
to intermediate with other ministries, state governments
and discussed this issue. I explained to them the need to
and governments of other countries.

maintain high standards of discipline in the Armed Forces

There is a feeling that Senior Reviewing Officers, who
and also the sanctity of a decision. I cautioned them that
may not have seen an officer at close quarters in that
there would be public suspicion of political interference if the

Particular assignment, can write off an officer’s career
appointment were changed with a change in government.

y downgrading Initiating Officer’s and Reviewing

“O n 28* November I hosted a dinner for the retiring

S
yra^ n9s or Panning remarks o f faint praise,

Chief. As usual, I invited the CNS-designate, all Chiefs of
e
oDs role in such cases is vital and essential for

Staff and retired Chiefs resident in Delhi. When mv staff
a ancing out, particularly in the case o f very senior
asked whether there would be any embarrassment in
officers, (emphasis added)

inviting Ramdas, 1 said that as long as his appointment

J | ear ^ at ran^ anc*
in services and junior officers
e o see MoD as an adversary, the Babus of little

352 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

understanding and lot of clout, slow, indifferent, corrupt

A Chief’s right to have his own team has to be
and ignorant. In Finance terms, they often feel that
tempered with equity and justice. The Ministry or the
funds for security take precedence over all else. At higher

Government should have the right to approve or reject
levels, the services refer to integration (as elsewhere).

the Service recommendations.

The down side is that people are people. The Babu and

In the past, the Defence Ministry has got into the habit
the service officer are prone to be as honest / dishonest,
of asking for a panel of names for certain appointments.

efficient / inefficient as the other. The Babu is trained to

The Service Headquarters normally overcome this
battle rules / politics / files. By integrating officers of the
obstruction by forwarding the names of two or three

Army, Navy and Air Headquarters with MoD, the service
obviously unsuitable candidates along with their main
officer will also turn into a Babu.”

choice. The practice of asking for a panel of names
should be avoided as it then makes the Defence Ministry

Views o f Chiefs o f the Naval Staff
the selector, a task, which by law, belongs to the Service

Admiral Nadkarni was the Chief of Personnel (1983-85),

Headquarters.

Vice Chief of the Naval Staff (1986-87) and Chief of the

“If the Government, for any reason, decides not to

Naval Staff (1987-90). In his article Armed Forces and
approve the recommendations of the Chief, it should

Civil Service' in the Hindustan Times in January 1999, he
ask for another name to be submitted until finally a
stated:

recommendation of the Chief is accepted. Neither

“Over the years, India’s Armed Forces have created an
the Appointments Committee of the Cabinet nor the
aura about themselves. It is generally believed that some

Defence Ministry can take upon itself the task of making
service appointments or promotions."

of the ills which pervade the civilian administration have
not penetrated the services, that everything is efficient,

In a Times of India article on 24 May 1999 ‘For an Open
fair and square. This is a myth. Servicemen are as Enquiry’, Admiral Tahiliani wrote: susceptible to being persuaded by a bit of sycophancy

“The biggest area of political interference arises in
as civilians.

the area of promotions and appointments of senior

“Understandably, every officer has ambitions to reach
officers. We have seen polite arm-twisting where the
the highest rung in the promotion ladder of his service.

Service Headquarters have acquiesced to the wishes of

In that quest, he expects justice and fairness from
their political masters, even when these were at variance
his seniors. A fair and just system of promotions and
with their professional judgment. These led to many
appointments has to be built around well-publicised
aggrieved officers resorting to legal action for redressal
rules and guidelines.

of grievances.”

“The present system in Service Headquarters lacks

The Services Viewpoint
both transparency and a rigid adherence to rules. For From what has been articulated in the public domain, many years now, the Government has tried to persuade the gist of the Services Headquarters viewpoint could be Service Headquarters to frame a set of rules for summarised as follows: promotion and appointments at the senior level. The

Services have always resisted this on the grounds that • Include the services in the security-related decision rigid rules will erode the flexibility, which is necessary for
making loop.

making suitable placements for the benefit of the Service.

• Greater authority in financial matters.

Inevitably, flexibility has also resulted in arbitrariness and

• Remedy the tremendous imbalance in the accountability
cronyism.

and responsibility of the Chiefs.

“Every senior officer who is cleared for promotion to the

• Autonomy in personnel matters.

higher rank should be considered fit for each and every • Regulate its revenue expenditure without interference appointment in that rank. If certain appointments in the
from the MoD
same rank such as Principal Staff Officers (in Service

Headquarters) Corps Commanders (in the field) etc. are

Developments After 1990
considered superior to others, then well-publicised rules The severe drought after 1986 was followed by a prolonged snd guidelines must be laid down for those.

period of financial stringency. This led in early 1990 to the

“Above all, the Defence Ministry must acknowledge constitution of the Committee on Defence Expenditure the right of the Chief to recommend appointments.

(CDE) headed by Mr Arun Singh who had been the Minister

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 353

Revenue Expenditure, which comprised more than seventy
of State for Defence under Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi per cent of the budget. This led to the appointment of a from 1985 to 1987. The Committee forwarded its report Task Force.5 Based on the report of this Task Force on in 1992. One of its many recommendations concerned Budgetary Centres, submitted to the Government in delegation and decentralisation of financial powers so that April 1992, the Government approved the concept of approval for buying spares did not have to run through Authority and Responsibility Centres with clear-cut budgea succession of hurdles. It was not logical that the accountability for procurement of equipment for execution tary allocation (Budget Centres) for achieving laid down of tasks should rest with one person whilst financial control targets.

rested with somebody else. It recommended that the Chiefs

Having initiated the suggestion, the Navy took the lead.

of the three services should be empowered to procure the The Navy introduced the ‘New Management Strategy equipment required for the execution of their tasks, whilst (NMS) in the field of Maintenance on 4 October 1993 and remaining within their overall budgetary allocations.

in the field of Logistics on 23 November 1994. Its aim was

Meanwhile, in 1989, Naval Headquarters had forwarded to enhance Value for money’ in revenue expenditure by to the Controller General of Defence Accounts a proposal establishing a clear linkage between resources utilised and suggesting a model to decentralise the management of
outputs achieved.

5. TheTask Force was headed by AK Ghosh asn it

„

__________ _ _ _

354 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

43

Changes In NHQ Organisation

Pream ble

The Defence Plan 1966-71 had accepted the Navy’s
expansion programme and increase in manpower. With

Soon after independence in 1947, the staff at Naval Headgreater emphasis on self-sufficiency in the indigenous quarters (NHQ), under the Chief of Naval Staff (CNS),
production of ships, weapons and ammunition, the nature
was grouped into five ‘Branches’ under five Principal Staff and scope of the workload in NHQ began to increase.

Officers (PSO s). These were the Chief of Staff/Deputy C-in-

C, Chief of Personnel (COP), Chief of Material (COM), Chief

In 1966, the Director of the Submarine Arm was
of Administration and Chief of Naval Aviation (CONA).

sanctioned and placed under the Deputy Chief of the

Naval Staff.

The 1955 Reorganisation

In 1967, the Deputy Chief of Naval Staff was re-designated

The first major re-organisation of NHQ after independence as Vice Chief of the Naval Staff (VCNS), and the Chief of took place in 1955. The Chief of Staff/Deputy C-in-C was Naval Aviation was re-designated as Assistant Chief of the re-designated Deputy Chief of Naval Staff (DCNS). The Naval Staff (ACNS).

Chief of Administration was abolished and its Directorates
redistributed between the Staff, Personnel and Material

In 1968, concurrently with the arrival of the first submarine

Branches.

in India, the CNS was upgraded in rank to Admiral. Also in

1968, two new Directorates were sanctioned. The Director

In 1959, D CNS was upgraded to Rear Admiral. This of Acquisition Project, dealing with the acquisitions from functioned satisfactorily until 1961, when the combined the Soviet Union and elsewhere, was placed under the impact began to be felt of growth, modernisation and self- VCNS. The Director of Leander Project dealing with the sufficiency.

indigenous construction of the Leander class frigates was
placed under the COM.

N H Q A fter the 1962 Reorganisation

PSO

In 1969, the Frigate Cell of Directorate of Naval

Directorates under PSO

Construction became Directorate of Leander Project.

DCNS

Operations, Intelligence, Signals, Plans,

(Rear Adm)

Weapons Policy & Tactics, Chief Hydrographer,

By 1969, it became clear that the division of

Civil Engineering (Works).

responsibilities and the workload needed to be rationalised.

CONA

Air Staff, Air Material.

The objectives were:

(Commodore)

• To remedy the imbalance in distribution of responsibilities

COP

Personnel Services, Training, Education,
between the VCNS, COR COM and the ACNS, and the

(Commodore)

Medical Services, Legal (JAG), Supply Branch,
increasing overload on all of them as a result of the

Clothing & Victualling, Civilian Personnel.

Navy's development.

COM

Marine Engineering, Electrical Engineering,

• To make the appointment of VCNS tenable by a Vice

(Commodore)

Weapons & Equipment, Fleet Maintenance,

Admiral so as to better supervise and coordinate work

Stores,

Armament

Supply,

Armament

Inspection,

Naval Construction, Scientific
in NHQ and to enable a choice between two Vice

Admirals (FOC1NCWEST and VCNS) when considering

Research,

Naval Secretary Administration.

a successor to a retiring CNS.

(Captain)

• To create a new Logistics Branch under a Chief of Logistics (COL) in the rank of Rear Admiral to deal with all Changes Betw een 1965 and 1968
matters concerning Stores, Clothing, Victualling, Supply

In 1965, the Chief of Personnel and the Chief of Material
and Civilian Personnel.

were upgraded in rank to Rear Admiral.

• The growth and diversification of sea going forces and

. To re-designate the ACNS as DCNS in the rank of Rear
the doubling of manpower since 1962.

Admiral.

• The expansion and modernisation of maintenance

• To relieve the overload of the Directorate of Personnel
facilities.

Services, by splitting it into two directorates - 'Personnel

• The updating and enlarging of training complexes.

and ‘Personal Services’.

• The establishment of the Submarine Arm.

Except for the re-designation of the ACNS as DCNS, the
other objectives were met in the 1969 Reorganisation.

• The large variety of weapons and missiles, computerised
fire control systems, communication and electronic

NHQ After the 1969 Reorganisation
warfare systems.

PSO

Directorates Under PSO

• The acquisition of sophisticated naval aircraft.

VCNS

Operations, Plans, Weapons Policy & Tactics,

• The induction of gas turbine propulsion.

(Vice Adm)

Intelligence, Signals, Chief Hydrographer,

Scientific Advisor (R&D), Naval Secretary.

• The acquisition of ships from Russia with their new phi

ACNS

Air Staff, Air Material, Submarines, Acquisition
losophies and practices in the fields of maintenance,
logistics and training, all of which were substantially

(Commodore) Project, Meteorology.

different, distinct and irreconcilable with extant

COP

Personnel, Personal Services, Training,
practices.

(Rear Adm)

Education, Medical Services, Legal (JAG).

• The march towards self sufficiency and the indigenous

COM

Fleet Maintenance, Marine Engineering,
construction programme ranging from 200 tonne

(Rear Adm)

Electrical Engineering, Weapons & Equipment,

Seaward Defence Boats and Landing Craft to 2,000

Armament Inspection, Naval Design, Naval
tonne Survey Vessels and the 3,000 tonne Leander class

Construction, Leander Project.

frigates.

COL

Supply Branch, Stores, Clothing & Victualling,

(Rear Adm)

Armament Supply, Civilian Personnel, Civil

The salient features of the 1972 Reorganisation were:

Engineering (Works).

• The creation of the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff

Changes Between 1970 and 1972

(DCNS) in the rank of Rear Admiral, responsible for

‘Operations’ and the associated disciplines of intelligence

In 1970, a study was carried out to reorganise NHQ on
and signals, leaving VCNS to concentrate on the policy
functional lines:

and planning functions of the Staff Branch.

• Whether the Staff Branch should comprise of Executive • The upgradation in rank of Chief of Personnel and Chief officers only or should Technical officers also participate
of Material to Vice Admiral.

in taking staff decisions?

• The creation of three Assistant Principal Staff Officers

• Should the Air and Submarine Arms be separate

(APSOs) in the rank of Rear Admiral namely Assistant
branches?

Chief of the Naval Staff (Policy and Plans) (ACNS P&P),

• Should Engineering and other specialist directorates

Assistant Chief of Personnel (ACOP) and Assistant Chief
look after Training’ in their respective fields or should
of Material (ACOM).

these branches be represented in the Directorate of

Naval Training?

• The distribution and organisation of Directorates
was rationalised, separating wherever necessary the

The factors taken into account in the 1972 Reorganisation
problems of Russian and Western acquisitions. In 1970,
were:

the Design Cell of Directorate of Naval Construction

• The need to strengthen the policy-making apparatus
became Directorate of Naval Design under COM.

to respond quickly to situations and also allow lamer

The Acquisition functions of the Directorate of Naval
initiative to the Commands.

Construction were entrusted to the Directorate of

Acquisition Projects. The Director of Stores was renamed

’

° r9a™sati0" al ‘essons learnt during the conflict
with Pakistan in December 1971.

Director of Logistic Support.

356 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

NHQ A fte r the 1972 R eorganisation

P S O

Directorates under PSO

A PS O

Directorates under A PSO

VCNS

Combat Policy & Tactics

ACNS(P&P)

Plans

(Vice Adm)

Chief Hydrographer

(Rear Adm)

Civil Engineering (Works)

Staff Duties

Acquisition Projects

Scientific Advisor

DCNS

Operations, Intelligence, Signals

(Rear Adm)

Air Staff, Air Material

Submarines

COP

Training, Medical, Legal

ACOP

Personnel,

(Vice Adm)

Education & Meteorology

(Rear Adm)

Personal Services

Civilian Personnel

COM

Naval Design

ACOM

Marine Engineering

(Vice Adm)

Leander Project

(Rear Adm)

Electrical Engineering

Dockyards & Fleet Maintenance

Weapons & Equipment

Naval Construction

COL

Supply Branch

(Rear Adm)

Logistic Support, Clothing & Victualling

Armament Supply, Armament Inspection

Changes Betw een 1972 and 1978
with the logistic functions coming under the Chief of

Material, establish tighter material control of refits.

The Directorate of Management Services (DOMS) was
created in 1974 and placed under ACNS (P&P). A year

NHQ’s recommendations were approved in 1977 and
these formed the basis for the next major reorganisation
later, in 1975, it was placed directly under the VCNS.

of NHQ in 1978.

By the mid 1970s, the Navy’s organisation was

The salient features of the 1978 Reorganisation were:

experiencing problems in coping with the tempo of
acquisitions. There was avoidable duplication in some

• On the merger of the Supply Branch with the General
areas, while other areas remained understaffed. There was

List officer cadres of the Executive Branch on 1
constant pressure for more manpower. A study was initiated

January 1978, the support and maintenance functions
of the Navy were placed under the COM. All ‘Personnel
whether the organisation could be rationalised and, to the
functions were regrouped under the COP. With the
extent possible, not only enable staffing requirements to be
abolition of the COL, the number of Principal Staff
met within existing manpower resources but also provide

Officers (PSOs) reduced from 5 to 4 - VCNS, DCNS,
for better accountability.

COP and COM under whom there were the three

This study resulted in two major conclusions:

APSOs - ACNS, ACOP and ACOM. With the reduction
of one PSO at NHQ (the COL), Southern Naval Area

• The Supply and Executive Branches should be
was upgraded to Southern Naval Command under a
merged. Ju n io r officers of the Supply Branch could

Vice Admiral.

volunteer to convert to the Executive Branch and those

• The Directorates of Logistic Support and Armament
found fit would undergo conversion courses. During

Supply under an ACOM (Logsitics) were placed under
the transition, officers of the Supply Branch in ships
the COM for better coordination of all aspects of stores
and establishments would be withdrawn without any
and machinery under one branch.

relief. As regards Supply Branch sailors, the adoption
of ‘combat post manning’ on board ships compelled

• The Directorates of Clothing and Victualling were
reorganisation for economy in manpower to
e
merged into the Director of Supplies and placed under
the COP as both functions were related to personnel.

achieved.

• The Director of Naval Armament Inspection was placed

• The ‘Logistics’ function, which had been set up under a
under the VCNS for closer supervision of munitions.

different PSO , would be more functional if amalgamated
with the Material and Personnel branches. This woul

• The Director of Staff Duties was redesignated as Director
result in a more streamlined organisation at NHQ.

of Administration.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 357

NHQ After the 1978 Reorganisation

0

Directorate 0f

Directorates under A PSO

Naval

Oceanology

PSO

Directorates under PSO

APSO
and

Meteorology

Plans

VCNS

Combat Policy & Tactics

ACNS(P&P)

Civil Engineering (Works)

(D NO M ) established

(Vice Adm)

Chief Hydrographer

(Rear Adm)

in Ju n e 1982 to deal

Administration

Acquisitions

Armament Inspection
with Oceanography,

Management Services

M e t e o r o l o g y ,

Scientific Research

A n t a r c t i c a

DCNS

Operations, Intelligence, Signals
expeditions
and

(Rear Adm)

Air Staff, Air Material
associated subjects.

Submarines
o

Directorate
of

COP

Training, Medical, Legal

ACOP

Personnel

Diving
and

Under

(Vice Adm)

Education, Meteorology

(Rear Adm)

Personal Services

Sea Activities (DOD)

Supplies

Civilian Personnel
established in May

COM

Dockyards

ACOM

Marine Engineering

1983.

(Vice Adm)

Fleet Maintenance

(Rear Adm)

Electrical Engineering

Leander Project

©

In

October

Weapons & Equipment

Naval Design

1983,
the

Naval Construction

Controllerate
of

ACOM (Logistics)

Logistic Support

(Rear Adm)

Warship Production

Armament Supply
and Acquisition was

Changes Between 1979 and 1984
established
under

VCNS to integrate and coordinate the various activities

The salient features of the 1984 Reorganisation were:

of shipbuilding and ship acquisition at NHQ.

The

• Implementation of the First Cadre Review. The rank up-

Director of

Acquisition Project and the Director
gradations were of DCNS from Rear Admiral to Vice
of Naval Ship Production were grouped under a Rear

Admiral, and four NHQ Directors to the rank of Rear

Admiral ACWPA.

Admiral - DNO to ACNS (Operations), DMAS to ACNS

In October 1984, a new ‘Logistics Branch’ was created.

At NHQ, the Chief of Logistics & Administration
was DlrM 0*

(COLA), created as a PSO in Phase 1 of the Second

• DLP renamed DNSP in 1980.

Cadre Review in the rank of Vice Admiral, was assisted
by the erstwhile ACOM Logistics, now redesignated as

• Directorate of Harrier Project (DHP) established in

ACOL. The Directorates placed under the new Logistic
newes Pr H 80 t0r,deal ^
the inducti°n o f £

Branch were the Directorate of Logistic Support (D LS),
new Sea Harriers. This directorate was renamed *
the Directorate of Supply (D O S), the Directorate of

Directorate of Aircraft Acquisition (DAA) in 1983 tn H i

Administration (DOA), the Directorate of Management
ervices (DOMS), the Directorate of Works (DW),
the Directorate of Armament Supply (DAS) and the

Directorate of Transport (DOT) when formed.

rank of Rear Admiral

1 “

°> « »

PSO

D1« e , a „ d, Ipsofl" " ' ' ’e ' 984

VCNS

APSO

Combat Policy & Tactics

Directorates Under APSO

(Vice Adm)

Chief Hydrographer(R Adm)

ACNS(PSP)

Plans

Dir SSK Project (R Adm)

(Rear Adm)

Armament Inspection

Scientific Research

ACWPA

Acquisitions

(Rear Adm)

Ship Production

DCNS

Intelligence, Signals

(Vice Adm)

Submarines, Diving

ACNS (Ops)

O p e r a tio n s

Oceanology & Meteorology

(Rear Adm)

3 58 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

ACNS (Air)

Air Staff,

(Rear Adm)

Air Material

Air Acquisitions

Personnel

C O P

Training, Medical, Legal

ACOP

(Vice Adm)

Education,

(Rear Adm)

Personal Services

Civilian Personnel

COM

ACOM (Systems)

Marine Engineering

(Vice Adm)

(Rear Adm)

Electrical Engineering

Weapons & Equipment

Naval Construction

ACOM (D&R)

Dockyards

(Rear Adm)

Fleet Maintenance

Value Engineering

DGND

Naval Design

(Rear Adm)

Logistic Support

COLA

Supply Branch

ACOL

Armament Supply

(Vice Adm)

Administration

(Rear Adm)

Civil Engineering (Works)

Transport

Management Services

In Ju ly 1985, Directorate of Financial Planning (Non

Changes Betw een 1984 and 1986

Public Funds) - DFP (NPF) was created under COP for

In February 1985, the Directorate of Ship Systems
profitable investment of non-public funds.

Development (D SSD ) was created under the VCNS to

In September 1985, the Directorate of Naval Construction
deal with the training of personnel for, and the lease of a
was renamed as the Directorate of Naval Architecture.

nuclear propelled submarine from Russia. In May 1985,
he was placed under the ACWPA.

In October 1985, sanction was accorded for Project

Seabird (the Third Naval Base at Karwar) to be headed

On 1 April 1985, in accordance with Phase II of the
by a Rear Admiral; he was placed under VCNS.

Second Cadre Review:

In November 1985, the Directorate of Combat Policy

-The Controller of Warship Production & Acquisitions
and Tactics was split. The renamed Directorate of Staff

(CWPA) was created in the rank of Vice Admiral and

Requirements (DSR) was placed under ACNS (P&P). A
placed under VCNS.

new Directorate of Tactics was created in April 1986 and

-The Director of Civilian Personnel was upgraded to
placed under DCNS.

ACOP (Civilians) in the rank of Rear Admiral.

. In Ju ly 1986, as part of the restructuring of the Navy and

In May 1985, the Directorate of the S S K Project and the

NHQ organisation, the logistics function was restored

Directorate General of Naval Design were placed under
to the Material Branch. The Chief of Logistics was re

CWPA.

designated as Controller of Logistic Support under the

COM.

NHQ A fter the 1986 Reorganisation

APSO

Directorates

PSO

Controllerates/Directorates

ACNS(PSP)

Plans

VCNS

Chief Hydrographer (R Adm)

(Rear Adm)

Staff Requirements

(Vice Adm)

Project Seabird (R Adm)

Works

Administration

Armament Inspection

SA to CNS

CWPA (Controller Of Warship

Production & Acquisition)

(Vice Adm)

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 3 59

Contracts

ACWPA/SSK

Ship Acquisition

Ship Production

(Rear Adm)

Submarine Acquisition

Equipment

Ship Systems Dev (SSD)

DGND

Naval Design

(Rear Adm)

DCNS

Intelligence

ACNS (Ops)

Operations

(Vice Adm)

Signals

(Rear Adm)

Submarine Operations

Tactics

Diving

Oceanology & A'leteorology

ACNS (Air)

Air Staff

(Rear Adm)

Air Material

Air Acquisitions

COP

DMS Navy (Surg Rear Adm)

ACOP (CP)

Personnel

(Vice Adm)

NSEC

(Career Planning)

Manpower Planning

Judge Advocate General

(Rear Adm)

Training

Education

ACOP (PC)

Personal Services

(Personnel & Conditions)

Pay & Allowances

(Rear Adm)

Non Public Funds

ACOP (Civ)

Civilian Personnel

(Rear Adm)

COM

(Vice Adm)

ACOM (Systems)

Marine Engineering

(Rear Adm)

Electrical Engineering

Weapons & Equipment

Management Services

Value Engineering

ACOM (D&R)

Dockyards & Tech Services

(Rear Adm)

Refits & Maintenance

Naval Architecture

CLS Controller of Logistic Support

(Vice Adm)

ACLS

Logistic Support

(Rear Adm)

Armament Supply

Transport

Clothing & Victualling

Changes Between 1986 and 1990

• From March 1987 onwards, the dormant Directorate

• In May 1986, the Submarine Desinn Or™
under the DGND.

9 QrŮp Was forr"ed
of Equipment under CWPA was merged with the

Directorate of Contracts also under CWPA.

• In November 1986, the CAIO Rule Writinn o™
shifted from DSR to DOT.

Group was

• In April 1987, the Directorate of Systems Applications
was established under DCNS for all work on satellite and

• In January 1987, the concept of Branch 'P ,
space applications.

D-rectorates' was dispensed with in NHQ’s C h a rte d "!

On 14 Ju ly 1987, the Director of Armament Supply
was upgraded to A PSO status as Director General of

• In February 1987, the Director of Medical Services ( I W

Armament Supply.

was upgraded to Director General of Medical S e W

In June 1989, the Directorate of Naval Signals was

(Navy) in the rank of Surgeon Vice Admiral.

sifted from being under DCNS to being under ACNS

(Ops).

3 6 0 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

NHQ Organisation in 1990

PSO

Controllerates/Directorates

APSO

Directorates

VCNS

Chief Hydrographer (R Adm)

ACNS(P&P)

Plans

(Vice Adm)

Project Seabird (R Adm)

(Rear Adm)

Staff Requirements

Administration

Works

Armament Inspection

Naval Academy

SA to CNS

CWPA (Controller of Warship

Production & Acquisition)

(Vice Adm)

Contracts & Equipment

ACWPA/SSK

Ship Acquisition

Ship Production

(Rear Adm)

Submarine Acquisition

Ship Systems Dev (SSD)

DGND

Naval Design (Construction)

(Rear Adm)

Naval Design (Engineering)

Naval Design (Electrical)

Submarine Design Group

DCNS

Submarine Arm

ACNS (Ops)

Operations

(Vice Adm)

Intelligence

(Rear Adm)

Submarine Operations

Systems Applications

Signals

Tactics

Diving

Oceanology & Meteorology

ACNS (Air)

Air Staff

(Rear Adm)

Air Material

Air Acquisitions

COP

DGMS Navy (Surg Vice Adm)

ACOP (CP)

Personnel

Manpower Planning

(Vice Adm)

NSEC

(Career Planning)

Judge Advocate General

(Rear Adm)

Training

Education

ACOP (PC)

Personal Services

(Personnel & Conditions)

Pay & Allowances

(Rear Adm)

Non Public Funds

ACOP (Civ)

Civilian Personnel

(Rear Adm)

Marine Engineering

COM

ACOM(Systems)

Electrical Engineering

(Vice Adm)

(Rear Adm)

Weapon & Equipment

Management Services

Value Engineering

ACOM (D & R)

Dockyards & Tech Services

(Rear Adm)

Fleet Refits & Maintenance

Naval Architecture

CLS Controller of Logistic Support

(Vice Adm)

ACLS

Logistic Support

(Rear Adm)

Clothing & Victualling

Transport

DGAS

Armament Supply

(Rear Adm equiv)

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 361

44

Changes In Command And Control Structure

Preamble

-Increase in training commitments and expansion of
training facilities Inclusion of the NO IC Goa area under

Prior to and during the 1965 Indo-Pakistan War, the four

COMCHIN.

Naval Operational and Administrative Authorities were Flag

Officer Commanding Indian Fleet (FOCIF), Flag Officer • ForVizag: Bombay (FOB), Commodore Cochin (COMCH1N) and

-Establishment of a submarine base and basing of

Commodore East (COMEAST).

submarines, basing of Petyas, submarine depot ship,

FOC1F was senior to FOB and was responsible directly

LSTs, LCCls, minesweepers, patrol boats, etc.

to Naval Headquarters (NHQ) for the Fleets activities and

- Establishment of a new major Dockyard.

its operations during war.

- Establishment of a Type Training School for the Russian

Lessons were learnt during the 1965 war. It had been
ships and submarines.

decided also to base the new acquisitions from Russia at

- Expansion
of

Vizag

W/T
for
submarine

Vishakhapatnam.

communications.

Accordingly, proposals were initiated in January 1966 to • For the A&N: re-designate the nomenclature and responsibilities of the

-Advance Base at Port Blair.

four authorities, so that, in war, as operational authorities

-Training Base for the Andaman garrison.

they would be directly responsible for the conduct of
maritime operations and the operational control of • For Paradip: maritime forces in their respective sea areas.

- Expanded Boys Training Establishment.

In 1967, NHQ’s plans envisaged:

• For Haldia:

• For FOCIF:

- Base Facilities.

-Additional destroyers as part of the Fleet.

The Reoganisation of 1968

• For Bombay:

After dovetailing with other concurrent proposals for

-Phase II of the Naval Dockyard Expansion Plan.

rationalisation and upgradation,
the following re

- Improvement of Port Defence Facilities.

organisation came into effect on 1 March 1968:

-Expansion of the Barracks and basing of additional

• The Flag Officer Bombay (FO B ) who had hitherto been
junior to the Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet

-Setting up NOIC Kathiawar and defences on that

(FOCIF) was re-designated as Flag Officer Commanding
coast.

QL
in Chief Western Naval Command (FO C IN C W EST) and

• For Cochin:

upgraded in rank to Vice Admiral.

• The Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet (FO C IF)

- Expansion of the Base Repair Organisation (BRO)

was subordinated to the Flag Officer Commanding

-Construction of a new wharf and additional berthina
in Chief Western Naval Command (FO CIN CW EST).

facilities.

y

Instead of ‘all front line ships’, including those

- Basing of minesweepers and patrol craft.

undergoing refit being under FOCIF, ‘only operational
ships’ as allotted by FO C IN C W EST would be under the

-Establishment of Commodore Sea Training.

Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet (FO C W EF).

The non-operational Fleet ships undergoing refit in

The IL 38 Maritime Patrol and Anti Submarine Warfare

Bombay Dockyard would be administered directly by

(MRASW) aircraft acquired from Russia.

f o c in c w e s t .

The Naval Officer in Charge, Goa (NOIC GOA) was

• In anticipation of the formation of the Eastern Fleet upgraded to the rank of Rear Admiral and re-designated under the Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet as Flag Officer Commanding Goa Area (FOGA).

(FO C EF) after the arrival of the ships and submarines
from Russia, the Commodore East Coast (COMEAST)

In the First Cadre Review of 1980, appointments were
at Vishakhapatnam was re-designated as Flag Officer upgraded, phased over a period of three years 1981 to Commanding in Chief Eastern Naval Command

1983:

(FO C IN CEA ST) in the rank of Rear Admiral.

• Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet and Admiral

• Commodore in Charge Cochin (COMCHIN) was

Superintendent Naval Dockyard Bombay were upgraded
re-designated as Commodore Commanding Southern
from Rear Admiral to Vice Admiral

Naval Area (CO M SOGTH).

• Fortress Commander Andaman and Nicobar and the

• All ships, aircraft, dockyard and logistics support facilities

Chiefs of Staff of Headquarters Western and Eastern
were placed directly under the respective administrative

Naval Commands were upgraded from Commodores
and operational control of FO CINCW EST, FO CINCEAST
to Rear Admirals.

and COM SOGTH.

In the Second Cadre Review of 1983, appointments

In 1970, CO M SO GTH was upgraded to the rank of Rear were upgraded, phased over two years 1984 and 1985: Admiral and re-designated as Flag Officer Commanding

• The Chief of Staff Headquarters Southern Naval

Southern Naval Area (FOCSOC1TH).

Command, the Chief Instructor Navy at the Defence

Services Staff College and the Chief Staff Officer

In 1971, the Eastern Fleet was constituted under

(Technical) Headquarters Western Naval Command

FOCEF.

were upgraded from Commodores to Rear Admirals

The C om m and and Control Stru ctu re in 1975
with effect from 1 April 1984.

• With effect from 1 April 1985,

CNS
approval
was
accorded
for

(Admiral)

upgrading the Naval Officer in

Charge Bombay from the rank

FOCINCWEST

FOCINCEAST

FOCSOCITH
of Commodore to the rank of

(Vice Admiral)

(Vice Admiral)

(Rear Admiral)

I

Rear Admiral in the redesignated

i
appointment of Flag Officer

FOCWF

FOCEF

Bombay.

(This was kept in

(Rear Admiral)

(Rear Admiral)

abeyance and implemented when

Flag Officer Maharashtra was
appointed on 1 Ju ly 1986.)

NOsIC

NOsIC

NOsIC

(Commodores/Captains)

(Commodores/Captains)

(Commodores/ Captains)

By 1984:

Bombay, Kathiawar

Vizag, Calcutta,

Cochin, Goa

• Ex-officio NOICs Karwar and

Madras, A&N

Lakshadweep were functioning

Changes in C o m m a n d and Control After 1975
under FOCINCSOGTH.

• The two Material Superintendents at Bombay and

*n 1977:

Vishakhapatnam, earlier under the Dockyards, were

^OCSOCITH was upgraded to the rank of Vice Admiral
placed under their Command Headquarters.

and re-designated as Flag Officer Commanding in Chief • Naval Store Depots had been created at Port Blair, Goa Southern Naval Command (FO CIN CSO G TH).

and Cochin.

In Goa, there was a substantial increase in the Air Arm

• Captains 8th and 9th Submarine Squadrons had been
assets resulting from the basing there of:

appointed under FOCsINC EAST and W EST respectively.

Super Constellation m aritim e patrol aircraft taken over

• A new Base Maintenance Facility (BM F) had been set up
r°rn the Air Force; and
in Goa for Russian IL 38 aircraft and Kamov helicopters.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 363

one authority, leaving the Director of Training in NHQ

The Naval Aircraft Repair Organisation (NARO) in Cochin
to interact with the Ministry of Defence and the other
had been upgraded to a Naval Aircraft Yard (NAY).

services.

Until 1984, the respective FOCslNC or their Chiefs of ^ To rationalise Command and Control of the Air Arm by Staff used to be on the Boards of Trustees of the major
designating FO G A also as Fiag Officer Naval Aviation
ports in India. In 1984, the NOlCs were appointed as the

(FONA) and make FO N A responsible directly to

Naval members on these Boards and charged with the

NHQ for all aviation training and maintenance activity
defence of the ships and other national assets located
and act as the class authority for all aviation matters.

in their port area and also for providing aid to civil power

Operational deployment of all aviation mits to continue
under the overall directions of their FOCslNC.

to be controlled and directed by FO C slN C W E ST and

The Reogranisation of 1986

EAST.

►

To rationalise Command and Control of the Submarine

The changes that took place in the Command and Control ' Arm by creating Flag Officer Submarines (FOSM) as structure in 1986 were the cumulative result of:

the single point class authority and responsible for all

• The rank up-gradations of the two Cadre Reviews.

training and maintenance of submarines, analogous to

• The troubled situation in Sri Lanka from 1983 onwards

FONA for naval aviation.

which required the demarcation of the geographical • In NHQ, to restore the Logistics function to the Material areas between the Eastern and the Southern Naval

Branch, redesignate the Chief of Logistics (COL) as

Commands to be rationalised.

Controller of Logistic Support (C LS), make the Chief

• The proposals of 1984 to create additional Naval ‘Area
of Material (COM) the single point of accountability for

Commanders’, analogous to FOGA, for the Saurashtra
maintenance and logistics and regroup/rename NHQ

Area (FOSA), the Maharashtra Area (FOMA), the Tamil

Directorates as necessary.

Nadu Area (FOTNA) and the Bengal Area (FOBA).

• To constitute Flag Officer Maharashtra (FOM A) to be

• The proposals of 1984 to create additional Naval
responsible to FOC1NCWEST for the:

Officers-in-Charge (NOlCs) for Porbandar, Paradip,

Haldia, Tuticorin and New Mangalore, in addition to

-Operational control of forces assigned for the local
the existing NOlCs at Kathiawar, Bombay, Goa, Karwar
naval defence of all ports in the Maharashtra area.

Cochin, Lakshadweep, Madras, Vizag, Calcutta and

-Administration of the establishments/units located at

A&N (Port Blair).

Bombay.

• The proposals of 1985 to have only two operational

-Interaction with the State Government and other
commands and change the role of Southern Naval
agencies.

Command to the Navy's Training Command. These

1985 proposals consolidated / revised / rationalised all

This would leave FO C IN C W EST free to concentrate on
the earlier proposals.

larger operational matters.

In 1985, NHQ sought approval to streamline the Navy’s

NHQ s proposals were approved. The revised Command

Command and Control structure. The main features Structure was implemented from 1 Ju ly 1986.

were:

Flag Officer Submarines was created on 1 September

• To reduce the Operational Control Authorities from three 1986 after the first submarines of the two new classes had to two and make them accountable for all operational commissioned - the Russian 877 EKM (Kilo class) and the activity in their areas:

German HDW 1500 SSK .

- FOC1NCWEST for the Western seaboard and the

Arabian Sea.

In 1988, proposals were revived for the creation of Area

Commanders at Cochin, Madras and Vishakhapatnam on

- FOCINCEAST for the Eastern seaboard and the Bay of the same lines as FOMA, particularly for Madras in view of Bengal.

increased naval activity in Operation Pawan’s support of

• To place the control of all Training Establishments the 1PKF in Sri Lanka. NHQ were advised by the Ministry hitherto under FOCslNC W EST and EAST under of Defence to include these in the proposals for the next FOCINCSOCITH and place accountability for all Triennial Cadre Review. Since an inter-service consensus was not in favour of another Cadre Review, these proposals
training policy formulation and implementation under
remained pending.

3 6 4 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

In 1990, the two Commands forwarded a proposal to
place in NHQ pertaining to acquisitions, maintenance,

NHQ to revert to the earlier Command and Control structure
plans, etc.

namely have three Operational Control Authorities - West,
o Western Naval Command wanting FO G A to be placed

East and South, disestablish the Training Command and
under it for more effective utilisation of air assets.

relocate FONA and FOSM. This proposal was the result

The changes proposed were:

of:

o Operation Pawan in Sri Lanka and Operation Cactus in
o Creation of FOC1NCSOCJTH as an operational authority
the Maldives, both of which had highlighted the need
with a maritime area of responsibility.

for Southern Naval Command to be charged with
o Reversion of the control of training to NHQ.

operational responsibilities for effective command,
o Shifting of the two Class Authorities, FO N A and FO SM ,
control and logistics.

to NHQ as ACNS (Air) and ACNS (Subm arines) for
o The
administrative
incongruities
of

Southern
better interaction with other branches in major policy

Naval Command controlling major naval training
decisions.

establishments in other coastal states with whom the
o Placing of FO G A under FO C IN C W EST.

other Command Headquarters were interacting.

o The class authorities. FONA and FOSM , being too

After consideration, it was decided to maintain status
removed from the major decision making that took
quo.

The Navy’s Command and Control Structure in 1990

|CNS (Chief of the Naval Staff)

FOCINCWEST (Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Western Naval Command

— FOCWF (Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet)

I— Western Fleet

Warship Workup Organisation

— FOMA (Flag Officer Maharashtra Area)

U NOIC (B)

|—Local Flotilla

|

I—Harbour Defences

I— ASD (B) (Admiral Superintendent Naval Dockyard)

I— Naval Dockyard Bombay

— FODAG (Flag Officer Offshore Defence Advisory Group)

— NOIC Saurashtra

— Ships/Submarines under direct control

— Naval Air facilities

— MS (B) (Material Superintendent Bombay}

I— Material Organisation & Store Depots

— Weapon Preparation & Armament Depots

— Shore Establishments/Authorities/Units

I

FOCINCEAST (Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Eastern Naval Command)

I— FOCEF (Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet)

■

I— Eastern Fleet

FOSM (Flag Officer Submarines)

h- Submarine Base

Submarine Training School

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 3 6 5

1- FORTAN (Fortress Commander A&N Islands)

- Allocated ships

- Naval air facilities

- Base Repair Organisation Port Blair

- Shore Establishments/Authorities/Units

1- ASD (V) (Admiral Superintendent Naval Dockyard)

[_ Naval Dockyard Vishakhapatnam

NOlCs Calcutta, Vishakhapatnam, Madras, Paradip, Tuticorin

Ships under direct control

Naval Air facilities

MS (V) (Material Superintendent Vishakhapatnam)

U Material Organisation & Store Depots

FOC1NCSOCJTH (Flag Officer Commanding in Chief Southern Naval Command)

1— FOGA (Flag Officer Commanding Goa Area)

— NOlCGoa

— Ships/aircraft for Local Naval Defence

— Shore Establishments/Authorities/Clnits

Training Squadron and Local Naval Defence Forces

Training Establishments and Schools

Base Repair Organisation Cochin

Naval Store Depot Cochin

Weapon Preparation & Armament Depots

Shore Establishments/Authorities/(Jnits

NOlCs Cochin, Lakshadweep, New Mangalore

Administrative support of naval air establishments/units

Developments After 1990

Naval Officers in Charge (NOslC) of the Coastal Areas

After 1990, the NOIC function in coastal areas was made the collateral duty of the local naval authority that was actually interacting with the local civilian authority:

CJnder

Collateral Duty of

FOCINCWEST

NOIC Maharashtra

CSO to FOMA at Mumbai

NOIC Goa

CSO to FOGA at Goa

Note: NOIC Gujarat is a separate entity at Porbandar

FOCINCSOGTH

NOIC Karnataka

Oi/cND School at Kochi

NOIC Kerala

CO Venduruthy at Kochi

& Lakshadweep

FOCINCEAST

NOIC Tuticorin

CO Kattaboman at Tirunelvelli

NOIC Tamil Nadu

CO Adyar at Chennai

NOIC Orissa

CO Chilka at Chilka Lake

NOIC West Bengal

CO Netaji Subhas at Kolkata

NOIC Andaman Islands

CO Jarawa at Port Blair

NOIC Nicobar Islands

CO Kardip at Kamorta

Note: NOIC Andhra Pradesh is a separate entity at Vishakhapatnam

3 6 6 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

45

The C oast Guard

The Genesis of the Coast Guard

When, therefore, the Coast Guard was created in 1978,
it was in the context of the following assessments:

While the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the

© Naval Force Levels were inadequate for non-military

Sea (UNCLOS 3) was still in the early phase of discussing
tasks like the protection of life and property at sea and
the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and well before India
law enforcement in India’s maritime zones.

had enacted the Maritime Zones Act of 1976, discussions
had commenced in India on how the EEZ was going to

© ‘Hi-tech’ naval ships and highly trained naval personnel
be safeguarded. In 1974, Naval Headquarters suggested
should not be wasted in carrying out the non-military
to the Government to have an armed force on the lines of
tasks listed in the Coast Guard Act.

the US Coast Guard and stressed the importance of inter-

© The Navy should only be utilised for its wartime and its
ministerial coordination while selecting Coast Guard vessels,
traditional oceanic naval roles.

recruiting experienced personnel, setting up communication
networks, using naval repair facilities, indigenisation etc.

The interim Coast Guard was constituted on 1 February

Such integrated Navy-Coast Guard development would

1977 with two frigates (Kuthar, Kirpan) and five patrol boats
avoid duplication and economise effort.

(Panvel, Pamban, Panaji, Pulicat and Puri) for enforcing the laws of the country in the field of customs, immigration,

On 25 August 1976, India passed the Maritime Zones
poaching, and pollution at sea, etc. It functioned under the

Act which claimed a 12 mile territorial sea, a 24 mile
aegis of the Navy until 1 August 1978.

contiguous zone, a 200 mile EEZ and a continental shelf up
to 200 miles or the outer edge of the continental margin,

The permanent Coast Guard was constituted as an
whichever was greater.

armed force of the Union on 19 August 1978, under the

Coast Guard Act 1978, which cam e into force on that day.

Soon after this Act was passed, a committee was set The Coast Guard is funded by the Revenue Department of up to consider the type of force that should be created
the Finance Ministry.

to enforce compliance with its provisions. Three options
emerged:

T h e C o a st G u ard A c t 1978

• To entrust this responsibility to the marine wing of the The Act specified the following duties and functions of the Ministry of Finance, which already had a number of Coast Guard: Central Board of Revenue (CBR) anti-smuggling vessels.

This option was not pursued, as the functions were too

• It shall be the duty of the Coast Guard to protect by such
onerous.

measures, as it thinks fit, the maritime and other national

• To set up a separate Coastal Command, as a part of the
interests of India in the maritime zones of India.

Navy, to oversee these functions. This option was seriously

• Without prejudice to the generality of the provisions
considered since it would avoid the expenditure of raising
of sub-section above, the measures referred to therein
and maintaining a separate armed force. The Ministry of
may provide for:

External Affairs, however, felt that patrolling of the EEZ

- Ensuring the safety and protection of artificial islands,
and protection of national assets was a peacetime role for
offshore terminals, installations and other structures
which defence assets should not be used.

and devices in any maritime zone;

• To set up a separate armed force of the Union, along

-Taking such measures as are necessary to preserve
the lines of the U S Coast Guard. This option was finally
chosen, as it avoided the Navy being distracted from its
and protect the maritime environment and to prevent
and control marine pollution;
primary role of preparing for hostilities.

Mumbai, for Karnataka at New Mangalore, for Kerala at

- Providing protection to fishermen, including assistance

Kochi, for Tamil Nadu at Chennai, for Andhra Pradesh
to them at sea while in distress;
at Vishakhapatnam, for Orissa at Paradeep, for Bengal

-Assisting the customs and other authorities in anti-
at Haldia, and two in the A&N region - at Campbell Bay
smuggling operations;
in the Nicobar Islands and at Diglipur in the Andaman

-Enforcing the provisions of such enhancements as are

Islands.

for the time being in force in the maritime zones; and

• Four ‘Coast Guard Stations’ at Vadinar (Gujarat), Okha

-Such other matters, including measures for the safety

(Gujarat), Tuticorin and Mandapam (Tamil Nadu).

of life and property at sea and collection of scientific

• Coast Guard Air Station (West) at Daman, Coast Guard
data, as may be prescribed.

Air Station (East) at Chennai, Coast Guard Air Enclaves

• The Coast Guard shall perform its functions under
at Mumbai, Goa, Kolkata and Port Blair.

this section in accordance with, and subject to such • Coast Guard Berthing Jetty, Base Maintenance Gnit rules as may be prescribed and such rules may, in
and Stores Complex at Chennai, Berthing Jetty at
particular, make provisions for ensuring that the Coast

Vishakhapatnam.

Guard functions in close liaison with Union agencies,
institutions and authorities so as to avoid duplication of

Force Levels
effort.

At its inception, the Coast Guard acquired the frigates INS

The Maritime Zones of India (Regulation of Fishing by

KCITHAR and KIRPAN and five patrol boats from the Navy.

Foreign Vessels) Act 1981

From 1983 onwards, the Coast Guard commissioned

This act came into force on 2 November 1981. It laid Seaward Defence Boats (SDBs), Offshore Patrol Vessels down the procedure to regulate fishing by foreign vessels (OPVs) with Chetak helicopters embarked, Fast Patrol in the India’s EEZ. It provided for deterrent punishments Vessels (FPVs), Inshore Patrol Vessel (IPVs) and Interceptor for illegal fishing in the EEZ like levying fines, confiscation Boats (IBs). It also operates and mans the Indian Oil of craft, etc.

Corporation’s fast interceptor boats at Vadinar.

Concurrently, notifications were issued extending the

A helicopter squadron was commissioned in 1982 and
provisions of the Criminal Procedure Code and the Indian a maritime surveillance squadron was commissioned in Penal Code over the EEZ.

1983.

The Coast Guard thus became the principal agency

Manning and Training
for enforcing all national legislation in the Maritime In the initial stages, the majority of officers and sailors Zones of India, policing, surveillance and patrolling were deputed from the Navy. Later, naval personnel were 7,683 kilometres of coastline and over two million either re-employed or absorbed in the Coast Guard. In due square kilometres of the sea within national jurisdiction, course, Coast Guard officers (Assistant Commandants), patrolling offshore installations off Mumbai and the

Tamil Nadu coast to ensure their security, working in non-technical sailors (Naviks) and technical sailors close liaison with other Government authorities to avoid (Yantriks), trained by the Navy, started manning the Coast Guard.

duplication of work.

During hostilities, India’s Coast Guard would function

Achievem ents
under the overall operational command of the Navy, as is The evolution of the Coast Guard has been remarkably done by other Coast Guards of the world.

cost effective. Most of its ships and aircraft are indigenous.

Organisational Structure

With the Navy’s help, its manning and training have been
extremely economical. Its anti-poaching operations, its

The broad structure that has evolved over the years is:

anti-smuggling assistance to the Customs, its pollution-

• Coast Guard Headquarters at Delhi.

control operations, its protection to endangered marine
species like the Olive Ridley turtles on the Orissa coast,

• Three ‘Regional Headquarters’ at Mumbai, Chennai and its Search and Rescue Operations, its sustained round-Port Blair as Headquarters respectively of the Western, the-clock surveillance in the shallow waters of the Palk Eastern and Andaman & Nicobar (A&N) Regions.

Bay between Tamil Nadu and Sri Lanka, all have been

• Coast Guard ‘District Headquarters’ for the nine Maritime invaluable. From the time of its inception in 1978, till end States: for Gujarat at Porbander, for Maharashtra at

2000, the Coast Guard has, in round figures:

3 6 8 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

• Seized contraband worth over 300 crores of rupees.

Maldivian Coast Guards to help enhance confidence levels

• Apprehended over 100 smuggling vessels, over 700
and understanding.

foreign poaching trawlers and over 7,000 of their crew.

In addition to its statutory functions, the Coast Guard

© Responded to over 40 oil spill incidents.

assisted cyclone, flood and earthquake relief operations.

© Prevented over 20,000 illegal immigrants / infiltrators.

In 2001, the Coast Guard reached out as far as Ja p a n to
o Flown over 900 Search & Rescue (SAR) sorties and, in participate in an Indo-Japan Coast Guard Exercise.

over 600 missions, saved over 1,000 lives at sea.

Coast Guard vessels continued to participate in the joint

Developments After 1990

Navy-Coast Guard patrols in Palk Bay (Operation Tasha),
off the Maharashtra and Gujarat coasts (in Operation Sw an)

Since 1990, regular Indo-Maldivian training exercises, of and around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands.

the ‘Dostf series, have been held between the Indian and

TRA NSITION T O EM INENCE / 3 6 9

46

Commissionings And D ecom m issionings

Com m issionings

Ships Commissioned 1976 to 1990

Name

Date

Ship Type

SHARABH

27 Jan 1976

Landing Ship Tank(Medium)

PRALAYA

17 Feb 1976

Missile Boat

PRATAP

17 Feb 1976

Missile Boat

PRABAL

17 Feb 1976

Missile Boat

PRACHAND

17 Feb 1976

Missile Boat

GDAYGIRI

18 Feb 1976

Leander Class Frigate

SHAKTI

21 Feb 1976

Fleet Tanker

CHAMAK

4 Nov 1976

Missile Boat

CHAPAL

4 Nov 1976

Missile Boat

VIJAYDGRG

25 Dec 1976

Ocean-going Rocket Boat

CHATAK

9 Feb 1977

Missile Boat

DGNAGIRI

5 May 1977

Leander Class Frigate

S1NDHGDGRG

29 May 1977

Ocean-going Rocket Boat

SDB T 52

3 Sep 1977

Seaward Defence Boat MK 2

CHARAG

17 Oct 1977

Missile Boat

PORBANDER

19 Dec 1977

Coastal Minesweeper

HOSDGRG

15 Jan 1978

Ocean-going Rocket Boat

PONDICHERRY

2 Feb 1978

Coastal Minesweeper

SDB T 53

12 Apr 1978

Seaward Defence Boat MK 2

SDB T 51

17 Nov 1978

Seaward Defence Boat MK 2

LCGL31

4 Dec 1978

Landing Craft Gtility MK 1

BHAVNAGAR

27 Apr 1979

Coastal Minesweeper

BEDI

27 Apr 1979

Coastal Minesweeper

LCG L 34

28 Jan 1980

Landing Craft Gtility MK 1

RAJPGT

4 May 1980

Guided Missile Destroyer

TARAGIRI

16 May 1980

Leander Class Frigate

ALLEPPEY
lOJun 1980

Coastal Minesweeper

RATNAGIRI

10 Jun 1980

Coastal Minesweeper

LCG L 33

1 Dec 1980

Landing Craft Gtility MK 1

SANDHAYAK

26 Feb 1981

Survey Ship

VINDHYAGIRI

8 Jul 1981

Leander Class Frigate

LCG L 32

6 Nov 1981

Landing Craft Gtility MK 1

Guided Missile Destroyer

RANA

19 Feb 1982

Seaward Defence Boat MK 2

SDB T 54

1 Sep 1982

Torpedo Recovery Vessel

TRV A 71

15 Sep 1982

Torpedo Recovery Vessel

TRVA72

23 Feb 1983

Ocean Going Tug
m atanga

2 Apr 1983

Inshore Minesweeper
malvan

16 May 1983

Inshore Minesweeper
m a n g r o l

16 May 1983

Inshore Minesweeper

MAHE

16 May 1983

Seaward Defence Boat MK 2

SDB T 55

20 Aug 1983

Guided Missile Destroyer

RAN JIT

15 Sep 1983

NIRDESHAK

4 Oct 1983

Survey Ship

GODAVARI Class Frigate(Project 16)FFG

GODAVARI

10 Dec 1983

LCU L 35

17 Dec 1983

Landing Craft Utility MK 1

MAKAR

31 Jan 1984

Survey Craft

M1THUN

31 Mar 1984

Survey Craft

MULKI

10 May 1984

Inshore Minesweeper

MAGDALA

10 May 1984

Inshore Minesweeper

MALPE

10 May 1984

Inshore Minesweeper

MEEN

23 Jun 1984

Survey Craft

MESH

31 Oct 1984

Survey Craft

SDB T 56

31 Oct 1984

Seaward Defence Boat MK 3

ASTRAVAHINI

5 Nov 1984

Torpedo Launch and Recovery Vessel

CHEETAH

30 Nov 1984

Landing Ship Tank (Medium)

SDB T 57

26 Feb 1985

Seaward Defence Boat MK 3

SDB T 58

26 Mar 1985

Seaward Defence Boat MK 3

MAHISH

4 JUN 1985

Landing Ship Tank (Medium)

SDB T 59

10 Ju l 1985

Seaward Defence Boat MK 3

N1RUPAK

14 Aug 1985

Survey Ship

SDB T 60

24 Aug 1985

Seaward Defence Boat MK 3

GULDAR

30 Dec 1985

Landing Ship Tank (Medium)

GANGA

30 Dec 1985

GODAVARI Class Frigate (Project 16)

SDB T 61

15 Jan 1986

Seaward Defence Boat MK 3

T1R

21 Feb 1986

Cadet Training Frigate

RANVIR

21 Apr 1986

Guided Missile Destroyer

KARWAR

14 JulL 1986

Coastal Minesweeper

LCU L 36

18 Ju l 1986

Landing Craft Utility MK 2

KUMBHIR

31 Aug 1986

Landing Ship Tank (Medium)

LCU L 37

18 Oct 1986

Landing Craft Utility MK 2

LCU L 38

10 Dec 1986

Landing Craft Utility MK 2
k a k in a d a

23 Dec 1986

Coastal Minesweeper

LCU L 39

25 Mar 1987

Landing Craft Utility MK 2

VEER I

26 Mar 1987

Fast Missile Attack Craft

VIRAAT

12 May 1987

Aircraft Carrier
m ag ar

18 Jul 1987

Landing Ship Tank (Large)

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 3 7 1

Coastal Minesweeper

OIDDALORE

29 Oct 1987

Coastal Minesweeper

CANNANORE

17 Dec 1987

Guided Missile Destroyer

RANV1JAY

21 Dec 1987

Fast Missile Attack Craft

NIRBH1KII

21 Dec 1987

GODAVARI Class Frigate (Project 16)

GOMATI

16 Apr 1988

Coastal Minesweeper

KONKAN

8 Oct 1988

NIPAT 1

5 Dec 1988

Fast Missile Attack Craft

KOZHIKODE

19 Dec 1988

Coastal Minesweeper

ABHAY

10 Mar 1989

Anti Submarine Patrol Vessel

N1REEKSHAK

8 Jun 1989

Diving Support Vessel

KHGKR1

23 Aug 1989

Missile Armed Corvette (Project 25)

SGKANYA

31 Aug 1989

Offshore Patrol Vessel (ex Korea)

NISHANK

12 Sep 1989

Fast Missile Attack Craft

NIRGHATII

15 Dec 1989

Fast Missile Attack Craft

INVESTIGATOR

11 Jan 1990

Survey Ship

AJAY

24 Jan 1990

Anti Submarine Patrol Vessel

SGBHADRA

25 Jan 1990

Offshore Patrol Vessel (ex Korea)

SUVARNA

2 Jun 1990

Offshore Patrol Vessel (ex Korea)

SAV1TRI

20 Nov 1990

Offshore Patrol Vessel (ex HSL)

KCJTHAR

7 Jun 1990

Missile Armed Corvette (Project 25)

AKSHAY

10 Dec 1990

Anti Submarine Patrol Vessel

Ships Commissioned After 1990

KIRPAN

12 Jan 1991

Missile Armed Corvette (Project 25)

AGRAY

31 Jan 1991

Anti Submarine Patrol Vessel

VIBHOTI

3 Jun 1991

Fast Missile Attack Craft

JAMCJNA

31 Aug 1991

Survey Ship

SARYCJ

8 Oct 1991

Offshore Patrol Vessel (ex HSL)

KHANJAR

22 Oct 1991

Missile Armed Corvette (Project 25)

VIPCJL

16 Mar 1992

Fast Missile Attack Craft

SHARDA

20 Dec 1992

Offshore Patrol Vessel (ex HSL)

SUTLEJ

19 Feb 1993

Survey Ship

SCJJATA

3 Nov 1993

Offshore Patrol Vessel

VINASH I

20 Nov 1993

Fast Missile Attack Craft

SAGARDHWANI

30 Jul 1994

Marine Acoustic Research Ship

NASHAK II

15 Dec 1994

Fast Missile Attack Craft

VIDYCJT II

16 Jan 1995

Fast Missile Attack Craft

KRISHNA

22 Aug 1995

Cadet Training Ship (2nd Hand Leander)

NIREEKSHAK

15 Sep 1995

Diving Support Vessel

JYOTI

20 Jun 1996

Fleet Tanker

GHARIAL

14 Feb 1997

Landing Ship Tank (Large)

PRAHAR

1 Mar 1997

Fast Missile Attack Craft

TARANGINI

11 Nov 1997

Sail Training Ship

DELHI

15 Nov 1997

Guided Missile Destroyer (Project 15)

3 7 2 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

T 80

24 Jun 1998

Extra Fast Attack Craft

KORA

10 Aug 1998

Missile Armed Corvette (Project25A)

MYSORE

2 Jun 1999

Guided Missile Destroyer (Project 15)

T 81

5 Jun 1999

Extra Fast Attack Craft

ADITYA

3 Apr 2000

Fleet Tanker

BRAHMAPUTRA

14 Apr 2000

BRAHMAPUTRA Class Frigate (Projectl6A)

TR1NKAT

28 Sep 2000

Fast Attack Craft

MUMBAI

22 Jan 2001

Guided Missile Destroyer (Project 15)

KIRCH

22 Jan 2001

Missile Armed Corvette (Project 25A)

t illa n c h a n g

17 Mar 2001

Fast Attack Craft

DARSHAK

28 Apr 2001

Survey Ship

KULISH

20 Aug 2001

Missile Armed Corvette (Project 25A)

TARASA

24 Aug 2001

Fast Attack Craft

SARVEKSHAK

14 Jan 2002

Survey Ship

TARMUGLI

9 Mar 2002

Fast Attack Craft

PRABAL I

11 Apr 2002

Fast Missile Attack Craft

GAJ

10 Oct 2002

Ocean Going Tug

PRALAYA

18 Dec 2002

Fast Missile Attack Craft

TALWAR

18 Jun 2003

Guided Missile Frigate (Project 1135.6)

TRISHUL

25 Jun 2003

Guided Missile Frigate (Project 1135.6)

T 82

9 Oct 2003

Extra Fast Attack Craft

T 83

14 Jan 2004

Extra Fast Attack Craft

KARMUK

4 Feb 2004

Missile Armed Corvette (Project 25A)

TABAR

19 Apr 2004

Guided Missile Frigate (Project 1135.6)

T 84

19 Apr 2004

Extra Fast Attack Craft

BETWA (Project 16A)

7 Ju l 2004

BRAHMAPUTRA Class Frigate (ex GRSE)

Ships Awaiting Commissioning at the Time of Writing

BEAS (Projectl6A)

Submarines Commissioned 1976 to 1990

Name

Date

Type

SINDHUGHOSH

30 Apr 1986

EKM (ex Russia)

SHISHUMAR

22 Sep 1986

SSK (ex Germany)

SHANKUSH

20 Nov 1986

SSK (ex Germany)

SINDHUDHVAJ

12 Jun 1987

EKM (ex Russia)

SINDHURAJ

20 Oct 1987

EKM (ex Russia)

CHAKRA

5 Jan 1988

Nuclear (lease completed)

SIMDHUVIR

11 Jun 1988

EKM (ex Russia)

SINDHURATNA

18 Nov 1988

EKM (ex Russia)

S1NDHUKESARI

19 Dec 1988

EKM (ex Russia)

SINDHUKIRTI

8 Dec 1989

EKM (ex Russia)

s in d h u v ija y

17 Dec 1990

EKM (ex Russia)

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 3 7 3

S u b m a r in e s C o m m is s io n e d A fter 1990

SSK (ex MDL)

SHALKI

V Feb 1992

SHANKCJL

28 May 1994

SSK (ex MDL)

SINDHURAKSHAK

24 Dec 1997

EKM (ex Russia)

S1NDHGSHASTRA

19 Jul 2000

EKM (ex Russia)

Naval Air Squadrons Commissioned 1976 to 1990

Squadron

Date

Aircraft Type

Role

INAS312

18 Nov 1976

Super Constellation (ex 1AF)

Long Range Maritime
succeeded by

Patrol (LRMP)

16 Apr 1988

TG 142 (ex Russia)

INAS315

7 Oct 1977

IL 38 (ex Russia)

Maritime Reconnaiss ance and Anti

Submarine Warfare (MRASW)

1NAS 333

11 Dec 1980

Kamov (ex Russia)

Antisubmarine Helicopters

1NAS318

8 May 1984

Islander (ex Britain)

Coastal Reconnaissance
and Observer Training

Aircraft Inducted After 1990

Type

Source

Sea Harriers (in 300 Squadron)

Britain

Dorniers (in 310 Squadron)

Germany and Hindustan Aircraft

Advance Light Helicopters

Hindustan Aircraft

(ALH) in the process of induction
in Utility/Commando/ASW versions

Shore Establishments Commissioned 1976 to 1990

Establishment

Date

Location

Role

INS MANDOVI

5 Jan 1976

Verem, Goa

1976 Sailors Training 1986 Cadets Training

INS DRONACHARYA 27 Nov 1978

Fort Cochin

Gunnery School

INS CHILKA

21 Feb 1980

Chilka Lake

Sailors Training

INHS KASTCJRI

2 Jun 1980

INS SHIVAJI (Lonavia)

Naval Hospital

INHS NIVARINI

3 Oct 1980

INS CHILKA

Naval Hospital

INS ABHIMANYC1

1 May 1980

Karanja, Mumbai

Chariot & Marine Commando Training

INS UTKROSH

11 May 1985

Port Blair

Naval Air Station

INS KALINGA

21 Nov 1985

Visakhapatnam

Missile Preparation Facility

INS KATTABOMAN

20 Oct 1990

Tirunelvelli

Submarine Communication Facility

Shore Establishments Commissioned After 1990

INS DEGA

21 Oct 1991

Visakhapatnam

Naval Air Station

INS RAJALI

11 May 1992

Arakkonam

Naval Air Station

INS VAJRABAHCJ

1 Feb 1996

Mumbai

Submarine Headquarters

Naval Air Station

1999

Mumbai(Kunjali)

Helicopter Base

INS EKSILA

28 Aug 2000

Visakhapatnam

Gas Turbine Overhaul

Commissioning of Floating Dock

Floating Dry Dock FDN-I was towed from Mumbai to Port Blair, moored and then commissioned on 11 July 87.

374/TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

D e c o m m is s io n i n g s

Ships D ecom m issioned 1976 to 1990

No. of Years Service in

Sl.No.

Ship

Date

Ship Type

Indian Navy

27

MAGAR

31 Mar 1976

Landing Ship Tank(Large)

21

B A S S E IN

31 Jul 1976

Inshore Minesweeper

23

GODAVARI

31 Aug 1976

Escort Destroyer(Hunt class)

34

CAG VERY

30 Sep 1977

Cadet Training Frigate

29

TiR

30 Sep 1977

Cadet Training Frigate

DELHI

30Junl978

Cruiser

30

KCJTHAR.}

18 Aug 1978

Anti Submarine Frigates

KIR PAM ,}

(Transferred to Coast Guard)

PAM BAN, PA N V EL,} 18 Aug 1978

Patrol Boats

PAM AJI, PCJRI,}

(Transferred to Coast Guard)

PCJLICAT,}

9.

SGTLEJ

31 Dec 1978

Survey Ship

37

10.

KAKINADA,}

30 Jun 1979

Coastal Minesweepers

23

CGDDALORE,}

11.

ABHAY

30 Jun 1980

Seaward Defence Boat

19

12

39

.

JGMNA

31 Dec 1980

Survey Ship

13.

KARWAR,}

31 Mar 1981

Coastal Minesweepers

25

CANNANORE,}

14.

KISTNA

31 Dec 1981

Cadet Training Frigate

38

15.

VEER

31 Dec 1982

Missile Boat

11

16.

GGLDAR

15 Oct 1984

Landing Ship Tank (Medium)

18

17.

BHATKAL,}

30 Apr 1985

Inshore Minesweepers

16

BGLSAR,}

18.

MYSORE

30 Aug 1985

Cruiser

28

19.

TALWAR

30 Oct 1985

Anti Submarine Frigate

25

20.

ATGL

31 Mar 1986

Seaward Defence Boat

16

21.

BRAHMAPGTRA

30 Jun 1986

Anti Aircraft Frigate

28

22.

KAVARATTI

31 Ju l 1986

Anti Submarine Vessel

16

23.

NIRBHIK

31 Dec 1986

Missile Boat

15

24.

KILTAN

30 Jun 1987

Anti Submarine Vessel

18

25.

GHARIAL

30 Sep 1987

Landing Ship Tank (Medium)

21

26.

NIPAT

29 Feb 1988

Missile Boat

17

27.

KATCHALL

31 Dec 1988

Anti Submarine Vessel

19

28.

n ir g h a t

31 Ju l 1989

Missile Boat

18

29.

NISTAR

3 Nov 1989

Submarine Rescue Vessel

18

30.

VINASH

15

Jan 1990 Missile Boat

19

31.

DARSHAK

15

Jan 1990 Survey Ship

25

32.

ANDAMAN

21 Aug 1990

Anti Submarine Vessel

17

(Sank off Visakhapatnam)

TRANSITION T O EM INENCE / 3 7 5

33.

NASHAK

31 Dec 1990

Missile Boat

19

Ships Decommissioned After 1990

VIDYGT

31 Mar 1991

Missile Boat

20

KAMORTA

31 Oct 1991

Anti Submarine Vessel

23

T 51

30 Nov 1991

Seaward Defence Boat Mk 1

13

BETWA

31 Dec 1991

Anti Aircraft Frigate

31

VIJ ETA

30 Jun 1992

Missile Boat

21

TRISHGL

31 Aug 1992

Anti Submarine Frigate

32

KADMATT

30 Nov 1992

Anti Submarine Vessel

24

BEAS

22 Dec 1992

Anti Aircraft Frigate

32

T 61

31 Mar 1993

Seaward Defence Boat Mk III

15

T 53

31 Aug 1993

Seaward Defence Boat Mk I

15

T 52

31 May 1994

Seaward Defence Boat Mk I

17

DEEPAK

30 Apr 1996

Fleet Tanker

29

PRATAP

17 May 1996

Missile Boat

20

CHARAG

17 May 1996

Missile Boat

21

MILGIRI

31 May 1996

Leander Class Frigate

24

GAJ

14 Aug 1996

Ocean Going Tug

23

VIKRANT

31 Jan 1997

Aircraft Carrier

36

SHARDGL

30 Jun 1997

Landing Ship Tank

22

L31

1 Feb 1999

Landing Craft Gtility

20

MESH

1 Feb 1999

Survey Craft

14

ARNALA

9 Apr 1999

Anti Submarine Vessel

27

ANDROTH

9 Apr 1999

Anti Submarine Vessel

27

KESARI

10 May 1999

Landing Ship Tank

24

HOSDGRG

5 Jun 1999

Ocean-going Rocket Boat

21

PRABAL

29 Dec 1999

Missile Boat

23

PRACHAND

29 Dec 1999

Missile Boat

23

PRALAYA

8 Jun 2001

Missile Boat

25

MAGDALA

31 Oct 2001

Inshore Minesweeper

17

AMINI

16 Sep 2002

Anti Submarine Vessel

30

VIJAYDGRG

30 Sep 2002

Ocean-going Rocket Boat

26

MALVAN

3 Jan 2003

Inshore Minesweeper

19

CHATAK

5 May 2003

Missile Boat

26

MGLKI

16 May 2003

Inshore Minesweeper

19

ANJADIP

13 Dec 2003

Anti Submarine Vessel

31

MANGROL

7 Apr 2004

Inshore Minesweeper

20

SINDHG DGRG

24 Sep 2004

Ocean-going Rocket Boat

28

Submarines Decommissioned 1976 to 1990

KHANDERI

18 Oct 1989

Foxtrot Class

21

Submarines Decommissioned After 1990

KALVARI

31 May 1996

Foxtrot Class

28

VAGHSHEER

30 Apr 1997

Foxtrot Class

22

VAGIR

7 Jun 2001

Foxtrot Class

27

KGRSGRA

27 Sep 2001

Foxtrot Class

30

KARANJ

1 Aug 2003

Foxtrot Class

34

376 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

47

Commissioning C o m m a n d in g O ffic e rs O f

M ajor Inductions

Major W arships

S u b m a r in e s

Aircraft Carrier Viraat Captain (later Vice Admiral) V Pasricha Kalvari / Vela (Russian Foxtrot) Class

Rajput Class Guided Missile Destroyers

Kalvari

Cdr (later Commodore) KV Subra Manian

Khanderi

Cdr (later Rear Admiral) MN Vasudeva

Rajput

Captain (later Vice Admiral) GM Hiranandani

Karanj

Cdr (later Captain) MN Samant

Rana

Captain

(later Vice Admiral) B Guha

Kursura

Cdr (later Rear Admiral) A Auditto

Ranjit

Captain (later Admiral) Vishnu Bhagwat

Vela

Cdr (later Rear Admiral) JM S Sodhi

Ranvir

Captain (later Admiral) Madhvendra Singh

Vagir

Cdr (later Rear Admiral) KR Menon

Ranvijay

Captain (later Vice Admiral) JC De-Silva

Vagli

Cdr Lalit Talwar

Godavari Class Guided Missile Frigates

Vaghsheer

Cdr (later Commodore) PS Bawa

Godavari

Captain (later Rear Admiral) K Pestonji

Shishum ar (German HDW 1500) Class

Ganga

Captain

(later Vice Admiral) KK Kohli

Shishumar

Cdr (later Captain) PM Bhate

Gomati

Captain (demised in harness) KMS Rajan

Shankush

Cdr (later Captain) OP Sharma

Leander Class Frigates

Shalki

Cdr (presently Rear Admiral) KN Sushil

Nilgiri

Captain (later Rear Admiral) DS Paintal

Shankul

Cdr (presently Commodore) PK Chatterjee

Himgiri

Captain (later Rear Admiral) NN Anand

Sindhughosh (Russian 877 EKM / K ilo ) Class

(Jdaygiri

Captain (later Commodore) KN Dubash

Dunagiri

Captain (later Vice Admiral) S Jain

Sindhughosh

Cdr KC Verghese

Taragiri

Captain (later Vice Admiral) SM Gadihoke

Sindhudhvaj

Cdr (later Commodore) SP Singh

Vindhyagiri

Captain (later Vice Admiral) H Johnson

Sindhuraj

Cdr (later Commodore) V Kumar

Sindhuvir

Cdr (later Captain) KR Ajrekar

Other Ships

Sindhuratna

Cdr (later Captain) E Sebastian

Shakti (Fleet Tanker)

Captain (later Commodore) K Rishi

Sindhukesari

Cdr (later Commodore) SP Singh

Magar (Landing Ship)

Commander DB Roy

Sindhukirti

Lt Cdr (later Commander) K Ramdas

Tir (Cadet Training Ship) Cdr (later Commodore) S Nath

Sindhuvijay

Lt Cdr (later Captain) S Govind

Chakra Class

Captain (later Vice Admiral) RN Ganesh

(Russian Charlie)

A ir S q u a d r o n s

Squadron

Aircraft

Com m issioning C o m m an d in g Officer

300

Sea Harriers

Cdr (presently Admiral) Arun Prakash

312

Connies

Cdr (later Captain) RD Dhir

312

TCI 142 Ms

Cdr (later Captain) VC Pandey

315

IL 38s

Cdr (later Commodore) BK Malik

318

Islanders

Lt Cdr (later Commander) J S Dhillon

333

KA 25/28s

Cdr (later Commodore) P Jh a

339

Skg Mk 42 Bs

Cdr (later Commodore) SV Purohit

48

Naval Ceremonial

Reviews of the Fleet by the President

Presentation o f C o lo u rs by the President

Traditionally, the President of India reviews the Indian Fleet It is an ancient tradition for armed forces (and elements once during his tenure in office. To date, all reviews have thereof) that accomplish meritorious and outstanding been held in Bombay Harbour.1
service to be presented with “Colours” to engender pride
and esprit de-corps. These Colours are proudly paraded

The Presidential Review is an impressive ceremony,
by the recipients on special occasions to add dignity and
second only to the Republic Day Parade. Naval ships and stature to parades and guards of honour.

ships from maritime organisations like the Coast Guard, the

Merchant Navy, the National Institute of Oceanography, the

In countries that have the monarchical system of

Oil and Natural Gas Commission, Training Ship Rajendra government, the Colours are presented by the monarch.

and Naval Yard Craft are anchored precisely in neat lines In countries that have the presidential form of government, and dressed overall.

the colours are presented by the President.

The President embarks in a naval ship nominated as

In 1951, Colours were presented to the Navy by President
the Presidential Yacht, which flies the President’s Colours.

Rajendra Prasad.

After receiving a 21-gun salute, the President reviews the

Fleet by cruising past each line of ships. Each ship’s side

Between 1976 and 1990, “Colours,” identical to those
is manned by her ships company in white ceremonial earlier presented to the Navy, were presented to the Naval uniform. As the President passes by, each ship’s company, Commands:

in unison, take off their caps in salutation and give three
resounding ‘Jais’.

Formation

Date of Presentation

B y

At sunset, all ships at the anchorage participate in a fire

Southern Naval

26 November 1984

President Giani Zail
works display. As darkness descends, all ships, in unison,

Command

Singh
switch on their garlands of lights, which accentuate their

Eastern Naval

25 March 1987

President Giani Zail
silhouettes.

Command

Singh

No Fleet Review was held for President N Sanjiva Reddy

Western Naval

22 February 1990

President R

| Command
during his tenure from 25 July 1977 to 24 July 1982.

Venkataraman

Date

Naval

Submarines

Aircraft/

Coast Guard

Yard

Mercantile Marine

Reviewed B y

Ships

Helos

Craft

& Other Ships

11 Jan 76

43

5

5 Navy

-

-

6

President Fakhrudin

Ali Ahmed

12 Feb 84

45

3

32 Navy, 5 CG

2

7

9

President Giani Zail

Singh

15 Feb 89

48

8

29 Navy, 8 CG

2

4

10

President R

Venkataraman

]. The escort vessel H M IS Indus represented the Royal Indian Navy in the Coronation Review in England in 1937. This was the first ever participation o f an Indian naval ship at the Royal Reviews held at Spithead off Portsmouth.

• The 1971 Ethiopian Navy Day Celebrations at Massawa

N av al B a n d s

(embarked in Talivar).

In ancient times, marching was sustained by the beat of
e The 1972 Southeast Asia Sailing Regatta at Colombo
drums. In later times, martial music enhanced the effect

(embarked in Arriba).

of drums.

• The 1973 Ethiopian Navy Day Celebrations at Massawa

Today each major training establishment has a band. In

(embarked in Mysore).

addition, bands are positioned in New Delhi and Port Blair

® The 1977 International Fleet Review in Britain on the
to meet ceremonial commitments. Listed alphabetically,
occasion of the Silver Jubilee of the Queen of England s
bands are located in:

Coronation (embarked in Cldaygiri).

• INS Chilka for the new entry sailor training establishment

® The 1986 Bicentennial Celebrations of the Statue of
in Orissa.

Liberty and the President’s Fleet Review in the U SA

• INS Circars for ceremonial and training requirements at

(embarked in Godavari).

Visakhapatnam.

® The 1987 International Fleet Review and EX PO at Tokyo

• INS Dronacharya for the Gunnery Training School at

(embarked in Ganga).

Fort Cochin.

• The 1987 International Ocean Festival in Mauritius

• INS Hamla for the Logistic, ED P and Cookery schools

(embarked in Vindhyagiri).

at Marve (Bombay).

® The 1988 International Naval Review and Bicentennial

• INS India for ceremonial requirements at Delhi.

celebrations in Australia (embarked in Godavari).

® INS Jarawa for ceremonial requirements at Port Blair.

• The 1990 International Fleet Review in Malaysia

• INS Kunjali for ceremonial and training requirements at

(embarked in Ganga).

Bombay.

The Indian Navy’s Central Band was com m issioned in

• INS Mandovi for the Naval Academy in Goa.

Bombay in 1945 with a complement of 50 musicians, most

• INS Shiuaji for the Engineering Training School at of who had earlier belonged to the bands of India’s princely Lonavla.

states. INS Kunjali in Bom bay is home to this band and to

• INS Valsura for the Electrical Training School at the Navy’s School of Music.

Jamnagar.

Over the years, in addition to its traditional parade and

• INS Venduruthy for ceremonial and training requirements ceremonial commitments, this band widened its scope at Cochin.

by:

• INS Viraat, the aircraft carrier, for ceremonial

• Performing with civilian choirs and orchestras.

requirements.

• Developing into a symphonic concert band, introducing

Bands invariably embark on board ships going on
traditional Indian musical instruments and including
goodwill visits abroad, like the annual Seychelles and
string instruments like violins, violas, cellos and string

Mauritius Independence Day celebrations and international
basses.

and prestigious events like:

Today, the Naval Central Band has grown to a 125-piece

• The 1967 EXPO at Montreal, Canada (embarked in

Symphonic Orchestra. From martial music, successive

Brahmaputra).

conductors of the band have increased the Ban d ’s

• The 1970 EXPO at Tokyo, Japan (embarked in Trishul).

repertoire to include overtures, solos, duets, concertos

• The 1970 Captain Cook Centenary Celebrations in
and other forms of contemporary m usic including Indian

Australia (embarked in
classical and Indian and Western pop music.

Tir).

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 3 7 9

V ID V U T

V IN A 3 H

L C D R M J 31N OH

C O R A J L O B O

COR HC TANCJA r«td)

3 H A N K H

K A K IN A D A

N IR 0 H A T

N A 3 M A K

L C D R C V D A V ID [ R t ld l

L C D R J 3 K A R P E

L C O R Y B H ID E

L C O R T L R A T T A N

3 U T L t J

C A U V E R Y

C O R B A R A O

KE3ARI

Q H O R PA O

COR 3 DOSe

LCOR 8 U P T E 3 H W A R RAI

CD R 3 I3 3 A C 3

O U L D A R

Q O D AN/ARI

L C D R O E IP E

C D R N P 3 IN 0 H

V AOLI

VAOIR

V A O H S H E E R

C D R L T A L W A R

L C O R B S U P P A L

C D n J M 3 SO D H 1 V 3 M

K U TH A R

K A R A N J

K U R S U R A

C A P T O T W A O M W A N I.N M

L C D R S C A N A N O

L C O R R N O A N E 3 H

K A D M A T T

K A M O R T A

K IL T A N

C A P T C V P A R T H A S A R A T H Y

C D R P K O U P T A

C O R P 3 W A N I

A N D R O T H

A R N A L A

C O R R K K H A N N A

C A P T 3 3 K U M A R . V r .C

HIUOlRl

3 T R IS H U L

U O A Y O IR I
s e r w A

C D R K H Z A D U .V f.C

C D R K N O U B A 3 H

T T R P .S A W H N E Y

C O R M 3 R A W A T
b r a m m a p u t r a

C A P T R R S O O D .V r .C .N M

T A LW A H

C O R A K S M A R M A , NM

V I K R A N T

D EL H I

M Y S O R E

C A P T U K R O Y . A V S M

C A P T J O N A O K A R N I.V S M

C A P T S L S E T H I N M .A V S M

ABBA

C A P T K 9 3 U B R A - M A N I A N - V3M

I N D I A N V A L i u R

JA W A H A R L A L N E H R U

J A L A R A T N A

C A P T K O S IN O H

C A P T T 3 KH AR A

C A P T A K M E H T A

V I 3 H V A A N U R A O

C A P T A A N A Z A R E T H

IN A S 3 0 0 -C D R O I3R A N I

I N A S 3 3 0 - COR AS R A W A T.N M

REAR A D M IR A L RL P ER E IR A ,A V S M ,F lo g O fficer Com m anding,-Southern N a va l A re a C O M M O D O R E R EVIEW - C M D E Q M S H E A . A V S M (B o r) REAR A D M IR A L RKS Q H A N D H I, Vr.C.Flag O fficer C o m m a n d ln g .W e ato rn Fleet P R E S ID E N T S Y A C H T - C A N N A N O R C - C D R S R A M S A G A R

REAR A D M IR A L V E C 8 A R B O Z A . A V S M (B ar), Flag Officer Com m anding. E as te rn Floet S T A N D B Y Y A C H T - K A R W A R - L C D R B L S H A R M A Superintend once o f Com m odore F. L. F ra e e r.A V S M .F IS .C h ie f Hydrogrophor to tho G ove rnm e nt o f India.

IN A S -310

Cdr O

LCU 32

OMORPAO

IC5AHI

LlCdr 3 «

LlCdr KR R«

< U*vpl'

CHARAO

LlCdr O Subtm *

VUAYOURO

C<3/ L Shtnkir

BRAHMAPUTRA

VELA

C“ P* A S R a»»t Nb

LlCdr O P Sha

KATCHALL

Cdr BK Kiraii

OUNAOIRl

UOAYOIRI

Cap! VK Mihoi

UORA 3URAK3I

Capi O Ch»nd

FLAGSHIPS

VICE ADMIRAL M R SCHUNKER. PVSM.AVSM (Retd).Director General Coast Guard_____

Bombay, u 2|[eb 84

------ CGS V1KRAM

VICE ADMIRAL IJ S KHURANA, Flog Officer Commanding Western Fleet___

__

— INS GODAVARI

REAR ADMIRAL L RAM DAS. AVSM.' Vr C. VSM. Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet

— INS ANDAMAN

PRIME MINISTER'S YACHT.

INS ALLEPPEY

LtC*UVOhmla
ihraDw. Feb. 1984 under the Superinie* lendence

Designed and Prepared by the Naval

C o m o r o ,. A . G.

FB.

Go,.™

stTCcT %

^

£1 <1

5F5rf

15 '+<=<■0 1989
f Ije ,3)leet

|Ire0thent (©f Jnftta

^ R e f n e f n Q $ f

Jg>Ijrt j$L ^hmkataraman ,A t 3$ombau (®n 15 Meb 1989

ALI2E IINA3 310)

CHE TAK (COA 3 OOO)

CMCTAK (1NA5 351

PARTICIPATING S H IP S /A IR C R A F T

SEAION-O (IN AS 330)

IL-38 (1NA3 3I9)

AND

DOSMtR (CC3A3 1 50)

(ORAN (INAS 991)

3CA HARRIER (INAS 300)

C O M M A N D IN G O F FIC ER S

■SLANDC" (INASS50)

KAMOVS (W AS933)

T U - 1 « M (INA3 31?)

F-27 (CO A 3 700)

0

S H IP ........................ . . C O M M A N D IN G OFFICER

RA COLUMN

PRACHAND ........................... . LT CDR MO VERM A

P R A B A L ............................................IT CDR M GEORGE

C H A M A K ............................................ LT CDR H NAJR

CHA PA L......................................... LT CDR C P JA C O B

^ 3

M U L K I....................................... LT CDR S B A N ERJEE
r*J MAMAL >*OTU

,C!^IK){70)DOwC

TRV 72 .................................................. LT P YADAV

SD B 6 1 ............... ................... L I CDR S S PURVIMATH

IN D IA -W E S T COAST

LCU 3 8 ............................................LT COR P SAHAY

S H A N K H ............................SHRI DAOAMIAN HUSSAIN

BOMBAY A N C H O R A G E

A P SA R IK A ......................................................................... •

SHRI <K FALRBHAI

SCALE 1:12500

RB COLUMN
m

©

STS VARUNA ................................. LT CDR S S YADAV

DEPTHS are in meirc> and arc reduced lo Chari

P O R BA N D A R .................................... LT CDR S S RAO
is apBrOTinule!) the le-'elof Lowru Auronomici

B E D I.................................. ............LT CDR AK JU LK A HEIGHTS are in mtlrev Underlined figure* are

18*
above Chari Datum; all olher heights are abot

RATNAG IRI....................................... LT CDR DN SIN HA

Waier Sprinp

PRACHAND

V U A Y D U R G .................................CDR S S SlNSU NW AL

PROJECTION: Tranner^ Wcrcaior

T 3 RAJCNOHA

SIN O H U O U RG .............................CDR GN SASIDHARAN

SOURCES. IN Sar»e>% lo m3.

V E E R ....................................................... CDR J P S'NGH

NlRBH IK........................................ LT CDR VR NAPHADE

N IPA T ............................................. . LT CDR GV 8 ABU

POrtOANOAH

RC COLUMN

3H*5rtUMAn

R A JK A M A L .........DY COMOT K BALASUBRAWANIAN

M E E N ...................................................... CDR J J VALAVI VEERA ......................................... DIG N S ACHARYA

V U A Y A .............. ...................................DIG R SINGH

V A R U N A ......................................... CDR M P TANEJA

DARSHAK ......................................CDR RC CHITNIS
v i Sh v a a o it y a

N IR U PA K ...............................................CDR V SINGH

//

RD COLUMN

KADMATT................................. CDR CT JO SEPH .N M

RATNAQlRl

A RNA LA...........................................CAPT SC DEW AN

A N D A M A N ...................... CD R Rl SESHADRIVASAN

G A J ............................................... LT CDR R CHADHA

G U L D A R ..............................CDR A CHINAVERRIYYA

COLA

C H E E T A H ....................... CDR P S SREENIVASAN. V SM

VIJAYDURO

B E A S .................................................... COR l< SA LUJA INO iAN GOODWILL

RE COLUMN

G A N G A ............................................ CAPT M J SINGH

GOMATI........................................... CAPT KM S RAJAN

G O D A V A R I................... CAPT SV GOPALACHARI V SM

SINOHUDURO

TARAGlRl................................... CAPT S C S 8ANGARA

VINOHYAGlRI. .. .CAPT ARUN PRAKASH, VrC. VSM

DU NAG lRI.................................CDR MV PRABHAKAR

H IM G IRI............................................. CDR R TALWAR

UD A Y G lR l........................................ CDR KS SANOHU

SlNOHUDMVAJ

NILGIRI .................................................... CD R HL WAHI TIR ................. .......................... CAPT RC KOCHHAR

VI3MVA BANOHAN

RF COLUMN

SH ISHUM AR .............................. COR UN CHITNAV1S

SHANKUSH ......................................... CDR KN SUSH IL

SIN D H U D H V A J....................................CDR DV PANDIT

SINO HUVIR...................................... CDR KR AJREKAR

K A L V A R I......................................... LT CDR K RAMDAS

V ELA ................................................. CD R V S AGASHE

VAGIR.............................................. CDR AY KALASKAR

C H A K R A .............................................CAPT SC ANAND

RQ COLUMN

SAOAROfEP

V1RAAT.......................... CAPT M ADHVENDRA SINGH

4

V IK RA N T ............................................CAPT 8 S KARPE

R A JP U T ............................................... CAPT H SINGH

/

R A N V IR ...................................... CAPT P J JA C O B. V SM
c

R A N V U A Y .......................................... CAPT J C D SILVA rtALVAW

R A N JIT ...................................CAPT OP B A N S A L V SM

M A G A R ........................................ CDR AVTAR SINGH

%

SHAKTI ........................................CAPT AS RAWAT. NM

D EEPA K ........................................ CAPT SG PATANKAR

/•

RH COLUMN

-

V « r» l* ItfWUMOJ ^ _________________— ^ 5

UDAYOIRI

TS R A JE N O R A ..............................CAPT S S S REWARI

NAJ© CALA/EftY

VISHVA A D IT Y A .............. CAPT JC PURI. VrC (RETD)

prongs urn

■o

\

INDIAN G O O D W IL L ........................... CAPT TK SARKAR

VISHVA BANDHAN...............................CAPT R SAXENA

SA G AR D EEP.............................CAPT RAGHUBlR SINGH

%

. <

NANO C A U V ER Y .................. CAPT P SATYANARAYANA

SAGAR K A N Y A ......................CAPT GV VANDERJUCHT

_ \"

G A V E SH A N I.............................CAPT M S L FERNANDES
r \

, . . . v
v " S ‘

SA MUD RA S E V A K .........................CAPT NS KOND Al

* / *

/

YACHTS

- J

P O N D IC H ER RY...................................... CDR SK SOOD

BAOAR KANYA

B H A VNA G A R.............................. LT CDR CO PRAKASH

A L L E P P E Y .................................. LT CDR AA VAISHNAV

FLYPAST LE A D E R ....... RADM S RAM SAGAR VrC. NM

S Q U A D R O N N O ..................... S O N C O M M A N D E R

INAS 321 ............................. CDR S S PARANJAPE. NM

FLAGSHIPS

1NAS 333 .....................................CD R A VAIDYA. NM

INAS 330 ..............................................CDR S S MALHI

....................................................A D M IR A L JO N A DKA RNI. PVSM . A V SM . NM. VSM. Chief of the Naval SufT

' /

INAS 550 .......................................... CD R J S DHILLON

PRESIDENT'S YACHT ....

INAS 3 1 0 .......................................LT CDR S P MENON

IN S V IK RA N T ..

INAS 551 ............................................COR S KUMAR

IN S R A JP U T ...

PONDCHUtNV

INAS 3 1 5 ............................................CDR B l SINGH

IN S RA NVfR ...

: A D M IR A L L R A M .M S . PVSM . AVSM . VrC. VSM. Flag Officer C o m m a n d s ,l o , * . i J S S Niv jU c “

INAS 3 1 2 ...................................COR VC PANOEY. NM

PRIME MINISTER'S YACHT

INAS 300 .............................................COR SK DAMLE

IN S R A N V IJA Y .

IN S R A N J I T --

................................. R E A R A D “ ‘R A ^ * A ?D

Z R A JU -NM - r u *
commtmS>nt w o lt ,D FW |

BHAVNAOAK

...............................................

A D M IR A L B CUHA. FU * Officcr Commanding fcanern Fleet

CGAS 800 .......................................... CO R RHL MAINI

CGAS 750 ......................................... CO R T HARI. NM

C C S V EER A

• VICE A D M IR A L H JO H N SO N , VSM . Director General i

CGAS 700 ...................................... C D R P SENGUPTA

STAND-BY Y A C H T.

1WTT'

* ipm
fhR t^ftRTT^r.ir

^ ^ ^.in*.mfqw.*

•igned and Publuhed >t (he Naval Hydrographic Office. Dehra Dun. IS Feb 1989 under ihe S u | * n ' rimtIv), _
m
ippj r e iftn r.lS **¥<1 1989

CEREMONIAL CHART 5083
f R e a r A d m ira l V .K . S in g h , V S M . F IS , C h ie f H y d r o g r a p h e r t o Ih* G o v e rn m e n t o f I n d ia .

Naval Philately

The Navy has figured in many philatelic releases. Prior to

G eneral

Independence in 1947, the only philatelic materials having

The first postage stamps in the world originated in Britain a naval connection were: in 1840. In India, stamps were first introduced in Sind • The nine pies Soldiers’ and Seamen’s Envelope and its province in 1852 in what is now known in the philatelic
one anna overprint version.

world as the ‘Scinde Dawk’ (Dawk being the Anglicisation
of the Indian word ‘dak’ meaning ‘post’).

• The 1941 ‘Pigeon Mail’ covers commemorating the naval
mail being sent by pigeons from the naval establishment

Common daily use stamps, called ‘Definitives’, are
at Kalyan to the Naval Dockyard, Bombay. The sale of
issued as a series in various denominations and their
these covers helped to raise war funds for the Royal
design pertains to one theme. These are printed in large

Indian Navy.

numbers. The Navy has never figured in ‘definitives’.

• A set of four World War II Victory stamps, of similar

‘Commemorative’ stamps are issued on a specific
design, issued in 1946.

date to commemorate personalities or a significant
national / international event. The Navy has figured

After Independence, the Navy’s ships, submarines,
in ‘commemoratives’. Linked to the release of a aircraft and events have figured in stamps. Until 1979, commemorative stamp is the ‘First Day Cover’ (FDC) there were only two stamps relating directly to the Navy.

issued by the Department of Posts. This envelope bears, These were: on the obverse, a ‘Cachet Design’ which is a written and

• The Armed Forces ‘Ja i Jaw an’ stamp issued in 1966
pictorial / graphical representation of the event being
after the 1965 Indo-Pakistan conflict, which depicted
commemorated. The stamp being released is affixed on the
the cruiser INS Mysore.

FDC and a ‘First Day Cancellation’ is made on the stamp.

This cancellation is different to the regular cancellation

• The 20 paise INS Nilgiri stamp issued when the Prime and its design relates to the purpose of the stamp.

Minister launched India’s first indigenous frigate in

October 1968.

Owing to the limited number of such stamps issued every
year, it is not feasible for every event to be commemorated

In 1979, young naval enthusiasts1 founded the Naval
through the release of a stamp. For events or occasions Philatelic Society (NPS) to increase public interest in the of lesser national significance, a ‘Special Cover’ with a Navy. This society organised Naval Philatelic Exhibitions in Special Cancellation can be sponsored and released by

1979 and 1980. The NPS helps to design commemorative
any organisation in association with the Department of stamps, special covers and pictorial cancellations to mark Posts. This envelope, like the FDC, bears a cachet design
naval events and activities. It has organised the release of
and the special cancellation. Any stamp / stamps, of total the following stamps: denomination sufficient to meet postal rate for an ordinary • Lord Mountbatten, 1980.

cover, could be used. The Special Cancellation is affixed
only on the day of the event.

• INS Taragiri, 1981.

• The President’s Review of the Fleet, 1984.

Ships and establishments can arrange to release
special covers’ with ‘special cancellations’ after obtaining

• The 250th Anniversary of the Naval Dockyard Bombay,
the approval of the Chief Post Master General of their

1985.

concerned postal circle.

National Maritime Day, 1999.

1. Am ong them are C om m odore Anil D hir and C om m and er G N A ch arya (presently the H on orary S e cre ta ry o f the N aval Ph ilatelic So ciety, India) w ho to this day rem ain dedicated and enthusiastic naval philatelists.

* 2 0 p.

1-TTVcT

I N D I A

'•TRcT

IN D IA

X’St-r.

5: c^?-:«^ys=#r

N(«U oocxvuo BCwaxr.J30:«
moo

^i??r
l \ D I A

KT. =f}.tfr.fa»T'-^ IN.S.VIKRANT

'9 0 6

& Development Organisation commemoratives, the

The releases thereafter have been:

Rashtriya Indian Military College Dehra Dun (where some

• 400th Anniversary of Kunjali Marakkar.

naval officers studied), the National Defence Academy,

• Martyrs of the 1971 War - the Navy stamp shows the the Defence Services Staff College, the Antarctica old INS Khukri that was torpedoed and sank with her expeditions (in which naval personnel have participated), Commanding Officer, Captain MN Mulla.

the 1965 Mount Everest Expedition (in which a naval
officer participated), the 1982 Asian Games (in which

• Special commemorative stamps on the occasion of the naval officers won medals in sailing), the round the world International Fleet Review 2001 in Mumbai.

voyage of the sailing vessel Trishna (in which a naval Apart from the above, there are inter-service stamps.

officer participated), the Indian Peace Keeping Force (in

Though the Navy is not specifically represented, there are Sri Lanka), and so on.

naval linkages like ‘Greetings To Our Forces (four stamps,
of which one shows a stylised ship), Defence Research

Chronology of I s s u e s

S N o

Date of Issue

Occasion / Event

Description

D epictio n

1.

26 January 1964

Presentation of President’s

Special Cover issued

Colours to Southern Naval
with

Command
cancellation

2.

26 January 1966

Republic Day after the

Uai Jawan’. Silhouette of the cruiser INS Stam p 1

1965 Indo-Pakistan War

M YSO RE together with an Air Force

Gnat aircraft and the bust of a soldier

3.

15 December 1968

Navy Day

Commissioning of the first Leander Stam p 2
frigate INS NILGIRI on 23 October

1968

4.

15 August 1972

Independence Day after the “Greetings to our Forces” Joint Services Stamp 3

1971 Indo-Pakistan War

Crest with vertical colour bands of
the Army, Navy and Air Force in the
background

5.

4 December 1972

Navy Day

Special cancellation

Cancellation

6.

30 June 1978

Decommissioning of the

-

Special cover issued
cruiser INS DELHI
with
cancellation

7.

28 August 1980

Commemoration of British

-

Stam p 4

Admiral of the Fleet Lord

Louis Mountbatten

8.

4 December 1981

Navy Day

Fifth Leander frigate INS TARAGIRI

Stamp 5

9.

18 May 1982

15th
anniversary
of INS V1RBAHU

Special cover issued

Submarine Headquarters in
with

Vishakhapatnam
cancellation

10.

8 December 1982

15th
anniversary
of
the

Cancellation

Submarine Arm

11.

4 December 1983

Navy Day

30“’ Anniversary of the Naval Air Arm

Special cover issued
with
cancellation

388 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

S No

Date of Issue

Occasion/Eventent

Description

Depiction

12.

12 February 1984

President’s Review of the Set of four stamps depicting the Stamp 6

Fleet
silhouettes of the aircraft carrier

VIKRANT, the submarine VELA, the
guided missile destroyer RATiA and a
naval Sea Harrier aircraft

13.

7 Ju ly 1985

Silver Jubilee of the naval INAS 300

Special cover
fighter aircraft squadron

14.

29 August 1985

Decommissioning of the

—

Special cover issued
cruiser INS MYSORE
and
cancellation

15.

11 January 1986

250,h Anniversary of the Bombay Dock, ships and the Dockyard Stamp 7

Naval Dockyard Bombay

Building

16.

16 February 1986

Silver Jubilees of the aircraft INS VIKRANT

Stamp 8
carrier

17.

9 May 1986

Silver Jubilee of the naval INAS 310

Special cover issued
anti
submarine
aircraft
with
squadron
cancellation

18.

17 September 1986

Arrival in India of the first INS SINDHCJGHOSH

Special cover issued

EKM
submarine
from
and

Russia
cancellation

19.

23 September 1986

Arrival in India of the first INS SHISHCIMAR

Special cover issued

S S K
submarine
from
with

Germany
cancellation

20.

5 April 1987

Presentation of President’s

Special cover issued

Colours to Eastern Naval
with

Command
cancellation

21

18 May 1987

Silver Jubilee
of

Naval INHS KALYANI

Special cover issued

Hospital at Vishakhapatnam
with
cancellation

22.

31 Ju ly 1987

Commissioning of the first INS MAGAR

Special cover issued
indigenous Landing Ship
with
cancellation

23.

4 December 1987

Navy Day at Hyderabad and

-

Special

Secunderabad
cancellation

24.

21 December 1987

20lh Anniversary of the

Special cover issued

Submarine Arm
with
cancellation

25.

15 February 1989

President’s Review of the Fleet Ships in Line Abreast

Stamp 9

Fleet

The author acknowledges with gratitude the inputs provided by Vice Admiral AS Krishnan who retired in 2002 as the Chief of Material and who, for many years has been the doyen of Indian Naval Philately.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 389

50

The Navy And The Army’s

Military Engineering Service

Preamble

“Until 1941, the Royal Indian Navy was responsible
for planning and executing its own civil works. After

The Military Engineering Service (MES) functions under
the Japanese Navy’s attack on the G S Navy in Pearl
the Engineer-in-Chief of the Indian Army. It designs and

Harbour in December 1941, the scope and quantum
oversees the construction of military buildings. It repairs
of naval works increased rapidly and the Corps of
and maintains all the buildings of the three services and

Engineers - the Sappers - were made completely
other organisations under the Ministry of Defence.

responsible for planning and execution of civil works.

All Naval civil construction work has been undertaken

All wartime construction at the major Naval bases was
by the MES, except for two projects during the period 1976
made by the MES. At the time of partition in 1947,
to 1990 - the new Naval Academy at Ezhimala in Kerala1
the buildings and roads assets apportioned to the Navy
and the new Naval Base at Karwar in Karnataka. In their
were only about Rs. 2 crore.

association with the Navy, the MES built up considerable

“After partition until 1962, the development of naval
expertise in the construction of Dockyards and special-to-
assets was not much, despite the works in Bombay and
type works.

in Cochin. It is really after the Chinese aggression in

1962 and thereafter that the momentum of civil works

The M E S ’ Involvement with the Navy
started building up.

The M ES’ involvement with the Bombay Naval Dockyard

“The factors which the M ES bears in mind when

Expansion Scheme commenced in the late 1950s when the
dealing with the Navy could be covered under several
civilian contractor was unable to keep to the construction
heads:

schedule of the Ballard Pier Extension and the Barracks
and Destroyer wharfs. It has continued thereafter under

- The process of release of funds for the execution of
the Director General Naval Projects Bombay.

naval works is invariably faster than that in the Army
and the Air Force. The reaction time therefore for the

In the case of the Vizag Dockyard, the organisation of

M ES is much shorter.

the Chief Engineer Dry Dock and the East Coast Zone2
was created in June 1969 for the M ES to construct its first

- Communications in the Navy are much faster than
and largest Dry Dock in India. The initial planning and
in the other two services and this affects the relations
design was done in Delhi and the formation moved to
between the planner and the user.

Vishakhapatnam in November 1969 to start its work.3

- In the 1970s and 1980s, the Navy was the fastest
expanding of the three services. It was inducting

Major General MK Paul was associated with the
accelerating technology, which meant that in the civil

Bombay Naval Dockyard Expansion Scheme and with
works, which were planned, often there would be
the construction of the Dry Docks in the Vishakhapatnam

Dockyard. He recalls:

changes in the original design, which the M ES would
need to adjust to.

1 For this contretem ps, see the section titled "The New Naval A c a d e m ^ h im a la ” , page 323. -----------------------------------

2. The civil works of the East Zone covered the constmrtinn nf
t •

•
r*

Bimlipatnam, all civil works in the North, Middle and South AnH

Training Establishment at Chilka, the depots at Koraput and

Bay in Great Nicobar.

amans, in Little Andaman, at Car Nicobar and at Kardip and Campbell

3- S
i

S
bpa9

CenS

Uti0n " the C° nStrUCti0n ° f th£ ^

D° ^ ard h- ^ e n covered in the Chapter on “Maintenance, Repair and

- The interaction between the M ES and the Navy had
invariably had to evolve the optimum for each station
to take into account that the seniority structures were
regarding the type and depth of foundation vis-a-vis the
somewhat different and the organisational structure
number of storeys to be constructed.

was somewhat different and that these factors should

“Corrosion is another problem at most naval
not intrude in the way of professional interaction.

stations. The periodicity of painting stipulated in the

- As a rule, naval personnel, both officers and men, are

M ES regulation is quite inadequate to keep corrosion
better educated than their counterparts in the other
at bay. Similarly, the temperature and high humidity
two services. The M ES had to take this into account
encountered in most naval stations makes air
when dealing with the user.

conditioning and refrigeration essential. This involves

- The average naval person is more technologically
both heavy capital as well as maintenance expenditure
aware and these technological awareness factors often
compared to the Army and the Air Force. The Navy’s
get factored into civil works.

air conditioning and refrigeration requirements are
substantially higher and the magnitude, location and

- Promotions in the Navy were generally faster than
centralisation of these plants at these stations are a
those in the Sappers. It often happened that officers
matter that requires the deepest possible study to arrive
who had earlier been part of the same pay group got
segregated when M ES officers became junior to their
at cost effective solutions.”

contemporaries.

Proposals to Restructure the M ES

“The most important facet of interaction between the

By the end 1980s, the volume of the Navy’s civil works

M ES and the Navy is the geographical factor. Unlike the had become so large, the need for them so urgent and the Army and the Air Force, the Navy is generally on the delays so frustrating that scepticism grew about the MES’

coast. The number of naval establishments are limited.

capability to cope. The causes of disenchantment being

They are concentrated at a few points, all at urban
articulated were:

conglomerations where there is paucity of space and
much pressure of land. This means that the Navy has

© It takes unduly long to complete civil works. Shore
been forced to go in for multi-storeyed construction
infrastructure, therefore, lags far behind our urgent
with its attendant services like water supply, electric
needs.

supply and the consequent increase in the industrial

• The quality of finished work leaves much to be desired.

establishments of the M ES stations. In any case, the

As a result, we do not get full value for the money
electric supply, water supply, civil services and most of
spent.

the urban necessities on which the M ES depends are

• Architectural designs have not kept pace with time and
hardly adequate to meet their own needs. Thus the M ES
tend to be stereotyped, repetitive in nature and over-
is forced to provide its own independent systems and
cautiously heavy.

plan the requirements at least 20 years ahead.

• Modern construction techniques are not adopted.

“The climatic conditions along the coast are well
established. Heavy rain is one of the major characteristics.

It was felt that the situation would improve if the M ES

Many naval stations are subjected to cyclonic influence.

Chief Engineers in each Command were under the

The M ES has to take this into account since it affects the respective FOCs in C in Bombay, Vishakhapatnam and drainage and layout of waterproofing and area drainage Cochin instead of under the E in C in Delhi.

systems.

These issues were examined at length. It was decided

“The other problem pertaining to location of major that Zonal Chief Engineers (Navy) would be positioned as naval stations is the soil. In many cases, the territory follows: is estuarine and as such there are heavy over layers of
alluvium. Also in most cases, due to shortage of space,

Naval Command

Zonal Chief Engineer
vast tracts of land are always being reclaimed. At these

Eastern Naval Command

Chief Engineer Navy Vizag
places, the soil is mostly marine clay with its peculiarly Fortress Commander ASrN

Chief Engineer Navy Port Blair
treacherous characteristics. Thus the expenditure on
foundations is generally 40% to 60% of the expenditure Southern Naval Command Chief Engineer Navy Cochin
of structure in most of the naval stations. The M ES have

Western Naval Command

Chief Engineer Navy Bombay

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 391

51

The Navy And The Sea Cadets
foreshore of the China Creek, had built a stone fiigate as

The Genesis of the Sea Cadet Corps
the headquarters of the Karachi Sea Scouts.1

In the 1930s, Mr Gokaldas S Ahuja’s Karachi-based
business of exporting carpet-grade wool to Europe brought

After the Partition of India in 1947, Mr Ahuja and many of
him into contact with the sailing fraternity in Karachi. Fond his Sea Scouts migrated to Bombay. The Navy allowed the of the sea and of sailing, he acquired a converted fishing Sea Scouts to conduct their training in the Naval Dockyard boat and along with a few young boys, who were equally and later in INS Angre.

fond of the sea, used to sail in Karachi harbour.

In 1950, Mr Ahuja visited the CJnited States and Britain

In May 1938, he and a few others set up the Karachi to study their naval youth movements. In Britain, he found Sea Scouts (as a counterpart to the Boy Scouts) with the that the Sea Cadet Corps was closest to his objectives.

aim of teaching young boys swimming, sailing, knots and

In 1951, the Sea Scouts were renamed as the Sea Cadet
splices. The organisation grew and in due course a Sea Corps. As the number of cadets increased, training started Scout Council was formed.

being carried out both at INS Kunjali and INS Angre.

In Ju ly 1942, a sailing dinghy of the then Royal Indian

In the late 1950s, a suggestion was made to the Sea

Navy capsised in Karachi’s China Creek. Sea Scouts Cadet Corps that it should amalgamate with the naval who happened to be in the vicinity, promptly assisted in wing of the National Cadet Corps. The suggestion did not the rescue of the three naval trainees. As a gesture of find favour because bringing the Corps under government appreciation, the Commanding Officer of the Navy’s purview would require every decision to be approved by an Boys Training Establishment, HMIS Dilaivar, obtained outside authority and slow things down.

approval for the Sea Scouts to use his establishment for
their training. In due course, Sea Scouts embarked ships

In 1956, the Sea Cadet Council was formed. Its objectives
of the Navy for training cruises and were given small arms were:

training in the Navy’s Gunnery School (HMIS Himalaya)

• To create sea-mindedness in the citizens of India.

in Karachi.

• To help in the formation of and running and controlling

During the 1939-1945 World War, Mr Ahuja and some
the Sea Cadet Corps Units in various ports and other
of his officers of the Sea Scouts were granted honorary
places in India.

commissions in the Royal Indian Navy Volunteer Reserve • To give technical training to and instill Naval Traditions and they participated in the motorboat patrols of Karachi
in boys who intend to serve in the Indian Navy or the
harbour. The young Sea Scouts learnt and imparted first

Merchant Navy, both in war and in peace and also to
aid training and did air raid precaution duties.

those sea-minded boys and girls who do not intend
to follow a sea career but who, given this knowledge,

After the war, in recognition of their contribution to
would form a valuable reserve for the Indian Navy and
the war effort, the Sea Scouts were presented with two
the Merchant Service.

motorboats to facilitate their waterman-ship activities.

During these war years, Mr Ahuja got to know the naval

• To provide for the physical, mental, moral, spiritual,
officers who later migrated to India after Partition.

social, educational and cultural development of the

Cadets.

By mid 1947, Mr Ahuja had raised Rs 2,50,000 from
the public, the Karachi Port Trust, the Government of • To develop character and good citizenship in their Sind and the Governor’s War Purposes Fund and, on the
widest sense among boys and girls through sea training,
discipline and love of adventure._______________________

1. The 'stone frigate’ was inaugurated by Mr Jamshed Nusserwanji, i renowned theosophist and philanthropist and Mayor of Karachi.

In 1957, the Sea Cadets presented a guard of honour to Maharashtra for 99 years at a nominal rent of Rs 1 per Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru at Raj Bhawan. The Prime year. It was commissioned by the Chief of the Naval Staff Minister told the cadets:

in November 1991. It provides storage for the sailing boats

“What I have seen today has pleased me immensely - with their masts rigged, dormitory accommodation for 100
that our boys and girls here in Bombay have voluntarily cadets, boat building and boat repair facilities.

joined the Sea Cadet Corps and are learning the

In 1994, the Chief of the Naval Staff became ex-officio
rudiments of seamanship and that they are doing this

President of the Sea Cadet Council with the Flag Officers
with very keen enthusiasm. Now that I have met you, I Commanding-in-Chief of the Western, Eastern and Southern wish to be kept informed about you and your activities,

Naval Commands as Senior Vice Presidents.

so that 1 can continue to know what is happening and
what you’re doing.”

At the time of writing, the Sea Cadet Corps remains
a non-government, non-political, non-sectarian youth

At the Prime Minister’s behest, the Bombay Port Trust organisation having 15 units all over India. Most units are gave the Sea Cadet Corps a plot of land on the south
located in naval establishments and the Navy provides

Bombay foreshore at Colaba, at a nominal rent, for building training facilities and officer and sailor instructors. Boys their “stone frigate” headquarters. The Bombay Port Trust and girls in the age group 10 to 12 years are eligible to also gave a grant of Rs 100,000 and a recurring annual apply. Training lasts for four years.

grant of Rs 5,000.

Its 7,000 school/college-going boys and girls voluntarily

At the invitation of the Prime Minister, the Sea Cadets come for an average of 5 hours theoretical and practical started participating in the Republic Day Parade in Delhi training every Sunday throughout the year and for training from 1958 onwards. Participation ceased after 1991 due courses during vacations. They acquire smartness through to objections raised by the National Cadet Corps (NCC). In
parade training and physical training and learn about first
their home states, Sea Cadets participate in the Republic aid and communications.

Day, Independence Day, State Day and other parades.

Sailing and water-based activities are carried out on

In 1963, when laying the keel of the “stone frigate”

Saturday afternoons and during school vacations. By
headquarters, Prime Minister Nehru told the Sea Cadets:

learning to handle pulling boats at a young age, they
acquire confidence and proficiency in watermanship,

“I wish that every boy and girl in this country should seamanship and sailing.

be able to undergo this kind of training in one form or
the other, whether Navy, Army or Air Force. This time

All Sea Cadet officers are honorary and voluntary and
particularly it is essential on account of the emergency hold Sea Cadet Corps ranks. Officers and cadets provide when our border has been violated.2 But even without themselves with uniforms and receive no honorarium or the emergency, our young men should become active expense of any kind. Cadets pay an admission fee on joining and disciplined and the lethargy in us must be wiped and a nominal annual subscription. Many cadets are from out. For this reason, I am especially happy to be here to
non-privileged backgrounds, and at the end of their training,
participate in the keel-laying ceremony of the national
emerge better equipped for mainstream life.

headquarters ship and I sincerely hope that the Sea

Vice Admiral RKS Ghandhi, resides adjacent to TS

Cadet Corps will flourish.”

Jawahar. He recalls:

In 1973, the Sea Cadet Council registered as a

“I often return from fishing very late at night. Whenever

Public Registered Charitable Trust with the Rag Officer
the day comes for young boys and girls to submit their

Commanding-in-Chief Western Naval Command as
applications to become Sea Cadets, I have seen their

Chairman Trustee and eminent persons in the fields of
parents queuing up in the middle of the night to submit
shipping, industry, administration and the Navy as its
the forms the next morning. As for those who are already

Trustees.

Sea Cadets, their enthusiasm to excel, both on board
their ‘stone frigate’ and in watermanship activities has to

The tempo of sailing activities increased in the 1980s and
be seen to believed!”

fund raising commenced for the construction of a “boating
station” and associated facilities. The Naoroji Pirojsha

Retrospect

Godrej Memorial Building Boat Station was built adjacent
to TS Jawahar on land leased from the Government of

From its inception in 1938 as the Sea Scouts and later as
the Sea Cadets, the founder of the Corps, Mr Gokaldas

2- China had violated India's northern and north-eastern borders in October 1962.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 3 93

1955: The Sea Cadet Corps admitted the first batch of

Ahuja, had a symbiotic relationship with the Navy and 24 girl cadets to its ranks and like the boy cadets, the girls with every single Admiral of his time. From 1947 onwards, were trained in squad drill, signaling, shooting and boat the Navy gave the Sea Cadet Corps whatever it sought to
impart parade, small arms and watermanship training, not work.

only because of Mr Ahuja’s irresistible enthusiasm but also 1956: The Sea Cadet Council was formed as a controlling because the Navy shared his vision of making children body of the Corps with the Governor of Bombay as its better acquainted with the sea around them.

President. The Council comprised the Chief Minister,

On the recommendation of the Navy, the President the Education Minister, the Army Area Commander, the honoured him by progressively granting him honorary naval Flag Officer Commanding the Indian Fleet, the Mayor of rank, the last of which was Honorary Commodore. After his Bombay and the Commodore-in-Charge Bombay.

demise, the cause of the Sea Cadets has been continued

Sea Cadets were organised into three units: Bombay
by his son Commodore (Sea Cadet Corps) Rabi Ahuja, who Gnit No 1 at INS Angre, Bombay Gnit No 2 at INS Kunjali has been associated with the Sea Cadets from a young age.

and Bombay Gnit No 3 of girl cadets at INS Angre.

Following in his fathers footsteps, he was granted the rank
of Honorary Captain Indian Navy in 2003.

To raise funds for the permanent headquarters to be
housed in a ‘stone frigate’ on the foreshore in Bombay

The citation of Mr Gokaldas Ahuja’s Padma Shri stated:

Harbour, Dr Homi Bhabha permitted the Sea Cadet Ball to

“Honorary Commodore Ahuja’s achievements span be held on the lawns of the Tata Institute of Fundamental half a century. His endeavours have been responsible for Research in December each year. The Sea Cadet Magazine giving to this country not only responsible citizens but started being published, timed for release during the Ball.

also yachtsmen of international repute, fine officers in
the Indian and merchant navies and many of the leading

1957: Summer and Winter Camps started being held in
citizens in our great cities.

the National Defence Academy in Poona. Four Sea Cadets

“In recognition of his services to the Sea Cadet Corps,
proceeded to Britain at the invitation of their Sea Cadet
the maritime community of India, to the youth of the Organisation in London to undergo training with the country and indeed to the country as a whole, the British Navy.

President is pleased to bestow the title of Padma Shri on 1958: At the invitation of the Prime Minister, the Sea Cadets Gokaldas Shivaldas Ahuja.”

started participating in the Republic Day Parade in Delhi.

This citation reflects how much the vision and

1959: Sea Cadet Gnit commissioned in Madras.

perseverance of a single individual in a worthy cause can
benefit so many. Over 20,000 boys and girls have received

1961: The Chief of the Naval Staff authorised the Captain

Sea Cadet training; many of them have succeeded in the Superintendent of the Sea Cadet Corps to hoist the Indian Navy, the Merchant Navy, the Army, the Air Force and in Blue Ensign, having the badge of the Corps, on board the corporate world.

ships of the Sea Cadet Corps as long as these vessels were
exclusively in the service of the Sea Cadet Corps. This was

The Sea Cadet Corps has excelled in fostering sailing.

ratified by an Act of Parliament.

Its officers and cadets have won gold medals in Asian

Regattas and World Championships. TS Jawahar and 1963: Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru laid the keel the Navy have jointly organised and conducted national of the ‘stone frigate’ that was to become the National and international sailing championships. Today, the co

Headquarters of the Sea Cadet Corps.

located facilities of the Naval Sailing Club Mumbai and TS

Jawahar are amongst the finest in the world for conducting

Vice President Radhakrishnan inaugurated the Silver
international sailing regattas and championships.

Jubilee Celebrations.

The ensuing chronology records the development of

Sea Cadet Gnit commissioned in Tiruchirapalli.

the close relationship between the Navy and the Sea Cadet

Corps.

1964: Sea Cadet Gnit commissioned in Calcutta in INS

Hooghly, now named INS Netaji Subhash.

Chronology

1966: President Radhakrishnan commissioned the ‘stone

1951: Sea Scouts renamed as Sea Cadet Corps.

frigate as the National Headquarters of the Sea Cadet

Corps and named it ‘Training Ship Jawahar’ in memory

1954: Sea Cadet Band formed.

of late Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. The Government

394 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

of Maharashtra donated Rs 250,000, the Municipal

1987: Sail Training Ship Varuna sailed for the Australian Corporation of Greater Bombay donated Rs 100,000 Bicentennial Celebrations and Tall Ships Race from and the Scindia Steam Navigation Company donated Rs

Hobart to Sydney with a naval crew and two Sea Cadets in

100,000. These moneys, together with the Rs 100,000 September 1987.

earlier granted by the Bombay Port Trust and the funds
collected during the Sea Cadet Balls helped to defray the

TS Jawahar along with the Naval Sailing Club conducted
construction costs of TS Jatuahar.

the First Commonwealth Regatta.

1969: Sea Cadet Sailing Association formed and affiliated

1988: Varuna returned to Bombay after her Australian
to the YAI.

voyage in April 1988.

1970: Sea Cadet Unit commissioned in Visakhapatnam in

TS Jatuahar conducted the International ‘Cadet Class’

INS Circars.

World Championship. For the first time in the history of

Indian sailing, India won a Gold medal in a world sailing

1971: Cadet class National Association formed on board
event. These gold medals were won by Sea Cadets Cyrus

TS Jatuahar.3

Cama and Amish Ved. In the same event, Sea Cadets Nikhil

Ved and Vikas Kapil won Bronze Medals.

1972: The Captain Superintendent of the Sea Cadet Corps,

Mr Gokaldas Ahuja was promoted Honorary Commander

1989: Two Sea Cadet officers, Shakeel Kudrolli and Sumeet
in the Indian Navy.

Patel won gold medals at the Asian Regatta held in China,
the first gold medals won overseas.

1973: Sea Cadet Unit commissioned in Delhi in INS

India.

1990: Sea Cadet Unit commissioned in Bombay at INS

Hamla at Marve.

1974: Honorary Commander Gokaldas Ahuja promoted

Honorary Captain Indian Navy.

1991: TS Jatuahar assisted the Naval Sailing Club
in the conduct of the International Enterprise World

1975: Sea Cadet Unit commissioned in Cochin in INS

Championship.

Venduruthy.

Pirojsha Godrej Memorial Boating Station commissioned

1976: In the Cadet Class World Championships organised
to further develop TS Jatuahar's sailing infrastructure.

by TS Jatuahar, Sea Cadets Farook Tarapore and Sanjiv

Rawell won the Bronze Medal, the first ever medal won by 1992: Sea Cadet Unit commissioned in Jam nagar in INS
an Indian in an International Individual sports event.

Valsura.

1979: Honorary Captain Gokaldas Ahuja promoted

1993: Sea Cadet Units commissioned in Goa in the

Honorary Commodore Indian Navy.

Hydrographic School in INS Gomantak and in Port Blair
in INS Jaratua.

Keel of the Sea Cadet Corps’ Sail Training Ship laid at

Bhavnagar by the FOCinC West.

1994: Sea Cadet Unit commissioned in INS Chilka.

1980: Sea Cadet Unit commissioned in Ootacamund in

1995: Sea Cadet Unit commissioned in Lonavala in INS
the Good Shepherd Public School.

Shiuaji.

Sea Cadet Corps’ Sail Training Ship launched by the

1996: TS Jatuahar conducted the International Cadet

Chief of the Naval Staff.

class World Championships.

India’s first square rig sail training ship commissioned 2000: Sea Cadet Units commissioned in Pune in JN
by the Chief of the Naval Staff as SCC STS Varuna.

Petit Technical High School and the National Defence

Academy’s KV School.

1982: T S Jaw ahar along with the Naval Sailing Club
conducted the Asian Games Yachting Event in Bombay 2001: Sea Cadets participated in the Navy’s International Harbour. Ex-Sea Cadet Farook Tarapore and Sea Cadet

Fleet Review and had the honour of leading the City Parade

Midshipman Zarir Karanjia won a gold medal.

carrying the flags of 33 participating navies.

1986: Honorary Captain Gokaldas Ahuja awarded the

TS Jatuahar hosted the Sea Cadet Annual Conference

Padma Shri.

and an International Muster for foreign Sea Cadets.

3- The two-hander Cadet has nurtured most of India’s top class sailors.

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 395

The Sea Cadet Corps conducted the International

Sea Cadet Unit commissioned in Okha in INSDtvarka Optimist Dinghy Asian Sailing Championship with 58
and in Daman in the Coast Guard Air Stations Public participants from 12 Asian countries.

School.

2004: Two Sea Cadets embarked in Tarangini for the final 2003: Two Sea Cadets embarked in the Navy’s Sail leg from Singapore to Kochi.

Training Ship Tarangini during the 42-day middle leg in
the Great Lakes.

396 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

52

Sailing And Yachting

Preamble

Yachting2 from 1960 Onwards

In India, sailing is as ancient as its history. Sailing vessels In 1960, the yachting enthusiasts of Bombay and Poona, carried India’s merchandise as far east as China and as far led by the Army’s College of Military Engineering (CM E) in west as the Red Sea and the east coast of Africa.

Poona, succeeded in launching the Yachting Association
of India (YA1) and patterned it on the Royal Yachting

Sailing as a sport was introduced in India by the English Association of Britain.

in the 19th century and remained an exclusively English
sport. The first Yacht Club was established in 1846.

Since the CME and its Sappers Sailing Club came under
the Engineer in Chief (E in C) at Army Headquarters, the first

A number of sailing clubs came into being wherever there President of the YA1 was the E in C. The Commandant of was sufficient water and sailing enthusiasts. The prominent the National Defence Academy, Rear Admiral BA Samson clubs were in Bombay, Poona, Calcutta, Barrackpore, was the Vice President. Major KO Stiffle of the CME who Madras, Maithon1 and Secunderabad. Clubs owned their had been the driving force in the creation of the YA1 was own boats and also looked after the boats owned by their the first Secretary. Today, there are 42 clubs affiliated to members.

the YA1.

From the naval point of view, sail training imparts first

Commander (then Lt Cdr) RN Gulati was the Assistant
hand experience of wind, weather and the vagaries of the Secretary of the YA1 in 1960. He recalls: sea and fosters nicety of judgement and the quality of

"In a matter of two years after 1960, due to the

“sea sense” . Its unique value lies in its ability to develop untiring efforts of the YAI, the several sailing clubs
initiative, courage, comradeship, teamwork and endurance,
located in different parts of India were brought under
particularly in rough weather. The Navy imparts sail training
the YAI banner and All-India Regattas were held. The
to cadets as soon as they embark on their naval career.

Navy took serious note of this development and naval

Naval Sailing in the 1950s
officers began to feature prominently in such regattas -

Lieutenant Commanders Mammen, Mongia, Contractor

In the 1950s, frigate-sized ships and above used to have
and Moghal were among them. It is significant that they
two-hander 14-foot sailing dinghies embarked on board
were all products of the National Defence Academy,3
for sail training. On Wednesday and Saturday afternoons
barring Mammen who was in charge of the NDA’s Naval
and on Sundays, it was customary for ships to lower

Training Team.

their dinghies, in whichever harbour or anchorage they

“With the Navy’s greater involvement in racing, the
happened to be in, and except when sailing races had been
mantle of the Presidentship of the YAI shifted to the
scheduled, leisurely sail around the harbour. Commanding

Chiefs of Naval Staff, which continues to this day.

Officers usually took one of their ships’ officers to crew
for them and the ships’ officers usually took one of their

“In February 1962, whilst at the NDA, I organised and
younger officers or midshipmen to crew for them. This
skippered an off-shore sailing expedition from Bombay
helped the younger officers to learn and acquire sea sense
to Goa and back. Of course, once again the Sappers
from their elders.

of the Army had beaten us in this regard as well, as in

1 • The 80-square mile Maithon Lake is located in the Damodar Valley.

2- In contemporary sailing parlance, 'a yacht is a craft raced under sail measuring to a standard size.

3- The National Defence Academy is located beside the 15-square mile Kharakvasla Lake.

The Navy undertook to man and maintain Varuna as a
the mid 50s, Major Stiffle had skippered a Seabird class tender to the training cruiser Mysore. In return, the Navy yacht to visit Karachi and Bandar Abbas in Iran.

used Varuna for three days a week for the sail training of

“In 1970, when I was the Deputy Director Naval Training Mysore’s naval cadets.

at NHQ, I started the ball rolling for the acquisition of an
ocean-going yacht. Unfortunately, it didnt materialise Varuna’s Voyage to Australia for the Bicentennial then. However the seed had been sown. It resulted in Celebrations the acquisition of the square-rigged brig Vanina in 1987, On 26 January 1988, Australia was to hold the bi-centennial which completed around the world voyage following in celebrations to commemorate the landing of the first the footsteps of the Army Trishna’s similar voyage a few Australian settlers in and around the port of Sydney. As years earlier.”

part of these celebrations, a “Tall Ship” race was scheduled

The Sea Cadet Sail Training Ship Vanina
from Hobart to Sydney in which 250 square-rigged ships
would be taking part. It was decided that the Indian Naval

The Section titled, “The Navy and the Sea Cadet Corps ’ Adventure Foundation would sponsor Varuna for the has dealt with the genesis of the Sea Cadets in Karachi in celebrations.

1938, their re-naming as Sea Cadets in Bombay in 1951
and the subsequent development of the Corps in close

After being refitted in the Naval Dockyard Bombay,
association with the Navy. Its founder, Mr Gokaldas Ahuja, Varuna sailed on 14 September 1987 on her first oceanic had two visionary dreams:

voyage, manned by seven officers, five senior sailors, 16

• The first was to raise the funds for the construction of naval cadets and two Sea Cadets. She carried 2/2 tonnes a ‘stone frigate’, as the headquarters of the Sea Cadet of fuel and 2,700 litres of water, which limited their water Corps. In 1966, the President of India commissioned consumption to five litres per head per day during the Training Ship Jawahar, on the eastern foreshore in 29,600 km voyage.

Bombay harbour.

On the outward journey, Varuna called at Goa, Cochin,

• The second was the construction of a Sail Training Ship the Indonesian ports of Padang, Cilacap and Bali, and in which his Sea Cadets could actually go to sea. This the West Australian ports of Port Headland, Carnarvon, was fulfilled on 20 April 1981 when the Sail Training Geraldton and Fremantle.

Ship Varuna was commissioned by the Chief of the

Naval Staff, Admiral RL Pereira.4

After departure from the South Australian port of

Adelaide, Varuna suffered a setback off Port Lincoln. She

The 110-tonne, 29-metre long Varuna was built by lost both her masts with sails at sea on 20 December 1987.

Alcock Ashdown in Bhavnagar, at a cost of Rs 32,50,000,5 At her next port of call, Melbourne, she was refitted with a to the drawings of the “Royalist’’, a brig owned by the Sea new rig, (without square sails but only fore and aft sails) in Cadet Corps in Britain. The design had been chosen for which configuration she participated in the Tall Ships event its capacity to allow the maximum number of cadets to be with improvised ‘jury masts’ and arrived at Sydney on 14
trained, without their having to handle unduly heavy sails January 1988, as planned, for the Tall Ships Parade.

and having the facilities for acquiring skills in navigation,
engineering and communication.

Varuna departed from Sydney on 29 January 1988. After
calling at Melbourne, Adelaide, Esperance, Fremantle,

Varuna was the first square-rigger in Asia. She had 5,000 Carnarvon, Christmas Island, Jakarta, Singapore, Penang, square feet of sail - six square sails and six fore and aft sails.

Campbell Bay, Cochin and Goa, she arrived in Bombay on

She had a bunk each for 21 cadets, a modern galley and

15 April 1988, having completed a 15,000-mile voyage in
a chart house well-equipped with navigational aids. Her seven months.

normal speed under sail was 6 to 7 knots though she could
make up to 10 to 12 knots with all sails rigged. She was

Indian Naval Sailing Vessel Samudra
fitted with two diesel engines for manoeuvres in harbour
and for use when wind conditions were unfavourable. She Tri-Service Expedition 1988-89
could sail for 8 to 10 days at a stretch.

In 1987, the Navy acquired the 13-metre sailing yacht

Samudra. In 1988, it was decided to send Samudra on 4. Her keel had been laid in 1979 and she had been launched in 198

5. Apart from an interest free loan from the Navy, the Prime Minister
the maintenance of Varuna.

contributed Rs 100,000 annually from th e N ational D e fe n c e F u n d for 398 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

a Tri-Service expedition to circumnavigate the globe. The countries, it was affiliated to the Royal Yachting Association first leg of 7,590 miles was from Vizag on the east coast of Britain and was recognised as the National Yachting of India to Dakar on the northwest coast of Africa. The Authority for India.

second leg of 9,735 miles was from Dakar to Hawaii in the
middle of the Pacific Ocean. The final leg of 10,660 miles

August 1960: First YAI Regatta held under the auspices
was from Hawaii back to Vizag.

of the National Defence Academy on Kharakvasla Lake.

Flying the Blue Ensign of an Indian Naval Fleet Auxiliary,

1961: Defence Services Sailing Club inaugurated at Delhi-

Samudra set sail westbound from Cochin on 15 November Okhla on the river Yamuna.

1988, manned by six officers - four from the Navy and one

Indian Naval Sailing Association (INSA) established.

each from the Army and the Air Force.

Naval Sailing Club Vishakhapatnam inaugurated when

On the first leg, Samudra called at Aden, Port Said, INS Circars took over the local yacht club.

Malta, and Cartagena and arrived at Las Palmas on 2

February 1989.

Second YAI Regatta held under the auspices of the Naini

Tal Yacht Club on Naini Tal.6

She set sail from Las Palmas on 6lh March and after
calling at Cayenne, Georgetown, Trinidad and La Guaira

1963: The International Yacht Racing Association (IYRCI)

arrived at Panama on 5th May where a new enqine was granted India the sail letters “KI” . (K was used by all fitted.

Commonwealth countries and I was for India).

She sailed from Panama on 24th May for San Cristoba

1964: Naval Sailing Club Cochin inaugurated in

(Ecuador). To avoid the hurricane season off the west coast September.

of Mexico, Samudra was re-routed via the South Pacific

1965: Naval Sailing Club Bombay shifted from INS Angre

Ocean.

to its present location in Colaba after the Coast Wing Boat

After calling at the Galapagos Islands, Nikuhiva and Pool was taken over from the Army.

Tahiti, she arrived at Rorotonga on 26th Ju ly where she

1969: Sea Cadet Sailing Association formed and affiliated
remained until 9th September when she sailed for Port Villa.

to the YAI.

After calling at Port Moresby, Darwin, Surabaya and Port

Blair, she arrived at Vizag on 4 December 1989.

1970: In the Asian Games Yachting in Bangkok, Lieutenant

Commander S Contractor won the Bronze Medal in the

During her 52,000 km voyage round the world, Samudra Enterprise class event. He received the Arjuna Award.

visited 27 ports in 18 countries.

1971: India became a full member of the International

Bali Yatra 1992

Yacht Racing Association and the letters “IND” replaced

In November 1992, the Navy in collaboration with the the letters “KI” on Indian sails.

Government of Orissa sent Samudra on a sailing expedition

1972: Lieutenant Commanders S Contractor and T Mogul
to Bali in Indonesia to commemorate the trading links and participated in the 1972 Olympics sailing events in Kiel, the sailing route used by traders during the period of the

Germany.

Gupta Empire.

1973: National Enterprise Association formed in the Naval

C h ro n o lo g y

Base Cochin.

1950: Naval Sailing Club Bombay started functioning with

1977: The International Yachting Championship in the
three boats owned by the Naval Officers ‘Vasant Sagar’

Enterprise class boats was held at Goa from 11 to 17

Mess and maintained by the Shipwright School in INS December 1977. This was the first time when such an Angre.

event was held in an Afro-Asian country.

1955: INS Shiuaji Sailing Club started functioning on

1978: In the Asian Games Yachting at Bangkok,

Shivaji Lake.

Commanders SK Mongia and D Kumar won Silver Medals
in the Enterprise class event. Commander S K Mongia

I960: The Yachting Association of India formed on 15
received the Arjuna Award.

May 1960 at the CM E Poona. Like other Commonwealth

6- Subsequent YAI Regattas were held on a number of occasions at Maithon, Madras, Delhi, Bombay, Kirkee, Cochin, Secunderabad, Bangalore and Kharakvasla.

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 399

INS Shioaji Sailing Club shifted to the new Shivsagar

1980: The Navy inaugurated the annual Seabird Rally from

Bombay to Goa.

Lake.

Naval Sailing Club (Mandovi) constituted in November

1981: April 1981 - Sea Cadet Sail Training Ship Varuna
commissioned.

for the Naval Academy.

In the Enterprise class World Championships held in

1991: In the Enterprise class World Championships held

Canada, Captain SK Mongia won the Bronze Medal.

in Bombay, Lieutenants F Tarapore and K S Rao won the

Gold Medal.

The Headquarters of the YAI shifted from the Army

Headquarters’ Engineer-in-Chief to Naval Headquarters.

1992: November 1992 -Samudra sailed on the expedition
to Bali to commemorate the sailing route used by traders

1982: In the Asian Games Yachting in Bombay, Sub during the period of the Gupta Empire.

Lieutenant F Tarapore won the Gold Medal in the Fire-Ball
class event. He was awarded Rs 10,000 for his achievement

The Naval Sailing Club Mumbai
by the Chief of the Naval Staff. He also received the Arjuna The Naval Sailing Club Mumbai is the largest yachting Award.

complex in India. It houses the National Sailing Institute

1984: Lieutenants F Tarapore and D Bhandari participated of the Sports Authority of India. It hosts national sailing in the 1984 Olympic sailing events at Los Angeles.

championships and international sailing and yachting
regattas and championships.

1985: The Indian Army’s ‘Sappers’ commenced their one
and a half year 50,000-kilometre circumnavigating voyage

The Indian Naval Sailing Association
round the world in their 37-foot fibre-glass yacht Trishna.

The Indian Naval Sailing Association (INSA) was established

1986: In the Asian Games Yachting at Pusan, Lieutenants in 1961. Its aims were: F Tarapore and D Bhandari won Silver Medals in the 470-

• To promote the sport of sailing and yachting amongst
class event. Lieutenant D Bhandari received the Arjuna
naval personnel.

Award.

• To encourage the growth of naval sailing clubs in

Naval Sailing Club Port Blair inaugurated.

ports and, where facilities exist, in naval bases and
establishments.

1987: September 1987 - Sail Training Ship Varuna sailed
for the Australian Bicentennial Celebrations and Tall Ships

INSA started off with four Naval Sailing Clubs - Bombay

Race from Hobart to Sydney.

{INS Angre), Visakhapatnam (INS Circars), Cochin (INS

1988: April 1988 - Varuna returned to Bombay after her Venduruthy) and Goa (Dona Paula). Since then Naval Australian voyage.

Sailing Clubs have been inaugurated in INS Shiuaji

(the Engineering School at Lonavala), INS Valsura (the

Watermanship Training Centre Mandovi inaugurated in Electrical School at Jamnagar), INS Hamla (the Logistics, the Naval Academy.

Management, Computer and Catering School at Marve,

Bombay), INS Agnibahu (the parent naval establishment

November 1988 - Samudra sailed for the Tri-Service

Sailing Expedition.

at Karanja, Bombay), INS Gomantak (the parent
establishment at Vasco da Gama, Goa), INS Mandovi (the

1989: December 1989 -Samudra returned to Vizag after Naval Academy at Panjim, Goa), INS Chilka (the Sailors circumnavigating the world.

Training Establishment on Chilka Lake in Orissa) and INS

Jarawa (the parent naval establishment at Port Blair in the

1990: At Asian Games Yachting in Beijing, Lieutenant F Andaman Islands).

Tarapore won the Bronze Medal in the 470-class event.

Lieutenant Commander H Motivala and Lieutenant PK

INSA conducts annual intra Navy championships and

Garg won the Bronze Medal in the Enterprise event. fields individuals and teams for national championships.

Lieutenant PK Garg received the Arjuna Award.

400 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Four Yearly Asian Games

Year

Venue

Class

Skipper & Crew

Medal

Gp to

No yachting events

1970

1970

Bangkok

Enterprise

Lt Cdr S Contractor

Bronze

1974

Teheran

No yachting events

1978

Bangkok

Enterprise

Cdr SK Mongia

Silver

Cdr D Kumar

Silver

1982

Bombay

Fireball

Sub Lt F Tarapore

Gold

1986

Pusan

470

Lt F Tarapore

Silver

470

Lt D Bhandari

Silver

1990

Beijing

470

Lt F Tarapore

Bronze

Enterprise

Lt Cdr H Motivala

Bronze

Lt PK Garg

Bronze

TRANSITION TO EMINENCE / 401

IN T H E I N D I A N O C E A N

EAR LY E U R O P E A N T R A D IN G

Muscat

C a lc u tta

Damai

/ ^ N u re u lip a ta m

B om b ay)

/ /

B A Y O F

S ocotra Is
jP u lic a t

B E N G A L

A R A B IA N
i p o n d l c h e r r y

A n d a m a n ls<

CannanoreY*.

S E A

^ C u d d a lo r e

'■

M a h i.

N a g a p a tin a m

C a lic u f
iK araik al

CochlnV

Tuticol
lannar
rtT rin c o m a le e

N lc o b a r Is

C o lo m b o !

M ALD IV E S

A d d o o A toll

M om basa

■ S eych elles

D iego Suarez

D ie g o G arcia

M A D A !

■ Mauritius

Reunion

M ocam bii

M ergu i

C ar N ic o b a r ■

G rea t

N ic o b a r

[in g a p o re

Am bolna

M a c a s :

E A S T IN D IE S

IM O R

Strait o f S u n da

4 02 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

R eference Notes

1. H istorical O v e rv ie w o f Naval P resen ce in the Indian O c e a n - 15th to 18th C e n tu rie s T h e C h in ese

After the inland canal was completed, water-borne traffic
shifted from the sea to the canal route. The fleets built

In the 14lh century, rampant piracy off Chinas coast had led
up during Cheng Ho’s voyages were allowed to run down.

Chinese emperors to commence the construction of a long This coincided with the imperial perception that China was north-south inland canal through which merchandise-laden
self sufficient enough to be the centre of the world and
boats could ply between the southern and northern regions.

that there was no need to interact vigorously beyond its

Whilst this canal was being constructed over the decades,
maritime boundaries.

armed imperial Chinese ships kept the pirates at bay.

Piracy in the China seas, which had been one reason

In 1402, the Ming emperor decided to extend his behind the Chinese voyages into the Indian Ocean, commercial influence westwards into Southeast Asia and intensified with the northward withdrawal of the Imperial the Indian Ocean. He selected Cheng H o1 to command Navy. To counter pirate attacks, the later Mings (1435
these missions. Between 1405 and 1434, Cheng Ho led to 1644) and the Manchus (1644-1911) tried to insulate seven voyages of over sixty ships at a time, the largest and

China from the sea.

best equipped exploring fleets then known, laden with gold,
silks, porcelain and other Chinese wares. During these

The next significant voyage of Chinese naval ships into
voyages, unprecedented for that era, he visited Indochina,
the Indian Ocean took place 550 years later in 1985.

Java, Sumatra, Ceylon, Calicut on India’s Malabar Coast,

T h e P o rt u g u e s e

Hormuz at the entrance to the Persian Gulf, Aden at the
entrance to the Red Sea and the coast of east Africa.

In 1492 Columbus sailed westwards from Spain in search
of the Indies. Five years later, Vasco da Gama sailed

These voyages were intended to encourage Indian
southwards from Portugal in 1497. After rounding the

Ocean kingdoms to come and trade with China and at Cape of Good Hope, he went up the east coast of Africa the same time to discipline private Chinese merchants who
belonged to a pirate fringe. This policy was given up in the and engaged an Indian Gujarati pilot who navigated him 1420s when the Chinese capital moved from Nanking to across the Arabian Sea to make landfall near Calicut on Peking to cope with the Mongol threat in the north.

the Malabar Coast of India in 1498.2

1. The voyages of Cheng Ho (Zheng He, meaning Three Jewel Eunuch) helped to extend Chinese political, maritime and commercial influence in Southeast Asia and the Indian Ocean. His voyages reinforced the foundations laid from the 9th century onwards for the emigration of Chinese traders to Southeast Asia, who became the forbears of today’s ‘Overseas Chinese’ of this region.

2. Vasco da Gama sailed from Lisbon with four ships on 8 July 1497. In November, he rounded the Cape of Good Hope. By the time he reached the port of Mozambique, he ran into Muslim hostility but at Malindi on the coast of what is now Kenya, he managed to secure a Gujarati pilot to guide him eastward. He set sail on 24th April with three ships and reached Calicut (now Kozhikode) on the Malabar Coast of India on 20/21 May 1498.

When he offered the paltry gifts that he had brought with him (cloth, hats, coral etc) to the Hindu ruler known as the Zamorin, he was told that

‘it was nothing to give a King and that the poorest merchant who came from Mecca would give him more than that'. Instead he was asked for gold. Vasco was unable to sign a trade agreement. With the winds against him, the voyage back to Malindi took three months and many of his crew died of scurvy before they arrived in Portugal in September 1499. On his return, he informed Portugal’s King Manuel that the Indians were not interested in European trinkets and clothes. They made far better fabrics and trinkets themselves.

To follow up Vasco da Gama’s discoveries, Pedro Alvares Cabral was immediately dispatched to India with thirteen ships and a thousand men.

He established a trading post in Calicut. When news reached Portugal that this trading post had been razed by the Zamorin and Cabral had to flee to Cochin, Vasco da Gama was sent to India again in February 1502 to avenge that act. On the way to India he attacked a number of Muslim ships killing more than 400 men, women, and children returning from a Haj pilgrimage to Mecca. Arriving in Calicut, he subdued the inhabitants with superior fire-power and forced the Zamorin to make peace. Bearing a rich cargo of spice, he started homeward, establishing en route Portuguese colonies at Mozambique and Sofala on the coast of what is now Mozambique, before arriving in Portugal in September 1503. Rewarded by the Portuguese monarch for supposedly 'breaking the Muslim monopoly on trade with India’, Vasco da Gama settled down to profit from his ventures.

For the next two decades, he saw no active sea duty. In 1524 he was named viceroy and sent to India to correct the mounting corruption among the Portuguese authorities there. He died in Cochin three months after his arrival.

By pioneering the Portuguese sea route to India, Vasco da Gama had established Lisbon as the centre of the European spice trade, and laid the foundation for the Portuguese control of trade with the ports of eastern Africa, south-west India and the East Indies.

They found it impossible to manage without them.

The Portuguese objectives were to monopolise the trade

The Arabs were soon trading again, with Portuguese
in spices, which the Arabs then controlled, and secondly to
concurrence.

undermine the Ottoman-controlled monopoly by depriving
it of its terrestrial spice trade.

• Even though Portuguese ships patrolled both the west
coast of India and the Strait of Malacca, shippers were

The first two Portuguese viceroys, Francisco de Almeida
able to bypass Malacca and India. They brought spices
from 1505 to 1509 and Afonso de Albuquerque from 1509
from the Moluccas through the Strait of Sunda to Aceh
to 1515, evolved and implemented, with remarkable speed,
in northern Sumatra for transhipment directly to the
the concept of naval power based on fortified posts and

Red Sea. Albuquerque’s inability to capture Aden at the
backed by settlements:3

Red Sea entrance allowed the resumption of Red Sea

• On the east African coast at Kilwa in 1505 and

Arab traffic up to Alexandria from where Venetian ships

Mozambique Island in 1507.

carried the spices to Europe.

• Near the entrance to the Red Sea in the island of Socotra • Portugal’s naval power could not fully dominate the in 1507.

Indian Ocean because resource constraints precluded

• On the west coast of India at Cochin in 1502, Cannanore
having the number of ships necessary to control the
in 1506, Goa in 1510, Diu in 1535 and Daman in
vast water expanse. Indian Ocean footholds became

1558.4
expensive to maintain. Frequent mishaps to fleets, from

• On the Malay coast of the Malacca Strait at Malacca in
shipwreck or enemies, reduced profits. The lack of a

1511.

true monopoly prevented the Portuguese from charging
the prices that they wished in European markets.

• At Timor in 1511.

• With fewer than one million people and involved in

• At Amboina in the Moluccas in 1512.

similar forays in Africa and South America, Portugal was

• At the entrance to the Persian Gulf at Hormuz in 1515.

short of manpower. Soldiers from the home country

Subsequent viceroys established posts in Ceylon at
could only be spared in limited numbers. This made the

Colombo in 1518, in the Spice Islands - at Ternate in the

Portuguese rely on alliances with local states and enlist

Moluccas in 1521 and Macassar in the Celebes in 1545,
local troops.5 To overcome the manpower limitation,
at Bombay in 1534, at Macau in China in 1557 and at
the Portuguese turned their forts into settlements to

Mombassa in 1593 on the east coast of Africa.

provide a resident population for defence. Intermarriage
was encouraged.6 Christianity was encouraged through

For nearly a century, the Portuguese operated in the
the church.7 The new mixed population became firmly

Indian Ocean without European competition. Whilst their

Roman Catholic and successfully resisted attacks and
network of trading posts and forts gave them a measure
sieges.

of maritime control, they never gained total control of
the trade in pepper and fine spices. There were several • From viceroys to humble soldiers and seamen, the reasons:

Portuguese succumbed to the temptation to line their
own pockets.8

• Until the arrival of the Portuguese, much of the intra-

Indian Ocean trade had been conducted by Arabs. At

In 1580, the Portuguese crown passed to the Spanish
first, the Portuguese intended to oust the Arabs entirely.

Habsburgs until in 1640, a revolt restored independence.

3 '

4. The enclaves adjacent to Dam an were established much later - Nagar Haveli in 1783 and Dadra in 1785

5. This policy was continued throughout the Indian Ocean by the Dutch, the French and the British until 20* centu^.

u- G, ° ^ a, LUSp

CT ™
nity reSU‘teld fr0m A ^ e r q u e - s policy after 1510 of subsidising m arriages between Portuguese residents and Hindu brides, ^ n though M alacca was he nerve centre for the spice-producing islands of in d te
change m art for the trade

To Ifcccf
preoccupation wrth the Ottoman fleet in the Red Sea, Goa becam e the capital of the Portuguese East in preference 7. Sain t Ignatius Loyola had founded the Je su it order in 1534. Soon thereafter, Goa was selected as their headquarters in the Indian O cean. The See of G oa was established in 1537. In 1542, the great Je su it saint, Francisco Xavier, selected by Ignatius Loyola and appointed Papal Nuncio, arrived in Goa. In 1557, Goa was made a Metropolitan See and in 1560 an Archbishopric 8.

This m alady afflicted all the powers that followed the Portuguese.

4 04 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

It was during this period, 1580 to 1640 that Portuguese VOC ships and for providing small warships to escort, and power declined in the Indian Ocean. The Portuguese ran
protect from English depredations in the North Sea, the
short of skilled manpower to crew their vessels and the
convoys returning from the Indian Ocean. The large Dutch
rising naval power of Holland and England challenged their warships remained ‘in being’ to oppose the English fleet in position. Cinder Dutch blows in the East Indies and those
the ongoing Anglo Dutch Wars.

of the English in India,9 Portuguese dominance ceased,

The primary VOC objective v/as neither religion nor
though they continued to retain colonies like Mozambique,
empire but the spice trade. Knowing that the Portuguese

Goa and Timor well into the 20th century.

had no forts in the Moluccas, Ja va or Sum atra, they went

The Indian Ocean region did gain a few things from
directly to the main source of spices, the Spice Islands -
the Portuguese presence. The tangible benefits were the Celebes and the Moluccas - and secondarily to India s the introduction of products like tobacco, potatoes,

Malabar Coast for pepper and cardamom and to Ceylon11
pineapples, tomatoes, papayas, cashew nuts, and two
for cardamom and cinnamon. In 1619, they fixed their
varieties of chillies.

headquarters at Batavia (now Jakarta) in West Java.

The Dutch

Their strategy was to take control of the spice trade by
isolating the East Indies from trading in spices by sinking all

After the defeat of the Spanish Armada in 1588, the route vessels found in the archipelago’s waters, opening fortified to the east lay open to both the English and the Dutch.

trading posts, expanding its presence by direct force and

In the race to the Indian Ocean, the Dutch, having larger through alliances with local rulers.

resources, were the first to arrive.

The English East India Com pany (EIC ) had followed

Since the 1590s, many Dutchmen had voyaged to India
the VOC to the East Indies. It was no match for the VO C
and the East Indies in the service of the Portuguese as
in resources. In 1632, the VOC killed all the English
gunners, traders and clerks. Representatives of Amsterdam
merchants had been to Lisbon to collect information on agents in Amboina, the main trading post for spices in the sea route and the Portuguese trade.10
the Moluccas. After this massacre, the EIC withdrew and
made Surat the centre of their India system (based on

In 1602, the Dutch parliament granted the Dutch East friendly relations with the Mughal emperors) and obtained India Company, the VOC, a charter giving it a trading
a footing at Goa by an amicable arrangem ent with the
monopoly that extended from the Cape of Good Hope in

Portuguese.

South Africa eastwards to the Strait of Magellan in South

America, with sovereign rights in whatever territory it might

The VOC broke down the Portuguese monopoly by
acquire to conclude treaties with local princes, to build forts,
the persistent use of force. W ith superior resources and
maintain armed forces, wage war and conclude peace.

better seamanship, the Dutch wrested Portugal’s trade and

By so doing, the Dutch Government made the VOC its
bases. M alacca,12 Ceylon, and Cochin fell to the Dutch
instrument of war and conquest. Administrative functions
in 1641, 1658, and 1662 respectively. In 1652, the VO C
were to be carried out through officials who were required
established the first European settlement in South Africa
to take an oath of loyalty to the Dutch government.

on the Cape of Good Hope. At the peak of its power in

1669, the VOC had 40 warships, 150 merchant ships, and

In the initial stages after the formation of the VOC, the

10,000 soldiers.

role of the Dutch Navy was limited to providing guns to

9- The Persians, with English help, ousted the Portuguese from Hormuz in 1622. Bombay passed to England by marriage treaty in 1661. Ousted rom most strongholds, the Portuguese retained their capital at Goa, despite blockades and sieges.

10- In 1595, small companies of Amsterdam merchants had started their first voyages to the Indian Ocean. These voyages had followed the Portuguese route around the Cape and, expectedly, were opposed by the Portuguese. In Amsterdam, these small companies started competing for profits ereby spoiling the market. The leaders of the Dutch Republic commenced efforts to unite the small companies into one company, which in 1602
ecame the Vereenigde Oost-lndische Compagnie (VOC) - ‘United East India Company’ - the world’s first ‘joint stock company/

•

^ utch ships first visited Ceylon in 1602 and found the local king eager to enlist Dutch help against the Portuguese. In 1610 and 1612, when the the D GSe a9a'n S0U9^,t help’ the Dutch signed treaties. In 1638 and 1639, the Dutch captured Batticaloa and Trincomalee respectively. In 1642
fleet b|t<:h 3nd

Portu9uese si9ned a 10-year truce treaty, followed by a 1644 treaty for sharing the cinnamon producing areas. In 1656, a Dutch by th . , kaded and captured Ceylon, except for the Portuguese strongholds of Mannar and Jaffna in the north of Ceylon that were supported Jaff Glr ndian strongholds of Nagapattinam and Tuticorin. In 1657, the Dutch evicted the Portuguese from Tuticorin and in 1658 from Mannar

^
nna and Magapattinam.

the1 c^lt’* the
captured Malacca, but this no longer ensured control of the spice trade to Europe. To impose a monopoly, the VOC restricted ivation of cloves to Amboina and of nutmeg and mace to the Banda Islands, destroying the spice trees elsewhere.

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 4 0 5

autonomy and collecting tribute for the VOC.

Much larger than the English EIC, the Dutch VOC had the
character of a national concern. Dutch naval power, more

Gradually, internal disorders, the growth of British15 and
efficient than that of the Portuguese, secured monopoly French power and the consequences of a harsh policy conditions in the islands and sea-lanes. It was only in land towards the inhabitants enfeebled the VOC. The corruption areas like Travancore (in Kerala) that resort had to be made of VOC officials, financial mismanagement and a decline to competition.

in trade eventually led to the VO C’s bankruptcy. In 1799,

As regards the problem of payments for commodities, the Dutch government revoked the VO C’s charter, took the VOC, like the EIC, (and the Portuguese before them) over its debts and assumed direct control of what came to were short of exchange goods. Textiles were needed to buy be called the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia).

spices and silver was needed to buy cotton and silk in India

The English
and China respectively. To work the spice monopoly, the

VOC developed an elaborate system of trade extending The English venture to India was entrusted to the East from the Persian Gulf to Japan, the ultimate object of which India Company (EIC), formed for the exploitation of trade was to secure the goods with which to secure the spices with East and Southeast Asia and India. It received its without recourse to scarce European resources. It was this monopoly rights of trade by royal charter on 31 December trade that brought the VOC to northwest India at Surat,13

1600. It was not comparable to the ‘national’ character of
to the southeast Coromandel Coast at Nagappattinam, to the VOC. Its initial capital of £ 50,000 was less than one-Bengal14 in northeast India and up-country at Agra.

tenth of the VOC’s.

By the late 17th century, the VOC declined as a trading

The EIC’s first objective being the ‘the spices of the
and naval power and became more involved in the internal East Indies’, the first two voyages went there. On the third affairs of Java. By the 18th century, the VOC had changed voyage, one of the ships came to Surat in 1608 to obtain from a commercial-shipping enterprise to a loose territorial cotton textiles for exchange with the spice growers in the organisation interested in the agricultural produce of the East Indies.16

East Indies archipelago. It established plantations for coffee
and other new crops and instituted a system of forced

The EIC ’s naval victory off Surat in 1612 over the
deliveries. This relied on the cooperation of amenable Portuguese, whose control of the Haj pilgrim sea route to Javanese aristocrats, and on intermediaries from the Mecca was already being resented by the Mughals17, brought growing local Chinese population whose immigration the about a dramatic change. The embassy of the Englishman VOC promoted. In the Moluccas and much of the East Sir Thomas Roe (1615-18) to Emperor Jehangir’s court Indies archipelago, VOC trading rights were converted into secured an accord (in the form of a firman™, or grant of political control, with local rulers retaining their internal
privileges), by which the EIC secured the right to trade and

13. As early as 1604, the Dutch had tried, without success to open trariTin c

> ■
u ^

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Gujarat cottons for the Moluccas, Sumatra and Europe' In 1616 th <;

°

,n

^“am ^ay on the northwest coast of India, to secure
the Dutch ‘provisional’ permission to open a trading post In 16i m ®rc^ants» fearful that the Dutch might attack their shipping, granted commerce with Prince Khurram, the son of Mughal Emperor Jeh

'• T h '

°PPosition. the Dutch succeeded in negotiating a treaty of

Cambay, Ahmedabad, Agra and Burhanpur.

an9lr-
ereafter trading posts for indigo and textiles were established at Broach, 14. In 1627, the Dutch established their first trading posts at Pippli and R
and Bernagore in ‘perpetual fief, the Dutch set up trading posts at (
v

*

’ a

^

MaWab °f BengaI gave the Dutch the S ta g e s of Chinsura

Ganges at Patna. Their exports were textiles and silk saltnptrp n^o

'nsura and Qassimbazar up the Hooghly River and further upstream on the 15. it was powerless to resist a British attacK on its possesses " n 80

^

^

^

16. The captain had a letter from the king of England to Emperor Jehannir * 1,-
person in 1609. Jehangir promised trading facilities but the Portuau

^errn'ss'on t° trade. He went to Agra and presented this letter in
that they would resist any attempt by the EIC to encroach on their o re v ’

t * P°StS Were
a,ready wel1 established in India, made it plain
cotton textiles on southeast India's Coromandel Coast at Masulipatam

^ trade’

'n 1611, established a trading post for
the presence of a Portuguese fleet. In 1612, therefore, the EIC sent

^

S S*X^ 9n<^ seven^1 v°yages were unable to trade at Surat owing to and obtained a finnan confirming Jehangir’s permission to trade In ^ r f 5?,113^ 00

^ h tin g ships. This squadron arrived in Surat in September
several days followed, neither side securing any decisive advantaae I

°a n ’ 3 Portu9uese fleet arrived to dispute the matter. A running fight of landed their goods and set up their first trading post

'

November, the Portuguese drew off. The EIC ships returned to Surat, 17. The annual Haj pilgrimages to Mecca, whose route lay through Guiarat „ ^ c

,
dominance of the Arabian Sea. Indeed, the safe performance of H h h

. urat had for years been hassled by Portuguese extortion and passes issued by the Portuguese.

^ ^

Muslim ladies of Emperor Akbar’s household had to be arranged under 18. This firm an from the Mughals, combined with the EIC’s exclusion frnm c

,
not the Far East, should be the chief theatre of English activity in Asi S by the V° C in the Same peri°d’ determined that ,ndia* a"d

4 0 6 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

to establish trading posts in return for becoming the virtual

In 1690, political instability in south India made it
naval auxiliaries of the Mughal Empire.19
necessary to acquire a second fortified trading post,
besides that in Madras. The EIC purchased a fort, later

The ElC ’s attempts to penetrate the East Indies had met named Fort St David, near the town of Cuddalore, about with stout opposition from the VOC. After the Amboina

100 miles (160 km) south of Madras.

massacre in 1632 (in which the VOC seized the EIC
trading post and executed all the English, Japanese, and

The trade developed by the EIC differed substantially

Portuguese traders), the E lC ’s trade for spices steered
from that of the VOC. It was a trade in bulk instead of
discreetly clear of the VOC’s domain.

in highly priced luxury goods. The profits were a factor
of volume rather than scarcity. It worked in competitive

Shivaji, the founder of Maratha power in India, had
instead of monopolistic conditions. It depended upon
perceived the need for ships to harry both the Mughals and
political goodwill instead of intimidation.

the EIC and had built up a modest fleet of agile indigenous
armed ships called ghurabs and gallivats.20 In January The ElC’s trade became more profitable than that of the

1664, Shivaji, assembled his fleet and attacked Surat by VOC, because of the smaller area covered and because land. Six years later, in 1670, Shivaji attacked Surat again.

the absence of the armed forces for enforcing monopoly
reduced overhead expenses. But it encountered the same

For the rest of the century, the EIC settled down to a
difficulties of payment. Indians would take iittle other than
trade in cotton and silk piece goods, indigo, and saltpetre,
silver in exchange for their goods, and the export of bullion
with spices from south India. From India, it extended its was an offence to England’s reigning mercantilist political commercial activities to the Persian Gulf, Southeast Asia
and East Asia.

economy.

To solve the silver problem, the EIC developed a system

On the Coromandel Coast, the trading post established of country trade not unlike that of the VOC, the profits of at Masulipatam in 1611 was moved up to the site of

Madras in 1639 to be nearer to the weaving centres from which helped to pay for the annual dispatch of goods to which the EIC obtained cotton textiles for export to Persia

England. Madras and Gujarat supplied cotton goods, and
and the East Indies. In 1641, Madras became the ElC ’s Gujarat also supplied indigo. Silk, sugar, and saltpetre (for headquarters in south India and became the first settlement gunpowder) came from Bengal. There was a spice trade to be fortified.

along the Malabar Coast on a competitive basis with the

VOC and the Portuguese. Opium was shipped to China

The only exception to the arrangement of trading posts and became the basis of the Anglo-Chinese tea trade.

operating under Mughal firman was the island of Bombay. In
the First Anglo-Dutch War in Europe (1652-1654), England

Towards the close of the 17th century, when the VO C’s
and Portugal had been allies. After the war, the Portuguese financial crisis compelled its ships to decay and its ceded Bombay to the king of England in 1661 as part of relations with local rulers started depending on flattery and the dowry for his marriage to a Portuguese princess. Since presents, the EIC concluded that its position in India had there was no way that the king could administer Bombay to depend on naval and military power. It tried to copy the from England, he transferred it to the EIC in 1668. The VOC’s policy of the use of force. It resorted to armed trade EIC had a precarious time for seventeen years until 1685,
and attacked the Mughals. This 1686-90 venture ended in
when it moved its headquarters from Surat to Bombay and
disaster. Out of this fiasco, however, came the foundation
fortified it.21

19. There is an apocryphal story that the Mughal Empress, Moor Jehan, had the prescience to caution Emperor Jehangir against granting this firm an to the English because they might infiltrate his empire from seaward. But the Emperor told her that women should not meddle in matters of statecraft.

20. The ghurabs' were beamy, shallow draught, square-rigged sailing ships of 300 to 400 tonnes with two or three masts and armed with sixteen to thirty nine-pounder and twelve-pounder guns.

The ‘gallivats’ were smaller, shallow draught galleys of 70 to 120 tonnes, armed with four to ten two-pounder and four-pounder guns and propelled by a single bank of oars, with a triangular mainsail as ‘auxiliary.

Their usual tactics were to lie in wait for a single ship and then attack with eight or ten ghurabs and forty and fifty gallivats carrying boarding parties. The ghurabs would lie off astern of the ship at long cannon-shot and fire at her masts. If they succeeded in dismasting her, the gallivats with their boarding parties would close her from all sides and board her.

21. The situation in Bombay was quite piquant. The EIC was on Bombay Island, the Portuguese on Salsette and at Mahim and Varsova, the Mughals at Mazagon, and the Marathas on Khanderi and Elephanta Islands. For the best part of twenty years, the EIC balanced in a precarious neutrality between the Marathas and the Mughals, taking no part in the fierce and bloody battle fought between their fleets off Thana (in which the Sidi, the Mughal admiral, secured an overwhelming victory), but trying, in pursuance of orders from England ‘to keep out of wars and obtain trading rights from both sides’.

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 4 0 7

of Calcutta in 1690 - a mud flat that had the advantage of

In 1664, the French m onarchy approved the formation
a deep anchorage.

of the Compagnie des Indes O rie n ta ls (CIO), granting it
exclusive privilege of trade for 50 years from the Cape of

At Madras, Fort St George was already fortified. A fort Good Hope to India and the South Seas. The CIO was had been built in Bombay. Fort William in Calcutta followed granted also the perpetual grant of Madagascar and in 1696. By the end of the 17th century, the E1C had three the neighbouring islands on the condition of promoting centres of power on the coasts of India, each sustainable

Christianity there, the perpetual grant of all lands and places
by sea.

conquered from France’s enemies and the ownership of all

The E1C found that India produced the world’s best mines and slaves it might take.

cotton yarn and textiles. To this huge ‘cottage industry’,

The CIO first arrived at Surat in 1668. In pursuance of the
they provided the powerful stimulus of European demand. firman given by Emperor Aurangzeb, the CIO established By the end of the 17th century, India had a sophisticated
a trading post and began to trade westwards with Bandar
market and credit structure and controlled a quarter of the Abbas and Basra in the Persian Gulf and eastwards up to world trade in textiles.22 It had twenty three percent share the Spice Islands.25
of the world’s GDP (roughly the USA’s share of the world’s
wealth today). Indian cottons had transformed the dress

The CIO flourished briefly until 1675. By 1680, little
of Europe.23
money had been made and many ships were in need
of repair. Further progress of French settlements was

The French
interrupted by events in Europe. The VOC captured

The French had shown an interest in the Indian Ocean Pondicherry in 1693. When the CIO retrieved it in 1697, from the early years of the 16th century but their voyages it had regained a fine fort but had lost the trade. By 1706, were few and far between.24
the CIO seemed moribund.

In the 17th century, French trading companies were

Other European Com panies in the 17th Century
established under different names to oversee French
commerce with India, East Africa and other territories of the There were four other European enterprises in the Indian Indian Ocean, and the East Indies. French ships periodically Ocean during this period: visited the Spice Islands, Malacca, Japan and the coasts of • Danish. Initial attempts to gain a share of the East Arabia and India. But the VOC’s determination to monopolise

India trade were not very successful. Ships operated
the trade checked the French from establishing an effective
intermittently from 1616 onwards from Tranquebar
naval presence in the Spice Islands.

on the Coromandel Coast. After the Danish East India

In 1642, the French established a trading post on

Company was formally chartered in 1729, it acquired

Madagascar s southeast coast at Fort Dauphine as it was

Serampore in Bengal in 1755 and prospered until the
easily reached by ships coming from or going to India.

British advance of power there later in the 18th century.

The company waned after Britain destroyed Danish

In 1643, lie de Bourbon (now the island of Reunion) was
naval power in its 1801 war in Europe. In 1845, Britain
settled as a layover staUon for ships rounding the Cape of
purchased Tranquebar and Serampore.

Good Hope en route to India. The French established a
settlement there in 1662.

• Belgian. In 1723, the Ostend Company of Austrian

Netherlands merchants appeared for a brief period as

22. Economic historians have done considerable research on thTu i

T

------------------------------------

India’s wealth sustained more than a hundred million peoole With i ° f lnd‘a between the 16th and 18th centuries. At the end of the 16th century, t e est in the world. There was a large and vigorous skilled artic* ^
arable land, its agriculture was vibrant with productivity comparable to an owners and the courts. The economy produced a qreat fin^r,0 T °F ? FC6 ^ at Pr°duced not only cottons but also luxurious products for the

) were more than ten times those of his contemporary Loui y?\/S u
and
annual revenues of the Mughal Emperor Aurangzeb (1659-

23. The English steadily learned from India about cotton textiles b !

' * * * * . * * ° '

by the Industrial Revolution.

e en of the 18th century, they began making textiles with machines generated 24. 29 years after the Portuguese, the first French ship appeared at Hi,, i 1
ships visited the Maldives and, via Ceylon and the Nicobar Islands r
h
two ^renc^ ships reached the west coast of Sumatra. In 1601, two

25. By 1671, trading posts were established in Malabar, in M a s u ^ !'^ ^ SUmatra'

Islands. In 1671, a French fleet visited Surat, Daman, Bombay G ^ ° n ^ ^oromandel Coast, Ceylon, Malacca and in Bantam in the Spice king of Ceylon the grant of Trincomalee. In 1676, the CIO ac ' ' °h '

c.ut' ^rangannore and Cochin. After rounding Ceylon, it obtained from the competition with the already-established VOC, the CIO's shio^

Pondicherry on the Coromandel Coast, 85 miles south of Madras. In constant obtained Chandarnagar, 16 miles north of Calcutta from tholT6? °^ en harassed and sometimes confiscated by the VOC. In 1690-92, the CIO

’ u,,Iine Mughal governor.

4 0 8 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

a serious rival in Indian Ocean trade, In 1731, it was dramatic change; over the next 20 years, it opened new eliminated by diplomatic means.

trading posts as trade expanded.28

Sweden and Prussia tried to establish profitable

The Situation in the Middle of the 18th Century
companies - both were unsuccessful.

In north India, the Mughal Emperor was sickly, in western

The 18th Century Anglo-French Contest

India the Marathas were dominant and in peninsular India
there was competition between the Marathas, the Mughals,

In the economic wisdom of the 18th century, colonies,
and the local rulers for regional political primacy. The
trading companies and their settlements existed to provide Marathas were both active and ambitious.

the mother country with a favourable balance of trade, a
profit held in gold and silver to pay for its army and navy in

It was on this scene that the wars in Europe precipitated
times of war. The wars of the 18th century therefore aimed
an Anglo-French naval contest in the Indian Ocean. In an
to dispossess other European powers of their colonial internecine dispute in 1740, Prussia had seized Silesia.

sources of wealth.26 After the demise of the Dutch East France supported Prussia. Britain supported Silesia. The India Company (the VOC) in 1699, the trade contest was British decided to contest France’s Indian Ocean trade.

between the English East India Company (the EIC) and The neutrality of previous years was abandoned. Both the French East India Company (the CIO).27 Britain’s Navy sides depended on naval power for success.29
was, by this time, the largest force of its kind in the world.

By 1761, the French threat to British power in south

For the first half of the 18th century, the EIC confined

India had been contained. In 1769, France suspended the
its relations with the Mughal emperors (who by then had operations of its CIO.

spread into south India) to disputes over rights and terms
of trade at local levels. Fresh privileges were obtained from

In 1778, war broke out in Europe again, this time
the Mughal Emperor in Delhi, and these, the English were
between Britain and a coalition of France and Holland.

content to argue about, rather than fight for.

The EIC seized the CIO trading posts on the Coromandel

Coast. The Dutch naval force had confined itself to the

The CIO was reconstituted in 1720 and under the

East Indies. The French Navy was tasked to confront the
close supervision of the French government, underwent a

26. In 1534, the Sultan of Gujarat, in return for a promise of a contingent of 500 Portuguese soldiers to fight against Mughal Emperor Humayun, ceded to the Portuguese the islands of Bombay and Bassein.

27. In the 18th century, the EIC gradually prevailed over the VOC in the race to satisfy Europe's extraordinary appetite for the silks and cottons of Bengal and for the tea of China. The consumption of tea helped to fuel a new explosion of sugar production in Caribbean plantations worked by slaves bought in West Africa and paid for in such diverse imports as Brazilian sugar, Coromandel and Bengal cottons.

28. Mauritius (lie de France) was settled in 1721. Mahe on the Malabar Coast and Karaikal on the Coromandel Coast were acquired in 1725 and 1739
respectively. Chandarnagar in Bengal was revived.

The CIO prospered between 1735 to 1754. In 1742, Dupleix, the ablest leader of the CIO, was appointed the governor-general of French India.

He directed the struggles of the CIO against the EIC. The capture of Arcot, however, in 1751 by the EIC's Lieutenant Colonel Robert Clive restricted CIO control to south India, where it remained dominant until 1761, when the British captured the CIO s capital, Pondicherry.

29. The French moved first into the Bay of Bengal. An improvised fleet from Mauritius relieved the British siege of Pondicherry, blockaded Madras by sea, defeated British ships in two naval actions and drove them up to Calcutta. Dupleix captured Madras in September 1746 but failed to take the neighbouring British fort of St David which in the 18,h century, had become a second centre of British power in south India. In 1747-48, aided by the presence of a British fleet, Fort St David withstood a French assault. In the treaty that ended the war. France returned Madras to the British.

After the CIO's capture of Madras the French had grown in prestige as skilful soldiers, and grown in power by troop detachments left behind by the French fleet. The CIO seized the opportunity for exploiting this increase in French reputation by involving itself in a dispute over the succession to the governorship of a large state in south India.

Partisans of the rival families looked impartially to the Marathas, the Mughals, and the Europeans for help. The CIO assessed that the reward for the success of their protege would be the undermining of the EIC's trade in southern India and greater influence over the affairs of peninsular India.

The CIO allied itself with one group In a battle that demonstrated convincingly the superiority of French arms and methods of warfare, fortune favoured the CIO. The EIC reacted by supporting the other claimant. There developed a private war between the two companies. In the next battle, the CIO was worsted, forced to surrender and make a settlement with the EIC.

During the next war in Europe (the 1756-63 'Seven Years' War between France and England), both countries sent their fleets to the Indian Ocean. The first British force was diverted to Calcutta. This gave the French general the initial advantage; however, after taking Fort St David, he

>ost time, his attack on Madras miscarried and the EIC was able to defeat the CIO decisively.

In 1758, Fort St David was retaken by the CIO but was abandoned when the French Pondicherry was attacked by the EIC. After a siege, Pondicherry, the capital of French India, was captured. The French surrendered in January 1761.

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 4 0 9

of operations on land - a principle that Suffren boldly

EIC and the British Fleet in the Bay of Bengal, retrieve
disregarded in his campaign.

the trading posts, assist the French troops besieged in

Cuddalore and assist Hyder Ali, the ruler of the Carnatic who

On return to France, Suffren was promoted to Vice
was fighting the British. This required the interruption of Admiral. The inscription on the medal struck in his sea communications in the Bay of Bengal between the EIC
honour succinctly stated his achievements - The Cape
settlements and especially between the British strongholds

Protected’, ‘Trincomalee Taken’, ‘Cuddalore Delivered’,
of Calcutta and Madras, despite the disadvantage of France

‘India Defended’, ‘Six Glorious Com bats’.

having no naval bases to support its Fleet.

The principal factor for the French lack of success was

Between February 1782 and June 1783, a French Naval the British command of the sea. The French could get no fleet under Admiral Suffren repeatedly got the better of Indian allies for lack of money and no money for lack of the British fleet under Admiral Hughes in a series of naval
supply from France. Because the French saw more profit
actions. With no naval bases available to assist, Suffren
from trade in the West Indies, the French CIO in the Indian
doggedly repaired the damage suffered by his ships during

Ocean lacked whole-hearted government support. The
each encounter, using locally available materials and his British could supply Madras from both Britain and from ships crews.

Calcutta.

For want of adequate support from the French

Government, Suffren did not succeed in his objective to

Whilst this naval contest was going on in the Bay of
decisively defeat British naval power in the Bay of Bengal.

Bengal, a body of opinion grew within the EIC that only

Nevertheless, his achievements were substantial. For British control of India could end the constant wars two years, he operated hundreds of miles away from the between the Indian states and provide really satisfactory nearest French naval base. And his threat against British conditions for trade. Full dominion would be economical naval domination forced a satisfactory peace, in spite of as well as salutary.30 The British government began to the other reverses to French arms.

control EIC policy through a regulatory board responsible
to Parliament.31

Suffren believed that the proper work of a Navy was
to crush the enemy in action and that the command of

Until the end of the 18th century, Portugal, Holland,
the sea could never be secured whilst a hostile fleet was France, and Britain continued to engage in naval encounters undefeated. This ran counter to the principle of the French in their respective regions to retain local control of the sea naval authorities of that time that the destruction of the routes that linked their overseas colonies to the parent enemy’s fleet was to be subordinated to the furtherance
country. Britain emerged victorious from this struggle.

2. 19 C e n t u r y B r it is h H e g e m o n y in t h e In d ia n O c e a n The following excerpt from a book (‘War and Diplomacv

The second element of Britain’s imperial policy was to
in Kashmir 1947-48’) based on recent research Z prevent any land-based great power from securing an outlet Ambassador C Dasgupta elaborates on this strategy:

into the Indian Ocean. The object, in other words, was to

“For two centuries, the Indian Empire was both the prevent the outflanking of British sea-power. In the 19th object and the instrument of British strategy in the Indian century, Britain viewed the Turkish Empire in Arabia and Ocean. The defence of India was secured b y a t i S d the kingdoms of Iran and Afghanistan as a buffer against policy. In the first place, Britain controlled the entry points Russia’s expansion to the shores of the Indian Ocean. CIp into the Indian Ocean through a ring of naval bases. Port to World War I, Britain sought to preserve the integrity of Said and Aden guarded the entrance through the Red the Ottoman Empire in Asia in the belief that its collapse Sea, the Cape route was controlled through the base at might advance Russian interests.

Simonstown in South Africa, while bases in Singapore and

The defence of the Indian Empire was thus o rg a n ised

Fremantle guarded the entrance from the Pacific
on a regional basis through a policy which effectively
converted the Indian Ocean into a ‘British lake’.

30. Many of the ElC’s employees looked longingly at the territorial revenues that might assist their own enrichment.

31. The ElC’s commercial monopoly started to break
was deprived of even this after the first Indian War o"f IndlpendT 1

° nWards*!t was a ‘mana9in3 a9ency 'for the British Government of India. It of 1857 compelled Britain to formallv take over th*
dence in 1857 (which Western history books refer to as the Indian Mutiny). The events Ocean S
c
ceased t
o

X
e

“

ff° m the E1C B " ‘ai"'S

3SSUmed Strate9‘C reSP° nSib'"ity * * “ * 'ndian 4 1 0 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

is equally true that it was the Indian Empire which

Indian military units were permanently garrisoned at Aden,
made it possible to implement this policy. With its central Singapore and Hong Kong. At various times, Indian troops situation in the Indian Ocean, India was the focal point of sea were sent overseas to protect British imperial interests in and, later, air communications in the region. It was a great East and North Africa, Sudan, the Gulf, Malaya and even supply and storage centre. Above all, the Indian Army was

China.”

the instrument of British control over the littoral countries.

3. I he Operations of the German Cruiser Em den in the Indian Ocean in 1914

Emden commenced its operations in the Bay of Bengal
between Britain and Australia. But before the Germans
by bombarding Madras, capturing / sinking 25 steamers could land to cut the undersea cable and destroy the W / T
and sinking warships in Penang. Merchant shipping started
mast, the Station sent out a warning which Emden jammed
being kept in port. British warships started searching for but too late.

Emden.

Fortuitously, an Australian Navy force happened to be

After two months in the Bay of Bengal, Emden headed in the vicinity escorting a troop convoy to Egypt. The for the Arabian Sea to target the steamer traffic between
cruiser Sydney was dispatched to investigate.

In the

Aden and India. Enroute, W / T intercepts alerted Emden ensuing battle, Sydneys superior gunfire prevailed. Emden that the search for her was intensifying.

grounded herself and eventually surrendered.

The Captain decided to target the Cable and Wireless

Station in the Cocos Islands and disrupt communications

4. The Jap anese Navy’s Foray into the B a y of Bengal in 1942

(Excerpt from ‘White Ensign - The British Navy at War

Towards the end of March we received strong indications

1939-1945’ by Captain S W Roskill Royal Navy, pages 186
that such an attack was to be expected in the very near
to 189).

future, and Admiral Sir Geoffrey Layton, who had recently
been appointed Commander-in-Chief, Ceylon, with full

After the sinking of the two British battleships, the Prince
powers over all civil and military authorities, took energetic
of Wales and the Repulse and the surrender of the British steps to meet the expected blow. Because Colombo and naval base at Singapore ... “A new crisis suddenly blew Trincomalee were ill defended and too far forward to up in the Indian Ocean. There by the end of March 1942,
provide security, Somerville’s fleet was actually working
the Admiralty had managed to scrape together a new from a secret base at Addoo Atoll in the Maldive Islands.

Eastern Fleet consisting of two large aircraft carriers and a
small one, five battleships (four of which belonged to the

On the last day of March he moved from there to
old and slow R Class), seven cruisers, sixteen destroyers,
concentrate his forces to the south of Ceylon, while
and seven submarines. Its commander was Admiral Sir reconnaissance aircraft searched the waters to the east Jam es Somerville, who had made his reputation while in through which the enemy was almost certain to approach.

command of Force H working from Gibraltar.

By 2nd April, however, no sign of Japanese movements

Although on paper the strength allocated to him
had reached Somerville; and he therefore decided to
appeared substantial, in reality he was very unenviably
allow normal shipping movements to be resumed, and
placed. Firstly, his air element was far too weak to enable
himself returned to Addoo Atoll to refuel. Ju s t when he was
irn to oppose the main Japanese carrier striking force.

approaching the base, the first sighting report of strong
econdly, many of his ships were old and not in first-class

Japanese forces some 360 miles south-east of Ceylon
condition; and thirdly, his bases were ill-equipped to supply reached him.

his needs.

In fact, Admiral Nagumo, with five fleet carriers (having

, ^ us there were very real grounds for anxiety over some 300 aircraft embarked), four battleships and three th^ Ůtcorne
an incursion into the Indian Ocean by cruisers had sailed from a base in the Celebes on 26th March, e sPlendidly trained and so far consistently successful
passed south of Sumatra and entered the Indian Ocean on

^apanese carrier force commanded by Admiral Nagumo;

3rd April. A smaller force under Admiral Ozawa (one light
n
eylon was the obvious place for him to strike at next.

carrier and six cruisers) was moving across the Bay of

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 411

.U

R. ,rma With the obiect of

Admiral Ozawa’s force had meanwhile entered the Bay 0f

Bengal from Mergui in southern

^

gnd from the ^ tQ ?th Aprjl he p)ayed havQc
attacking our shipping off the

^ unescortecj ancj unprotected merchantmen which had

It was Nagumo’s main force which was sighted on the been sent SOuth from Calcutta and other ports to avoid the afternoon of 4th April, and that report caused Admiral danger 0f attack while they were lying helpless in harbour.

Layton to clear every possible ship out of the harbour of The origjnai order to clear Calcutta of shipping was probably Colombo. He also sent the heavy cruisers Dorsetshire and ^ se. but for some unexplained reason it was kept in force Cornwall, which Somerville had detached from his main until the 5* _ by which time it should have been plain that fleet on the 2nd, back to rejoin the Commander-in-Chief.

the ships wouid be safer where they were lying.

At 8 am, on 5th April, the expected attack on Colombo
jn five days> twenty three merchantmen totaling over
t o o k place; but the defences were fully alert, and Admiral

|]2,000 tonnes were sunk by Ozawas
squadron off

Laytons timely precautions resulted in the damage to the east coast of jncjia; ancj t0 that heavy toll, Japanese shipping and port installations being comparatively light, submarines working off the west coast added a further five The raid had nothing like the deadly effects of that on Port s^ s

32,400 tonnes.

Darwin in the previous February; and although Japanese

British shipping movements along both coasts of the
aircraft losses were far fewer than we believed at the time,
whole sub-continent were brought to a standstill; and
they were high enough to constitute a check to Nagumo’s
the confidence of the men of the Merchant Navy in the
heretofore uniformly successful carrier aircrews.

protection which they had always relied on receiving from

Unfortunately the good work done by the defenders their comrades of the Royal Navy was severely shaken.

of Colombo was partly offset that same afternoon, when
the Japanese striking forces located the Dorsetshire and

Happily the Japanese had not planned to make an

Cornwall on their way south to rejoin the fleet, and sank extended foray in the Indian Ocean, or to penetrate west them both with a series of devastatingly accurate dive- of Ceylon. By 12th April both Nagumo and Ozawa were bombing attacks. Meanwhile, Somerville was steaming returning to Singapore by way of the Malacca Straits, w 1 e towards Ceylon from Addoo Atoll; but his slow division was the Admiralty had suggested to Somerville that his slower still far behind his faster ships. The C-in-C n

- e

- x

- t

- a

- ntici

--- p
r ate

-- d

- ships should withdraw to East Africa to guard the long an
an attack on his secret base; for Admiral Layton had vulnerable W S convoy route (from England to support the signaled to him that a powerful enemy force was believed Army in Egypt, since the Suez Canal was closed), to be between Ceylon and the Maldives.

Indian

Comparative calm thus descended on the

Throughout the 5th, reconnaissance aircraft from
in which

Ocean, and we were afforded a breathing space
the carriers flew wide searches; but they failed to sight to improve the defences of our bases and the protec 10

Nagumo, who had in fact withdrawn far to the south-east, of our shipping; and, very gradually, reinforcements sen and in the evening Someiville turned back to the northout from home reached Admiral Somerville. None the ess, west to safeguard his base. Meanwhile, Nagumo’s aircraft the shock sustained by the blows struck by Nagumo an were combing the waters to the south and east of Ceylon Ozawa had been very severe; for the vulnerability o ou^
for the British Fleet, and we may be thankful that they never maritime control over a vast and important area of ocea found it; for had they done so it is difficult to believe that had been ruthlessly exposed.

Somerville’s weak and motley force could have survived
attack by the Japanese carrier planes.

Looking back today, it is plain that the disasters of Apr!

1942 derived partly from the error we had committe 1

On the 8* one of our shore-based reconnaissance the previous autumn when, under strong pressure ro afi rcraft resighted Nagumo’s ships 400 miles to the east
r ,

.

,

, . , ,

- — ™«- the Prime Minister (Winston Churchill), the A mira
of Ceylon towards which they were again steering. The had reluctantly agreed to Admiral Phillips's weak and harbour of Tnncoma ee was at once cleared of shipping, unbalanced force being sent to Singapore. Though it is, and the expected attack took place early next morning, of course, impossible to say what proportion of the heavy Unfortunately some of the ships sent out from Trincomalee losses which we suffered between December 1941 and were found by the Japanese striking forces close to the April 1942 might have been averted had we adopted the coast, after they had reversed course to re-enter the Admiralty’s strategic purpose of concentrating every ship harbour. The small carrier Hermes, a destroyer, a corvette that could be spared in Ceylon, it is none the less clear and two tankers were at once completely overwhelmed that the Naval Staff's views on strategy were much the and sunk‘
sounder; for at the very least their policy would probably

4 1 2 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

have resulted in Phillips’s squadron surviving to play a part Japanese from sending Nagumo and Ozawa into those waters, it might have saved Rangoon, and it would surely
inthe defence of the Indian Ocean.

have reduced the time needed for us to regain the initiative

That could not, of course, have saved Malaya or the
at sea” .

Dutch East Indies; but it might well have discouraged the

5. The British Navy’s Attack on M adagascar in 1942
nn 4 Mavl942 the British aircraft carriers Illustrious needed success". A f t e r t h e loss of Malaya and the loss of nH Indomitable attacked Diego Suarez in French the battleships Repulse and the Prince o f Wales, after the Madaaascar The British stated at that time that they had
loss of Singapore and Hong Kong, Diego Suarez Prom‘sed
acted to prevent the island from falling into the hands of an easy victory. It took several months to capture thewhole the Japanese. In his memoirs, Winston Churchill stated
island of Madagascar. Later, British forces attacked the
that the operation took place at a time “when we sorely French island of Reunion.

6. The Recapture of the Andaman & Nicobar Islands
battleship Richelieu, searched for the Japanese cruiser

In April 1945, the French battleship Richelieu bombarded
force reported to be near Port Blair. On the night of 16th

Car Nicobar. On 2nd May, Richelieu bombarded Port Blair.

May, British destroyers of the Richelieu group sank the

From 10th May onwards, two groups, one formed around Japanese cruiser the battleship

Haguro by torpedo attack.

Queen Elizabeth and the other around the

7. “ Results to the British Commonwealth
the Transfer of Political Power in India”

of

Commonwealth air communications both in peace and

(Excerpts from the T h e Transfer of Power’ Volume 8 Pages

50 to 57 - Mote of Ju ly 1946 i.e. one year after the end
war.

of the 1939-45 World War and one year before India’s

VI. “The strategic consequences of independence for

Independence forwarded to London by Field Marshal

India are set out in the G H Q paper that follows.

Wavell, Viceroy of India

(Note: The GH Q Paper/Appreciation has been inserted

I. “The transfer of political power in India to Indians will
here for coherence. Para VI continues after the End o f
affect Great Britain and the British Commonwealth Appreciation.) in three principle issues: Strategy, Economics and

Prestige. This note is an attempt to assess very briefly our

B egin n in g o f Apprecia tion
prospective gains and losses in each of these fields.

Object

I- “The principle advantage that Britain and the

Commonwealth derive from control of India is Strategic. The object of this paper is to appreciate the value of India to The greatest asset is India’s manpower. The War of the British Empire, and to set out the strategic advantages 1939-45 could hardly have been won without India’s and disadvantages should India becom e an independent contribution of two million soldiers, which strengthened
sovereign state outside the British Com m onwealth of
the British Empire at its weakest point.

Nations.

MI- India was also, during this period, a very valuable Factors base of war. Her contribution in material was very
considerable; and the potential will increase as India s Introduction
industrial capacity expands.

The strategy of the British Commonwealth is at present

1V ~^he Naval bases in India and Ceylon have enabled the
based on the ability to move troops and material by air and

British Navy to dominate the whole of the Indian Ocean sea across the world without interference by any hostile region, except for a short interlude in the last war; these power.

bases are of importance for the protection of oil supplies
r°m Persia and the Persian Gulf.

In order to be able to protect our m erchant shipping,

V-

India will also be an indispensable link in the
we have established Naval bases on the main lines of

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 4 1 3

communication in order that the necessary warships may India, and it would be untenable if India were dominated by a major power such as Russia.

be maintained and repaired. We are now establishing air
lines of communication and air bases from which both our India as a Base
maritime and air lines of communications (L of C) can be
protected.

Major operations of war must be based upon a land mass
which is capable of containing oil the necessary base

The increasing range of shore based aircraft and the installations, repair shops, hospitals which are necessary development of guided missiles has already made it for the maintenance of modern Naval, Army and Air difficult to protect convoys in narrow waters, and there is

Forces. Furthermore such a base must have an indigenous
little doubt that we shall have to rely less on narrow waters
industrial capacity, which can expand to meet the extra
such as the Mediterranean, and more on the broad waters load placed upon it in war.

of the great oceans. In effect our L of C will gradually be
pushed southwards and we shall come to rely on the Cape

With the coming of Atomic Warfare there is increased
route to the East much more than on the Mediterranean.

necessity for space, which will allow of proper dispersion
of base installations.

Importance of the Indian Ocean

Should it be necessary for the Commonwealth to

It is the openly expressed policy of His Majesty's
undertake military operations on a large scale in the Far

Government that no potentially hostile power shall

East, India is the only suitable base from which such
establish bases in the Indian Ocean area, and any attempt
operations could be sustained.

to do so would be regarded as a hostile act. (Emphasis
added)

Australia has the space and, to some extent, the industrial
capacity, but has not the manpower from which to provide

The oil from the Persian Gulf is essential to the British fighting forces and also to expand her industry.

Commonwealth, and its safe passage must be assured.

Indian M a n p o w er

Our normal sea communications with Australia and

New Zealand pass across the Indian Ocean, but these From a military point of view, one of India’s most important could be deflected round the Cape or through the Pacific assets is an almost inexhaustible supply of manpower.

without undue dislocation. From a Naval point of view, a India, including the Indian States and Nepal, can produce hostile India within the next five years would not seriously as many soldiers as the Commonwealth can maintain.

affect our position, but if India was dominated by Russia

Without this help it would have been difficult to win the
with powerful air forces, it is likely that we should have last two wars.

to abandon our command of the Persian Gulf and the

Northern Indian Ocean routes.

It must, however, be remembered that up to date all
recruits have been volunteers, and by the end of the last

Air Communications
war the limit of voluntary retirement had been reached.

The Imperial Air Communications between the UK and British Manpower

Australia and the Far East must of necessity pass through

Ind.a A subsidiary route for Long Range Aircraft could be This para concerns British Manpower. Its gist is Britain is established using routes such as:

at present experiencing great difficulty in finding sufficient

- Arabia-Ceylon-Cocos Island-Australia.

armed forces to meet her worldwide commitments. A
relief of 7000 officers (800 British Army, 1500 RAF, 300

- Ceylon-Andaman/Nicobar lslands-Burma/Malaya.

RIN, 4,400 British Indian Army) and 33,900 men (16,400

East Africa-Seychelles-Diego Garcia-Ceylon/Cocos Island

British

10,000 RAF and 7,500 British Indian Army)

These routes could be further developed by the use of would be of very great importance. In addition, a large floating bases and Aircraft Carriers.

proportion of approximately 2,000 British officials and

30,000 non-officials would leave India and be available for

Ceylon
service elsewhere in the Empire.’

Ceylon is of value only if it can be used as an effective Natural Resources
substitute for the Naval and Air bases now located in India

India is the sole p rod u cer of ju te, and on e of the largest It is considered that even if the island were converted into producers of tea in the world. Both these commodities are a fortress, it would be of limited use in the face of a hostile
of great value to the C o m m o nw ealth.

414 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Thorium exists in Travancore and this mineral may and Malaya. (Emphasis added) become of increasing importance in connection with

The harbours should be developed, and airfields should
atomic warfare.

be built from which to defend Malaya against attack from

India.

Industrial Capacity

India is at the beginning of an industrial revolution. Her Sum m ary cotton and steel industries are beginning to rival those of The disadvantages to the British Commonwealth of an any country, and there is no doubt that her heavy industries
independent India may be summarised as follows:

are capable of enormous expansion. In twenty years, India
o The supply of oil from the Persian Gulf is dependent
may be a highly developed industrial country, and may be
upon the maintenance of our sea communications
capable of producing herself all the equipment required by
in the Persian Gulf and Arabian Sea. These could not
modem armed forces. If India is part of the Commonwealth,
be assured if India was dominated by Russia, and we
this constitutes a great and increasing asset. If India is
consider that Russia would not neglect her opportunities
hostile or dominated by a hostile power, the threat to the
of influencing an Independent India,

Commonwealth would be extremely serious.

o Air communications between Arabia and Africa on the

Effect o f British W ithdrawal from India
one side and Burma, Malaya, Australia and New Zealand

Although potentially powerful, India is at present so
on the other could not at present be maintained without
divided within herself, that if the British should quit India
the use of bases in India,
entirely, leaving the leaders of the various parties to work
o The value in use of Ceylon would be largely reduced if
out their own salvation, the country would be left open to

India was hostile, and the island would be untenable if

Russia.

India was dominated by Russia.

It is not possible to estimate whether Russia would

© India as a base is of the greatest importance to the
actually establish bases in India, but with her taste for
successful prosecution of operations in Southeast Asia.

power politics, it is considered likely that Russia would take

• Indian manpower is an enormous asset to the
advantage of an unprecedented opportunity to establish

Commonwealth Armed Forces.

herself in a position from which she could threaten the
whole fabric of the British Commonwealth. History has

India’s natural resources and industrial capacity are of
shown that Nature abhors a vacuum and if the British step
increasing importance.

out, we can expect the Russians to step in.

The only advantage we can see in an independent India

Effect o f a Hostile India
is a relief for British Manpower commitments.

If India were hostile, our naval position would not be

We consider that it is impossible to guarantee that an
seriously affected, but if she was dominated by a hostile
independent India would not be unfriendly or would not
power we cannot guarantee our sea communications in
be influenced by a power such as Russia, China or Ja p a n ,
the Northern part of the Indian Ocean and our oil supplies
hostile to the British Commonwealth. Should such a
from the Persian Gulf would probably be cut off.

situation arise, we could not maintain our power to move
freely by sea and air in the Northern part of the Indian

Andam an and N ic o b a r Islands

Ocean area, which is of supreme im portance to the British

We have already pointed out that Ceylon would be untenable

Commonwealth.

in the face of an India dominated by Russia. It is however

A reorientation of Commonwealth strategy, whereby we
considered that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are
might make use of the Pacific in place of the Indian O cean
just far enough from India to allow a reasonable degree of is a palliative which may be forced on us, but it will not security. If we quit’ India, we shall presumably continue to
adequately replace the value of the Indian O cean to the
old Malaya, although it is doubtful whether we shall hold

British Commonwealth.”

urma permanently. Our communications to Burma and
a aya will then be from the East and Southeast and we

E n d o f A p p recia tio n
s all be in a similar position to the Japanese in 1942-45.

Para VI continued. “It is clear (from the above

In these circumstances it is considered that we should Appreciation) that a defensive alliance with India is of great not give up the Andaman and Nicobar Islands, but
importance to Britain. Such an alliance cannot be forced
ů d hold and develop them as an outpost to Burma
on a free India, but is likely to be sought by India itself, if t r a n s i t i o n T O EM IN EN CE / 4 1 5

we manage well. It should secure our naval position in the famine. The nucleus of a Communist organisation already I n d i a n O
c e a n and Persian Gulf, the maintenance of the link
exists and is making itself felt. It would not be difficult
in air communications and so far as possible the use of for Russia to gain a foothold in the country by its usual methods if the Government is weak and if the gateway of

Indian manpower. Without such an alliance, Britain stands

Afghanistan is not effectively barred.

to lose very heavily by abandoning India.

The greatest danger is that an independent India may

Unfortunately there is every prospect of an Indian
come under the domination of Russia. It is very difficult Government being ineffective. It is a tremendous task to estimate how likely this is to happen. An independent to take over control of a country as large and diverse Indian Government could hardly be unconscious of the as India. There is no evidence that either the political or length of its seaboard or of the fact that 90% of its trade the administrative capacity exists to do so. If the Indian is seaborne. The defences of the country are so much Government does turn out to be weak and incompetent, stronger by land than by sea that India would naturally the country is likely to lapse into chaos and disorder. If that look first for a naval alliance, especially at a time when condition occurs, the loss to Britain in strategic position, a steady flow of imports is so vital to the development manpower resources, communications and trade, will be of the country. And it must surely be many years before very serious even if Russia does not intervene. Indeed, any Russia can become a formidable naval power in the Indian advantages to Britain that can be anticipated as a result of Ocean. Again communications by land with Russia are so handing over political power are all conditional on there bad that Russian help would be no substitute for British being a stable successor Government that can rule the and American help in developing the country. It seems country.

therefore that the future Government of India will not of its
own choice go for Russian protection.

To sum up, it is vital to Britain that when she gives over
political power in India, she may be able to hand over to

Russia might however try to employ her usual tactics a stable and friendly Government and contract with it a of giving support to a revolutionary party. Conditions in genuine defensive alliance. Fortunately, India’s interests India are not unfavourable - a few capitalists and Princes quite obviously point the same way. If this objective is have enormous fortunes, while labour is still exploited, achieved, the demission of political power may bring has genuine grievances, and has begun to feel its power. advantages and not loss. In all other circumstances the Maladministration can easily cause local scarcity and
debit balance will be heavy” .

8. Britain’s Perception of the Russian Threat

It had taken Russia three centuries to recover from the

At the end of the 19th century, the relentless outward

Mongol and Tatar invasions that had begun in the 13th thrust of Russian expansion was blocked chiefly by five century. As early as 1552, conquering the khanates containing powers - Germany and Austria - Hungary in of Central Asia became a security priority for Russia. In Europe, by the Ottoman Empire to the South and by Japan the 17th century, Russia conquered Siberia.32 By the mid in the Far East. These powers managed to keep Russia a 1800s, Tsarist Russia strove to build an empire to extend continental rather than a global power.

its might, spread orthodox Christianity and gain vast
farmlands and cotton fields for its merchant class. In the

To prevent Russia from securing an outlet into the Indian

19th century, it conquered the Caucasus - the gateway to Ocean that could outflank British sea-power: Persia, Turkey and the Middle East and pushed westward

. Britain’s Navy was modernised and built up to cope
against Europe.

with a combination of any two hostile navies Bases
were established at the Cape of Good Hope in 1806

Tsarist Russia also started pushing southward from the

Mauritius in 1810, Singapore in 1818, Aden in 1839 and
frozen north towards China, Persia, India and Afghanistan.

Hong Kong in 1841.

Britain viewed this Russian advance into Central Asia as a
threat to its position in India which, in the 19th century, it was

• In the ‘Great Game’ with Russia in Central Asia, Britain
consolidating as the pivot of its empire in Asia. Fearing that
converted Afghanistan, Persia, Tibet and Thailand into
the Russians wanted to advance as far as the warm water
landward buffers against Russia’s expansion to the
shores of the Indian Ocean.

ports of India, Britain scrambled to check Tsarist expansion.

32. Russian fur traders and Cossacks gradually advanced eastward 2500 miles across the Siberian wilderness and reached the Pacific coast in 1639

In 1741, Russian settlements had been established in Alaska, across the Bering Strait. Gntil 1867, when the US bought it, Alaska was known as Russian America.

4 1 6 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

9. Iran

A wealthy Englishman started the search for oil in Iran in

Oil Company and the other oil companies to agree to

1901. After much expense, his venture struck oil in 1908
the same kind of profit-sharing that major American oil
in southwest Iran near Abadan and, in 1909 the Anglo-
companies had negotiated with the Saudi and Venezuelan

Persian Oil Company (APOC) was formed. APO C then
governments. Finally, the Iranians lost patience and,
needed capital to build its refinery.

following massive demonstrations, nationalised all the oil
companies in Iran.

At this point in time, Britain’s Navy was debating
changing over from coal to oil fuel. In 1911, Winston

In retaliation, the U S embargoed Iran for nationalising

Churchill, then head of the British Admiralty, used £ 2
its oil industry. The major oil companies, acting together,
million of Government money to buy half of the APO C
boycotted Iranian oil, refusing to handle any crude oil
on behalf of the British Navy. Churchill also decided that
produced by the fields under the new regime. Their control
new British battleships would be fueled by oil rather than
over transport and refining was so thorough that Iran’s oil
coal. APOC had managed to find a new backer and a good
exports dropped from $400 million in 1951 to $2 million in
customer. The Iranian oil supplies were to prove valuable

1951 and 1952. The deficit to oil supplies could be made
to the British in the 1914-1918 World War.

up easily because the Middle Eastern fields were being
operated at much less than capacity. Additional pumping

In 1935, APO C was renamed Anglo-Iranian Oil Company by their companies in Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq not (AIOC). AIOC had German engineers and technicians only made up the difference, but also delighted the three in their refinery. This became a problem when Britain Arab nations concerned, who had no particular liking for and Germany became enemies in the Second World the non-Arab Iranians.

War (1939-1945). Britain asked that Iran expel German
nationals. Iran’s refusal to comply and growing pan-Arab

Britain challenged the legality of Iran’s action at the
support for Germany impelled Britain and the Soviet International Court of Justice. The Court ruled in Iran’s Union to occupy the southern and northern halves of Iran
favour.

in 1941. This ensured Allied possession of the Iranian oil

In 1952, Britain planned to oust Prime Minister
fields, forestalled any such German move and opened a

Mossadeq from power in a secret coup. The Truman
southern route for delivering war supplies to Soviet armies Administration was against the idea. In 1953, the Shah of in the north. Iran did not take kindly to this ‘invasion’. The

Iran tried to dismiss Mr Mossadeq. He failed and had to
occupation by foreign powers fomented resentment in the
flee the country.

Iranian people.

The Administration of the newly elected President

After the war ended, a dispute erupted in 1946 between

Eisenhower became apprehensive that Iran’s political chaos

Iran and the Soviet Onion regarding Iran’s northern border would inspire the Soviet Union to impose a communist with the Soviet state of Azerbaijan. The Soviet Union’s dictatorship. It is believed to have approved a plan drafted immediate proximity to the oilfields of the Persian Gulf by British and CIA intelligence officials for a CIA-assisted worried the US. This led the US Administration to declare

‘regime change’ to overthrow Mr Mossadeq and institute a
its Truman Doctrine33 of assisting states against Soviet

‘Communist’ intrusion. After America and the Soviet Union western-style government. The Mossadeq government did arrived at an understanding that neither side would try to
collapse and the Shah of Iran was restored to the throne.

influence developments in Iran and would respect each

It laid the basis for the belief that the CIA could topple any
regime in the world.

other’s sensitivities, the Soviet Union withdrew from the
northern half of Iran. The American and other western oil

Obediently, the Shah agreed to let British and Am erican
companies continued with their activities in Iran.

oil companies take over oil production again. The real

In Iran, nationalist, anti-foreign sentiment continued to or suspected CIA involvement in the Shah’s restoration simmer. In 1951, the new nationalist government in Iran,
sowed seeds of anti-Americanism that continued to afflict
led by Mr Mossadeq tried, in vain, to get Anglo-Iranian
the Shah's regime. Over the next 26 years, Iran becam e

33. The gist of the 1946 Truman Doctrine was that ‘the OS must support free Dennlp whn

^

"

"

outside powers.’ It declared the US commitment to preserve the pro-West orientation nf d ™ ? ' e^ s,i t>

Ju9ation by armed minorities or
as secured mi.itary facilities in Dhahran (Saudi Arabia) In
and p
o
r
t

S

"

9 the S ° Vi6t Uni° n- The
for the US Navy’s Fifth Fleet.

P

Bahrain for US Navy ships in 1949. Today Bahrain is the base

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 4 1 7

one of the richest countries in the Persian Gulf accounting Israel. To exert further pressure on the GS, the Organisation for nearly one tenth of the world s oil production.

instituted a series of cutbacks in oil production that reduced
the availability of oil worldwide, created an acute shortage

From 1967 onwards and throughout the 1970s, America of oil and caused the price of oil to skyrocket. As a result of encouraged and funded the Shah of Iran’s ambitious plans the quadrupling of oil revenues in 1973, the Shah of Iran for the expansion of the Iranian armed forces.

embarked on a massive arms build up.

The Shah’s naval plan envisaged the development of

By the mid 1970s, the G S realised that a permanent
new and modern naval bases at Bandar Abbas (near the naval presence would be necessary for rapid deployment Strait of Hormuz) and at Chahbahar (in the Gulf of Oman in the Gulf. It planned to further develop Diego Garcia as and the Arabian Sea). In the 1970s, the naval development a basing facility for a GS task force in the Indian Ocean.

of Chahbahar was funded by CIS loans and designed to In 1976, the GS Senate opposed this expansion until support not only the warships which the GS was supplying
to the Iranian Navy, but also the GS Navy’s ships deployed the President reported to Congress his Administration’s in the Arabian Sea and the Persian Gulf.

efforts to negotiate with the Soviets on de-militarisation
and naval arms limitations in the Indian Ocean. The

When President Nixon assumed office the Nixon Doctrine Ford Administration turned down the suggestion on the was supplemented by its Twin Pillars’ policy wherein grounds that negotiations on such matters were not in the the GS sought to promote Saudi-Iranian cooperation in GS interest while the Soviet Gnion and its Cuban surrogate maintaining stability. This policy fitted neatly into the plans were actively engaged in support of revolution in Africa, of the Shah of Iran to acquire the armed muscle necessary especially in Angola.

to protect the Iranian oil lifeline running the length of the

Persian Gulf. It was strengthened by the Saudi decision

One of the first actions by the Carter Administration in
to embark on a similar programme to arm itself The US

1977 was to initiate negotiations with the Soviet Gnion
played the major role in helping Saudi Arabia to procure leading toward a demilitarisation of the Indian Ocean.

modern weaponry and training for its armed forces That effort was suspended as a result of Soviet and Cuban believing that cooperation between Iran and Saudi Arabia intervention in the Horn of Africa.

would ultimately protect US security interests.

In 1978, the GS increased the flow of arms and

In 1968, Britain announced the phased withdrawal of advisers to Iran to bolster the Shah’s efforts to counter its remaining military forces from East of Suez This was growing domestic dissidence against ‘westernisation’. In immed'ate'y followed by the first deployments of Soviet response to Soviet concern over GS attempts to influence naval ships in the Indian Ocean. When Britain finally
developments in Iran, the G S stated that whilst they

S h a h T i r° m

° f SU6Z ° n 30 Movember 1971 the would not interfere in Iran’s internal affairs, the G S firmly Shah of Iran announced that Iran would police the waterj supported the Shah in his efforts to restore tranquility in in and around the Persian Gulf.

Iran and would maintain relations with Iran in foreign policy,

During the 1973 Arab-Israel war
rv
economics and security. In the end of 1978, a conservative

Islamic revolution, inspired by Ayatollah Khomeini, took

Arab Petroleum Exporting Countrie; clampeTa c X le t e over and forced the Shah to abdicate.

embargo on oil exports to the US because it supported

10. British Indian Ocean Territory

10 i 96,f’, Brita!n announced ^ decision to withdraw
gradually from the Indian Ocean. It became essential

^

On 8 November 1965, before granting independence to
a location where facilities could be established for berth™ Mauritius, Britain created a new colony called the British naval ships, for refuelling maritime reconnaissance a

S Indian Ocean Territory (BIOT), by amalgamating the
and for strategic communications where there woul! Aldabra Islands and the Farquhar and Desroches Islands not be any local political opposition. Since the Cham ! (all purchased from the Seychelles) with the Chagos archipelago was strategically situated at the centre of th

Archipelago (formerly a dependency of Mauritius).

Indian Ocean and lay out of the path of cyclonic storms I
was found very suitable.

On 10 December 1965, the British Colonial Secretary
announced in the House of Commons the decision to set
up a new colony to be known as the British Indian Ocean

4 1 8 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

T ritory to provide defence facilities for the British and U S
wanted to preserve the ‘zone of peace’, non-militarised

Governments in the Indian Ocean, the nucleus of which
status of the Indian Ocean as embodied in United Nations
was to be the Chagos Archipelago. The other islands
resolutions, but to no avail. From 1965 to 1976, the
concerned were Aldabra, Farquhars and Desroches.34
administrative headquarters of the BIO T were at Victoria
in the Seychelles.

In 1966, America and Britain signed an agreement for the
construction on Diego Garcia of a major Anglo American,

In Ju n e 1976, the islands purchased from the Seychelles
air and naval, refuelling and support station, along with a
were returned to the newly independent Republic of
communications facility. Most of Diego Garcia’s transient

Seychelles. After that date, the BIO T comprised only the
population was relocated to Mauritius and the Seychelles.

atolls of the Chagos Archipelago and its administrative

Until the early 1970s, the production of copra from coconut offices moved to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office palms was the only economic activity. Thereafter, the last in London.

of the plantation workers and their families were moved to

Although there is no permanent civilian population in

Mauritius.

the atolls, about 3,500 U S and British military and contract

The littoral and island states of the ocean protested
civilian personnel were stationed there in the mid-1990s.

strongly against the development of Diego Garcia. They

11. Iraq

In 1958, the Hashemite kingdom of Iraq was displaced
where Iran’s oil fields were located. During this war, the
by the socialist B a ’athist regime. It soon received Soviet

U S Administration facilitated arms sales to Iraq not so
economic and military assistance.

much to support Mr Saddam Hussein, but out of antipathy
toward Iran’s Ayatollah Khomeini, who had overthrown the

In 1961, Iraq nationalised all the oil concessions in Iraq

Shah. The Iran-Iraq war lasted from 1980 to 1988. Iran
that were not then being exploited. The U S and Britain
recovered its territory at an enormous cost in lives. When
launched an embargo of Iraq in an attempt to persuade Mr

Iraq resorted to chemical warfare, Iran sued for peace.

Saddam Hussein to re-privatise oil. Mr Saddam Hussein
simply found a new customer - the Soviet Union.

After Iraq won that devastating war, Mr Saddam Hussein
continued to pursue independent economic development

In 1972, Mr Saddam Hussein and his B a ’ath party rather than letting transnational corporations reap profit nationalised the oil holdings of the Iraq Petroleum
from his country’s oil resources. He worked to form the

Company, which actually was owned by a group of western

Arab Cooperation Council to join Iraq with Jordan, Egypt,
oil companies including Dutch, American and French and Yemen in a regional trading bloc.

firms. Prior to nationalisation, Mr Saddam Hussein made
a peace offer to the dissident Kurds in Iraq, who were

In 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait to settle several disputes -
warring against his regime. Reportedly, the Kurds were
territorial and financial. It led to the U S led Gulf W ar of 1991
about to accept his offer, but the Nixon Administration
that forced Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait. The Administration
offered them $16 million in weapons as incentive to keep
of President Bush (Senior) described the Persian Gulf region
fighting - and they did (with additional help from the Shah
as a ‘nerve centre’ of the industrialised and developed
of Iran). Eventually, Iraq set up its own national company Western economies. In the U S view, it was a stark struggle and nationalised all the oil fields.

against Iraq for domination and control of oil resources of
the region - these oil resources were not only the life-blood

By 1980, with Soviet help, Iraq had built up its military of modem developed countries but also a vital element of strength to become the most powerful state in the Gulf.

military power.’

After its 1979 Revolution, Iran had become the new
enemy. The U S Administration started improving relations

There was another view. Reportedly, just eight days before
with Iraq - militarily, Iraq was the G ulfs most important

Iraq invaded Kuwait, the U S ambassador Ms April Glaspie
state and, after Saudi Arabia, the Gulf’s most important oil
told Mr Saddam Hussein that the U S Administration had

Producing state.

no opinion' regarding Iraq’s ‘border dispute’ with Kuwait,

Iraq seized the opportunity of the Revolution in Iran
his gave Mr Saddam Hussein the impression that the CIS
to settle old territorial disputes. It invaded Khuzistan,
would turn a blind eye to his invasion of Kuwait. Reportedly,

34. London Tim es of 11 November 1965.

GS intelligence learned of Iraq’s invasion plans several days down Mr Saddam Hussein. For reasons not yet clear, OS
in advance, but no deterrence was attempted. In this view, forces did not attempt to enter Iraq but ceased operations the Gulf War of 1991 was engineered as an excuse to bring after Iraqi troops withdrew from Kuwait.

12. The Iran - Iraq War 1980-1988

The cause of Iraq’s invasion of Iran on 22 September 1980

Iraq used its chemical warfare capability against Iranian
was that after deposing the Shah of Iran in 1979, the new forces in 1984, 1985 and 1986 and on its own rebellious Irani Shiite state established by Ayatollah Khomeini was Kurdish population.

messianic and wished to expand its influence throughout the

These capabilities alarmed the West. The U S developed

Islamic world. In doing so, it began to interfere significantly a policy that was intended to halt both the Iran-iraq War in Iraqi affairs, attempting to influence Iraq’s sizeable Shiite and the development of the Iraqi chemical and nuclear faction. (About 55% of Iraq’s population was Shiite, 20% was warfare capabilities.

Kurdish and the ruling Sunni secular minority was 25%.).

In January 1983, the U S established a new unified Central

Iraq penetrated deeply into Khuzistan where the oil Command, (CENTCOM), and assigned it the responsibility fields are located but failed to defeat Iran decisively.

for a huge geographic area, including the Persian Gulf.

After a year, Iranian forces went on the offensive, The forces assigned to the Rapid Deployment Force were regained almost all of their lost territory and approached increased. As a result, CENTCOM had seven Air Force Basra. Here the offensives stalled and the war became a tactical fighter wings, two strategic bomber squadrons, stationary battle of attrition.

five Army divisions, a Marine Corps Expeditionary Force,
three carrier battle groups, a surface action group, and

Meanwhile, Iraq began to develop nuclear and chemical five maritime air patrol squadrons. US military positions warfare capabilities. The nuclear capability was seen as such throughout the Middle East were expanded to handle the a danger by the Israelis that they conducted a preemptive deployment of large numbers of US troops, an airfield air attack in and destroyed Iraq’s primary nuclear facility.

was built in southeastern Egypt, and supplies were prepositioned in Oman and Diego Garcia.

13. The Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 1990

The reasons for the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait go back to the was admitted to the United Nations and the Arab League, creation of the present day Kuwait. In 1899, Britain and but Iraq did not renounce its claim, would often resurrect Kuwait signed a treaty in which Britain assumed control of it, and would cite it to justify the August 1990 invasion.

Kuwait’s foreign affairs. This was done to thwart German
imperialist designs in the region, and after W W I began,

There were four reasons for Iraq’s decision to invade

Britain established a protectorate over Kuwait.

Kuwait in August 1990:

W W I led to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the

• Iraq could not repay the $65 billion that it had borrowed
creation by the European powers of Iraq and a number of
from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia to finance the Iran-iraq
other countries. The finding of oil, and later in the 1970s

War. It could argue that this war was in Kuwaiti and
its greatly enhanced value, aggravated an already troubled

Saudi interests since the enemy was Irani messianic
tribal situation.

Shiite fundamentalism, which potentially threatened
both of them. Kuwait’s decision to not forgive Iraq’s debt

Kuwait was an artificial creation imposed by the West,
provided economic and emotional justification for the
and it both denied Iraq a considerable amount of oil and

Iraqi invasion.

restricted its access to the sea. This arrangement was never

• Second, the Kuwaitis were rich and had huge investments
accepted, and when Kuwait received its independence on
abroad. Access to this wealth would resolve Iraq’s

19 June 1961, Iraq almost immediately claimed it, basing
financial problems.

this on the facts that Kuwait had been part of the Ottoman

Empire, that it was an artificial British creation, and that it • The third reason was alleged Kuwaiti oil drilling in the Rumaila oil field, which lay in disputed border territory.

threatened Iraq’s access to the sea.

• The fourth reason was Kuwaiti overproduction of oil.

Threatened by invasion, Kuwait appealed to Britain,

Gulf revenues were depressed as a result of an oil glut
whose military reaction was enough to thwart Iraq. Kuwait

4 2 0 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

on the spot market in the late 1980s. In Ju ly 1990,

Britain began actively advocating the use of force. France,

Iraq threatened to use force as retribution for Kuwaiti

China and Russia all opposed this, but U S and British
overproduction and under-pricing, claiming that Kuwait
efforts culminated in a UN resolution which approved the
and the UAE had cost Iraq $14 billion in oil revenue.

use of force to expel Iraq if it did not leave Kuwait by 15

When Iraq suggested face-to-face peace talks, Kuwait January 1991.

preferred Arab League mediation.

Meanwhile, Iraq attempted reconciliation with Iran to

On 2 August 1990. Iraq invaded Kuwait and by 4th
break the blockade. It offered to return virtually all the

August, Iraqi forces w'ere amassed along the Kuwaiti-
territory taken during the Iran-Iraq war - this included 164

Saudi border for a possible invasion of Saudi Arabia. If Iraq
square miles in the Elam region and the strategic Shatt-el-
occupied Saudi Arabia, it would not only establish itself as Arab waterway.

the secular leader of the Arab world, but also would control

Iran was not persuaded for several reasons, including

45% of the world's oil. Moreover, if Iraq invaded Saudi
the costly Iran-Iraq War, the traditional enmity toward Iraq

Arabia, then an invasion of the CAE would soon follow.

and the economic need to improve relations with the West.

If these moves were successful, then Iraq would have a

However, Iran did remain neutral in the 1991 W ar and
major influence on the worlds oil supplies.

provided humanitarian assistance.

Immediately after the invasion, the U S froze Iraqi assets

Iraq had been an important client of Russia, one that
in the United States. The first United Nations resolution
offered a balance to Iranian theocracy. However, the
demanded that Iraq withdraw from Kuwait. The second
implosion of the Soviet Union that followed the policies
resolution imposed an oil embargo. Russia agreed to
of perestroika (restructuring the economy) and glasnost honour the sanctions. Twelve European states also froze

(transparency in policy), constrained Russian foreign

Iraqi and Kuwaiti assets and embargoed Iraqi oil.

policy. Russia’s immediate and urgent priorities were to

The embargo was not immediately effective. Sanctions
preserve the integrity of as much of the U S S R as possible;
and blockades have poor records of success, and as the
to transform the economy; to gain technological help from
embargoes effects were assessed in the ensuing months,
the West; and to recast its armed military into one that
it was concluded that if it were to succeed (and this was a
offered strategic defence and strong regional capability.

question in itself), then it would take a long time, certainly

Russian policy during the war was to try and persuade Iraq
at least a year, to force Iraq to withdraw.

to withdraw from Kuwait while providing limited military
assistance.

The U S and Britain believed that war was necessary,
because if Iraq withdrew, then they would have to commit

The air war started on 17 Jan u ary 1991. B y February,
to a costly long-term peace-keeping force, and Iraq would
total air superiority had been achieved and severe dam age
be free to continue its nuclear, chemical and biological
inflicted on Iraqi forces in and around Kuwait. The land
warfare programmes.

campaign started on 24th February and in a few weeks

Kuwait had been recaptured and Iraqi troops pushed back

By November, it was obvious that sanctions were not
into Iraq.

enough to force a withdrawal from Kuwait. The U S and

TRANSITION T O EM INENCE / 4 ?1

Select Bibliography

By

P u b lis h e r

Title

G E N E R A L

Wings of Fire - An Autobiography

A P J Abdul Kalam

Universities Press,

Hyderabad 1999

Defending India

Jaswant Singh

Macmillan India, 1999

Nuclear Weapons & Indian Security -

Bharat Karnad

Macmillan 2000

The Realist Foundations of Strategy

Prepare or Perish -

Gen KV Krishna Rao

Lancer 1991

A Study of National Security

Weapons of Peace -

Raj Chengappa

Harper Collins 2000

The Secret Story of India’s

Quest to be a Nuclear Power

My Life

Grand Admiral Erich Raeder

U S Naval Institute

German Navy

Annapolis U SA 1960

CJ Boats - History, Development

David Miller

Conway Maritime Press 2000
and Equipment 1914 - 1945

Admiral S M Nanda - The Man

Admiral S M Nanda

Harper Collins & India

Who Bombed Karachi - A Memoir

Today Group, New Delhi 2004

Betrayal of the Defence Forces -

Admiral Vishnu Bhagwat

Manas Publications

The Inside Truth

New Delhi 2001

The Magnificent Viraat - Decade

Commemorative Publication
and Half of Glorious Flying

IPK F-O PER ATIO N PA W A N

Assignment Colombo

J N Dixit

Konark Publishers

The IPKF in Sri Lanka

Lt Gen Depinder Singh

Trishul Publications, Noida

The Sri Lankan Crisis

Maj Gen Afsar Karim

Lancer International,

Major Shankar Bhaduri

New Delhi

C H E C K S A N D B A L A N C E S

My Presidential Years

R Venkataraman

Indus-Harper Collins India 1994

A Cabinet Secretary Looks Around

B G Deshmukh

Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan

Mumbai 1998

A Cabinet Secretary Thinks Aloud

B G Deshmukh

Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan Mumbai

H D W S S K S U B M A R IN E S

The Dynasty-A Political

S S Gill

Harper Collins India

Biography of the Premier Ruling

New Delhi 1996

Family of Modern India

Seem a Mustafa

New Age International

The Lonely Prophet-VP Singh

New Delhi 1995

A Political Biography

Chitra Subramaniam

Viking, Penguin India 1993

TheStory Behind the News

Vice Admiral Daya Shankar

The Shankar Family

Memoirs and Memories

A-1/23 Safdarjang Enclave

New Delhi 2003

B R A S S T A C K S

Chanakya Publications 1988

Ravi Rikhye

The War That Never W as

Manohar, New Delhi 1995

Kanti P Bajpai

Brasstacks and Beyond -

P R Chari

Perception and Management

Pervaiz Iqbal Cheema
of Crisis in South Asia

Stephen P Cohen

Sum it Gangulyu

O C E A N

E X T E R N A L N A V A L P R E S E N C E IN T H E IN D IA N

George Allen & Unwin

K M Pannikar

Asia and Western Dominance

London 1953

Longman Group UK 1993

Sanjay Subrahmanyam

The Portuguese Empire in Asia,

1500-1700: A Political and Econom ic

History

Cambridge History of India

Denison Ross

The Portuguese in India

Volume V

1498-1598

Oxford University Press 1999

Wheeler M Thackston

Jahangirnama

Memoirs of Jahangir, Emperor of India

The Hague 1955

Jacob Van Leur

Indonesian Trade and Society

Walburg Pers, Zutphen 2003

Femme S Gaastra

The Dutch East India Company

Expansion and Decline of the VOC

Jam es D Tracy (editor)

The Rise of Merchant Empires -

Long Distance Trade in the Early

World 1300 to 1570

Varorium Series 1994

Ashin Das Gupta

Merchants of Maritime India

1500-1800

Oxford University Press

Prem Shankar Jh a

The Origins of a Dispute -

New Delhi 2003

Kashmir 1947

Sage Publications, 2002

C Dasgupta

War and Diplomacy in Kashmir

1947-48

Her Majesty’s Stationery Office

The Transfer of Power 1942 to 1947

1980

US Naval Institute,

Capt S W Roskill, RN

White Ensign -

Annapolis, U SA

The British Navy at War 1939-1945

C o m m o d o re J G o ld rick

Oxford University Press

The Royal Australian Navy

Australia 2001

And Others-

Edited by David Stevens

Estranged Democracies - India and

Dennis Kux
the United States 1941-1994

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 4 2 3

In d ex

A B H A Y A JA Y A K S H A Y A G R A Y (Anti Subm arine Patrol Vessels ex U S S R ) 2 6 ,3 2 ,2 1 5

Academy

A BH IM A N YU 241

.National D efence Academy 323

A D IT Y A (Fleet Tanker) 50

.Naval A cadem y IN S M andovi G oa 324

A G N IB A H U 268, 275, 400

.New Naval A cadem y Ezhim ala 323, 324, 327

A G R A N I (P O Leadership Sch o ol) 289, 293

Admiralty (British ) see under Britain

A JIT A T U L A M A R (S D B s M K I) 27

Addoo Atoll 11, 14, 15

A L L E P P E Y (C M S) 3 0 ,2 1 5

Ahuja G S, H onorary C om m odore, Indian N avy (Se a Cadet

A M B A (Subm arine Depot Sh ip ) 26, 114, 215

Corps) 392, 394, 395

A R N A LA A N D R O T H A N D A M A N A N JA D IP A M IN I (A S W Petyas Ahuja Rabi, H onorary Captain, Indian N avy (S e a C adet Corps)

ex U S S R ) 27, 215

394

ASTRA VA H IN I (Torpedo Trials Vessel ex H S L ) 31

Air Arm 86

.Aircraft

B

A liz e s 29, 86, 87, 96

.D o rn iers 103, 107

Bangladesh 22, 36, 182, 232, 234

.Isla n d e rs 29, 104

Baxi J J , R Adm (L) 52, 54, 59, 62, 68, 82

.K ira n s 104

Baw a P S , Cm de (s/m) 377

■ Seah aw ks 22, 29, 86, 91

Bhagw at Vishnu, Adm 247, 337, 377, 422

.S e a H a rrie rs xii, 29, 84, 91, 92, 94, 95, 105, 106, 339-340

Bhalla NR V Adm (E ) 154

•Air Defence Ship 91, 106

Bhandari CL, R Adm (E ) 152, 347

•Reminiscences of

Bharat Dynam ics (B D L ) 175

•Mr Govind Narain, D efence Secretary 1976 (regarding

Bharat Electronics (B E L ) 55, 179

Maritime Reconnaissance) 101

Bharat Heavy Electricals (B H E L ) 62, 65

•Adm RH Tahiliani C N S 1984-87 (regarding Viraat) 90

Bhate P B , Capt (s/m) 377

•Admiral of the Fleet S ir Benjam in Bathurst, British Navy

Bom bay Dockyard see under Naval Dockyard Bom bay

(regarding Sea H arriers) 94

Bose SC , Cm de (E ) 62

•Vice Adm N P Datta (regarding M aritim e Reconnaissance)

Brass Tack - see under Operation Brass Tacks

102

Britain x, 47

•Rear Adm S K Dam le (regarding Sea Harriers) 93

.withdrawal from East of Suez 8, 11

•Rear Adm Shekhar Sinha (regarding Sea Harriers) 93

Britto A, V Adm (E ) 132, 155

•Cmde V Ravindranath (regarding Seakings) 96

B R O Cochin
see under Naval Ship Repair Yard Cochin

•Cmde S Purohit (regarding Seakings) 97, 98, 100

B R O Port Blair see under Naval Ship Repair Yard Port Blair

Air Force-Navy Interaction xix, 54, 88, 100, 105

B R O Visakhapatnam see under Naval Dockyard

Ajrekar KR , Capt (s/m) 118, 377

Visakhapatnam

A liz e (anti subm arine aircraft) see under Aircraft

B A S S E IN B IM LIP A T A M (IM S ’ ex Britain) 25

A lo u e ttes see under Helicopters

BH A V N A G A R B E D I (C M S’ ex U S S R ) 30, 216

Am erica see under United States

B R A H M A PU T R A B E A S B E T W A (Earlier frigates ex Britain Anand NN, R Adm 377
converted for training cadets. Now
successors of

A N D A M A N Foundering of 243

Godavari class m issile frigates) 26, 29, 83, 223

•

Reactions to the Foundering 246

B C IL S A R B H A T K A L (IM S ’ ex M D L) 26

•Retrospect 247

Antarctica see under Expeditions to Antarctica

C

A&N Islands 17, 18, 19, 21, 104, 408, 413, 415

.Kam orta, K A R D IP 138, 139

Cactus See under O peration Cactus

.Port Blair, JA R A W A 104, 138, 139

Cadre Reviews 255, 299, 303

Anti Subm arine Operations 112, 113

Careerism 334

A PSO H Indigenous Sonar of 1980s xii, 64, 175, 178, 179

Cartography 230

Arun Singh, Minister of State for Defence, 1985-87 353

Cerem onial

Arunachalam VS, SA to RM 1983-1988 179

•Fleet Reviews 378

Arvind Singh Cdr, Maha Vir Chakra, Sri Lanka 242, 320

.President’s Colours 378

Auditto A, R Adm (s/m) 377

Chandra Shekhar, Prim e Minister, 1990 352

Awati MR V Adm 336

Chandavarkar P S Cdr, Vir Chakra, Sri Lanka 242, 320

30

Changes in Command & Control Structure 362

C H EE T A H (L S T ex Poland) 3 1 ,2 1 6

. Command & Control Structure in 1990 365

C H ILK A (training establishm ent) 283, 288, 289, 379, 400

Chariots 241

C1RCARS 283, 379, 400

Chatterjee PK, Cmde (s/m) 377

D

Checks & Balances

.Financial Control 345-354

Dakshin Gangotri, India’s first A ntarctic Research Station 227,

.Canons of Financial Propriety 346

.Promotions & Appointments 345-354

228

.Reminiscences of

Dam le SK , R Adm (p) 93

.Mr R Venkataraman, President 1987-92 351-352

Dam odaran, R Adm (Constr) 47, 51

.Mr Govind Narain, Defence Secretary 1976 349

Das P S , V Adm 262

.Mr NN Vohra, Defence Secretary 1990-92 350-351

Datey P, Capt (L) 179

.Mr AK Ghosh, Financial Adviser 349

Datta N P.V A d m 75, 102

.Adm RH Tahiliani, C N S 1984-87 348, 353

Dawson O S, Adm 179

.Admiral JG Nadkarni, C N S 1987-90 353

Daya Shankar, V Adm (E ) 48, 151, 348

.R Adm (E) C L Bhandari, D GNP Vizag, 1969 347

Decommissionings

C hetaks (A louettes) see under Helicopters

.Ships 375

Chief of Logistics 295-298, 355

.Submarines 376

Chief of Material 297, 355

Deep Seabed Mining 33

Chiefs of the Naval Staff

Defence of Offshore Assets 249

1947-48 R Adm JT S Hall RIN

Offshore O il Basins (m ap) 250

1948-51 V Adm E Parry RN

Defence Reviews xiv, 125, 158

1951 -56 V Adm M Pizey RN

.1963 24

1956-58 V Adm SC arlill RN

.1973 28, 32

1958-63 V Adm RD Katari IN

.1975 32

1963-66 V Adm B S Som an 19, 102

Desai, Morarji, Prim e Minister 1969 347

1966-70 Adm AK Chatterji

De-Silva JC , V Adm 377

1970-73 Adm SM Nanda 422

Dhillon JS , Cdr (p) 377

1973-76 Adm SN Kohli

Dhir RD, Capt (p) 377

1976-79 Adm J Cursetji 102

Diego Garcia

1979-82 Adm R L Pereira 179, 342

.Historical Background 11

1982-84 Adm O S Dawson 179

. Development of CIS Facilities 8, 11, 13

1984-87 Adm RH Tahiliani 51, 90, 183, 348, 353

Dixit VS, Cdr (L) 150

1987-90 Adm JG Nadkarni 181, 313, 353

Dixit JN , Foreign Secretary 189, 422

1990-93 Adm L Ramdas

D o m ier (aircraft) See under Aircraft

1993-96 Adm VS Shekhawat 75

Dubash KN, Cmde 377

1996-98 Adm V Bhagwat 247, 337, 377, 422

D A R SH A K (Survey ship ex H S L ) 26, 49, 216, 230, 232, 235

1998-01 Adm Sushil Kumar

D EGA (N AS Visakhapatnam) 104, 107

2001-04 Adm Madhvendra Singh 195, 377

D E L H I (Old W W 11 cruiser) 25, 181, 223

2004- Adm Arun Prakash vii, 92, 93

D E L H I (Lead ship of new class of missile destroyers, Project 15) China x, 17

Coast Guard Act 1978 249, 367

.Reminiscences of

Commissionings

.R Adm NP Gupta (Constr) 50

.Ships 370

.R Adm A Ganesh (L) 52

.Submarines 373

.R Adm J J Baxi (L) 54

.Naval Air Squadrons 374

.Capt S Prabhala (L) 55

.Shore Establishments 374

.Capt Mohan Ram (Constr) 55

.Floating Dock 374

.Capt J Subbiah (Constr) 55

Committee on Defence Expenditure 1991-92 353

D E E P A K (tanker) 26, 216

Controller of Logistic Support 361

D C JN A G IR I (4th Leander) 30, 58, 60, 61, 71, 216

C O RT O S 282

DRONACHARYA (Gunnery training establishment) 288, 292,

Corvette Project 72

Cursetji J , Adm 102, 297

C A C JV ER Y (W W II Frigate) 223, 280

E

C A N N A N O R E C U D D A LO R E (C M S’ ex CJSSR) 26, 31, 216

C H A KR A (Leased Nuclear Propelled Subm arine ex U S S R ) 120, Embargoes 21 (Footnote 15)

121,216

England See under Britain

C H A TA K C H A M A K C H A PA L C H A RA G (Missile Boats ex U SSR ) Expeditions to Antarctica 225, 312

4 26 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Research Station Dakshin Gangotri 227, 228

.MATCH (Torpedo carrying helicopter) 29, 86

2nd Research Station Maitree 228, 229

.Seakings (Anti Submarine/Helicopter ex Britain) xii, 21, 29,

Chronology of Expeditions till 1990 228

58, 86, 87, 96, 97, 107

Ezhimala-Mew Naval Academy 324-325

Seakings Mk 42 B 97,107, 340, 341

.Kamovs (Anti Submarine Helicopter ex CJSSR) 29, 86, 99, F

107

.Simulators 95, 96

Fixed Commissions in ships 272

HDW (German Submarine Manufacturer) 74-80, 117, 121, 341,

Fleet

343

.Western Fleet 104

Hiranandani GM, VAdm 69 (Footnote 13), 179, 287 (Footnote

.Eastern Fleet xvi, 104

8), 377

.Reviews 378, 380, 382, 384

Hindustan Shipyard (HSL) 46, 52, 137

Foreign cruises 215

Holland x

France x,

HCIMVAD Sonar of the 1990s 180

Frigate Project See under Leander Frigate Project

Hybridisation 128

Functional Departments see under Operator Maintainer

Hydrographic School 234

HAMLA (training establishment) 289, 379, 400

G

HANSA (NAS Goa) 104

HIMGIRJ (2nd Leander) 25, 27, 57, 58, 60, 61, 71, 212

Gadihoke SM, V Adm 377

HOSDURG (Ocean Going Rocket Boat ex USSR) 30, 217

Gallantry Awards 1976-1990 312-322

Gan (Addoo Atoll) 14, 15

I

Ganesh A, R Adm (L) 52, 62, 70, 84

Ganesh RN, VAdm (s/m) 377

IKL (German Submarine Design Firm linked with HDW) 77, 79

Gandhi Indira, Prime Minister 1969-77, 1979-84 79, 188

Indian Navy

Gandhi Rajiv, Prime Minister 1985-90 91, 184, 188, 354

.1947 to 1965 16

Garden Reach Workshops (GRW) 46, 49, 56

.1965 to 1975 20

GED, GTD, GKES (of the USSR) 126-129, 133

.1976 to 1990 28

Ghandhi RKS, V Adm 393

.Overview of Ship Acquisitions 28

Ghosh MB, V Adm (E) 262

.Overview of Submarine Acquisitions 29

Goa 89,91,92, 102, 103, 105

.Overview of Aircraft and Helicopter Acquisitions 29

Goa Shipyard (GSL) 46, 56

.Highlights of Developments between 1976 and 1990

Godavari-Salvage of old WWII Godavari, Operation Godsal 181,
ix, 29

201,313

.Ships and Submarines Acquired between 1976 and

Godavari (Lead ship of new class of missile ASW frigates of

1990 29-32

Project 16) 64

Indian Ocean ix, 2, 410, 411, 414, 418

Gopalachari SY V Adm 200

.as a zone of peace 10

Gorshkov SG, Adm of the Fleet, USSR 123, 133, 153

.external naval presence x, xi, 1, 2, 5, 11, 14

Govind Narain, Defence Secretary 1973-75) 101, 349

.features 1

Govind S, Capt (s/m) 377

Indiresan, Prof at IIT Delhi 176, 177

Growth of the Navy ix,

Indonesia 406

Guha B, V Adm 377

IL 38 (MRASW aircraft) See under Maritime Reconnaissance

Gupta NR R Adm (Constr) 50
islander (aircraft)

See under Aircraft

QAJ (Ocean Going Tug ex GRSE) 27, 216

International Law of the Sea

See under Maritime

GARUDA (NAS Cochin) 104

Legislation

GHORPAD (LST) 27, 216

INVESTIGATOR (Survey Ship ex GRSE) 30, 47, 49, 230, 235

GHARIAL, GULDAR (LSTs) 26, 31, 49, 217

GODAVARI, GAHGA, GOMATI (Missile Frigates ex MDL) 31, 52,

J

53, 66, 70, 71, 216, 217

GOMANTAK (shore establishment) 234, 400

Jaffna peninsula 185, 192, 242

GORSHKOV (Aircraft Carrier ex USSR undergoing

Jagjivan Ram, Defence Minister 1971 257
modernisation in Russia) 106

Jain S, V Adm 377

Jain VK, Lt (L) 175

H

Jammu & Kashmir see under Kashmir

Japan 406-408, 411-416

Helicopters 88, 99

Jawahar, Sea Cadet Training Ship & Sea Cadet Corps

Alouettes/Chetaks (Search & Rescue Helicopters ex

Headquarters in Bombay 393-395

H AL) 29, 86, 99

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 4 2 7

Lohana KK, Capt (Constr) 67, 82

Jha P, Cmde (p) 377

Lowe LA, V Adm (E) 60

Johnson H, V Adm (o) 377

LCUsL31, L32 (ex HDL) 30, 49

Jupiter - see under Operation Pawan

LCCls MKI I L 33, L 34, L 35(ex GSL) 30, 49

JARAWA (shore establishment) 138, 379, 400

LCCJs MK III L36, L 37, L 38, L 39(ex GSL) 31, 49

JAMUNA (Survey Ship ex GRSE) 49, 230, 235

M

K

Kamov (Russian ASW helicopters) see under Helicopters

Madhvendra Singh, Adm 195, 377

Karwar - New Naval Base, Project Seabird 171

Maintenance, Repair and Refit Facilities 135-156

Kashmir 6, 17-19

Maitree, India’s Second Antarctic Research Station 227, 228

Katchativu 188, 194

Maldive Islands, Male 181, 408, 411, 412

Khandekar AR, Capt (L) 179

Malik BK, Cmde (p) 377

Kiran (jet trainer aircraft) See under Aircraft

Mandovi-Naval Academy 324, 400

Kockums (Swedish Submarine Manufacturer) 74, 75

Manning of Ships and Conservation of Expertise 264

Kohli KK, V Adm 377

.Reminiscences of

Kohli R, Cmde (L) 68, 179

.V Adm VL Koppikar 278

Kondath M, Capt 75

.Cmde 1J Sharma 277

Koppikar VL, V Adm 258, 278, 304, 335, 336

.Cmde SS Sodhi 264

Krishna Menon, (Defence Minister, 1957-62) 46, 61

.Cdr VF Rebello 265

Krishnan SKK, R Adm (E) 154

Manekshaw Field Marshal SH FJ 197

Kumar V, Cmde (s/m) 377

Manpower, policy, reforms, growth, controlling costs 260, 261,

KALVARI KHAN DERI KCJRSURA KARANJ (submarines ex USSR) 264, 276

26, 116, 121,217,218

Marine Commandos (MARCOs) 241

KAMORTA KADMATT KILTAN KAVARATTIKATCHALL (ASW

.Operations between 1987 and 1990 242

Petyas ex USSR) 26, 217, 218

Maritime Boundaries 233, 234

KARD1P See under A&N Islands

Maritime Legislation

KARWAR KAK1NADA KONKAH KOZHIKODE (CMS’ ex GSSR)

. 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea 232

26,31,217,218

.passage of warships through territorial waters 232

KATTABOMAN (VLF station) 119

.Maritime Zones Act 234

KHCIKRI (ASW Frigate ex Britain sunk in Dec 71 War) 24, 81,

.Safety Zones for offshore installations 249

175, 388

.Coast Guard Act 249, 367

KHCIKRI KCITHAR KIRPAN KHANJAR (Missile Corvettes, Project

Maritime Reconnaissance 24, 100, 106

25) 26, 32, 72, 73,218

.Transfer of Command and Control 100, 101

KISTNA (WW 11 frigate) 224

.Super Constellation MR aircraft 101, 103

KORA, KIRCH, KULISH AND KARMUK (Missile Corvettes

./L 38 MRASW aircraft 29, 86, 103, 113

Project 25A) 44, 73

.TCJ 142 LRMP aircraft 29, 103

KESARJ KCJMBHIR (LSTs ex Poland) 27, 31, 218

.Dornier 228 MPA aircraft 103

KCINJALI (Helicopter Base, Bombay) 72, 99, 104, 107, 379

Mazagon Docks (MDL) 46, 52, 56, 57, 62, 73, 79

Mehta LR, V Adm (L) 153

L

Menon KR, R Adm (s/m) 377

Meteorology See under Naval Meteorology and Oceanology

Lakshadweep Islands 104, 230, 363, 364, 366

Military Engineering Service 390-391

Leadership ix, 334-337

Misra SM, R Adm (Constr) 47

Leander Frigate Project 17, 22, 25, 57, 65

Missile Boats 21, 24, 25, 52

.Reminiscences of

Mohan Ram NS, Capt (Constr) 55, 63, 65

.V Adm L Lowe (E) 60

Mookerji S, V Adm 159

.V Adm BA Samson 61

Mountbatten L, Admiral of the Fleet, British Navy 17 (Footnote

.R Adm J J Baxi (L) 59

4), 386, 388

.Cmde SC Bose (E) 62

MAGAR (LST (L) ex GRSE) 31, 49, 138

.Capt S Prabhala (L) 63

MAHISH (LST (M) ex Poland) 31,218

.Capt Mohan Ram (Constr) 63

MAKAR, MITHCJN, MEEN, MESH (Survey Craft ex GSL) 31,

Logistics

235

.Chronology of Efforts to Cope with Logistics 166, 295

MALVAN, MANGROL, MAHE, MULKI, MAGDALA, MALPE (IMS’

ex USSR) 30, 218

.Merger of Supply and Secretarial Branch with Executive

MANDOVI (Naval Academy) 283, 279, 379

Branch 1978 167, 296

MATANGA (Ocean Going Tug ex GRSE) 30, 49, 218

.Creation of Logistics Cadre 1989 169, 296

428 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

itvcnRE (old W W II cruiser) 23, 26

.On-Board Maintenance Workload vis-a-vis Maintenance

MYSORE, MUMBAI (Project 15 Missile Destroyers) 218

Manpower 161

.Dockyards and the Quality of Refits 161

N

. Productivity of the Dockyard Work Force 161

.Base Maintenance Gnits 162

.Test Equipment 163

Madkarni JG , Adm 181, 313, 353

.Dockyards 163

Nanda SM, Adm 422

Marain Govind Defence Secretary 1976 101, 349

.Improving Dockyard Productivity 163

.Ship Maintenance Authority 165

Nath S, Cmde 377

Naval Assistance in Peacetime

.Reminiscences of

.Gen KV Krishna Rao 158

.to ships in distress at sea 201

.V Adm S Mookerji 159

.search and rescue 203

.medical assistance & evacuation 204

Naval Hydrography and Marine Cartography 230

.cyclone, flood and earthquake relief 205

Naval Oceanology & Meteorology 237

.Monsoon Experiments 237

.maintenance of essential services 206

.Oceanographic Data 238

.firefighting assistance 207

.Bathymetric Charts 238

.naval aid to civil authority 207

.assistance by naval diving team 208

Naval Operations 181

.apprehending poaching

.During 1965 18

& smuggling trawlers for sea

.During 1971 22, 186
transportation 212

.Between 1976 and 1990 xv, 181

Naval Ceremonial 378

.Godsal 181

.Reviews of the Fleet by

.Starling 182

. President Fakhrudin Ali Ahmed on 11 Jan 76 380-381

.Rajdoot 182

. President Giani Zail Singh on 12 Feb 84 382-383

.Brass Tacks 183

. President R Venkataraman on 15 Feb 89 384-385

.Pawan xvi, 183, 192, 242

.Presentation of Colours 378

.Cactus xvi, 199, 242

.Naval Bands 379

.Tasha 200

Naval Constructor Cadre 47

.Reminiscences of

.Reminiscences of

.Adm JG Nadkarni (regarding Godsal) 181

.Mr Parmanandhan DGND 47

.Adm RH Tahiliani (regarding Brass Tacks) 183

•R Adm SM Misra (Constr) 47

Naval Physical & Oceanography Laboratory 97, 175

Naval Dockyard Bombay 45, 62, 135, 140

Naval Ship Repair Yards (ex BROs)

.Karanja Basin Bombay 136

.Cochin 138, 147

. Naval Dockyard Expansion Scheme 136, 139

.Port Blair 138, 148

•Reminiscence of

Naval Welfare

•V Adm (E) Daya Shankar 151

.Housing 328

•Cmde PR Franklin (s/m) 152

.Schooling 328

Naval Dockyard Visakhapatnam 21, 137, 142, 145

.Welfare Funds 330

.South Dry Dock (Varuna Dock) 143

.Benevolent Fund 330

•North Dry Dock (Matsya and Surya Docks) 144

.Amenities Fund 332

• 1984 Master Plan 144

.Group Insurance 330

• 1991 Master Plan 146

Nehru Jawaharlal, Prime Minister 1947-64 91, 338, 393

•Reminiscences of

NEVESBCJ, the Dutch Warship Design Bureau 57

.R Adm (E) CL Bhandari 152

New Moore Island 182

.V Adm (L) LR Mehta 153

NHQ Organisation in 1990 361

V Adm (E) NP Bhalla 154

Nicobar Islands 17-19, 21, 413, 415

.R Adm (E) SKK Krishnan 154

New Management Strategy (NMS) 354

.Maj Gen (Engineers) MK Paul 154

NILGIRI (1st Leander) 25, 27, 57, 58, 60-62, 64, 71, 85, 218

.V Adm (E) A Britto 155

.

MIPAT NIRBHIK NASHAK NIRGHAT (Missile Boats ex GSSR) 27

Naval Expert Committee Report on Maintenance 1979-80

NIRBHIK, NIPAT, NISHANK, NIRGHAT (Missile Attack Craft ex

142, 158, 168, 272

GSSR) 31, 220

•Adherence to Planned Preventive Maintenance (PPM)

MIRDESHAK, MIRUPAK (Survey Ships ex GRSE) 30, 49, 220,

Routines 159

235

•Incidence of Operational Defects during Operational

MIREEKSHAK (Diving Support Vessel ex MDL) 32, 120

Period 160
fSISTAR (S/M rescue ship) See under Submarine Arm

.Quality of Work Carried out during Refits 160

.Maintenance Concepts 160

.Tenures in Dockyard Appointments 160

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 4 2 9

Pereira RL Adm 179, 342
o

Personnel xvii, 105, 252

.Civilian Personnel 260

Oceanology See under Naval Meteorology and Oceanology

.Borne Strength Between 1965 and 1990 260, 261

.Merger of the Supply & Secretariat and Executive Branches

Officers

.Intake 252, 323

295-298

.Training 279-283, 323

.Morale & Discipline 261, 263, 334

.Promotion 253

.Naval Services Selection Boards 262

.Increasing Officer Intake 252

.Fourth Pay Commission 28, 305

.Rationalising the ‘Rules of Sea Time’ 253

.Welfare 328-333

.Aircrew Officers in Embarked Flights 254

.Reminiscences of

.Linkinq the Command Examination and the Staff Course

.Vice Adm VL Koppikar 258

254

.Vice Adm PS Das 262

.The Special Duties List 256, 257

.Grand Admiral Erich Raeder German Navy 262, 263, 334

Operation Cactus xv, xvi, 14, 199, 242

Pestonji K, R Adm 377

Operation Jupiter - see under Operation Pawan

Port Blair See under A&N Islands

Operator Maintainer Concept xviii, 267, 269-271, 286,

Portugal x,

.Reminiscences of

Prabhala S Captain (L) 55, 63, 68, 179

.VAdm VL Koppikar 278

Prakash Arun, Adm (CNS 2004- 92, 93, 377

.Cmde 1J Sharma 277

Purohit SV, Cmde (p) 97, 98, 100, 315, 340, 341, 377

Operation Pawan xv, 183, 192, 193, 242, 312

PANAJl, PULICAT, PAMBAN, PANVEL, PURI (Patrol Boats ex

.Indo-Sri Lankan Accord xvi, 184, 189-191

USSR) 26

.Trincomalee xi, 184, 190, 197, 410, 412

PONDICHERRY PORBANDAR (CMS’ ex USSR) 30, 220, 269

.Naval Operations xvi, 192

PRALAYA PRATAP PRABAL PRACHAND (Missile Boats ex USSR)

.Operation Jupiter 195, 242

30

.Reminiscences of

.ShriJN Dixit 189

R

.Mr MK Narayanan ex Director IB 189

.Field Marshal SHFJ Manekshaw 197

Rajan KMS, Capt 377

.Gen VN Sharma CAS (1989-91) 196

Ramdas K, Cdr (s/m) 377

.Adm Madhvendra Singh 195

Rameshwaram 188, 192, 194,

.Lt Gen Depinder Singh 187, 191, 196

Ramnad 194

.R Adm Shekhar Sinha 192

Rao PVR, Defence Secretary 1962-66 18

.Mr Lakshman Kadirgaman, Sri Lankan Minister 184

Ravindranath V, Cmde (p) 96

(Footnote 1)

Rebello VF, Cdr 265

.Cmde Padmasankar 194

Retrospects

.Cdr Arvind Singh MVC 242

1. Development of the Navy till 1975 24

.Cdr Anoop Verma VrC 242

2. Growth of the Navy between 1976 and 1990 32

.Cdr PS Chandavarkar VrC 242

3. Warship Design and Production 54

Operation Tasha 200

4. The Leander Frigate Project 61

Organisation

5. Project 16 - Godavari Class Frigates 70

.Changes in NHQ Organisation 355-361

6. The Submarine Arm 123

.Changes in Command and Control 362-366

7. The Russian Acquisitions 131

8. Maintenance Repair & Refit Facilities 156

P

9. Naval Expert Committee on Maintenance 165

10. The Indigenous Panoramic Sonar - APSOH 179

Padmasankar Cmde Naval Officer-in-Charge Madras, Op Pawan

11. Operation Pawan 196

194

12. Foundering of the INS Andaman 247

Pakistan 17, 234

13. Personnel. 262

Paintal DS, R Adm 377

14. Manning of Ships and Conservation of Expertise 277

Palk Strait 184, 189, 200, 251

15. Operator Maintainer 277

Pandey VC, Capt (p) 377

16. Training 293

Paramanandhan S, (Constr) DGND 47, 65, 66, 73, 82, 83

17. Cadre Reviews 304

Pasricha V, V Adm (p) 377

18. Merger of Supply and Secretariat Branch 297-298

Paul MK, Maj Gen, Military Engineering Services 154, 390

19. The Navy and Sea Cadets 393-394

Paulraj A, Cmde (L) 175-180

Rishi K, Cmde 377

Pawan See under Operation Pawan

Roy DB, Cdr 377

PCTs 266, 274-277

Russian Acquisitions 17, 20, 21, 25, 28, 124

4 30 / TRANSITION TO EMINENCE

Sinha PK, R Adm (L) 252

. A c q u i s i t i o n s between 1976 and 1990 i x , 28, 32, 125, Sinha Shekhar, R Adm (p) 93, 192, 297, 320

130

Sodhi JM S, R Adm (s/m) 377

.Spares Problem s 126

Sodhi SS, Cmde 264

Hybridisation 128

SOMC 273, 276

.JISW OG 129

Sridharan K, R Adm (s) 297

.Acquisitions after 1990 131

Sri Lanka (Ceylon renamed Sri Lanka) 234

.Strategic Significance for India 184

RemAnatolyCDobrynin Soviet ambassador in Washington

.Naval assistance in Apr 1971 186

1950-80 124

.Operation Pawan 1987-90 192

. V Adm A Britto COM 132

.Operation Jupiter 195

RAJALI (NAS Arakkonam) 103, 104, 107

Srinivasan Dr, Director NPOL 179

RAJPUT RANA RAN JIT RANVIR RANVIJAY (Missile Destroyers

SSK See under Submarine Arm
ex USSR) 30, 31, 220, 269, 275

Subbiah J , Capt (Constr) 49, 55, 64, 72

RATNAGIRI (CMS’ ex GSSR) 30, 220

Submarine Arm 110

.Inductions 25, 114

.Depot ship Amba 26, 114

.Rescue vessel Nistar 27, 119

Sailing & Yachting 397

.Interim rescue vessel Nireekshak 120

.IN Sailing Vessel Samudra 398-399

.Six yearly refits 115, 116

.Indian Naval Sailing Association 400

.VLF communications 118

Sailors

.Indigenous batteries 116

.Intake & training 283

.Indigenous construction HDW 1500 74, 117, 341-344

.Reorganisation of structure 264, 273-276

.EKM/Kilo class xiii, 29, 117, 120

.Changes in branch responsibilities 266

.Nuclear propelled Chakra xiii, 29, 121

.Instructor Cadre 259, 284

.Reminiscences of

.Increasing the Period of Engagement 256

.German Navy’s Grand Adm Raeder (regarding submarine

.Changes in Sailors Conditions of Service 257
warfare) 110

.The Master Chief Petty Officer (MCPO) Cadre 258

.R Adm KR Menon (regarding tradition) 123

.Artificers 258

.Capt KR Aj'rekar (regarding EKMs) 118

.The Navy-Entry Artificers Scheme 259

Subra-Manian KV, Cmde (s/m) 377

Samant MN, Capt (s/m) 377

Super Constellations see under Maritime Reconnaissance

Samson BA V Adm 61

Supply & Secretariat Branch Merger with Executive Branch 295

Samudra, Indian Naval Sailing Vessel 398-399

Survey

Schunker MR, V Adm 179

.Ships and craft 49, 230

Seabird See under Karwar

.Hydrographic Office 230, 232

Sea Cadets 392-396

.Hydrographic School 234

.Sea Cadet Corps Headquarters, TS Jawahar 393-395

.Sea Cadet Sail Training Ship, Varuna 202, 222, 395, 398,

Suri RB, VAdm 51, 336,

400

Sushil KN, R Adm (s/m) 377

SANDHAYAK (Survey Ship ex GRSE) 30, 49, 220, 235

Sea Harriers See under Aircraft

SATAVAHANA (School of Submarine Warfare) 120, 288, 275

Seahawks (fighter aircraft) See under Aircraft

SAVITRI, SARAYU, SARADA, SUJATA (OPVs ex HSL) 26, 32, 52

Seakings (British ASW helicopters) see under Helicopters

SCIKANYA SCJVARNA SCJBHADRA (OPVs ex Korea) 26, 32, 52,

Sea Training

- See under Training

Sebastian E, Capt (s/m) 377

221

SHAKTI (Fleet tanker) 30, 47, 220

Sharma IJ, Cmde 277

Sharma OR Capt (s/m) 377

SHARDUL SHARABH (LSTs) 27, 221

Sharma V N General Chief of Army Staff

SHISHCJMAR, SHANKCJSH (SSK Submarines ex Germany) 31,
f r o m 1989 to 1991 196

Shastri Lai Bahadur Prime Minister of India 1964-65 18, 185

79,221

Shekhawat VS, Adm 75

SINDHCJDURG (Ocean Going Rocket Boat ex GSSR) 30

Ship Maintenance Authority 164

SINDHUGHOSH, SINDHCJDHVAJ, SINDHCJRAJ, SINDHUVIR,

Simulators

SINDHURATNA, SINDHCIKESARI, SINDHUKJRTI,

.Seaking (FATS) 96

SINDHCJVIJAY (EKM Submarines ex GSSR) 31, 221

.Sea Harrier 95

SUTLEJ (Survey Ship ex GRSE) 49, 235

.EKM 120

Singh Depinder Lt Gen GOCINC South, 1987, Operation Pawan

187,191, 196, 422

Singh SP, Cmde (s/m) 377

Tahiliani RH, Adm (p) 51, 90, 93, 183, 348, 353

Singh VR Prim e Minister 1990 352

Talwar L, Cdr (s/m) 377

TRANSITION T O EMINENCE / 431

V

Tasha See under Operation Tasha

Thukral DN, R Adm (Constr) 77

Training

Vasudeva MN, R Adm (s/m) 377

Venkataraman R, President of India, 1987-92 121, 351, 422

.Officers

.Naval Academy 279, 323-325

Verghese KC, Cdr (s/m) 377

.Sea Training 280

Verma Anoop, Cdr, Vir Chakra, Sri Lanka 242, 320

.Staff Course 282

Vohra NN, Defence Secretary 1990-92 350, 351

.College of Naval Warfare 282

Vohra RB, R Adm 51

.Sailors

Visakhapatnam Dockyard See under Naval Dockyard

.Sailors Training Establishment (STE) 283, 323

VAJRABAHU (S/M Headquarters West) 119

.Training Reforms of 1974-75 284

VEER VIDYUT VIJETA VINASH (Missile Craft ex U S S R ) 27, 31,

.Stream Training 268, 285

222

.Operator Maintainer Concept 286

VELA VAGIR VAGHSHEER VAGLI (Foxtrot Class Submarines ex

.Creation of Training Command in 1985 286

USSR) 27, 29, 121,221,222

. 1985 Delegation to Study the (J S Navy’s Training System

VIJAYDURG (Ocean-going Rocket Boats ex USSR) 30, 222, 269

287

VIKRANT (WW II aircraft carrier ex Britain) xii, 22, 26, 53, 86-88,

.1986-89 Revitalisation of Training 287-291

105

.Training Equipment 291

.Modernisation refits xi , 25, 29, 83, 84, 89

.Training Schools in 1990 292-293

.Material State in 1990 105

Training of Foreign Personnel 36

.Decommissioning 106

Trincomalee See under Operation Pawan

VINDHYAGIRI (6th Leander) 30, 60, 61, 71, 222

T 51, T 52, T 53, T 54, T 55 (SDBs MK II by GRSE) 30, 49, 221

V1RAAT (Modernised Aircraft carrier ex Britain) xii, 28, 31, 89-91, T56, T57, T58, T59, T 60, T 61 (SDBs Mk III ex GRSE/GSL)

106

31, 49

V1RBAHU (S/M Headquarters East) 119

TALWAR, TRISHUL (Fitment of missiles in Britain ASW Frigates)

26, 29, 53, 65, 82, 83, 221

W

TARAGIRI (5th Leander) 30, 59-62, 71, 221

TIR (CTS ex MDL) 31, 50, 224, 281,

Warship Design & Construction 44, 53, 54

TRVsA 71, A 72(Torpedo Recovery Vessels ex GSL) 30

.Delivered up to 1975 44

TALWAR, TRISHUL, TABAR (new Russian Krivak III class missile

.Delivered 1976 to 1990 44
frigates) 131

TCI 142 (LRMP aircraft) see under Maritime Reconnaissance

.Delivered after 1990 44

.Under Construction in 2004 45

Q

.Warship Building Yards 45

United Nations

.1982 Conference on the Law of the Sea 33, 232, 234,

.Hindustan Shipyard Limited (HSL). 46

249

.Mazagon Docks (MDL) and Garden Reach Workshops

(GRW) 46

.Seabed Committee 33

USA/US/United States

.Goa Shipyard Limited (GSL) 46

.and India 10

.Constructor Cadre 47

.and Pakistan 16, 17

.Design Organisation 48

.and Iran 8, 417, 420

.Reminiscences of

.and Iraq 8, 419, 420,

Mr Paramanandhan ex DGND 47

.geo strategic perceptions of India xi, 413-416

.Rear Adm SM Misra (Constr) 47

.naval policy in the Indian Ocean x, xi, 7-10, 416

Rear Adm NP Gupta (Constr) 50

.presence in Persian Gulf 7, 8, 10

Rear Adm A Ganesh (L) 52

.presence in Diego Garcia 8, 11-13

Rear Adm J J Baxi (L) 54

(JDAYG/RI (3rd Leander) 30, 58, 60, 61, 71

Capt Mohan Ram (Constr) 55

UTKROSH (NAS Port Blair) 104

Capt S Prabhala (L) 55

Capt J Subbiah (Constr) 49, 55

WESOAVESEE 52, 54, 68-70

4 3 2 / TRANSITION T O EMINENCE

PORTS VISITED BY INDIAN NAVAL SHIPS 1976 TO 1990
a
r
c
t
i
c

o
c
e
a
n

GREENLAND

NORTH

J t / o Riga

^ JbBultiysk

Moscow

AMERICA

Gdynia

BRITAIN f Antwe p

'/O l ,o Havre

FRANCE

OcJossu,Y

<^>S^vastopol

Vladivostok

Vania o / Black Sea N x P o li

La Corunna p

—

„

IstambulA -----

New Yoik

\

SPAIN / Toulon
p Lisbon J

*Pakimo'

Azores Is

/

\

Izmir TURKEY

Athens

(PantaDelgada)

(GibraJtary ^

—xTc

Norfolk

T a n g i e r ^ ^ - ^ t c . f , Bizote

Mediterranean Sea

Casablanca J o

ALGERIA

PACIFIC

Canary Is

C H I N A

Kuwait*

Las Palmas »

Bandar Abbas

EGYPT \ \

BahramNA j 5 ^ '

INDIA

\ \

Doha^OOA

Hongkong

OCEAN

Calcuttao

Ha\

ATLANTIC

\ \

SAUDI A R A BIA

Chittagong

\ \P Jeddah

CUBA^

Port Sudan o T £ \

Bombay

Jamaica <=>

/

YEMEN

IE T N A M \

Manila/ / PHILIPINE

Massawa OVti \

Bay o f Bengal

THAILAND^ Dal5”

f e (

\ InHodeid&K

Arabian

OCEAN

Dakar

Sea
y ^ Bangkok;

Wang

^ I S L A N D S

Djibouti o r ^ A d c a

A & N Is j

U S o S a ia h ip

AFRICA

Cochin

Berberu^

/

//

Ho Chi

// \ \

Conakry \p
tfrincomalce

Georgetown

( A

MinhCity ”

c - t S

NIGI'.RIA

GHANA

Colombo © S R I LA NK A Pc 3gyVKuantan Muara/>>KotaTf>

G U YANA

.pLagos

SOM ALIA y Mogadishu

* Male

Bclawan1 k

Ox

L a b u a n ^ iiinabalu

Padang

K E N YA

INDIAN OCEAN

^Mombasa

PACIFIC

° Zanzibar

NEW

Seychelles
a

TA N ZA N IA

Dar-cs salaam

3UINEA

Point N o w

(Port Victoria)

Diego Garcia

BRAZIL

Matadi

Comoros

Port Moresb)

Recife
p Luanda

OCEAN

0 (Moroni)

J a n g o la

A Diego Suarez

(Lautoka)

(o'-locamedes
o FUl

SOUTH

(Suva)

MAURITIUS

AMERICA

(Port Louis)

Maputo

SOUTH

AFR ICA

Cape Town Ip

Cape ofG°^ Hopo

NEW

ZEALAND

ANTARCfl- OCEAN

(Nautical Miles)

Table of Contents

- The Development of CJS Facilities in Diego Garcia

- Addoo Atoll
- The Submarine Arm
- The Leander Frigate Project
- 1976-1990
- 5. INDIAN OCEAN D EEP SEA B ED MINING
- 8. W A RSH IP D ESIG N AND PRODUCTION
- Indigenous Submarine Construction
- Personnel
- Russian Acquisitions Between 1976 and 1990

- 18. 1979-80 NAVAL E X P E R T C O M M ITTEE R EPO R T

- School of Naval Oceanology & Meteorology
- 28. T H E M ARINE CO M M ANDO S
- 29. TH E FO U N D ERIN G O F IN S ANDAMAN

- 30. D EFEN C E O F O F F S H O R E A S S E T S

- The Defence of Offshore Assets
- The First Cadre Review
- Acknowledgements
- 37. GALLANTRY A W ARD S 1976 - 1990
- BRANCH W ITH EXEC U T IV E BRANCH IN
- 36. T H E FOURTH PAY CO M M ISSIO N
- The Command and Control Structure in 1975
- 45. TH E COAST GUARD
- R E F E R E N C E N O T ES
- Select Bibliography
- Index
- 15 India’s Exclusive Economic Zone
- 19 Maritime Boundaries in the Bay of Bengal
- The New Naval Academy at Ezhimala