1 " ransltion

to

1 " riumph

History of the Indian Navy 1965-1975

I ransltion

to

T riumph

History of the Indian Navy 1965-1975

Vice Admiral

GM Hiranandani

PVSM, AVSM, NM, Ph D (Retd)

Published by

Director Personnel Services (DPS)

Integrated Headquarters Ministry of Defence (Navy)

New Delhi

First published in India by

Lancer Publishers & Distributors

56 G autam N agar, New Delhi -110049

Second Edition

Reprinted in 2005 by

Naval Printing Press

New Delhi

ISBN 1897829 72 8

D edicated

t o

Those

W ho

H elp ed the N avy to A ch ieve W hat It D id

A n d to Those

W ho H a d the Vision and the S e lf C onfidence to

Innovate, Persevere and Prevail

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Admiral Sushil Kumar

Naval Heaciquarters,

PVSM. iJVSM. AVSM. NM, ADC

New Delhi-110 011

l o r Q

w

o r d

T r a n s it i o n to Triumph authored by Vice A d m i r a l G M

Hiranandani, p v s m a v s m n m (Retd), is the third volume that chronicles the history o f the Indian N a v y and covers the period 1965-1975. The earlier two volumes ( " U n d e r Two Ensigns" and "Blueprint to Blue Water") covered the period 1945 to 1965.

The period 1965 to 1975 has been an important milestone f o r the Indian Navy, It signified the period when the Indian N a v y jo i n e d the missile league and also graduated to a three dimensional fo rce . This was the period when the Leander Frigate programme paved the way f o r self-reliance through indigenous ship construction. Finally, it was d uring this period that the nation was called to arms and in its baptism o f fire the Ind ian N a v y covered itse lf with g l o r y d u r i n g the 1971 operations.

Therefore, in many ways, this book 'Transition to T ri um ph' is a tr ibute to those who served in the Indian Navy during this eventful period, 1965-1975.

The Indian N a v y is greatly indebted to Vice Ad mi ral G M Hiranandani f o r paiiistakingly compiling this book with meticulous care and attention to detail. It will no doubt become an invaluable reference book f o r students o f maritime affairs and remain a source o f inspiration f o r futurelgenerations o f the Indian Navy.

^ / , , J/

(Sushil K um ar)

Admiral

Dec 1999

A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s

To obtain authentic insights of the events between 1965 and 1 9 7 5 ,1 conducted over two hundred and fifty interviews with people who were directly involved with the Navy during this period. To a large extent, these interview s are the basic source for this book. 1 am grateful to each of the interviewees for having spared time to interact and share their perceptions with me.

1 am also indebted to the authors and other institutions from whom I have quoted excerpts to present a birds eye view of the Indian Navy d u rin g th is period. These authors and their publishers have been listed in the S elect Bibliography, and credits given in the footnotes.

The maps in this book have been prepared by the Naval H ydrograph ic Department and photographs have been culled from naval archives and the personal collection of Lt Cdr SK Sharma. Commander S Syal and the Naval History Cell assisted in the enormous task of sorting out and docum enting source material. Petty Officer W riters Mangal Singh and BR C h ou d h ary undertook the tedious task of typing and retyping the transcripts of interviews and the manuscripts of this book. I am grateful to them all and to N aval Headquarters for providing their assistance so unstintingly.

To the many who helped and who have not been mentioned individually go my heartfelt thanks.

My biggest thank you goes to my wife, son, daughter and brother-in-law for their encouragement and support, without which the long hours early every morning would have been so much harder to put in.

Preface

History is built on rational explanation. By combining published source material and memoirs with recollections o f participants and my own personal knowledge, I have tried to present a reconstruction o f events that is as accurate and authentic as possible. My aim has been to present the reader with a holistic overview o f the events concerning the Indian Navy between 1965 and 1975, notably the 1971

War with Pakistan.

Broadly speaking, there are two approaches to understanding controversial incidents:

•

One approach is to say that the participants knew perfectly well why they undertook a particular operation but did not later admit the reason, for to do so might pinpoint their responsibility. Faced with this approach, the historian must try to present a convincing reconstruction o f the environment that may reveal the motives and objectives of the principal players.

•

The second approach is to explain a setback in terms not of motive but rather of institutional drift.

Often, a flawed idea that has been around for some time gradually acquires legitimacy because institutions and policy makers adapt to it and think it could be used to advantage.

In this context, the tragic loss of the KHUKRI will remain a vexed issue. If at all a two ship Search and Attack Unit (SAU) had to be sailed to take on a submarine whose capabilities were known to be superior to those o f the ships of the SAU, then the SAU should have been closely supported by substantial anti submarine air effort like Seaking anti submarine helicopters, Alize anti submarine aircraft and Super Constellation reconnaissance aircraft, all of which were readily available. This was not done. On the other hand, had the KHUKRI been following well established torpedo counter measure procedures like high speed, zig zag courses, superimposed by random weaves, which ships of a SAU are enjoined to follow, she would never have been such an easy target. The Captain of KHUKRI took the calculated risk of overcoming the limitations of his ship’s sonar by doing slow speed on a steady course, hoping that the experimental sonar modification developed by the Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Bombay would help to increase his sonar’s detection range. Was this personal initiative or institutional error? It is for the reader to judge. Regrettably luck was not on KHUKRI’s side.

Similarly, the initial concept for the Amphibious Operation was for landing a force in Cox’s Bazar.

During the war, this changed to sealing off the escape route to Burma. At the implementation level in Calcutta, it was assessed that if troops were indeed escaping to Burma, then they would ensure that Cox’s Bazar was well defended. The place of landing was therefore changed from the harbour of Cox’s Bazar to the beaches o f Ukhia, a few miles further south, where sandbars were known to exist.

The beaches could not be reconnoitred until a few hours before the landing. The ships arrived at the landing site late. The tide had started to rise. Of the two ships carrying troops, only one beached on a sand bar - the other backed off. Short-statured Gurkhas, who had never seen the sea. jumped into the water with a full load o f equipment on their backs, one hand holding their rifle and the other hand holding a rope leading from the ship to the beach. The water between the sandbar and the beach had become deeper due to the rising tide. Troops of the first wave started to founder. All were rescued, except for three who drowned. The landing ship backed out. Another attempt was made to beach on another sandbar. The ship nearly foundered. She was helped to back out and pump out her flooded compartments. The attempt to land over the beach was abandoned. After an overnight transit to Cox’s Bazar harbour, troops were landed by local boats. The disembarkation completed two days after the forces in East Pakistan had surrendered. In retrospect, it is clear that the stipulated degree of

planning, o f training and o f rehearsing, which is enjoined in well established m an u als o f jo in t w had not been done for this operation. The more pertinent question, however, is w h eth er these***

at all have been done given the compulsions o f secrecy and the unpredictable speed at which developed in this short, sharp thirteen day war.

Ven^

It is not my intention to invite controversy. Without trying to vindicate or to criticize, controver events like these have been presented dispassionately, leaving ju d gem en t to the reader. It is intw context, that the sections on the Sinking of the KHUKRI and Am phibious O peration Beaver woulS

provide food for serious thought in these extremely intricate areas o f naval operations.

Although this volume of the history has been sponsored by the Indian Navy, the views and interpretation o f facts in this book are entirely my own. They do not reflect the view s either of the Indian Navy or the Government.

To make it easier for the lay reader, contem porary nam es o f c o u n trie s h a ve been used interchangeably such as Britain for United Kingdom, America for USA and R u ssia for Soviet Union etc.

There is a saying “The past is a work of art, free of irrelevancies and loose en d s”. M y hope has been to recreate past events after enough time has elapsed to recollect them in relative tranquillity but not before the “irrelevancies and loose ends", which are the spice o f history, have disappeared!

New Delhi

(GM Hiranandani)

15 October 1999

V ice Adm iral (Retd)

Contents

Foreword

vii

Why Was’nt the Fleet Recalled to Bombay Earlier 49

Acknowledgements

viii

Could the Navy Have Done More

51

Preface

ix Post War Naval Reactions

52

Glossary

xviii Afterword

53

Lessons Learnt

55

1. THE GROWTH OF THE NAVY TILL 1965

1

4. THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITIONS 1965 TO 1971

56

The Navy’s Growth During the Second World War-

1939 to 1945

1 Defence Minister Chavan’s Delegation to Russia -

Pre-Independence Plans for the Navy’s Development 3

1964

57

The Wansborough Jone’s Report-1946

5 Defence Minister Chavan’s Delegation to Britain -

Post-Independence Plan for the Reorganisation and

1964

59

Development of the Navy

5

The Navy’s Reluctance to Switch to Russian

The Professor Blackett Report

5

Acquisitions

59

Developments 1948 to 1952

6 The Decision to Acquire Russian Vessels - Mid 1965

60

The Armed Forces Reorganisation Committee - 1952 7

Security of Information Regarding Russian

Developments 1954 to 1962

7

Equipment

61

Developments 1963 to 1965

8 Indian Technical Delegation to Russia - 1966

61

Overview of the Ships Acquired Between 1947

Russian Naval Staff Delegation to India - 1967

62

and 1965

11 Revival of Interest in Russian Missile Boats

62

The Visakhapatnam Project - 1968

63

2. THE INTERNATIONAL GEOPOLITICAL WEB 12

The Acquisition of Missile Boats - 1969

64

The Induction of Missile Boats - 1970

64

3. THE 1965 INDO-PAKISTAN WAR

20 Repair and Refit Facilities - 1970

64

Acquisition of More Petyas and Submarines - 1971 65

The Dramatis Personnae in the 1965 War

20 The Induction of the Missile Boats - 1971

65

Pakistan’s Plan

20

The Intrusion in Kutch - Operation Desert Hawk

5. MAZAGON DOCKS AND THE LEANDER

April 1965

21

PROJECT

67

Naval Movements Between May and August 1965 24

The Intrusions in Kashmir

24 Acquisition of MDL and GRW

67

Operation Gibraltar - August i965

24 Modernisation of MDL

67

Operation Grand Slam - September 1965

27

Goa Shipyard

68

The Developments in Delhi - September 1965

27

MDL Starts Warship Refits

68

Naval Operations in September 1965

31 Selection of Shipbuilders for Collaboration

68

The Pakistan Navy’s Role and Deployments

31 Vickers/Yarrow Report on Facilities Required in MDL 71

The Indian Navy’s Role and Deployments

33 Final Technical - Economic Assessment of Frigate

Some T a ctica l C onsiderations in the North

Design Options

71

Arabian Sea

35 The choice

the FSA 34 Leander Design and

The Indian Fleet’s Sorties - 10 to 23

Finalisation of Agreements in 1964

71

September

35 Positioning of Top Management

73

Submarine and Anti Submarine Operations in

The Problems to be Overcome

73

September 1965

39 Delays in Construction of MDL Facilities

73

Other Minor Incidents

40 Training in Britain for Constructing Frigates

74

Analysis of the Reasons for Not Using the Navy

Training in Britain in Ship Design

76

Offensively

40 CON1FPO Organisation in Britain

77

The Higher Direction of War

40 Frigate Cell in MDL

78

Why Was the Indian Fleet Sent to the Bay of

Delays in Starting Construction

78

Bengal

Availability of Materia] Required for Constmcting ^

8. THE EVOLUTION OF THE NAVY’S PLAN n

OPERATIONS

° P

118

Creation o f the Directorate o f Leander Project in

80

Taking the Offensive

NHQ

81

118

The Deployment o f the VIKRANT

The First Frigate - INS NILGIRI

82

Fitting Out and Trials

The Evolution of Plans in Eastern Naval Command 198

82

Commissioning

The Operational Plan o f Eastern Naval

Changes in Sensors and Weapons to Improve

Command

Leander Capability

82

VIKRANTs Passage to the East Coast

1

Interaction with Netherlands Warship Design

Work up for War

^ 3

Bureau (NEVESBU)

83

The Evolution of Plans in Western Naval Command 124

The Second Frigate - INS HIMGIRI

84

Comparative Strengths o f Opposing Naval

The Third Frigate - INS UDAYGIRI

85

Forces

^ 4

The Fourth Frigate - INS DUNAGIRI

85

The Operational Plan o f Western Naval

Improvements in the Anti Submarine Capability of

Command

124

the 5th and 6th Leanders

85

Offensive Utilisation o f Missile Boats

125

The Fifth Frigate - INS TARAGIRI

87

23 November Presentation in Delhi o f Operational

The Sixth Frigate - INS VINDHYAGIRI

87

Plans

125

The Indigenisation of Leander Class Frigates

87

The Operational Plan o f Southern Naval Area

126

Reminiscences of the Leander Frigate Project

92

The Naval Element o f the Mukti Bahini

127

The Leander Frigate Project in Retrospect

95

The Escalation Towards War

128

9. NAVAL OPERATIO NS IN TH E EASTERN

6. INDIGENOUS WARSHIP DESIGN

96

NAVAL COMMAND

131

The Start of Major Warship Design

96

Day to Day Events - 4 December to 16 December 131

Building up the Cadre of Naval Constructor Officers

96

VIKRANTs Air Operations

13®

Strengthening of the Design Organisation

97

Damage Inflicted by V IK R A N T s A ir Strikes

140

The Challenges Posed in Warship Design

98

Submarine Operations

Project 16 GODAVARI Class Frigates

99

THE SINKING OF TH E GHAZI

14°

Project 25 KHUKRJ Class Corvettes

102

102

The Pakistan Navy’s Deployment o f GHAZI

14

Warship Modifications Undertaken 1965 to 1975 102

The Indian Navy’s Assessm ent o f GHAZI’s

Indigenous Warship Design in Retrospect

104

141

Deployment

Indigenous Naval Yard Craft Built Between 1965

144

sncl 1975

Analysis of GHAZI’s Sinking

144

105

When Did GHAZI Sink

150

THE 1971 INDO PAKISTAN WAR

What Caused GHAZI T o Sink

153

Afterword

7- TOE EVENTS PRIOR TO THE 1971 WAR

li

NAVAL COMMANDO OPERATION A T MONGLA - 154

KHULNA 8 TO 11 DECEMBER

F

D“

° S » ! ; S ' Pakl8t“

Na' > ' 1965- ^

i'

THE ENTERPRISE INCIDENT - DEPLOYMENT ^

Soviet Un

S

' S InteracUon with the

et Union 1966 to 1969

1(

AMERICAN NAVAL T A S K GROUP INTO 1 H

^

OF BENGAL

\$1

The Situation on 10 December 1971

^ g

Reconstruction o f Events

\6&

™ 'W i S a w s D aJ ' f Sur,aceSh'Ps

!'

Indian Reactions

169

Dramatis Personn^T^ Between 1& 5-71 1

170

Political

n the 19 71 W ar

Analysis and Comment

o a T’AR a/v

THE AMPHIBIOUS LANDING A T COX’S

^

mdiJ e l 9 7 l w i S " EaSt PakiStan ^ d i n g up to

Operation Beaver

1^°

The Landing Operation in R e t r o s p e c t

\ Q 0

T h e ? " * ® * ^ 0 1116 ° eterl0ratlng N a t i o n in The Reconstruction o f Events

Manag^ ^

Could the Operation Have Been

AVAr

Tbe ’" dian X ^ Plan t CPr ° n ^

Plans

1

--------------- A

TMT OF

182

hittagong

0 apture Kh ulna and

THE PAKISTAN NAVY’S ACCO U NT OF

OPERATIONS IN EAST PAKISTAN

R E T R O S P E C T .OF NAVAL O PE R A TIO N S IN T H E

Deployment of Daphne Class Submarines

223

EASTERN NAVAL COMMAND

183

Deployment of Midget Submarines

223

Deployment of Chariots

224

10. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE WESTERN

Assessment of Pakistan Air Force Performance

224

NAVAL COMMAND

185

Excerpt from “History of the Pakistan Air Force" 224

Pakistan Navy - Air Force Cooperation

224

THE FIRST MISSILE ATTACK ON KARACHI

185

Excerpt from “Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership”

224

Events Before the Attack

185

Pakistan Maritime Reconnaissance

225

The Attack

187

Excerpt from “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership"

225

Events After the Attack

187

Excerpt from “Stoiy of the Pakistan Navy"

225

The Pakistan Navy’s Account

191

Analysis

225

Retrospect

194

WESTERN FLEET OPERATIONS AND THE SECOND

13. RETROSPECT OF THE 1971 WAR

227

MISSILE ATTACK ON KARACHI

196

Reasons for Cancellation of the Attack of Night

Naval Operations in the Arabian Sea

227

6/7 December

198

Naval Operations in the Bay of Bengal

228

The Second Missile Attack on Karachi

199

Submarine Attacks on Merchant Ships At Sea

228

The Pakistan Navy’s Account

199

Pakistan Navy’s Policy on Attacking Merchant

The MYSORE Group’s Raid on the

Ships

229

Makran Coast

203

Indian Navy’s Policy on Attacking Merchant

After the War

203

Ships

229

SINKING OF THE KHUKRI

204

Inadvertent Damage to Neutral Ships in Harbour 229

The Hunter Killer Operation

205

Afterword

231

Sinking of the KHUKRI

205

Anti Submarine Operation Falcon

209

14. NAVAL ASSISTANCE TO BANGLADESH

After the War

210

AFTER THE 1971 WAR

232

Post War Inquiries on the Loss of the KHUKRI

210

SUBMARINE OPERATIONS

211

Reopening the Port of Chittagong

232

KURSURA’s Patrol

211

Establishing a Swept Channel

232

KARANJ’s Patrol

212

Restoring Port Facilities

232

Retrospect

212

Reopening the Pussur River Ports

233

Loss of Alize 203

212

Khulna

Trade Warfare

2.13

Minesweeping the Pussur River Entrance

233

Defence of Bombay

213

Sweeping the Minefield at Chittagong

235

Retrospect of Naval Operations in the Western

Damage Caused by Drifting Mines

235

Naval Command

214

Check Sweeping of the Swept Channel

239

Retrospect

240

11. NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE SOUTHERN

Diving Operations in Chittagong

240

NAVAL AREA

215

Transfer of Seaward Defence Boats

240

Transfer of Captured Pakistani Merchant ships to

12. ANALYSIS OF THE PAKISTAN NAVY’S

Bangladesh

241

ACCOUNTS OF THE 1971 WAR

217

15. THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITIONS -

1972 TO 1975

242

Pakistan Flotilla Operations

217

Excerpt from “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership”

217

Basing of Russian Acquisitions in Bombay - 1972

242

Excerpt from “Story of the Pakistan Navy"

219

Requirements Forwarded to the Russian Side

242

Pakistan Submarine Deployment

221

Acquisition of Improved Missile Boats

242

Excerpt from “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership”

221

Russian Technical Delegation to India

243

Excerpt from “Story of the Pakistan Navy’

222

Acquisition of Improved Landing Ships - 1973

243

Role of Pakistani Submarines

222

Russian Technical Delegation to India - 1974

243

HANGOR’s Movements Till 9 December

222

Acquisition of Newer Larger Ships - 1974

244

Analysis of Pakistani Submarine Deployment

223

Inter Government Agreement for the New

Deployment of GHAZI

223

Acquisitions - 1975

244

\

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/xiii

Professional Delegation to Russia - 1975

244

Communications with Submarines At Sea

259

Missile Coast Battery at Bombay

245

Retrospect

259

Fitment of Surface to Surface Missile System in

Expectations That Did Not Materialise

260

TALWAR

245

Utilisation Not Foreseen But Which Proved

Developments Alter 1975

245

Invaluable

260

Under Utilisation of Submarine Depot Ship

A RETROSPECT OF THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITION

AMBA

260

PROGRAMME

245

17. THE NAVAL A IR ARM

262

Could the Acquisitions Have Been Managed Better

245

The Operational Compulsions

246

The Growth o f the Air Arm Till 1965

262

The Technical Compulsions

246

FRU and INS GARUDA

262

Retrospect

24 6

INAS 550

262

Acquisition of VIKRANT

262

16. THE SUBMARINE ARM

248

Naval Jet Flight

262

INAS 550, 551 and INS HANSA Sulur

263

Developments Until 1965

248

Training and Maintenance Facilities in Cochin

263

Submarine Training with the British Navy

249

VIKRANT, Seahawks and Alizes

263

Utilisation of British Trained Personnel

250

The Goa Operation in December 1961

263

Approval for Acquiring Submarines

250

INS HANSA’s Shift to Dabolim

263

Discussions with Britain in 1963

251

Helicopters

264

Discussions in America - May 1964

251

Thumba

264

Discussions in Russia - September 1964

252

Helicopter Maintenance Unit in Bombay

264

Discussions in Britain - November 1964

252

Naval Air Operations in the 1965 Indo

Developments in Early 1965

253

Pakistan War

264

Indonesian Bellicosity

253

Developments Between 1966 and 1971

265

The Navy’s Hesitance to Switch Over to

The Aircraft Carrier

265

Russian Acquisitions

253

Seahawks

265

Developments Between 1966 and 1975

254

Additional Seahawk Fighter Aircraft

265

Selection of Crew and Language Training

254

Material State of Seahawks

265

Submarine Training in Russia

254

Replacements for Seahawk Aircraft

266

Submarine Infrastructure Facilities

256

Alize Anti Submarine Aircraft

267

The Induction of Submarines

256

Helicopters

267

The 1971 Indo Pakistan War

256

Seakings

267

Basing of Submarines in Bombay

256

MATCH Alouettes

268

Personnel Aspects

256

SAR Alouettes

268

Reducing the Rejection Rate

256

268

Helicopter Training School

Monetary Incentives

257

INAS 551

268

Special Rations

257

268

Naval Air Operations in the 1971 Indo Pakistan War

Standard Submarine Ration Scale

257

268

Bay of Bengal

Catering Units

257

269

Operational Sorties Flown in December 1971

Submarine Depot Ship AM PA

257

269

Arabian Sea

Submarine Rescue Vessel NISTAR

257

27 0

Developments Between 1972 and 1975

Submarine Training School SATAVAHANA

258

270

The Aircraft Carrier

Six - Yearly Refits of Submarines

258

27 0

Aircraft

Indigenous Submarine Batteries

258

270

The Seahawks

Other Activities

258

270

Harrier Trials On Board VIKRANT in 1972

Developments After 1975

258

2 70

Alizes

Six - Yearly Refits of Submarines

258

270

Seakings

Indigenous Submarine Construction

258

270

Acquisition of Improved Russian Submarines 258

Alouettes/Chetaks - INAS 331

270

Nuclear Propulsion

258

Kirans

271

Lease of Russian Nuclear Submarine

259

Maritime Reconnaissance

272

Evaluation of French Atlantic MRASW Aircraft

xiv/TRANSITION T O TRIUM PH

The Decision to Acquire MRASW Aircraft

272

Developments After 1965

286

Transfer of Super Constellations to the Navy 273

Weapon Acceptance Trials and Work Up

286

Developments After 1975

276

Weapon Acceptance Trials

286

Aircraft Carriers

276

Work Up

287

VIKRANT

276

Developments After 1975

287

The Second Aircraft Carrier

276

New Weapons

287

Fixed Wing Aircraft

276

Weapon Maintenance

287

INAS 300

276

Naval Armament Depots

287

Phasing Out of Seahawks

276

Naval Armament Inspection

287

Induction of Sea Harriers

276

Weapon Acceptance Trials and Work Up

288

INAS 310

276

Phasing Out of Alizes

276

19. FLEET ACTIVITIES

289

Induction of Dornier 228

277

INAS 312

277

The Pattern of Fleet Activity Prior to 1965

289

Super Constellations

277

JET Exercises with Commonwealth Navies

289

TU 142s for LRMP

277

The Pattern of Fleet Activity 1965 to 1975

290

INAS 315

277

Tactical Evaluations

291

IL 38 MRASW Aircraft

277

The Pattern of Fleet Activity After 1975

291

INAS 550

277

Goodwill Visits to Friendly Countries

291

Islanders

277

INAS 551

277

20. MAINTENANCE, REPAIR AND REFIT

Kiran Training Aircraft

277

FACILITIES

293

Helicopters

277

Helicopters in Frigates and Destroyers

277

Bombay Dockyard

293

Induction of Russian KA 25

277

Naval Dockyard Expansion Scheme

293

INAS 321 Relocation to KUNJALI

277

Modernisation of the Bombay Dockyard

294

INAS 330/336 and Seaking Variants

279

Overview of Development 1965-1975

294

New Naval Air Stations

279

Visakhapatnam Dockyard

296

Preamble

296

18. WEAPONS

280

Overview of Development 1965-1975

296

BRO Cochin

299

The New Weapons

280

The Development of Facilities at Port Blair

299

Surface Warfare

280

Developments After 1975

299

Anti Aircraft Warfare

280

Retrospect

300

Anti Submarine Warfare

281

Problem Areas

281

21. PERSONNEL

301

Weapon Maintenance

281

Evolution of Responsibilities for Weapon

Officers

302

Maintenance

281

Intake and Schemes to Reduce Shortages

302

Evolution of Weapon Maintenance Facilities

Manning Plan for Officers

302

in Bombay

283

Training of Officers

302

The Naval Armament Service

283

Changes in Training at the NDA

302

Developments 1939 to 1947

283

The Naval Academy and the RSES

303

Developments 1948 to 1965

284

The GSES

303

Building Up the NASO Cadres

284

Afloat Training and Training Ships

303

Building the New Naval Armament Depots 284

The Scope and Curriculum of Afloat Training

303

Building Up Self Reliance

285

Training Ships

304

Developments After 1965

285

Duration of Initial Training

304

Homing Torpedoes

285

Changes in Training at the Naval Academy in 1974 304

Guided Missiles

285

Command Examination

305

Explosive Handling in Commercial Ports

285

Logistics Management Examination

305

Naval Armament Inspection

285

Technical Management Examination

305

Developments Until 1965

285

The Select List System of Promotion

305

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/xv

305

Submarines

Sailors

327

Intake and Schemes to Reduce Shortages

305

Air Arm

327

Increasing the Period of Engagement

306

Overview of Ships and Submarines Acquired

Between 1965 and 1975

Training of Sailors

306

328

BTE

306

23. EPILOGUE

STE

307

329

Branch Training Schools

307

Petty Officers Leadership School

308

H ISTO RICAL REFERENCE DATA

Policy for Transferring Sailors Into and Out of Ships 308

Artificers

309

24. NAVAL HYDROGRAPHIC DEPARTM ENT

33X

Introduction of MCPO Cadre

309

Changes in the Navy's Saiior Structure

309

Developments Prior to 1965

33j

The CROSS Committee

309

Developments Between 1965 ana 1975

333

Changes in Nomenclature of Junior Sailors

310

Developments After 1975

335

Changes in Branch Responsibilites

310

Re-allocation of Branch Responsibilities and Duties 310

25. NAVAL SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH AND

Transfer of Power Electrical Duties from Electrical

DEVELOPMENT

337

to Engine Room Branch in Petya Class Ships

311

Fixed Commissions in Ships

312

Developments Prior to 1965

337

Highlights of Scientific Progress 1965 to 1975

338

General

312

General Research and Development

341

Allotment of Personal Numbers to Officers

312

Projects Started in 1965-75 But Completed

Naval Standing Establishment Committee

313

After 1975

343

Changes in Regulations Regarding Moustaches

Oceanographic Research

343

and Beards

313

Changes in Uniforms

314

26. THE INDIGENISATION OF NAVAL STORES

The Training Reforms of 1974 and 1975

315

AND EQUIPMENT

346

Controlling Manpower Costs

317

Discipline and Morale

317

27. THE INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE SEA

Officers

3 17

AND INDIAN M AR ITIM E LEGISLATION

347

Sailors: Cleanship Duties and the

Topass Incident

317

Developments Till 1965

347

Accomodation

320

Developments After 1965

348

The Navy’s Civilian Personnel

322

Maritime Boundaries

351

Increase in the Navy’s Borne Strength Between

1965 and 1975

323

28. UNIFIED CODE FOR THE THREE SERVICES 352

Changes in Sailors Conditions of Service After 1975 323

Retrospect

324

29. THE THIRD PAY COMMISSION

353

22. THE GROWTH OF THE NAVY BETWEEN

The Post War Pay Committee of 1946

1965 AND 1975

325

The Raghuramaiah and Kamath Committees

The Third Pay Commission

gg

Highlights of the Developments Between 1965

Developments after 1975

and 1975

325

The Submarines

325

30. THE NAVY’S EDUCATION BRANCH

The Seaking Anti Submarine Helicopters

326

358

The Advent of Anti Ship Missiles

326

Developments Till 1965

359

The Russian Acquisitions

326

Developments After 1965

The Leander Frigate Project

361

326

Developments After 1975

Aircraft for VIKRANT

326

The Dcfcncc Reviews of 1973 and 1975

327

31. NAVAL METEOROLOGY AND O C E A N O L O G Y

Developments After 1975

327

Ships

3^2

327

Developments Till 1975

xvi/TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH

Meteorology

362

VISITS OF TRAINING SHIPS TO FOREIGN

Oceanography

362

PORTS

378

Developments After 1975

363

Formation of the Directorate of Naval

36. COMMISSIONINGS & DECOMMISSIONINGS

Oceanology and Meteorology (DNOM)

363

1965 TO 1975

380

32. WELFARE

365

Commissioning of Indian Naval Ships

380

Commissioning of Submarines

380

Indian Naval Benevolent Association

365

Commissioning of Naval Air Squadrons

381

Scholarship Scheme 1972

366

Commissioning of Shore Establishments

381

Indian Naval Amenities Fund

366

Decommissioning of Indian Naval Ships

381

Educational Facilities for Children of Naval

Personnel

368

37. CEREMONIAL

382

33. CHANGES IN NHQ ORGANISATION

370

Presidential Reviews of the Fleet

382

The Presidents Colour

383

The 1955 Reorganisation

370

Navy Day

384

The 1962 Reorganisation

370

Changes from 1965 to 1968

370

38. THE DIVING CADRE AND THE CHARIOT

The 1969 Reorganisation

371

PROJECT

385

Changes from 1970 to 1972

372

The 1972 Reorganisation

372

39. TRANSFER OF NAVAL SHIPS TO FOREIGN

Changes from 1972 to 1975

373

NAVIES

387

Changes after 1975

373

40. ASSISTANCE RENDERED BY THE NAVY IN

34. CHANGES IN COMMAND AND CONTROL

PEACE TIME

388

STRUCTURE

374

41. BATTLE CASUALTIES INDO PAKISTAN

From 1965 to 1975

374

WAR 1971

394

Soon After 1975

374

42. AWARD WINNERS 1971 INDO PAKISTAN

35. VISITS OF SHIPS AND SUBMARINES TO

WAR

397

FOREIGN PORTS

375

Select Bibliography

407

Index

409

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/xvii

Glossary

DCNS

Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff

DDIMS

AA

Anti Aircraft

Director of Development and Inspects

ACNS

Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff

Marine Stores

n’

Demob

Demobilisation

Adm

Admiral

AHSP

Authority Holding Sealed Particulars

DG

Degaussing (reducing the underwater magnetic

AIO

Action Information Organisation

influence of a ships to avoid triggering

am

Before midday

magnetic mines)

ANZUS

Australia, New Zealand, United States(pact)

DGI

Director General Inspection

ARD

Annual Review Demands (for stores and

DGND

Director General Naval Design

spares)

DGS&D

Director General Supplies and Disposals

AS

Anti Submarine

DM

Defence Minister

ASD

Admiral Superintendent Dockyard

DMO

Director of Military Operations

ASW

Anti Submarine Warfare

DNI

Director of Naval Intelligence

ATC

Air Traffic Control (tower)

DNO

Director of Naval Operations

AZ

Alize(French carrier borne aircraft)

DPI(N)

Director of Production and Inspection (Navy)

A&N

Andaman and Nicobar (islands)

DRDO

Defence

Research

and

Development

Organisation

B

DSSC

Defence Services Staff College

DTG

Date Time Group(indicates the time that a

BARC

Bhabha Atomic Research Centre Bombay

signal is issued) Dunking Sonar Fitted in

BEL

Bharat Electronics Ltd

helicopters; during hover, it enables the sonar

BHEL

Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd

to be lowered deep into the sea to detect

BMU

Base Maintenance Unit

submarines

BRO

Base Repair Organisation

DWP

Director of Warship Projects

BSF

Border Security Force

D/F

Direction Finding

BTE

Boys Training Establishment

E

EDC

Estimated Date of Completion

CAP

Combat Air Patrol(aircraft)

EEZ

Exclusive Economic Zone

Capt

Captain(naval rank. Also Commanding

ER

Extended Refit (western ships)

Officer)

EW

Electronic Warfare

CAS

Chief of the Air Staff

CASEX

Combined Anti Submarine Exercise

CBR

Central Board of Revenue

Cdr

Commander(naval rank)

F 86

Sabres/F

104

Starfighte^

CENTO

Central Treaty Organisation (Turkey, Iran,

Nomenclature of American fig

Pakistan)

aircraft

CFL

Cease Fire Line

ffe

free foreign exchange

Chennai

New name -for Madras

Foxtrot class

NATO nomenclature of Kuss

CIA

Central Intelligence Agency (American)

CILQ

submarine

astern

Compensation in Lieu of Quarters(for sailors)

FOCEF

Flag Officer Commanding

CinC/CINC Commander in Chief

CMD

Chairman Managing Director

Fleet

n Fleet

FOCIF

Flag Officer Commanding In1

dia

Cmde

Commodore(naval rank)

FOCINC

Flag Officer Commanding in C 1 fI1

CMS

Coastal Minesweeper

Flag Officer Commanding Wes

CNS

FOCWEF/FOCWF

Chief of the Naval Staff

CO

Fleet

Commanding Officer

Frogmen

Underwater Commandos

COAS

Chief of the Army Staff

COM

FRU

Fleet Requirement Unit

Chief of Material

CONIFPO

Controller Indian Frigate Project(in Britain)

G

COP

Chief of Personnel

CPO

Chief Petty Officer

(of

CRPF

GED

General Engineering D e p a r t m e n t

Central Reserve Police Force

CRs

Russian GKES)

Current Repairs (Russian ships)

D

GKES

State Committee for Foreign

Economic

LST(M)

Landing Ship Tank(Medium)

Relations(Russian)

Lt

Lieutenant(naval rank)

GRSE

Garden Reach Shipbuilding and Engineering

Lt Cdr

Lieutenant Commander(navaI rank)

Ltd

L.O.Cs

Lines of Communication

GRT

Gr,oss Registered Tons(ship size)

GRW

Garden Reach Workshops

M

GSL

Goa Shipyard Limited

GTD

General Technical Department (of the Russian

MADDLs Mirror Assisted Dummy Deck Landings (done

GKES)

by carrier borne aircraft on shore airfields prior

GTs

Gas Turbines

to embarkation)

MATCH

Multi-role Anti Submarine Torpedo Carrying

H

Helicopter

MCPO

Master Chief Petty Officer

HAL

Hindustan Aircraft Limited

MDL

Mazagon Docks Limited

HF

High

Frequency

(long

distance

MEA

Ministry of External Affairs

communications)

Met

Meteorology

HK

Seahawk(British carrier borne aircraft)

MHQ

Maritime Headquarters

HMIS

His Majesty’s Indian Ship

MLR

Money in Lieu of Rations (for sailors)

HMS

His/Her Majesty's Ship/Submarine(British)

MOD

Ministry of Defence

HSL

Hindustan Shipyard Limited

MOR

Maritime Operations Room

HUK

Hunter Killer (anci submarine operation)

MRASW Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti Submarine

Warfare(aircraft)

I

MRs

Medium Repairs (Russian ships)

MTE

Mechanical Training Establishment

LAF

Indian Air Force

Mumbai New name for Bombay

ICE

Internal Combustion Engine (eg diesel engine)

ICS

Indian Civil Service (later called IAS)

N

IFF

Identification Friend or Foe(identifies contacts

appearing on radar)

NAD

Naval Armament Depot

IMS

Inshore Minesweeper

NAI

Naval Armament Inspection

IN

Indian Navy

NAIS

Naval Aircraft Inspection Service

INAS

Indian Naval Air Squadron

NARO

Naval Aircraft Repair Organisation

INCS

Indian Naval Canteen Service

NAS

Naval Air Station

INS

Indian Naval Ship/Submarine

NATO

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

ITTE

Integrated Type Training Establishment

NATS

Naval Air Technical School

IWTA

Inland Water Transport Authority (East

NAVAC

Naval Academy

Pakistan)

NCML

Naval Chemical and Metallurgical Laboratory

ND

Navigation

(and

aircraft)

Direction

J

(specialisation)

NDA

National Defence Academy

JET

Joint Exercises at Trincomalee

NDC

National Defence College

J&K

Jammu and Kashmir

NEVESBU Netherlands Warship Design Bureau

NHQ

Naval Headquarters'

K

NOIC

Naval Officer in Charge

NPOL

Naval Physical and Oceanography Laboratory

K 25

Senior Officer 25th Missile Boat Squadron

NRs

Navigation Repairs (Russian ships)

Kilo Class NATO nomeuclature of Russian submarine

NRs

Normal Refits (Western ships)

Kochi

New name for Cochin

NSD

Naval Store Depot

NSRY

Naval Ship Repair Yard

L

NSTL

Naval Science and Technology Laboratory

LCU

Landing Craft Utility

O

Lepus

Swedish, aircraft dropped, flare bomb to

illuminate a target at night to assist air attack

OPEC

Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries

LMA

Laccadive, Minicoy and Amindivi (islands now

called Lakshadweep)

P

LOC

Line of Control

LOGREQ Logistic Requirement(signal)

PAF

Pakistan Air Force

LRMP

Long Range Maritime Patrol(aircraft)

PCT

Pre Commissioning Training

LST(LJ

Landing Ship Tank(Large)

PDRs

Pre Determined Routes (for civil airliners)

xix/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

pm

After midday

PM

Prime Minister

TAS

Torpedo Anti Submarine (specialisation)

PMO

Prime Minister’s Office

TG

Task Group

PN

Pakistan Navy

PO

Petty Officer

U

POK

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

POL

Petrol, Oil and Lubricants

UHF

Ultra

High

Frequency(short

psi

pounds per square inch(pressure)

distance

communications)

PWSS

Port War Signal Station(at harbour entrance)

UK

United Kingdom (Britain)

UNCLOS

United Nations Conference on the Law of the

Sea

Union Public Service Commission

R Adm

Rear Admiral

UPSC

Radar

Radio Detection and Ranging(above the sea)

USA

United States of America

RAF

Royal Air Force

USSR

Union of Soviet Socialist Republics

Rating

Sailor

RCC

Recompression Chamber(divers)

RCD

Regional Cooperation for Development

(Pakistan, Iran, Turkey)

V Adm

Vice Admiral

Recce

Reconnaissance

VCNS

Vice Chief of the Naval Staff

RIN

Royal Indian Navy,.

VDS

Variable Depth Sonar fitted in ships; it enables

RINR

Royal Indian Navy Reserve

the sonar of a moving ship to be lowered deep

RINVR

Royal Indian Navy Volunteer Reserve

into the sea to detect submarines

RM

Raksha Mantri (Defence Minister)

VHF

Very High Frequency(communications)

RN

Royal Navy (British)

VIP

Very Important Person

RPM

Revolutions Per Minute

VLF

Very Low Frequency (communication with

RTD

Repair Technical Documentation(Russian)

submerged submarines)

R&D

Research and Development

V/S

Visual Signalling

R/T

Radio Telephony

VT

Variable Time (as applicable to radio proximity

R/V

Rendez Vous (meeting point at sea)

fuzes)

VTOL

Vertical Take Off and Land (aircraft)

W

S Lt

Sub Lieutenant (naval rank)

SAR

Search and Rescue (by ships, aircraft and

WED

Weapon Equipment Depot

helicopters at sea)

WRINS

Womens Royal Indian Naval Service

SD

Special Duties (categoiy of officers promoted

WSAG

Washington Special Action Group

from sailor cadre)

WW II

Second World War

SDB

Seaward Defence Boat

W/T

Wireless Telegraphy

SEATO

South East Asia Treaty Organisation

SFNA

School for Naval Airmen

Sidewinder Nomenclature of American air to air missile Skyhawk Nomenclature of American carrier borne

X Craft

Midget submarines for penetrating ^iar^)0ULpi

aircraft

XO

Executive Officer (2nd in command of a s

SMP

Self Maintenance Period(ships)

Also officer of the Executive Branch)

SMU

Ship Maintenance Unit

Sonar

Sound Navigation and Ranging (under the sea)

Y

SPDC

Spare Parts Distribution Centre

SSG

Special Services Group (elite commandos)

Yarrow Admiralty Research &

SSK

YARD

D

e v e l o p m

e n t

Hunter Killer Submarine(Submarine Search

and Kill)

STE

Seaman Training Establishment

STOL

Short Take Off and Land (aircraft)

S/M

Submarine

TR AN SITIO N T O T R lU M p* ^

The Growth of the Navy till 1965

The N a vy ’s Growth During the Second World

minesweepers and .patrol craft until newly built ships

War : 1939 to 1945

could enter service. The first Basset class trawler

built in Garden Reach Workshop Calcutta entered

Prior to the Second World War, Britain’s Royal Navy

service in 1941 - it was followed by five more. The first was responsible for the overall maritime defence of

Bangor class fleet minesweeper built in India entered

India. For this purpose, the Royal Navy maintained:

service in 1943. Six new sloops came from Britain

and were named after Indian rivers. Bathurst class

•

a Fleet based at Trincomalee in Ceylon.

minesweepers came from Australia. Numerous minor

•

a Fleet at Singapore.

vessels like motor

minesweepers, harbour defence

•

a Squadron at Bahrein.

motor launches and landing craft came from Britain,

The Royal Indian Navy (RIN) was responsible for

America and Australia. The naval base and Naval

coastal defence only. It had one naval base at Bombay

Dockyard at Bombay were modernised. Three new

and training establishm ents scattered in many

branches were created - Electrical, Education and

regions of India.

Medical.

In September 1939, when the Second World War

In 1945 when the war ended, the Navy had seven

started, the Royal Indian Navy had only five sloops,

sloops, four anti submarine frigates, eight corvettes, one trawler, one survey ship and one patrol craft. It fourteen minesweepers, sixteen trawlers, one survey

had 114 officers and 1732 ratings (sailors were called ship, two depot ships, thirty auxiliary vessels, one ratings). All the six rating training schools were hundred and fifty landing craft, two hundred harbour

concentrated inside the Naval Dockyard in Bombay -

craft and forty five harbour defence launches. The

Gunnery, Seamanship, Signals. Anti-submarine,

number of personnel had risen to 3014 officers and

Boys Training Establishment (BTE) and Mechanical

27,433 ratings, most o f whom served in shore

Training Establishment (MTE). There were no rating

establishments. The recruiting pattern had changed

training schools for Torpedo, Electrical or Radar.

noticeably - there was a large increase from the O fficers went to Britain for basic and advanced Madras and Bengal Presidencies and a steep decline

training in all disciplines. Eighty percent of rating in recruitment from the Bombay Presidency and the

recruits came from tiie Punjab and from the Bombay

Punjab. The intake of Hindus had risen to forty two

Presidency - mainly Konkan, and of them, seventy

percent and that of Muslims had fallen to thirty five

five percent were Muslim and nine percent Hindu.

percent. Several new naval base establishments and

During the war, the Royal Indian Navy underwent

training establishments had come up all along the

a phenomenal expansion. Thirty one small vessels

West and East coasts.

were im m ediately requisitioned to serve as

Location

Establishments

Function

Trainees

(HMIS)

Karachi

Bahadur

Basic Training

Boy stokers

Himalaya

Gunnery Training

Officers and ratings

Dilawar

Basic Training

Boy seamen

Chamak

Radar Training

Officers and ratings

Physical Training

Jamnagar

Valsura

Torpedo and Electrical

Officers and ratings

Training

Lonavla

Shivaji

Mechanical Training

Artificer apprentices

Apprentice Training

and stokers

Photography School

Ratings

Parent Establishment

Dalhousie

Basic Training

Boys

Bombay

Supply and Secretariat

Officers and ratings

Fort Barracks

Training

Basic Training

New entry officers

Akbar

New entiy ratings

Thane

Physical Training

Cookery School

Cooks

Basic Training

Reserve officers

Firoze

Malabar Hill

(R1NVR, R1NR) and WRINS

Visual Signalling and

Ratings

Talwar

Colaba

Wireless Telegraphy

Training

New entry ratings

Khanjar

Basic Training

Firefighting and

Officers and ratings

Damage Control Training

Coastal Training Centre

Officers and ratings

Marve

Hamlawar

Landing Craft Wing

Anti-submarine

Officers and ratings

Versova

Machlimar

Training

Ratings

Cheetah

Motor Transport and

Boat Training

Sewree

RIN Hospital

Naval Hospital

Bombay Central

Kakauri

Demob Centre

Trombay

Cheetah Camp

Demob Centre

Womens Royal Indian

Ahmednagar

Jahanara

Basic Training

Naval Service(WRINS)

COCHIN

Venduruthy

Parent Establishment

HMS Kaluga

Airfield for Royal

Naval aircraft

Coimbatore

HMS Garuda

Naval Aircraft

(Peelamedu)

Repair Yard for Royal

Naval aircraft

Coimbatore

HMSVairi

Naval Aircraft Depot

(Sulur)

for Roy£il Naval aircraft

Mandapam

Tengra

Combined Operations Base

Hamla

Landing Craft Training

Officers and ratings

Madras

Adyar

Parent establishment

Madras

HMS Yalluru

Naval Air Station

(Tambaram)

Fleet Requirement Unit

and Aircraft Repair

Yard for Royal Naval aircraft

Madras

RAF Air Station

For Royal Naval aircraft

(Sholavaram)

Kakinada

Jahangir

Coastal Training Centre

Officers and ratings

VISAKHAPATNAM

Circars

Parent Establishment

Calcutta

Hooghly

Parent Establishment

Nalini

Basic Training

WRINS

Delhi

India

Parent Establishment1

2/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Pre-In depen den ce Plans fo r th e N avy’s

•

Primarily for the safety o f Indian and Empire

D evelop m en t

shipping in the sea areas contiguous to India’s

coastline, their approaches and the trade routes

B ritish S tra teg ic Perceptions in 1944

in the Indian Ocean.

As Britain grad u ally reconciled its e lf to the

•

Secondly, for the combined operational training

inevitability of India becoming independent after the

of the Indian Arm y’s specialist am phibious

end of the Second World War, the Commander in

formations, providing escort and assault ships

and craft for landing these formations on hostile

Chief India assessed that the vital strategic interests shores, for which a nucleus force of assault ships

of the British Commonwealth in the Indian Ocean

were:

and craft and a training organisation was to be

maintained.

•

Oil supplies,

•

Thirdly, in conjunction with the Air Force, the

•

Control of the eastern and western approaches to

Navy was to ensure the timely neutralisation of

India.

any foreign invading force attempting a landing

•

Air communications to Iraq, Ceylon, Burma and

on the shores of India. It was therefore essential

Malaya.

for the RIN to have an adequate air component for

•

Control of the seas and the island territories.

seaward reconnaissance and for air strikes in

support of surface forces.

In his view, should India be unfriendly or liable to

be influenced by a power such as Russia, China or

For these tasks, the Committee recommended a

Japan hostile to the British Commonwealth, Britain’s

naval force of one Cruiser Squadron (3 cruisers), one

strategic position in the Indian Ocean would become

Destroyer Flotila (8 destroyers), one Training Flotilla untenable and British communications with New

(8 Sloops), one General Duty Flotilla [8 frigates) and Zealand and Australia most insecure.

flotillas of minesweepers, motor torpedo boats and

harbour defence launches, alongwith survey ships,

The Plans f o r the Navy's Development in 1944f45

assault ships and a depot ship for repairs.

As the Second World War neared completion, three

Committee f o r Pla n n in g the R equirem ent o f the separate studies emerged sequentially on the future

Armed Forces 1945

development of the Navy.

After the cessation of hostilities in August 1945. the The Godfrey P la n o f 1944

Government appointed a Committee to plan the

This plan was prepared in April 1944 by Vice Admiral

requirements of India’s Armed Forces, based on the

Godfrey, the Commander in Chief of the Royal Indian

Chiefs of Staff Committee Report of 1944. The gist of

Navy, for submission to the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

this Committee’s Report, was that by the end of the

It had two phases. Phase I proposed the replacement

War, Japan would have been completely subdued, the

of inefficient ships by modern frigates and sloops,

principal foreign powers in the East-would be the

acqu isition o f eigh t destroyers and training of USSR, the USA and China and that India would be

personnel by 1947 to man a cruiser. Phase II

responsible for maintaining sufficient forces to

envisaged the acquisition of aircraft carriers and

overcome a minor power and to hold out against a

subm arines with associated training and

major power until Imperial Forces could arrive. It did maintenance facilities.

not take into account an independent India after the

War. It did anticipate that India would be a member of

The Chiefs o f S ta ff Committee Report o f 1944 on the British Commonwealth. Since no one part of the

The Size and Composition o f the Post War Forces

Commonwealth could, in peace or war. be self-

in India

sufficient or independent of supplies from other

This report assumed the only threat to be from

parts, the economy and defence of each nation of the

Russia, that independent India would continue to

Commonwealth would, therefore, largely depend on

remain in the B ritish Commonwealth and that

the use of the sea and air routes and ports. While the

reinforcements would arrive from Britain and other

main responsibility for keeping open these sea and

parts of the British Empire to help India defend her

air communications would rest with the Royal Navy

frontiers.

and Royal Air Force under the orders of the British

The Committee viewed the Royal Indian Navy

Government, each com ponent part o f the

(RIN) as a ‘Dominion Navy’, responsible:

Commonwealth would need to be prepared to bear its

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/3

share. India, in common with other countries of the

and appropriate training organisations, as well as Empire, would, therefore, need to maintain naval and

p erso n n el p o s s e s s in g an e x p e r t k n ow led ge 0f air forces as necessary to ensure the defence of her

am phibious operations. In a d d ition , the Navy in bases and the security of shipping within her coastal

conjunction with the A ir Force, w ou ld need to be waters from submarine, mining and air attack and to

p rep a red to tak e its s h a re in in te r c e p tin g and assist in the protection of trade in the ocean shipping attacking any foreign in vad in g force which might routes.

attempt a landing on Indian shores.

India’s central position in the Indian Ocean was

Th e A rm y w ou ld be r e s p o n s ib le fo r coastal likely to make her particularly sensitive to the need

d efen ce

and

th e

A ir

F o rc e

fo r

seaward

for an increased naval force and especially for larger

reco n n a issa n ce, s h ip p in g p r o te c tio n and cowarships than she at present possessed. Such ships, operation with the RIN. Naval units might be required

unlike the small units which the Royal Indian Navy

to proceed at sh o rt n o tic e to p o rts in occupied had, would be capable of adequately representing

countries in case disturbances arose and to patrol the

India in other parts o f the Commonwealth, foster riv e r a p p ro a ch es to su ch 'p o rts . A s regards better understanding of India and improve relations

superpower aggression on Afghanistan, sufficient

within the Empire.

aircraft would need to be available to prevent the Russia was viewed as the only major power likely

Afghans from being overaw ed by the Russian air

to seriously threaten India. Aggression by Russia was

strength on their border.

therefore taken as the basis for estimating the forces

Naval forces to counter these threats could not be

which India would require for her defence against a

quickly improvised in times of war. The main task of

m ajor power. It w as not possible to forecast the the Navy in peace, in common with the other Services,

strength of the forces which Russia might be able to

would be to prepare for war but since the full strength bring to bear against India. The scale of attack would

of the naval force might be needed immediately on the

depend on conditions which would change from time

outbreak of war and a long period was required both

to time. As these conditions changed, the scale of for the construction of warships and the training of en em y a tta c k w ou ld need to be review ed and naval personnel, naval forces, and air forces to codefensive measures brought up-to-date.

operate with them, would need to be maintained in

So lo n g as In d ia w as con n ected w ith G reat peace at a high standard of preparedness.

B rita in , e ith e r as a D om in ion or by a treaty While for purposes of local defence, a number of

guaranteeing assistance, hostilities between Russia

sm all ships w ou ld need to be m a in ta in e d , a and India could only be either the cause of or the proportion of large ships would also be necessary.

result o f a war between Great Britain and the USSR.

The p rovision o f such sh ip s w o u ld p rod u ce a Such a war would, inevitably, sooner or later, develop

balanced naval force, form an added incentive to into another world conflict. While India’s contribution recruitm ent and in creased p rid e in the service, to a war of this nature would depend very largely on

besides assisting considerably in the train in g of the defence policy o f the British Empire as a whole,

personnel which could not be adequately carried out

India was likely to bear the first brunt of such an in small ships. In addition, great im portance was attack and would need therefore, to be prepared at all

attached to the fo rm a tio n o f ail a d e q u a te air tim e s to d efen d h er fro n tie rs u n til Im perial com ponent for seaw ard re c o n n a is s a n c e and a reinforcements arrived.

striking force and also to the maintenance o f modern

The principal respons;bility of India’s Navy after

coast defences and m a teria l for lo c a l seaw ard the w ar would be the safety 'f indian and Empire defences such as booms, mines, nets and indicator

shipping in the ports of India ana iJieir approaches;

loops.

In d ia w o u ld a lso w ish to take h er share in the The establishm ent o f industries w ith in India

protection of this shipping on the trade routes within

would tend to make her economy and prosperity more

the Indian Ocean. It would be an important task of

dependent on the security of her export trade and so

In d ia’s Navy to provide facilities for the combined maintain, and possibly increase, the importance of

o p e ra tio n a l tr a in in g o f th e A rm y form ation s her ports and overseas communications. Therefore.

maintained in the country and to provide a share of

India needed to maintain adequate naval forces and

the escorts, assault shipping and craft required to

ensure that the ports on which she was dependent

land these formations on a hostile shore, should this

were ept up-to-date in accordance w ith modern

prove necessary. This implied the maintenance, in

requirements. The coastal trade of India was not only

peace, of a nucleus force of assault shipping and craft an essential part of her peace and war economy but

4/TRANSITIO N T O T R IUM PH

was also an important factor in her transportation

In August 1947, Rear Admiral JTS Hall, RIN, was

system. The requisitioning of the majority of her

appointed as India’s first Flag Officer Commanding

coastal steamers at the beginning of the present war

Royal Indian Navy. His Chief of Staff (now called the

for naval purposes had greatly increased the

Vice Chief of the Naval Staff) was Commodore Martin

congestion on the railw ays. It was, therefore,

H St L Nott. These two farsighted officers, guided by

im portant that encouragem ent be given to the

Rear Admiral Lord Louis Mountbatten, then Viceroy

development of the coastal trade and the shipbuilding

of India, and assisted by Cdr (later Admiral) AK

industry, that sufficient naval forces be maintained to Chatterji the first Director of Naval Plans, the Staff avoid being obliged to requisition mercantile shipping

Officer Plans Lt Cdr (later Vice Admiral) N Krishnan

immediately on the outbreak of war.

and Lt Cdr YN Singh, the navy’s first aviator,

prepared on “Outline Plan for the Reorganisation and

T h e Wansborough Jones R eport o f 1946

Development of the Indian Navy”. It visualised four

essential roles for the Navy:

In 1946, an Interim Government was formed under

Prime Minister Nehru. India’s Independence was

•

To safeguard Indian shipping.

clearly foreseeable. The Prime Minister commissioned

•

To ensure that supplies could reach and leave by

a B ritish adviser, Mr Wansborough Jones, to

sea in all circumstances.

recom m end the scien tific and organisational

•

To prevent an enemy landing on India’s shores.

measures required to make India a self supporting

•

To support the Army in sea borne operaUons.

defence entity. The Jones report outlined four basic

roles for the Indian Armed Forces:

The minimum force recom m ended was two

aircraft carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, four

•

To secure the land frontier against raids from

submarines and miscellaneous small ships to be

border tribes or attack from a second class army.

built up in 10 years. The plan envisaged gradual

•

To support civil power.

development of the Navy to form two fleets, each to be

•

To provide a small expeditionary force capable of

built around a light fleet carrier.

protecting India’s regional interests.

The plan clearly reflected the Indian Navy’s

•

Within available financial resources, to develop a

aspiration for regional pre-eminence, apart from

force capable of taking the field in a first class

several seminal recommendations to remedy the

war.

after-effects of the partition o f the Navy, like shortages of manpower, constructing new training

Post Indepen den ce Plan fo r “The

establishments, disposing of old ships and acquiring

R eorgan isation and D evelopm en t o f the

immediate replacements.

At the end of 1947, based on the above, a ten year

Indian N a vy”

plan for the expansion of the Navy was submitted to

After partition in August 1947, the RIN comprised:

the Government and was approved in principle by the

Defence Committee of the Cabinet in 1948 but

•

Four Sloops (KISTNA, CAUVERY, JUMNA,

without financial commitment.

SUTLEJ),

•

Two frigates (KUKRI, TIR)

The Professor B lackett R eport

•

One Corvette (ASSAM)

•

Twelve coastal minesweepers (ORISSA, DECCAN,

Whilst these proposals were being discussed, Prime

BIJNOR, KUMAON, KHYBER, ROHILKHAND,

Minister Nehru in 1948 sought the advice of Professor

CARNATIC, RAJPUTANA, KONKAN, BENGAL,

PMS Blackett. He was a renowned British physicist

BOMBAY, MADRAS). After the cyclone which hit

who had pioneered naval operational research in the

Bombay in 1948, only KONKAN, BOMBAY,

British Navy during the Second World War. Professor

BENGAL and MADRAS remained in service. The

Blackett was asked to prepare a report outlining the

remainder were so severely damaged that they

measures necessary for India to become near self

had to be sold as scrap.

sufficient in defence production over a period of seven

•

One survey .ship (INVESTIGATOR)

years.

•

Four trawlers, four motor minesweepers, one

Whereas previous studies had assumed that in

m otor launch, four harbour defence motor

the event o f h ostilities, the B ritish and

launches and landing craft.

Commonwealth Navies would assist India, Prof

B lackett’s basic prem ise was that a newly

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/5

in d ep en d en t In d ia w ou ld w ish to stand unaided

•

Escorting and protecting a small number of 0

where defence was concerned. In his view., a Third

c o n v o y s ’b etw een A d en and S ingapore bu?

World War was unlikely - the immediate need was to

further (merchant shipping was important for th°

plan and prepare for a small scale war. Professor developm ent o f trad e and a valu ab le natio \ Blackett’s report on how best India should meet her

asset).

a

defence needs w ithin available scientific, financial

•

Co-operation with the Arm y and the Air Force in

and industrial resources highlighted that:

repelling landing operations and advances along

coastlines, and to be able to undertake similar

•

India w as econom ically weak. To become self

operations against the enemy.*

sufficient, a strong economy and industrial base

was essential.

D e v e lo p m e n ts 1 9 4 8 t o 1952

•

The import of sophisticated defence equipment,

th ou gh in escap ab le, had to be m inim ised to In 1948, Vice Admiral Sir Edward Parry succeeded

conserve foreign exchange for industrialisation

Rear Admiral Hall as Commander in Chief and Chief

and for im proving agriculture, on which future

of the Naval Staff of the Royal Indian Navy. He was rise in defence expenditure would be based.

able to tell the British Admiralty that India’s Ministry

•

Front line platforms which depended upon state

of Defence did not want the Indian Navy to be just an

o f the art technology for optimum performance

adjunct of the B ritish Navy b u t to be a real Navy during combat, like fighter aircraft, heavy tanks

capable of carrying out m ajor operation s of naval and a ircraft carrier task forces, could not be

warfare.**

afforded in the quantities required to confront a

In September 1948, a 69 ship Navy was proposed.

major power. The major powers were, in any case,

However, because of budgetary constraints, the Navy

unlikely to be drawn into a regional conflict as

had to recast its requirements. In October 1948, a

between India and Pakistan. On the other hand,

revised plan proposed a 49 ship Navy.

both the USA and Britain had large stockpiles of

In December 1948, another revised plan spelt out

w eapons and m aterial rendered surplus after

the The Role of the Navy’ and proposed a smaller 47

W orld W ar II w hich did not require optimum

ship Navy com prising two a ircra ft carriers, three performance in order to be effective.

cruisers, eight escort destroyers, four fleet destroyers

•

If India bought these surplus stocks, if India

(B ritish Battle. C la ss/ W ea p o n C la s s ), f ůr avoided expensive high performance weapons

submarines, four A/A frigates, two A/S frigates, six and chose low performance systems relevant to

fleet minesweepers, one LST, one survey vessel, five

local scenarios, then self sufficiency was possible.

motor launches, seven minor landing craft and two

•

The import of a new and improved weapon system

squadrons of aircraft per carrier (one each for fighter should only be considered if its performance was

and strike and one for SAR).

so m arkedly superior to its predecessor as to

In 1949, G o vern m en t a p p ro v e d on ly those ju stify the initial cost by reduced running and

proposals of the 10 year naval plan which r e l a t e d to maintenance costs or to provide training schools

the recruitm ent and tra in in g o f person n el. The with single models to keep the services in touch

expansion of the Fleet, though restricted to one with weapon developments.

aircraft carrier, frigates, a survey ship and a landing

•

In the lon g run, s e lf sufficiency would create

ship, did not exclude submarines.

freedom o f choice in foreign policy rather than

This setback was compounded by the difference

strategic isolation.

in opinion between the Indian naval planners in Delh*

P ro f B lackett made specific recommendations

and the British Adm iralty. W hen A dm iral Parry regarding the compositon of the three services. In his

forcefully pressed the Adm iralty to m eet his p l»n view, the Indian Navy's missions were:

requirem ents, the A d m ira lty told him th a t the prim ary fu n ction o f the In d ia n N avy w as the

•

Protection o f coastal shipping against mining,

protection of the coastline and harbours of India and

su b m arin e, su rfa ce and air attack , with the to perform specific functions in the defence of the

capability to respond in kind.

British Commonwealth.

*

In his book on “Naval Aviation", Adm iral Chatteiji states that as a result o f several meetings with Prof Blackett Government accepted in principle the proposal to acquire light fleet carriers. It was envisaged that the first carrier would be purchased in 1955 and the second two years later.

** “Sea Pow er and Indian Security" by Rahul Roy Chaudhary, Page 29.

6/TR ANSITIO N T O T R IU M PH

In 1951, Vice Admiral Sir Mark Pizey succeeded

• the outright purchase of the three Hunt class

Vice Admiral Parry as the Chief of the Naval Staff.

destroyers which were on loan from the British

Since the Government was unable to afford large

Navy since 1952.

scale naval expansion and the British were not willing

to give India what it wanted, Admiral Parry’s plan had

In April 1956, Government approved the

to be shelved. Instead, Admiral Pizey proposed a 10

development of combatant naval aviation. The light

year replacement program. It was carefully phrased

fleet carrier HMS HERCULES was purchased from

to minimize opposition, both from the Government of

the British Navy.

India and the British Navy.

In 1957, the Navy proposed to the Government

the retention of existing ships in commission. If T h e A rm ed Forces Reorganisation

approved, this together with the new acquisitions

under construction in Britain would double the

C o m m ittee - 1952

number of ships in the Fleet and enable it to cope

In 1952, this Committee was constituted to reduce

with the increased size of the Pakistan Navy.

the expenditure on the Indian Armed Forces during

In 1958, the Government:

the period 1952/53 to 1954/55. The Committee

•

Agreed to NHQ’s proposal to keep the existing

recommended that two cruisers be acquired in

ships in commission till 1962/63 or expiry of life,

addition to INS DELHI. In due course MYSORE was

whichever was earlier.

commissioned in 1957. The acquisition of the aircraft

•

Approved the outright purchase of the three Hunt

carrier was deferred. It was eventually sanctioned in

Class destroyers that were on loan from Britain.

1956.

•

Agreed in principle to the acquisition from Britain

The number of ships to be acquired during this

of three new destroyers in lieu of three of the six

period were reduced. Since destroyers were not

second rate A/S Type 14 frigates of the KHUKRI

readily available, the newest available frigates were

Class proposed in 1950. These destroyers were

ordered from Britain.*

required to provide the aircraft carrier with anti

submarine protection and at night act as

D evelop m en ts 1954 to 1962

VIKRANTs escorts in the event of surface action.

In 1954, agreements were signed for the acquisition

Pursuant to these decisions:

from Britain of eight new frigates (3 anti aircraft, 2

first rate anti subm arine, 3 second rate anti

• The Navy floated informal inquiries to the British

submarine) and 6 minesweepers (4 coastals and 2

Admiralty regarding the availability of three

inshores).

Daring or Later Battle Class destroyers.

As part of the Naval Replacement Programme, the

• Since the Bombay Dockyard would not be able to

Government also sanctioned two Fleet tankers. A

berth the envisaged size of the Fleet, the Navy

second hand tanker had been purchased from Italy in

proposed the setting up of a major naval base at

1953 and commissioned as SHAKTI in 1954. The

Visakhapatnam and made plans for the

Government sanction stipulated that the second

immediate construction there of a 1 120-foot jetty

tanker should be built in India.

and a workshop.

In 1956, Vice Admiral Sir Stephen Carlill took

• To establish a presence in the A & N Islands and over as C h ief o f the Naval Staff. By this time, to keep an eye on naval activity in the Bay of

Pakistan had joined CENTO and SEATO and had

Bengal, the Navy proposed to Government the

been promised substantial naval assistance. America

positioning of a Resident Naval Officer (RNO) at

committed to directly supply two destroyers and eight

Port Blair.

minesweepers and pay Britain for refurbishing and

• The Navy decided to dispose o ff the old

supplying a cru iser and four destroyers. Naval

minesweepers which were occupying precious

Headquarters, already preoccupied with pressing the

alongside berths. RAJPUTANA, ROHILKHAND

case for the aircraft carrier, found itself compelled to and two LCTs had already been disposed of in

propose:

1956. Action was now taken to dispose of

BOMBAY. MADRAS and BENGAL. Only KONKAN

•

the acquisition of three destroyers from Britain to

was retained as a general-purpose vessel.

match Pakistan’s acquisitions and

*

For details o f developments during this period, see “No Easy Answers" by Goldrich and “Sea Power and Indian Security" by Rahul Roy Chaudhary.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/7

In 1958, Vice Admiral RD Katari took over as the

When China attacked in the end o f 1962, the

first Indian Chief of Naval Staff. By this time, the first profile of the Navy’s ships was as follows:

a^e

o f the eight new frigates o f Admiral Pizey’s naval

•

Acquisitions After 1947: One aircraft carrier, uv replacement plan had started commissioning and the

cruisers, six d estroyers, on e tan k er a n d 0ne aircraft carrier was being modernised. The Navy restores ship, all o f which were second hand. The started its case for a submarine arm.

new acquisitions were eight frigates, four coastal

In 1959. Britain indicated that neither Daring nor

minesweepers and two inshore minesweepers.

Later Battle Class destroyers were available. The

•

Old Ships Pre 1947: Six frigates and one LST.

Navy then proposed to Government the acquisition

from Britain o f three Early Battle Class destroyers

D e v e lo p m e n ts 1 9 6 3 to 1 9 65

which were older than those earlier requested.

In p u rsu an ce o f the decision to relieve the After the military reverses during China’s attacks in

con gestion o f ships at Bom bay and to ease the end 1962, India sou gh t d efen ce assistan ce from growing workload on the Naval Dockyard at Bombay,

America, Britain and the C om m onw ealth. These

the Navy proposed to Government the basing of some

countries asked for details o f specific assistance.

ships at Cochin, Visakhapatnam and Calcutta.

These details w ere sent. T h e requ irem en ts were In April 1960, Government acquired Mazagon

phased in the form o f a five-year plan and led to the

D ocks Ltd (MDL) and asked it to prepare a

formulation of the 1964 - 69 Defence Plan.

prelim in ary rep ort on the fa cilities required to M eanw hile th e A m e ric a n P re s id e n t and the modernise MDL for building frigates. In November

British Prime Minister, who had met at Nassau in the

1960, Government approved in principle that three

Bahamas in December 1962, had decided that:

frigates should be built in India.

The Navy’s efforts to get the second fleet tanker

•

America would not supply “lethal” equipment to

b u ilt in In d ia did not bear fruit. G overnm ent India, except for equipping the Arm y’s mountain

sanctioned the acquisition of a new Fleet Tanker to

divisions on the Indo Chinese border.

replace the old second hand tanker SHAKTI.

•

Britain, the ‘traditional supplier, would deal with

In January 1961, MDL submitted its preliminary

the Navy’s requirements.

report. Government deputed a team to discuss with

•

The envisaged aid to India o f $120 million would

the Admiralty, the collaborating shipbuilders and the

be shared equally between America and Britain.

armament suppliers the steps to be taken to execute

the Frigate Project expeditiously and economically.

Immediately after China's attack:

T h e team recom m ended con stru ction o f three

•

The first RNO P o rt B la ir w a s appoin ted in Leander class frigates in collaboration with Britain.

November 1962.

In December 1961, the Portuguese were evicted

•

G overn m en t a cco rd ed s a n c tio n for the

from Goa. The airfield at Dabolim was taken over by

con stru ction o f th e n ew 1 1 2 0 fo o t w h arf a the Navy. In Delhi, there was difference of opinion

Visakhapatnam.

betw een the M in istries w hether Goa should be

developed solely as a mercantile port or whether the

The year 1963 was a major milestone in

Navy’s requirement to have a naval base h alfw ay

naval plan n in g. T h e G o v e rn m e n t in itia ted betw een

Bom bay

and

Cochin

could

be

exhaustive review o f defence requirem ents. C 1

accommodated. Th is discussion continued until

was viewed as the primary threat. The Governing

1963.

decided that the Army’s strength should be raise ^

F rig a te P ro je ct

825,000 men and the A ir F o rce’s s t r e n g t h squadrons. The resources required to achieve

^

By 1962, in response to global enquiries, Sweden and

meant that the Navy could not be s t r e n g t h e n ^ ^

H olland had also subm itted proposals to build

Whereas the Navy had proposed a force level o

^

frigates in India. In mid 1962, a team led by the DCNS

ships, the Defence Plan for the Navy e n v i s a g e ^

visited Sweden, Holland and Britain to make a final

phased programme for replacem en t o f over-ag

techno-economic assessment of the British proposal

ships".

vis a vis the others. The team recommended the

During 1963:

B ritish Lean der frigate. In view o f the d ifficu lt fin a n cia l p osition and the shortage o f foreign

•

With a view to take up the construction of

exchange, the final decision awaited the negotiation

in India, a team of officers headed by the U

of credit on soft terms.

8/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

The Cruiser - INS DELHI with INS MYSORE in the backgrond INS RANJIT (Fleet Destroyer)

INS MAGAR (Landing Ship Tank)

INS GANGA (Escort Destroyer)

INS BETWA (Anti Aircraft Frigate)

INS TALWAR (Anti Submarine Frigate)

visited Britain and Sweden to evaluate their offers

Frigate Project for the first four years, as well as for of collaboration.

the expansion of Mazagon Docks Ltd.

®

The respon sibility for Seaward Defence was

Negotiations were also finalised for the Navy’s

entrusted to the Navy. The Coast Batteries which

tanker to be built by a public sector shipping line in a till then were manned by the Army were taken

foreign shipyard and on completion, for the tanker to

over by the Navy.

be chartered to the Navy.

•

The Navy was asked to garrison the A&N islands.

When the Rann of Kutch incident occurred In

INS JARAW A was com m issioned as a naval

April 1965 the position regarding the N avy’s

establishment. A naval garrison was stationed at

requirements was:

Port Blair and provided with vessels for moving

between the islands.

•

America had said that Britain should deal with

®

It was decided to set up at Visakhapatnam, the

the Navy’s needs.

full fledged Naval Base and Dockyard which had

•

The British Navy had expressed its inability to

been proposed in 1957.

spare either the type of destroyers or the type of

•

It was decided to develop Goa as a naval base. INS

submarines which the Navy wanted. British

G OM ANTAK was com m issioned as a naval

shipbuilders were willing to build a new Oberon

establishment. The Naval Air Station Dabolim’s

class submarine which India wanted. India’s

facilities were updated to make them capable of

suggestion for soft credit, as had been extended

operating jet aircraft.

for the Frigate Project, was being reconsidered by

the British Government.

By early 1964. the Defence Plan 1964-69 had

•

Russia had offered a variety o f ships and

crystallised. The requirem ents of the Plan were

submarines to meet the Navy’s needs.

discussed by the Defence Minister's Delegations

In May 1965, soon after the Rann o f Kutch

during their visits to America in May 1964, to Russia

incident, a series of events occurred with startling

in August 1964 and to Britain in November 1964.

rapidity.

Neither America, Britain nor Russia perceived any

threat to India from China’s Navy. In their view,

•

In April, Pakistan intruded into Kutch.

India’s priority was to contain China on India’s land

•

In May, Britain informed India that they were

borders by strengthening the Army and the Air Force.

unable to extend financial assistance for an

Russia however was willing to meet the Navy’s needs.

Oberon class submarine to be built in a Britain

In his book “Indian Navy's Submarine Arm",

shipyard.

Admiral Chatterji states:*

•

In June, there was an increase in Indonesian

intrusions into the Nicobar Islands. The Navy

"From the Soviet point of view, India’s naval recommended to the Government an immediate

shopping list no doubt came at a propitious time.

increase in naval presence in the Bay of Bengal to

Following the victory of the Chinese in the eastern

deter further intrusions.

Himalayas and Peking’s sharp attacks on Soviet

•

The refusal of British credit to build the Oberon

foreign policy in the Indian Ocean, Moscow s geoclass submarine and the need for increased naval strategic analysis of Southeast Asia welcomed a

presence in the A & N islands com bined to

powerful Indian Navy that would associate and

precipitate the decision to accept the Russian

cooperate with the Soviet Navy to contain China

offer of ships and submarines which they had

in the region. Whatever may be the reasons for

made in September 1964.

the Soviet Union’s prompt and positive responses

•

In September 1965, an agreement was signed for

to India’s Naval requirements, it was certainly

the acquisition from Russia of four submarines, a

very helpful and timely in making up the various

submarine depot ship, five Petya class submarine

deficiencies in the Indian Fleet".

chasers, two Landing Ships Tank Medium and

By 1965, collaboration agreements had been

five patrol boats, all for deployment in the Bay of

Bengal and the A & N Islands.

concluded with Vickers Yarrow of Britain for the

indigenous construction of three Leander class

In a letter to Rear Admiral Sridharan in November

frigates. Britain offered a special defence credit of 4.7

1965. Admiral Mountbatten wrote:**

million pounds to cover the external cost of the

*

Page 44.

■* “Maritime History o f India" by Rear Admiral K Sridharan. Page 429.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/9

“I have a specially soft spot in my heart for the

up a modest force, using the sterling balan

Indian Navy, having done so veiy much for it from

up during World War II. Despite the disinclinar ^

the time I was the Supreme Allied Commander

increase defence expenditure and even after C

l0nt°

and had most of the Navy serving under me from

the pressing needs o f the A rm y and Air F o ™ ^ ^

1943 to 1946 un til I was V iceroy and then

Navy’s percentage share o f the defence budget ’ the Governor General, when I took a great personal

from 4 per cent in 1950/51 to 9 per cent in

part in the division and reconstitution of the

and 12 per cent in 1959/60. From 1961 onwards

Navy.

Navy’s allocation steadily declined to 4% in 1964/r

“Ever since then I have been instrumental in

mainly because o f the o v e r-rid in g need to swift?’

getting almost all of the requirements o f the

modernise the Army and Air Force after the Chi

Indian Navy met by the British Government,

aggression o f 1962.

nese

including the two cruisers, the aircraft carrier,

It is also interesting to note how the long awaited

the destroyers, the organisations for building the

approval for the Subm arine A rm resulted not onlv frigates at Bombay etc.

from a curious com bination o f several geopolitical

“I had even managed to get more favourable

and econom ic factors but also as part of a much terms for the construction of a British submarine

larger d ecisio n to s ta r t a c q u ir in g the Navy's but alas it all took so long that this particular

requirements from Russia.

transaction fell through”.

As can be seen from the follow ing table of ship

acquisitions betw een 1947 and 1965, the Navy's

A n O verview o f th e N a vy’s Growth

growth was m oderate, slow and steady, with new

1947 to 1965

construction ships from the UK replacing those o(

World War II v in ta g e a n d w ith indigenous Viewed in retrospect, even though the allocations to

construction gradually acquiring momentum.

the Navy were low, it was possible to gradually build

10/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Overview of the Navy’s Growth 1947 to 1965

ACQUISITION

STANDARD

NAME

VINTAGE

YEAR

YEAR

SUPPLIER

DISPLACE-

ORDERED

DELIV-

ERED

^ight Cruiser

7000

DELHI

WW2

1947

1948

Britain

Light Destroyers

1700

RAJPUT,

WW2

1948

1949

Britain

RANJIT,

RANA.

Landing Ship Tank

2200

MAGAR

WW2

1949

1949

Britain

Escort Destroyers

1000

GODAVARI

WW2

1951

1953

Britain

GOMATI,

GANGA.

Light Tanker

3500

SHAKTI

WW2

1952

1953

Italy

Inshore Mine •

120

BASSEIN

New

1952

1954

Britain

sweepers

BIMLIPATAM

Coastal Mine360

KARWAR,

New

1952

1956

Britain

sweepers

CANNANORE,

CUDDALORE.

KAKINADA.

Light Cruiser

8700

MYSORE

WW2

1954

1957

Britain

Anti Aircraft

2250

BRAHMAPUTRA

New

1955

1958

Britain

Frigates

BEAS.

1958

BETWA.

1960

Anti Submarine

2150

TRISHUL

New

1955

1959

Britain

Frigates

TALWAR

1958

Anti Submarine

1200

KHUKRI,

New

1955

1958

Britain

Frigates

KIRPAN.

1959

KUTHAR.

1959

Seaward Defence

63

SUBHADRA,

New

1956

1957

Italy

Boats(for Central

SUVARNA,

1958

Board of Revenue)

SHARAYU,

SAV1TRI.

Seaward Defence

86

SHARADA,

New

1957

1959

Yugoslavia

Boats

SUKANYA.

Repair and Store

4600

DHARINI

Second

1958

1959

Italy

Ship

Hand

Seaward Defence

120

AJAY,

New Indigenous

1958

1960

Garden Reach

Boats

ABHAY,

1961

and Hoogly

AKSHAY.

1962

Docking

Light Aircraft

18000

VIKRANT

WW2

1957

1961

Britain

Carrier

Survey Ship

2800

DARSHAK

New Indigenous

1954

1964

Hindustan

Shipyard

TRANSITION TO TR IUM PH /11

2

The International Geopolitical Web

freedom struggle until 1947 is a record of the failure The partition of India in 1947 was the outcome of

attitudes whose historical origins went back several

o f innum erable e ffo rts to a c h ie v e Hindu Muslim centuries. Starting in the 8 th century, the Hindu

political unity.

kingdom s o f India were subjugated by Muslim

In A p ril 1947, R e a r A d m ir a l Lord Louis

invaders , first from Afghanistan and then by the

Mountbatten w as appointed as the last Viceroy of

Mughals from Central Asia. The British East India

India to hand o v e r p o w e r b y m id 1948. After Company stepped in as Mughal power declined. After

assessing the situation, he concluded that partition the first Indian struggle for independance in 1857,

could not be avoided and the h an d in g over would two things happened. Britain formally took over the

have to be preponed.

He presented to the Congress

governance of India from the East India Company.

and the M u slim L e a g u e a p la n to partition the And the British started depending more on the

country into India and Pakistan. The boundaries of

Hindus who for many year? had been availing of

the two c o u n trie s w o u ld b e d em a rca ted by a English education and had been exposed to Western

commission. T h e Princely States could stay free or thought. The Muslims, having ruled India for several

join either country. Power w ould be transferred on

centuries, started resenting this rise in Hindu status.

the basis of ‘Dominion Status’ and thereafter either

As the movement for freedom from British rule

G overn m en t c o u ld w ith d r a w fro m the British gathered headway, fears of Hindu econom ic

Commonwealth if it wished. W ith rioting spreading

domination led the Muslims to demand separate

beyond control, the date for the end o f British rule Hindu and Muslim electorates. Over time, this led to

and the transfer of power was preponed by nearly a

the Muslim League’s demand for a separate Muslim

year to two months hence, on 15 August 1947.

state, to be called Pakistan, comprising the Muslim

Despite seriou s d iffe re n c e s o f opinion on ^

m ajority provinces of Baluchistan, Sind, West

concept and the tim in g , th e p a r titio n plan wa^

Punjab, the Northwest Frontier province and East

accepted by both parties. The enorm ous violen t

Bengal. The Muslim League, led by Mr Jinnah, was

the Hindu M u slim rio ts an d th e lo ss o f li e *

able to mobilise the Muslim middle class. He played

property that follow ed, w h en m illio n s o f fam

*

on their fears of Hindu domination and they followed

migrated from one side to the other, left deep sc

him.

mutual suspicion in both countries.

^vised

On the other hand, the Congress leaders of

The 567 rulers of the Princely States wer^(5 s^ates

India’s freedom movement, both Hindu and Muslim,

to accede either to India or to Pakistan. 55 ^ ree

were determined that independent India must be a

acceded to India. 5 states acceded to Pakistan.

secular state, where the pull of religion did not states were undecided — Junagadh, Hydera a

intrude into matters of governance. The Congress

Kashmir:

party, led by Mahatma Gandhi, Pandit Nehru, Sardar

Patel, Netaji Bose. Maulana Azad, Frontier Gandhi

•

The Muslim ruler o f Hindu majority ^ur*a^ , eded

Abdul Ghaffar Khan and innumerable other Hindu

small state on the Saurashtra coast, ®rs J* ruler

and Muslim nationalist leaders fervently believed in a

to Pakistan. The population o b j e c t e d .

composite Hindu Muslim culture and staunchly

changed his m ind and acced ed to In *

opposed the partition of India into two homelands

Navy’s role in this operation is recor e

They were unable to allay the insecurity which the

history o f the Navy for the period 194

Muslim League played upon. When the Muslim

“Under Two Ensigns”.

u hprab^,a

League leaders were asked what would happen to the

•

The Muslim ruler o f Hindu majority Hy

t0

millions of Muslims who would remain in India in S e

land locked state in the centre of India,'*'

provinces in which they were in a minority ?he£

remain free. However, t h e . anti Hindu

answer was that “they would have to manage" To violence unleashed by the R a z a k a r s , an ®

ioi

nd,an leaders, this “two nation theory’ was Muslim organisation dedicated to

impractical and repugnant. The history of IndTa I

*Iyfe V e°c3^

the supremacy o f Muslim power in th

led to a swift police action by India to restore law

unnecessarily in an area and terrain which was

and order. The Nizam accepted Hyderabad

unfavourable, geographically as well as population

becoming a part of India,

wise’ .*

e

The third state, Muslim majority Kashmir, not

The United Nations Commission arrived in July

only became the cause of the 1947, 1965 and

1948. Pakistan admitted that it had sent in three 1971 Indo Pakistan wars but also the cockpit for

brigades of troops. The Commission made various

international geo-politics. Like the Nizam of

suggestions. Negotiations followed. The UN resolution Hyderabad, the Maharaja of Kashmir wanted to

stipulated that the very firs t step was Pakistani remain free. This was not to Pakistan’s liking.

withdrawal o f its forces from the areas it had occupied Pakistan sent into Kashmir tribesmen, followed

in Kashmir. The second step was to restore the by irregular forces, to take over Kashmir. The jurisdiction of the Srinagar government over the whole tribesmen entered Kashmir in October 1947 and

of the state o f Jammu and Kashmir. A plebiscite was to within days had advanced to the outskirts of

be held only after these two conditions were fulfilled. A Srinagar. The Maharaja sought India’s assistance

cease fire came into effect on 1 January 1949, one

to repel the raiders. India insisted that this could

year after India’s initial complaint to the UN. Bv this only be done after his state had formally acceded

time, Indian troops had pushed the Pakistanis back

to India. This was done. The first Indian troops

to a cease fire line, (CFL) across which Indian and reached Srinagar on 27 October and the raiders

Pakistani troops faced each other to prevent

were pushed back. Pakistan then sent in its

intrusions.

regular forces in civilian clothes. They too were

Prior to the cease fire. India insisted upon and

pushed back.

obtained three safeguards :

On 1 January 1948, India referred the Kashmir

•

The administration of the territory held by

issue to the United Nations, stating that despite the Pakistan (which Pakistan called Azad Kashmir )

ruler and the people having acceded to India, the would not mean loss of sovereign ly for the

Government of India, to keep the matter above board,

Kashmir Government over these territories nor

would hold a plebiscite to ascertain the wishes of the

recognition of the Government of Azad Kashmir.

people after law and order had been re-established in

•

India would maintain its forces, not only to

the .entire state. The Security Council, particularly ensure law and order, but also to defend the state

America and Britain, instead of recognising that

against external aggression.

P akistan ’s aggression had created a warlike

•

Pakistan, having no locus standi, would play no

situation, passed a resolution calling on both sides to role in holding the plebiscite. In subsequent

ease the tension. A few days later the Security years, no plebiscite could be held because

Council passed another resolution to create a United

Pakistan declined to vacate the part of Kashmir

Nations Commision to exercise a mediatory role and

territory which it had forcibly occupied in 1947.

investigate the facts.

In 1950, the Kashmir State Constituent Assembly

India was dismayed at the American and British

was convened. Pakistan threatened a ‘jehad’ (holy

attitude, as was the Viceroy, Lord Mountbatten, at

war). Forces of both sides advanced to the borders.

their d elib era te refusal to recognise India s

Pandit Nehru made it clear that an attack on Kashmir

tran sp aren tly sin cere intentions, despite the

would mean an attack on India and would invite

communal holocaust of partition. In later years, this retaliation. Fifteen years later, in 1965, that warning American and British attitude of equating India and

was made good. Meanwhile various proposals

Pakistan, despite repeated aggression by Pakistan,

continued to be made by the U N Commission and by

became the basis of Anglo-American policy. Proposals

others to resolve the deadlock but to no avail.

for arms aid were assessed, not on the criterion o

In 1949, the Communist Government of Mr Mao

need but on not disturbing the military balance in

Tse Tung assumed power in China. The American

the Asian sub-continent.

supported Kuomintang forces under General Chiang

The Government of India told the Indian Army o

Kai Shek fled to Taiwan (earlier called Formosa). In

clear the Pakistanis up to a point which cou

e

end 1950, Chinese troops intervened on the side of

militarily defensible. The Army strongly presse

or

the North Koreans and inflicted reverses on the

advancing farther. The Government felt that “going

United Nations forces in Korea leading to an

farther w ould have em broiled Indian forces

*

“Distant Neighbours" by Kuldip Nayar Page 71.

TRANSITION TO TR IUM PH /13

destroyers and frigates, bombers and fighter aircr armistice. India sent a substantial military force to

were being acquired from Britain. In step with th* *

keep the peace.

The Korean war compelled America to take a

better understanding o f Indian policy, the Russian*

wider view of the Cold War which had been going on

started making overtures to displace Britain as th*

prime source for India’s defence needs. Mr PVR ^

with Communist Russia since the end of the Second

World War. America started putting together a chain

(later Defence Secretary from 1962 to 1966) was the

of military alliances, stretching eastwards from the

Deputy High Commissioner in London. He recalls:

Atlantic Ocean to the Pacific Ocean to encircle the

“When the Air Force had come to England in 1952

southern flank of the Russian and Chinese landmass

to n ego tia te fo r th e C a n b e rra bombers, 1

and contain the spread of communism.

remember the Soviet Military Attache asking me

The gist of America’s geo-strategic perception of

“why don’t you approach us for assistance, rather

Asia at that tim e w as th at w ith China under than approach America and Britain?’

communist domination and Communist Russia on

“I also recall Prime M inister Nehru’s talk to

India’s northern border, India had become the pivotal

senior Indian High Commission officials in 1952

state in non-com m unist Asia. If India went

“It is all very w ell th at R u ssia and China are communist, for all practical purposes, all of Asia making many overtures to us, but with America

would be lost. Presiden t Trum an approved his

and Britain also, you n ever k n ow which way

National Security Council’s recommendation for

these things w ill turn. We sh ou ld be equally military and economic aid to India. India received distant from both, ju s t to s a fe g u a rd all our Sherman tanks for the Army and C 119 Packet

interests.”

military transport aircraft for the Air Force. No naval aid was either sought or offered. Even though tanks

In 1953, Pakistan joined the American sponsored

and aeroplanes were being purchased, India was not

four nation Baghdad Pact-T u rk ey, Iran, Iraq and

in favour of strategic linkages. In Pandit Nehru’s view, Pakistan. Th e U S -P a k is ta n M ilita r y Defence it was better for India to keep aloof from power Agreem en t w as sign ed in M ay 1954. T h is was alignments and military alliances than to take sides,

followed by Pakistan jo in in g the South East Asia either with America or the Communist bloc. More was

T rea ty O rga n isa tio n (S E A T O ) c o m p ris in g the to be gained for the cause of peace by facilitating

Philipines, Thailand and Pakistan. America informed

better mutual understanding.

India o f its d ecisio n to p r o v id e m ilita r y aid to Until the early 1950s, Russia found it difficult to

Pakistan. India protested. America replied that it was

understand how India could be independent while

willing to give the same arms to India. India d e c lin e d .

still rem aining in the British Commonwealth. It

America did however give assurances that it w o u ld

viewed India’s non alignment as tilted towards the

not permit American arms to be used against India.

Western “imperialist” bloc rather than towards the

Am erican P resid en t E is e n h o w e r w ro te to Prirne

“socialist” bloc of Russia and China. When India

Minister Nehru that “ — I am confirm ing public y

refused to sign the San Francisco Peace Treaty with

that if our aid to any country, including Pakistan, is Japan (preferring to sign a separate treaty giving up

misused and directed against another in aggression,

reparations), Russia began to understand India’s

independent foreign policy. After 1952, when it first will undertake immediately, in accordance with iny

exercised its veto in the Security Council, Russia’s

constitutional authority, ap p rop riate action b°

support of India’s stand on Kashmir became firm.

w ith in and w ith o u t th e UN to th w a rt sue The NATO alliance was formed in 1949 followed

aggression.”

,

by CENTO, SEATO and ANZUS. America invited India

In 1954, Pandit Nehru visited America. He

to join some of these alliances. When India declined to the American Government deeply involved in

do so. America invited Pakistan. Pakistan responded

Cold War with Russia and not at all intereste ^

favourably to joining a Middle East defence pact, in

transfering the technological assistance

return for extensive military and economic aid India

was seeking for developing her heavy industry-

.

pointed out to Pakistan that with American arms

he visited Russia in 1955, he found there a & increasing Pakistani fighting potential, it would be

greater willingness to help India. In 1956, when ^

ridiculous to talk of the demilitarisation of Kashmir

First Secretary of the Russian C o m m u n i s t Par ^

at

as the first step to hold a plebiscite

Krushchev visited India, he stated categorically

Until the early 1950’s, all of India's core defence

Russia considered Kashmir an integral part o

requirements like tanks, field artillery, cruisers'

From then onwards, the relationship between

Q(j

and Russia started becoming extensive. R u s s i a

14/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

by India steadfastly, using its veto in the Security American help if attacked by India. It was this secret Council to counter American supported pro-Pakistan

commitment that Pakistan invoked and in response

resolutions on Kashmir. Also from 1956 onwards,

to which America sent a naval task force with the

Russia started extending credits on favourable terms

nuclear carrier ENTERPRISE into the Indian Ocean

for India’s industrial development, particularly for

in the 1971 Indo Pakistan war. Pursuant to this

huge projects like the Steel Plant at Bhilai and the

agreement, America started using Peshawar for

Heavy Engineering Corporation at Ranchi.

spying on Russia. U 2 spy planes started taking off

The mid 1950s marked a high point in India’s

from the Peshawar Air Force base and electronic

policy of non- alignment. The Conference of Afro

listening posts were set up for monitoring Russia’s

Asian N ations at Bandung in Indonesia, the

missile tests and other electronic transmissions.

Panchsheel Declaration and slogans of India - China

In Indonesia, the Communist Party of Indonesia

friendship signalled to the developing world India’s

(PKI) had grown in strength and established strong

model for socio-econom ic development, without

linkages with Russia and China. In the years after

getting embroiled in Cold War military alliances as a

the Bandung Conference of 1955, Indonesia had

precondition for aid.

distanced itself from India, and moved closer to

By 1958, these slogans nad worn thin. India and

Pakistan. Between 1959 and 1964, the Indonesian

China had started to drift apart. Indian and Chinese

Navy had acquired an enormous fleet from Russia. It

patrols clashed in the northern Himalayas, in Aksai

comprised one heavy cruiser, eighteen destroyers and

Chin, an area which India regarded as its own and

frigates, twelve submarines, sixty seven corvettes and

which China found vital to control because it

motor torpedo boats, twelve missile boats, twenty one

connected Sinkiang with Tibet. Pakistan seized the

minesweepers, eleven landing ships, six landing

opportunity to exploit to its advantage, the widening

craft, four transport ships and four oilers.

rift between India and China. Acting on the principle

In 1960, Mr Kennedy became the Am erican

that your enemy’s enemy is your friend, Pakistan

President. American policy changed significantly.

requested China to demarcate the border between the

Instead of depending on military bases and alliances,

two countries, part of which lay in the territory of America decided to help economically strong, free and

Kashmir under Pakistani occupation. China did not

neutral nations to contain Communism. This

respond.

increased India’s significance in American policy and

In 1958, there was an anti western coup in Iraq.

decreased that of Pakistan. The border dispute

Iraq withdrew from the Baghdad Pact and it was

between India and China and A m erica’s own

renamed as the Central Treaty Organisation

difficulties with China over Taiwan made it pragmatic

(CENTO).

for America to join hands with India in dealing with

Between 1955 and 1959, the Pakistan Navy

China. 1960 was also the year that the tussle was

received American assistance for:*

developing between Communist Russia and

Communist China on the ideological leadership of the

•

A cq u irin g eigh t Am erican Navy coastal

International Communist Movement. Anticipating

minesweepers as grant aid

that President Kennedy may provide arms to India,

•

Acquiring one cruiser and five destroyers from

Pakistan sought and obtained assurances from

the B ritish N avy’s reserve fleet, which were

America in 1961 that ‘if and when arms aid was given

modernised in Britain with American support

to India, Pakistan would be consulted’.

•

Building a new naval armament depot and a new

Sensing these shifts in geo-political alignments.

naval stores depot

Pakistan sought to improve relations with other

•

A c q u isitio n by the Pakistan A ir Force of a countries. In 1960, Pakistan accepted Russia’s offer

squadron o f twenty, twin engined Albatross

for oil prospecting. President Nasser of Egypt was

aircraft for anti submarine patrols

invited to Pakistan. Along with Iran and Turkey,

•

Jetties and wharves

Pakistan formed the Regional C ooperation for

•

Ammunition and stores

Development (RCD). Outwardly it was an alliance for

economic and cultural cooperation. Years later, both

Early in 1959, under the auspices of SEATO,

Iran and Turkey gave Pakistan arms which it used to

America signed with Pakistan a bilateral agreement o

fight India.

cooperation for security and defence. Later it became

In 1961, Pakistan repeated its earlier suggestion

known that this agreement was accompanie

y a

to China seeking demarcation of borders. Within

secret commitment specifically assuring Pakistan o

Story o f the Pakistan Navy, Pages 184 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TR IUM PH /15

engineering and medical equipm ent and some light

weeks of the Indo China conflict in 1962, Pakistan

infantry weapons for mountain divisions, about h i

conceded China’s territorial claims in the Hunza

was d elivered by mid 1965. T h e rem ain d er wa area. In an agreement signed in 1963, Pakistan gave

stopped when war broke out in September 1965

S

away to China 2200 square m iles o f Pakistani

Occupied Kashmir bordering Sinkiang. In return,

Whilst responding to India’s request for military

assistance,America and Britain insisted on the pr^

China helped to build the Karakoram Highway from

conditions o f re sta rtin g d is c u s s io n s to solve the Sinkiang into Pakistan.

In 1961. under D efence M inister Krishna

Kashmir problem, o f m aking a form al declaration

M enon’s determ in ed drive for s e lf reliance, an that the arms received w ou ld not be used against agreem ent was signed with Russia for the

Pakistan and o f in sp ection by A m erica n military m anufacture in India o f Russia s latest fighter

officers that the arm s g iven w ou ld only go to the aircraft, the MIG 21. The Air Force became the first of forces facing the Chinese. The Indo Pakistan talks India’s armed forces to go in for Russian acquisitions.

broke down in May 1963. Apart from the earlier basic

Two other m ajor se lf reliance projects were the differences, India w as u n w illin g to agree to the indigenous manufacture of frigates for the Navy and

boundary agreem ent betw een China and Pakistan

tanks for the Army.

over areas of illegally occupied Kashmir.

When China attacked India in October 1962,

After China’s a ttack in 1962, the Indonesian

India appealed to Russia, America, Britain and the

Communist Party’s pro-C h in a lin e fu rther soured Commonwealth for m ilitary aid. The immediate

Indonesian relations with India. The growing size of

response was positive. A strengthened India on

Indonesia’s Russian su p p lied fle e t bolstered the China’s southwest border suited their interests. It

Indonesian Navy’s confidence. Bellicosity increased -

could help lessen the pressure China was exerting on

claim s were voiced to the N ic o b a r Islan d chain.

Taiwan, an American protege. It could help lessen

Intrusions increased in the sou th ern m ost island, China’s pressure on Britain in Malaya. And it could

Great Nicobar, which was a mere 90 miles from the

help distract China from the pressure it was exerting

northern tip of Sumatra. Statements were made that

on Russia’s eastern border. Russia agreed to meet

the In dian O cean s h o u ld be re n a m e d as the India’s needs and to deliver before the due dates, the

Indonesian Ocean.

equipment for which contracts had already been

From 1963 on w ards, P a k is ta n in creased its signed.*

viola tion s o f the ce a s e fir e lin e in Kashm ir. A Soon after India’s request for military assistance,

perception grew in Pakistan that India would become

President Kennedy of America and Prime Minister

too strong as a result o f the m ajor decisions being Macmillan of Britain happened to meet at Nassau in

taken in India’s Defence Plan 1964 - 69 and that it the Bahamas. It was agreed that the West need not be

was best to settle scores w ith India sooner rather over-generous in their response as it would disturb

than later.

the military balance with Pakistan. Of the total aid of Politically, In d ia c o n tin u e d its m easures to 120 million dollars promised initially, 60 million each integrate Kashm ir in to th e In d ia n mainstream-would be given by America and Britain. Emergency

Kashmir’s representatives in the Indian Parliamen .

aid of light arms, ammunition and winter clothing

hitherto nominated, would be elected by the peop e-

was airlifted to India.

The President o f India w as em pow ered to

When China resumed its attack in November

President’s rule to Kashmir, as he could in the o

1962 and advanced into Assam, India asked America

states of India,in the event o f a breakdow n oi

to intervene militarily with air support. By the time

constitutional machinery.

.^e

China declared a u n ilateral cease fire on 22

Betw een 1959 and 1965, A m e r ic a gave

November, America had despatched to the Bay of

Pakistan Navy a floating dock ( 1 9 6 1 ), a fleet tan Bengal a naval task force which included the nuclear

DACCA (1963), and a submarine GHAZI (1964), a ^

powered aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE. By a curious

with equipment for training establishments an

coincidence, the same aircraft carrier was sent to the

dockyard.**

aS

Bay of Bengal during the 1971 Indo Pakistan War as a

gesture of support to Pakistan.

In May 1964, Prime Minister Nehru died.

_

succeeded by Mr Lai B ahadu r S h astri. P a * 1

Of the military assistance of non-lethal items

intensified its anti India campaign and decide

such as spares for transport aircraft, communication,

1965 was the right year to force a s e tt le m e n t o ^ ^

“Stalin to Gorbachov" by TN Kaul. Page 40.

Story of the Pakistan Navy, Pages 204, 208, 209.

16/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Kashmir issue that had eluded them in 1947-48.

increase in intrusions in the Nicobar Islands. The

During 1964. delegations headed by Defence

Navy recommended an immediate increase in naval

Minister Chavan held discussions with America.

presence in the Bay of Bengal. This precipitated the

Russia and Britain regarding assistance for India’s

decision to accept the ships and submarines which

Defence Plan 1964-69. America could not offer what

Russia had offered to the Defence M inister's

India wanted. Russia offered the Army and Navy

delegation in 1964 and to base them in

what they sought. The Army contracted for light

Visakhapatnam.

tanks and artillery. The Navy did not want to strain

Within a brief period of four years between 1961

its connections with the British Navy and waited for

and 1965, the geopolitical and economic compulsions

the outcome of discussions with Britain.

of America and Britain had led India’s Air Force,

The Defence Minister’s delegation visited Britian

Army and Navy to accept Russia’s generous offers of

in end 1964. It found that Britain’s decision to reduce its latest conventional defence systems on extremely

the size o f its Navy precluded it from meeting the

favourable financial terms. The 1956 Rupee-Ruble

Navy’s im m ediate requirem ents o f ships and

Trade Agreement was extended also to defence sales

submarines. However, negotiations were concluded

from 1965 onwards.

for British collaboration in the construction in During the 1965 war, Indonesia’s stance was

Bombay of the British Navy’s latest design of Leander

markedly pro-Pakistan.. There was an increase in the

class frigates.

sightings of unidentified submarines and aircraft in

In end 1964, B rita in ’s economy was under

the Andaman and Nicobar islands. In response to

serious strain. A major review of defence and foreign

Pakistan’s t-equest for assistance, the Indonesian

policy had concluded that Britain could neither afford

Navy sent two submarines and two missile boats to

its overseas defence commitments nor the size of its

Karachi.

The Indonesian Naval C h ief even

Navy. It was mutually agreed that the burden of Cold

volunteered to distract India by making moves to take

War naval deployment in the Indian Ocean should be

over islands in the Nicobars.** It was this

borne by A m erica. In due course, the British

vulnerability in August 1965 that impelled Naval

w ithdrew from Gan in Addu Atoll and America

Headquarters to keep the Indian Fleet in the Bay of

established its presence in Diego Garcia. Likewise,

Bengal for as long as possible, so as to deter the American Navy gradually replaced the British

adventurist Indonesian naval moves.

Navy’s presence in Bahrein in the Persian Gulf.

After the 1965 Indo Pakistan War, Russia's

By 1965. there were sharp differences in Britain

mediation at Tashkent helped to negotiate the

about Indian Ocean policy. In one view, Britain’s

postwar settlement. From 1966 onwards, Russia

economic difficu lties and the conclusions of the

tried to wean Pakistan away from American and

strategic defence review carried out in 1964 required

Chinese influence by offering defence assistance and

that Britain withdraw from the Indian Ocean and

economic aid. By 1969, it was clear that this had not

concentrate on Europe. The opposite view was that in

succeeded. In the same year, discussions started on

view o f C h in a’s nuclear explosion in 1964,

what in August 1971 was to become the Indo Soviet

Indonesia’s confrontation with Malaysia in the east

Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Cooperation.***

and Egypt’s ‘subversion’ of Aden and the Persian Gulf

Russia offered to sign a similar treaty with Pakistan

in the west, Britain should not withdraw from the

provided they got out of CENTO. SEATO and the

Indian Ocean, because it would leave friends and

American Military Assistance Programme. Pakistan

allies in the lurch. Even though Indonesia and Egypt

rejected the offer.****

were not overtly communist, the British viewed their

In the 1960’s, America’s naval policy in the Indian

actions as serving communist objectives. In their

Ocean had many ingredients. The foremost was to

view, the security of the Indian sub-continent was

deter Russia from interrupting the flow; of oil from the central to Indian Ocean Policy and it would not avail

Persian Gulf countries to America and Europe.

to stand fast on the Himalaya, if the western and

Politically, this entailed American support-of Iran to

eastern flanks of the area were turned.*

counter Russian influence in Iraq. It entailed

In May 1965, Pakistan intruded into the Rann of

maintaining a naval presence in the Persian Gulf, and

Kutch. A t the same time, there was a marked

wherever possible, in the countries on the rim of the

Letter to the London Times 29 Apr 65 by Sir Olaf Caroe and others.

**

“The First Round" by Air Marshal Asghar Khan. Page 45

*** For details see "War and Secession" by Sisson and Rose. Page 19 .

See “My Years with the IAF" by Air Chief Marshal PC Lai page 333.

TRANSITION TO TR IUM PH /17

A fte r the 1971 w ar, th e R u s s ia n N avy WOrk Indian Ocean, not only to secure the sea lanes of

alongside the Indian Navy to clear the mines laid h*

com m unication which criss-crossed the Ind.an

the Pakistan Navy in the approaches to Chittago y

Ocean but also to inject military force from seaward

harbour.

when required. By 1968, the American Navy had

effected the necessary adjustments in its global naval

In 1971 also, the concept o f the Indian Ocean as

deploym ents. In 1968. Britain announced its

Zone of Peace crystallised in the UN. The original idea intention to withdraw from East of Suez by 1971 and

of the Non A lign ed M ovem en t w a s that the Great generated debate on “the Vacuum in the Indian

Powers should not enhance their military presence in

Ocean”. Russia’s naval presence in the. Indian Ocean

the Indian Ocean area. The UN’s 1971 resolution for

increased to keep pace with the American naval

an Indian Ocean Peace Zone was v e iy specific about

the scope of the Zone. The Indian Ocean covered not

presence.

America felt that Russia was articulating anxiety

only the ocean, but also its natural extensions like to forestall Am erican naval deploym ent. The

the Red Sea, the Persian G u lf etc. It did not include Russians on the other hand, felt that the establishing

the adjacen t lan d m ass. T h e m a in thru st of the of communication facilities in Diego Garcia and in

resolution was directed against Great Power rivalry in

Northwest Cape in Australia could be interpreted

the Indian Ocean. It did not try to find a solution to clearly as reflectin g an intention to deploy

the p o litics o f th e lit t o r a l. N or d id it make the submarines in the Indian Ocean whose ballistic

acceptance of the Zone o f Peace by the Great Powers

missiles were targeted on Russia.

conditional upon reciprocal obligation by the littoral Fears of a naval vacuum in the Indian Ocean were

and hinterland states. However, since this did not soon overtaken by fears of the militarisation of the

suit the Cold War interests o f the two super powers, Indian Ocean. Am erica neither denied nor

the UN’s Adhoc Committee attem pted to reverse the

acknowledged the deploym ent of subm arine

priorities. The G rea t P o w ers w e re a b le to divert launched ballistic missiles. The Russian Navy started'

attention from their own obligations by demanding

showing its flag in the Indian Ocean, partly to fill the that the regional powers should them selves accept

naval vacuum, partly to counter the American Navy

de-nuclearisation first. And, as usual, they were able and partly to demonstrate to the littoral states that

to manipulate regional dissensions and rivalries to

the Russian Navy was a force to contend with. Since

stall the convening o f a Zone o f Peace Conference.

Russia lacked naval bases in the Indian Ocean, an

In 1972, Iraq nationalised her oil companies. The

anchorage was developed off Socotra near the Gulf of

Iraqi Navy established a naval base and positione

Aden. Overall, there was a steady increase in the

Russian supplied missile boats at Umm Qasr at c

presence of American and Russian naval ships.

head of the Persian Gulf in the Shatt-el-Arab, not

In 1969, American President Nixon’s ‘Twin Pillar”

from the Ira n ia n o il fie ld s o f A b a d a n . ^ nierl^n strategy entrusted the security of the Persian Gulf

commenced the construction o f naval facilities

region to the monarchies in Iran and Saudi Arabia.

Diego Gracia to support a carrier task force f°r^

America started heavily arming both countries under

days. Three submarine pens were to be cons^rU^jeI-

the Nixon Doctrine. In 1970, the Russians became

for the attack submarines which accompany a ca ^

active in the Dhofar rebellion in Oman, which was a

battle group. The runways were to be len£ ^ eJ!e ted

Persian G u lf choke-point. These moves towards

operate B 52 strategic bombers. Am erica in

^

m ilitarisation o f the Indian Ocean triggered

that it did not intend to employ nuclear wea£ °jiist]c

countermoves to make the Indian Ocean a Zone of

these B-52’s nor deploy submarine launched a

Peace. And both these moves and countermoves bad

missiles from Diego Garcia.

, j fat

to take into account the overall American hypersensitivity regarding West Asian oil supplies In 1973, the A rab Is ra e li w a r P ersua ® inst OPEC states to use oil pricing as a weapon a

In 1971, the Indo Soviet Friendship Treaty and

the West to offset the continued

Russia's veto in the Security Council during the Indo

e c o n o m i c . P °

Pakistan war helped India to liberate Bangladesh so

and military arms support for Israel. They ralSg

that ten million refugees could return to their homes

price of oil. The results were m any and ^ ve^ sta^

America made its gesture of support to Pakistan bv

nations o f the West reacted w ith hysteria

a

with, but soon turned it to advantage.

\yfr°

S

f c W

E^

E* r mSE carrier «™ UP ‘ nto the Bay

of Bengal. The R ussian Navy, in an equally

massive increase In wealth for the OPEC sta* ’ tary

reassuring gesture of support to India, shadowed the

then s ig n ific a n tly in c r e a s e d th e ir ^re3t g | g | | N a v y 's task force into the Indian Ocean.

expenditures and arm s p u rch a ses. The

banks, faced w i t h mounting deposits o f pctr°

SSfHON TO TRIUMPH

increased their lending to non OPEC Third World

Pakistan’s naval relationship with China started

countries. T h is credit boom offered an excellent in September 1970 when the CinC Navy first visited

opportu n ity to upgrade defence equipment,

there. By this time, unrest was brewing in East

particularly as Western suppliers were increasingly

Pakistan and China agreed to strengthen the Navy in

keen to exp ort state o f the art weapons and

East Pakistan by supplying small shallow craft for

equipment to offset domestic economic decline and

riverine patrols. The patrol craft could not be

balance of payment difficulties, both of which were

delivered until after the establishment of Bangladesh,

being aggravated by rising oil prices. Concurrently, when the contract was amended. In subsequent

extensive plans were initiated for oil substitutes and

years, China supplied the Pakistan Navy with

diversification o f oil supplies. The number of new

hydrofoil torpedo boats, gunboats, missile boats and

producers increased. Soon supply exceeded demand,

large patrol craft.*

prices fell and the crisis shifted from the consumers

In the years after the 1971 war, the Pakistan Navy

to the producers.

acquired one more Daphne class submarine, two

In 1973 also, America decided to create a Quick

Agosta class submarines and Atlantic maritime

Reaction Force to deal with crises in the Persian Gulf.

patrol aircraft from France, frigates and anti

The Russian Navy symbolised its presence when it

submarine Seaking helicopters from Britain and

helped to clear m ines in the Red Sea. In 1974, destroyers on loan from America.

Russian influence started building up in Somalia and

the Russian Navy helped in clearing the Suez Canal of

mines.

TRANSITION TO TR IUM PH /19

The 1965 Indo Pakistan War

Preamble

Kashmir issue. Then there w as the dilemma of two

members of the same British Commonwealth being

The analyses of all wars and all naval operations at war with one another.* In fact Britain, America arid invariably reveal facets which caused confusion and

Canada declared on embargo on 14 September on all

facets of great achievement. From the records

supplies of m ilitary eq u ip m en t and stores to both presently available of events in 1965, two general

India and Pakistan. Soon th erea fter, France and

features stand out prominently:

Sweden im posed a s im ila r e m b a rg o . In a wider perspective, declaration o f w a r cou ld have invited

•

1965 was the first time after independence in

G reat Pow er in v o lv e m e n t an d U n ite d Nations 1947 that the Cabinet, the Ministry of Defence,

intervention.

the Chiefs of Staff Committee and the Services

For the N avy, th e e v e n ts o f 1965 yielded H eadquarters came face to face with the

invaluable lessons. Many o f the shortcomings were

procedural realities of war and its international

im plications. Every single personage and

remedied before the 1971 war. Many o f the inherent

institution had to carefully feel the way forward.

contradictions o f “b e in g at w a r w ith o u t formally There were no precedents to go by. Expectedly,

declaring war" re-surfaced during naval operations in there was considerable confusion. Had the war

1971.

been longer, many grey areas would have

progressively clarified. Instead, its short

The Dramatis Personae in the 1965 War

duration perm itted achievem ents to be

General J N Chaudhuri w as th e C h ie f o f the Army exaggerated and shortcomings to be subsumed.

Staff and Chairman o f the Chiefs o f S taff Committee.

•

The second feature was the clear determination of

both the Indian and Pakistan Governments to

Vice Admiral B S Soman was the C h ief o f the Nava

localise the war, to desist from attacks on cities

Staff. Air Marshal Arjan Singh was the Chief of the Air and non-m ilitary targets and to, anticipate

Staff. Rear Admiral BA Samson was the Flag Officer

reciprocity in not sinking each other’s merchant

Commanding Indian Fleet (FOCIF).

ships. This too created confusion. In the

Mr Lai Bahadur Shastri w as the Prime Minis er.

doctrines prevalent at that time, the Armed

Mr Y B Chavan was the Defence Minister. Mr Swar

Forces were trained to go all out in war. They

Singh was the Foreign Minister.

e

were not accustomed to the political niceties of

In the Ministry of Defence, Mr P V R Rao was tn

only one or two Services fighting and the third

Defence Secretary, Mr HC Sarin w as the Secretary

service being confined to defensive action within

Defence Production, Mr GL Sheth was the Additionn

geographical limits. The media on both sides

Secretary and Mr DD Sathe was a Joint S ecretary->

were sensationalising the achievements of their

LK Jha was the P rin cip a l S e c re ta ry to the Pr respective Arm ed Forces. For all practical

Minister. Mr CP Srivastava, the Private S e c r e t a i y ^

purposes. India and Pakistan were actually at

the Prime M inister, p u b lis h e d h is m e m o i r s war with each other Indeed, in his broadcast on

Bahadur S h a stri” in 1996. M r RD Prad h an .

6 September, President Ayub Khan of Pakistan

Private Secretary to the Defence Minister, publis

stated that Pakistan was at war. But n e t t E Z

his memoirs “Debacle to Revival” in 1999.

Government o f India nor of Pakistan formally

declared war . thereby increasing the confusion

Pakistan’s Plan

With hindsight, it is clear that the internlav of

The picture that emerges from published

sources and m em oirs is o f an a g g r e s s i v e P

comprising three m ajor operations n a m e d

affair. Pakistan wanted to Internationa T s ^ t h l Hawk, Gibraltar and Grand Slam.

The first phase, Operation Desert Hawk, to be

massive attack with Patton tanks on Punjab to

launched in early 1965, was a probing encounter to

capture Amritsar and as much Indian territory as

claim territory in the Rann of Kutch, where the

possible for eventual exchange after the cease fire.

boundary had not y et been demarcated. This

Since none of the foregoing was known to India at

operation was meant to serve several purposes. First

the time, India’s responses to these unfolding events

to assess. In dia’s responses. Next to draw India’s provide insights into the why’s and wherefore’s of the military forces southward to Kutch, away from the

Indian Navy’s actions in 1965.

Punjab. Thirdly to give Pakistani military forces a dress rehearsal for a full scale invasion of India later The Intrusion in Kutch - Operation Desert

in the year, initially in Kashmir and thereafter in Hawk - April 1965

Punjab. Fourthly to test how far America was serious

in enforcing its ban on the use of American supplied

The Rann of Kutch is a marshy area about 300 miles

Patton tanks and other military equipment for an

long and 50 miles wide on the western seaboard of

attack on India.

India. The incident started in January 1965 with

Concurrently with this first phase, the training

Pakistan claiming the entire Rann of Kutch on the

was to be started of about 30,000 men in guerrilla

grounds that Sind, one of Pakistan’s provinces, used

and sabotage activities. These men were to be formed

to exercise administrative control over the area

in ten ‘G ib ra lta r’ forces, each commanded by a during the British period. This was one of the many

Pakistani Army officer ,and comprising six units of

undemarcated areas pending since partition in 1947.

five com panies o f 110 men per company. Each

Pakistan was keen to have at least the northern

company com prised regu lar troops of the Azad

portion of the Rann, which it had earmarked for

Kashmir Army, which was part of the Pakistan Army,

offshore drilling with the help of an American oil

along with Mujahid (volunteers for a jehad) and

company. India asserted that Kanjarkot, Chadbet

Razakar (defen ders o f the faith) irregulars.The

and Biarbet, which Pakistan claimed, belonged to

Gibraltar Forces were placed under the command of a

India and not to Pakistan.

Major General of the Pakistan Army who was also

Operation Desert Hawk started with skirmishes

commanding a division of regular troops.

between Indian police patrols and Pakistani border

The second phase. Operation Gibraltar was to

guards about an eighteen mile track, a mile and a

commence in early August 1965 and envisioned

half inside Indian territory where Pakistani forces

several stages. Infiltrators would penetrate sixty

established two posts. By early April, the fighting had locations throughout Kashmir and at each location

spread to within 10 miles of the fort at Kanjarkot. On initiate terror,a rson , murder, destroy bridges,

9 April, Pakistan forces in brigade strength attacked

communications and government property. After a

the Central Reserve Police manned Sardar post near

the old ruined fort of Kanjarkot. The CRPF contingent

few days o f la rge scale damage, it would be

was forced to withdraw. The task of sanitising the

announced over a new radio station called ‘Voice of

area was then taken over by the Army. The Indian

Kashmir’ that the people of Kashmir had risen in

Army asked the Pakistan Army to vacate Kanjarkot.

revolt. In due course, after describing the success of The Pakistan Army refused. On 16 April, Pakistan

the p eo p le’s u prisin g, the radio station would claimed Kanjarkot to be Pakistan territory. On 24

announce the formation of a National Government.

April, Pakistan launched a division size attack, using

Concurrently, the Pakistan Government would deny

Patton tanks and field guns. The attack was

the Indian Government’s allegations of infiltration

contained with considerable casualties on both sides.

and label as aggression the Indian Army s crossing

When the incident had started, the British Prime

the Cease Fire Line into Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

Minister initiated moves to secure a cease-fire.

to stop further infiltration.

During the Commonwealth Heads of Government

Towards end August, the Pakistan Army woul

conference in London, he succeeded in his efforts, A

launch the third phase Operation Grand Slam. This

simple cease fire was declared on 29 April. On 15

Would be a large scale attack across the India

June fighting erupted again. On 30 June, a formal

Pakistan international boundary into the Chamb

cease fire was signed in London restoring India’s

area in order to capture Akhnoor and cut India s only

police control over the disputed areas while allowing

road link with Kashmir. Pakistan would allege that

the Pakistan police the use of the disputed track.

this was a response to India’s aggression across the

Both the national and the international press

cease fire line. After the successful launch of the commented adversely on fhe performance of the

thrust to Akhnoor, the Pakistan Army would launch a.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/21

Indian troops. Though the Army did not fare as badly

largely unstated, b u t it w as caused k

as Pakistan claimed, Pakistan did make local gains.

generated by the gradual change in I n ? fricti<>n Logistics favoured Pakistan. It had an airfield at over the K a s h m ir is s u e . I n P ak ist

SN

Badin where it had deployed F 86 Sabre fighter

becoming increasingly evident that T ^ ’ U *as

aircraft. And Pakistan had deployed its Army in force

to do a v o lte fa c e on it s com m it™ Want«l

- an infantry division and two regiments of tanks,

plebiscite in Kashm ir. T h is was c l e a f

to

including the Patton tanks recently received from

pronouncement o f its leaders and bv

m t‘he

America. India protested to America against the use

cfnnc

+

C __xi- -

.

"

Drar]

steps in itia te d fo r the in c o rp o ra tlo ^ ^ 31

of these Am erican supplied arms and Am erica

r

d isputed te rrito ry in the In d ia n Uni" °fthe protested to Pakistan. Nothing much happened.

nrpHnminnnt inemr in

1

_

Oil'.

predominant view in Pakistan w as that 7 n ' ^

On the naval side, no encounter occurred. Early

was done to thwart India’s efforts, she w o u ft

in 1965, the Indian Fleet had visited Bahrein and

emboldened to proceed ahead with her nlancf

Kuwait as planned. The aircraft carrier VIKRANT had

the assim ilation o f the sta te into its territor!

carried out a routine cooperation exercise with the

Lack o f any response on Pakistan’s part it was

Army in the Kutch area. When the skirmish occurred,

feared, would enable the Indians to strengthen

some ships were on routine assignments on both

their claim over the State as time passed."

coasts and in the Andamans. Most ships were in

Bombay undergoing maintenance in preparation for

In Ju n e, a fo rm a l c e a s e fir e agreement was the annual exercises in the Bay of Bengal for the

arrived at, e ffe c tiv e fro m 1 J u ly . It provided for duration of the southwest monsoon. The aircraft

ministerial level talks which, if they did not produce a carrier had disembarked her air squadrons and was

compromise, would be follow ed by reference of the on her way back to Bombay for docking. When

Kutch issue to a tribunal to demarcate the boundaiy.

Pakistan intruded in Kutch, she was ordered to sail

The ministerial m eeting never took place - Pakistan

back and reembark her aircraft. By the time she had

did not reply to India’s communications -so a tribunal

done so, the cease fire had been declared. This delay

was ap p o in ted . T h e t r ib u n a l u p h eld by 2 to 1

in her docking was to result in the carrier not being

Pakistan’s claim to the northern h a lf o f the Rann and available for operations later in the year.

awarded 10 p e rc e n t o f th e d isp u ted territory to The official history of the Pakistan Navy titled

Pakistan.

Story OfThe Pakistan Navy 1947 - 1972’ states-*

Mr Pradhan’s memoirs state:**

-In March 1965 the Indian Navy, having

“After the cease-fire on the Rann o f Kutch, the

completed a series of exercises off Bombay and

Indian army had started m oving troops to their

Cochin, sent their aircraft carrier and a number

battle locations with the object o f r e s t r a i n i n g any of destroyers and frigates on a goodwill visit to the

Pakistani adventure in the Punjab or in Jammu

other units fro m

UP wiin

and Kashmir. H ow ever for w ant o f intelllge^

extensive exerric^c

i

carried out

assessm ent, the m o vem en t w a s c o n s i d e r a ^

extensive exercises off Kutrh

slow. During March and April 1965, the

M u d e d anti s

u

t a

^

^

S

S

T S

v a lle y

w as

sim m ferin g

w ith

anti- n

photo recce missions by carrier borne aircraft

This appears to have been a nrelnHp ♦« « ? -

p rop a ga n d a .

In M a y 1965, the

go ve rn m e n t w a s fo r c e d to

operations in which the aircraft

f

h

wc40 iUl LtU LU *r e a r *r -

e-s t S&e^

important role in traninnrt-

played an

Abdullah. There were protests and agi*a

^ time

t0

> » « of

and the Pakistani haw ks decided that the

support base tor operations In the area

“ 8

was ripe to launch a g u e rrilla type °Pera^tiofl In Karachi, COMPAK arrived snrtH

,

Ja m m u and K a s h m ir n am ed

Oper

afternoon and enquired how soon ^

y ° ne

Gibraltar’."

proceed to sea. All available shin*

S ° 0uld

Pakistan’s incursion into Kutch r o u s e d s ^

ready and proceeded to sea , f P! Were made

leelings amongst the people of. India. They ha

^

the Rann o f Kutch o p e r a t o r ^

later for

memories of the humiliation India had s u f f e r e

* #

Prel“Ade t°t K,eSeptember 1965 WarW

W&S 3

bands of the Chinese in 1962. The o p p o s i t i o n P

j

k t u a

feature of the 19rr i

alleged that Prim e M in ister S h astri h a d n o ^

both its genesis and its outcome L

WaS 0131

• S ^ a u ! ----------------------- Z !™ 6 have remained flrmly enough.Several considerations appea *

. M

** Page 250.

^ g lg h e d with the Prim e M in is te r in h a n ^ n ^

22/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Kutch crisis. Mr C P Srivastava was the Private

should the operation to march into Lahore be

Secretary to the Prime Minister in 1965. His memoirs

launched or not? The arrangement I made with

“Lai Bahadur ShastrT, state:*

Shri Y B Chavan, who was then the Defence

“At the back of his mind was always the firm

Minister, was that if such a contingency arose, he

advice of the Army Chief that an escalation of

would send me a message indicating the date by

fighting in the Rann of Kutch area was. tactically,

which the Prime Minister must get back because

not in the country’s interest and that if there had

we were about to move forward. However the

contingency did not arise.

to be a tria l o f stren gth between India and

“In fact I recall, and it might be useful for the

Pakistan, it should be elsewhere.”

record, a meeting between Prime Minister Shastri

Mr L K Jha, the Principal Secretary to the Prime

and President Ayub during the Commonwealth

Minister in 1965, recalls:

Conference session. It was a private meeting and I

was there. Ayub said somewhat patronisingly “

“I was in volved with some o f the overall

You know, your chaps tried to commit aggression

considerations which were guiding the war effort

on our territory, our chaps gave them a few

and meetings of the Emergency Committee of the

knocks and they began to flee”. Then Shastriji

Cabinet as'well as the Secretaries where some

said “Mr President, you are a General. I have no

aspects were viewed largely from the political

military knowledge or experience. But do you

point o f view but equally from an operational

think if I had to attack Pakistan. I would choose a

point of view.

terrain where we have no logistic support and you

“Now, first o f all, the attempt on our part was

have all the advantages? Do you think I would

to keep the whole thing confined, territorially as make such a mistake or any of my Generals

well as otherwise, to a local conflict, rather than would allow me to make that mistake?” And one

allow it to assume the character o f an Indo -Pak could see from the face of President Ayub that

War. This was the prime objective o f our policy - it this thought startled him. Because quite

had been in the past also. But at the same time, obviously he had been led to believe, in my

we had come to realise that fighting on terrain

judgment by Bhutto, that the Indians had

chosen by the enemy would always leave you at a

attacked in the Rann of Kutch. And he was firmly

disadvantage. This came out very, very vividly

of that view until this question was posed by

during the Rann of Kutch affair when Pakistan

Shastriji. I could see him visibly pause and not

had all the logistic advantage and we had a

pursue the point any further”.•*

tremendous problem in getting men, material and

Mr C P Srivastava’s memoirs state:"**

supplies moving to the front.

“A t that very time, a political decision had

“Why was air power not deployed in the Rann of

been taken that we would not fight with our hands

Kutch conflict? Air Chief Marshal Aijan Singh

tied behind our backs and therefore a plan fo r

told me the reason. He said that soon after the

opening a second front in the Punjab by marching

commencement of hostilities in the Rann of Kutch

into Lahore had been drawn up and perfected. But region, he received a telephone call from Air

it was not launched because a cease fire came

Marshal Asghar Khan, his counterpart in

into existence, and we naturally hpped that some

Pakistan, suggesting an informal agreement that

peaceful way o f resolving the Rann of u c

neither side should employ the Air Force in the

dispute would be evolved and in fact it went o

conflict. Arjan Singh him self agreed on the an international body to settle.

wisdonj of this proposal but he confirmed the

“ But even when there was the state oi

arrangement after receiving political clearance

uncertainty, a kind of simple cease flrewimout

from the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister.

any formal agreement, the Commonweal

Aijan Singh was also of the opinion that the Rann

M in ister’s C onference was taking p a^e

of Kutch was not a suitable area for large-scale

London. Shastriji went to London and wen

operations by India.

“Shastri was a man o f peace and he was

him. And w hen going, there was c0£ c®**

determined to go to the farthest extent possible.

supposing things hotted up in our a s

*

Page 198.

** Blueprint to Bluewater page 420.

•** Page 199

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/23

consistent with national security and honour, to

in 1962, the Arm y’s hands were more than full

maintain peace with Pakistan.

the In dian N avy had b een c h a rg e d with th*

garrisoning of the Andaman and Nicobar islands i

Another consideration seems to have been Prime

1965, the Navy was respon sible for the defence

Minister Shastri’s belief that it would be easier to

these islands.

0

make up with Pakistan, the people of which were of

Not the least o f Prime M inister Shastri’s worries

the same stock as Indians, than to make up with

was the internal situation - the likelihood of Hindu

China. He was in favour of peace. And if war was

Muslim riots, the d ifferen ces o f opinion, between forced upon India then, whilst reacting in whatever

political parties and w ithin the Cabinet, on howto manner India thought fit. the conflict should be

deal w ith P a k is ta n ’s b e llic o s it y and the no -

localised as far as possible.

confidence m otions in P arliam en t at a time when Yet another consideration seems to have been the

there was a pressing need for greater unity.

international political climate. After Russia s open

clash with China, Russia began to be more friendly

Naval Movements Between M ay and August

with her neighbors Turkey, Iran and Pakistan, who

1965

were still members of American led military alliances

directed against Russia. In trying to woo Pakistan,

The ‘Story of the Pakistan Navy’ states:*

Russia appears to have been influenced by the

prospect of Pakistan getting closer to China. Russia

“A fter the Rann o f K u tch

o p era tio n s, the

invited President Ayub Khan. He visited Moscow in

Pakistan Navy’s ships went to sea frequently and

April 1965 during the Rann of Kutch conflict and

carried out in ten sive m an eu vers. Changes of

India noticed that Russia tended to take a neutral

formation from surface to anti aircraft disposition

position in the conflict. It was reluctant to say were carried out while long periods were spent

an yth in g in pu blic when it was tryin g to woo p a trollin g o ff K a ra ch i. E x e rc is e s continued Pakistan. India also came to know that Russia was

throughout the monsoons. In August, all leave

considering President Ayub Khan’s request for arms.

was stopped in the fleet and preparations were

Prim e M inister Shastri visited Russia soon after made for possible hostilities’ .

President Ayub Khan. Russian leaders reassured him

The Indian Fleet sailed for the Bay of Bengal

that they were trying to wean Pakistan away from

in end June. No directive had been received from

military pacts as well as from China and if they were

successful, India would benefit more than Russia.

G overnm ent to p rep a re fo r w ar. It had been There was also the lurking threat from China.

arranged for a British submarine to be a v a ila b le After the Sino Pakistan border treaty in 1963, China’s

off Madras in July for anti subm arine training,

Prime Minister Chou En Lai had made a state visit to

after which it was planned that ships of the F le e

Pakistan in 1964.This was followed by a state visit by vis it

the

A n d a m a n s,

C a lc u tta

an

President Ayub Khan to China in March 1965.

Visakhapatnam.

And there was Indonesia, whose relations with

India had deteriorated after the Bandung Conference

The Intrusions in Kashmir - Operation

o f 1955. The Communist Party of Indonesia had

Gibraltar - August 1965

come to power and had close links with Communist

China. In the end 1950’s, the strength o f the

It is clear from Pakistani published sources

In don esian Navy had increased substantially.

mid May, six weeks before signing the formal cea ^

Between 1959 and 1965, Russia gave Indonesia one

fire in London, President A yu b Khan w as g ivenng cruiser, fourteen destroyers, fourteen submarines,

military presentation on Operation Gibraltar. ^ rlon

eight anti submarine patrol vessels, twenty missile

the presen tation , at his b e h e s t, the assau

^

boats and several motor torpedo boats and gunboats

Akhnoor was included in Operation Grand Slam- ^

In don esia had arrived at a mutual defence

accorded approval for O p eration G ib ra lta r ° fCe arrangem ent with Pakistan. Indonesian leaders

launched. In end J u ly, he a d d re s s e d the F°

started voicing claims to Great Nicobar which was

Commanders of Operation Gibraltar.

* -ne

closest to Sumatra and wanting the Indian Ocean to

The first infiltration across the Cease F i r e ^

be renamed as the Indonesian Ocean.

(CFL) started on 1 August over a 700 kilometer

After China’s attack on India’s northern frontiers

from Kargil to Chhamb. The Indians a s well as

• Page 215.

"

------------- ------- ------------

local Kashmiris were taken by surprise._____

24/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Operation Gibraltar commenced on 5 August.

Sixty companies o f Pakistani armed personnel in

Mr PVR Rao, the Defence Secretary in 1965,

stated in his 1972 USI Lecture:

disguise, arm ed w ith modern weapons and

explosives, infiltrated across the cease fire line to

‘The firm decision that the Army should cross the

blow up strategic bridges, raid supply dumps, kill Cease Fire Line to root out the infiltrator’s bases VIP's and cause arson. On 5 August itself, some and, in case Pakistan regular forces intervened,

infiltrators were apprehended.

our forces should be fre e to retaliate at any In his foreword to Air Marshal Asghar Khan’s

suitable place o f their choice was taken on the

book T h e F irst R ou n d ’ , Mr A lta f Gauhar, then night o f the 13th August by the Prime Minister,

Pakistan’s Secretary oflnformation and Broadcasting

when the Defence Minister and certain officials,

states:*

including the Chief of the Army Staff were present.

These decisions were taken on the request o f the

"The truth is that the first four volunteers who Chief of the Army Staff that to check infiltration, were captured by the Indians described the whole

the infiltrators' bases should be destroyed and in

plan in a b roadcast on All India Radio on 8

any fight between regular forces, the Services

August 1965, n early a month before India

should not be restricted. Shri Lai Bahadur crossed the international boundary”.

Shastri was anxious to avoid any extension of the.

conflict but was determined that measures to

On hearing these broadcasts, Pakistan realised

liquidate infiltrators should be pursued

that their secret plan was now open knowledge.

vigorously. The Prime Minister gave expression

Mr C P Srivastava’s memoirs state:**

publicly to the decision taken at his speech from

"It was only on 8 August 1965 that more detailed

the Red Fort on the 15th August, when he

information about extensive infiltration by armed

declared that “ resort to the sword will be met

men from P ak istan was provided to Prime

with the sword’. And even as the speech was

Minister Shastri. He immediately summoned a

being made, our troops occupied certain posts

meeting o f the Em ergency Committee of the

across the Cease Fire Line near Kargil and, in the

Cabinet. The Chief of Army Staff attended this

following days, occupied various places across

the Cease Fire Line, including Haji Pir and

meeting. He assured the Prime Minister that the

destroyed the infiltrators’ hideouts. After giving

Army and the p olice were in control of the

the broad directive on the 13th August, the Prime

situation, the raiders were being rounded up but

Minister did not concern himself with the details

further sabotage could still occur by the raiders

of the operations. He left all operational decisions

not yet captured. The Prime Minister asked the

to be supervised by the Defence Minister, but I

Chief o f Arm y S taff to take whatever action he

used to report to the Prime M inister at his

considered

n ecessa ry

to

prevent new

residence every evening the progress of the

infiltrations.”

operations”.

“On 9 August, as per its pre-arranged plan,

Pakistan announced a rebellion in Kashmir and

In Naval Headquarters in Delhi, the situation had

the heroic exploits o f the freedom fighters who

become quite vexed. With all the operational ships of

were helping them. It also reported receiving a

the Indian Fleet away in the East, the resources broadcast, by a secret radio station calling itself

available in Bombay were meagre. The frigate

as the ‘Voice of Kashmir’, of the setting up of a

TALWAR. which had been carrying out essential

Revolutionary Council to take over all authority

maintenance was hurriedly boxed up and sent for

in Kashmir. Within days however, it became clear

investigating the presence of possible enemy vessels

to the world that this was a propaganda hoax.

in the Kori Creek, a few miles southwest of the Indo

Soon even Pakistani newspapers ceased further

Pakistan border in the Gulf of Kutch.Her first patrol

Propaganda. By 11 August, the Pakistan Army

was for 5 days from 12 to 16 August, then again from

realised that Operation Gibraltar had flopped.

24th to 28 August. No encounter occurred.

From 15 August onwards, the Pakistan Army

From the East, the Flag Officer Commanding the

stepped up its violation of the cease fire line on

Indian Fleet (FOCIF). Rear Admiral B A Samson,

reading of the increasing tension in Kashmir, rang up

the Srinagar - Leh road”.

the Chief of the Naval Staff (CNS). Vice Admiral

page xii.

page 208.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/25

t a m m T ! AND KASHMIR

oNaushera

Rawalpindi o

Jbehnn o A , Akhnur

LEGEND

International Border

----------Line of Control

- -

Road fromPathankot toLch

----------Canal

o

100

ISO

200

ZM

_ 1 __

_L_

Som an, on more th a n o n e o c c a s io n and su ggested build up to retrieve the situation by launching the

that the Fleet r e tu r n to Bombay. He was told that the phase - Operation Grand Slam - to capture

Fleet sh ou ld a d h e r e to its programme of visitin g the Akhnoor and Amritsar. One major problem, which

Andam ans a n d C alcu tta.

could only be resolved with the approval of President Ayub Khan, was that this operation would require the

Operation Grand Slam - Septem ber 1965

Pakistan Army, to move across the international

Mr Pradhan’s book states:*

frontier between Sialkot and Jammu. President Ayub

gave his approval on 29 August. On 1 September,

"By the first week of August, the infiltrators had after heavy preparatory artillery fire, a column of

not achieved their objective. In order to raise the

seventy tanks and two brigades of troops drove

guerrilla’s morale and spark the support of the

towards Akhnoor bridge to cut off the supply line

local population, Pakistan undertook a limited

from Punjab to Kashmir.

offensive against Chhamb in the Jammu area. As

a counter offensive, in the northern sector, Indian

The Developments in Delhi

troops crossed the CFL and captured Kargil

Mr Pradhan’s memoirs state:**

Heights thus securing the safety of the Leh-

Srinagar road. Further, in order to hit the

“On 30 August, General Chaudhuri went to

infiltrators’ bases, India decided to cross the CFL

Srinagar for an on-the-spot assessment. He was

on the western sector and capture two strategic

due to return to Delhi on 1 September. That very

areas in POK, the H ajipur Bulge and the

morning at 3.45 am, Pakistan started the

Kishanganga Bulge. The operations began on 23

bombardment of India’s front positions. The

August and four days later, an Indian column led

blitzkrieg offensive was planned to exploit

by Major Ranjit Singh Dayal (later Lieutenant

Pakistani superiority in armour and heavy

General) m ade a final heroic assault and

artillery. ‘Operation Grand Slam’ caught the

captured the 18,600 feet high Hajipur pass. The

Indian commanders by surprise - a full scale war

Pakistanis were ill-prepared to defend these

had erupted”.

strategic areas in POK and the Indian offensive

“In the morning meeting on Wednesday, 1

unnerved them. By the end of August, Pakistan

September 1965, General Kumarmangalam said

had failed to achieve any success and President

16-days is the least (period) before Pak should

Ayub was under pressure to do something to

retaliate.

check the loss o f further territory and avoid

“The VCOAS’s assessment that sixteen days

military humiliation.

would be the minimum period before Pakistan

“Pakistan had limited options of regaining the

launched an attack showed how faulty both

initiative in Jammu and Kashmir except perhaps

military assessment and intelligence were”.

by crossing the CFL from the west in the Chhamb

Air Chief Marshal Aijan Singh recalls:

area. It offered m any advantages. It was

contiguous to Pakistani territory and was well

“In the Air Force, we were aware of the

connected to Pakistan’s rail and road network

seriousness of what was happening. We had

and the nearby cantonments of Sialkot, Kharian

thought it out. In my opinion and the Army may

and Jhelum . The plains sector of Ghhamb-

not accept it, the attack on Chamb Jaurian took

Akhnur, bein g suited to the use of armour,

the Army by surprise. It was a very strong attack

Pakistan could threaten the Akhnur bridge over

by the Pakistan Army. As far as I know, we only

■

the Chenab. All communications between India

had a Brigade plus. The main purpose of the

and its garrisons in Chhamb. Naushera, Rajaun

Pakistan Army was to capture Akhnoor Bridge,

and Poonch passed over this bridge. If Pakistan

the vital link between Jammu, Rajo-uri and

Poonch. If the Pakistanis had captured or

succeeded in capturing the bridge, it could cut o

destroyed Akhnoor Bridge, they would have cut

the logistic requirements of the Indian troops

the LOC and then there was no way of supplying

west of the Chenab and the valley itself.

that area except by air. That was their main aim

When Pakistan Army Headquarters found that

initially. After that, probably their attempt would

e tic*G was turning against them, pressure began to

have been to cut the Jammu, Udhampur and

Pafie 252 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/27

Srinagar road or interrupt the road traffic to the

Valley and in th e m o u n ta in s. They h

advantage over there. Our endeavour h ^ ^

valley.

“It was a big attack and our Army was quite

and it had been clearly and openly stat*

overw h elm ed by it.

The Pak istan is kept

before 1965, th at an y a tta ck by the P a k ^

advancing the whole day. General Chaudhuri

Army on Jammu and Kashmir will be cons'ri^

came to me first and said that he would like the

as an attack on In dia. T h is w as repeated^

A ir Force to p articip ate. I said “We have

Prime Minister Shastri even during August

discussed it. We will participate but I cannot do it

attacks w ere goin g on in J& K . S o m eh ow ^

unless it is a decision of the Government. Once

Pakistan A rm y did not qu ite take it serious^

you use the Air Force, then it widens the scope of

They thought that b ecau se they had attacked

war and that means all out war”. Then he and I

Chamb Jaurian which was a part o f Jammu and

went to Mr Chavan. At that time it was perhaps

Kashmir, India’s reaction will be only there and

an hour and a half before sunset. Things were

not somewhere else. But even for our own sake

g ettin g bad there and the Arm y were very

thank God we decided that Pakistan should be

concerned that during the night. Pakistan might

attacked somewhere else and not in Jammu and

do much dam age and advance fu rther and

Kashmir. You cannot tie the Arm y in a limited

probably even capture Akhnoor. I must also say

and difficult maintenance area and fight the war

that I'was very keen and the Air Force was very

aga in st P a k is ta n at p la c e s w h ic h are more keen that we should participate, otherwise, we

favourable to them .

C ham b Jaurian is near

felt, why have an Air Force? And I must say to his

Gujranwala and G u rd a sp u r and not far from

credit. Mr Chavan did not take more than five

Rawalpindi and Lahore. All the forces kept there

minutes to tell me to go ahead. He did not say

could help the Pakistan thrust. In our case, al

what should be done but he said “I leave it to you,

our troop s w e re s it t in g a ro u n d Pathankot, you do it the way you like. Attack where you like,

Am ritsar, F ero zp u r and A m b a la . They were

the way the Army wants it”.

involved in Kargil area and other high places, and

“We had only one air station at Pathankot

could hot be withdrawn easily. So that is how the

which was nearest to Chamb-Jaurian, the scene

decision to attack on the Lahore and Sialkot front

o f fighting, and we put up everything we had

was taken”.

readily available over there, about 20 aircraft or

1972,

so. We lost four aircraft, all Vampires. Vampires

In his 1972 USI National Security Lecture

were a bit out of date. However, though I felt sorry

Mr PVR Rao states:

to have lost them, but I thought the air attack was

“The a tta ck by P a k is ta n a t Cham b on

worth it because otherwise the Pakistan Army’s

morning of the 1st September came as a surPn^t

attack would not have been halted. It is

in its exact location and intensity. From a o

recognised by the Army also that from the time we

the 26th August, th ere w ere heavy Pak

attacked, the Pakistan troops did not move

forw ard. We probably did not do extensive

movements in this area under our con^^Utjiat

observation, but the A rm y had conclude ^

damage, but it put the fear of God into them, that

they were attacked from the air and probably

the attack would come further north. ^ ec^UrUSe

would be again attacked at night. We were not

this, though there was already a clearance

very good in attacking at night, but PAF may have

of the Air Force, there were no coordinate P ^

thought it otherwise. That attack was absolutely

W hen the Pak a tta c k ca m e th ro u g ’

essential and very useful in the whole operation

Chaudhuri was in Srinagar. He returns

because it stopped the Pakistan Army advancing

at about 4.30 p.m . and cam e straigh

aSjn

on to Akhnoor and cutting the only LOC to the

Defence Minister’s room, where a meetin

fof

Northern area.

progress. As he walked in, the General

just

“It was at about that time that we decided to

immediate air support, stating that he

^ efe

react at a place of our choice. Pakistan has been

come from Pathankot and the A ir ^ ? ^1

always keen to fight a war at places of its choice

was having the aircraft ready. Air Mars ^

That is obviously the right thing to do. Everybody

Singh agreed w ithout h esitation to g°

p S t0,

a war at his own safest choice

su pport, on ly p o in tin g o u t th a t in

^QsSes

Pakistan s endeavour has always been to get the

launched without adequate preparat o •

Army involved in a big way in Kashmir .Tn £ e must be accepted and th a t p ilo ts n1 p efeflcC

mistakes between friend and foe. The

28/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

M i n i s t e r agreed t h a t t h e a t t a c k mav go i n fo rth w ith ” .

Defence Minister to request the Indian Air Force

or ground support. The DM’s request came at 4 p

Mr C P Srivastava’s memoirs state:*

m. By 5.19 p m the Vampires at Pathankot were

airborne”.

“Shastri received information about the Pakistani

invasion by about midday over the telephone

Intense air battles took place over the next few

from G en eral C haudhuri, who was then in

ays between India’s Vampire. Mystere and Gnat

Srinagar and immediately convened a meeting of

aircraft and Pakistan’s American supplied Sabre and

the Emergency Committee of the Cabinet. While

Starfighter aircraft. The Pakistan Army had achieved

the C abinet C om m ittee was considering the

initial surprise at Chamb. By 2 September, they had

situation, General Chaudhuri reached New Delhi

occupied areas up to a depth of five miles. By 5

with the la te s t in form ation and made an

September, they were at a village called Jaurian, only

im portant proposal for the Prime Minister’s

20 miles from Jammu, on their way to the crucial

approval. G eneral Chaudhuri reported that

Akhnoor bridge over the River Chenab. The Air Force

although available Indian forces were putting up

halted the Pakistani columns at Jaurian.

resistance, the Pakistan Army, which had Patton

Regarding the developments on 4 September. Mr

Pradhan’s book states:***

tanks, was pushing ahead. Indian units did not

have matching armour and were thus not in a

“The loss of Akhnur would be a major disaster

position to stop the invasion. He said the

and Chavan decided to go ahead with an

situ ation was h azardou s and requested

operation that had been planned after the Rann

immediate support from the Air Force.

of Kutch incident. On 20 April. Shastri had

“.A similar situation had arisen in 1962 at the

declared before Parliament

“If Pakistan

time o f the Chinese invasion, when the question of continues to disregard reason and persists in its

the use o f the A ir Force had been considered in aggressive activities, our Army will defend the

order to halt the forw a rd rush o f the Chinese country and decide its own strategy and

Army. A t that time the Government had decided

employment of its manpower and equipment in

against the use o f the Air Force. On this occasion the manner it deems best.” General Chaudhuri,

however. Prime Minister Shastri decided that the

with the approval of the Defence Minister, had

Air Force should immediately go into action. He

worked out a plan code-named ‘Operation Riddle’

was conscious of the danger that the Pakistan Air

to launch an offensive action to secure the

Force m igh t bom b Indian cities or vital

eastern bank of the Ichhogil Canal. It was felt

installations but this was a danger that had to be

that the mere presence of the Indian troops on the

faced. The C abin et Com m ittee concurred.

canal opposite Lahore would draw Pakistani

D efence M in ister Y B Chavan conveyed the

forces from Sialkot and other areas and thus

reduce its offensive capabilities in other sectors.

decision to the Chief of the Air Staff. Air Marshal

Moreover, if India could establish a bridgehead

Arjan Singh, who replied that the Indian Air Force

over the canal, the Pakistan army would be forced

was ready”

to fight there and that would lead to the attrition

Air Chief Marshal P C Lai was the Vice Chief of the

of her smaller army. By basing the defence line

A>r Staff in 1965. His memoirs “My Years with the along the canal. India would confine the war to

•AF"' state:**

Pakistani territory in addition to acquiring a large

chunk of Pakistani territoiy. Operation 'Riddle*

The IAF w as kept inform ed of what was

was planned to meet an eventuality like the one

happening and was more or less ready for ground

the Indian’s were facing on 4 September”.

support but they could not give it till asked to o

so by the Government and by the Army.

The entry in Defence Minister Chavan’s diary on

Vam pire

aircraft had been moved

Tuesday. 7 September 1965 reads:****

u p from P o o n a to

Pathankot on the Air Force's own initiative on JO

“Morning Meeting-Army is doing well according

August.On the afternoon o f 1 S ep tem b er,

e

to plans. CAS gave further bad news of losses at

Arm y Chief. G eneral Chaudhuri. asked the

1.

page 224.

... ^ 1 2 7 .

j"ages 265 et seq.

Pages 272 et seq

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/29

allow things to escalate into a f u ll scale war Kalaikunda and over a base in West Pakistan.

“Bombing by both sides in East Pakistan has

mean war in the legal sense - between India and Pakistan.

created a problem. I told CAS to hold his hand in

East Pakistan. We do not want any wasteful

Adm iral Som an had in the meantime - ever escalation there. Politically also, it would be

since the in v o lv e m e n t o f th e A ir F orce - been unwise to do anything which might provoke

straining at the leash, saying ‘look, let me go into China at this moment. He (CAS) agreed .

a c t io n B u t again the same consideration which was acting as a restraint - on using the A ir Force or Mr Pradhan’s amplifying note states:

going into Lahore - prevailed. It was fe lt that if we now opened up another fro n t o ff Karachi, it would

“A d ifficu lt situation had arisen when the

become a major engagement and would no longer

Pakistan Air Force attacked Kalaikunda in West

be a matter o f localised conflict. So the decision Bengal. They also dropped some paratroops

was taken that the operation to march into Lahore

between Gauhati and Shillong in Assam. All of

would be launched but that the Navy would not be

them were captured.

involved.

"Chavan did not want any escalation in the

east and had advised CAS not to initiate any

“The Indian A rm y crossed the international

action on that side. H ow ever due to som e

border at Wagah on the m orning o f 6 December misunderstanding, the same day Canberras of

and headed f o r Lahore. President Ayub went on

the Eastern Air Command attacked Chittagong

the air. It was a very, very s tro n g and angry and Dacca airfields. In retaliation, the Pakistan

broa d ca st. A d m ira l S o m a n th o u g h t that the Air Force attacked .Indian bases at Kalaikunda,

opening o f the Lahore fro n t meant that a no holds Bagdogra and Calcutta h ittin g a num ber o f

barred situation had come and he, I think, issued aircraft on the ground”.

a signal that we were at war with Pakistan. This signal had to be countermanded, because we did

Mr L K Jha recalls:*

not want to go to that stage so soon. But still we realised that the Navy had the capability and if the

“When the conflict started in the Jammu area of

events so necessitated, I don't think there would Kashmir and their tanks came into our territory

have been too long a hesitation to use it. But the where our tanks could not easily go because the

feelin g was strong that i f we could contain the bridges were not strong enough, there was a real

Pakistani fo rc e s and h old them on land, then dilemma. Air Marshal Arjan Singh and General

perhaps it w ould be w iser n ot to g e t the Navy Chaudhuri were present at a meeting to discuss

involved. I knew that the N a vy was not

things where we all turned to Arjan and asked

happy

him whether he could take on the Pak tanks from

with this decision because they were very anxious

the air. Now there was a great deal o f hesitation, to go into action. ”

again on the basic policy o f keeping the conflict as A d m ira l Som an r e c a lls th e d e ta ils o f the narrow-based as possible and in not involving the

constraint placed on the Navy and what he did abou

Air Force. Whether to bring in the Air. Force was a it:**

matter where a very crucial decision was involved

but there seemed to be no other alternative. Arjan

“ One m orning, I received a file sign ed by

agreed to take the Pak tanks on at very short

Sarin, ICS, (then Secretary Defence ^ro^uCJi? 1

e

notice without any prior preparation and even in

saying “the Navy is not to operate north o f ^

the late afternoon.

la

w tiitiud

u e

c ofi Por

t-'o ba

ro nd

an ar

aa ,

r, and

a is aliso not

u to

^ take

“It was still being thought of as a local battle.

initiate offensive action at sea against

+VlP

But we realised that the terrain where we were

unless forced to do so by offensive aci

fighting was one where we were much more

P

r ak

K fo

t rces.’ If I

I rem em ber co rrectly.

vulnerable and communication depended on a

Defence Secretary, Shri P V R Rao, ICS, a n d ^

ccuple of bridges - if they were blown up, v/e just Defence Minister, Shri Y B Chavan. were o u •

wou:.d be com pletely cut off. And therefore

Delhi at that time. I rang up Sarin and told n

thought turned to using the plan which had been

that I could not accept that order and was seeej

e^'lter evolved fo r marching into Ixxhore. But even the Defence M inister as soon as he r e t u r n

then it was a very firm decision that we would not which was the very next day.

3 O 0 M N S m O N TO TRIUMPH

"When I saw Chavan he said that he was

to be annoyed and told me ‘ You have no choice \

sorry that even after the Chinese debacle in 1962,

I then asked him whether he had any objection to

the Navy had continued to be overlooked and as

my seeing the Supreme Commander of the Armed

such it would perhaps be better if the Navy did not Forces meaning the President. He smiled and

go looking fo r trouble. I said that while I was most politely said “ No, you do not have to see him”.

grateful to him for having appreciated that we

were at that tim e the stepchild of the

Mr PVR Rao, the Defence Secretary, recalls:

Governm ent, non p articip ation by us in an

aggressive manner in this war would not only

“I was Secretary at the time and have not signed

any such order. The Additional Secretary was not

adversely affect the morale of the service but the

concerned with operational matters. What the

Navy’s image in the public would go down the

Admiral has stated was substantially the

drain. He mentioned the fact o f the aircraft carrier Government decision. It was communicated in

being in the dock and the responsibilities assigned writing at best in the minutes of the Defence

to the Navy f o r the defence o f the Andaman and

Minister’s morning meeting, which were issued

Nicobar Islands fro m a possible and probable

by Shri DD Sathe, Joint Secretary, after the

attack from Indonesia which, in the Government’s

minutes were approved by me."

order o f priorities, was more crucial than naval operations against Pakistan.

Mr Pradhan’s memoirs reproduce the entry in

“I assured him that I was fully aware of these

Defence Minister Chavan’s diary on 11 September

im plication s o f the N avy’s operations and

1965:*

respon sibilities. MYSORE had already been

“Morning meeting gave some hopeful and

deployed in that area and all that I was asking for

encouraging glimpse of the situation on the front.

was to leave the Navy to plan and do what it can

“Had discussions in the presence of the PM with

in an a ctive m anner instead of remaining

CNS (Admiral SM Nanda). Necessary orders were

passive. Finally the Defence Minister said that

given.

even the Prim e M inister, Shri Lai Bahadur

“Had a talk with CNS about his plans. He is

Shastri, did not want the conflict to escalate at

rather too keen to do something. I had to restrain

sea and th at w as that. I requested him for

him”.**

permission to see the Prime Minister so that I

could convince him o f what I felt strongly about

Naval Operations in September 1965

and he readily agreed.

"W hen I ca lle d on the Prim e Minister, he The Pakistan Navy’s Role and Deployments

brought up the same two points - the Navy had not

The Pakistan Navy comprised one cruiser (BABUR),

been strengthened since the Sino Indian conflict

one submarine (GHAZI). seven destroyers/frigates

and its resp on sib ilities in the Andaman and (KHAIBAR. BADR. JAHANGIR. ALAMGIR. TUGHRIL.

Nicobar area were more important than in the

SHAHJAHAN. TIPPU SULTAN) and one tanker

Arabian Sea. I told him that it was wrong in (DACCA). Of these, one destroyer (TUGHRIL) was

principle to tie dow n one arm o f the Defence under refit. The remaining ships comprised the

Services to passive action in a war situation. It Pakistan Flotilla. The Pakistan Air Force had B 57

should have the freedom to act offensively so long

Canberra bombers. F 86 Sabre fighters and maritime

as it did not bite off more than it could chew. When reconnaissance aircraft operating from Karachi.

he brought up the question oi the undesirability

The Story of the Pakistan Navy states:***

of any escalation of the war at sea , I reminded

•‘The role assigned to the Pakistan Navy was the

him o f w hat happened to Germany on a few

maritime defence of Pakistan. This included the

occasions in the two World Wars when they kept

following tasks - the seaward defence of the ports

their fleets bottled up. I added that I was sure

of Pakistan, keeping the sea lanes of

that had they used their Navy fully, from the start

communication open, escorting merchant ships,

of the wars, the history of the world would have

protection of coasts against amphibious assaults.

been different, however much the rest of the

world disliked this possibility. On this he seemed

page 277.

The CNS in 1965 was Vice Admiral Soman. Rear Admiral

name

The Defence M inister had inadvertently written the w^ong Nanda was Managing Director o f Mazagon Docks in laoo-Pages 216 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/31

interdiction of shipping and assisting the army in

the riverine operations in East Pakistan”.

the area in addition to enemy air threat. The task

‘The surface units were deployed as one force

group refueled from their tanker and arrived off

to patrol on an arc 100 miles from Karachi to

warka at midnight. Dwarka was blacked out

achieve concentration of force, provide seaward

and could only be identified on radar.

defence and attack the enemy as one group”.

Bombardment commenced at 0024 at ranges

between 5 and 6 miles and finished four minutes

"The su b m arin e GHAZI was sailed on 2

later, each ship having fired 50 rounds. Shortly

September to patrol off Bombay and instructed to

thereafter, Pakistan Air Force aircraft attacked

attack only the heavy units of the Indian Navy i.e.

Dwarka after receiving clearance by a green

VIKRANT, M YSORE and DELHI. She was in

Verey s light. The task group withdrew at full

position by the morning of 5 September.”

speed. During the withdrawal, BABUR picked up

T h e S tory o f the Pakistan Navy’ states the

several aircraft contacts on her surface radar.

following reasoning for the Dwarka operation:*

Ships were ordered to engage any aircraft that

came within gun range and some ships did open

“The Indian Navy, with considerable numerical

fire. The task group resumed patrol on the 100

su periority, w as bottled up in harbour due

mile arc by sunrise".

mainly to our subm arine’s presence in their

“After the Dwarka operation, the Pakistan

waters. This situation afforded an opportunity to

Flotilla continued patrolling the 100 mile arc.

the Pakistan Navy to carry out an offensive action

Very little happened. On one occasion, on 20

against Dwarka without any hindrance from the

September, five radar contacts were seen near

Indian Navy. The Dwarka bombardment was

Kori Creek

and ships were detached to

undertaken for the following reasons - to draw the

investigate and take action. Later the five ships

heavy enem y u n its out o f Bombay for the

retreated southwards.”

subm arine to attack, to destroy the radar

The Indian Navy’s Role and Deployments

installation at Dwarka, to lower Indian morale

and to divert Indian air effort away from the

The Indian Navy comprised one aircraft carrier, two

north”.

cruisers, nineteen destroyers /frigates and one

“On 6 Septem ber, the Pakistan Flotilla

tanker. Of these 23 ships, 10 were under refit at

Bombay - the carrier (VIKRANT), one cruiser (DELHI),

received the news that the Indian Army had

three destroyers (RAJPUT, RANA and GANG A), two

attacked across the international border in the

frigates (TRISHUL and BETWA), three ships (the

Lahore area and ships sailed for their pretraining frigate KISTNA and survey ships DARSHAK

assigned war stations. Thereafter, they remained

and SUTLEJ). The tanker (SHAKTI) was barely

at sea almost continuously till 27 September.

servicable. Training frigate TIR was in the Andamans.

Simultaneously the Naval Control of Shipping

Survey ship INVESTIGATOR and landing ship

Organisation was activated which took effective

MAGAR were in Visakhapatnam. Two Hunt class

control of Pakistan merchant ships. An embargo

destroyers (GODAVARI and GOMATI) were at

was declared on all merchant ships carrying

Cochin. One cruiser (MYSORE), one destroyer

warlike stores for India. The C in C directed the

(RANJIT), and six frigates ( BRAHMAPUTRA. BEAS,

Chairman IWTA to seal off all river routes used by

TALWAR. KHUKRI, KUTHAR and KIRPAN) comprised

Indian stea m ers tra n sitin g through East

the Indian Fleet. The Seahawk and A lize air

Pakistan and to seize all such vessels and their

squadrons, which had disembarked from the aircraft

cargo. All these measures, implemented without

carrier for the duration of her refit, were distributed delay, caused severe losses to the enemy in

between Bombay, Goa and Cochin. Indian Air Force

valuable cargo, ships and river craft”.

Liberator aircraft were available for maritim e

“On the afternoon of 7 September, Pakistan

reconnaissance.

Naval H ea d q u a rters directed a task group,

The Indian Navy's role was the maritime defence

comprising the cruiser ( BABUR), five destroyers (

of the Western and Eastern coasts and the island

KHAIBAR, BADR, JAHANGIR, ALAMGIR and

territories. The tasks envisaged were first to cany out SHAHJAHAN) and a frigate (TIPPU SULTAN), to

sweeps off the west coast of Pakistan to disrupt the

bonibard Dwarka the same night and added that

port of Karachi and inflict vital damage on port

one or two enemy frigates may be encountered in

installations if ordered, next the destruction of

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/33

Pakistan naval forces if ordered, third provision of

Seahawks because the A ir Force had become

general support for the defence of the major ports on

committed in the air battles in the North.

y

the west coast and fourth, the provision of general

After the Indian Arm y crossed the internat'

and protection to our merchant ships in the

cover ana pruictuun ^

------------

*

border on 6 September, a signal was intercepted f ^

Arabian Sea. especially those plying to and from the

Pakistan Naval H eadquarters to all Pakistan nav^

Persian Gulf and the Red Sea. After the Government’s

u n its to e x e c u te O p e r a tio n R esp o n se, which directive to abstain from offensive action, these tasks apparen tly referred to in stru ctio n s to commence boiled down to defending territory in the Andaman,

hostilities. The CNS, Admiral Soman, issued a signal

Nicobar, Laccadive and Minicoy groups of islands and

to all naval units and formations stating that war had

defending the major ports o f Bombay, Goa and

broken out with Pakistan and all measures were to be

Cochin on the west coast of India.

im m ediately- a d o p te d

fo r n e u tr a lis in g any

On 1 September, when the P a k ista n A rm y

m isad ven tu re on th e p a rt o f th e Pakistan Navy.

crossed the international border and advanced

Within 10 m inutes o f this signal being issued, the towards Akhnoor, the Seahawk aircraft had already

Government directed the CNS to cancel this signal,

moved to the Air Force Station at Jamnagar for an

th e re b y c a u s in g h im c o n s id e r a b le personal armament work up which had been p revio u sly

embarrassment. The G overn m en t’s view was that

planned. Naval Headquarters immediately recalled

although hostilities had com m enced with Pakistan

the Indian Fleet to Bombay from the Bay of Bengal

and the Army and Air Force had been fully committed

and moved the A lize a ircra ft to Bom bay for

to the operations, no declaration o f war had taken

reconnaissance and anti submarine patrols. Some

place. In a letter to the Tim es o f India on 29 November ships were in Calcutta and som e w ere in

1978, Adm iral Som an stated th a t the Ministry of Visakhapatnam. The ships comprising the fleet had

Defence directed Naval Headquarters in writing that

various speeds and were not in good material state

the Navy was not to o p era te in a threatening or having been away from Bombay, their base port, for

offensive manner north o f the latitude o f Porbandar

over two months. MYSORE, with only h a lf o f her

and that nowhere on the high seas w as the Navy to

boilers functioning,had her maximum speed reduced

initiate any offensive action against Pakistan unless

from 31 knots to 18 knots. BRAHMAPUTRA and

forced to do so by their action.

BEAS could only do 15 knots while their rated speed

FOCIF, in his flagship, the cruiser MYSORE, was

was 24 knots. All ships headed for Bombay at best

the first to arrive in Bom bay on 7 September. The speed.

same day, Pakistan Radio announced “Our Army

Meanwhile the Navy’s Seahawk aircraft, which

A ir F orce h ave a lre a d y a c q u itte d themselves had moved to Jam nagar on 1 S eptem ber for

creditably in the defence o f Pakistan. The Navy wi

armament workup,

were placed u n der the

not lag behind”. Action by the Pakistan Navy seeme^

operational control of the Western Air Command on 3

imminent. Naval Headquarters informed Bombay

September. They were tasked to prepare for an air

the likelihood of a naval raid on Bombay that nig ^

strike on the radar in sta lla tio n at the n earest FOCIF sailed the same evening with one cruiser an^

Pakistan Air Force station at Badin. On 5 September,

three escorts. Nothing suspicious was detected, the Seahawks came to immediate state of readiness

very same night, the Pakistan F lotilla bombar

and the strike on the Badin radar installation was

Dwarka.

aJl

scheduled to be launched at dawn on 7 September.

TALW AR, w h ich had b e e n c a rry in g oU* t(

^ ^ePtem^>er.when the Indian Army crossed

independent patrol o ff Kori Creek from 28 Aug ^

the international border and advanced towards

had been d i r e c t e d by N aval H e a d q u a r t e r s ° ^

Lahore, the Pakistan A ir Force attacked Indian

September to carry out a barrier patrol off the n° ^

airfields. On the evening of 6 September, the Indian

west tip of the Saurashtra coast, 30 to 80 xn^ cS

Air Force station at Jam nagar was bom bed by

of Okha, to-provide advance warning o f the aPPr^ £

akistani B 57 Canberra bom bers. Bom bing

o f the Pakistan Flotilla. On 6 September, TAL ^ ^

Gonuniied throughout the night. LAF aircraft, the air

developed leaks in her c o n d e n s e r s resu ltin g ^

a tie control tower and the runway were damaged.

serious problem o f boiler feed water c o n t a m i n

^

neSeahawks were lucky . they escaped damage. On

and had to p u t into Okha to effect t e m p o r a r y rep ^

aiin?

^

strike °n Badin was abandoned and

Okha, being only a few miles from Dwarka, * V7stajii i l S K

Se^ awks were withdrawn from Jamnagar to

detected the transmissions o flh e passing PaKi defence of Bombay, which 4 s an

an

w arsh ip s. She also h e a rd th e g u n fire 0

p f T Force commitment, was entrusted to the Navy ’s bombardment. Next morning, she was direc IS1T1QN TO TRIUMPH

send a team to Dwarka to assess the damage. The

been attacked and ‘kills’ claimed of submarines

team found that most of the shells had fallen on the

sunk, only to find that the contacts could not

soft soil between the temple and the railway station

have been submarines at all, because no

and had failed to explode. The air attack had

evidence of damage floated to the surface.

damaged a railway engine and blown off a portion of

•

Both the Indian Fleet and the Pakistan Flotilla

the Railway Guest House.

were aware of the hazards of being found within

FOCIF and his ships returned to Bombay on 8

reach of opposing strike aircraft during day time.

September. By 9 September, all ships had arrived

The damage that determined air attacks could

from the Bay o f Bengal. TALWAR also arrived from

inflict on warships at sea during day time had

Okha after temporary repairs. All Fleet ships were

been abundantly demonstrated during the

now in Bombay, having their urgent operational

Second World War. No responsible commander of

defects attended to and getting ready to sortie out.

naval forces at sea would expose his force to such

The dilemma was for what task? On the one hand

risk. A force would venture within the other side’s

were the restrictions imposed by the Government

air strike radius only at night and that too only to

that to localise the conflict, the Navy was not to go such a depth as would enable it to be out of

beyond Porbandar. On the other hand, Dwarka had

enemy air reach by first light. The depth of

ju st been bombarded and needed to be avenged.

penetration at night therefore depended on the

Within the Navy, the lower levels were itching for

speed at which the intruding force could

action.The higher levels were grappling with the

withdraw to safety from air attack.

problem of how to bring the Pakistan Flotilla to action

•

The North Arabian Sea is criss crossed by the Pre

w ith ou t v io la tin g the sp irit o f Government’s Determined Routes ( PDR’s ) used by

international airliners between Bombay and West

directives. And in the Indian Parliament, a member

Asia. Without height-finding radars, the

acidly enquired ‘What was the Indian Navy doing

behaviour of radar echoes of these aircraft are

when the Pakistan Navy bombarded Dwarka?”

easily mistaken for enemy reconnaissance

S o m e T a c t i c a l C o n s i d e r a t i o n s in the N o rth

aircraft. This triggers tactical reflexes thac affect

subsequent actions - “has my force been detected

A rabian Sea

by the enemy and should I change my plan or is it

For the lay reader, it would be useful to be aware of

just a civilian aircraft in a PDR and I can

some of the phenomena which affect naval operations

continue with my plan”.

in our waters. It would help to understand better the

actions of the Pakistan Flotilla and the actions of the

The Indian Fleet’s Sorties 10 to 23 September

Indian Fleet during these naval operations:

Admiral Samson recalls his Fleet’s sorties from 10 to

14 and from 18 to 23 September:*

•

The atmospheric conditions in the sea areas off

the n o rth -w est coast o f India and between

“Earlier my assumption was that I would have

S au rash tra and Karachi are conducive for

adequate air search capability to provide a

anom alous p ropagation called

anaprop.

reasonable chance of locating the enemy, and on

Depending on their ‘frequency’ and the time o

this basis I would have deployed the Fleet to a day’, electro magnetic transmissions either trave

position which would enable me to meet as much

very long distances (warships off Saurashtra can

as possible the tasks of bringing the enemy to

clearly hear warships off Karachi as if they were

action, to afford protection to our major ports on

very near or vice versa) or travel no distance a a

the West Coast and to provide cover to our

(on certain frequencies, there is a total fadeou o

merchant ships from the Persian Gulf and the

Red Sea. But with the very limited availability of

wireless communications between Sauras ra

reconnaissance aircraft. I had to revise my plan.

and Bombay and vice versa). Similarly on oar

The problem really was to find the enemy.

ships, radar scans display echoes of distant s ips

"I decided to sail on the night o f 1 0 /1 1

as if they are very near and display spurious

September and probe as far north and north-west

echoes behaving suspiciously like ships.

as possible, not forgetting the possibility of

•

In these waters, analogous phenomena p r ^ ^

another Pak raid on one o f the ports in

below the sea. Sonar detects echoes an

P

Saurashtra. I hoped I would find the enemy and I

them as if they were real submarine con

•

decided also to remain at sea as long as possible.

Both in peace and in war, such con ac

Blueprint to Bluewater Pages 443 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/35

NAVAL OPERATIONS IN THE A R A B IA N SE A IN S E P T E M B E R 1965

WEST PAKISTAN

.Ak Force SfrttMo

o BA SXK

tAOSTAJt

H'sy of rxix'H

UBS FROM

r N D I A

HACKOfFAnfTAK

MnLLATO

KUTCH

DWARKA

WHIW«riM5

JAMNAGAR

dvarka

SAURASHTRA

PORBANDAR

PLEBT. TRIANGULAR

PATROL TRACK 10 TO 23 SET

refueling from the tanker, SHAKTI. This ship,

having only one engine operational, was partially

the Maritime Operations Room at Bombay on

disabled and could not replenish me at sea and so

land line, but even the rebroadcast of the signal

by the Naval Signal Centre. Bombay at 0200

I planned for her to sail independently to be

hours did not reach the Fleet owing to the

anchored at Diu for refueling the Fleet on 13 and

anaprop conditions still prevailing west of

14 September. In the event, her second engine

Saurashtra on that night.

also packed up and she did not sail at all, thus

At 0300 hours on 12 September, another

limiting my period of stay at sea. RAJPUT, one of

Alize took off from Jamnagar, established

the two destroyers, also packed up and returned

wireless contact with the flagship and, after

to Bombay.

carrying out a search, reported a few surface

“As regards air cover, I decided to stage two

contacts about 90 miles north of the Fleet but,

Alizes from Jamnagar and to carry out searches

not being able to investigate them further

north o f latitude 21 degrees 30 minutes from

because of lack of endurance, returned to base. A

2000 hours on 11 September onwards and to

third Alize sortie was airborne at 0400 hours on

arrange for six to eight Seahawks to be available

12 September and searched the area, without

at Jamnagar from 0600 hours on 12 September

success, as by this time the Pak warships had

for la u n ch in g s trik es on Pak ships or the retreated to their own waters.

subm arine up to a range of 150 miles from

“There was no doubt about the identity of

Jamnagar. The IAF Liberators would carry out

these ships as when the first Alize was flying over

searches in areas south of latitude 21 degrees 30

them, they had switched on their lights and fired

minutes.

green Verey’s flares for purposes of identification

“Flying my flag on board the MYSORE and

but when the Alize did not respond with light

with the B RAH M APU TRA, BEAS, BETWA,

signals, they had quickly realised that the aircraft

KHUKRI, KIRPAN, KUTHAR and TALWAR in

was not their own and had then quickly switched

company, I sailed out o f Bombay on our first

off their lights and steamed towards the Pakistan

sweep on the night of 10/11 September. On the

coast at full speed to be in safe waters before

morning o f 11 September, within hours of our

daybreak. Thus ‘anaprop’ conditions had

departure from Bombay, BEAS reported an

deprived the Fleet of a rich haul that was there for

unidentified aircraft at a range of 42 miles. The

the asking. By 0700 hours on 12 September the

aircraft appeared to have been shadowing our

Pak warships, whose presence within 90 miles of

forces and was evaluated as a ‘snooper’. Two

our Fleet had been detected and reported at 2030

Seahawk aircraft were scrambled from Bombay

hours the previous night, had disappeared.

but could not intercept the unidentified aircraft

“The Fleet continued to proceed north until it

reached the northern limit of its search after

as it had disappeared by the time the Seahawks

which it turned southwest. Eight Seahawks

arrived on the scene. Our position was thus likely

which had come from Bombay to Jamnagar and

to have been compromised.

two Toofanis (erstwhile Ouragons) of the Indian

“An A liz e search was launched from

Air Force also carried out a sweep in the area after

Jamnagar at 20 0 0 hours on the evening of 11

refueling but without success.

September and within half an hour picked up a

“On the morning of 12 September, TALWAR

number of contacts confirming the presence of

had another machinery breakdown and when

two groups o f Pak ships only 50 miles west of

efforts to rectify the defects failed, she was

Okha and soon made a detailed wireless report on

detached from the Fleet to limp back to Bombay.

the disposition of the contacts to me and repeated

“Towards sunset on the same day, the

it a few minutes later. Unfortunately, however,

remaining force proceeded northwards once

due to. freak anomalous wireless propagation

again and continued its sweep till the early hours

conditions prevailing in the area on that night,

of 13 September when it intercepted two

the w ireless beam from the aircraft suffered

merchant ships laden with arms bound for

unusually high attenuation by the atmosphere

Pakistan, SS Steel Vendor and SS Steel Protector.

and multiple reflection and refraction at varying

The ships had to be forced to stop under threat of

levels as a result of which the signal did not reach

fire but could not be captured in the absence of

me or any other ship of the Fleet nor was it picked

clearance from higher authorities, as it had been

UP by Jamnagar. At midnight, the Alize alrc|’a made very clear that the Indian Fleet was not to

landed at Jamnagar and transmitted the repo

o

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/37

the n a tu re of ca rg o In these shin

seek action, though it was permitted to open fire

sh ip p in g p ro g ra m m e a n d hence t h ^ thelr

, n s e l f defence. And so the Steel Vendor and the Steel Protector continued to cruise tow ards

d is t in c t p o s s ib ilit y o f th ese shi Karachi, ‘escorted ‘ by the Indian F leet at a

intercepted and either captured or destro

distance of only two cables, until they reached the

distance from Bombay to Aden is 1650 mn

northern limit of the Fleet's sweep, when the

thus this sweep would entail operations fa T ^

merchant ships, after bidding adieu, disappeared

from our shores but it w as considered well wt?

the capability of our whittled down Fleet Re

over the horizon.

“At about 1000 hours on 13 Septem ber,

indicating likely Pakistani seaborne landings?

KUTHAR picked up an underwater ‘sonar’ contact

the S au ra sh tra coast, however, put paid to the of a possible submarine and soon KHUKRI joined

sweep an d the F le e t w a s prom ptly sailed to in the hunt. The contact was held intermittently

intercept the Pak Fleet off Saurashtra.

until 1100 hours during which time KUTHAR

“I sailed in M YSO RE with RAJPUT, RANJIT, launched deliberate attacks with full salvos from

B E A S a n d B E T W A on the morning of 18

her anti submarine mortars. The contact was,

S eptem ber. My In te n tio n w as to reach the however, lost and the anti subm arine action

Saurashtra coast as early as possible to counter terminated. The contact was assessed to be

the landings and so proceeded at my best speed of tracking at seven knots for a fairly long period

22 knots. I had to leave BEAS behind to fol ow, as and subsequent analysis led to the conclusion

she could do only 19 knots.

that it may well have been a submarine.

“That evening at abut 2 0 1 5 hours, while I was

“Ships were now beginning to run short of

on my northerly leg, an a ircra ft was picked up fuel and the only tanker, SHAKTI, not being

some six miles away. T h is aircraft was sighted by available, the three shipsi of the 14th Frigate

B E A S an d w a s h e a rd to be reporting to the Squadron. KHUKRI, KIRPAN and KUTHAR, and

K arach i tra n sm ittin g statio n the position an the destroyer RANJIT, were detached on the

d ispositio n of o u r s h ip s m ost accurately. T e afternoon o f 13 Septem ber to carry out an

aircraft continued to shadow u s and finally a

offensive anti subm arine sw eep o ff the

out at 2 1 3 0 h o u rs. I continued north til a e approaches to Bombay. After an u neventfu l

midnight and then turned southwest. No ene

night, the Fleet returned to Bom bay on the

sh ip s were sighted and it w as evident t a morning of 14 September.

landing was being attempted by the enemy o

“On 17 September KHUKRI, KIRPAN and

coast. It is probable that the seaborne a ^

KUTHAR, with gunfire support provided by RANA

operation w as cancelled by the Pak F ee^ ^

and GANGA, launched a thorough search of an

our p resence n e a r the S a u ra sh tra coa

area of about 5000 square miles off Bombay as

compromised.

y out

the Pakistan submarine GHAZI was believed to be

“N e verth eless, I c o n tin u e d to ca antj22

operating in the southern approaches to Bombay.

sw eeps in the sam e a re a on 2 0 ,

^ y/e

On 21 and 23 September, ‘sonar' contacts were

Septem ber. O n the e v e n in g of the

picked up and attacks lau n ch ed b y th ese sh ip s intercepted w ireless tra n sm issio n s w

^ ^

but the contacts were soon lost. T h e ships

obviously from Pak ships and in^icat^h,we9t ^

continued on their anti subm arine patrol until 24

had contact of an ‘enem y’ on a sou

^ e

September, one day after the implementation of course at 10 knots. These

me cease fire.

t r a n s m i s s

picked up by several of o u r sh ip s anl

^

t h e ' p w ^ lts second so rtie' the m ain b ° d y Of convinced that we were in close p r°

^ithů

BETwl CS ruTg ^ M

YS

t BE(?h

S'

enemy. However, it w as not p o ssi

ge #

d ire c tio n fin d in g e q u ip m e n t to g ^ t tfcw d

S

^

d U T T

3nd thC T A L W A R h a d b y n o w

d ire c tio n of th ese t r a n s m i s s i o n s carried n n )m a jo r d e fe c ts a n d c o u ld n o t s a il) appeared to be northerly and so we c

September to 2 3 S P T

Arabian Sea from 18

this direction. Despite the fa c t ,

i frotf9 {*

continued in this direction for seVC ontact

our best speed, we did not make any jn^erceP s

the enemy. Bearing in m ind that the

^ad

s s s a

message indicated that the

was f c

kno

S

wn

E

that Pak s

istan &

was r ^

aware of

contac

it

proceeding in a south-westerly dire

TON TO TRIUMPH

obvious that this contact could not be the Indian

Fleet and in all probability was some merchant

Submarine and Anti Submarine Operations in

ship proceeding out o f Karachi or the Gulf of

September 1965

Kutch. I therefore turned towards the Gulf in case

The Story of the Pakistan Navy states:*

the enemy was attempting to intercept one of our

merchant ships from this area. I found nothing

“Just after the Dwarka attack on night 7/8

and it was clear that this was another incident of

September, the Pakistan submarine GHAZI had

‘anaprop’ electromagnetic conditions and that

been patrolling off the Saurashtra coast. She

these in te rc e p te d m essages were being

tracked 4 to 5 escorts on passage from Bombay

tran sm itted by local patrol vessels outside

proceeding up the coast but did not attack them

Karachi Harbour. Thereafter, despite repeated

as her orders were to attack only heavy ships."

high speed sweeps as far north as Mandvi, no

While on return passage to Bombay from the East

contact of any Pak ships was gained.

coast, BEAS picked up a submarine contact at 1230

“However, we continued to intercept Pak

on 9 September about 45 miles south of Bombay. She

wireless transmissions and it was clear that our

carried out an urgent attack, followed by a deliberate

forces were being continuously shadowed more or

attack half an hour later.Thereafter contact was lost.

less throughout this operation. It was also clear

GHAZI makes no mention of this attack.

from these transmissions that air strikes were on

On 11 September, there were intensive anti

call for Pak surface ships. Unfortunately our

submarine air patrols off Bombay. One Alize aircraft

A lizes or Seah aw ks could not operate from

flew over GHAZI while she was snorkeling but failed

Jamnagar after 12 September as repeated air

to detect her. GHAZI returned to Karachi thereafter to

attacks had rendered the airfield untenable. The

rectify her defective electronic counter measures

Liberator maritime reconnaissance aircraft of the

equipment and resumed patrol on 15 September.

IAF,

how ever,

continued to carry out

Between 7 and 10 September, the Indian Fleet

reconnaissance sweeps of the northern part of! the

was in Bombay. When GHAZI was in Karachi from 12

Arabian Sea but failed to pick up any Pak surface

to 14 September to effect repairs, the Indian Fleet was or air contacts. In fact, on two occasions our

operating off the Saurashtra coast. When GHAZI

forces were reported by them as enemy and on

resumed patrol on 15 September, the Indian Fleet

one o cca sio n th e p osition o f our force was was in Bombay from 14 to 17 September, in between

reported in plain language!

sorties.

“On the morning of 22 September I had to

On 17 September, FOCIF sent out five escorts for

detach the RAJPUT and RANJIT as they were

an anti submarine search in the southern

running short of fuel. Meanwhile I had received a

approaches to Bombay. They searched an area of

further signal concerning the merchant ships

5000 square miles between 17 and 23 September.

arriving from the G u lf o f Aden bringing vital

Several sonar contacts were picked up. On two

defence cargo and so I altered course with the

occasions, 21 and 23 September, contacts were

MYSORE, BEAS and BETWA towards the central

attacked for several hours. GHAZI makes no mention

of these two attacks. Presumably she was nowhere

Arabian Sea to try and escort them to safety. But

within a few hours o f our sailing on our new

near.GHAZI’s ‘Record of Service’, retrieved from the

m ission, w e received a message from Naval

sunken hull in 1972, indicates that “In 1965, while

H ead qu arters con veyin g our Government s

on war patrol off the port of Bombay. GHAZI

acceptance o f the United Nations’ cease lire

encountered three frigates. She fired four torpedoes

proposal from 0330 hours on 23 September. So

and scored three hits on the BriUsh Type 41 frigate

decided to retu rn to the Saurashtra coast to

INS BRAHMAPUTRA”.

forestall any attem pt by the Pakistan Navy o

The Story of the Pakistan Navy’ mentions that:**

create mischief in that area in a last minute bid

gain propaganda value. I returned to

“Off Bombay, on 22 September, GHAZI gained a

with the regret that I had missed an °PP°“ UI^

firm contact. After tracking the zig-zagging

to try and engage the Pakistan Navy In a

.

contact all day. GHAZI fired four torpedoes at an ‘

despite waiting Just outside its lair for near y

A A frigate ‘ in the evening. After one and a half

weeks"

________ -

* page 222.

* Ibid.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/39

m inu tes, th e firs t torpedo was heard to h it, A n alysis o f th e R e a s o n s fo r not Using th fo llo w e d five secon ds la te r by an oth er h it.

N a v y O ffe n s iv e ly

e

GHAZI’s sonar reported patterns o f explosions

being fired . After this attack, GHAZI returned to

In con sid erin g th e re a s o n s w h y th e Navy did Karachi on 23 September where the Captain was

achieve anything significant, several basic question

decorated for having sunk the Indian Navy s anti

arise. Was there any flaw in the higher direction of aircraft frigate INS BRAHMAPUTRA”.

war? After the Rann o f Kutch incident, why was the

Fleet sent to the Bay o f Bengal? W hen the intrusions

After the cease fire, FOCIF invited the foreign

started in Kashm ir In early August, why wasn’t the

n aval a tta ch es from New D elh i on b oard the Fleet immediately recalled to the W est Coast? Given

BRAHMAPUTRA in Bombay to remove any doubts

the constraints im posed b y the Government, could

that the ship was afloat and fighting fit.

the Navy have done better than it did?

Overall, the above account provides a glimpse of

the com plexity o f submarine and anti submarine

T h e H ig h e r D ir e c tio n o f W a r

warfare and the difficulties of predicting, with any

There were two aspects o f the higher direction of war

degree of certainty, the outcome of submarine and

in 1965 which created confusion. T h e first was the

anti submarine operations in the North Arabian Sea.

G overnm ent’s g en u in e and s in c e re b e lie f that in m odern w a rfa re, it w a s m e a n in g fu l to engage in Other Minor Incidents

warlike activity w ithout form ally declaring war. The

second was that once the Government had decided to

There were two other incidents which to this day

counter hostile acts by Pakistan, it was reasonable

remain unexplained:

that activity be selectively confined to only one or two

•

On 11 September, an unidentified aircraft was

of the Armed Forces. As regards the first aspect, the

reported over Visakhapatnam. Fire was opened

extracts quoted above from Mr PVR Rao, the Defence

by the ack ack guns of the Naval Coast Battery.

Secretary in 1965, the memoirs o f Mr C P Srivastava,

The History o f the Pakistan Air Force makes no

the Private Secretary to Prim e M in ister Shastri in mention o f any attack on Visakhapatnam on 11

1965, the recollections o f M r L K Jha, the Princip September.

Secretary to Prime M inister Shastri in 1965 make

•

On 15 September, unidentified aircraft were

clear that the G overnm ent w as determ ined no o

reported over Cochin. Fire was opened by the

enlarge the scope o f the conflict beyond the rninin^ t0

ships p atrollin g o ff Cochin and by the Naval

required to safeguard its position in Kashmir

Battery located at the harbour entrance. Some

prevent any escalation o f the c o n flict beyond

shells fell into the populated areas adjoining

objective. It will also appear from the extracts

Ernakulam . Some shells, which fell into the

below that the Chief of tiie Arm y Staff, who was the

water near the harbour entrance were mistaken

facto Chairm an o f the C hiefs o f S ta ff Commi

•

for air dropped mines. A minesweeper was rushed

exclu ded th e N a vy fro m p a r tic ip a tio n in_

from Goa to Cochin to sweep the mines - no mines

contingency plan in case Pakistan attacked Kas

were found. A Seahawk aircraft got airborne from

In the 1971 N ation al S ecu rity L ectu re oi t Cochin a irfield to intercept the aircraft - no U n ited S e rv ic e s In s titu tio n o f In d ia , Gene encounter occurred. The History of the Pakistan

Chaudhuri stated:

A ir Force makes no mention o f any attack on

Cochin on 15 September. A post war analysis

“Now th a t b o th M r B h u tto an d A ir M a r^ ^ .

suggested that the je t aircraft could have been

Asghar Khan have p u b licly claim ed that

^

from a British or American aircraft carrier task

were responsible for planning and instiga

force which might have been operating in the

Pakistan’s attack on India in 1965,1 think I

area. The reminiscences of some participants at

interpolate here a footnote from histoiy. In \ end Cochin indicate that there were no echoes of any

when we were revising m ilitary plans to de ^ ^

aircraft on the scans of the warning radars being

ourselves in case o f an attack from our neigh

’

manned in the ND School.

the troops-available on the W estern Front

rou ghly equ ivalen t to those o f Pakistan. °

rapid expansion had meant some dilution. In tn

limited advance which must form the fulcrum

any defensive plan, we w ere faced w ith thre

7 '4<Sr/fRANSmON T O T R IUM PH

alternatives. The first one was the occupation of

military would then be duly informed. Despite the

some u n gu arded territory. This seemed

public political statement, the military were

unproductive and non -permanent. The second

always in great doubt as to whether at the

was the occupation of and probably substantial

appropriate time any such permission would

destruction to a big city. For this there were

really be given. They were also aware that if a

insufficient troops. Anybody who has studied the

positive decision was made at this late stage, then

capture of a big town, will realise how expensive

it would be most difficult, if not impossible, to

this operation is in manpower. The resistance put

finalise the operational plans, make the

up by beleaguered Berlin in 1945, defended only

necessary concentration of units - always a long

by the rem nants o f a defeated army, against

and complicated business - brief the

overwhelming odds, is a good example of what I

commanders at all levels fully about the tactical

mean. In dealing with this alternative, there was

picture and then launch a successful operation.

also the p o litic a l view that any substantial The troops were fully convinced that at this last

destruction of a major population and historical

moment, the Government could have a drastic

centre would leave a raw wound between two

change of mind and militarily the final result

neighbors, delaying unduly the eventual aim of

might then be a fiasco.

living in amity together. The third alternative was

“After the 5th May 1965, when it appeared

the destruction of equipment, cheaply obtained

that an attack on Kashmir or India later that year

but if d estroyed , expen sive in every way to

was a distinct possibility, the first matter that replace. This third alternative seemed the correct

needed clearance was this ability to retaliate. In

choice. I would submit that we were successful in

my discussions with both the Prime Minister and

the pattern we adopted and the ensuing heavy

the Defence Minister after the pros and cons had

economic and political disturbances in Pakistan

been Jully discussed, the necessary sanction was

certainly contributed to the downfall of the Ayub

obtained. Consequently, we had plenty o f time to Government and perhaps to the democratisation

work out the appropriate moves. The day Pakistan now pending.

moved her regular troops.infantry and armour

“Incidentally, Pakistan’s own plan for 1965

into the Jammu sector. I was in Kashmir. As I was

was based on first getting us to panic and move

coming back in the plane to Delhi, the Director of

down h eavy rein forcem en ts from the main

Military Operations, who was in the aircraft with

Punjab theatre to Kutch. Once they had got us

me. started writing out the required signals to go

there, then the so called raiders would have gone

to the formations concerned. On landing, he went

into Kashmir, supported by the Pakistan regular

straight off to send them out and I immediately

army capturing the key point of Akhnur. Though

went to see the Defence Minister who formally

confirmed my action. He then informed the Prime

the first part of the Pakistani plan misfired, the

Minister and that evening the PM asked me to see

originators were so intrigued with the ingenuity of

him, discussed a few details and further approved

the second part, that they put it into action

the action taken. The PM might then have

anyway. O p eration s by em otion are always

informed some of his close colleagues, but this

incorrect and the second part also failed. It was

was not my concern.

on the 5 th May 1965 that the l a r g e r pattern o f

“As a number of other broad policy points

Pakistan’s intentions to seize Kashmir before we

connected with the operations had also been

got too strong became apparent, though the actual

cleared in this same manner, I feel it is desirable

details o f how they would do it were not clear at to mention the mechanics by which these

that time, fo r the initiative lay, as it always does, clearances were given. In 1965, somehow in a

with the aggressor.

rather unconventional, unplanned way, a series

“Previous to 1965, it had always been said by

of informal meetings started up between the PM,

our political leaders that any attack by Pakistan

the DM, the PS to the PM and myself. A little later

against Kashmir would be construed as an attack

on my veiy esteemed and valuable colleague. Air

against India. Consequently India would then be

Marshal Aijan Singh, joined us. for obviously the

at liberty to attack Pakistan in order to improve

Army and. the Air Force were closely linked

her own defences. This statement of policy,

together in any defence role. The Naval Chief did

however, was never incorporated into any military

not come Jor the Navy's role did not look like being

Plan. The explanation for this omission was that a

a very big one. At these meetings, there was a tree decision would only be taken at the time an

c

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/41

interchange of views and the many implications

In the 1 9 7 2 N a tio n a l S e c u rity Lecture of the various actions which might be taken in a United Service Institution of India, Mr PVR Ra°

variety of circumstances were discussed in detail.

was the Defence Secretary from 1962 to 1966 stated No formal notes were kept for very often it w as only a clearing of minds. When however, a certain

“After November 1962, the Defence Committee

policy matter was accepted, it was noted and put the C abinet w as revam ped into the Emergent

up for clearance later in a more formal manner.

Com m ittee. B u t the m a jo r change was in the w o rkin g of the D efence M in iste r’s Committee

D uring these m eetings, it w a s in trinsically

understood

Th is Committee, less the Finance representative

that I would keep my colleagues, and

met daily except w hen the Defence Minister was

particularly the Naval Chief, informed o f the more

out of Delhi and w as effective in ensuring better

im portant d e c isio n s, th at M r L K J h a w o uld sim ilarly keep the appropriate members of the

c o o rd in a tio n a m o n g s t the S e rv ice s and in C ivil Services informed and, of course, the PM

speeding the b u ild u p of the forces. But the and the DM w ould keep th eir p o litic a l and system u n d e rw e n t a c h a n g e a s the crisis Ministerial colleagues informed as they thought m ounted in A u g u s t 1 9 6 5 . T h e re have been fit. As Chief of Army Staff, I found these meetings various claim s about the decision-making at that extremely valuable, for not only was 1 quite sure time. One claim is that a sm all group, with the of the parameters within which I could work but I

Prime Minister at its head, took all decisions and w as also well briefed on the possible political, the whole p ro ce ss fu n ctio n e d very smoothly.

domestic and economic implications. This saved

There are, on the other hand, complaints that a lot of time later in more formal discussions and

there was unnecessary political interference, with

also, when 1 was discussing plans for the future the result that achievement fell short of what was

war with the PSO’s and the Army Commanders, I

feasible and desirable”.

w as in a position to give them a good deal of Mr PVR Rao also recalls:

background inform ation w hich they, in their

turn, found useful. These meetings with the PM

“The idea that th ere w a s no communication

and the D efence M in iste r also gave me the between the Chiefs and the Government is qu1 e opportunity to put my view point directly to the incorrect, because com m unications can be ei er two people who would ultimately play the largest oral or in writing. After M r C havan became

part in making the final overall decisions.

Defence M inister, there u sed to be a meet ng

“In this particular case, these informal, ‘clear

every morning at 9.30 in the Defence Minister the a ir’ meetings seemed to have worked very room, attended by the three Chiefs of Staff

satisfactorily and advantageously. There were no

the Defence Secretary. The C abinet ^^cre^ aI-

personality clashes, while the sm all numbers

usea to come sometimes but he was not a regu

concerned seemed to keep discussion down to

visitor. Regular m inutes of meetings were eP

essentials. Everyone present was fully aware of which were circulated to all concerned.

,

the security im plications and so there were no

“As regards written Directives, the Navy,

leaks or fear of leaks. An air of informality and. 1

particularly the Army, are very fond of saying

^

might add, good humour allowed a great deal of there were no written directives. I think it *s freedom in sp e a k in g and th in kin g, w hile a very ridiculous thing. In my view, decisions we

mutual confidence was built up which was most

not taken by the Cabinet. The decisions wer

important then and later. I am not saying that always taken at the Defence M inister’s morning this particular method of discussion could have

meetings. If the decisions required further wntte

worked equally well or at all, with another group authority, then only would they go to the PM ap of people in the sam e position. B u t it does Defence Com m ittee of the C a b in e t. So, 0

em phasise w hat I co n sid er to be the second operational purpo ses and that is w hat I a

important point in organisation for defence. This

concerned with, all three C h ie fs were in the is the need for a free interchange of views between

picture every day of what was happening I*1 *

the v a rio u s sectio n s of the d ecision m aking Government. It is not correct to say that the authorities concerned and then enough liberty

Service Chiefs were isolated or insulated and they

given to-each one to work within his own sphere

wanted written orders that were transparent.

with a minimum of interference."

Mr Shastri was staying at the relevant time

at 4 Motilal Nehru Place and he had his office at 4 2 ^ 3 P I ^ S I P 0 N T O T R IU M PH

the adjacent intercon n ected building at 10,

janpath. From about the 6th August 1965,1 was

they should spring into action without further

orders. As news came out of the Pak attack on

asked to go to his office and I used to go there the Chamb front, the IAF on the night of 1 /2

after office on my way home to report to him

September, attacked Lalmanirhat and other

about the events o f the day. As the situation in

targets in the East and the Pak Air Force, on its

the valley vis a vis the infiltrators continued

part, attacked Kalaikunda airbase near

unabated and to drift, Shastri was clear that the

Kharagpur. Evidently, the Chief of Air Staff had

troops should go across the Cease Fire line and

not been able to countermand his earlier

wipe out the in filtra to r’s bases in POK. This instructions to his field officers in the East in

became an issue for regular discussion at the

time. General Chaudhuri was very upset and

morning m eetings, one or two o f which Shri

protested to CAS/DM. The situation was rectified

Shastri also attended. It was Government’s

and the incident smoothed over.

policy that if our action across the CFL brought

“I have no knowledge of the happenings in the

out the Pak regular forces into the open, we would

meetings between PM/DM and a Chief of Staff.

not confine ourselves to operations in Kashmir

Chiefs of Staff have direct access to the President,

but be free to respond wherever we thought best

the PM and the DM. However, the P.M. arid the

on the West Pakistan Front. In this situation.

D.M. were very punctilious and, if any action was

General Chaudhun demanded that if operations

required, the material would usually come down

became necessary against West Pakistan, the

for suitable action. The DM would normally

whole might of the Indian Armed forces (all the

mention the point requiring action in the morning

three arms) should be thrown in and asked for a

meeting; or, as in one or two cases, where

written directive from Government in this regard.

personalities were involved, he mentioned the

This developed into a tussle of wills between

problem privately. That the Naval Chief remained

General Chaudhun on the one hand and the PM/

uninformed at any stage about Government policy

DM on the other. As things continued to drift, I

is just shibboleth.

drafted, on Shri Shastri’s instructions, a directive

“With regard to the 1965 war, it should be

to the Chiefs o f Staff accordingly. This was about

realised that the Government of India, that is the

the 10th or 11th August. There was, even then,

civil Government, wanted to keep the operations

never any question of extending the operations to

at as low a key as possible. Kashmir had to be

the eastern sector. When I took the draft directive

defended and. to the extent that Pakistan was

to 10 Janpath, Shastri took it from me and kept

creating trouble there, it had to be faced. But it

was the determined policy of Prime Minister Lai

it, saying he would read through it. On the 11th,

Bahadur Shastri and the Indian Government not

12th and 13th, every evening, I asked for the

to allow the operations to escalate.

paper back but he would just smile. The Indian

“It is correct that the Navy was told not to Army crossed the Cease Fire Line on the 13th,

approach Pakistan or threaten it. There is no

destroyed the in filtr a to r ’s bases and in the question of going to Shastri or anything o f the sort.

process, ca p tu red H aji Pir by a brilliant

But the Navy is quite correct in saying that they

operation. The operation was wholly Army; the

were asked not to escalate the fighting. They are

*AF was not used. On the 14th or 16th August,

absolutely correct. And India did not want to

Shastri returned to me my draft directive, saying

escalate the war. In point o f fa c t even in the east that it w as no lon ger necessary. No written

we did not take any action. In 1965, we wanted to

directive (apart from the minutes of the morning

limit the fighting as much as possible".

meetings) were issued to any of the Chiefs of Staff,

ncidentally, General Chaudhuri also did not

in the 197 3 National Security Lecture of the

turther pursue the matter and he was in fu ll U n ited Service Institution of India. Air Chief Marshal

**9reement that the Navy had no role at that stage

2 ? Whfw^s

V W CMef of Air Staff In 1965 ( and

n t-*16 operations and that the operations should

Subsequently Chief of Air StafTIn 1971) stated:

not be extended to the Eastern sector.

“Farlv in 1965, Pakistan attacked us in Kutch. in

The absence of a written directive and the

western India. The attack caught the armed

See-saw that went on in this respect resulted in a

forces unawares- The Army took the field without

^ r io u s incident. The C hief of A ir Staff had any prior planning or preparation. Its reaction

pparently given standing instructions to his field

was fast but there was no Joint Army-Air Force

in la n d e r s that if open hostilities broke out.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/43

plan, and all that the Air Force could do was to

a tta c k in K a s h m ir a ft e r th e Kutch

provide logistic support with light aircraft. The

B a s ic a lly , I th in k , it w a s because

p ossib ility o f ta ctical support w as considered

c o m m a n d e r s w e r e w e d d e d to the

after the fighting began. It was then realised that

m ilita ry o p e r a tio n s w e re principally

our bases were so far from the battle zone that

a ffa ir an d th a t th e o th e r services could ^

our a ircra ft w ou ld have to operate at extrem e

o p e r a te on th e fr in g e , as it w ere, with*?

range with reduced weapon loads while Pakistani

occasion al b on u s fro m th e A ir Force. This was aircraft could dominate the entire combat area

com pounded by a b ig -b ro th er attitude towards

from bases close by. Given time, we could also

the A ir Force which led to its being treated with a

have im provised an airfield or two in or near certain am ou n t o f in d u lgen ce but prevented it Kutch, but the fighting ended before that. The

bein g accepted as a v ita l and equal partner in

incident was soon defused but, apparently, not

war. M atters w e re fu rth e r complicated by the before it had encouraged Pakistan in the belief

belief that if the Indian A ir Force took part In the

th at the tim e had come to settle the Kashmir

figh tin g then th e P a k ista n i A ir Force would do dispute by force of arms.

lik e w is e , th u s in c r e a s in g th e likelihood of a

“Then in August and September 1965 came

general war between the two countries Instead of

th e secon d K ash m ir War. It began w ith

a localised con flict in J & K. There was a good skirm ishes in- the valley by so-called freedom

deal o f truth in this, o f cou rse, but this was a fighters, in reality agents of Pakistan. These were

p o s s ib ility fro m w h ic h th e r e w as no escape.

followed, towards the end of August, by an all-out

Indeed, this was a p ossib ility that could not be

attack by Pakistani armour in the Chamb area of

ignored for Pakistan had alread y been wa™ d

Jammu province, with the obvious objective of

that any attack on Jammu and Kashmir would e

cutting the Jammu-Srinagar highway. Our Army,

treated as an a tta ck on India. W ith a politica working under the restrictions of the Cease Fire

direction as clear as th at on the record,

agreement, was lightly equipped in that sector

incum bent on the C hiefs o f S ta ff to have e

and though it fought valiantly, its AMX tanks

plans ready for such a contingency. The fac

were no match for the more powerful Pakistani

they did not is in dicative o f the thinking a

Pattons. While there was some hope of the Army

time.

.or

holding the Pakistani attack on its own. there was

“The events in th e C h a m b - Jaurian seCQut

no talk of bringing the Air Force into the conflict.

leading to the call for air support took matter ^

B u t on 1st S eptem ber, w ith the P ak istan is o f the A r m y ’s h a n d s. A t th a t

p re s s in g fo rw a rd from Jau rian , G eneral Government had to decide whether to enlar&

Chaudhuri, the Army Chief, was compelled to ask

area of conflict, and it did so without hesi a ^

for air support.

That, indeed, appeared to be th e only ^ uje

“There had been no prior joint planning for

d ivert P a k ista n i fo rc e s fro m th e

such an eventuality. Air Marshal Aijan Singh, the

Jam m u-Srinagar h igh w ay, th e loss o

«jey#

Air Chief, had on his own alerted the air bases in

would have jeopardised the defence of the

^

the Punjab. When the call came, a force of fighter

With the decision to fight Pakistan o u ts id e J ^

bombers from Pathankot mounted a strike on the

the Army had to move Up forces from Pe^.cer^ef

Pakistanis within minutes of being ordered to do

stations, some from the D ecca n and ft*

^

so. It was a touch-and-go affair, because the

south, and formulate an operational plan a

demand for air support came late in the afternoon

and the strike had to be mounted in an area with

n0ti-e'

u twee*

During the five days that elapsed be

^

which our pilots were not familiar. With only a few

the Government decision and the date sc ^

minutes o f daylight left, they could have missed

implementing it, there w a s som e d is c u s s the battle zone or attacked the wrong targets.

how the Army and the Air Force should °P® t jt

Fortunately they did neither and so helped to

On the Army side, the notion persisted tn*

bring the Pakistani force to a halt.

w ould fight on its own, w ith the A ir F

“At this point, it is interesting to consider in providing an occasional bonus; and in

somewhat greater detail why there was no prior planning of Army -Air operations even though, as

f i Z e'«Where,‘ was V lce-Chief, we t h o u d

ghting mainly an air war against the pAF t9,

G eneral C h a u d h u ri said in h is 1971 National 7 C C0? 8ldered to be strateg ic targ

Security lecture, he expected the Pakistanis to assigning relatively low priority to su p p 0rt

$ m O N

T R IUM PH

Army. Separate plans were hastily drawn up by

each Service with no joint consultation worth the

support. This was the more remarkable because

unlike our set-up. in which all three Service

name. And again, no tasks were envisaged for the

Chiefs and their Headquarters were based at

Navy.

Delhi, the Pakistani Air Chief was located at

“Please note that in 1965, the higher defence

Peshawar, the Army Chief at Islamabad, near

organisation was functioning and the Chiefs of

Rawalpindi, and the Naval Chief at Karachi. The

S ta ff C om m ittee m et regu larly under the

fact that their forces managed to work well

chairmanship of General Chaudhuri. Officers in

together speaks well for their mutual

positions of authority had read and studied and

understanding, which is more important than

taught the p roced u res for inter-service cophysical proximity.,Furthermore, since Pakistan operation. It was not realised, however, that even

had been the one to start the fighting in J & K, it when the general drill is known, each particular

is to be presumed that its Service Chiefs had

task still requires a great deal of preparatory

given some thought to the possibility of a more

work, that the persons taking part need to be

widespread conflict and prepared for it

trained for it, that supporting facilities have to be

accordingly.

arranged for in advance, and this has to be done

“Despite its preparations, however, Pakistan

for every contingency that can be envisaged.

failed to make any inroads in J & K and just

Flexibility in battle is gained only through long

about held its own elsewhere. We advanced up to

and arduous preparation.

the Ichhogil canal, West Pakistan’s first line of

“T h a t we d iscovered when we entered

defence, and. towards Sialkot. Pakistani forces

Pakistan. Soon the Army found that it could not

came into Indian territory around Gadra Road in

fight e n tire ly on its own, for the PAF was

Rajasthan. Except for a single PAF attack on an

constantly harassing it. The Army needed air

Indian Air Force base near Calcutta, there was no

defence and tactical support but no detailed

fighting in the east. Our Navy had no operational

arrangements- had been made for either. The Air

tasks but suffered a sea-borne attack at Dwarka

Force was willing to help and it did all it could but

in the west. The fighting was brought to a halt by

in the absence of joint plans, large gaps remained

22nd September, the Army having been engaged

in the air cover in the combat zone. Neither did

in combat for nearly a month and a half and the

the air operations, through which we hoped to

Air Force for 22 days. At the turn of the year came

immobilize the PAF and reduce Pakistan’s ability

the Tashkent agreement, negotiated by our then

to make war, achieve much for we had no well

Prime Minister, the late Mr Lai Bahadur Shastri.

thought out ta rget system for the purpose.

“In retrospect, it is clear that the 1965 war

Having had some responsibility for all this, I must

was successful as a defensive action, for it

confess that the air war became a somewhat hit- •

managed to preserve the status quo in Kashmir,

but the operations in the Punjab and Rajasthan

and-miss affair, that depended heavily on finding

were inconclusive. We failed to make a real dent

targets of opportunity for its success. The aircrew

in Pakistan’s forces, both on the ground and in

perform ed m agnificently, doing all that was

the air. The Navy being far removed from Kashmir

expected o f them and more; had there been a

took no part in the fighting.

coherent joint war plan, we would have derived

“With the benefit of hindsight, we can now see

much fu lle r b en efit from their courage and

what part the higher defence organisation played

sacrifice.

in the 1965 war. Frankly. I do not think it made

“Our advan ce into Pakistan caught the

any significant contribution. I say this after

Pakistani forces by surprise. I imagine they had

careful thought, knowing that one o f our

not thought the Indian Government and Armed

distinguished Army Chiefs. General J N

Forces capable o f swift decisions and speedy

Chaudhuri. was then Chairman of the Chiefs of

action. The initial successes of our Army were

S taff Committee. Even at the risk o f his

soon checked by stiff resistance, a notable feature

displeasure. I must say that he failed to get the of which was the close co-operation between

e

organisation working as it should have done. The

Pakistani Army and Air Force. The two of them

General him self admits as much, w ithout

had obviously done their homework well, or our

meaning to. in the published version o f the

jaw an s reported that the PAF were Qu*c

0

National Security lectures that he delivered in appear whenever the Pakistani ground forces

this Institution in 1971. He said in those lectures

were in difficulties, and gave them most eflecuve

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/45

I T i r e TNTII A N FLEET m THE BAY OF BENGAL I N J U L Y - AUGUST 1965

EAST PAKISTAN

CALCUTTA

BURMA

MYSORE

BRAHMPUTRA

j BEAS ordered to

1 KHUKRI, KUTHAR

1

return to Bomb*)'

I KIRPAN, RANTTT

THAILAND

| orJead » re*um

It o B t tt o v

* r \

j x \

i

' \

ANDAMAN'

ISLANDS I

P*rolofA&N

NICOBAR \ ^

ISLANDS \

that he saw the Kutch incident as a prelude to an

attack by Pakistan in Jammu and Kashmir, and he

field. In the years that followed these lessons were

absorbed and applied."

therefore began the Army's preparations well in

advance. He omits to mention that the Air Force

The above excerpts indicate that until early

and the Navy were kept in the dark about this. He August 1965 the Chief of the Naval Staff, Vice

goes on to say that he often discussed the threat

Admiral Soman, was unaware of two things - that

with the Defence Minister and the Prime Minister

information was available to the Chief of Army Staff

and that, once in a while, he took the Air Chief

that Pakistan may attempt to seize Kashmir later in

along with him. The impression conveyed is that

the year and that the Chief o f Army S taff had

he looked upon the impending conflict as an

obtained the Government’s approval in principle for

Army affair, in which the use of the Air Force

the Army to counter attack Pakistan, if Pakistan

would be incidental. To my mind, this reflects an

attacked Kashmir.

attitude long prevalent in the Army, and only

recently dissipated, to the effect that its larger

Why was the Indian Fleet Sent to the Bay of

size and grea ter age gave it a commanding

Bengal

superiority over the other services and invested it

with the sole right to decide how wars should be

Admiral Soman recalls:*

fought. I may be reading too much into a single

“After the Indo Chinese conflict in 1962, the

statement, but to me it is axiomatic that effective

defence of the Andaman and Nicobar islands was

co-operation between the Services can grow only

left entirely to me. The Army refused to send even

out of mutual trust and full understanding of

a platoon there and we had to raise our own land

each others capabilities and limitations. I think

force with sailors in khaki uniform to man the

that was lacking in 1965.

various stations in these islands. So far as the

“In any case, the A ir Force and Navy, not

Navy was concerned, as soon as Pakistan started

having been a lerted about the possibility o f the trouble in Kutch, I had felt that my first

another w ar o v e r Kashmir, no inter-service priority would be these islands because while

contingency plans were drawn up, nor was any talking to various people during my visit to

course of action agreed upon with the Air Force in

Indonesia as the Fleet Commander a few years

the event o f its being called out to support the

earlier, and having been briefed on the

Army. This mental block against consultation

developments since then, I felt a little nervous

and joint planning continued right through the

about these islands. This was because when the

phase of guerrilla activity and was only partly

Army refused to send any units for their defence.

removed when Pakistani armour threatened to

I had taken on the responsibility of doing so with

cut the Jammu-Srinagar highway. It was at that

sailors with no experience in landfighting. But I

critical stage, on 1st September 1965, that the Air

had also placed MYSORE and two major ships in

Force was asked for air support, which it gave at

the area till the very last minute. It was only after

short notice. Complaints from our forward troops

the war had started and I was permitted to bring

about the limited extent of air cover in the war

the Fleet back to the We^t Coast that I brought

that follow ed w ere w ell-founded, for in the

the ships across to the Western theater because I

absence of precise plans the Air Force had simply

wanted to ensure that no opportunity was given

to Indonesia to start anything at the same time.

maintained its normal forces at its bases in the

Punjab and in Jammu and Kashmir. To do its job

Whether eventually it proved itself I do not know

Properly, some redeployment of squadrons and of

but prior to that, Soekarno was reported to have

been keeping an eye on the Bay islands.

logistic and communication facilities should have

“The Fleet, when it reached Bom bay, h ad to

been effected b efore the commencement of

be given this thoughtless order from the ‘higher

hostilities. Had the joint planners been able to do

authorities’ of not operating north of the latitude

their work in advance, I am certain more positive

of Porbandar. Nothing else could be done except

results w ou ld have been achieved in 1965.

to try and see that the Pakistani sh ip s did not However, apart from preserving the*statiis quo in

move towards the Andam an and Nicobar Islands

Kashmir, the 1965 war was valuable for the many

to hold hands with the Indonesians.

Practical lessons it taught us in the conduct o

operations from the highest level to combat in the

blueprint to Bluewater Pages 456 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/47

„ iT^toiiitjpnre on the presence

concern in M ay 1965 at the rise in Indonesian, „

“1 also had some inte g

, knew

that p re cip ita te d the d e c isio n to acquire n 1t*

of some Indonesian ships a

combined ships and su b m arin es. It helps to understand1351'’1

T fyr°cPesTof Pakistan and Indonesia w ould the reasons for delaying the recall of the Indian^

nelther^e against the Indian Fleet nor the Indian to Bombay till 1 September, when the Pakistan^

™ S a n d It was most likely to be for the capture crossed the international border to attack Kashmir 3

E

&

and N ic o b i Islands. 1 was quite

Another reason for ~ n

en*d n

i ,g th .

e Indian „

Fl..

e .e.t. t. c

convinced in my mind that the Indonesian Navy

Bay of Bengal seem s to have been not to forego %

knowing full well that only a small force of sailors o p p o rtu n ity fo r e x e r c is in g w ith a submarine in khaki/uniform was present on these islands,

particularly since the P akistan Navy had received %

could m ike, an attempt to capture the Nicobar

subm arine GHAZI from the American Navy in 1964.

Isla n d despite the then pretty poor state of Admiral Soman recalls:***

Indonesia ^ Navy.”

“After the fizzle-out of the Kutch affair, for which Was there any threat from Indonesia? Air Marshal

the Fleet sh ip s had been hurriedly brought out A sghar Khan, who had been the C h ie f of the from their refit and periodic maintenance, we had P akistan A ir Force d u rin g the R an n of K u tch the H obson’s cho ice of either com m itting t em incident, retired in J u ly 1965. Soon after In d ia b a c k to t h e ir r e f it a n d maintenance,or o crossed the Wagah border on 6 September, he was continuing to keep them operationa in or e

sent to China, Indonesia, Turkey and Iran to seek aid.

make full use of the (already projeeted)

In his memoirs, The First Round", he recounts his submarine training w ith a Royal

®

discussions with President Soekarno and Admiral

which w as due to arrive in India snori. y.

Martadinata of Indonesia:*

been our experience in the past tha ^

anti

u v u i uui

—

■*

r*v>prsifr “

sim ulated tra in in g on a tta ck teacn

rnlake

President Soekarno said that India’s attack on

submarine training schools ashore c

Pakistan was like an attack on Indonesia and

anti subm arine teams fully efficien •

garget

they were duty bound to give Pakistan all possible

“It was decided, therefore, tha

waS too

assistance. President Soekarno told him to take

away whatever would be useful to Pakistan in

h u n tin g a n d t r a c k in g 0 PPo rtu n ^

peri0^‘

valuable to be m issed even if, ^unT? ^ oe in th is emergency. Two R u ss ia n su p p lied

the ships w ere not in a s good a s

^ aSth^

submarines and two R ussian supplied missile

material state as they should be, so•

a^ aCjdn|j

boats were sent to Pakistan post haste.**

anti submarine searching, hunting

^ . ve an

Admiral Martadinata asked Air Marshal Asghar

K han “D on’t you w ant u s to take over the equipm ent and P e rso n n e l. w erCTehad assesS

efficient. In m aking this decision,

^ 0vetnbef

Andaman Islands? A look at the map will show

that we perhaps had tim e till a 0

that the Andaman and Nicobar Islands are an

1965 before things might get ho ag

j rfluS.

extension of S um atra and are in any case

between East Pakistan and Indonesia. What right

“In the context of th is a s ^ ^ s

j the

point out th a t w h ile M Y S O R E

£as

have the Indians to be there? In any case, the subm arine frigates w ere sent ou

Indonesian Navy w ill immediately commence

patrols of the approaches to these islands and Coast for anti s u ^ % r in ®

was P ^ e

Br

DI it

1 is

U5h

I

1 su

s bm

uumari

cu ne

iu

c Astut

-- e

- ,

-- VIKRAi , 1nntf 0

U- ve

- r

cany out aerial reconnaissance missions to see

{0

what the Indians have there".

the dry dock for her norm al u

Tep&xS 0{

periodic maintenance, particu ar y

tionin^ n{

In hindsight, lt would appear that the concern

her flight deck m a ch in e ry. m alfu

liveS

voiced to Admiral Soman by the Prime Minister and

w hich would have endangered v

A^° m

by the Defence Minister and Admiral Soman’s own pilo ts and cau sed l o ss e s o f a r c ^ ^ her concern at that time about the se c u rity of the c o n s i d e r a t i o n i n c o m m i t t i n g

a n

Andaman and Nicobar isla n d s w as not entirely d u rin g th is period w as that th m o n s o o ^ 5, ,e unfounded. Indeed, as will be seen in the Chapter on v isib ility co nd itio ns d u rin g the ™

^ val’^

detract somewhat from the fulloper

Russian A cq uisitio n s 1965 to 1971, it w as th is

sV #<*,

of such a ship. All ships from the E asi___^.

' ^ y racked Karachi only after the cease fire.

Blueprint to Bluewater Pages 421 et seq.

0 N TO TRIUMPH

due back from the anti submarine exercises in

"Fairly early during August, General Chaudhuri early S eptem ber 1965 and, after normal

and I went to Kashmir, we heard all the

maintenance, would have been operational again

Commanders, we discussed the situation and felt

by November 1965, by which time VIKRANT was

that the Army would be able to handle the

also scheduled to get ready.

situation. One did not really think at that time that

"As it happened, events forestalled our

it could result into a bigger, full scale war, mainly calculations. MYSORE and the first pair of

because the Army was absolutely certain that this

frigates to com plete their exercises with the

situation will not go out of hand. We thought that submarine carried out such normal periodic

the Army, assisted by the Air Force purely in

m aintenance as possible with the limited

logistic operations, could tackle the situation. And resources available at Visakhapatnam, and were

I think it was managed very w ell because the

deployed in the Andaman and Nicobar area from

Army regained control over the situation. There

where, during the monsoon period, smaller patrol

was no danger o f it becoming a bigger war. ”

craft are withdrawn. This was in accordance with

the normal operational programme of the ships

Vice Admiral N P Datta. then a Commander

and was necessary, as there had been reports of

serving in Naval Headquarters, recalls:*

surface and submarine ( of unknown nationality)

"Around the middle of August, I had gone to the

activity in this area. It was virtually in the middle

Naval Chief, with whom I had earlier served as the

of this deployment and before the second group of

Fleet Operations Officer. I gave him my. view that

ships exercising with the submarine had finished

if the Fleet was to be recalled, it would take a

their periodic maintenance, that all these ships

week or longer for them to get back to the west

had to be deployed to the West Coast to cater for

coast, after which they would require another

any Pakistan naval activity. Needless to say,

week or so to effect necessary repairs and

therefore, the material state of the ships, so far as

maintenance before they could be operational.

their propulsion systems were concerned, was by

“Admiral Soman said that this was the very

no means at the optimum, as it perhaps could

point that he had made to the Chiefs o f S taff have been had we foregone the anti submarine

Committee but had been overruled by the Army

exercise. I have no doubt, however, that the anti

Chief, General Chaudhuri, as the Chairman o f the

subm arine exercises carried out with the

Committee, who had said that if any alterations

submarine ASTUTE stood our ships in very good

were made in the disposition o f the Indian Fleet, if stead.

the ships were hurriedly recalled from Calcutta

“From intelligence available prior to the end

and sent back to Bombay, it would create a furore

of August, it was known that the Pakistan Fleet

in the press and it would forewarn the Pakistani

was in Karachi carrying out maintenance and

General S taff o f the Indian Armed Forces'

various exercises throughout the months of July

knowledge of their plans and hence their reaction

and August 1965, while ours was on the East

would be severe."

Coast. Being away from their homeport. Bombay,

This remark of Admiral Soman suggests that by

our ships had to continue to do with very meagre

mid August. General Chaudhuri had informed him of

maintenance and repair facilities and resources,

the Army’s intentions to cross the cease fire line and

which had yet to be developed on the East Coast.

of the need to avoid any action which might forewarn

“A warning on the worsening situation was

Pakistan.

sent to the FOCIF on 31 August, but it was not till

As regards the ambiguity as to who was the

the next day, 1 September 1965. that the Fleet

Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee in 1965

ships were ordered to rush back to the West

and the interaction between the Chief of Army Staff

Coast, and operational directives to the Fleet anc

and the Chief of the Naval Staff. Shri PVR Rao. the

Commands were issued two days later.

Defence Secretary recalls:

Why wasn’t the Fleet Recalled to Bombay Earlier

“The Chiefs of Staff Committee is presided over by

Air Chief Marshal Arjan Singh, the Chief of the Air

the longest serving service Chief and not by rank.

Staff in 1965 recalls:

In my time (1962 to 1966) it was first presided

Blueprint to Bluewater Page 424.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/49

over by A ir M a rsh a l Engineer, then by V ice participate in th e operations. And that i

Admiral Soman and then by General Chaudhun.

might h ave b een conveyed by the man

In 1965, Vice Admiral Soman was its Chairman.

O n th e N a v y s id e , I r e a lly cannot s a v ? '

The Chief of Army Staff was not the Chairman of

h a p p e n e d b e c a u s e t h e r e appeared to be the Chiefs of Staff Committee. In any event, the

adequate pressu re to participate in the 1965^°

Chairman of the Chiefs of Staffs Committee has

“W e u s e d to m e e t fo r lo n g periods in the no authority to over-rule any Chief of Staff. It is

Chiefs o f S ta ff C o m m ittee and I remember that

of course different if one Chief acceded to the view

the N avy’s p a rticip a tio n w as not discussed over point of another".

there. W h e th e r it w a s ra ised within the inner structure o f the iSfavy or in the MOD is a different

In another interview, Admiral Soman stated that

m atter o f w h ic h I w o u ld n ot know. I think the when the war began, he was the Chairman of the

general im p ression w a s th at there was no great

Chiefs of Staff Committee but as the Navy was not

keen n ess on th e p a r t o f th e Navy to go to war, given any offensive role, he left the Chairmanship in

T h at was th e im p ressio n I had got, but I do not favour of the C h ie f of the Arm y Staff, G eneral re m e m b e r A d m ir a l S o m a n or anybody else Chaudhun.

actually discussing w ith m e that he would do this

Air Chief Marshal Aijan Singh recalls:

or that”.

"I do not remember and I do not think there was In an interview, the FOCIF, Rear Admiral Samson

discussion amongst the Chiefs o f S ta ff on the stated:

Navy's participation. I do not think so. Every time there was a discussion amongst the Chiefs of

“Avery important lim itation in * e tasks assign^

Staff, records were kept. And if you look at the

to the Navy w as th a t any conflict wi

records, I do not think you will find any record of

would not m ean a to ta l w a r involving a

^

discussions at all on this. I do know there was

services b u t to b e lim ite d o n ly to ac 0 ^

never any discussion by Admiral Soman with me

borders. I and m y colleagues were awar

^

whether the Navy should participate or n ot The th a t th is u n d e r s t a n d in g k e tw e ^

war,te

Navy is closer to the Air Force and if any operation

countries w a s to lim it th e extent o

ctionol

has to be planned, it’s got to be a joint operation.

avoid civilian casualties as well as des ^ ^

And there was not a single discussion between

one another’s industries etc. So

^ ^ al.

Gen Chaudhuri and Admiral Soman and myself

was concerned, this lim itation was

on the participation of the Air Force in naval

though never spelt out in writing •

operations.

“Secondly somehow at that time everybody

From the foregoing, it emerges that.

was talking about one thing, everybody at that

had d

•

by end August, after the cease fire

to

time thought that the aircraft carrier was the main crossed, A dm iral Som an had recon ?. e scope°

weapon against Karachi They said that the Navy

Government’s decision not to enlarge

sta^5

could not fight without the aircraft carrier actually p a rticip a tin g and that the ca rrier was not conflict beyond that required to restoI*^it|1 oflW!

available because it was being refitted. I have a quo in Kashm ir, le a v in g th e Navy

g

feeling, without any positive proof, that there was defensive role. The non availability o

ofa

not enough pressure from the Navy to participate

carrier VIKRANT m ay have been supp

I think a lot depends on the Chief. A Chief can

defensive mindset.

m v e r ^ ^ c

convince the Government to do certain things in

#

In September, immediately after the

^ fri

war. The Government is very receptive during a

asked the Chief o f the Naval Staff to

f

war where the services are involved. I remember

signal to the N avy th a t In d ia w as a -

that everything I recommended was agreed to bv

Pakistan, the Ministry of Defence sen

gj-ate

Prime Minister Shastri. except our plan to attack

directive to Naval Headquarters, not o

0

the PAF around Dacca. That was probably wrong

a th re a te n in g or o ffe n s iv e m a n n e . e ac^ 0.4

on my part even to suggest it. He was not in

P o rb a n d a r an d fo r b id d in g o f f e n ®

T&

favour. He said “why extend the war"?

against Pakistan unless forced to

“So I think there was not enough pressure

formalised the Navy’s defensive role.

o f

-i

b u ilt up. Perhaps the G overn m en t w as not

•

T h e F le e t C om m a n d er w a s a w a ^ the ^

Governments reasons for constraining

convinced that the Navy w as fu lly prepared to

to defensive action.

SO/IWkNSmON TO TRIUMPH

Could the Navy Have Done More

control, seizing enemy merchant ships and

Both in the press and within the Navy, there was

attacking enemy warships at sea and their ports

criticism o f the Navy for not going into action and

without a proper formal declaration of war, one

doing something noteworthy, as had been done by the

wondered whether they realised that any such

Air Force’s successes in the air battles over Kashmir

action on the high seas, without the declaration

of war was liable to be branded as piracy,

and by the Army’s decimation of Pakistan’s American

especially if any neutral ships became involved.

supplied Patton tanks in the Punjab. Indeed, in

“The need for a ‘rethink’ on the question of the

response to a suggestion from Rear Admiral Nanda,

operation

and

control

o f

maritime

then in Mazagon Docks (and later CNS in the 1971

reconnaissance-has also become apparent.

war) that the Navy’s non-participation was affecting

Intelligence is vital for the Navy in planning its

the morale o f officers and men and that the CNS

operations and executing them. While the Air

should come and speak to them, Admiral Soman

Force, with their meagre resources and

came to Bombay and told them “We all have to do

preoccupations with other commitments,

what we are told to do”. This did not assuage their

valiantly tried to give the limited cover agreed

frustration. Admiral Soman remained circumspect

upon, it was disconcerting to comprehend the

about the Government's directive that the Navy desist

fact that of the 13.5 lakh square miles of coverage

from offensive action.

required for the operations undertaken by the

After the 1965 operations, Admiral Soman ,

Fleet, a bare one lakh square miles could actually

addressing the senior officers of the Navy, said:*

be covered.-This too was achieved in 24 sorties of

188 hours by the IAF with its Liberators and

“Notwithstanding our initial disadvantage of the

Super Constellations, augmented by 60 sorties of

location of the Fleet on the East Coast at the time

160 flying hours of the Alizes. This meant that the

of the commencement of the undeclared war, and

Fleet ships’ endurance, limited as it was due to

the material limitations of the ships after three

the lack of a replenishment tanker, had to be

months o f exercises away from base, the Fleet,

devoted to searching for enemy ships, hoping for

w ith th e h elp o f the valian t efforts of the a chance contact, which was a terrible waste,

Dockyard, took the initiative to seek the enemy

quite apart from its ineffectiveness, particularly

and bring him to battle. Although this was not

with our meagre resources."

achieved, I am sure it had placed itself in a

position to contain the enemy in his waters if he

As can be seen from the foregoing reconstruction

had ventured out, which I know was all that was

of events, the Navy went beyond the constraints

expected of the Fleet.

imposed by the Government. Although instructions

“It is indeed a great pity that the role assigned

had been received not to seek action at sea outside

to the Navy was mainly a defensive one. History

our territorial waters, all ships were directed to hunt has proved over and over again that at sea, more

and destroy submarines whenever and wherever they

than perhaps on land and in the air, offense is the

were detected. The Seahawk aircraft o f the Navy,

best form o f defence. In the days of old, when

which coincidentally arrived in Jamnagar on 1

there was no wireless communication, Nelsons

September for its annual armament work up, were

could put their telescopes to their blind eyes and

specifically tasked to put out of action, the high-

get away w ith it as heroes on top o f their

power radar installation at Badin in Pakistan, which

respective columns. It indeed took courage to put

is only 135 nautical miles away from Jamnagar.

the telescope to the blind eye and win laurels. But

Events precluded this operation but the offensive

it takes equal, if not greater, courage (perhaps of a

spirit was there. The Indian Fleet, despite the

different kind) to play the tethered role and cur

restriction of not operating north of Porbandar, had

the offensive spirit o f a fighting force in t e no hesitation in planning the first sweep with Alizes

greater n ation al in terest as claimed by t e

searching well north of Porbandar in the hope that

contact would be made with the Pakistan Flotilla.

authorities.

‘The implications of a war at sea did not seem

When this did not happen, FOCIF had no hesitation

to have been fully understood in the Government

on subsequent nights of proceeding northwards

agencies at many levels, but when some of t ese

whenever he thought he might catch the enemy.

agencies talked glibly of blockade, contraban

*

Blueprint to Bluewater Pages 463 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/51

they are supreme and unchallenged on

Given the Government's determination to lim it

and that the enemy territory is at their m

Seas

the scope of the conflict as much as possible (and the

Pakistani naval raid on D w arka left th e*?’^

resultant restrictions o f‘no offensive operations an d and men of the In d ia n N avy infuriat°ri

s

'do not proceed north of Porbandar), given the C h ief somewhat humiliated. T h is w as particula l *nd of Amy Staffs desire of not giving Pakistan any

of the senior e c h e lo n s o f o u r Navy o n ^ h ^

inkling of the Army's plans (not agreeing to the Fleet

devolved the r e s p o n s ib ilit y for the m a n being brought back to Bombay earlier) and given the ambiguities that arise when th ere is no fo rm al defence of India. I w as then the Deputy Ch f declaration of war (trade warfare and co n trab an d

Naval Staff (now Vice C h ie f of Naval Staff) a d control when neutral ships get involved), it is difficult vowed to myself that if ever there was anoth 1

to see what more the Navy could have done.

round involving naval fo rces and I was in

kind of position of responsibility, I would go to the

Post War Nava] Reactions

farthest extremes to teach the enemy a lesson and

to avenge this dastardly act. T h is opportunity was That the Government was aware of th e N avy's

to come in 1971 w h e n I w a s F lag Officer frustration at having been restricted to defensive

Commanding in Chief, W estern Naval Command

in Bombay.

Minister

ChaVan' the then Defence

“In 1965, the In d ia n Navy had gone to war with their hands tied behind th eir backs and al A

'

bH '1 effiClent r0le

but im m obilised. A G o v e rn m e n t instruction under the signature of a Jo in t Secretary, Ministry

“ “"try. The Navy protected

h " Ce o f th e

of Defence, laid down that the In dian Navy was

.WtaJ

our security M

^ WhiCh Were

Indian coast line AJ Ůrpor(s and the

not to proceed m ore th a n 2 0 0 m iles beyond destined for our p o r t s J l

s h ip s

Bombay nor north of the p a ra lle l of Porbandar.

"ternational trade was n! Safdy a n d o u r

This meant a fettering of the Navy’s mobility. The Interfered with by the Pah ? perm 'tte d to be

Joint Secretary’s com m unication w as given to the

then CNS, Admiral BS Soman. W hen he told me

about it, I was naturally most upset and told my Plotted t 0

WUhin the bounds andVce^ m en t

Chief that if I were in h is position,* I would protest vehemently; for the Government decision and its

Within the m

import and im plem entation w ould have a most s s & s & s a a * . ais„ nct

demoralising effect on the Navy as a whole.

A dm iral Som an, o n b e i n g a s k e d by ^

r e c e n t l y , gave h i s v e r s i o n o f w h a t t r a n s p i r e d then, n h is c h a r a c t e r is t ic f o r t h r i g h t m a n n e r . H e r e i 1

..

ared". Admiral

l n h i s o w n w o r d s :

As far as I rem em ber, it w as the rnor^i^ n

after the start o f the w a r that I got a file »

e Ministry sign ed b y S a rin , w h o w as

oint Secretary,* sayin g that the Navy lS_

0 ^initiate any o ffe n siv e a c tio n a^a. ve Pakistan at Sea and is not to operate aD

e latitude of Porbandar except in PUI*?._teiy

nY

Navy offensive action. I imrne

,

contacted the M inister. M r Y B Chavan.

® ed to see him; at o u r m eeting I s r any Protested against th is o rd er an d said i

in^u cannot accept it from a Jo in t

^ e Ministry. If I rem em ber cor r f C

if

J a v a n initialed the directive and askcd ^ {

do* 1 re plied that in tha

the Prime Minister.

WaS ^ Secretary Defence Production.

nts were m ade for me to see the

account w as forwarded to M r PVR Rao who w as the Shastriji, the next morning, and I

D efen ce S e cre ta ry in 1965. T h e q u e rie s an d h is prime

Twenty m in u tes w ith h im . O n h is

r e p lie s le a v e no room fo r d o u b t r e g a r d in g the had about

" au

that it was a Cabinet decision - I am

Government’s intentions.

assurance *

he tQ0 in it ia le d th e file - I

•

W a s

th e r e a w r it t e n d ir e c t iv e f r o m th e

not SUrH T o n the understan din g th at sh ou ld I accepted c

, may be allowed to see the

G o v e rn m e n t/ Ministry o f D efence to the C N S not to

consider « n e o s e a r y . ^ C om m an der-in -C h ief.

take offensive action?

PreSl[de^as°often derisively asked by civilians and

M r Rao states:

'

of the other two services w h y ou r Navy

“T h e re is no d is p u te th a t the G o v e rn m e n t S d not do anything in retaliation again st the

directed, as a m atter of policy, the Navy not to raid on Dwarka. The question was asked even by

play any role in the 1965 conflict. W hether there those who knew that our co a st is su ch th a t a w as a written directive from the Defence Ministry, sneak raid on a remote part o f it is possible. But it as claimed by the CNS, can only be checked from is not surprising that our reputation plummeted;

the NHQ re co rd s. Th e lea st one c a n do is to more so because our aircra ft c a rrie r V IK R A N T

p ublish an extract from the NHQ records from the

was in dry dock undergoing routine m aintenance:

alleged written order of the Defence M inistry”.

it was openly called a ‘white elephant’. Many rude

remarks were made about our sm art uniform s,

In th e re c o rd s p re s e n tly a v a ila b le , no s u c h foreign jaunts, and the p ro verb ia l g irl in every written directive has yet been located.

port, all amounting to a ‘big cipher when it came

to fighting’. Few knew that all this obloqu y w as

•

W as the G o vern m en t right in deciding to localise

brought on the N a vy by a d ic t a t o f o u r o w n

the conflict?

Government.

M r Rao states:

It was difficult for the N avy to u n d erstan d

the reason for such an order. M aybe it was to lim it

“T h is w as the G o vern m e n t of In d ia ’s lim ite d the scope of the 1965 operation against Pakistan,

o b je ctiv e a n d it w as a ch ie v e d . W h e th e r the maybe the G overn m en t th o u g h t th a t o u r old G overnm ent should have em barked on a w ider t h ^ n o t be able to m ake a good showing.

o p era tio n can be debated, b u t it-w as not the m u l f ^ t a n Fleet th en c o n s is te d o f s h ip s o f Prime M inister’s idea”.

little

6 Same

as ours - or perhaps ju s t a

•

A fter the Kutch incident, did the C h ie f o f the A rm y

when , r ei; I he reason w iU no d ou b t com e ou t

S t a f f in fo r m th e M in is t r y o f D e f e n c e o f h is

wars is published

a ss e ss m e n t that Pakistan w ould attempt to seize

Kashm ir later in the year?

Surrender’ 'v i 0° ° a of the 1 9 7 1 w a r. 'N o W ay B u t M r Rao states:

“I thou

31 Krishnan states:*

Pakistan ° t h ^

round o f aggression by

“A fte r the K u tc h ce a se fire , n o n e in the Government expected trouble until it erupted on every0ne's dis

WaF’ *n w h i c h ’ m u c h to

Pkyed little nrgUSt and con stern ation, the Navy

4th A ugust”.

humiliation

F ^ ' 1 rem em ber the hurt and

•

H a d th e C h i e f o f A r m y S t a f f r e c e i v e d th e

a^istani fro n ta l + * ° VGr t lle ^a c t t h a t e v e n a ir0ntal a tta rlr

______ r ... .

.

,

,

^ brought f , attack on one of o u r ports had

G o vern m en t's approval in principle f o r the A r m y to

counterattack in a p la ce o f its choice if Pakistan

e successful h

retribution. (Reference is to

attacked in Kashm ir?

akistan flee+ U

a*ta ck by u n its of the

coast.)**

0n D w a rk a on the S a u r a s h t r a

M r Rao states:

“Rather, the G overnm ent p ressed the A rm y to

^ ^ c e r n i

attack. The Chief of the Army Staff wanted all the three services to participate. In my opinion, he se n se d th at th" '

was never serious about th is but w as trying this effort *

e s e rlo u s eno ugh to

gambit to support h is inaction”.

— -— [t at c la rific a t io n . T h e above

TRANSITIO N T O TR IU M PH /53

Mr PVR Rao, the Defence Secretary in 1965 has

In this connection. Mr Pradhan's memoirs state *

stated that it was the determined policy of Prime

■(On 4 September} The situation was getting

Minister Lai Bahadur S hastri and the Indian

desperate. The loss of Akhnur would be a major

Government not to allow operations to escalate.

disaster and Chavan decided to go ahead with an

There were no Army or Navy operations against

operation that had been planned after the Rann

East Pakistan.

of Kutch incident. On 20 April, Shastri had

declared before Parliament “If Pakistan continues

The 1AF attack on Lalmanirhat was the result of a

to disregard'reason and persists in its aggressive

communication gap of Air HQ' not informing the Air

activities, our Army will defend the country and

Station in time. The 1AF did not retaliate against the

decide its own strategy and employment of its PAF’s subsequent attacks on K a la ik u n d a on 7

manpower and equipment in the manner it September, on Bagdogra on 10 Septem ber and oh deems best." General Chaudhuri, with the Barrackpore and Agartala on 14 September.

approval of the Defence Minister, had worked out

In the Arabian Sea, GHAZI did n ot attack

a plan code-named ‘Riddle’ to launch an offensive merchant shipping nor did the Indian Navy seize action to secure the eastern bank of the Ichhogil Pakistani merchant shipping on the high seas.

Canal. It was felt that the mere presence of the

In his book, “The First Round" A ir Marshal

Indian troops on the canal opposite Lahore would Asghar Khan has stated: draw Pakistani forces from Sialkot and other

areas and thus reduce its offensive capabilities in

“President Ayub Khan said th a t sin ce East

other sectors. Moreover, if India could establish a

Pakistan had not been attacked, it would be

bridgehead over the canal, the Pakistan army

better not to launch strikes a g a in s t enemy

would be forced to fight there and that would lead

airfields in that area. He felt that considering our

to the attrition of her smaller army. By basing the

difficulties there, it was not in our interest to start defence line along the canal. India would confine

ostilities on the Eastern front.

the war to Pakistani territory in addition to

O u r N a v y w a s k e e n t o i n t e r c e p t o n t h e h i g h acquiring a large chunk of Pakistani territory.

s e a s t h e m e r c h a n t s h i p s t a k i n g s u p p l i e s t o I n d i a Operation ‘Riddle’ was planned to meet an

.eventuality like the one the Indian’s were facing

O f f i n g

f r o m d o i n g s o b y o u r F o r e i g n on 4 September"

w i t h L ° p e a r

i n t e r n a t i o n a l o p i n i o n . H o w e v e r C h a i r m a ^ ^ a ^ ' s t -a n * A d m i r a l A h s a n , t h e n Finally Shri Rao states:

Authorising

lnland Water T ra n sp ort

“Notwithstanding Government’s directive in the

captured t h ^ e m ^ n ^ 'in a Hghtning action

Defence Minister’s morning meetings to the CNS

hundred India

et

more than one

about his role thereafter, he seems to have

with their valuable aStal ^Ipptag vessels along

embarked on certain actions on his own. The

The

CarS°*

account speaks for itself. The Fleet was in a poor

state. This was not the Navy’s fault. It had got °fthe PakisUnNaw mart« ™ recce capability

only measly funds. Whatever resources

to escalate naval con n in g ofPakistan's reluctance

Government could spare for defence was given in

For™ toNhave be^ S ' r^ e ^ ^ a c h e s to Karachi

1962 - 1965 to the Army and the Air Force. Going

SA 16S1 ° ? S^ C

c o r rtred' The Pakistan Air

by the account of the 1965 war as written above. I

Air Force s t a t e s - Th

T p

he ^

Hi i Am erican supplied

would consider the decision of the Government to

story of the Pakistan

restrict the Navy to a low key was fully justified!"

T h e SA \6‘s of No 4. *

m a ritim e role nr! 4 S^ a d m «

In hindsight, three points of the 1965 war bear

movement of sht

cUl»6 and^

6 given thC

noting:

aircraft carrier

PartlCul^ eP °rting the

The first was the determination of the

h “Within t h T E ^ '

UUrly th« enemy

Governments of both India and Pakistan not to

hours with only w

U days

,

escalate the conflict.

The total operaUonalfiUal'ftecSot)(.r

3 flew 72

9 8 : 3 5 h o u r s tv ,.

^ n B r t , lw ? e r^ t i o n a l n i in t o

hůrs. the

tw nal P^ots.

single month. H u ^ C ^

mbnth was

'red

-----

ret1 Percent - 8 Url

•

Pages 265 et seq.

servWu 8 a n y

^

1CeabiUty o f

54/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

both the SA 16 and helicopters was maintained throughout the month.”

The third point is that the raid on Dwarka seems

more to have been a reaction to India’s crossing the

Indo Pakistan b o rd e r on 6 Septem ber, than a destroyers t on I P ^ ° ne ° r two of th^

preplanned action to provoke the Indian Fleet to join

r , i " i v ; r , ChH,,agon8 ,n

battle. The post w ar rh eto ric in Pakistani (and Bay of Bengal the inH-3

Sea *anes in the

Indian) literature that the Indian Fleet was bottled up

- J * .

for fear of the GHAZI is the resu lt o f widespread in h m nnf ° ther imPortant requirements were taken

ignorance of the decisions o f both Governments to

ht nd from 1966 onwards like a u g m ^ n ^ S

minimize the scope o f conflict.

seaiIc tS aJbnatenanCHandrCpalrfacUities anddeP°ts

a d S n is W

*

re° rganiSin« toe command and

Lessons Learnt

administrative structure in the light of the 1965 war hese were to stand the Navy in good stead in the

Several lessons were learnt from the 1965 operations.

icj/ 1 war.

Foremost was the need for a fleet tanker which would

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/55

The Russian Acquisitions 1965 to 1971

Pieamble

he was asked a question “You call yourself non-

aligned but you buy all m ilitary equipment from

1950S' RUSSla f0Und « difficult tO

the West. Perhaps Nehru had no real answer to

give except that “Well, nothing has been offered to

us . So he was told th a t “w e w ill give you anything that you want”. Nehru sent a cable to

■socialist- bloc of Russia and China S e n w "

ew Delhi to say that a top level A ir Force team

s ould get ready to come to Moscow and that he

giving up reparations!

1 ®_Separate treaty

would personally brief this team on his return

lrom Moscow.

rw f 0

Air Marshal M ookherjee, then

Russia's support of India's stanrf Se£urit^ Council,

? Air Staff’ Air c mde Arjan Singh, my

firm and steadfast.

Kashmir became

were 6

aS a ^ Capt and a couple of others

N

™a fe

^orm a team. We were briefed by

requirements Uke \ a n k f

C°re defence

said theft

^ePar^urG. If I recall right, Nehru

destroyers and frigates bnmh*

ry’ cr^iseVs

visible nn<i-+Jrin^ ^is visit to M oscow he felt a were being acquired

f c S T W ® alrCraft

attitude anri^ chan&e in the governance and the

better understanding of Indian

P with * e

compart

a1PProac^1 of the Soviet leadership

started making overtures to disola? n Russiar>s

prime source for India’s defence

a

tain as the

“But", he said ^ ^ had known in the Stalin era.

toter Dtfcra

5 t o " " ' ? * , ' * PVR £

Very sure. So v

^ave to be careful, we are not

offer you

* *

t^lere and try whatever they

” * D' p” s'

•

Qc ‘

CCpt no ‘^ c o n tin e n ta l bombers"-

“When the Air Force han

CaUs:

In i 95

9 fi

sr

- ~ w « m e n t a i Domoers • x »

tto

o negotiate

n e g o tia te fo

for

r tth

h ee C

O ^

o f \ h ° ° ^

£ngl

$ a

a n

n d

d tin

n «5

19 a

50 n ^ .

IOrthrr‘ *

\ h

ghtt descr

^

fpt^ h

U5n chev v isited India. His

I T

^

t h

e

^

A

^

^

0^

52, n o r t h e r ^ ^ P t i o n of' K a T m i r 'T s " nh~e tech n ical

making ^

overt^eS

&nd

^

^

Su^

Sted

an

a d

n

d Brita

Bri in

ta

in al

a s

l o

s ,

o

, yo

y u

o

u ne

n v

e e

v r

e '

r kn

k o

n

o

Shchev'S \ \ ^ n CdD KirpaT ^ hC Navy's needs'

these

these things

things will

will tu

t r

u n

r .

n

We

W

e Sh

sh "

n ! u uh

u ich

h Wa

W Y

a

y

“DuringhiSM Slaff- He recalfs gh WaS ° n M"

S £ £ ? ° “ b0th- JUSt

safeguard^ 11*our

^PUay-° ac^>re

repeated offers

sut'ng duck alKthe largea^ ’t's from Russia. He

* eaPons wh)^ ecaUse R P® uke cruisers were

in 195™^ulri^X edSSa^tS

the Air Force.

atest aircraft for

its sh?e macie a strolCi destroy th d developed

Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar recalls-

,

^

h S S S a B

‘ Nehru was the first leader of a non com™

.

country to be invited to the Soviet Union

P . n „ „

s s ? -

In 1 9 5 7 . the Russian Defence Minister, Marshal

Chinese threat. He replied that what India needed

Zhukov, visited India. In Cochin, Rear Admiral RD

was a strong, mobile, Army, Navy and Air Force, well

K a ta ri. the F le e t C om m a n d er, in v ite d him to a equipped with the latest weapons. Instead of a

b a n q u e t on board the flagship. In his memoirs, “A prestigious, overhauled, old British aircraft carrier Sailor Remembers” he recalls:*

(which he called the fifth leg of a dog and an easy

target), India should go in for a submarine fleet to

“From the moment Marshal Zhukov, stepped on

guard her long coastline.**

board, he v ir tu a lly im p a led me again st the The strategic defence review undertaken by India

centre-line capstan and demanded to know why

in 1963 viewed China as the primary threat. To cope

we were acquiring an aircraft-carrier. Resisting

with a combined threat from China and from

the temptation to tell him that it was none of his

Pakistan, the requirements of the Army, Navy and Air

business, I tried to explain to him the reasons

Force were quantified in the 1964-69 Defence Plan.

which induced us to do so, but he could not, or

The gist of the requirements were sent to America,

would not, accept them.

Britain and Russia in advance of Defence Minister

“The discussion was obviously reaching a

Chavan’s visits to these countries in 1964.

point of exasperation to both sides but the climax

came w hen Z h u k o v m ade the provocative

1964

observation that we were buying the carrier at the

behest of the British and to please them. That was

Defence Minister Chavan’s Delegation to

too much to accept, and I was provoked into

Russia

saying “Marshal Zhukov, you are a renowned

military leader and one o f Russia’s heroes in the

In Russia, the Defence Minister’s delegation were

last war. I, therefore, consider it a great honour

shown a submarine, a submarine depot ship, and

that you should have deigned to discuss military

small craft like a missile boat, a torpedo boat and a

matters with humble me. But you must concede

patrol boat.

The assessments of the naval members of the

that I would advise my Government in a manner

delegation were that while the submarines were

that I feel is best for my country and not at the

suitable, the smaller craft might not be suitable

behest of any foreign power”. That, regrettably,

during monsoon conditions. As regards missile

brought the conversation to an abrupt halt.

boats, it was felt that even though their mobility made Zhukov m arched straigh t to his place at the

them very effective for coastal defence of ports, their dinner table (the dinner itself was not quite ready

acquisition should receive lower priority than the

to be served). The meal was a near silent affair

acquisition of submarines.

with the silence of tension”.

Mr RD Pradhan, IAS. was the Private Secretary of

During Mr Krishna Menon’s tenure as Defence

Defence Minister YB Chavan from 1962 to 1965. He

Minister from 1957 to 1962, a landmark defence

accompanied the Defence Minister in 1964. In his

agreement was concluded for the supply of the latest

memoirs “Debacle to Revival", he states:***

Russian MIG 2 1 fighter aircraft to be followed by their T h e fact that the Defence Minister of India was

progressive production in India.

visiting the Soviet Union, at that point of time,

After China’s attack in 1962, India urgently

was Itself of great political significance. Chavan

needed aircra ft, h elicop ters, tanks, arms and

had already visited the United States and was

amm unition. B rita in and A m erica had limited

scheduled to visit the United Kingdom. It was

themselves to supplying mainly weapons for the

known that India had not received the expected

mountain d ivision s facin g China and minor

aid and assistance from the United States and it

equipment. Russia’s response was positive and they

was clear that as far as the Indian Air Force was

agreed to meet India’s needs.

concerned. India would have to depend only on

Marshal Zhukov was not alone in his views on me

the Soviets. They had already agreed in principle

Navy’s acquisition o f an aircraft carrier. In 196J.

to supply MIGs and also help to set up factories to

India's ambassador in Moscow asked the R u s s i a n

manufacture MIG-2 Is in India.

Defence Minister, Marshal M a l i n o v s k y , what sort ol defence p reparedness India needed against the page 83.

Stalin to Gorbachov by TN Kaul Page 57.

Pages 211 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/57

“Knowing his closeness to Khrushchev,

defence efforts a n d th a n k e d the Soviet Union f Chavan was conscious that the success of his

the positive resp o n se h e h a d received. He placed mission greatly depended on his talks with

before C hairm an K h ru s h c h e v 'th e only issue’

Marshal Malinovsky.

that had'rem ained u n resolved.

“An unexpected result of the Soviet

“K h ru sh ch ev s p o k e e lo q u e n tly of the authorities’ offer to meet India’s defence

economic cooperation betw een the two countries.

requirements was the perceptible change in the

He regarded B hilai as on ly a sam ple of fruitful attitude of our Army and Navy top brass towards

lndo-Soviet cooperation th a t should be further

Soviet-made equipment and armaments.

expanded. He renewed the offer made by Marshal

“Until that time, Soviet assistance was

Malinovsky to give all th e arm s and equipment

envisaged only for the Air Force for which Krishna

that India needed and added that according to his

Menon had worked hard and had come under

information, there was a gap between what had

political attack. By the time Chavan visited

been offered by the State C om m ittee and what

Moscow, the Indian Navy, which had refused so

Chavan wanted, regarding the period of credit.

far to look for their requirements outside the

He had decided to be a good arbitrator and divide

United Kingdom, was receptive to a suggestion to

the difference exactly midway between the Soviet

at least consider the possibility of Soviet

offer and Chavan’s expectations!”

assistance Till that time, right from top to

™

*aVy appeared t0 be 50 stron&y pro- Admiral Nanda recalls: British that no one could imagine acquiring

anything outside the United Kingdom Uwas

“T h e r e w a s a f a r e w e l l p a r t y i n t h e K r e m l i n g i v e n fortunate that Rear Mmiral SM Nanda, Deputy

b y t h e S o v i e t D e f e n c e

M i n i s t e r

M a r s h a l

CNS. was a member of Chavan's earlier

Malinovsky. T h e D e f e n c e M i n i s t e r a n d t h e delegation to .the United State* n »v

earller

D e f e n c e S e c r e t a r y w e r e d i s c u s s i n g t h e f i n a we stood vis-a-vis the Western X T *Where

r e q u i r e m e n t s o f w h a t t h e t h r e e s e r v i c e s w a n t e d .

came to Moscow with an open mind™ ^

and

N o w u n k n o w n t o m e . t h a t d a y t h e y h a d r e c e i v e d i n s t r u c t i o n s f r o m t h e G o v e r n m e n t i n D e l h i t o s a y voting the N ^ v a l S d j S t e S n Lem % l°

y o u m a y a c q u i r e A r m y a n d A i r F o r c e e q u i p m e n t .

U

n a v a * equipment at a l l f r o m Russia.

Just before we entered

u

Before the p a rty fin is h e d , a b o u t fiv e or si Naval Commander-in-Chief iv, n r artne- ^

“A r i m ^ ^ d m ir a ls g o t a r o u n d m e a n d sai the Gulf of Leningrad toll ^

SSR Fleetin

shins?" ^ an da- te ll us w h a t is w r o n g w ith ou perhaps for the first time in t h T ” thal 11 Was

that foreign civilians were beino f I ? * 1 hlstorV

i n s t r u c t -

1

d i d n , t

k n o w

a b o u t

t h

A

“ N o t h i n o Ů S ^r o m o u r G o v e r n m e n t .

S o I s a l

aboard a Soviet submarine SoL'th

t0 come

was racing away from the coast ^ SUbmart«e

t e l l i n g t h T ° n 5 " ' T h e y t h o u g h t t h a t I w a s n o unsteady feet, we did not re

f°r our

W

t h e t r u t h -

S o t h e y s a i d * * W e a r e

f o r t h e A i r

^o r t t l e A r m y e q u i p m e n t a n

submarine was being subjected t0 te that the

pressure on the outside and wl treni«WJoi»

eci u i p m e n t

v * e q u l P m e n t b u t n o t f o r a n y n a v a going several hundred feet down AfterK r3pldly

t e a m . Y o u m Ů a r e

N a v a l m e m b e r o f t h e

of cruising under water, during ^

^ ° hours

a g a i n s t t h e

^ a v e a d v i s e d y o u r M i n i s t e r

given a demonstration of its m ai,

We Were

t ° t h i n k v e r v f T *a S e

n a v a l e q u i p m e n t ” . 1 h a

the lethal power of its torpedoes J erability and

the port.

orpedoes. we returned to

1 s a id ^ u t0 What could have g° ne

bvioUs\y the A r ^

iS h a s h a p p e n e d a g a in -

Chavan’s meeting with the rv^«

e money and the^

F orce h a v e ta k e n all

USSR Council of Ministers,

^

*rri sure the same

U° ^ ° ney left for 1116 NaVy'

had been fixed for 9 September

voi

^e finding

aPPens w ith y o u . You

usual courtesies. Chavan convev^

1 the

Minister Lai Bahadur Shastri's «

Pr'me

P r o ^ aVy- ^

S

o dd! !!iCUlt t0 * * m o n e y for

£°olem is

. ld that a e a in ^

5 ® ? *

against China our

Khrushchev and talked about his imneCtta8s to

the visit to Leningrad. Volgograd 2 ? ' ° ^ Qf

verv

as far as our M rontier and not at sea.

-^J^ority".

avy is c°ncerned. it has a

elaborated on India’s need to strengthen Us

58/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

e s a

a

i n

- know w hat had

°ns from our Prime

M i n i s t e r , w h o h a d b e e n i n f l u e n c e d b y t h e B r i t i s h Navy.

In the case o f the “Oberon" type

a n d t h e A m e r i c a n G o v e r n m e n t s , t h a t w e s h o u l d submarine, Chavan was told not to make even a

g o t o t h e R u s s i a n s . A n d s o i n 1 9 6 4 , w e d i d formal request.

n o t t a k e t h e R u s s i a n s h i p s a n d s u b m a r i n e s t h a t

“During our stay in London, Lord

w e r e b e i n g o f f e r e d t o . u s ” .

Mountbatten monitored the talks closely. I guess

he suggested that Chavan make one last effort to

Defence Minister Chavan s Delegation to

appeal to the old links between UK and India, to

Britain

see if Harold Wilson and his government would

relent on assistance to India.

In his book, Mr Pradhan states:*

“The communique issued at the end of the

talks papered over the failure. It emphasized the

“On C havan’s re tu rn from M oscow in mid

British ministers’ awareness of the fact that

September, w here he had been assured o f a

Britain had In the past been the main supplier of

supply of frigates and even submarines if India so

military equipment to the Indian defence forces.

desired, there was rethinking in the Navy. Until

Their anxiety at India’s recent efforts to cast her

that time, Britain had been the sole supplier of

net further afield for defence supplies was subtiy

naval equipment.

referred to.

The last paragraph of the

“Lai Bahadur Shastri felt that before making

communique reaffirmed the importance which

any com m itm ent to the Soviets, the Defence

they (the Indian and British Ministers) attach “to

Minister should v is it B ritain to find out the the closest possible cooperation between the

attitude of the British Government. Apparently,

services” and expressed the hope that within the

the situation had become favourable with the

spirit of the Commonwealth partnership, close

advent of the Labour Party in 1964 under Prime

liaison would continue to be maintained between

Minister Harold Wilson. Chavan was not too

them. It was clear that while Britain could or

enthusiastic sin ce he had form ed his own

could not assist, India was not expected to seek

assessm ent.

He had w itn essed the close

help elsewhere”.

coordination between the USA and the UK on the

There were two basic reasons why Britain was

quantum and scope o f m ilitary assistance.

unable to meet the Indian Navy’s needs for destroyers

During his discussions in Washington, he had

and submarines. These were.

been told that they would not consider military

assistance in th e naval field. However he

•

The British Navy itself was being down-sized due

reluctantly agreed to visit London and make an

to cutbacks in their budget. It was short of the

effort, especially when Mountbatten urged him to

type of destroyers and submarines which India

do so, since acquiring naval craft from the USSR

wanted and could not spare any for India.

would have far-reaching implications for the age-

.

India’s needs were immediate and building new

old relationship between the British and the

destroyers would take too long.

Indian navies.

To meet India's desire to acquire the latest

“The previous Conservative Party government

submarines rather than learn on old ones, the British

had indicated its willingness to collaborate in

e

agreed to re-examine whether they could provide

financing of three Leander class frigates. In ia

deferred credit to build a new Oberon class

wanted Daring class destroyers. Denis Healey,

submarine in Britain. Till it was ready, India could

the Defence Secretaiy explained to Chavan t eir

take an older submarine on loan to meet immediate

difficulty in offering any sizeable assistance since

Britain was facing a serious balance of payments

needs.

crisis. The new Labour Government was making

The Navy’s Reluctance to Switch to Russian

a fresh assessment of its defence requiremen s

Acquisitions

and was not in a position to make a irm

com m itm ent. So far as the Indian Navy s

In his book "The Indian Navy's Submarine Arm".

requirements for the Daring class destroyers were

Admiral Chatteijt states:**

concerned, he bluntly said no. Instead, t ey

"The Navy was reluctant to go in for Soviet ships/

could make an offer of older destroyers w c

r-..hmarines on several counts. All ships and

were eventually to be phased out in the Brit s

Page 229 et seq.

**

Page 42.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/59

craft of the Navy were of British origin. Spares

“In early A p ril, th ere w as a meeting of the h

v.eil

o.d1 *. in ships a ' n

J d de

A p

pro

j t

o s

t swe

werre

e for

lor th

the

e BBrriittiisshh

Secretary's Committee In w h ich the activities of

held to ships and

commonaUty of

ships. There was

the In d o n e sia n s a ro u n d the Andamans and

*“

eq ’

u*

ip m T

e ,

n

t

* n »

o{

Nicobars were discussed. The Navy stressed the

the same country "Wc

.

^ shote need for m aintaining a naval presence there to deal with th is situ a tio n . O n the basis of that discussion, the Navy prepared a draft paper In s a s ^ ^ s s s s s

w

, h

, ich it reco

c m

or m

a e

m n

c d

n e

ocd

u th

u a

, ti we a„g

ea, in

UI

1 approa

„ c

d h

+

CtnfAc TTK

Rnftftta for naval

s

vess n

els. T r

h is *

p a p

e u

r k

w

aa

s n

d

p

a R

ssu

e s

ds

,

a

th

rf

°

o r

and to

cases initial training also.

ugh the

Vn the UK. and were very familiar with ^ «-ish

Wh° aPProved u and then lt

equipment and the philosophy and routme tor

went to the E xternal A ffa irs M inister and the their operation and maintenance. There were no

A ^ w Ce ,M inlster- 11 cam e b a ck by the end of language problems for training Indian personnel

P /early May> bY which time the Rann of Kutch

in the UK on ships / submarines and in their

training establishments".

operations had started.

did

Kutch incident, we found that we

The basic question now became whether or not to

ifno &et enůgh sym pathy from the West. In

switch over from British to Russian acquisitions.

e ° f

Panting out to the Americans that the

Several objections had to be overcome. The Navy’s

a** °

atton tan k s w a s a v io la tio n of the

entire administrative, training, maintenance, logistic, EKPnr* nCeS giv en to In d ia b y President

technical, operational and tactical procedures and

remain0^ * and Secretaiy Dulles, the Americans

systems were wholely based on those of the British

remained unmoved.

Navy. All naval personnel were familiar with these

aspects in the English language. Changing over to the

convmerirJmh e ^Navy's o rig in a l paper was

Russian system would entail enormous change.

the Minief ° r CalDinet Paper and came back to

There was considerable diffidence whether the Navy

went through tKD^ fenCe’ 1 haPPened to see it*1

would be able to manage so extensive a change.

right annr

^

and felt

w as not

There was apprehension also of severance of

that going°h ° i S° 1 wrote a note pointing out feedback, both technical and tactical, regarding the

Russians wsq

t0 the Americans. British and

existing British acquisitions.

benefits because ^°in^ to &ive us

additional

Last but not least, there was the anti Russian

mindset of an English speaking naval officer corps

trained by the British Navy, whose impressions of

will not ghLanS had already told u s that they

Russia derived solely from what was published in

^

British

ec*uiPment and

England and America who were engaged in a Cold

cůldn’t giVf»

d already told us that they

War against Russia.

Subn\arine

a Credl<: for the Oberon class

There were prolonged discussions on all the

implications. Even thoOgh by early 1965 it was clear

“Therefor

had ^ rther buUo^ 681 course was not to delay

that only Russia was agreeable to meet the Navy’s

had e

b e

e n

er D

T^e

n

^ Hir

,

t „

0 _

a,5

ct e

; p

e t

P th

e Ru

the Russi

ss an

ia

n o

t ffer which

immediate needs, the Navy remained reluctant to

sever connections with the British Navy.

“Mr ChT

8 Slnce August 1964.

f u l l y a e r e e r t V a t! i r e a d 01811 n o t e a n d s a i d *

M

1965

pursue. Onivov/i ^ at ls

course India shů

{"e was sent h ^ Chavan gave that decision, th

T h e D r r is in n t n a

to put U * C. } ° Naval H ea d q u arters asking The Decision to Acquire Russian Vessels

of Sovietships

proP°sals for a c q u i s i t i o n

In 1965, Mr K Subrahmanyam was the Dem,.

W‘th the n

Submart^ s ."

Secretary Budget and Planning tn the Ministry of ^ ,Come the d e W PrflmarY concern having n o *

Defence.

He recalls:

^

Islands and in

«?e

and Nlcobaf

“In March 1965, the British told us that they will

“• - * * ----•

-

OneraK.iDelegatlon In A

—

c0onnC

c eetrnn V

v o

o licceedd ^b y ^

not be able to give us a credit for building an operabilitv l

n

in m

™o

n»„^

V _

n Au6U8t 1964

1964 r e g a r d in g the

Oberon class submarine.

th e n offered theP* ° ° n eondlt:lons of the sm a ll ship Petya class anti

^

8lde now offered the large

6Q/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Ships.

subm arine v e sse ls a n d L a n d i n g

Mr Subrahmanyam accompanied the delegation

Security of Information Regarding Russian

to Russia in August 1965. He recalls:

Equipment

“We stayed in Russia for 15 days from Aug 15 to

01 September. We w ent to Sevastopol and the

In view of the Cold War between the West and Russia,

Black Sea Fleet. We also went to Leningrad and

the Russian side was especially concerned that

went to sea in a F Class submarine.

information regarding the capabilities and limitations

“The discussions with the Soviets were very

of the equipment being supplied to India should not

tough. Our side put them through rigorous

leak to the West. Assurances regarding security of

questioning on every aspect. At the end of it, the

information had already been conveyed to the

Russian side by the other two services.

Russians them selves said that they were now

In 1965, the Russian side desired that no undue

glad that they were going to give ships to the

publicity be given to the naval acquisitions.- The Navy Indians. They were confident that these ships

enforced, thereafter, very strict security of

would get looked after better and would also be

information in Visakhapatnam.

more effective than those they had sold to the

Over the years, this unavoidable restriction led to

Indonesians and the Egyptians."

three unforeseen and unfortunate results:

On 1 September 65, the Delegation signed an

•

The “need to know” criteria effectively prevented

agreement for:

the dissemination of knowledge of Russian

•

The acquisition of:

equipment in the remainder of the Navy.

•

The annual transfers of officers and men into and

Four submarines

out of Russian ships to give them “sea time" did

Five Petya Class anti submarine vessels

not give enough time for meaningful

a submarine depot ship. It could support

understanding of the Russian concepts for

su bm arin es at an ch orages in the A&N

operation and maintenance of equipment, of

Islands, distant from the main base. And

spares provisioning and indenting, and of

until facilities were set up ashore, it could

technical documentation.

also assist in the maintenance and repairs of

•

Foreign warships and foreign naval visitors were

submarine and Petya equipment, recharge

not permitted to visit Visakhapatnam. The

subm arine propulsion batteries, prepare

Western powers suspected that a Russian naval

su bm arin e torpedoes, im part

combat

base was being set up. The presence of Russian

training on sim ulators to submarine and

guarantee specialists compounded this

Petya sonar operators and attack teams on

misconception. In Western naval and military

submarine and anti submarine tactics.

magazines, Visakhapatnam had a red star over

Two Polish built medium size landing ships of

it, implying that it was a support facility for

Russian design to carry men and material to

Russian naval ships deployed in the Indian

the A&N Islands.

Ocean.

Five small 90 ton patrol boats for the Custom

Department’s anti smuggling patrols in the

1966

A&N Islands.

A Russian Design Team to visit India and prepare

Indian Technical Delegation to Russia

a Project R eport for setting up a new Naval

The first Russian acquisitions to arrive in India were

Dockyard in Visakhapatnam, together with a

the Landing Ships Gharial and Guldar. Both the LSTs

Naval Base, a Submarine Base, a Submarine

sailed home through the Suez Canal and were based

H eadquarters and an Integrated Training

in Visakhapatnam. They commenced ferrying

Establishment for the ships and submarines

construction material, equipment and stores to the

being acquired.

A&N Islands immediately after arrival.

The Russian side to consider the construction in

After seeing the first LST. it was realised that

India o f 500 ton patrol craft based on the

before the construction of the submarines and Petyas

specifications handed over by the Indian side.

became too advanced, every effort should be made to

try and modify them to suit Indian hot and humid

climatic conditions.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/61

spares and stores w h ich h ad alread y started

The outcome of discussions was *attheRusswn

arriving from Russia.

side were unable to mate any major modificaUons as

the vessels were already under construction. The

Interim R e p a ir F a c ilitie s

Russian side stated that the experience of Russian

Since the new Naval D ockyard w ould take several

submarines operating in the tropics was sufficient to

years to come up, it w as d ecided to m eet interim dispel Indian apprehensions. However, the Russian

requirements by expanding the existing Base Repair

side would welcome the Indian Navy s feedback of

operations in the tropics to help improve design*

Workshop.

Discussions were also held on numerous

Commissionings in 1967

technical issues like equivalence of fuels, oils,

•

The five patrol boats were loaded on to Russian

lubricants and paints, de-rating of machinery

•

heavy lift m erch an t sh ip s, o ff-lo a d e d m performance due to tropical conditions, supply of

Visakhapatnam and commissioned in February

drawings, standardisation of engines, stowage and

preservation of ammunition, manufacturing details

and March 1967.

,

of submarine batteries, tropicalisation etc.

•

The first submarine, KALVARI was commissioner

Two problem areas became clearly discernible

in the Baltic in December 1967. After the

during this first technical interaction in 1966. These Arab Israel war, the Suez Canal had close .

were to recur repeatedly in subsequent years. These

frigate TALWAR was sent to the Baltic to e^cor

were the “Indenting of Spares" and the supply of KALVARI back to India via the Cape o f Good

“Repair Technical Documentation" in English. The

Hope. KALVARI arrived in V i s a k h a p a t n a m m Russian side explained in detail how the Russian

July 1968.

Navy's system worked and the Indian side tried to

determine how best the Russian spares

Revival of Interest in Russian Missile Boats

replenishment procedure could be dovetailed into the

British naval procedure prevailing in the Indian Navy

Russia had given missile boats to the In d o n es ia n and From the very outset, these two problem areas - one Egyptian navies in the early 1960s.

logistic and the other technical-became vexatious

The Russian side had first shown the missi e

They remained so for the next ten years.

iQctS t0

Defence Minister's Delegation in August

1967

^ thattime- the Navy had shown no interest m

u°atS’ mainlV because no Western Navy ha

Russian Naval Staff Delegation to India

would

aiK* ^ was noi: c^ear how useful they

would be m růgh weather.

In 1967. a Russian delegation headed by a

Alter the 1965 war.

___ ^ ^ o t i n n s led

to theNaw's

War' two major considerations

submariner Admiral visited Visakhapatnam. The

delegation gave detailed advice on setting,

Soviet

S “ 'Sltl0n of missile boats from the

u d the

interim facilities for:

could deter hit n ^ main one was that these boats

ot the type thatp " Jn ^ d s on the Saurashtra coast A subm arine base, submarine headquarters

done at Dwarka

an Navy had so successfully

submarine exercise areas, communications with

b*ok. M w w Kohll states;M

submarines at sea, submarine rescue procedure

in case of accident etc.

At one time, intent

T h e m ain ten an ce o f one subm arine and two

Pakistan Navy wa<* ^ence

suggested that the

Petyas until the submarine depot ship arrived in

missile fitted friea?°"Si,dcring the acquisition of 1969.

R^n^ ts 0{ a missile

order to forestall the

T h e sto ra g e , p re p a ra tio n , m ain ten an ce and e°mbay; 1 had, on Qnp (ack by Pakistan on

practice firing of submarine and Petya torpedoes.

Union r fr°m M l™ral 0°f tfny vlsits to Russia, The training of subsequent submarine and Petya

ml,_

_

_

.

Shk0V \\T

the Fleet o f th e S oviet

crews in India.

wh^ e o u id k Cy ha d T m 7 b n e

Th e annual de-preservation and re-preservation

o f the growing volume of machinery, equipment,

was later abfe t o L ^ repMed tn ^ e

^He

Navy that

Typical of the officer corps mindsets in those early years, the efforts of guarantel sn«> » T ——-

^

other

to the Russian factories of equipment performance in Indian conditions was viewed a P o r t s *

•* page 41

spying.

ana send feedback

62/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

t h e s m a l l O s a c l a s s o f m i s s i l e b o a t s w o u l d b e and that three boats was the minimum for a

d e a l T h e i r m e r e p r e s e n c e w o u l d p r o v e a g r e a t viable attack unit".

d e t e r r e n t t o t h e e n e m y e m b a r k i n g o n a n a t t a c k /

1968

The second consideration was the pressure from

the Navy’s young gunnery sp ecialists to acquire

The Visakhapatnam Project

missiles. Russia had already supplied missile boats

to Indonesia and to Egypt. In June 1967, during the In January 1968, the Navy received the Report

6 day Arab Israeli War, an Egyptian missile boat sank

prepared by the Russian Design Bureau on the

an

Visakhapatnam Project. After the Report had been

Israeli frigate, the El LATH, at a range well beyond

the frigate’s own guns. Navies all over the world woke studied, Russian specialists arrived to clarify queries.

After detailed discussions, an Inter Governmental

up with a start to the e ffe c tiv e n e s s o f this new Agreement was signed on setting up a new Naval

Russian weapon - the surface to surface, anti ship,

Dockyard, a Naval Base, a Submarine Base and an

homing missile - which enabled a small boat to sink a

Integrated Type Training Establishment for the four ship several times its size within a matter of minutes.

submarines, five Petyas, submarine depot ship,

At one stroke, this new weapon altered the centuries

landing ships and patrol boats which had been

old concept o f p ro lo n ged gun b a ttle s between contracted for in 1965.

opposing warships.

To maximise indigenous content, it was agreed

The significant characteristics of the boat were an

that a sizeable proportion of the designing effort

extremely thin skinned 200 ton hull, propelled by

would be undertaken in India and that a !arge

very high power engines to give a high speed of 34

proportion of equipment and machineiy would be of

knots. Being small, the boat had a very small radar

indigenous origin. Later, this was to become one of

cross section. Its sop h isticated radar was more the many factors which delayed the completion of the

advanced than any other known radar - it enabled the

nroiect by several years, because techmca y

missile boat, with its low radar reflectivity, to detect a equivalent indigenous machinery was not always

larger ship well before the latter was even aware of its a v a i l a b l e .

presence, to fire its missiles and to speed away faster than any other ship. The Russian naval architects

The Missile Boats

had deliberately designed these characteristics, so as

to give the small boats this advantage against much

I n h i s b o o k A d m i r a l K r i s h n a n s t a t e s : ( i b i d ) larger American naval ships attempting to attack the

Russian coast. Basically, the boats were designed for.

and had lim ited en du ran ce for, only coastal

operations.

In December 1967, Vice Adm Krishnan took over

the idea £ the

M jagjjvan Ram had taken

from Vice Admiral Kohli as the Vice Chief of the Naval

D e f e n c e M i n i s t e r . Ml

»

boats. We

Staff. In his book “No Way But Surrender”, Admiral

g ^ i n S approval for further negotiations with

Krishnan states:*

t h e S o v i e t G o v e r n m e n t .

To me. the acquisition of these missile boats had

Submarine«

»

«

'

„ „ o [ ,

become an ob session . The CNS, Admira

Chatterji, was a forward looking man and it was

In 1968. Government appro

s u b m a r i n e r e s c u e v e s s e l .

easy to convince him that we must, under every

circumstance, buy at least six boats.

“When A d m iral Gorshkov, the five star

C° mmiSSl0nirl9^ M O R T A and KADMATT. the

Supreme Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy

T w o Pety^lAMnFRI and the subm arine depot ship

visited Delhi, we included in our discussions t e

submarine KHMTO«ra ^

“

ember ig68 ^

question of acquiring the improved version,

AMBA Wel ed C h o m from Vladivostok. KHAN DERI

class, missile boats for the In d ia n N avy.

e

improved class was fitted with four missiles

instead o f tw o).T h ese discussions gave an

! he In d ia n s w ere d ilig e n t .e .r n e r s and indication that the original offer was still ope

page 3 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/63

professionally far more confident than the navies they

The last of these commission,n

tad earlier h elp ed t. w i n .

a c q u ls lllo n p r o g r a m m e « " J

. M

,he

acquisition programme

contrartpH fnr in iq r c ;

subm arines

contracted for in 1965.

submarine

1969

1 9 7 0

Acquisition of Missile Boats

In January 1969. a delegation went to M oscow to

t h e I n d u c t i° n o f t h e M i s s i le B o a ts r s ? ^ r nsive

‘ "S ou th Bombay as T R A T A ir. which was later to I T

anlJTechnical Po,iU„ ns f o S ™

b“ ° “

1NS AGN1BAHU. The Technical Position was

I n S T w ? Uquid fuelled missil<=s.

t

Up te m p o ra ri’y in a s e c lu d e d W o r ld W a r 2 camp Admiral Krishnan states: (ibid)

^ C h e e ta h C a n lP n e a r M a n k h u r d in north

"A team consisting, of the ArM-t-

n ™

b o a rd s w e r e fin a lis e d fo r lo c a tin g the gunnery specialist* and

,

Secretary, a

Pe™ anent T ech n ica l P o sitio n s.

and myself proceeded to M o s c o w officers

Drntprt'tvlnSunSUS c o u ld b e fo u n d o n h o w b e s t to from Moscow after a successful

Tetun‘ed

f o ° w

*

sk in n ed h u lls fr o m th e r a p id bottom and ?UUrterS' lhe N a t i o n a l staff w ?,'

,NaVal

t r o lic f,

*C° rr° Si0n w h ich a ffe c te d a ll s h ip s h u lls in

'Novemhp1 Kd, V* name this secret nro

I*™

left in t h T ? ' 0 n e WeW W as th a t th ey s h o u ld not be

^ i s in favour' o j ^ f ^ ^ ^ e v e r l vetoed

they sh ou l7 be h a C le d ^ n '31171' 6' 11’ " ’6' 1

g ° ^ T

'

Admiral AK C hatter?™

i

' the in itials of

co

" n

o « e

™ t e hha

rbd

e s

,

haS

U led Ufu

P on sshlippw

w aa>'

y ss aan

n dd ssto

t v

o v

w ed

e _ 0n

Programme of « r . w J ' ,e plunged into a

expensive M

l.S m ce th e

th' s“ e h

>a" r d

■ "s* w o

w u

o i

uld be both

the Soviet Union tor

proceed to Wou,d also entail drPH «nSUn?.m g

c o n s t r u c t - and

eigVit bo

u a

o ts,. their hn

?

? anc^

a m

n a

n inn

gin

g th

t e

h* UP- Eventually

&ln &- th e id ea h a d

- t

U o

P*

b

E e

v egi

n ve

tu n

al,

uic Kiea naci to De given

Technir-oi — ^

eiT. ba « fa cilities a n / £ '

^

Naval

^

berth ed in th e W e t B asin of

Technical Positions’ which ' f CiUties and the

the Naval D o c k v ^ T r ^

b e rth e<3 >n th e W e t B asin of

the missiles.'

Whlch s

^ or

or ed

ed and p

and re

r pare

r^d

wh

w i

h c

i h ov

over t

i m

mee

^

h .

A n d *lhe b o tto m fouling.

>

Train in g o f Crews in In dia

hef ^ by as m u ch a s T n l ' 0 S e rio u s ly r e d u c e t h d "

As soon as th^ r

^ e commence

kn°ts. was rem oved just

-

38 thE flrst ^ » - * -

-

M ^onneTTom nW 61:1 ° f the war in 197 1 ■

M ^ c h i 970 a°™ p' eted th e ir t r a in in g in R u s s ia in and —

ptance trialsbo f the boats

i

conserve

e t

t h

hei

e r

r ma

m c

a h

c in

h ier

n y

e ..

The crews of KAVARATTI

unloar^0' sbiPs and ir &

loaclecl on to heavy lift

fourth and fifth P e t y a s ^ ^ ^ C H A L L . the

such®^b°at"4 S ^ 1?0rted lo ln d ia - SinCE

we X

patnam' were deputed to p

trained in a" the bn -t?^ in lr>dia ai n A 200 lon cranc and the Tn

^ H

e e k s V

to u ta k

k e e o

ovveerr lh

t e h

a

e nd fR U,

U S

S S

S‘ia

a ffor

or J

u

u s

s tt 6

6

and p^

8 'v« e unloads ai Ume was in Calcutta.

e

I ff

n ic

d ii>

a n

. The R

R u

u ssssia

ian

nss w

5 ere im

^ p

re

Ss

as

il them b

bac

'a k

c t

k o

®

^ u^ t

mi t

a a

, r^

n f0

*vr

/

1 , ‘>ei J

ncd

r at Calcu

u tta

u ia .

- d

c e

i p r

r e

c s

sc s

i e

v d

tu

efficiency and professional k n n ^ ! ! d with thcir was

«nd C

" 8. I^owccl all the wav from

t Z T , l Cy 3nd professi°n al k ~ H

0

Sed With their

S givcn tnUd Ceylon to BnVCu a11 lhc way ,r0m

.

y had n e ith e r received

consic'ering

available To l °

'iUlble tor w hiChevcr shi

y- This lowin£^ task

Vladivostok nor had adequate t r a fn i^ r tra in in 8 ^

^ to

t w

o

w.

t0 n

'Vl g

n

g a t t he\ 4 h’ P w a s c o n v e n i e n t l y

set up ,n Visakhapatnam.

m‘ng facilit>cs been

a boat w a s ready

Commission inn*?

Commissionings in 1969

T h e la s t th r e e P e tv a s Kit ta m

KATCHALL, and the last t w I ^ b ^

A RATTI and

w a s re'u i

1 be^ a„ r

acilities

and KURSURA commissioned in end 1969® M R A N J

ůt normal n^nilllUm csSr.Um wůl(i »

asc Repair

The author was the gunnery specialist.

______

" “ " " » » n ^ ™ « l to c m j'«P .n d c ,, ><> 64/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

' “ " "ta lr ‘e‘ ? : « ^ i l - e

As regards coping with the foreseeable backlog of

Q7n an e n o r m o u s b a c k lo g o f p r o b le m s By mid 1970. a

ts ^ ^

functi0ning of

major periodic refits, the most that could be achieved

was a consensus on expediting the completion of the

a c k o f

and

new workshops and phasing out the forthcoming

eclu ipm er t'ion a n d in a d e q u a c y o f r e p a ir fa c ilit ie s refits to avoid bunching.

documentati

.n c r e a s i n g s l i p p a g e a l s o b e in g The Induction of the Missile Boats

S ^ t e d

£befits beco m in gd u ^fro m 1970

Until earlv in 1971, a number of boats were towed,

mwaTds. con cern

s e n t a T e c h n i c a l

Delegation to r e s o lv e th e P

experienced in

o < e s s e n t i a l

o i l s a n d

in adequ ate a v a l1

. 7 . m

0 f e s s e n t i a l s p a r e s ,

lubricants, n o n - a v a . l a b , 1 t y o f e s s e n t P^ ^

SkiT

th in d e c k s and w hose anchors and anchor

difficulty in o b ta m in g v ita l te c h n iC rie n c e d jn eq u a lly thin deck

w here the space on

ch ains w ere light in w eig

required

draw in gs, p r a c t i c a l

i >

d e la y s in th e

identification o f s p a r e p a r t .

so lu tion s

“ »

towing gear

construction o f th e N a v a l D o c k y a r d . In te rim so iu t to pass and shp t h h e vy

w hich w ent all

T h e R u ssian s had M te

^

kept aboVe

were agreed upon.

the w a y around the hui .

u_ Th is eased

a e ^ e r b y b r a c k t

1971

th e s t r e s s on th

of the conventional tow ing

Acquisition of More Petyas and Submarines

cu m b ersom e heavi

problem.

gear still rem ained a s e n o u p

KISTNA and

In mid 1971, it was decided to acquire: five more

In ea rly 1971.

! r^ win| duUes.* T1R, on her

Petyas and fo u r m o r e s u b m a r in e s b e c a u s

t0

TIR . w ere nominated

d kjstNA on her way

production o f th e s e v e s s e ls in R u s s ia w a s ... n s to

an end. T h e N a v y w a n t e d t h e s e a c q u i

^ ad

incorporate th e a d d itio n s a n d a lte ra tio n s

^

been id e n tified fo r im p r o v in g th e ir p e r is s u e s

delegation w e n t to M o s c o w to d is c u s s

o f

and also d is c u s s h o w to c o p e w ith th e m aj w a g

the e a r lie r v e s s e l s , s in c e t h e n e w D o c k y a r ddT e c h n ic a l d iscu ssio n s w ere held with^the lia b le , which merchant sh P

cost over

designers to increase the endurance of equipm ,

augmenting air-con d ition in g capacity,

P

&

&

&

&

£

&

*

performance o f equ ipm en t and incorp

^ ^

Western Nava

bQats t0 Bombay.

n

improvements considered necessary in

,.^0ns.

experience gained in operating in tropical con

^

The Russian side agreed to supply t^re®

neW

stock of 1968/1969 vintage and to buna

Petyas. In both cases, the modifications su gg

COrnnf! the boats under tow. A n a

r£counts the

the Indian side w ou ld be in c o rp o ra

maximum extent possible.

w o u ld be

In the case of the submarines, all ou

.jabie

"suib “

seq,r

u „

e ,

n e

t 9J

e

» P

“ s* e e ” K 'm

S b

a ‘

n >

d,;

hea ls

ds

<

t o

newly built, be fitted w ith the lates

f

tionS

■•The

nylon

tow

f" n tful and trouble ree

equipment and incorporate all the mo

which the Indian side had suggested.

v,pin£ fitted

In view of the Petyas and submarines

|^at all

Wth new types of equipment, it was ,a^refhe jsjaval

men on tn

___________ -— --------------

^ e repair fa c ilitie s b e in g created in

.

Dockyard, Visakhapatnam would be a u g m ------- -------

TRAN SITIO N t o t r iu m p h / 6 5

The author w as the C om m an ding Officer of TI

should try and do better but safely. With the

slowly and steadily increased, the nylon rope

confident seamanship and a lertn ess o f both

stretched and became bar taut hke :s i steel \

towing ship and towed m issile boat crews, it

rope Lt Cdr (later Vice Admiral) SK Chand. TIR s

became possible to achieve a towing speed of 16

XO. was able to provide Cdr (later Commodore

knots. This speed was nearly the maximum that

BB Yadav and his missile boat crews with no

TIR’s reciprocating steam engines could do. With

meals and even medical supplies by sliding them

repeated drills and good seam anship the boat

along the tow ropes to and fro. Soon a telephone

could be taken in tow and slipped in minutes. The

line was passed the same way for round the clock

two-way communication. Every morning at 0800

engine room crews of both ships became eager to

hrs Cdr Yadav would come up on the line and say

determine if we could safely achieve even higher

"Allah be praised for another incident free night”.

speeds, because by now the tactical possibilities

Both missile boats kept their engines and

of using nylons to tow m issile boats during

machinery switched off to conserve running

combat were becoming increasingly apparent. On

hours.

the last night before entering Bombay, TIR doing

“In Visakhapatnam. one boat was detached

full power, towed the missile boat at 1 7 knots

and the tow was to be continued with Cdr Yadav’s

without any adverse effects on the shaft locking

boat. Both ships agreed that it would be

arrangements of the missile boat.

worthwhile determining the maximum safe

"After securing alongside, the Co TIR handed

towing speed with this nylon arrangem ent.

over to the C-in-C, a two foot length of six inch

Careful precautions were taken to pad both ends

nylon rope with the formal report on the towing

of the towing nylon which might chafe with the

speed achieved and recom m en din g that the

towing fairleads and bullring. This was because

towing of missile boats using nylon ropes be

once the nylon was bar taut, chafing instantly

accepted as a practical proposition during war.

caused individual nylon strands to part and

“Later that year, the missile boats led by Cdr

continued chafing would part all the strands

Yadav were to achieve spectacular results in their

These precautions proved their worth. Ten to

missile attacks on Karachi”.

twelve

knots

were

made

good

from

Commissionings in 1971

All eight missile beats w ere com m ission ed in Calcutta, after being unloaded. T h ey arrived in

take timely act,on to avoid chafing of the rone

Bombay by mid 1971.

The submarine rescue vessel N1STAR arrived in

s

y nylon, l t was agreed that we

visakhapatnam in the autumn of 1971

66/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Mazagom Docks and the Leander Frigate Project

P r e a m b le

for ships of 4000 GRT and below, especially for new

Until the 19th centuiy, Mazagon Docks (MDL) used to

ships and the demand for old harbour craft are so

build wooden hulled warships for the British Navy. In

small that it would not be advantageous for

1929, the 18 gun friga te "T ig ris" and the 6-gun Government to consider taking over Mazagon Docks

schooner 'Shannon” were launched from MDL. As

merely for the construction of smaller vessels"

(Material from MDL).

steel hulls gradually replaced wooden hulls, warship

building in Bombay declined. The last warship to be

In 1957, Mr Krishna Menon became the Defence

built by MDL w as the 80 gun ship “Madras", Minister. He was determined that India should be

(renamed “Meanee”), in 1848.

self reliant for its basic defence requirements like

tanks, warships and aircraft. It was clear that HSL

Meanwhile the British Peninsular and Orient

would be overloaded if given the task of warship

(P&0) started a passenger ship service in

building and that only MDL and/or GRW could build

»42 from Suez to the Indian peninsula, initially to

large warships. He appointed a committee to look

an

rom Calcutta and later to and from Bombay.

into MDL’s capabilities and limitations, with a view to

- th W&i?

P&O s three main imperial routes

build frigate sized warships in India.

e others being to the Far East and Australia.

After protracted negotiations under Mr Krishna

Nnv-rt

P&O acquired the British India Steam

Menon’s forceful leadership, the Government of India

10n CoiilPany (BISN) which was managed by

in a package deal purchased MDL and GRW for 12.1

bee

° n Mackenzie of Calcutta. This ‘P&O Group’

million pounds (approx Rs. 3.85 crores) on 19 April

Da^ 1716

m ain o p e ra to r for In d ia ’s coastal

1960. The package deal provided for part of the

pert>jen^ r traffic. Its services linked India with the payment to be adjusted towards repairs of P&O

M a ? ^ U^’

Far ^ ast and East and South Africa.

Group ships after take over.

Reaclfw ^ ocks ^td (MDL) at Bombay and Garden

by the

S*10PS (CRW) at Calcutta were developed

Modernisation of MDL

water

GrouP to maintain their ships in Indian

In November 1960, Government approved in

contrS]V ° r m any y ears, the P&O Group held a principle that three Leander class frigates should be

todenenn

in te re s t in the M ogul Line. After

built in India. Soon thereafter, MDL submitted a

GRW aH/u06’ ^rom the early 1950’s onwards, MDL,

preliminary report on the facilities required to

meeting th 6 0t*ier small construction yards started

modernise MDL for building frigates.

harhn,,

e natio n ’s need for sm all vessels and

1 °ůr craft.

MDL was a 35 acre site, needing extensive

modernisation and expansion before it could build

^ad arisin^

^ econc* World War, an urgent need

frigates On its northern boundary was Kasara

^ rit a i n

n’ ^

* °

merch

u a

n nt

L s

h

nips in

In

in india

aia t

o

1

0 r

epla

iace

uc

Basin, a low lying, neglected wharf belonging to the

NavigafS W artime bosses. The Scindia Steam

Bombay Port Trust, and occupied mostly by fishing

Visakhan°tn com P any w as g iven a site at

•r

v a

e o

s c

s o

e ilc

s wh

wh ich rested o

on mud

u a

d - t

-

- l

-o

- w

--- w

-- a

-- t

- e

- r

- .

_ On MDL’s

was l a u " ^ 111-

*nc*ian built merchant ship

sou th ern boundary w as the je e p assem bly plan t o f

*aken 0y ec^ *n *948. In due course this yard was

M a h in d ra and M a h in d ra. on le a s e fro m th e P&O

^ in d iio + ^ L

G overn m en t and renamed

r r o u o since 1949 until 1962. Under Mr Krishna Shipyard Limited (HSL).

M enon's nudging, Mahindras vacated the South Yard

m 1962 and the B om bay Port Trust leased Kasara

Acquisition o f MDL and GRW

to MDL in 1963.

In 1956

MDL had two medium size dry docks - one for

G°v e r n m en ?

m

'

for harbour craft - and a

^

°

f

r 0

U

p

o ffe r e d t0 sel1 M D L t0 th e

------- 77n<5 „ nd one fo r h a rb o u r c ra ft - an d a reacti°n t o t ! rr

' T h e P ,a n n in g C o m m is s io n s

s e a g o in g sh ip > and

a c c o m m o d a te

this o ffe r in July 1956 was “the demand

number o f slipway

Selection of Shipbuilders fo r C o lla b o ratio n On 25 November 1960, Governm ent approved in

principle that three Leander Class Frigates should be

undertaken in Bombay Port T™st berUlSp

,

u

built in India. MDL submitted a preliminary report on

After receiving MDL's preliminary report on its

the civil works, machinery and equipment required to

requirement for additional facilities, the Government

undertake this project. At this stage, Government

retained the British firm of Alexander Gibbs and

deputed a team of three senior naval officers to Partners (who were also consultants for the

Britain to discuss with the A d m ira lty , the

Expansion Scheme of Bombay Naval Dockyard) to

collaborating shipbuilders and the arm am ent

advise and prepare plans for expanding MDL's

suppliers, the step :o be taken for building the first facilities, both for ship repair and ship construction.

modern major wai essel in India. The team was to

Keeping in view the imminent construction of

frigates, their major recommendations were to:

submit a project rc, ort and recommendations on the

arrangements to be made by NHQ and by MDL to

- Convert the Kasara tidal basin into an

execute the project expeditiously and economically.

impounded wet basin for fitting out three to four

The three officers were Captain (L) KR Ramnath, the

ships at a time after they had been launched.

Director of Stores Production (Navy). Captain (E) BP

- Construct the first long slipway on the south side

Sinha, the Director of Naval C o n stru ctio n and of MDL. together with ancillary fittings like cranes

Captain (E) CL Bhandari, the Managing Director of

etc.

MDL. This team’s discussions and recommendations

- Create fitting out berths, fitting out shops,

laid the foundation of the subsequent negotiations

prefabrication shops, etc.

which culminated in 1964.

By end 1963. the plan for impounding the Kasara

The overall framework of collaboration emerged

Basin had been approved and the construction had

as follows:

started of the 450 foot slipway in the South Yard.

Sin?e

collaboration for the Frigate Project was still

•

The Admiralty, as the owners o f the L e a n d e r under discussion, the final layout of the yard and the

design, would:

provide guidance drawings to the shipbuilder

S

0C

pb S „ 6

kS , C . ,n8,''Uh' :

authorise the supply of working drawings to

By 1968, most of the civil works for MDL's

MDL

modernisation had been completed. The Kasara

vet the line plans produced by the shipbuilder

Basin was flooded on 23 August ]<3fi8 i„

/

keep the shipbuilder and NHQ informed of all

s

i i i t ’- s

s

s

modifications and Alterations & Additions

envisaged by the Adm iralty for their own

- d secured alongside for ^

0“

* * ^

Leanders during construction

inspect all machinery and eq u ip m en t

Goa Shipyard

ordered, on payment of agency charges

supply armament and Admiralty items on the

of India dirKte^MDLTo^take^ole^' ^ Government

usual Government to Government contract

the Estaleiros Navais de On m * resPonsibility for advise on the terms of collaboration and the

December i 96l. ,n Aprj]

l Shipyard) on 19

contract with the shipbuilder

(GSL) was leased to MDL This Ip

ShlPyard Ltd

rain Indian naval and civilian p e r s o n n e l in overseeing and testing and tu n in g of

armament

6

p uiicier s resDonsihiHti

*1,0 1

ders responsibilities would be :

rmrMv^

Working draw ings, lis ts 0

MDL Starts Warship R efits

mat lnery eciuipment. copy orders for a

con<TalS' and fitting lists for the

d E i ^ ^ r S s r °ff~ioading its

ancr : r ° n ° f the shiP in India and a s s is

surmu'

technical know-how and advice

main

main machinery and boilers. The

68/transition TO TRIUMPH

^ appointed.

HcenJ?g,nes t0 be built in India under

r°m the English Electric Company

Spring o f S p e c i a l 'B' q u a l i t y steel and The cost of the additional facilities is estimated at Rs

'

s e c t i o n s required for the Leander

2.25 crores and the detailed project report is being

rdering o f a u x ilia r y m a ch in e ry and

prepared by Sir Alexander Gibbs & Partners.

' gnuipment required for the ship, subject to

The Leander is the most modern warship of its

the usual con d ition s o f in v itin g m ultiple

class under construction in the United Kingdom. The

te n d e rs w h ere a p p r o p r ia te or p r o o f o f design is a proven one and its construction is well

e c o n o m i c a l

p ric e s

from

nom inated

established. We consider that the specifications of

contractors

the ship to be built in Mazagon Dock must generally

assistance to Mazagon Dock with technical

conform to the existing Leander. There is no scope for personnel, on term s to be n egotiated , to

any major alterations, particularly in respect of

ensure completion o f the ship according to

armament and speed. It was stated by the Admiralty

programme

that a slight sacrifice of speed has been deliberately

- assistance in training o f personnel from the

accepted in order to improve the sea-keeping

Mazagon Dock in their yard in the United

qualities, put in a much greater amount of

Kingdom

sophisticated equipment such as a helicopter,

- provision o f fa c ilitie s to the In dian Naval improve the endurance, reduce maintenance

Overseeing T ea m fo r tr a in in g in their

problems and ensure a longer useful life than a faster

shipyard

ship of the same displacement. It is obvious that to

- supply of sh ipbu ilding stores, advice and

obtain greater speed for the same displacement, the

active collaboration as regards suitability and

machinery would take up much greater weight and

necessary m o d ifica tio n s to in d igen ou sly

space, and this can only be done at the expense of

produced s to res and eq u ip m en t to be

equipment and endurance.

To complete this project economically, efficiently

incorporated in the ship

a n d in go o d tim e and to produce ships o f a high

- to seek and provide the necessaiy guarantees

s t a n d a r d , th e c lo s e s t c o -o p e ra tio n w ou ld be for machinery and equipment built on. subn ecessa ry betw een Naval Headquarters, Admiralty.

contract and for the general performance of

the ship as a whole

to arrange fo r o rd e rin g , p a ck in g and

despatching of all machinery, equipment and

stores, according to a phased programme to

fit in with the construction program m e in

India

The armament s u p p lie r w o u ld su p p ly the eapons and associated control systems.

reputation.

considerable scope for

^ rciary of the Team’s Report and Recommendations

•We consider that tner

, equiprnent and

incorporating indigenous1^

Indja We

^ePartmSU^

Ůr ^iscu ssi ° ns w ith the various

m a t e r ia ls in the **** *° ^ f*£e first ship to be M/S VickntS

Admiralty, Messrs Yarrow and Co,

e s tim a te the Rupee^e

progressively

United K ^ ‘^rrnstrong Ltd. and other parties in the

a b o u t 50% o f the

subsequent ships. In

that the m^ 0rT1, we have reached the conclusion

for the second and e s ^

can , e learnt

i n c r e a s e

^azagonn>nStrUCtion

Leander Class Ships in

th is respect, w e feel that a gu s tra lia and C an ad a, Sllipbuiiri ° C^ in collaboration with Shipbuilder/

fr o m th e e x p e r ie n c e

id era ble progress in

The ^ rS is a feasible proposition.

A u s t r a l i a has achieved c

^ guns and

Pr°ject is t T? ec^a*e requirement for undertaking this manufacturing turbjn e l 2

being built in

^re'fabric +e^in

in s tru c tio n o f the slipway and

armament for the yp

o°nclude & i0n S^ ° P in M azagon D ock and to 0r^ard pia Co^ ab °ra tio n agreem ent, so that the

^ t n l r d e r to ensure the

examination of building drawings.

tike can S *n re£arc* to indigenous materials and

j^uld be neo^r° Cee^* ^ is estimated that two years

tK Mazagon n SS? y t0 Provide

additional facilities

s s s a s i - - f j s s f

w o u l d have t ° b ® P

N a v a l Headquarter

e Stipway a°H

can

*aiC* as soon aS

n the pre-fabrication shop are ready.

also have to take on the preparation o f ship

•

That subject to the report being a c c e p te d 1

maintenance schedules, provision of Base and Depot

Government, the next step of draw ing „n ^

spares and make arrangem ents

fo r

the

contract with the collaborating firms sh

i

commissioning and putting into service o f these

tackled in two stages:

0u

vessels.

-

The contract be drawn up by the Ministn, <■

‘NavaJ Headquarters would also be required to set

Defence, F in a n ce in c o n s u lta t io n w ith up an organisation for undertaking most o f the

Headquarters and Mazagon Dock and

functions of the Adm iralty vis-a-vis a private

The draft contract be discussed jointly with

shipbuilder in the United Kingdom. These can be

the A dm iralty and th e r e p r e s e n t a t iv e s 'o f the summarised as Headquarters, Overseeing and the

collaborating, firm s. It is r e c o m m e n d e d that liaison in the United Kingdom. A number of technical

fo r th is p u r p o s e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s from personnel, both naval and civilian, would have to be

M in is tr y o f D e f e n c e ,

F i n a n c e ,

N aval

deputed abroad for specialised training in overseeing

Headquarters and Mazagon Dock visit U K to

and fitting out of the equipment.

finalise the co n tra ct on th e sp ot. T h e scope of The order of cost for the construction o f a

Leander Class Frigate in the United Kingdom is

m odifications to th e L e a n d e r to m e e t Indian estimated to be 5.25 million pounds. The estimated

requirem ents sh ou ld a lso b e fin a lis e d during this visit.

&

cost of building the first ship in Mazagon Dock is Rs

8.5 crores. i.e., 20% above the U.K cost

It is

That Government approval be accorded for the

required personnel and their training. We have

S s T t K m C°St °r 1116 subse(luent ships will

limited our recommendtions in regard to the

personnel to the bare minimum consistent with

e WOr oad of the first ship. As the programme

gets underway and the second and third ships

e a en in hand, further increases in personnel

estimated at Rs 2 25 crores1Pment and the like is

us

e provided. However, as experience is

inTh anC* a *"ra^ned cadre is built up, economies R e q u ir e d

^ 65 ^

•KiUSe

technical rnanpow er would be

J S1, e

relation to the total programme. It is

work in M ^gV n ToSc k ° S s t 1s9h

61 ^ C° mpletion ° f

available in end 1967 the rem, / ' Xp* * edto be

fo r S1

essential that the cases for personnel

intervals. The programme o n T "

3t 18 month

DrnpSe

Up

v ari ů s team s should be

to end 1970.

S

me of 3 sh’Ps will thus extend

up GSSe aS

as possible as and when put

The team recommends:

through t h ^ G o f 386 0f P r ° S re s s in g the CaS®

for

i j Governmental machinery, the need

jj*e e

*° the construction of

wouiH^'i

cision be kept firm ly in mind. We

Ltd, and Vickers

proipr^

6 t0 place U on record that the whole

A rm * .

M e s s r s Harrow *

executed aStin^ over several y e a rs has to be

und°tlated' Messrs Vickers

LW °n terms to be

adminiofln a phased programme and if there are

-'uidiion with Messrs v

pro

conta f ‘ ratlVe deIay « ^ financing, placing of

he Civi‘ Engine/r

rr°W&C°-

person™ i

approval for essentially required

Action of the

mg Works, na

of gear

Whole project may be thrown out

mav hPon

ltS comPletion date and ultimate cost

“ ■ 4 . 1 " : » k

d

w o S ™ f ° » * » p .

as s°on

n

.

kay, shonM u

QU lred in

U.K it vu me unpredictable. In our discussions m a c r i t i r a ? l maCie C le a r t0 u s ^ a t i n s h ip b u ild in g .

faE

blaid

au'east^ 6 ked of the veTsd”

fitting nnt KUmp is c a c h e d after launch, when

S S - ! * *

a n S

dSf

c

0t

due to th e® ns‘

delays occur in fitting oU ’

available f , e^uiPment or personnel not

0ut, a vie-

aPPropriate stages o f the

Project and th

quite apar f

to * e Yarri

^ ip m e n t10^ 8 circ*e

d e te rio ra tio n of

S i , ^ L e a „ YS

while new a ready installed begins at one end

_ j * new equipment is being fitted at the other

70/TRANSITION Tn

' he fu tu re

end.

. kerS/Yarrow R ep o rt on F a c ilit ie s R equired V1

in M D L

From the British side, a team o f officials from Messrs Vickers Ltd and Messrs Yarrow Ltd conducted an

extensive survey of the facilities available in India and

“ chrx

, i r

c o i , a b o r a , e an<i t ra ™ [ "

produced, in 1962, their proposal to build Leander dass frigates in Mazagon Docks.

with

W e : iSited UK and held discussions

w ith Yarrow who were building a large number of

Leanders for the British Royal Navy. After the

Final Technical - E c o n o m ic A sse ssm e n t of Second World-War, the Leander was the first

Frigate D esig n O p tio n s

standard, frigate-sized ship that the Royal Navy

had designed and they were going to have several

In mid 1962, a delegation was sent to make a final

ships of thus class. The UK too were very keen to

technical-economic a ssessm en t o f the Vickers/

help our frigate project.

Yarrow proposal vis-a-vis collaboration proposals

I came back and I recommended that we

subsequently received from Sweden and Holland.

should negotiate with the United Kingdom.

Rear Admiral (later Adm iral) SM Nanda, who was

because it gave several advantages, in as much as

Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff, led this delegation.

the language problem was not there, which was

Admiral Nanda recalls:

going to be a problem, both with Sweden and with

We went to Sweden first, then Holland and then

Holland. -Secondly the equipment that was going

to be used was British equipment, which we

to UK. We visited the shipyards and saw their

already had. because all ships of our Navy were of

facilities, The facilities o f all three shipyards were good.

British origin. Thirdly that as the Royal Navy was

going to acquire a number of these ships, we

The next consideration was the equipment

could depend on support for spare parts during

t at was going to go into the ships. Where was

the lifetime of the Leanders that we were going to

e ecluipment going to come from? The third

have in our Navy. Overall, it was in the Navy’s

consideration was what support could we expect

interest to collaborate with the UK, with whose

_°r spare parts d u rin g the s h ip ’s life? What Navy we could discuss problems experienced in

eraction could we have on the usage o f the

operation, maintenance, indigenisation,

svsf

as w e^ as the eq u ip m en t and weapon

m odernisation and so on. This recommendation

u/^emS

on ^ e ships with the other Navies

was finally accepted by the Government.

were going to use these ships.

"There were a lot of questions raised in

assist 6 ^Wec*is h sh ip yard was very keen to

Parliam ent after this recommendation was made.

was Uf • ^ owever’ 1 was informed that Sweden

as to why we had gone to the British. I was sent

becau ° V ^ eres*ed in this type o f ship at all for by Defence Minister Chavan to explain to Mm

differed

Swedish Navy’s requirements were

the reasons why. we were recommending the

seas vT ~ ^ e ir environment was different, their

British option and not the Swedish option. The

onusn upuui

that there was a lot

very jir^re narr°w and their area o f operations

Were co 1 ^ aS ^ar as

maritime boundaries

^ te re s w T ^ 10^ *

^ *heir Navy was not

our MPs to ask

needed to be fully

^ePend 6

** Was °h v io u s that we could not

particular project a

After 1 gave

eclUipme0r! ^Wec*en for lifetim e support o f the

apprised of the

he was able

£°ing to b

t^le w eaPon systems that were

him all the reasons, h

^ ParllalTient and the

interactioe

in t*le ship. Nor could we have

any probjn w *th them as to their experience or

B r K T ^ S e ' P r o je c t » « » - P P ' ° “ d “

association with Yarrow .

maintenanmS ^ at ma^ arise in the operation or

d°Wn tn

°^t^lese ships. The choice narrowed

, .. „ vsA 3 4 Leander Design and

‘ We f^ h e rU K o r Holland,

technical jUnc* that H olland w as gettin g their

1961 it had been

T as desiJpH KtS from U K * The Z a n d e r, which

Cense in o

was going to be built under

^°lr*g to be ° anC*

the designs which were

acquired from the United Kingdom.

6

w w r n o N T O W O M W "

Leander Class Frigates.

29 Leander design which had already been

By end 1964, all the m a jor a sp ects of the

introduced in the Royal Navy. Dunng th einterv“ “ "jj collaboration had been finalised. In addition to the years, whilst discussions and negotiations were go g

technical aid fees, an annual amount 40,000 pounds

on, the Admiralty had decided to introduce for their

was to be paid for the In d ia n F rig a te Project Navy, a modified design called the "FSA-34

n this

design, the beam was broader by 2 feet (0.61m). It

Organisation in Newcastle, whose function was to

incorporated the latest equipment modifications and

liaise with the Lead Yard, Yarrow (Shipbuilders), who

made provision for

incorporating

fu ture

were to provide the basic working drawings for the

modifications.

construction of the first Leander in India.

During the Defence Minister’s visit to Britain in

The Memorandum of Agreement for the Leander

November 1964, the discussions on the Frigate

Frigate Project, known as the “Blue Book”, was signed

Project covered three major aspects.

on 22 December 1964, between the Government of

India and Vickers/Yarrow. The Blue Book covered

•

The Choice Between the Earlier FSA 29 and Later

three aspects:

FSA 34 Design.

The advice of the British MOD (Navy) and Vickers

• Technical Aid, including the provision of basic

Armstrong (Shipbuilders) was that:

technical drawings and the placing of 60 British

technical and other p erson n el, from Senior

-

The FSA 29 Leander design had been superseded

by the FSA 34 Leander design. India should

Managers down to Foremen level, to assist MDL

therefore go in for the latest FSA 34 design.

in the project.

■

The time delay caused by the working drawings

•

Supplies of major items from Vickers/Yarrow and

having to be redrawn would not exceed 12

•

Supplies of material from other United Kingdom

suppliers.

r

“

ce MDL CouId only lay toe keel in mid

1966, this delay would get absorbed. The cost

This Memorandum becam e o p e ra tiv e on 27

difference wouM be about 200.000 pounds. The

Januaiy 1965, when a parallel agreement was signed

FSA 34 design gave both added stability and extra

between the Government of India and the Ministry of

Defence (Navy) UK. The a greem en t authorised

Vickers/Yarrow to operate the agreements in the Blue

Book. The parallel agreem en t re la te d to the #

payment of design fees of 400,000 pounds to the

Ministry of Defence (Navy) UK for the training of

’

m 5 u V SSiStanCe t0 be Rend™ d * * the M OD

Indian personnel in Royal Navy D ockyards, the

ůpply of Admiralty pattern item s o f stores an

an inter - Governm ent Nle

be incorP°rated in

equipment, the scrutiny o f q u o ta tio n s and the This would cover the desien°f andUfm of A§recment.

inspection of material and equipment on behalf of the

P - ship f0r the huUandaoOOOr ° f 5° ' ° ° 0 P ů* k

Government o f India.

toe main machinery to recover fhPŮnds Per sh*P for

MrJ hfe Government of India then placed an order on

toe Admiralty for research devil C° SlS lncurred by

of new equipment.

development and design

<,„i.

°.r lhe construction of the first frigate. Th

*

Technical Aid Fees in ha d

n eatures of the agreement with the MDL wer

^builders,.

1,6 Pa,d * Vickers Armstrong

The work w as to b e u n d e r t a k e n a t c o s t P^uS

Profit o f 5% on th e to ta l c o s t o f c o n s t r u e ^ •

V1 ec* that the p r o fit to b e a llo w e d s h a l exceed RS. 140 lakhs.

A W a rsh ip O v e r s e e in g T e a m w a s g i v e n lh e

<,FT

" Pro," t

«T,=S

•

N a v T u t0 m ° nitor t ^ w ork .

. e

devi t- eac^cIuart-ers w a s a u t h o r i s e d to morlif-10nS ^r o m s p e c i f i c a t i o n s

a n d

#

Strin/Catl?n

accepted d ra w in g s .

t u e

D irect

^ COntro1 w a s t0 b e e x e r c is e d by

Warsiv°Fr\Genera* Inspection (DGI) and th

72/TM” SmONTOTOUMPH

: ,n‘' U" U

* The nm Verseeing Team (WOT).

e to

be mnh

S o f ^

O ffic ia l S e c r e ts A c t w e r

e applicable to s a fe g u a rd secu rity*

Maieure clau se w as to be ap plied for

chitecture marine engineering, electrical and

' FOf,C*

en or untoward occurrence requiring

i o n of the date of delivery.

r0010,

hn° ‘ 0gieS- Those in India

that the

M D L faced several formidable challenges:

The methodology o f accou n tin g and periodic

*

ments for the work executed were spelt out

•

T h e M D L’s expansion scheme would have to be

and adequate p ro v is io n m ade for advance

carried out fast enough to meet the cardinal dates

of the frigate construction programme.

Ba^Trials, Sea Trials and Repeat Trials for the

*

At the same time, MDL’s existing activities could

work performed on the hull, machinery, electrical

not be slowed down. Ship repair and new

construction work already contracted for had to

installations and other equipment were provided

be completed on time.

for and the onus of rectification placed on MDL.

•

MDL’s traditional activity had been ship repair

• A warranty clause m ade M DL resp on sib le to

and building auxiliary vessels. This required a

make good any defects onboard detected within a

relatively lower order of skills than that required

period of twelve months after delivery.

for warship building. MDL’s workforce was not

conversant with warship technologies. A massive

Positioning o f Top M anag em ent

training programme, both in India and abroad,

After the frigate contract was signed, the Government

was inescapable.

o

The rigorous specifications of the materials and

appointed to MDL the two key persons who had been

the equipment required for warship construction,

dosely associated with the Frigate Project during the

so as to obtain absolute reliability during combat,

negotiations. Mr HC S a rin ICS w as appoin ted

w e r e m u ch h ig h e r th an th e eq u iva len ts Chairman MDL on 7 November 1964, in addition to

c o m m e rc ia lly available in India. The range o his duties as Secretary Defence Production in the

m aterials required for warship building was not

Ministry of Defence. Rear Admiral (later Admiral) SM

a v a ila b le in In dia. M oreover the smaH order Nanda, who had been associated with the project as

Chief of Material in 1961/62 and as Deputy Chief of

the Naval Staff in 1963/64. was appointed Managing

Director MDL on 14 D ecem b er 1964. Mr S a fin

^ ained Chairman MDL for five years till 28 Sep

b e a lo n g

w ith all its attendant

d e p e n d e n ce on im ports,

. ,

Rear Adm iral N anda handed over to Rear

k

rai BA Samson on 3 May 1966, who later also

delays.

basically assem bly

197^me ^ a irm a n MDL until he retired on 15 May

*

T h T S e SS d a r d ofiork m an sh ip required_the

work, the stanaaru

d

ce in which

wh

^an(^e<^ ° v.er to Vice Admiral EC Kuruvila

sp ecial m ater‘ a1®'

nd the volume of closely

a s s o ^ Chairrnan M D L u n til 1976. T h is close w o rk had to be done; a

dent activities

N^QCla^0n ° f the Ministry o f Defence Production,

anc* *-he l ° n g te n u re s o f the top

and s r em Were

Prove invaluable for the timely

difficult.

ProbWCeS,.S^u* res°lu tion of innumerable teething

p °blems of the Frigate Project.

Delays in Construction of MDL Facilities

7

.

j t0 b egin the Frigate

The Problems to be Overcome

T h e b a s ic fa c ilitie s requ ired

^

ou tse, a s

Whiist N

^av*ng si0Va* ^ eadcluarters had the satisfaction of the Rsa n ^ or the latest available Leander design,

Ser*es was

^ ritish Leander o f the FSA 34

Koyal Nav^K* exPected to be commissioned in the

T

SCePticismy f

° re 1969- E xpectedly, there was

b ia a sonh Whether MDL would be able to build in

construction of t h e ’

onJy t„

^tish Naxn lsticated warship as modern as what the

p & A Shop w ere co P

been lald. Th

p&A

W

s^ WouIdhave.

?ůnci reaQ^tlCS’ ^oth in In d ia and abroad, had

M

WarJh? ^ ose in B ritain who had been

c°° 1*dinati

Were we^ aware of the complexity

S r i g a t e w a s t a u n C h ^

s r n 0 N T 0 T R l U M P H / 7 3

practically every aspect o f naval

exchange. It speaks volumes for the ingenuity 0f

The construction of slipways in the South Yard

the officers and men in the Machine Shop".

was also delayed due to the unexpected soil

conditions. The resultant re-planning upset the

Training in Britain for C o n stru ctin g Frigates expansion schedule, which in turn delayed to

installation of the cranes. At every step, the

Vickers made the generous gesture o f starting the

some unforeseen difficulty or the other, resulting in

training of Indian personnel from the Navy and from

revision of plans and compelling improvisation and

MDL even before the contract was signed in October

innovation.

1964.

Admiral Samson, recalls:

The skills required for warship building were

“The Platers & Assembly Shop, the very basis for

vastly different to those for construction of merchant

ship-building, was not ready, since that

ships and totally different to those needed for ship

particular contractor had been unable to adhere

repairs. There were over 35 warship building trades

to any schedule after several revisions. Thus the

as against only 10 merchant shipbuilding trades. A

first plate for the future NILGIRI, could only be

complete re-orientation of training was therefore

laid in the Machine Shop on May 16, 1966. This

necessary.

was just a simple steel plate on which a coconut

MDL deputed a number of its senior and junior

was broken. •

officers for training in the shipyards of Vickers and

“When the three slipways in South Yard got

Yarrow, for periods ranging from six months to two

ready, there were no cranes. When the contractor

years. A small body of about 150 workmen of all

was finally given notice to quit, he promptly

categories were also deputed to these shipyards to

obtained an injunction against the work being

observe at first hand the techniques for building and

carried out by anyone else. It is to the credit of

fitting-out. When these officers and men returned to

the particular judge that we were able to vacate

MDL, they in turn trained other officers and men

this injunction in an incredibly short time. Only

while actually building the first frigate.

thereafter could a new contractor be selected and

Lt Cdr (L) (later Captain) S Prabhala was in the

engaged.

first team who went to Vickers for training in early

“The Platers & Assembly Shop, with all its

1964. He recalls:

internal facilities etc. virtually came into full

being only after the first frigate was launched in

Since Mazagon Dock did not have qualified

October 1968. This one instance alone clearly

people in all disciplines, some of us from the Navy

shows how difficu lt it was for a you ng and

were deputed to Mazagon D ocks.

On the

inexperienced Yard to adhere to any kind of

Construction side we had Cdr AN Thukral, on the

on th

r mUCh l6SS try‘ng t0 comP'ete the hull

Engineering side we had Cdr YP Batra and on the

on the slipway, in what could be termed as in a

reasonable amount of time

Electrical side myself. There was a civilian

counterpart to each of us from Mazagon Docks.

improvising with^uch e m ^ m aking-d° and

On the Construction side it was Mr Choksi, on the

that were available in the old Yard

ma?hines

Engineering side it was Mr Dom Menezes and

the base plate for t h e t w n f

Abraham and on the Electrical side it was Mr

mounting is particularly in.

gun

Kharas.

diameter of this machine

teres tln g- The

“Apart from two from each o f these three

seriously considered imnn .-WaS SUCh that we

disciplines, we also had people from the drawing machine from Italy just fo r 'S ^ a ^

expensive

o ice and also some from the foreman category 0

Purchase would have L t * ! PUfP° Se' But

ec nicians

for

electrical,

shipw righ

other equally vital machine™ emd80'"® imp° rt of

ngineering, plumbing and so on.

we improvised with an exuti

quipment. So

nn u 6

^ a t Vickers wanted such a larg

Machine Shop that was o v e r " gm achine «n the

raised the huge machinp h

years °>d- We

latpr ftt0 C° me there for training, we realised

*■ a" * ^ e n

r e - 2

biiiiL

We went there, was because ship

was an extremely slow nror

6 plate- It

rath T *

*n those days was still an

much skill by the operator t0 a l ? an? required

was^i an a science’ in the sense that not

ecu racy.

thevHfHnned in advance. People went by what

training / n

Past* There w as’nt any forr*1

74/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

buildin ?

Sense ^ a t ^

is toe way you start

& a ship, this is how you plan

this is how you proceed with the

was happening. Watching a ship being built has

procurement or ^

^

We were just left

limited value; there is indeed value but it is only

conw r v e what they did. It we w an ted any by actually doing the job with one’s own hands

t0 observe

^

told t0 ask questions from

that one really learns.

clarification .

v^hat we could learn was

‘The three hundred odd personnel sent to the

the people o

much curiosity and

UK for training did not represent the total work

ho^rnueh wUHngness to lea rn w e displayed.

force that would be involved in building a

warship, which would probably be 1500 to 1800

™ T w a s r e a l T w h a t you c a ll on th e jo b men of all trades. The intention therefore was

that this nucleus would, on their return from UK,

training’, you were ju s t thrown into the works

train a selected work force in warship

and you picked up w hatever you could. There

construction.

was no formal training, th ere w as no form al

“It would seem on the face of it that these

planning system. From that aspect, it was not the

would be from those existing personnel with

best education for us b ec a u s e w e had to do experience in different trades in the Yard. But

improvements ourselves. It w as not as if we

there was a snag to this. Firstly most of our

started with a good foundation and then we could

labour, except in certain technical skills, were not

improve upon that.

educated enough and would not have been able to

“The intention w as th a t w e sh ou ld have

either read the intricate working drawings or the

people trained in all aspects of ship building. One

various manuals, all of which were in English

of the important aspects was inspection. So while

Secondly, psychologically it is always difficult to

we, on behalf of M azagon Dock, w ere getting

, h ^ e the thinking and attitude of people and

trained in how to build ships, there were people

from the Navy headed by Mr D otiw ala for hull

construction, en gin eerin g and electrical. Mr

Dotiwala, Cdr Sarkar and Lt MM Puri (Engineers)

and Cdr Bhatnagar an Electrical Officer, formed

the Warship Production Inspection Team. There

S nJSSS-Sd 4

-

c e r t - ,

wasn t any big team in Admiralty’s design office in

no mistakes.

d ri(,ht from the beginning

ath, as far as I recollect, because we always had

■•Weweredetermmedng

g whetheron

* liaison officer in Bath. Cdr M ohan Ram, a

that every man wortang

Machine sh0p

constructor and Cdr Bose an Engineer and Cdr

the slipway, in the P^ ™

ejob in the correct

adve came a little later, not in the period I was

or any other shop must d

Homl Sethna and

ere* but it was for a m u ch s h o rter period way. Thanks to peopie li

^ N. Thukral who

m,r ^eC*t0

building training.

Commander (lat®r °

standards from the very

activ-

e was no over all coordination of these

insisted on the

the right way f

res Vl ies- Basically we w ere seconded to the

outset, we werej f

work force on the: frigate

^rsh^ 6 counterParts o f the Adm iralty. The

thinking among,

%vlth no rel

being ^ insPection people, for instance, were

Lond °Vera^ supervised by the Naval Adviser

deviation. ^ ^ ensure ^

and ^ [ 2 young

Mazag11 n ^ ein £ d e p u ta tio n is ts and bein g ůr ou°n 0Ck Personnel, we were in contact with

n company in Bombay”.

^ mjral Samson recalls:

abro C

\iscussi°ns with those who came back

^ ix erf a^ter such training, it appeared to be

0PPortun fVa^U e‘

C e rta in ly th ey had the

^ s t r u o f1 J

Wa*c h in g a w a rs h ip bein g

supervisor lev ■

wjedge s

^ded for

confidence and k n ^

Bo0£

as 0

f^temsoHr .anc* o b servin g the m ethods and

b u y in g a warsh P mdL f as

for varylng

*°Wever

an experienced British yard.

^ e deputation ker9 andYarr.

A n s w er! " b.Vious reason s, none o f these Warship bei^f t CtuallY Permitted to work on the

managers from

- — "

& built. They could only watch what

“To establish our own design set up, two

neriods. These were to be in all disciplines -

officers were sent to work in MOD (Navy) UK

shipbuilding, designing. P&A Shop, w e' d' n §'

basically for acquiring the know-how of design

machine shop, everywhere. If MDL

asked

and production of Leander class frigates. These

these British personnel, there would have been

two were Lt NS Mohan Ram, a Constructor officer

no objections from Government. But it was the

and myself a Dagger Marine Engineer. Our job

united view of the top Managers and myself that it

was to learn as much as possib le about the

we really wanted to learn warship building, it was

design, about the m o d ific a tio n s , about the only by having not merely the responsibility but

various trials of the ship, how to conduct them,

the authority as w ell and doin g it oneself.

Without authority and responsibility we would

the acceptance standards etc. In other words, we

not learn warship bu ildin g and develop the

would be given the know-how o f construction,

confidence so essential for the future.

completion, trials of the ship and its operation in

“And so it was decided, despite the misgivings

the Indian Navy.

in all quarters, including NHQ and especially our

“Whilst at Bath, I studied the reports of the

collaborators, Vickers and Yarrow, who had grave

Yarrow Admiralty Research and Development

doubts about everything, that we would have only

(YARD) leading to the finalisation of the design of

a limited number of highly skilled personnel from

the Leander class of ships and also the details of

the UK. and that too only at the Foreman level. It

the background of the modifications which they

is a matter of great satisfaction and pride that we

subsequently adopted to their ships. I studied

never had more than four such personnel on loan

the test specifications and trials and test reports

from Britain at any one time, for periods varying

of a number of Leander class ships.

from 3 months to 3 years. We owe to these British

“Based on the Inspection and Trial Reports of

personnel much gratitude; they worked with their

these ships, I compiled a document of common

own hands and set an example to our own skilled

faults that occur during construction, fitting out

personnel at all levels. Similarly, there cannot be

and installation of engineering machinery. This

enough appreciation to all our Managers and

document subsequently proved to be very

Supervisors concerned who were w illin g to

valuable to MDL, to our Overseeing Team and the

shoulder such responsibility.

ship’s officers who were s ta n d in g

by to

In this way, the large m ajority o f the

commission the ship, in elim in atin g many o

personnel engaged on the Frigate Project on the

these faults.

slipways, in the Drawing Office and in the various

shops were very successfully trained "on the inlv Incidentally, the number o f in sta lla ti°n

as they built the first frigate, the N1LGIRT.

defects we had in the first and second Leanders

built by Mazagon Docks were much less than in

Training in Britain in Ship Design

the Leanders built by British shipyards. We also

compiled data sheets for the conduct of trials an

the post trials analysis of the results. 1 a^s0

“

Bose (a

attended the sea trials o f two Leander class

rigates of the Royal Navy, an experience whic

we could never have got otherwise”

^ design philosophy of the Leanri! ^ i

l ° StUdy

Commodore Bose recalls:

C

frigateS-

Captain Mohan Ram recalls:

som ebody had m a d e a s e c u r ity rn^sta^v

Propert o ? e S s i g n a s fs i s i t at f WŮld n0 t be MOD Navy every now

^

British

i

B e c a u s e . h o w e v e r m u c h y o u 111

under construction i n ^ u S ^ Ship was

Vpr?S1 ^

People w ill fin d o u t. I h a d so

substitutes. And in a ‘

S indiSe™ u s

ry unusual experiences. O n a rr iv a l I w a s 0

You are supposed to stick to th e L e a n d e r Pro

restructuring of the adm inister ^ With the

] * c

Nayy and the introduction ^

^

the Roy al

lonk t£rate: Uke a blinkered horse you should no

f e y were not going to (unlike olri * SCi0USness'

somp i'S Way ° r th a t w a V- I f y ů a r e f0

nu

gnals as before without charm

f

reply to

wjn hP ace where you are not supposed to be. y

charging for lt quUe

chari?, UP f° r the hi6h jump". They were very

samp t'0® Ver^ polite and very u n p le a s a n t at time. 1 got the m essage

76/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

t when one works in the Leander section

conditioning is veiy important. All the fire control

rfS h ip s). one c a n n o t b u t h ea r and see systems and the entire Ops Room are dependant

of D

For ex am p le the drawing o f the first Ikara

on efficient air conditioning. When I came back,

version of the L e a n d e r w a s d on e by me

NHQ wanted an indigenous air conditioning

because there was an easy-going Lt Cdr who liked

system. I put up a very learned note saying how

his golf. When he found that here is a Indian

important air conditioning was and why the air

Naval Constructor who was prepared to work long

conditioning system had to be imported. I was

hours, he put me there and I did the complete

sent for by the Secretaiy Defence Production, Mr

layout of Ikara anti subm arine m issile. I aLso

HC Sarin. He went through my whole note and

worked out the re-design of a Leander’s helicopter

said. “You are a very clever fellow and a very

deck and in so doing le a rn t h ow to d esign a stupid fellow. From this note I can see you know

helicopter deck. I pointed out to them that we

air conditioning inside out but I don't trust your

don’t have to make the whole deck very strong.

judgment. If we can air condition five star hotels,

Let’s find out which are the landing points of the

we can air condition ships also. I am not clearing

helicopter’s wheels, that way we can save some

air conditioning for import. More than that, I am

weight. But the British made the whole flight deck

putting you as the project in-charge for air

of the same strength.

conditioning the NILGIRT. When I came out. I

“In due course, I suggested that I should visit

was very angiy, I thought this decision might ruin

aril the specialist sectio n s w h ere the Leander the ship.

frigates were being designed. They agreed. I went

“After that, I had to sit down and design every

to the underwater shock section. I was able to

single trunking. I learnt a lot and it was a joy to

study documents which in the norm al course I

work with Voltas for air conditioning the NILGIRI.

Of course there were a few places where alittle

would not have had the opportunity to do. I saw

moisture came out. some places got flooded an

the damage stability calculations being done for

we had to put in additional drains, but ^.system

various classes of warships. I learnt everything

as a whole came out beautifully. I learnt

which was there connected with ship’s design and

something then - that there is aw«riom wh.c^

^ came back with a gold mine o f data. In those

tfnes bevond knowledge. Mr Sarin

inform^8, * W&S

a s P o n &e ta k in g in

only had t o K n o * d g , 0 „ « meets

lau

a s*mP*e thing like galley equipment or

s o m e p e o p le in the c0^ ® etaI ^ k i n g in half an eQu? ^ ec^uiPment- One would think a laundry

ch an ge one’s

that we Indians can do

the

is easy, but when you start designing

I , L m

' « » . «

whata i-1 ^ eGluiPment in a ship, you must know

Mr Sarin".

know whm^ er (*rier is supposed to do. You must

„ pr irfate Project Organisation

through a+v,a press is supposed to do. I went

C ontroller .nd,. a W

« i n i K

l u t i n g i

^ e s *

1 w en t th rou gh all the

Bnti u } Was astonishing how many meetings

w , .

had

1____________I_______________, ______________M

- U

r

^anv r n ^

o n la u n d r y e q u ip m e n t. H ow

t

frig a te Project, a s^na^ ^ ^ team of

W

v h

v a

n t r ^ L n g s t h ? y

at nmki

— J h

Aa

lcd

l

u o n

UI t

1 h

1Xe

1

6 g

8a ll

Ae

i y

e

Y eq u ip m en t,

equipiiiciiL.

-

-

o f a British Naval ^ ch^

C

L ' ^ as set up in

consisting of a

set up m

Sritish svst^ 8

with suppliers. In the

consis ng

^ ere is to

there is one person who knows all

^avealpn,

about ship’s laundries. We didn’t

section in Indian Navy. Similarly

N a v v ^ T ^ air“conditioning section in the

Glasgow to N e w c a g e ^ arded ^ ,ndia ,n accord

Ůt a stateni( made detailed notes and worked

to be made andthndcd schedule.

Cornmodore

fCart)e back Tem ° f recluireiT1cnts. By the time I

with a Pre^-et

on

w n r e p r e s e n tat

■ d e s i g n a te d

k e nItty gli+J)r° ^ a^^y had more information

MDL had its

HK Ka? adt organisation

H°yal KT:.m t t y o f the T.e*r,rw

t h e n f

Navy Offic°

Leander desiSn than any

(later Rear Admir

te Project ° r®f lechnical

C ontroller Indian.F 8 He had a team

bra,"‘ m « s t

thf*nWashed

^hat in one a sp e ct I got

(CONlFPO)at Newc

't°

*thq

purchase

Co

^ave tn k

®ritish - that certain critical

and financial man s yarrQW and ncg

nciitloning Te ^mPorted. One of them was air

^ V l c K e r s . n

r o

n the Leander cla ss frigate, air

of v a r io u s k i n d s in a d e q u a t e t i m e t o e n s u r e t h a t th e y e n s u r e i t s t i m e l y

Of equipment in B rita in and to

w e r e a v a i l a b l e w h e n r e q u i r e d .

T h i s b e g a n t o

despatch to MDLin Bombay.

s e r i o u s l y a f f e c t N I L G I R l ’ s c o n s t r u c t i o n s c h e d u l e .

M D L b e g a n f a l l i n g b a c k a t t h e v e r y o u t s e t a n d b y m i d Frigate Cell/Section in MDL

1 9 6 7 w a s a l m o s t t w o y e a r s b e h i n d s c h e d u l e i n r e s p e c t of i n f o r m a t i o n a n d d r a w i n g s f r o m t h e F r i g a t e The .et-up » » O L w a, a . *

O i l i n N e w c a s t l e . A l l M D L ’ s c o m p l a i n t s a n d a p p e a l s s e e m e d t o f a l l o n d e a f e a r s .

B y e n d J u n e 1 9 6 7 t h e

s s s s

r

o k

s i t u a t i o n h a d b e c o m e a l a r m i n g .

after training. Commander© YP Batra, as Planning

A d m i r a l S a m s o n r e c a l l s :

Mana er, Commander(C) AN Thukral, as Offlcer-m-

Charge Frigate (Hull), Shri J Kharas, as Officer-m-

“ I n r e g a r d t o t h e d e l a y s i n p r o v i s i o n o f d a t a a n d Charge Frigate (Electrical), Shri Dom M e n s e s * s i n f o r m a t i o n f r o m t h e U K , i t w a s q u i t e c l e a r t h a Officer-in-Charge Frigate (Engineering). This Cell

V i c k e r s w e r e h o l d i n g b a c k . W e f e l l w e l l b e h i n d was later re-designated ‘Frigate Section and was

s c h e d u l e . I n J u n e 1 9 6 7 , t o g e t h e r w i t h C h a i r m a n headed by Commander (E) (later Vice Admiral) BR

M D L c u m S e c r e t a r y D e f e n c e P r o d u c t i o n , M r Choudhury, Commander (L) (later C aptain) S

H a r i s h S a r i n , w e w e n t t o E n g l a n d t o h a v e a Prabhala, Commander (E) KM A charya and

d i s c u s s i o n w i t h t h e B r i t i s h A d m i r a l t y . I t o o K m e Commander (E) T Deva in succession.

o p p o r t u n i t y t o c o m p l a i n a b o u t t h e l a c k o i The Frigate Section, among other things, was

c o o p e r a t i o n f r o m V i c k e r s . A m e e t i n g w a s s e t u p responsible for producing from the basic drawings

received from Vickers, the detailed working drawings

i n V i c k e r ' s H o u s e t o d i s c u s s t h i s . T h i s t p e e 1

required for practical implementation in the shops

w a s a c r i m o n i o u s .

T h e r e w e r e v e r ^ N j l ? p Q

and on the slipways.

d i s c u s s i o n s

a n d

a r g u m e n t s .

C O

•

C o m m o d o r e K a p a d i a , w a s t h e r e w i t h m e a Delays in Starting Construction

M D L ’s S h i p b u i l d i n g M a n a g e r M r H o m i S e t h n w e l l . T h e m e e t i n g w a s m o s t u n fr u it f u l ir o m o After a ships hull has been fully fabricated, each

p o i n t o f v i e w .

.

e

compartment in the ship is marked off from detailed

“ I h a d f i n a l l y t o i n f o r m V i c k e r s t h a t s i n c e ^

drawings to assist the location of equipment, as also

w e r e n o t m a k i n g a n y p r o g r e s s , I w o u l d h a v e ^

the exact positioning of electrical cables, piping

o p t i o n b u t t o r e p o r t t o m y G o v e r n m e n t a ^

systems, ventilation systems, etc. After locating the

r e c o m m e n d t h e c a n c e l l a t i o n o f t h i s p r o j e c t .

^

position of all these systems in each and every

t h e n t h a t V i c k e r s d e c i d e d t h a t w e w o u l d c a r r y

compartment and after making minor adjustments

i n a m o r e c o o p e r a t i v e m a n n e r .

, t 0

wherever necessary, work begins to instal various

systems and equipment

“ I t w a s a t t h i s m e e t i n g t h a t w e

^

t0

m o v e t h e F r i g a t e C e l l f r o m V i c k e r s a t N e w c a s

^

in s t a l 2 o t f

L G ^

' M D L h a d 10 " m a n u f a c t u r e a n d in s t a l 2 0 m ile s o f fe r r o u s a n d n o n - f e r r o u s p i p i n g o f Y a r r o w s a t G l a s g o w w h e r e t h e B r i t i s h ^ e a n e r e varying sizes serving 61 systems. 180 m iles of

w a s b e i n g b u i l t a n d w h e r e o u r p e r s o n n e ^

s e e i n g h o w Y a r r o w w a s d o i n g i t .

s

M e d . ExSuhdifferent tyPCS

SiZes had be

“ T h e

s c e p t i c i s m

i n

t h e

B r i t i s h

w h ic h w e r e f it t e d w it h f o r a r i a t t s u t o ^

^

T

^

8 ’

i n t e r e s t i n g . W h e n I w e n t t o m e e t S i r L e o n

^

s y s t e m s , a ll c o m p a r t m e n t s i n t h ^ s E

a ' d l X

R e d s h a w , t h e M a n a g i n g D i r e c t o r G l a s g o w , t o d i s c u s s w i t h h i m t h e p r o g r e s s i n r . , ^ r , t r o 6;

°

<

»

s u p p l y o f i n f o r m a t i o n , h e t o l d m e b l u n t l y t h a Specialised equipment had to beTnsUUedTn a ' ' 68

n e v e r r e a l l y e x p e c t e d I n d i a ' s f r i g a t e P r o i e c t } °

determ inded sequence T v ,. -

lled m

a . a

a pre

p i c -

b e c o m p l e t e l y s u c c e s s f u l . H e s a i d t h a t V i c c o o r d in a t io n . I f o n e it e m o r s v ^ J e C lU lr e d d e t a i l e c l w e r e c o l l a b o r a t i n g w i t h t h e A u s t r a l i a n s s e q u e n c e o f t h e e n t ir e f it t in g o u t n ™

d e l a y e d ’ t h e

u i l d i n g B a t t l e C l a s s d e s t r o y e r s , t h e y h a d a B y t h e e n d o f 1 9 6 6

2 5 m a n a g e r s f r o m V i c k e r s t h e r e a n d A u S ^ ^ s t h a t t h e i n f o r m a t i o n a n d d r a w i n g s f r o m t h r ^

w a s s t i l l t r y i n g t o b u i l d t h e s e B a t t l e C e l l i n N e w c a s t l e w e r e c o r i n g o u t f aT

t 1

F r i g a t e

d e s t r o y e r s s u c c e s s f u l l y . I f t h e y c o u l d n o t a c h > w i t h o u t t h e d e t a i l e d i n f o r m a t i o n t h a t a n d

i t . h o w d i d I n d i a t h i n k s h e c o u l d ? H e s a i d W i

. . order the „ „ y hundred, and t h o u a S

V i c k e r s w e r e c o l l a b o r a t i n g w i t h the S p a n i s h a n n o t h i n g h a d h a p p e n e d t h e r e e i t h e r . A n d n o t h 78/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

was going to happen in the Mazagon Docks either

I took strong exception to this and invited him to the launching of the first L ean d er on the 23

1966, to

October 1968. He said he would come if it took combination of

L Sectlon- This

a

dUon of drawing office n J L

S was a

place. But even if it did take place, he did not It was also initiating nron.r

sign office-

consider that we would ever be able to coniDleie

™

th e req u is itio n s fo r^ tem s^ n 'h 11011'

fitting it out.

F

mostly indigenous, becaus? for h pr0Cured-

“After July 1967 the s itu a tio n began to

needed to be imported n

whatever was

improve vastly. As our teams in MDL and in the

CONIFPO in UK who w o „M S ' S L ” ° “ ' d S° ‘ °

UK gained experience and knowledge, we were

and get the items procured

p3per WOrk

able to get things moving satisfactorily though

we were unable to make up the time already loft

th °e °S ba? ' 1 sometimes feel that because of the tardy information being given to our teams in

the drawing office and to o u r representives

abroad, we had willy-nilly to put in that much

H a r i s f s a and ° h ^

UPS'

Iansh Sarin who was Sec ^

ret ^

ary P

D 1

e ^

fen '

ce

more extra effort to learn for ourselves. We iTarrJ

Production would come to MDL’s board room and

t fc h .r d way but „

„ e who u lu ^ n t

ind me waiting to see Admiral Samson who was

then the Managing Director. He would know me

by n'ame and start talking to me about things

A vailability o f M a t e r ia l R e q u ir e d fo r happening on the ground. The team in the

Ministry comprised Sarin and Podgy Nadkarni

C o n s t r u c t in g F r ig a t e s

who was the Officer on Special Duty. In Mazagon

Docks itself, we had quite a few luminaries in

'vas the no i^ a v a n ^ t]tl.enefcks in the Frigate Project addition to Admiral Samson. Mr Dotiwala was

et)uipment of the r ' * ^ 0 rnateria^ machinery and the overseer. Mr Sethna was the ship building

^ fight time and

standard and quality, at

manager. Partly because it was a new venture

^960's, India’s induct- 6

quantities- In the end

and we were all very enthusiastic and partly

deveV d to prorin

^

6 Was not sufficiently

because there was this interaction, we were able

material reqUj rPr|Ce

f; specialised equipment and

to overcome quite a few difficulties and

^ i p b u i i d i ’ " dn ‘ n ®h iP b u ildin g, much less in bottlenecks.

f in the case of? " 6

t0 fely larSely on imports.

“The technology transfer from Yarrow and

Bering i0n

l e a ? ^ 8,

was the problem of

Vickers was very poor. In fact Yarrow’s own

°Pulsi0n and auxil-

like w eap on s, main

planning was virtually non-existent. Admittedly

*rs in advance

machinery as much as three

ours was not there either. We had expected some

d shipped to MDL

0

C n insPected, packed

inputs from Yarrow but these were not coming

**S foj* fu

through. A classic example was that which

suy y ^ ild Steel ^

tGS’ t*lree types were required

occurred a few months before launching the

Di^er'grip p]at

* 3 quality steel and ‘A ’ quality

N1LGIRI. From the drawing of the under water

openings, I could count about 45 underwater

steeiSl°n of H in d u st^ I

Cnd o f 1965 the Rourkela

s0nip J^is Was used **

had deveIoPed only mild

valves The method of procurement was that

C

' 65%- The U

rS ' ” < *f first frigate. t u n i n g to Yarrow, who were building the same Leander

aftpr

*ated to ma

r

imported. Action was

design ship and were a few months ahead of us.

would pass on copies of their own requisitions

Cl nsiderable I f f acture ‘B’ quality steel and, what they called copy orders, and that would

Plates n

stringent

R ourkela succeeded in

indicate to us as to what was required to be

Hind,, Proved to hp

u f carried out on the trial

C S ta* Steel ha^

Iy sa*sfactoiy. In addition.

ordered by ~

,«fc“

forSD ati°n B s s 1

° developed steel plates to

S X r ' r d e r s S - « d ordered o„.y 30

Was bpi01^ PUrPoses r 151 * Tilese Pla^es were used these copy

vaives So we sent a telex to

under water valvesdtheyrnanag e f0 rth e

^ere ^ ^ built, 950/

t^le time the second frigate

odd unoer

^ ^

mangge for the

comrv!nd^ enousiv° ^ SteeI pIate requirements

Yarrow a s k i g

valves

g ?? T

T h

h eeyy sga

a iid

d "

- O

o h

h y^es, u

w e

0cioreAoh

r e m a i n i n g 1 5 o r

b e c a u s e w e h a d t h e m i n

Achaiya recalJs;

s tdckn"0tC0an you imagine the consternation, a few T R A N S I T I O N T O T R I U M P H / 7 9

months before NILGIRI’s launch, that we had not

to us by the Production Inspectors. We organis ri

even ordered the underwater valves totally as

Steering Com m ittee m eetin gs under th

required! That is just an example. But basically,

chairmanship of CNS, and represented NHQ

as we went along, we found that we had to learn

various coordination m eetin gs under th"

quite a few things which even Yarrow could not

chairmanship of the Joint S e c re ta ry (Publ^

teach us.

Sector) in the Department of Defence Production

“We had also to willingly take on the task of

who was also incharge of the Price Negotiating

indigenising as much as possible.

The

Committee. I also looked into the problems we

organisation in Delhi, initially called DDIMS, split may face during the various trials, during testing

into DWP and DPI(N). They again took a lot of

and tuning prior to manning and commissioning

initiative. Some of them were perhaps over

the ship and the various problems that the ship

ambitious. But it is a matter of record that even

may encounter during N aval S ervice e.g.

in the. very first Leander we managed to have a

maintenance and su bsequ en t operation,

large number of indigenous equipments and

availability of fuel, lub oils, and other stores and

systems. I remember a gentleman coming from

Base and Depot spares with a view to advising

Yarrow and wondering whether India which, in

their perception, was still in the bullock cart or

timely provisioning action by the various

organisations.

cycle stage, would be able to manufacture

equipment to warship requirements. We did

To this end, it was felt that in addition to the

successfully manage to indigenise a lot of

various Indian teams engaged in the Leander

med,Um to high technology equipment, which

roject, there should also be other units like an

j s of course a very desirable thing in the long

e aborate Inspection Organisation covering the

ndustries where naval item s w ere being

eveloped and produced, an on board Testing

work fe e rwaaVchQL MaZaf " D° CkS' ° Wn Civilian and Tuning Team, a M ach in ery Trial Unit (MTU)

la te r on thT v r i T ,

^

^

‘ Kn° W 11131

e c. The ship s commissioning crew could not be

p S

iS

S

?

L

T

" 1" lab” ur u m “

expected to have adequate knowledge of this class

°f six years, 1 have nnth ■

u nnS my first period

o ship, except to some extent of the Whitby class

way they put their shoUri Ut admiration for the

s ips. the Trishul and Talwar, which were

% £ ?* Mazagon

l£ 2 2 £

M ^ re+

St

we took UP a case with the

saiir\S ^ 0 ^ e^ence to send selected officers,

^

»

,

M IM lo„ t„

( t o o a e t p r o .M i n

asn ert an_ civi*ians to UK to train in various m , . S 0 evelopment and inspection of Naval

in nnhery! nd eQuipment in British industries.

electrioafr testin& anc* tuning of weapon and

J

n“ ^ M o ra le

Unit tn sys*-ems and with a Machinery Trials

proposal^ 11 UCt harb ůr and sea trials. The

sailors of th °lncluded training of the officers and

standing hv ^,Con)missioning crew who would be

harbour

Commodore SC Bose recalls:

an 1 ^

&nd °P erate the shiP durin£

third Dart

SGf *r*a^s themselves without any

^ ip s c r e w ^ M u 6 aS in UK*

50 doing* th%

the shin and?

u® accluil1ng a first hand feel of

in the

C0mmissionir,« 6

r out to sea subsequently on

monitoU

rmtgertS

heff1°n! , 1969 to 1872

“AH thu

Without anY trouble.

M azag o n D ocks w ith t h T h ^ ' 3 P ^ g r e s ^ i n recall a rem an ftachieved very successfully. 1

Sector of Vick ^ S*r EriC Issac* the M a n a gin g

on board whPn Vu' ^ h° was invited to be present s a s s i r s r « s s l s *

Sea trials. o n

6 S^ ^ean^er was undergoing

the equipment h**- C ^roSress and thp

ariůs

Power Trial f• ?.oniP^e^ on o f th e s ix h o u r s Full

^

all machin

Wi ! d b y th e Ful1 A s t e r n T r ia ls .

and

^

l T

Z

[lZ red indE o ?%

w as nothin? p v ^ eing operated rem o tely, there

80/transition t o tr iu m ph

i0ns referred

the funnel w h / ^ fu a ^

ot ^ la c k s m o k e from

n he e n g in es w e r e m o v e d fro m

Full Ahead-Stop-Full Astern in rapid movement

giving a shock to the boilers. Sir Eric expressed used to happen akn i

surprise at our achievement to Admiral Samson

an inspection of the helTcTpVerf ^ g0n Do(*sfor

the Managing Director o f Mazagon Docks who

" ‘ ^ d g o n Docks, who

ouette is a three wheel helir

S deCk ^

was al

a s

l o

s

o on

o

n board the ship. He said

i that the 20

^ e e l is in the middle

H

the fr° ” t

specialists who had been nominated by the R n Ji

Platforms were welded as pe^th

Pt6r ^

Navy and Vickers/Yarrow and kept ready in UK tn

design for the British WestlanS/0"

Bntish

/ly to India to h elp US in fhe ^

and°

a four wheel helicopter Wh

,

P' which was

commissioning of the ship on receiving an s o t

the Naval Air Staff, “W h / d id n ^ ^

aSked

message, would feel frustrated at having missed a

earlier"? I got no reolv t / f you teH

chance to visit India. I thought this

we had to change the who^

0131 mistake.

firing. We did a Inf o ff i- u lnsu,atl0n and the B S Cp2 rremark ^ 3 t o n a l l y c o n s e ^ E *

learning aU the time

things. But we were

operational a s p e c t ^ o f t h e 's 'h ^ ’

V' CW t h e

and th eN a J learnt sSm ^H ^i Mazagon Docks

787 item s a n d o t h e r n

e

l

l

v

T

n

^

t0 D

consequent on th e u se o f i n w J

s t o r e s

^ also pruned t h e w e ll 1

7

n o u s su b s titu te s ,

and fittings. T ill th a t u

^.b lis h e d Iist o f sp a re s

turbine liftin g g e t “ T

'

™

G

%

Nar

r

' b,«

ta 'ic p ". “

^

ShiP s c a ™

d

TARAGIRI With a bigger extendable hangar. It

nuxnbe® o f ; eaw 0n rd;

C° nSi£ted of a

was something quite phenomenal, something to

used when a shin ,-o *

S whlch cannot be

be proud of’.

5

“ m m u n ic a C Z Z

T ' W ith P r « e n t day

f a sh'P in a m atter o f V ? iS gear CŮld be

The First Frigate - INS NILGIRI

dockyard specialists w

b re e day s ’ along with

items from the sh L

/ ^ '6' 01'6' deIeted ffiese

INS NILGIRJ’s keel was formally laid on 15 October

I 6'8' one each for th ,

Hst &nd had onIy four

1966. Inspite of all the problems. MDL bravely one for MDL and th "0 ° ocky a rd s ’ east and

invited the Prime Minister to launch the NILGIRJ on n here turbines were ™ ^

°

for BHEL BhoPal

23 October 1968-barely two months after the Kasara

Ur Proposal and ann

'

, The PSOs appreciated

Basin was expected to be impounded.

CaPtain M0h

PPr° Ved «*•

Then MDL encountered a problem of another

an Ram recalls:

kind - Labour.

*ne Directo

Admiral Samson recalls:

Jas ''ery excSng0^

^

61' Project in 1969/1970

“The Management had been having discussions

and GeaCtrical ^ d e t h t ® " " ™ ' ^ ^ g u e s . On wit.’ i the Trade Union Committee on the terms

Com^

esh> on thf. „

Com m anders Baxi

and conditions for th

t e

h

e ne

n x

e t

x

t th

t r

h e

r e

e y

e e

y a

e r

a s

r .

s

. Th

T e

h

e

Union made major demand

dema

s

nd

an

a d

n

d

th

t e

h

,ayout! nder B°se. We d i d t h ^ ' Side there WaS

electr

0 f Co® P a r t m

Management too had made their own offer. There

V e r y f l r s t c o rn P ° s i t e

equip“ nic Warfare 0m ®n f, llk e the g a lle y , the was veiy hard bargaining and progress was being

c°ndj

er>t r o o m e t c

m

e le c t r o n ic w a r fa r e

made.

“Then s id

uddenly.

, just 1

i 5

b days

day

be

oefore

iore

,

' i

?

|

?

t h=

-

NILGIRI's lau ^

n r

chi

h n

i c

n f

g , th

t e

h

e Un

U i

n o

i n

o

n £

gave

v a

e

a st

s a

t t

a u

t t

u o

t r

o y

i

weeks notice to go on strike on the grounds

Which NaVy did n o th 1 aPS’ bIe han&ar’ which the two

whe

tha :

t the Managem

a n a gem ent

en t wa

c s

i

a be

ucing

uig tota

l u l u lly

h

j

non-

n n

e

n tC

t h0

h uld co

° l

t lapS

s e

p T

h k

l- ' „ We n

" e

ce

cd

ue

cd

u a

3 ha

nanga

nga r

>

w° i

uid

d k

K !

e helicop

O t

D e

t r

e

r ' lke an accor

o d

r io

ion, so tha

tha t

c

cooperative in respect of their demands. In effect,

ParJCprJ e closed anH W? S E n d in g, the hangar

on 22 October all workmen would proceed on

t h ^ e hangar w W,

tile helicopter was

strike.

, .

“The launching of a major vessel is a very

ComPan s ln a shin

°P en- Nobody had

c°mpany ° a^ed Domi° •

^GIRTs size. We got a

delicate affair, the preparation for which

commences several days in advance step by step

ln

Canada f 11? 1 ^ um*nurn Fabricating

but the 24 hours before the actual moment of

* V

s -

a t0 d0 ^

collapsible hangar

launching are the most tricky. A couple of

arning

tim e because we

hundred men had been trained individually and

J°o. And stupid mistakes

collectively for their specific tasks on the slipway.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/81

Each task had to be carried out at the exact

everything is satisfactory, after which the

moment and correctly; any mistake could spell

is finally 'boxed up’.

machinery

disaster. The strike notice had virtually put a

The Final Acceptance Trials extend over a nin

pistol to our heads, knowing full well that the

month period. Tests are designed to withstand sever^

launch might have to be cancelled without the

conditions, more rigorous than what the shin wo„M

help of trained personnel, who could not be

normally experience at sea. A fte r successful

replaced overnight.

Acceptance Trials, the ship is handed over to the

“I then asked the MDL Managers w hether

Navy.

LUC

they could launch the vessel w ith o u t the

Admiral Samson recalls:

workmen. At first they were most unhappy to

take such a major risk. Mr. Homi Sethna,

“The Navy was as pleasantly surprised as we were

Commander Thukral and Mr. Victor Franklin

at the timely completion of NILGIRI's Contractor's

finally agreed that they would have a try, after 1

Sea Trials (CSTs). It resulted in great relief and

told them that I would bring in as many men as

joy all round. An interesting feature was that the

possible from the Navy, who could be trained

sh.ps company, which had been standing by the

launching ^

W6ekS remaininS prior to the

ship, operated the vessel during the CSTs but

“I then recalled the Union Committee and

NHng ^ spo^ sible t0 Mazagon Dock and not to

me shlP remained with Mazagon Dock till

2 June, 1972”.

the fW f f mC ,ta^en fr°m keel laying to launching of

out of th I f Cf me tp tw° years* but fo r the fitting-one single worker from M*S

g launched. not

to the

C S lp’.

basin trials, the sea trials and up

anywhere near the Y a r d t ^ 0? D° Ck WaS to be

3 vear<;0mmiSf 0rlin^

Peri°d extended to another

This launching S o T v e d ^ r Pr°blems'

fitting nnf11

months. In warship building, the

country and nothing and nn

^

° f the

total of S wo Wa^s 01116 consuming. Nevertheless, a

Permitted to compromise ft ,

be

Ion? hppa

yrears from keel-laying to delivery was

a g re e m e n ts /c o n c e s s io n ™

, d ed t h a t a n Y

^ng, because of the teething problems.

demands stood automa'tf S?,

in resPect of

Commissioning

u “A short while ,aterT atJCaIly Cancel‘ ed.

^ m , when they inform L Was ask^ to rejoin

M rsTnd^r Wa* commissioned on 3 June 1972 by

the country they had deem ed^ f° r the Sake of

were 35 Lea

^ Pl1me Minister of India. There

stnke notice, it had hp*

withdraw their

worked, and in

':a^ a t e d risk but I

NILGIRI was'thp'^Rf^ 31 in 0ther Navies at the time'

ery successfully".

Punching went off

Navy, the Dut h a

^ anc^er- Apart fro m th e British

also had

’ ,Ustra^ian and New Zealand Navies

d U a n d e r design frigates.

Pr™ e M inister of^nd ia8

In dira G andhi th

Ganges in Sensors and Weapons to Improve

~

and *aunched the'^HLGIRi ^ Urn

fittin g out and Triuls

^

Capability

°nly one frigat^f31^ e’

Government had ordered

‘he equipment'isTried adVanced stage of fltti

£ach and everv q, ? and les*ed in 'r- tmg'ůt,

Placing the orri ° f COnstructed. There was delay in tested to the 7atUf

ln the ship i s t " 1 Trials’-

because India w * ° T

second and third frigates

QverseeingTeam * action °f the Navv

Ůghly

crisis. The special

throuSh a foreign exchange

undertaken.

any adjustments rpS arshiP

n°t be stretched +

4,7 n^l^on pounds could

requirements

^ After that the shin,

^

are

° * nc?lude the f o r e i g n exchange

*s ■ also known as

to sea for ‘bu1|h .

devalued in jn n

**** flrst frigate. The rupee was

resort to annual

6 and the Government had to

jn early ig 68

Plansfrom 1966 to 1969. Eventually

buHd two more frLrnment placed an order on MVh to han the originpi^a^es’ This was six nionths later second Leander Puan for comm encem ent o f the

‘ ^ ■ r m

r c m m n

Oe‘ 0 n " m ‘1

1968-

' which eventually began in May

Receiving orders p ie c e -m e a l w as one o f the handicaps that MDL had to accept. The advantage of

MDL ordering economic quantities on its suppliers

have ^ n e ^ s h ip 0 ^ Ůt ^ Sh!pS rather 01311

had to be sacrificed. T h e D utch who b u ilt the Leanders in their yards at Amsterdam and Flushing,

constructed six sh ip s o f the s eries alm ost

were by no means o t a f c T S i e S S

simultaneously, all o f which w ere commissioned

Nanda saying What will I tell my young officers

between March 1967 and May 1968.

when they ask me why are webui,ding these

obsolete Leanders?"

Naval Headquarters took advantage ol the delay

in NILGIRI to improve the sensors and the AIO for the

Captain Prabhala recalls:

subsequent Leanders.

There were several schools o f thought at that time

The British fire control systems in NILGIRI were

about the desirability o f changing equipment from

MRS 3 for the 4.5 inch guns and MRS 8 with

ship to ship. MDL felt that by avoiding changes,

CRBFD for the 40/60 guns. The search and

ships could be delivered quicker and cheaper. NHQ

navigation radars were 993 and 978. Vickers

felt that if we continued to build a series o f ships with were willing to transfer the technology for the 4.5"

and MRS 3. Around that time, we found that the

obsolescent sensors, weapons and equipment, they

company SIGNAAL in Holland, which supplied

would not meet the staff requirement. And from the

the fire control equipment and the radars for the

view point of indigenisation, it was not cost effective Dutch Navy’s Leanders, had superior equipment,

to mdigenise obsolescent technology.

superior in the sense they were already using

Commodore Achaiya recalls:

digital electronics as opposed to the analogue

We in MDL fought qu ite a b a ttle with Naval

electronics of the British systems. The Navy

Headquarters, requesting them to place orders

therefore, felt that if we go in for the indigenous

r a east three identical Leanders at a time. But

manufacture of the analogue MRS 3 and MRS 8.

we will be stuck with them for the next several

the^Swf6 a*reac*y under pressure, perhaps from

years. Why should we make outdated analogue

cont ^ branch, to change over radars and fire

systems when digital electronics were already

a lre ^ System?- The second frigate in fact was

coming into vogue? If we were going to make

wea^ ^ keing c o n te m p la te d w ith d ifferen t anything indigenously, we should start with

task of1 COntro* equipment. This was not an easy

something technologically more up to date than

build J nt^ ration* We were still learning how to

the obsolescent analogue British systems then

filling i 6 irS^ ^ri£ate’ correcting mistakes and

available.

,

have lp1

in inf ° rrnation. Hopefully we would

“Then we found that if we were to fit the

°f W o r k ^ ° n

^irst fri£ate, improved the way

Signaal equipment, the ship would require some

become e ff ^°F t *le seconc* ~friga te and really modifications in the hull and ini the^trurture

c°nstrij

1Cien^ *n the modern way o f warship

frigate Th°n’ ^

time we finished the third

rather f h ^ WaS a better waY

g ° ing about it

som ebody to supply us

im provem ents* scra m b le for 80 called

d ra w in gs o

jn g braad beam Leander

“I r

® m “ re power or capability.

Material

mentioning this to then Chief of

/ Z that we tied up with NEVESBU. the Dutch

and for that

The Dutch fire control

We hav~

miraI Kulkarni, “Is it not better that

Warship Des‘gn BureaUw

then licensed for

ide

thre

"^tical d

~e s^li Ps or six ships o f the same

and radar e9ulP™arat EIectronics, which was

We could KS*-fn^ ^ i s would not only mean that

m a n u f a c t u r e to

which had

e^icientlv

t^ em fester, cheaper and more

the only

“ / m a n u fa c tu r in g radars and

°Peratin s' *

a ^S0

m ore c°s t effective for

S

S

i i p n > e n t for .1 * Defence S e r i e s

^oulcj havCia^ niain ta in in g these ships. We

ejcPerience» icientity o f spares and operating

In te ra c tio n u>ith the Nethertand Warship Design were i ? Ut NH9 ’s im peratives in those

hůght. q iffe re n t from w h at we in MDL

Bureau jNEVESBU)

fjgvESBU. Commander <L)

ave PreferreiHtainly as a ship builder, we would

ent*cal sh

lf not six’ at least three of them as

r(lat

er Rear J K S 5

— - °f

He

Case the ban^S * a^so remember saying that in

recalls

0n goes up, is it not better for the

TRANSITION t o TRIUMPH/83

extent and also made the task of change over that

“We were there for 18 months. Cdr (later Rear

much easier. Also, this exercise was the first step

Admiral) Ranjit Whig of the Constructor Branch

was my colleague. The most important thing we

in building up the confidence in MDL to not just

learnt was that once the Dutch gave us a

take the drawings received from the UK and

commitment on transfer of technology, they did

implement them, but to gen erate new sets of

not withhold any single little bit of information

drawings as the workshop drawings, based on a

from us. Secondly, they taught us new methods

conceptual detailed design given by somebody

of doing a layout drawing, the systems drawing,

else. We saw its u ltim ate a p p lica tion in the the preliminary planning data and final planning

construction of the Project 16, GODAVARI class

data, what is called spatial working drawing and

frigates, where the NHQ’s Directorate General of

installation working drawings. What was most

Naval Design produced the detailed design and

emphasised was that when a ship is built in

the MDL translated them into working drawings,

Holland, even the final bill of material is

consistent with the specifications".

computerised so that the shipyard is given all the

ordering material from the Design Bureau. In our

Eventually, HIM GIRI and the subsequent

case, unfortunately, because we started with the

Leanders were fitted with the fo llo w in g Signaal British tradition of the DG Ships at Bath, we have

equipment:

never been able to implement this. In our case,

•

The VM 45 fire control system for the 4.5" gun.

only the preliminary and the concept design are

•

Two’ VM 44 fire control system s for two sided

being done in Naval Headquarters and the final

working drawings are prepared by the shipyard

Seacat anti aircraft guided missile launchers.

Not only does this lead to lack of standardisation

•

Long range Air Warning Radar LW 04, Surface

but it leads to enormous infructuous work and

Warning Radar DA 05 and Navigation Radar ZW

expenditure, which could be avoided

06.

if we really

had a component system of drawing.

•

DS 22 Display Systems in the Operations Room.

"What the Dutch, the Japanese and the

This system was still under developm ent by

Americans are doing is that after the prelimina™

Signaal and the In dian N avy w as the first

customer for it.

d e S ^ ? 6013'6 Wh°

»»d w o r k o n S

and E

i ™ 0* W° rking

Similarly the British Sonar 184 was replaced by

last K

l S

j t S

that

the later Sonar 184 M.

everything, is actualiv

fasteners, doors

Phase. Nothing is left to <-h UP m that drawing

The Second Frigate - INS HIMGIRI

T h -e ^ such a8;L fe c U y t m Cnf ° ;

even three parts of a shin

d™etaiUng that

HIMGIRI’s keel was laid on 4 November 1968. She

shipyards, can be c o n n S

v 66 different

was launched on 6 May 1970. MDL had been able to

shipyard and you will be ahl f ^ ^ ‘n a sinSle

reduce the time between keel laying and launch from

one third the time Unfnn

haVe a shiP ^

months t0 18 months. The fitting-out however

what we learn, we never do

in Ůr case

as considerably delayed due to the late arrival of s a failure on our part We h I * ® * l ° Say ^

jor items, both from abroad and India.

implement this in our

! n"Ver been able

l machinery installation was completed m

s ls ‘he most important th-

ganisation

com w

Basin Trials w ere s u c c e s s f u l

™

° » to Ihe

* * « >

» « to

T r i a l ^

Ja n u a ry 1974 a n d th e C o n tr a c to r's Sea prelim^C° m?lenced on 6 A Pril 1974'

A t r*hP

recalls*

S ll“ ter D™ « r r „:;ltrl||

gear h

?

Power trials, the tem perature of th

accentahi ,e a r in g s w a s fo u n d to b e r i s i n g a b o v e been marf6 .imits* The Sear box was the first to ha

d eta iled

m lndia t0 the Sw1ss M A A G d e sig n . A fter

Dock, to . i v x I l V J h e l p e d I f c . g ®

consultatioX a m in a tio n ' N a v a l H e a d q u a r t e r s .

■arge number of

Sn°P drawings

the bearinc/1 W*t'1 Sw iss design ers, d e c id e d to m o 'fy The Repeat r * CheCk the aliSnment o f the turb“ i S

re d u c e d t h e f e ^ ^ r p e 0p^

1974 werp 1

tr a c to r 's S e a T r i a l s in S e p te rn b 84/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

° lhC M D Ltos°m e

on 23 November6! 9 7 4 '

H1MGIRI commissione

plus side, H IM G IR I g o t b e tte r radars,

fabrication work on the third frigate, scheduled to On th e

AlO and fire c o n tro l e q u ip m e n t and two commence in January 1970, started in April 1970

s°na?cmided m issile lau n chers. D esign changes

due to late receipt of steel from Hindustan Steel Ltd.

S

1 made in the communication systems and

In 1969-70 there had been an acute shortage of

'helayout of mess decks to im prove habitability in steel. MDL had been able to carry on production

tropical conditions.

without serious dislocation as its earlier orders for

steel had materialised. By 1970-71 however, the fall C aptain Prabhala recalls.

in steel production adversely affected MDL’s work.

-As to whether this bold decision that was taken

The interval between keel laying and launching

was right, now with hindsight one can say ‘Yes it

increased to 25 months. The main machinery which

was right”. But I m yself, b eing a shipbuilder in should have arrived at the time of the ship’s

those days, w as o f th e s tr o n g v ie w th a t the launching in October 1972. was actually received in

primary task sh ou ld be to le a rn how to build May 1974, thereby further delaying the ships

ships fast, quick and at th e low est cost. And I commissioning till 18 February 1976.

was advocating the view that if the equipment fit

changes with every ship, som e design changes

The Fourth Frigate - INS DUNAGIRI

would be in v o lv e d , s o m e p ro v in g o f th e new The fourth Leander was launched on 9 March 1974.

systems would be in vo lved , w h ich would only

She was on the slipway for only 14 months as delay the construction programme. It would also

compared to 18 to 25 months for the second and Uurd add to the m aintenance problem s. Therefore, at

frigates respectively. Fitting out was affected by least for a range o f three ships, let us freeze the delays in receipt of indigenous as well as imported

equipment package before w e think of changing

equipment. The main engines and gear boxes were

the equipment.

j - A/tow

Basin trials were earned out in

“If the in d ig e n is a tio n p ro gram m e and the received ,ni May

Basm completed ..dsT.ctonl,

improvements which were taking place, either in

October 19

iq 7r The final inspection

in November/December, 197*

the Royal Navy or in the Dutch Navy, were to be

of hull, weapons, radio comp

DUNAGIRI

incorporated in the ship building programme, it

was completed in early 197/.

was a balance o f advantage which somebody had

commissioned on 5 May

launching had

to decide. I think with hindsight, we can now say

The time between ted

from launching

that it was a rig h t d e cis io n . It enabled us to been reduced to 1 m

ucgd tQ 38 months - the

understand that if you want to take out a piece of

to delivery had bee

Nevertheless. the total

equipment and put another piece of equipment in

shortest period yet achie

,uction was still too

its place, w h a t are a ll th e c h a n g e s from the of 58 months from sta

P ^ ^ Qther hand the

electrical side, from the hull side, from the ship long by world stand

. digenously produced for

side that we had to take care of. Therefore certain

range o f equipment being

sgtry was impressive,

capabilities w e r e b u ilt up in th e d esign the first time by Indi

g_ main g e a r i n g main

dePartments, with the result that later on, when

main boilers, mam t

aiternators. diesel

We wanted to rep la c e th e 4.5 inch gun w ith a c irc u la to rs , turbines for_tur

exchangers,

missile , or ta k e o u t som e e le c tro n ic w arfare a lt e r n a t o r s , stern tub ^ bushes.

processing

^ uipment and put in some Italian equipment, we

radar and fire contr°' t^onmg and re frig e ra tio n ere able to take it in our stride.

,

oth er w o rd s , i f w e had n o t m ade the

COmr n e " y 'b aroaSast equipment

fa^+n^eS’ We C0uld certainly have built the ships

Hiffer‘

the sim ultaneous learning curve in

c

eren t a s p e c ts o f s h ip design- and ship nstruction th e n w o u ld h a ve tak en longer,

“ “ ,derab,e

^ e two, I think the advantage lay, as

f° “ MenceeBl.” d | m i,p a ‘ a" le,' 1S'

^ t h hindsight, in the course we had taken .

. of Anti Submarine Capability

im provem ents

^ ^

gixth Leanders

Si

The Third Frigate - INS UDAYGIRI

111

pratin g e x p e rie n c e w as

been rep^ers

the second and third frigates had

,972 and 1973N',fo lM »"< ' lhe Seak' ne " Z

bully

’Ved together, MDL seized the o p p o rtu n ity to

gamed with tM NILGTOT)smo »T O T r a «P H / 8=

nem fa s te r th a n th e fir s t frig a te . T he

submarine, dunking sonar helicopters, and in view of

•

India s Department of Electronics would nmn

the continuing acquisition by Pakistan o f modern

the ASW fire control computer to control th

submarines from France, it became clear that future

SR 375 Rocket Launcher and the rierV,

new

Leanders would requ ire grea ter anti subm arine

A 244 torpedoes.

d6Ck in c h e d

capability.

•

The latest available Italian electronic warfer

Naval Headquarters initiated studies in early

equipment would be fitted.

e

1973 to improve the anti submarine capability o f the

5th and 6th Leanders. These changes crystallised in

All the above design modifications and chanees

mid 1973. The major changes envisaged embarking

were discussed with individual equipment suppliers

the heavy Seaking helicopter and improving the anti

in Canada, Sweden, Britain and Italy in 1974 By

submarine sonars and weapons.

1975, all the changes had been finalised.

Seaking Helicopter

Changes in Design

In 1966, the C anadian Navy had p io n eered the Rear Admiral Baxi recalls:

operation of a Seaking helicopter from the deck of a

“W hen I came back to NHQ in 1973, NHQ had

frigate. This entailed designing a Bear Trap Haul-

decided that the design of the fifth frigate will be

down and Traversing system for moving the heavy

g iv e n to DGND and n ot to DLP. As DDLP, I

helicopter on the small flight deck, providing a large realised that we really did not have much to do,

hangar and strengthening the flight deck to bear the

because if the design was being done by DGND,

weight of a heavy helicopter. All these changes would

what was going to be DLP’s role? In those days,

a ffect the sh ip s o v e ra ll d esign , s ta b ility and DGND had com e up w ith a design for a new

seakeeping qualities.

weapon package.

To meet the conflicting requirem ent o f a large

“In the meanwhile, I went into the technical

hangar and a long clear flight deck, the hangar would

feasibility o f DGND’s design to see whether a large

have to be telescopic. Extra fligh t deck space aft anti subm arine helicopter like a Seaking could

could only be made available by rem oving the anti

operate from a Leander. I distinctly remember we

submarine M ortar and the Variable Depth Sonar

consulted some Admiralty Fleet Orders and then

wells.

in v ite d the DGND, w ho had ea rlier given an

opinion that this was not feasible, to discussions

Anti Submarine Sonars and Weapons

with DLP. When I went into it, it was on a limited

The changes envisaged in the ships sonars and anti

p re s u m p tio n th a t th e M o rta r M ark 10 was submarine weapons were:

requ ired and that it could never be remove .

Then we came up with the idea that If the mo

•

The B ritish M o rta r M K 10 a n ti su b m a rin e well was covered up, the overhead space wo^

w eapon fitte d a ft w o u ld be re p la c e d by the ju st enough for a Seaking to operate from

Swedish Bofors SR 375 Tw in Rocket Launcher

The anti submarine mortar could be rep ac® .

with its integral m agazine and hoist, all fitted another type o f forward throwing rocket au

^

forward in the bows.

like the Swedish SR 3 7 & T h e n I worked d y ^

•

Two sided twin Torpedo Tube Launchers would

night so that no one else would come

Capt

be fitted to fire the latest Italian A-244 homing

what we were doing. Between Cons

Tender

torpedoes being acquired as successors to the

Choudhary who was in the Directora e

design

obsolescent British Mk 44 torpedoes:

Project and myself, we did allthe,

•

British G raseby’s 184 SS (solid state) search

work, showing the new flight dec ,

weapan

sonar would be fitted in lieu o f the earlier valve

version S on ar 184 M in the p re c e d in g th ree new h elicop ter and sh ° w * f

was the most

package which was involved. Tn1

Leanders.

creative time o f my life as a de®*ff®r' eW design

•

French Th om son-C SF solid state search and

“We a c tu a lly cam e up w ith

chJef 0f

attack sonar Diodon would be fitted in lieu o f the

concept. We gave a presentation ^ deslgn- Dr

earlier valve version attack Sonar 170 M in the

the Naval S taff and he ac« - P te(L

nd he also

first four Leanders.

Roy C h o u d h a r y was the SA to

E v e n Mr

•

British G raseb y’s S on ar GI 738 U nder W ater

a c c e p t e d t h a t o u r d e s ig n w i l L w o r K .

Telephone would be fitted in lieu o f the earlier

P a r m a n a n d a n , w h o h a d

y

a C c e p t t h a

Sonar 182.

D G ND, w a s g r a c i o u s e n o u g n w 86/TRANSITION TO TR IUM PH

operating a Seaking helicopter from a frigate was

same time as was taken for the TARAGIRI. She was

feasible. Finally the design was accepted. That is

commissioned on 8 July 1981, having taken 44

how we in DLP came back into the design of

months from launch to delivery.

TARAGIRI. Thereafter this led to a very healthy

competition between DGND and DLP. Cdr (later

The Indigenisation of Leander Class Frigates

Captain) Mohan Ram and Lt Cdr (later Captain)

Subaya, who were the two best young naval

In 1955, the Directorate of Stores Production (Navy)

constructors which the Navy had, joined DGND.

had been set up under Naval Headquarters. In

They said “If an electrical officer like Baxi can December 1956, it was transferred to the Ministry of

design a frigate with one Seaking helicopter, why

Defence under the Controller General of Defence

can’t we come up with a larger and better hull

Production as part of the Director General Inspection.

which can fly two Seaking helicopters?

Its designation was changed to Directorate of

“By that time the Directorate of Combat Policy

Development and Inspection (Marine Stores),

and Tactics had suggested that Soviet weapon

DDI(MS). By 1965, it had been able to:

systems be integrated into the next design. Not

•

Develop new items (including modifications to

only were they cheaper and more cost effective

commercially available items).

but it would enable standardisation of missile

•

Establish and purchase indigenous items thereby

inventory. I distinctly remember that I was

saving foreign exchange.

opposed to that idea, thinking that we will not be

able to carry out the interfaces. But ultimately,

The major handicaps that had been encountered

history and posterity had proved that this was the

were:

right decision and we became the first Navy in

the world to succeed in designing a hybrid ship,

•

The reluctance of the private sector to

manufacture for the Navy the small quantities of

the GODAVARI of Project 16, having a mix of

stores which had no general market in the

Soviet and Western sensors and weapon

country.

systems”.

•

The failure of the trade to keep up the supply of

stores according to agreed specifications.

The Fifth Frigate - INS TARAGIRI

Though the samples and the first one or two

These design changes delayed the commencement of

supplies were satisfactory, subsequent supplies

construction, which should have started immediately

were of inferior quality and failed to conform to

after the launching of the fourth frigate. Production

original specifications.

could commence only in April 1975. The keel was

•

The procedure by which DGS&D had perforce to

obtain supplies from the most economical source,

laid six months later and the ship was launched on

sometimes at the expense of quality.

25 October 1976. Thereafter there was a major

setback in fitting-out because of a delay of one year in By the time the Leander Project got under way in

receipt of the main engines. This created its own

the mid 1960’s, the field work of the preceding ten

chain of delays. Contractor’s Sea Trials commenced

years proved to be invaluable for the indigenisation of in April 1979. During trials, internal vibrations were Leander equipment.

observed in the main turbines. After the defects were

Commodore (E) SC Bose recalls:

rectified, repeat sea trials were satisfactorily

“Systematic indigenisation of naval stores and

completed in December 1979, and TARAGIRI was

material started in 1956 when a department was

commissioned on 16 May 1980. Whilst the time from

created by Captain (later Rear Admiral) Daya

keel laying to launch had been only 12 months, the

Shanker who was the Controller General Defence

least period so far, the time taken from launching to

Production (CGDP). A new directorate in Naval

commissioning was 43 months, much more than the

Headquarters started functioning with Capt (later

time taken for any of its predecessors.

Rear Admiral) CL Bhandari as the Director and

Commander (later Commodore) BC Chatteiji, as

The Sixth Frigate - INS VINDHYAGIRI

Deputy Director and other Staff Officers. There

VINDHYAGIRI was identical with TARAGIRI-

were two inspectorates. The one in Calcutta was

Construction commenced on

manned by then Lt (later Commodore) KC

5 July 1976. Her ee

was laid on

Chatteiji. The one in Bombay was manned by me.

5 November 1976, and she was launc^

on 12 November 1977 after a period of 12 months, tne TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/87

We had two tasks. Onewas to locate sources for equipm ent w hich w en t into the Leander

the indigenisation of stored items. The other was was the main idea behind the whole

at

to scrutinise the Naval Stores specifications and it should be in digen ised. For this we h a d ^

select the item susceptible for indigenisation. So office o f Commodore Paradkar, Director w

u

this was a new outlook, a new philosophy in

P ro je c t (DW P) u n d er th e M inistry of Defln 1956. Later on, the Inspection O rganisation

w h ose m ain o b jective w as to try and b r in e f’

under Director General of Inspection (DGI) grew, fruition the trials o f indigenous equipment and be

particularly with the Leander project which was

the conduit or the prime mover for bringing about

our b asic requirem ent. Th ere w ere two

c o lla b o r a tio n in In d ia b etw een the foreign branches. The Directorate of W arship Projects

manufacturer and the Indian manufacturer.

(DWP) looked after the engineering items. The

“Th at period, 1966 to 1968, under the very Directorate of Production and Inspection, DPI

able and dynamic leadership of Mr HC Sarin was

(Navy), looked after the tommon user Naval Store

one o f th e m ost p ro d u c tiv e periods as far as items. E le ctrica l and E le c tro n ic item s and indigenisation o f Leander equipment in India was

machinery spares”.

concerned. In ju st two years, we brought about a

large number o f agreements which have benefited

As part of the Leander Frigate Project, a Study the Indian Navy subsequently.

Group on Indigenisation w as set up in D elhi to

“ F o r e x a m p le an a g re e m e n t for the

function in close consultation with MDL for locating m a n u fa c tu r e o f b o ile r s w a s b rou gh t about capacity for indigenous m anufacture. In 1966, between the ACC Vickers Babcock and the Naval

Com mander (later A d m iral) J G N a d k a rn i, w as D o c k y a rd B om b ay. T o th is date, the Naval appointed as O fficer on S p e cia l D uty in the Dockyard manufactures boilers for the frigates.

Department of Defence Production.

“An agreem ent for the manufacture of main

Admiral Nadkarni recalls :

tu rb in es w as b ro u g h t abou t between English

“The agreement was for:

E le c tr ic C o m p a n y an d BHEL.

Mr Sarin

•

The transfer of the Leander design by the

in c id e n t a lly w a s e x tre m e ly dynam ic and MOD UK (because they were holders of the

pragmatic about all these things. If a particular

Leander design).

manufacturer refused to collaborate or refuse o

•

All the Lead Yard services and other technical

come to India, he had no hesitation in going o

help by VICKERS and YARROW and

somebody else.

f th

•

Overseeing by the British Ministry of Defence

“For exam ple the main switch boards o

(Navy).

L e a n d e rs in U K w e re m an u factu red

y

Cromptons, who refused to collaborate or c

.

“The agreement stipulated that at least for the

India. There was another m a n u fa c tu r e

fi st ship, we were obliged to buy a num ber of W hip and Bourne who also had manuf

ec uipments from Vickers, including the 4.5” gun switch boards for other ships o f the

y

n in

tu rret, the boilers, the main turbines and certain We invited them and they had no he

ght

other equipment. It was obligated that we buy at

com in g to In dia. A n ag reem e n t

0f

least for the first ship and, if we require, we could a b ou t betw een W hip and B ůrn^

ufaCtured

buy these for the second and third ships also, but

India and switch boards have been

it was obligatory only for the first ship. This was here since then.

^ «/e went to

the general agreement. A ll th is of course had

•'Sim ilarly for air con dition in g

an

happened before I joined the Ministry in 1966.

Carrier Air Conditioning w o

Vojtas.

After I joined, for the next two and half years

agreement between themselves an

David

I was intim ately connected not ju s t w ith the

“T h e m ain g e a r i n g for e x a m p l e ^ ^

Leander Project, but with the entire management

Brown's. David Brown re us

.

Jn s e a rc h 0

of Mazagon D o ck s and the G a rd e n R each for the m ain gearing, so we

qUS c0m,pany

Workshops to start off with, and later on with the s o m e b o d y else. We found a V ^ynQ heSitation . n revival of the Goa Shipyard which took place in MAAG o f S w itz e r la n d who h a

ate but also

1967.

o n ly to c o m e to In d ia a n d

g e a rin g

“In India we had two very important offices.

d e s ig n in g a t o t a lly

o

r i ?

N

l ^ f

Along with building w arships In India, we had

Leanders. So tn th is «

*

| „

g. -n .e « e » «

also envisaged manufacturing a large amount of

with the David Brown main g

88/TRANSmON TO TRIUMPH

from HIMGIRI onwards have the MAAG design

maximum extent possible".

main gearing for the main turbines.

“The final culmination of this process was the

Admiral Samson recalls:

landm ark agreem en t between the Signaal

Apparaten of Holland and Bharat Electricals of

The specifications, the very fine tolerances, the

Bangalore for manufacturing a whole range of

performance ratios and the fact that all

radar equipment as well as the AIO equipment.

equipment had to be shock-proof, were

That was a very major step forward and I think we

parameters which Indian Industry, by and large,

have benefited a great deal from that. After that,

were totally unaware of and had never

experienced. Thanks to the inspiration of Mr

all the radars o f the Leanders have been

manufactured by BEL In this way, it was really a

Krishna Menon, indigenisation was progressed

relentlessly. He had always maintained that

most p rod u ctive period as far as the

unless India was self-sufficient in major items of

in digen isation o f Leander equipment was

defence equipment, we would never be totally free

concerned.

and that, further if we were dependent on the

“I am sorry to say that the same dynamism

West or on anyone else, we would be badly let

and the same innovation somehow was not

down, in time of war when the ‘crunch’ came.

shown after M r.Sarin left. Our subsequent

And indeed this was proved Ume and again, in the

progressive indigenisation, to my mind, has not

conflicts with Pakistan in 1948 and 1965, when

been as impressive as it was in those two early

both the UK and the USA imposed embargos.

years of the Leander project.

“Today looking back, the degree to which

“In Naval Headquarters, we set up a cell

indigenisation was achieved was quite

in itially called DDLP. He was a part of the

extraordinary. For instance, we are now

Directorate of Naval Construction. He was called

accepting, without demur, the Main Gearing

Deputy Director (Leander Project). Subsequent to

being manufactured by Walchandnagar in

that, a completely new directorate was formed

collaboration with MAAG of Switzerland. And yet

called the Directorate of Leander Project. In due

in 1966. when this was first suggested, there was

course that becam e D irectorate of Warship

horror. The very idea of a highly sophisUcated

Projects. But initially it was headed by only a

piece of equipment like the main gearing being

Commander.

Subsequently a full fledged

manufactured, way out in the middle of nowhere,

Director looked after the Naval Headquarters part

some 60 to 70 miles outside Poona, in what was

of the Leander Project.

originally a sugar factory in a little village, was

"The Naval H eadquarters part basically

unbelievable to most. And yet it did succeed.

consisted of approving various indigenisation

"Another item which was the subject of much

substitutes or playing a part in the indigenisation

controversy was the air conditioning of the ship

process. Of course, the whole thing was like a

which was necessary primarily for the electronic

team. Naval Headquarters, being the users, were

equipment and computers. Voltas offered to do

part of the team.

this and the Admiralty were aghast that we

“Another organisation which was setup was

should install air conditioning manufactured

the Warship Overseeing Team. As the warship

locally. There was much skepticism in all

was being built, we had overseers making sure

quarters but we prevailed and we succeeded,

that it was being built to the correct specification

even though we had teething problems.

and certifying the various parts of the ship being

“Fibreglass for lining the ship internally came

built.

from Fibreglass Pilkington in Bombay - what

The Government also had formed a Steering

problems we had to ensure that we got the right

Committee for the Indigenisation of the Frigate

kind of fibreglass suitable for Indian sea-air

Project, with the Chief of the Naval Staff as the

conditions but we eventually succeeded.

Chairm an, w ith representatives from the

“Sixty Cycle Generators came from Jyoti in

Ahm edabad, the turbines from BHEL. the main

D epartm ent o f D efence Produ ction ,• Naval

Headquarters and MDL. Various manufacturers

boilers from Naval Dockyard and later the fire

control and surveillance ra d a rs from B E L in were invited to come and explain and suggest

measures to overcome their difficulties. They

Bangalore.

-There were enormous problems, aggravated

were encouraged to freely interact in the common

to some extent by doubts and lack of confidence.

endeavor to indigenise warship building to the

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/89

We had two tasks. One was to locate sources for

equipm ent w hich w ent into the Leander n . ,

the indigenisation of stores items. The other was

was the main idea behind the whole proiert T k

to scrutinise the Naval Stores specifications and

it should be indigenised. For this we h a d S

select the item susceptible for indigenisation. So

office of Commodore Paradkar, Director Warsh

this was a new outlook, a new ph ilosoph y in

P roject (DWP) under the M inistry o f Defen

1956. Later on, the In sp ection O rgan isation

w hose m ain ob jective w as to try and brine tn under Director General of Inspect on (DGI) grew,

fruition the trials o f indigenous equipment and be

particularly with the Leander project which was

the conduit or the prim e mover for bringing about

our b asic req u ire m e n t.

T h e re w e re

tw o

c o lla b o ra tio n in In d ia b etw een the foreign branches. The Directorate (>f Warship Projects

manufacturer and the Indian manufacturer

(DWP) looked after the engineering items. The

“That period, 1966 to 1968, under the very

Directorate o f Production and Inspection, DPI

able and dynamic leadership of Mr HC Sarin was

(Navy), looked after the 'common user Naval Store

one o f the m ost p ro d u ctive periods as far as item s, E le c tric a l and E le c tro n ic ite m s and indigenisation o f Leander equipment in India was

machinery spares”.

concerned. In ju st two years, we brought about a

large number o f agreements which have benefited

As part o f the Leander Frigate Project, a Study

the Indian Navy subsequently.

Group on In d igen isa tio n w as s et up in D elhi to

“ F or e x a m p le an a g reem en t for the

function in close consultation with MDL for locating

m a n u fa c tu re o f b o ile r s w a s b rou gh t about capacity for in d igen ou s m an u factu re. In 1966, between the ACC Vickers Babcock and the Naval

C om m ander (la te r A d m ira l) JG N a d k a rn i, w as D o ck y a rd B om bay. T o th is date, the Naval appointed as O ffic e r on S p e c ia l D u ty in the Dockyard manufactures boilers for the frigates.

Department of Defence Production.

“An agreement for the manufacture of main

Admiral Nadkarni recalls :

tu rbin es w as b rou gh t about between English

“The agreement was for:

E le c tric C o m p a n y and BHEL.

Mr Sarin

•

The tran sfer o f the Leander design by the

in c id e n ta lly w a s e x tre m e ly dynam ic and MOD UK (because they were holders o f the

pragmatic about all these things. If a particular

Leander design).

manufacturer refused to collaborate or refused to

•

All the Lead Yard services and other technical

come to India, he had no hesitation in going to

help by VICKERS and YARROW and

somebody else.

“For example the main

•

Overseeing by the British Ministry o f Defence

s w i t c h boards of the

(Navy).

L e a n d e rs in U K w e re m an u factu red by Cromptons, who refused to collaborate or come to

“The agreement stipulated that at least for the

India. There was another manufacturer ca e

ft st ship, we were obliged to buy a number o f

W hip and Bourne who also had m anu^ac^ 11^ .

ec uipments from Vickers, including the 4.5" gun

switch boards for other ships o f the Roya

a .

tu rret, the boilers, the main turbines and certain

We invited them and they had no hesita or\

other equipment. It was obligated that we buy at

com ing to India. An agreem en t was b r o u g f

least for the first ship and, if we require, we could

about betw een W hip and Bourne an

j

buy these for the second and third ships also, but

India and switch boards have been manu a

it was obligatory only for the first ship. This was

here since then.

,VPnt to

the general agreem ent. All this o f course had

“S im ila rly for air con dition in g w

. an

happened before I joined the Ministry in 1966.

Carrier Air Conditioning who br0^®J1lf

“After I joined, for the next two and half years

agreement between themselves an . o

^ avid

I w as in tim ately connected n ot ju s t w ith the

“T h e m ain gearin g for e x a m p

t0 India

Leander Project, but with the entire management

Brown’s. David Brown r e fu s e d to co

afC|1 0f

o f M azagon D ock s an d th e G a rd en R each for the m ain gearing, so we

company

W orkshops to start o ff with, and later on with the

somebody else. We found a vety a ,

itation. not

revival o f the Goa Shipyard which took place in

MAAG o f Switzerland who had no

^

in

1967,

only to come to India and co a o

* j ng f0r the

“In ln d ia we had two very important offices.

designing a totally different m

onjy jsjlLGlR*

Along with building warships in India, we had

Leanders. So to this day we

agates

also envisaged manufacturing a large amount of

with the David Brown main gean &•

TO TRIUMPH

m HIMGIRI onwards have the MAAG design

maximum extent possible".

main gearing for the main turbines.

•The final culmination of this process was the

Admiral Samson recalls:

landmark a g re e m e n t betw een the Signaal

Apparaten o f Holland and Bharat Electricals of

The specifications, the very fine tolerances, the

Bangalore for m anufacturing a whole range of

performance ratios and the fact that all

equipment had to be shock-proof, were

radar equipment as well as the AIO equipment.

parameters which Indian Industry, by and large,

That was a very major step forward and I think we

were totally unaware of and had never

have benefited a great deal from that. After that,

experienced. Thanks to the inspiration of Mr

all the rad ars o f the Leanders have been

Krishna Menon. indigenisation was progressed

manufactured by BEL. In this way, it was really a

relentlessly. He had always maintained that

most p ro d u ctive p eriod as far as the

unless India was self-sufficient in major items of

indigenisation o f L ean d er equipm ent was

defence equipment, we would never be totally free

concerned.

and that, further if we were dependent on the

“I am sorry to say that the same dynamism

West or on anyone else, we would be badly let

and the sam e in n o va tio n som ehow was not

down, in time of war when the ‘crunch’ came.

shown after Mr S arin left. Our subsequent

And indeed this was proved time and again, in the

progressive indigenisation, to my mind, has not

conflicts with Pakistan in 1948 and 1965, when

been as impressive as it was in those two early

both the UK and the USA imposed embargos.

years of the Leander project.

“Today looking back, the degree to which

“In Naval H eadquarters, we set up a cell

indigenisation was achieved was quite

initially called DDLP. He was a part of the

extraordinary. For instance, we are now

Directorate of Naval Construction. He was called

accepting, without demur, the Main Gearing

Deputy Director (Leander Project). Subsequent to

being manufactured by Walchandnagar in

that, a completely new directorate was formed

collaboration with MAAG of Switzerland. And yet

called the Directorate of Leander Project. In due

in 1966. when this was first suggested, there was

course that becam e D irectorate o f Warship

horror. The very idea of a highly sophisticated

Projects. But initially it was headed by only a

piece of equipment like the main gearing being

Commander.

S u b seq u en tly a full fledged

manufactured, way out in the middle of nowhere,

Director looked after the Naval Headquarters part

some 60 to 70 miles outside Poona, in what was

of the Leander Project.

originally a sugar factory in a lit tie village, was

“The Naval H ead qu arters part basically

unbelievable to most. And yet it did succeed.

consisted of approving various indigenisation

“Another item which was the subject of much

substitutes or playing a part in the indigenisation

controversy was the air conditioning of the ship

which was necessary primarily for the electronic

process. O f course, the whole thing was like a

equipment and computers. Voltas offered to do

team. Naval Headquarters, being the users, were

this and the Adm iralty were a gh ast that we part of the team.

should install air conditioning m anufactured

Another organisation which was setup was

locally. T h ere w a s m uch sk ep ticism ‘n a i l the Warship Overseeing Team. As the warship

quarters but we prevailed and we succeeded,

Was being built, we had overseers making sure

even though we had teething problems.

that it was being built to the correct specification

-F ib re g la ss for lining the ship internally came and certifying the various parts of the ship being

from Fibreglass Pilkington in Bombay' - what

built.

Problems we had to ensure that we got the right

The Government also had formed a Steering

kind of fibreglass suitable for Indian sea-air

ommittee for the Indigenisation of the Frigate

nriitinns but we eventually succeeded.

£r°ject, with the Chief of the Naval Staff as the

C0 ™

y S le Generators came from Jyoti in

airm an, w ith rep resen ta tives from the

. V, S a d the turbines from BHEL. the main

^ ePartm ent o f D efen ce Production, • Naval

K

t o m Navi, D ockedI and

« « «

eadquarters and MDL. Various manufacturers

control and surveillance ra d a rs from BEL in

^ ere invited to come and explain and suggest

easures to overcome their difficulties. They

Ball^rhere were enormous problems, aggravated

ere encouraged to freely interact in the common

to some S t e S by doubts and lack of confidence.

n eavor to indigenise warship building to t e

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/89

but we won through. What is important is that it

it - w h eth er it w a s the UHF t r a n < ^ .

created the kind o f confidence and experience,

CCS equipm ent and the Versatile Onn

° r ^

both in the S ervice and s p e c ia lly in In d ia n

- to a degree w hich the o t h e r Z

d S "™

Industry who, having succeeded in producing

indigenise. The naval c o n s t ru c t o r^ ]!

not

equipment o f such high specifications for the

the occasion and came out with improve,? h™*6 t0

Navy, w ere em bolden ed to go in fo r h ig h e r of the Leanders like the TARAGIRI and the p T f 1*

technology”

16, GODAVARI class frigates.

roJect

Captain Prabhala recalls:

"T h is com m itm ent to indigenisation the willingness to experiment and the willingness^

“So far as the in d ig e n is a tio n p rogra m m e is suffer the consequences by way of delays bv wav concerned, it came about even when I was in the

of equipment still undergoing trials, even though UK with Vickers for training. In the la s t six

the ship is complete is a tremendous plus point months o f our training, it was realised that we

with the Navy. Of all the three services, the Navy would need a full fledged team in the UK for

had this risk taking ability, it had the internal equipment procurem ent, for liaison w ith the

o rga n is a tio n a l m ech an ism s to initiate major Admiralty for the supply o f drawings, for liaison

indigenous program s, and it had the ability to

with the shipyards for the supply o f w orkin g

coax, p e rs u a d e and co n tro l the indigenous drawings and all that. Therefore an office called

manufacturers to also rise to the occasion. It was

CONIFPO (Controller Indian Frigate Project) was

a tremendous experience.

established, with Cmde Kapadia as the head of

“T h ere was only one occasion when, to my

the CONIFPO. We were already in touch with all

m in d , th e N a v y e rre d .

T h a t was in their

the major equipment manufacturers, whether it

im p a tie n c e to go in fo r m ore and more

was David Brown for the gearing, or Yarrows for

in d ig e n is a tio n and fe e lin g

that Bharat

the boilers, or English Electric for the turbines, or

Electronics was not responding fast enough, the

Vickers for the MRS3 fire control system and so

Department o f Electronics came forward and said

on, with the idea that we should simultaneously

th a t th ey cou ld d evelop the Computer Aided

seek transfer o f technology for the indigenous

Action Inform ation System (CAAIS). The Navy,

m an u factu re o f th e equ ip m en t, w h ile the without realising that an equipment or a system

construction o f the frigate goes on in Mazagon

for shipboard use is not something that can come

Docks.

out o f a Government office or a laboratory, place

too much faith in that Department. It took some

“In th ese tech n o lo g y tra n s fe rs fo r th e time for the Navy to extricate itself from that .

equipment, the role o f the Admiralty was limited.

It was only to the extent that they would express

Commodore Acharya recalls:

no objection to it, meaning that if we wanted to

make the gearing and let us say the gearing was

“When I was in Mazagon Dock and Capt p^ cJion

the d esign o f D avid B row n, D avid B row n

w as DWP, the m ain problem in inchgeri rhange

n atu rally w ou ld n ot be a b le to tra n s fe r the was the reluctance by NHQ to accep any

technology unless the Admiralty gave the OK to it.

in d e sig n i.e. of a re a d ily a v a i l a b l y ^

So to th at exten t, w e go t the no o b je c tio n equipm ent'as against the Br,tI* ^3 luCiance certific a te from A d m ira lty and w e g o t th e fitte d in B ritis h L ea n d ers. I nis

Design

Admiralty to iilfbrm all the major manufacturers

stem m ed from th e fact that

^

* n0t really

that we were interested in local manufacture in

Group was not strong enough.

^ at the

India with the help o f these companies.

taken root at that time.

e u nseen or

“The success o f the indigenisation effort in

d iffe r e n c e in d e s ig n m i^ht h fornlance. A boiilding .the iLeanders and the m achinery that

u n k n o w n c o n s e q u e n c e s 1 P

cycle A

came into: existence with it, the organisation o f

typ ical exam ple w as that of 5

were „ 0t

DWP initially and the organisation o f the DPI working. For quite some

'

iy bought ®

Navy later gave us the confidence that we can go

s u r e w h a t w o u ld h a p p e n

w

t t a c h ed it 0

ahead m ore b old ly w ith p ro cu rem en t o f

cy cle c o m m ercia l m otor an ^

^

equipm ent from indigenous resou rces. For

pump and made it run on

anSwer is. S°

instance, the communication equipment, ICS 3,

day I do n o t know " h a t t h ^ ^

f a s t S o ^

r **** Z a n d e rs was imported from the UK but

electrical p eop le said

som e pe°P

people said it will ru n too slo -

we were able to get Bharat Electronics to develop 90/TRANSIHQN TO TRIUMPH

it will over-heat. The point I am trying to make is

have a free hand to import everything". In

that at that point in time, the DGND did not exist.

retrospect, this was not a very fair statement

To some extent, one could understand the fear or

because each side had its own limitations".

relu ctance o f the Navy to boldly accept a

commercial design or the available design.

Captain Lohana recalls:

‘•By the tim e I was appointed DWP, the

Directorate had handed over the electrical part of

‘There was an agreement with the MOD Navy UK

for supplying drawings and specifications of the

indigenisation to DPI(N) and kept for itself the

equipment, as well as details of the pattern

engineering and hull items. I knew how hard

number stores. These became the basis for DWP

Commodore Paradkar had worked for DWP. This

and DPI (Navy) to interact with Indian industry to

had been his baby. During his time, he had one

motivate them to develop these products and

or two excellent deputies, among them the late

guide them in the development in terms of inputs

Cdr Dilip Bhandari who, as we were doing in

and drawings. A large number of these were

Mazagon Docks, had the enthusiasm and

either evolved to replace the existing ones or

willingness to take risks. They had initiated a

indigenised by way of reverse engineering.

number o f major projects for indigenisation

“Here, I would draw a distinction between

starting off mainly with the major items ranging

indigenisation and indigenous substitution.

from main turbines, main gearing, auxiliary

Indigenisation is when an identical product is

turbines, air conditioning machinery to

developed to replace the existing imported item,

underwater valves. All these were already well

whereas indigenous substitution occurs when a

established. During my tenure as DWP, I had no

piece of equipment performs the same function to

otcasion to improve upon these because by that

the same or higher performance criteria as the

time the indigenisation emphasis was shifting

substituted equipment without being identical in

towards indigenisation of radars and weapon

appearance to the earlier one.

systems.

“These two directorates. DWP and DPI(N),

“As regards the design changes in the

who had slowly set up their outfits all over India

equipment fit for the later Leanders, we were also

to interact with industry to develop items as well

talking about gas turbine propulsion at that time,

as to inspect them and test them before

so whatever was already set in motion had just to

acceptance, were highly motivated by the

be continued. We therefore devoted more

personal umbrella of Mr MM Sen. the then

attention to the inspection at manufacturer’s

Secretary Defence Production. Unfortunately, as

works rath er than initiating any fresh

things normally go in life, over the years these

indigenisation processes.

became kind of routine jobs and the basic

“In my own tenure as DWP, whilst nothing

motivation was lost".

new was initiated by me, there was no major

Commodore SC Bose recalls:

change in the attitudes between NHQ and DWP.

NHQ would gladly approve an indigenous design

“We had the Department of Defence Production,

proposed by DWP, provided somehow DWP could

Ministry of Defence, working hand in hand with

confirm and prove to NHQ that the indigenous

Naval Headquarters and Mazagon Docks Ltd

design was totally capable. Short of having a trial

towards indigenisation. In retrospect, I would say

ship solely at DWP’s disposal and with enough

this was the best and most systematic

time available for installing it. trying it out for one indigenisation effort the Navy ever had. And

yea r and surviving underwater explosion or

taking the totality into account, it was possibly

whatever, there was no other way of really

the best in the country at that time.

satisfying the Navy. On the other hand, Mazagon

“While the main.engines of the first ship were

Pocks was forever pleading to have the items

imported, the second ship’s set of main engines

cleared by the due date. We found that some of

were made by BHEL in Bhopal, using the same

the lead times indicated by Mazagon Docks were

English Electric drawings made in FPS System by

too inflated. This tussle continued for a long time.

converting the measurements to the Metric

I remember making perhaps an unfair allegation

System, which had been adopted in India and in

that “Qrtfy DWP seems to be interested in

which Bhopal’s machines were set. We also

indlgenising. Neither Naval Headquarters nor

developed an indigenous version of Allen’s steam

Mazagon Dock would like it. They would rather

auxiliaries with Jyoti of Baroda and BHEL

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/91

B h o p a l a o+

SpgSSSH SS the Leanders

Problem s in conversion r f ? ln We faced

as the term inals had tn °l

into ^PS s v * * ny

k " ° » " - « * *

i™?„a

r

,h'

z

i ps - s s :

m s h i p b u i l d i n g T h

Sr a d e A / B is

m a n u f a c t u r e d i n I n d l a t m ^ S t' e ' s w ' « »

b l e s s i n g s o f t h e M i n i s t r y o f s t e ^ ' n ' W e h a d th e L e a n d e r P ro je c t (DLP) n

D irect°rate of

p r o j e c t a t R o u r k e l a S t e e f Pin +

u n d e rta k e th e

E n g m e e r i n g (D M E ) a n d the n f C ° f Marlne W a r s h ip P ro je cts l D w p ™

* e ^ c t o r a t e of

f a i r l y s u c c e s s f u l j o b th o u g h

th e y d ld a

D efen ce Production h

Ministry of

s p e c i f i c a t i o n to l i W o .

w " * * m eet the

a c c e p t a b l e u n d e r d e v i t f

* S C onsldered

W a lch an d N a gar in c h e c ^ J ^ g 11 C£mdles ln the m an u factu rin g t o l e r a n t

d™ension and

c o n s t r u c t i n g t h e s e c o n d ^

^ 3 n d U Sed ^

a n d CGS system o f t t w

' meetJnS b° t h FPS

o f c o u r s e , i t w a s fo u n d f h ^

' Subseci uently.

was a success

It

q u i c k e r d e l i v e r y a n d c h

im p o rte d steel w as o f

H a v i n g e s t a b l i s h e d a n i ^ d i g ^ r K n i s WaS U S6d-cnnsmgtebEeo?aa^ H rag,USlnga r' d“

«

m a n u f a c t u r e o f s h i p b u i l d i n gg q u a h ? y s t e e ^ w e g earw heels “o v ^

-

^

WH y f reV 6 rt t0 “ w h e n e v e r necessary.'

•

° lle r S ° f 1116 fir s t Z a n d e r w ere erected i n t h e N a v a l D o c k y a r d B o m b a y . A n e w b o iler shop ex p lo ita tio n . We believe that such trials were w a s c r e a t e d a n d t h e b o ile r s , w it h d ru m s, tubes, done only in Canada and in Switzerland There

w ere continuous trials for 72 hours. The trials

m o u n t i n g s e t c f r o m B a b c o c k a n d W i l c o x o f r u n s w e n t on as sch ed u led except for one R e n f r e w w e r e e r e c t e d . B e i n g v e r y h e a v y a n d in c id e n t w hen one set o f bearings failed. We b u l k y , t h e s e b o i l e r s w e r e p u t o n t r a ile r s in the im m e d ia te ly kn ew w h at it was due to. The N a v a l D o c k y a r d B o m b a y a n d s h ifte d to M azagon representative o f MAAG Gearwheel, a renowned

D o c k f o r I n s t a lla t io n o n b o a rd .

designer, was present at the trials. We all agreed

“T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f t h e m a in s h a ftin g w a s w ith the corrective actions and continued with

a t t e m p t e d a t t h e H e a v y E n g in e e r in g C o rp ora tion the trials. I don’t think such a bold step would be

(H E C ) R a n c h i. B u t H E C w a s e x p e rie n c in g seriou s taken anywhere, to introduce into service a gear

a d m i n i s t r a t i v e p r o b le m s . A s s u c h th e p ro je c t did case which was never tried earlier. We have been

n o t f i n a l l y s u c c e e d . T h e y m e t th e s p e c ific a tio n s in v e r y lu c k y th at the propulsion system with a ♦

changed component gave no problem of noise or

5 0 % o f t h e it e m s . T h e y c o u ld h a v e h a d 100%

s u c c e s s h a d t h e y c a r e f u l l y f o l l o w e d o u r vibration in any mode.

“We developed all the gun-metal valves and

i n s t r u c t i o n s o f c r o p p in g th e e n d s o f th e fo rg in g s f it t in g s in d ig e n o u s ly . S im ila r indigenous b e f o r e r o l l i n g t h e s h a fts . In o r d e r to a c h ie v e good d e v e lo p m e n ts or su b stitu tes were found for q u a l i t y f o r g i n g s f o r t u r b i n e r o t o r s fo r th e N a v y e le ctrica l fittings, items of domestic and h a n d f o r P o w e r H o u s e s , H E C in it ia t e d a c tio n fo r services nature etc .

p r o c u r e m e n t a n d i n s t a l l a t i o n o f a V a c u u m D e g a s s i n g P l a n t a n d a 6 0 0 0 t o n p r e s s .

R e m in is c e n c e s of the Leander Frigate ProJ -«

U n f o r t u n a t e l y , o n i n s t a l l a t i o n t h e s e v a lu a b le p la n t s w e r e ly in g id le d u e to la c k o f in itia tive, an c a p t a in P rab h ala. later C h airm an and M an.

r o t o r fo r g in g s b e in g im p o r te d b y B H E L an d oth er D irecto r o f Bharat Electronics Ltd, recal

^

t u r b in e m a n u fa c tu r e r s .

“T h e m a in g e a r c a s e s , a v e r y c r itic a l p ie c e o

“A s to o v e ra ll

^ a lf years v *<h

c o n c lu s io n s from

s

leadership pr°v

m a c h i n e r y , w e r e a ls o in d ig e n is e d . In th e firs Mazagon Docks, I thin

Defence Products

L e a n d e r , w e u s e d im p o rte d D a v id B ro w n g ea rin g b u t fo r t h e s e c o n d L e a n d e r w e w e n t in fo r ones to b e p r o d u c e d a t W a lc h a n d N a g a r n e a r p^ n e *

u n d e r c o lla b o r a t io n w ith M A A G G e a rw h eel Co o f was

Z u r ic h . S in c e 1 9 6 6 , S w is s M A A G g e a r in g h ad then

Lt Cdr.

a lr e a d y b e e n fitte d a n d w a s w o rk in g sa tisfactorily w onderhd^ A t^ h ^ sta rti was only a

in C a n a d ia n N a v y fr ig a te s w h ic h w e re s im ila r to 9 2 /TRANSITION T O TRIUM PH

Handing over ceremony of Mazagon Docks Ltd to the Ministry of Defence by the P&O Group (L to R) Representative P&O Group, Mr YB Chavan (Chief Minister of Bombay) & Mr Krishna Menon (Defence Minister) Prime Minister Nehru and the Chief of the Naval Staff

Vice Admiral BS Soman - 5 June 1962

Delegation to the Soviet Union - September 1964 (L to R) Rear Admiral SM

Nanda (DCNS), Mr YB Chavan (Defence Minister) and Mr HC Saxin (Secretary Defence Production)

Discussion in Mazagon Docks in 1972 on the Frigate Project (L to R) Vice Admiral SN Kohli (FOC in C WEST), Admiral SM Nanda (o

^

Deputy Defence Minister and Vice Admiral BA Samson (Managing Direct

National Defence College 1965 (L to R) Rear Admiral SM Nanda, Vice Admiral AK Chatterji, Admiral of the Fleet, Mountbatten

INS KHUKRI (Anti Submarine Frigate) which was sunk in the 1971 W ar

Coastal minesweepers

became a Commander. The ease of access I had

with these people, the quick decisions that were

not be a loser”. He was able to make this

taken and the freedom that one had in many

argument so effectively that as a result we got a

lot of help from the Admiralty, they backed us

things, I think, today is very difficult to obtain.

when we had differences with Yarrows”:

“ On the question o f indigenisation, the

amount of freedom I had was unprecedented.

Rear Admiral Baxi, also later Chairman and

Almost as a one man team, I could shoot off

Managing Director of Bharat Electronics Ltd, recalls:

letters to the prospective Indian companies which

were operating in similar areas of products and

There were several organic elements which

say that look we have this requirement, we have

contributed to the success of the Frigate Project:

this British company which is willing to transfer

•

First and foremost, amongst the three

the technology, will you. two get together and

services, the Indian Navy has shown the

come out with a proposal, whether it was the

greatest determination to be sttff sufficient

switch boards, whether it was the motors. I have

and self reliant. And this was by a genre of

already talked about the fire control and the

people over generations, not merely by one

radar. It was an c :hilarating period because

individual.

there was complete freedom to do the best that

•

Secondly Naval Headquarters did not

you could and no hurdles were thrown in your

renounce its technical responsibilities. We

way.

had already created a Directorate of Warship

“I would also like to mention the generosity of

Projects (DWP) and a DPI (Navy). These two

the Admiralty. In the UK, lots of small fittings are

organisations, although they were under the

supplied to the shipbuilders by small companies.

DGI, were charged with the task of developing

These companies are so small that they do not

indigenous manufacturers. The officers who

have the ability or the infrastructure foF any

were sent to the Department of Defence

technology transfer. In any case, the items are

Production were seagoing naval officers, who

simple and they do not require any elaborate

were on deputation. They were not seconded

technology transfer, either for training or their

to become part of the permanent Cadre of

personnel coming to India to help initiating

DGI.

manufacture. So we were able to insist upon the

•

Thirdly, the Directorate of Leander Project

Admiralty that these are all Admiralty Pattern

(DLP)

was

created

within

Naval

items, you would have a set of drawings as the

Headquarters. This ensured complete

AHSP authority and you must give us those

product management. The design aspects,

drawings so that we in turn could give these

the coordination with the Lead Yard, the

drawings to our manufacturers and get them

approval of the drawings and all the complete

made. I remember that soon after we started the

technical activity regarding ship building was

construction in Mazagon Docks, a combined

handled in-house within NHQ itself.

delegation of Admiralty and ship building people

•

Fourthly, the Directorate General of Naval

came to MDL and this was the point which we

Design (DGND) was created within Naval

strongly made. The Admiralty agreed that this

Headquarters. Prior, to that. Naval Design

was im portant to us and they gave us the

was being handled by a Deputy Director

Naval Design in charge of ship building, a

drawings.

part of the Directorate of Naval Construction.

"Again I have to say that Mr Sarin played a

By creating DGND. we got an agency, manned

very important role in this because he went to the

by officers on deputation, responsible for

UK with Admiral Samson. With the CONIFPOs

modernisation and indigenisation. under the

help, there were a series of meetings in UK and Mr

direct control of Naval Headquarters, which

Sarin made the point that “Look you may think

slowly started to build up complete design

that all this means that there will be less that

and project management skills in-house,

Mazagon Docks will buy from the UK, but please

within the Navy.

remember that for certain things like the Gyro

•

Fifthly because the civilian Corps of Naval

Compass and similar critical equipment, we have

Constructor officers all went away to the

no other option except to import them from you.

United States and the United Kingdom,

If we are able to indigenise and therefore afford

except for three civilians Mr Parmanandan,

more ships, you will have more business for the

Mr Dhumal and Mr Dotiwala. from Cmde

bits and pieces for which we inevitably have to

Garg’s time onwards, the Navy started

come to you. Therefore in the long run, you will

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/93

inducting naval constructors in uniform. So

in N E V E S B U , we got the right a

the uniformed constructors became a highly

engineering support, the right d r a w i n g 01 of specialised cadre, capable of handling all

type of documentation and the right

h

rtSht

aspects of naval architecture, ship design and

constructors, electrical officers and

naval

ship, construction.

All of them w ere.transferring technnieng’neers-

the service. Th at w as the most irrmn ^ Within

“Similarly on the Mazagon Docks side, the

w hich created the impact.

lmportant thing

Navy sent some of their best officers and best

“Then n a tu ra lly the next corollary was

brains to go into shipbuilding. The best naval we re-designed the fifth Leander, the TARArSS

technical officers were placed at the disposal of with one Seaking helicopter. Then we went onT^

Mazagon Docks to be able to b u ild the firs t the seventh frigate, the GODAVARI which aeain

frigate.

was designed by naval officers, with two Seakine

“This total involvement of Naval Headquarters

h elico p ters. Th e D ire cto r Combat Policy and in ship design, ship construction, development,

Tactics (DCPT), w as the one who actually did the inspection and testing, whereby NHQ was itself concept designing and asked why can’t we have

the vendor and was also the customer, led to a two Seaking helicopters on board? Right from top

pragmatic approach by NHQ w henever

level decision m akers like DCPT and DNP, down confronted with com prom ises in the d esig n

to a Lieutenant in the naval architecture branch, process.

eve ryb o d y le a r n t to take technological and

“Unfortunately, in the A rm y and the A ir

p ro fe ssio n al d ecisio n s. A complete, integral, Force, exactly the Reverse happened. Because

d e c isio n m a k in g p ro ce s s b u ilt up within the there was DRDO afid there was DGI, most of the

confines of NHQ.

time they treated, these two organisations as if

“T h is is the one and only reason why, other they were the, vendors and the A rm y

th a n the A tom ic E n ergy Com m ission and the Headquarters or the A ir Headquarters were the

Space Organisation later on, Naval H ead q u arters customers. Because they them selves.did not

is the only service in this country which h a d truly have any design or construction responsibility, su cce e d e d in in d ig e n is a tio n . If you see the they tended to treat the d esig n er or In d ia n in g red ien ts of S pace and Atomic Energy, it is industry at that stage at p a r w ith th e ir exactly the sam e story as Naval H e a d q u a r te rs .

corresponding designer in the world market. In

Space and Atomic Energy had nobody to fa

ac

that mindset, if I get a M IG 21 from the world upon. They w ere the designers, they were

market, I want a MIG 21 from HAL. T h is w as ones who formulated the concepts, they were

never possible and never feasible. And because

ones who did the designs, they utfirna e y

t

there was no involvem ent on the p art of the see that their rocket fired and so a ar£ l ing service, they were riot able to succeed.

of in -h o u se w ork had to be done m develop J

Whereas in our case, first of all, progressive

systems, sub systems, concepts in es

0f

indigenisation w as done.

The g o als and

are the three services who you can

F

ambitions were limited. The first ship was made

w ho have done tru e in dig en isatio n .

totally from sub systems imported from UK. The

Headquarters, ISRO, and Depar ^

0f the

second ship had partial indigenisation, in the Energy. In my opinion, th is is the crux

sense that whatever system s were ava ilab le

matter.

.

, fh a t nothing

within the country or could be developed were

“I h a ve a lw a y s mal^ ^ ig e n is a t io n of J g utilised. The remaining systems were imported.

And so on.

succeeds like success. The

Machinery* ***

p r o p u ls io n system , the m ai

cabies, the

_ “One of the most im portant th ings w h ich

auxiliaries, the switchboards.

^ hjch

wer

strengthened the /co nfid ence of N aval

co n tro l system s, inc^u ” gEleCtronics un ^

S S Z T * ? * was the transition from the first m a n u fa c tu r e d by B h a ra

^ n H q a

.

rtgate to the second frigate. Th is was handled lic e n s e from SIG N A A L, a %haVing succe

t

witft a great degree of s u c c e s s by N aval confidence. T h is confidence,

we can

J m ysdf was

° fflcer

Charge

with a concept and the fee

j ^ q i r I an

f

t h P l v x H

Val Desi®n Team at NEVESBU,

led to the d e s ig n o f

a„d

a.

the s^pyardwhlch would redesign the ship for

subsequent design o f

, project 1

i-ac^'

Protect mi

CIi. *** Directorate of Leander

Project 25, Project 2 5 Alpha

10oke

n

m

p L P )washandllngthis. Somehow as a

Project 15 and the Navy has .“ ucceCded. *

historical happenstance, we had the right partner

The ingredients of w hy NHQ

94/TRANSJTlON TO TRIUMPH

NHQ actu ally Implemented, are not being

Design Bureau NEVESBU, all of these were essential

replicated by many organisations in this

ingredients of success. Most valuable of all was the

country”.

close and informal interaction between personages as

high as the Secretary Defence Production and his

The Leander Frigate Project in Retrospect

team in the Ministry of Defence and Defence Finance

The Leander Frigate Project, which commenced with

with the bright young naval officers of the Leander

the construction of the NILGIRI on 23 October 1966,

Project. The elders trusted the youngsters to do what

com pleted w ith the commissioning, of the

they thought was best. Likewise, the astounding

VINDHYAGIRI on 8 July 1981. During these fifteen

success of indigenisation was a direct result of the

years, six frigates were delivered, an average of 30

high powered Indigenisation Committee's free, frank

and helpful interaction with Indian Industry through

months per ship. By the time of the 6th Leander; the

DWP and DPI(N).

indigenous content o f bought out equipment had

The enormous self confidence gained in this

risen to 70%.

project by the Navy’s weapon planners, the naval

From every point o f view, the Leander Frigate

architects and the shipbuilder laid the foundation for

Project was a m onum ental achievement. The

the more audaciously designed warships that later

boldness o f the naval decision makers, the

emerged from Indian shipyards.

enthusiasm, .perseverance and dedication of the

The table below shows the gradual diversification

implementers in MDL, in the Ministry of Defence

in combat systems from the first Leander to the sixth

Production and in the Navy, the assistance by the

Leander. Equally significant changes were effected in

British A dm iralty, by the British shipbuilding

the engineering and electrical machineiy of these six

collaborators, Vickers and Yarrow, by the Dutch

ships.

NILGIRI

HIMGIRI, UDAYGIRI

TARAGIRI

(First Leander

DUNAGIRI

VINDHYAGIRI

(2nd, 3rd and 4th

(5th and 6th

Leanders)

Leanders)

Surface to

Air Missile

Launchers and

Dutch

Dutch

Fire Control

British

Gun Mounting

Dutch

Dutch

Fire Control

British

Ship Launched

-

Italian

Anti-Sub mari

-

ne Torpedoes

Anti Submari

British

Swedish

ne Weapon

British

Indian Alouette

British

Anti

French Alouette

with British

SEAKING with

Submarine

with British

Torpedoes

Italian Torpedoes

Helicopter

Torpedoes

20 MM Oerlikon

20 MM Oerlikon

Close Range

20 MM Oerlikon

(ex stock)

(ex stock)

AA Guns

(ex stock)

Chaff

-

Dutch

Dutch

Radars

British

British

British and French

Sonars

British

Action

Dutch

Dutch

Information

British

system

Electronic

British

Italian

Warfare

British

Indigenous Warship Design

Preamble

m en Ferry Craft, H a rb o u r Cargo Boats and diverse types of pontoons.

In the post independence Indian Navy, ship design A t the d e s ig n stag e w ere O ilers, Tugs, made a modest beginning in 1962 with the setting up Am m unition and Water Barges and Diving and Water of a small Design Cell within the Directorate of Naval Boats. In 1966, the Design,O rganisation had also Construction (DNC). By 1965, this cell had expanded assisted in the construction of the new Fleet Tanker to become the DNC’s “Central Design Organisation DEEPAK in Germany.

(CDO)".

A list of Naval Yardcraft and by whom they were Mr Parmanajidan recalls:

b uilt d uring the period 1966 to 1975 is given in the table at the end of this chapter.

“There was a bid from Mazagon Dock and from

the Ministry of Defence Production to take over The Start o f M ajor Warship Design

the Design Organisation. Some senior naval

officers asked me “W ouldn’t you feel m ore

O n 2 3 r d O cto b e r 1968, the Prim e Minister, comfortable w orking in a P u b lic . S ector

M rs.Indira Gandhi, launched INS NILGIRI, the first of Enterprise”? My answer was simple. “If the Navy

the Leander class frigates built at Mazagon Docks in is not directly involved in ship design, its building Bombay. Having herself laid the keel in 0cto^

:19

_

and its commissioning, we will meet the same fate

M rs Gandhi seems to have intuitively sensed the iy as a Defence Production Unit, w here the

long gestation tim e of nava l construct on-

t

hardware is made and the S ervices are not

re tu rn to D elh i, the P rim .

accepting it, because the services are not deeply urgent consideration be given to streng

naval

involved right from day one. The N avy’s

Design Office to w ork out the d e sig n s^ ^

smaller

involvement should be right from the S ta ff

co nstruction lik e frigates, subm

llture marine

Requirement, which should be refined by the

fast craft, suggested that

nuclear

Material Branch as regards our own capability.

p r o p u ls io n be c o n s id e re d , ir\c , hoth the ship The Staff Branch and the Material Branch should

propulsion, and stressed the nee

. lnate closely

work hand in hand till the design is. frozen and designers and the ship builders

icaCjty ofthe

then it can be given for production.

and in good time. T h is rem arkable P ^ o u s ln the

“The second advantage is that the design

P rim e M in is t e r w a s to p ro ve m

period may be four years. T ill the design is ensuing Defence Plan.

frozen, the shipyard does not know what to do.

[tractor

We can overlap the three year design period plus

Building up the Cadre o f Naval Co

the production at every stage and ensure that we

Officers

get the best out of the sh ip at the tim e of commissioning".

Capt

3 ain Lohnana re

re ca

c l

uls:

.o.

^

i?,68; this Design Organisation had

“The C orps of Naval Con® ^ sC0tmetinie in

successfully designed and handed over to the Navy

w as thought of and crea

parma*1

, The

S r m

f S

317 vessels: 200 ton water boat

when three civilian officer*' Mr r recr„ lt t £ > r e h2

. rA (19606)- 500 Hp Tug BALSHIL (1966).

D otiw a la a n d M r D hum al I « r ^

^

SAHAYAK (1967), Bucket

first uniform ed const™

• uK t o »

VP Garg, who was alreaay

. t0 stay

an Engineer O fficer

| g Under construction w ere Landing Craft Utility

and convert as a N ^ to fth eN a

______ Going Tug (GAJ), Avcat

certainly was the* foresight

I J ^ - ^ ^ a n d P O S H A K ) , HSD Tankers. 150

that one day the Navy will need to have Naval

further two years course was given to these Naval

A rchitects who understand ship design and

architecture graduates to become Naval

would help to maintain ships better. In the long

Constructors, by making them Naval Architects

run, it came as a blessing when we decided to

for warships. This was achieved by appointing

design and build our own ships.

two constructor officers trained In UK at IIT

“In the in itia l stages, there was debate

Kharagpur in the Naval Construction Wing set up

whether constructors should be a civilian cadre

within the Naval Architecture Department.

or in uniform. NHQ decided that they should be

Gradually, with the reduction in the availability

in uniform so that the Navy will have a hold over

of Naval Architect graduates per se from

them, whereas civilians might leave as and when

Kharagpur opting for the Navy, it was decided to

they liked. Secondly, some senior people in the

recruit graduates in allied branches of

Ministry did foresee that this small group of 18,

engineering such as Aeronautical, Mechanical,

which was sanctioned in the first instance, was

Metallurgical etc and cross train them as Naval

not a sufficiently viable cadre in terms of giving

Constructors, which was again done by the Naval

adequate career prospects. So to make sure that

Construction Wing within the IIT. Naturally, the

there were adequate career prospects, they were

training load increased, because not only was it

made a part of the Engineering Branch as far as

cross-training to adapt them to warships, but to

sanctions were concerned. Thus it became a kind

Naval Architecture and ships as a whole.

o f a separate fourth specialisation of the

“At about this time, the faculty at IIT

Engineering Branch, like Marine Engineering, Air

Kharagpur did undergo some dilution and we felt

Engineering, Ordnance Engineering and Naval

that the quality of training may be adversely

C onstruction. To what extent this proved

affected. At the same time, the available expertise

beneficial in the long run is a matter of debate.

within the Naval Headquarters in terms of the

“The D irectorate o f Naval Construction

Material Branch as well as Staff who could be

expanded as the Soviet acquisitions and the

called upon to give lectures to the students and

Leander Project came. At the commencement of

the setting up of the Design Directorate which

the Leander programme, a Frigate Project Cell

could impart some practical training sessions to

was also created within DNC, under a DDFP.

the students was the idea behind the proposal to

Then as the Soviet acquisition programme came,

shift the Naval Construction Wing Itself from IIT

since the DNC was the single point authority In

Kharagpur to IIT Delhi, where the basic academic

Naval Headquarters for dealing with all ship

faculty in terms of maths and applied mechanics,

acquisition contracts and new construction

which were essential inputs, were certainly of a contracts, the Soviet acquisition work was

very high order. It took a certain amount of

entrusted to me when I returned from training in

persuasion within the Navy as well as with the ITT

the Soviet Union. Since there was no separate

authorities and eventually it was successfully

sanction, I was held under the sanction of the

brought about around the mid 70s"

DDFP(C) and tackled both the Frigate Project

Strengthening of the Design Organisation

work, as well as the work connected with the

Soviet Acquisitions which later on went off to

A major objective of the 1969-74 Defence Plan was

other directorates, DAP, DLP and so on. Thus the

self reliance in the field o f warship design and

DNC was the parent directorate for the present

warship production. The aim was to meet the Navy’s

Directorate o f Naval Design, the Directorate of

requirements through indigenous efforts and

Leander Project, as well as the Directorate of

conserve foreign exchange. Accordingly the

A cqu isition Project. It is now called the

indigenous construction of frigates, patrol craft,

Directorate of the Naval Architecture, which is the

submarines, minor war vessels and auxiliaries had

professional directorate in the Material Branch

been accepted in this plan.

for Naval Architecture policy.

In 1969, Naval Headquarters proposed to the

“The training of the naval constructors of the

Government that a full fledged Directorate of Naval

first few batches, Including ours, was carried out

Design (DND) be sanctioned. At that stage, the Navy In UK. When it was decided to train them in did not have either adequate design experience or

India, the faculty o f Naval Architecture at IIT

capability. There was also an acute shortage of

Kharagpur, which was the only faculty then in

technical officers. Naval Headquarters had envisaged India for this discipline, was selected and a

TRANSITION T O T O ISM T O /#

induction o f foreign d esign ers on loan , w ith T h ro u gh o u t the decade 1965 to 1Q7

assurance o f back up from then- p a re n t

availability o f sanctioned manpower r i ! ? ' the non organisations. However, negotiations with the UK for

b alanced growth of the D esign OreanT

ed ^

the deputation of such designers did not bear fruit.

shortage o f service officers was particuiJ1S,atlon' The Meanwhile, soon after the start o f the Leander

retrospect, the successful ach ievem en t f aCUte' In construction programme, a choice had to be made

design d u rin g th is period can be a t t r ih m J T ^ P

whether the second and subsequent Leanders were to

factors:

^ to two

be identical to the first Leander (the advantage being standardisation and the d isa d va n ta g e b e in g

•

A ccep tin g an overlap between the “design”

^

obsolescence) or whether design changes should be

“production” phases. This enabled a shorter 2

effected from the second Leander onwards to enhance

fra m e fro m th e c o n c e p t d esign stage to th^

combat capability. It was decided that indigenous

c o m p le tio n o f th e fir s t sh ip o f the class. It frigates should, as far as possible, have the latest

m in im is e d the o b so le sce n ce factor. And it ensured lower costs by minimising escalation.

equipment.

In 1970, the Directorate of Naval Design (DND)

•

The team o f talented young constructors built up

was approved. It started off with the design for new over the preceding twelve years by the founding

classes of Seaward Defence Boats (SD B s M K2), fa th e r s o f th e D e s ig n Organisation,- which Survey Vessels, and a Landing Ship Tank (LST). The included Shri S. Parmanandan, Shri Dotiwalla,

most noteworthy feature of the DND was that it was S h ri D h u m al, C om m od ore V P Garg, Captain conceived and created as an integral part of the Navy, Thukral and Captain KK Lohana.

thereby enabling close interaction at all levels, while S h ri

P a r m a n a n d a n

w a s

awarded the

functioning under the scrutiny of the Naval Staff.

PADMASHRI in 1970 in recognition of “his eminence

In 1973, a team of designers from the Soviet

as the leading naval architect in the country and his

Union were invited to v is it In d ia to su g g e st an dynam ism , dedication and drive in building up the organisation to design frigates and submarines. They capability o f his organisation”.

quantified a requirem ent of over 170 q u a lifie d designers each for tackling the design of the new The Challenges Posed in Warship Design

frigate and the design of the new submarine. These requirem ents of m anpow er w ere j u s t not

Warship design and construction comprise five mai

implementable within available resources. The Naval stages:

Staff therefore accepted the revisio n of the sta ff requirements and approved a modified Leander hull

•

The first stage is the Formulati° no ° f

S ta ff Requirem ents by the Nava! Stafi■

d to

with a different weapon package, instead of insisting on an altogether new frigate design. This decision was the requirem ents that the ship wi

threats

to result in the GODAVARI class frigates of Project 16, meet, based on the evaluation o u

ivedas

which retained all the in d ig e n o u s p ro p u ls io n and the sh ip s’ role. These are i r s f ^ d ia lo g 116

machinery and other equipment already developed staff targets, which form the basis

igners to

for the six earlier Leanders.

b e tw e e n th e N a va l S ta ff an

techn*0^

estab lish th a t w h a t is demande

technically

In early 1975, the D esign O rg a n isa tio n

commenced conceptual design work on Project 16. By feasible and conversely, that ^

A nUmber

en

Naval S taff and the G overnm ent

feasible w ill m eet the s t a f f aspir

E v e n ^ ’J

accepted the design. Detailed drawing and design o f feasib ility studies are c a n j d o u ^

ted

work started in 1976.

8

the Prelim inary S t a f f Require

jts weap , g

w hich spell out the role o

„ nuiprnent

rtant

acmT^LPf *

l aSS s u b m a rin e c h a s e rs h a d b e e n

sensors and the other ma) ° *

ddjtion,

of

Thev w oiilH n!

f S 0 V it t Uni0n in ^

mid 1960’s -

ship is requ ired to carry. en d u rance- J a„d 1 9 8 0 ^

0r? need rePlacem ent in the m id

p a r a m e t e r s lik e s p e e d ,

dirnensi0

re to rt*

I

H e a d q u a r t e r s d e c id e d t h a t t h e ir

p r o p u ls io n , r e s t r ic t io n s

^ ^

S

S

S

W0^ d be ln diSen ou sly d e sign ed an d

com plem ent are indicate .

p esign'

, st^{

Island terrltm-i

o n ' ett®s " for the d efen ce o f the

.

The second stage is o f C on cjP i

of

design to J

an d o ff s h ore oil rigs. In 1 9 7 5

the firs t interpretation o f the Pge_

^

Project whlr°hmmenCed ° n 8hlps o f t h e Corvette requirements. During

de , Ltio11,

f S

S

t M

B

C

S

n g 1' c u lm in a te d in th e

design options are exp ° oarative eval

Project 25.

KHUKRI class corvettes of

stage which enables comp

48 /w w ajsin oN T o t r iu m p h

design proceeds on the basis of inputs from

The fifth stage is of Construction. On the basis of

sim ilar past ships, empirical relations, past

inputs from the designer, the shipyard orders

experience and the designer’s judgment. The

long lead items and materials and proceeds with

process is essentially iterative. At the end of

activities preparatory to commencing production

Concept Design, the most promising of the

in the workshops. These include faring of lines,

options are compared and the one likely to best

preparation of workshop drawings and assembly

meet the staff requirements is chosen for further

of jigs and fixtures. To minimise the overall period

development, in consultation with the Naval

of design and construction, the activities are

Staff.

telescoped and shipbuilding functions are

The third stage is of Preliminary Design. Various

commenced in the latter half of the detailed

aspects

and

param eters,

provisionally

design phase. Throughout the construction

determined during the concept design stage, are

stage, a continuous flow of drawings and

investigated in detail. Design proceeds along a

information has to be maintained between the

converging spiral form, investigating various

designers and the shipyard.

aspects o f dim ensions, weights, volumes,

stability, speed and powering, until an acceptable

Project 16 Godavari Class Frigates

com prom ise o f all the important and often

conflicting parameters is achieved. All design

The lessons learnt in the 1971 Indo Pakistan War, the

calculations are prepared during this stage.

detailed discussions with Russia for the next series of System schematics are generated to facilitate

Russian acquisitions and the progress made in the

weight, volum e, flotation and stability

development of indigenous systems made it possible

calculations. At the end of Preliminary Design, a

for the Naval Staff to consider major improvements in

p resen tation is made to the Naval Staff,

the combat capability of frigates. The Directorate of

indicating aspects/areas in which the design may

Combat Policy and Tactics suggested that the entire

entail a compromise in Staff Requirements. After

missile and gun package of the Soviet Nanuchka

the Naval Staff approve the preliminary design,

class missile corvette be installed in the frigates

the preliminary staff requirements, as modified,

which would follow the VINDHYAGIRI, together with

are prom ulgated as the final or frozen Staff

two Seaking anti submarine helicopters, the latest

Indian APSOH Sonar, a mix of Soviet and Indian

Requirements.

radars and Italian CAIO and EW systems. The

The fou rth stage is o f Detailed Design.

Directorate of Marine Engineering suggested that

Hydrodynamic model tests are carried out at the

steam propulsion be replaced by gas turbine

beginning of the Detailed Design stage.-These

propulsion.

valid ate the predictions made through the

The Naval Headquarters Technical Team which

analytical processes. Shortcomings emerging out

visited Canada in 1974 saw the Canadian 4100 ton

of the results o f model tests are rectified by

Destroyer DDH - 280 which had two Seakings

modifying the design features. During this stage,

embarked. Naval Headquarters decided to try and

special studies are undertaken in the critical

embark two Seakings in the smaller Leander hull.

design areas. Detailed structural drawings,

The Design Directorate was headed by Shri S

system details, layout and composite drawings

Parmanandan. The new frigate design was entrusted

are prepared. Comprehensive specifications are

to a project team headed by Commander (later

written out. A dialogue is then initiated with the

Captain) NS Mohan Ram. a Naval architect, trained in

ship builder and the detailed specifications and

the United Kingdom and who had worked in the Royal

drawings are made available to him.

Navy’s Leander Design Section. Organisational

F o r a t y p ic a l w a r s h i p p ro je c t, n e a rly 2000

capability had to be built up concurrently with the

drawings, som e run n ing into several sheets, and design, as there were not enough trained

over 15 volum es of specifications of nearly 2000

draughtsmen or junior designers. Expertise too had

pages, are required to be generated and over 1000

to be developed in-house.

guidan ce d ra w in g s supplied to the ship builder.

Mr Parmanandan who was then the DGND

In t u r n , th e s h ip y a r d g e n e r a te s over 1500

recalls:

d r a w in g s fo r s u b m is s io n to the designers for a p p r o v a l. T h e s e th e n fo rm the b a s is for the

“The Navy was looking around for a cost effective

option where surface to surface, air to surface

shipyard to prepare its working drawings, whic

and anti-air capabilities would be available from

w ould n u m b er several thousands.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/99

, ,

T-je naturally required the ship to

ship was comfortably sitting on the crest

a single ship- Thi

surface missiles,

have helicopter launched mr to s

were overwhelmed. It seemed possible th”

6

ship may go even faster than the Leander*1

. T

a „ « s u p i n e

power. This was amply proved during trial, SS

60%, 70%, 75% of full power, she was o '

n,‘ SSH J .n d S

Sealdng helicopters, so th a t a t

k i p C„e helicopter ir. the

h alf knots slow er than the Leander. B^t th**

m om en t she re a c h e d 85% to 90% U u

air be it for an anti submarine m ission or an anti

ship mission. Th e s t a ff d e fin ite ly w a n te d tw o acceleration was higher and she could overt^*

the Leander.

e

Seakings. They w ere n ot h a pp y w ith o n ly one.

With surface to su rface m issiles, s u rfa c e to a ir

“We had a group o f engineer and electrical

missiles and two Seakings, it a p p ea red to b e a officers working with us. Mazagon Dock wanted

cost effective ship. Certainly the Leander hull

them and I gladly agreed to let them go. When

was in no position to take it.

the ship w ent out for trials, there were Soviet

“The second problem that came up was the

experts on board. They had their own misgivings

economics of it. We had invested more than 150

about the ships speed but when they observed

crores in the indigenous development of the

she was doing 29 knots, 29.5 knots and even

steam machinery. This led to a clear decision that

upto 30 knots, they were surprised and equally

the propulsion package will remain the same, but

we were surprised. The ship was keeping up with

the ship must have the weapon package, which

the gas turbine propelled RAJPUT. When both

meant both the L Band and the S Band radars

ships were asked to do a zig zag manouvre, the

and, to accommodate the Soviet design

GODAVARI could do better than the RAJPUT.

philosophy and their weapons, a dedicated radar

“Th e w ake o f th e P ro je c t 16 was classic,, for each weapon. This was too much to go into a

whereas the RAJPUT was churning the ocean.

Leander design. This naturally meant that a new

Any commanding officer would like to have a ship

frigate had to be designed from scratch, except for

which has no wake at all, or at least a partially

the propulsion package which should not change.

suppressed wake.

“Our initial check indicated that we may lose

“I do not claim any credit for me or for any of

around 2 knots of speed but could provide 20%

my design officers. Its one of those things where

longer range, 150% more aviation fuel, all weapon

fortune favours those who are willing to take the

packages and additional complement to man the

risk. And GODAVARI happened to have ended

weapons and the helo included. The staff were

well”.

willing to accept the 2 knot penalty.

“From there, we proceeded to do a serious

Captain Mohan Ram recalls:

design. Half way through, we realised the ship

“All these changes c o u ld only be accommodated

was getting longer and thinner and if we adopted

in a larger hull, with increased internal sPa(^ or

the same propulsion package, the length

w eapon s and e q u ip m e n t and deck space

advantage may give an edge and we may be able

missiles.

is a

to do just about half a knot less than the Leander.

“T h e e v o lu tio n o f th e n ew

^ bold

rom that proposition, we went for a model test

fascinating story o f calculated risk-t

e

Of course we changed the fore part of the ship

in n o v a tio n an d e x tr a p o la tio n o a

eers

Tot of Sh

dCr f° re part would have Posed a

k n o w le d g e .

T h e N a v y ’ s m arin e e

jateSt

lot oobstruct!011, both for the missile, the gun

understandably desired to introduce ^ g ates.

point, there w aVve™ SlT*16'

fr0m

technology gas tu rbines in these ne

gurface

the Leander and th7pr“ ect T £ m° nality between

The Naval S taff had specified surfacr llc0pters.

and su rface-to-air m issiles, larger mand afld

PropH1lsionaaSn T t!!?r

flneness ln shIP

m odern guns and sophisticated com

maximum speed th$ p moclel test- When at

control systems.

, .a- a that the/

ship happens to lS t

UP Under the stern of the

“Early on, the Design Group

turbJnf

the ship loses speed11 If f,trough of

bow wave,

w ou ld n ot ch a n ge th e p ro ven s

te9 to

on the crest of the boH * Ůt UP hapPens to be

propulsion o f the N ILG IR I

. en made o

fPeed. When Mohan SnWr e

K the Shlp

turbines. M ajor investm ents ha ^

giectrfc .

facilities and tooling in Bhara

Limited and Hindustan Aerona

100/TOANS1T1ON TO t r iu m p h

the m an u factu re o f steam turbines and

In recognition of this achievement. Commander

auxiliaries. It was felt that it would be prudent to

Mohan Ram was awarded the Vishis.t Seva Medal.

amortise this investment over a larger number of

Captain Lohana recalls:

vessels.

“Also the new class of frigates already needed

The Project 16 started with a dialogue with the

a newly designed hull. The weapon and control

naval staff on what all they could have. Many

systems would be different. If the propulsion

sketch design studies and concept studies were

systems were also changed, it would lead to too

made. Ultimately what clinched the issue in

high an intensity o f change, which the Design

favour of the Project coming to DGND was that

Organisation and the Navy might find difficult to

here was a frigate which held the promise to

absorb and implement. So a sensible decision

house and operate two Seaking helicopters. I

was taken to design a larger hull, using well

think this was the clinching point which made

established, con ven tion al, steam turbine

the Navy decide to go in for this design. At the

machinery and auxiliaries.

concept stage, we were all involved but this idea

"The larger vessel would displace twenty

probably emanated not from one individual, but

percent more than the 3000 tons of the NILGIRI

instead got evolved as a result of discussions.

class frigate and would be about fourteen meters

“There was a definite element of selling this

longer. The Naval Staff also wanted the vessel to

concept to the Naval Staff, so that the Design

go at least one knot faster than the NILGIRI class.

Organisation could take on this challenge and

As the head and naval architect in the Design

progress it.

The credit must go to Mr

Group, I serendipitously discovered that with the

Parmanandan of course, who was leading the

same capacity of steam turbines as in NILGIRI,

team, but there were people like then

Commander Kapoor and Commander Mohan

the new design ship would go faster, due to

Ram who played a prominent part. Commander

improved hydrodynamic conditions at maximum

Mohan Ram of course then became the project in

speed. There would however, be a small penalty

charge for the rest of the main project.

of fuel consumption at cruising speeds. This

“I had one other small part to play when we

surprising discovery was at first pooh-poohed by

were doing the upper deck layout. When the

many, but was subsequently verified in model

missile containers were put on either side of the

tests and con firm ed during sea trials of

superstructure which was protruding out

GODAVARI, the first ship of the class.

towards the forward end from the main

“The m ajor change which had to be

superstructure, there was not enough space for

implemented in the design, was the decision of

people to walk past the containers, after allowing

the Naval sta ff to use Soviet weapons and fire

for the minimum distance between the

control systems together with Western and Indian

containers. My main contribution in this area

weapon systems and propulsion systems. This

was suggesting that there should be sponsons on

entailed the use o f two sets of main electrical

either side of the weather deck to locally create

power distribution systems, - one 440V, 3 phase,

more width to allow for the extra space required.

60 cycles and the other 380V/3 phase, 50 cycles.

This proved to be a successful and distinctive

This had never been done before in any warship,

feature of the ship.

but this radical decision was also taken. For the

“After this project was finally approved for

first tim e, a hybrid vessel was developed,

construction. Mazagon Dock wanted the Navy to

combining Western and Soviet systems in one

send somebody who would help the shipyard in

hull.

translating the Navy’s design into workshop

The decision to go ahead with the design was

drawings. I was asked to go to Mazagon Dock as

a bold act o f faith on the part of the Navy. It the Head of the Warship Design Section and

reflected the confidence the Navy had in its young

entrusted with the task of doing that. It was a

designers and the growing capability of Mazagon

great opportunity. As the work progressed, there

Docks. The go-ahead for the ship was given in

was constant interaction between the production

19?5. The keel was laid in 1977. GODAVARI

side on one hand and the Navai Headquarters

commissioned in December 1983. She fully met

design organisation on the other. It was tight

the sp ecifica tio n s and exceeded all major

rope walking between the two, which we managed

Performance requirements".

to do successfully*

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/101

colleague w ho w as in

•There were a lot o f discussions wheth

anti missile defence we should go in for th

for

charge <rf th^M erchant Ship Drawing o f f i^

lso

2

ned and left, so I had the o p p o r tu n ity o f 30 mm gun mountings or the Bofors 40/7n

Ct

heading the en tire d esign o r g a n is a tio n o f th e mountings. That took about six to seven m fu "

Mazagon Docks. A nd by the tim e I w a s s a ile d Ultim ately a clear decision was given

back to N a va l H e a d q u a r te r s as DGND. th e should have four surface to surface missiles n l^

GODAVARI, the first ship o f the class, had alm ost

the Spviet guns. It was also decided to fit som

r

p ro ceed ed to c o m p le tio n . I a t t e n d e d h e r the Lean ders’ radars, sonar, communicatio

commissioning ceremony as the DGND

equipment etc.

n

‘The point where the decision got delayed was

Project 25 KHUKRI Class Corvettes

the propulsion package. There was discussion as

In the mid 1960’s, Government had accepted in

regards a sin gle e n gin e room or two engine

principle the Navy’s requirements for 500 ton patrol

rooms, two engines per shaft or one engine per

craft. In subsequent years, various options were

shaft etc. The gearing o f two diesel engines to one

considered - building them in Bombay in the Gun

shaft posed problems. Would it be better to have

Carriage Basin near INS Kunjali, building them in the

a single robust engine rather than two, in a small

new Naval Dockyard at Visakhapatnam etc. By the

ship o f this size? Should we have a fixed pitch

early 1970’s, two schools of thought had emerged.

propeller or a CPP? To settle these issued, NHQ

One view was that with the cost of ships steadily

constituted a group o f officers to write a service

increasing, the Navy had no option but to go in for

paper. The then COM and DME produced a paper

small, fast, missile armed corvettes. The other view

based on which the design proceeded and the

was that in view of foreseeable threats, all the staff final powering calculation was completed. The

requirements could not be met in a 500 ton patrol

choice of propeller was also settled and it was

craft. The outcome was that the 500 ton patrol craft

decided to go in for a controllable pitch propeller

got renamed as the Corvette Project, to be built in two (CPP). However that resulted in a slightly heavier

versions - anti aircraft and anti submarine.

tail shaft and propeller and a higher trim aft. The

International tenders were called for and various

discussions over engines, and the mid course

weapon packages were considered. Eventually, in

correction w hich som e people wanted that it

1973 the project was dropped because of the serious

should not be a single engine per shaft or two

shortage of foreign exchange. NHQ then decided that

engines per shaft, did push the project back by

the corvettes would be designed and built

about 18 months.

indigenously.

“W hen you are w o rk in g on a Naval Sta

Mr Parmanandan. the Director General of Naval

Requirement and when the total project starts

Design at that time, recalls:

sliding back 18 months, every body gets fresn

ideas. Fresh weapons, fresh helicopters, res

“After five or six years of working with the Petyas,

radars, fresh sonar and eveiy one wants to pi

the Naval Staff wanted a new generation of ships

in. That has a veiy deleterious effect.

The Corvette Project had been going up and

“By the time I left NHQ, the ship a

down, with French collaboration, with

ordered, the d esign had been frozen

^

international tenders and with British private

model tests had been completed. But

e 1

^

companies putting in a bid. All that took very

Soviets insisted that the bridge struct! ^ nt have

series nfH6 yeafS' BUt n0thing came out of the

go further aft. And it got shifted. I wou

^ trim

s les ofdiscussions we had. either with the

permitted that to happen. It cause

anS m

took a decK

lthe BritiSh' The Naval staff then

problem and it got adjusted by ot er

thoUght

desiCn anH

g° ^

and start work 0n a

my opinion. Project 25 was a fair^y w

weap0n

s :

E

«

uct a Corvette to our own

out design, it had a w ell thoug

service.’

Plus four Soviet surface

aCfC° mmodate a hel°

package which I believe is giving g °°

«

to

Soviet gun mounting Mter'thi I T T * " d *

taken, the nnrmoi

decision was

Warship M o d ific a tio n s U n dertak en

Powering and

1 9 7 5

t e d

a preliminary design.

finalised as

plemen

M ajor m o d ifica tio n s d esign ed and in1

between 1965 and 1975 were:

102/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

•

The m od ern isa tion o f and fitm ent of Soviet

C a p ta in L o h a n a recalls:

surface to su rfa ce m issiles in TALWAR and

TRISHUL, which had been acquired in the early

“It was a very very bold step to remove the P 15

1960's.

missile containers from one of the missile boats

•

The conversion to the training role of the British

and fit them in the Type 12 frigates. Not only

Type 41 frigates, BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and

that, the Soviets were not particularly

BETWA which had been acquired in the end

enthusiastic about such a proposal. It was

1950’s.

therefore decided that we would do it on our own.

•

Phase One Modernisation of and modifications to

Secondly, the three missile configuration, which

the aircraft carrier VIKRANT.

was planned for TALWAR’s foxle deck to get

maximum benefit out of the deck area available,

F itm e n t o f S u r f a c e to S u r f a c e M is s ile s in

was something unique. There were definitely

TALWAR and T R IS H U L

inherent doubts and risks as to how the flight

In 1973, the Naval Staff commenced a study on the

paths would be affected and what were the

half life modernisation o f the two Type 12 British clearances required and What should be the

frigates. TALWAR and TRISHUL, which had by then

interface with the rest of the equipment and so

completed over 11 years in service. In view of the on. This assignment became an article of faith

proven efficacy o f the Soviet surface to surface with Mr Parmanandan. the then DGND. In the

missiles in the 1971 war. the Naval staff directed that absence of clear cut documentation and data,

the feasibility be examined of lifting a complete quite a large amount of study had to be carried

surface to su rfa ce m issile system from a non out of the existing fittings in the missile boats in

operational Soviet missile boat and fit it on board

order to decide what equipment was to be

TALWAR. C oncu rrently, it was decided to fit a

removed in addition to the containers themselves,

modern electronic warfare system which would help

what was the interface, how the fire control would

in identifying enem y w arships from their radar

work and so on. And I must say that the whole

exercise, inspite of certain technically inspired

transmissions at ranges compatible with the range of

the missiles.

assumptions, was something which went off very

well and the Navy could well be very very proud of

Mr Parmanandan then the DGND. recalls:

it".

“The Russians were not at all in favour of putting

Conversion o f BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and BETWA

one of the three missiles on the centre line. I did

f o r Cadets Training

not see anything wrong in putting it., as long as

the deflectors were correct and we knew the

With the starting up of the Naval Academy in 1971 to

correct distances and if the flame should strike

increase officer intake, it became necessary to

the bulkhead, there should be no damage done.

increase the capacity afloat for training cadets and

So we decided to have a forward bulkhead with an

midshipmen at sea. The cruiser DELHI was

converted to undertake the sea training of

air space and also have a walkway for people in

midshipmen. Thereafter the three Type41 frigates

case something goes wrong.

which had joined the fleet in 1958. 1959 and 1960

‘We had a group of scientists in the first firing

were converted in the 1970’s for undertaking the sea

for which we wrote down the specifications for

firing the missile. That raised the eyebrows of

training of cadets.

some officers in the Material Branch, specially in

Phase One Modernisation o f VIKRANT

the DWE. They said “who are these jokers in

After the 1971 war. VIKRANT needed a long refit to

Ramakrishna Puram to tell us what to do with the

replace her cracked boilers. Since this was expected

weapon on board?" But we were worried about

to be a long refit of about three years, it was decided an accident, nothing more than that. We had

to concurrently undertake as much modernisation of

a^ked for many measurement gadgets. One of

weapons, sensors and AIO as possible.

t ese was to put a series of shoe strings along the

Mr P a rm a n a n d a n . th e th e n DGND re c a lls.

deck and on the bulkhead. We knew what their

ch arring tem p eratu re was. That would

"There was a serious proposal to put the large

immediately indicate how far the deflectors were

Soviet combined surface warning - height

e cctive and how far they were not effective, a

estimating - S band radar on the ship. Vikrant s

salvo of three missiles was fired successfully.

masts were already saturated. We were asked to

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/103

„ wav of Dutting the antennae up

During this phase o f modernisatir,

,

find 0U*

Ja «,ith the I IT Madras on the

was fitted out with:

n- v IKRaNt

there3UWe worked with the IIT Madras on the

S u r a l side and we gave a proposal which was

.

Signaal LW 04, DA 05, ZW 06 radars a

«

workable. But the cost factor and the time

AIO system as in the Leanders

S 22

required was such that the Staff decided to forego

.

LIOD O p tro nic S ig h ts and Bofors 40/ 7n that radar.

, x c

mountings for anti missile defence.

gUn

“The second thing we spent a lot o f money

The m f i n and a u x ilia r y m achinery Were and a lot of time on was that a lot o f DC/AC

refurbished to the maximum extent feasible

alternators were put on board Vikrant to create a

larger AC power capacity for dedicated services.

There was a proposal to fit Bofors guns and a new

Indigenous WarsKip Design in Retrospect

type of laser sensor for anti missile defence. I do

As in the case of the Leander Frigate Project the not know whether it ended up as a success or not.

Navy’s achievements in Indigenous Warship Design The initial proposal was to fit the Soviet 30 mm

were astounding, the tra n sfer of talented young gun mountings in lieu of the hand operated

officers between the Frigate Project and the Design Bofors. If we had gone firm on that, probably we

Organisation generated enormous synergy. Soviet

would have achieved it at a much lesser cost and

w arship d esigners and the Soviet weapon system much quicker. While the Soviet weapon systems

supply organisations were generous and unstinting had their own deficiencies, they had the

in their help. The exchange of detailed information in advantage that it suited our culture and way of

the 1 9 7 0 ’s regarding the new Soviet acquisitions working and maintainability. Each 30 mm

enabled w eapon p la n n e rs in the Naval Staff to mounting had its own dedicated radar and its

suggest cost effective staff requirements which would own display which made it autonomous for

achieve the m u ch w ish e d for standardisation of operation. So if one mounting did not work, at

systems and economies in weapon inventories. The least the other one would be available. That

confidence b u ilt up in Mazagon Docks during the philosophy was not accepted halfway through

Frigate P roject helped to b u ild the ships which And when they changed over to the new weapon

earned m uch praise from the Navies of the world.

system, our Directorate was not any further

involved.

‘ M/*IKH.SraoNTO1HUMpH

Indigenous Naval Yard Craft Built Between 1966 and 1975

Si.No.

Name

Type

Commissioning

Ship

Date

Builders

1.

AMBUDA

Water Barge

31-3-66

GRSE Calcutta

2.

b a l s h il

Tug

30-8-66

-do-

3.

a m r i t

Victualling

23-5-67

Peoples Engine

Barge

ering works

Calcutta

4.

PANKAJ

-do-

23-5-68

-do-

5.

SAHAYAK

Hopper Barge

31-12-67

GRSE Calcutta

6.

SEVAK

-do-

31-12-67

-do-

7.

NIRAJ

All weather

20-7-67

AFCO Bombay

boat

8

NIKARAKSHA

Bucket Dredger

March 67

MDL Bombay

9.

PURAK

Avcat Tanker

05-6-70

-do-

10.

POSHAK

-do-

03-7-70

-do-

11.

Boat Pontoon

20-5-70

Andrew Yule

Calcutta

12.

-do-

20-5-70

-do-

13

-do-

20-5-70

-do-

14.

_

Berthing

16-5-70

CIWTC Calcutta

Pontoon

-do-

15.

-do-

16-5-70

16.

LSA-1

100 ton Barge

24-7-70

Alcock Ashdown

Calcutta

07-8-70

-do-

17.

LSA-2

-do-

21-8-70

-do-

18.

LSA-3

-do-

03-3-74

MDL Bombay

19.

ANGAD

Tug

30-10-94

-do-

20.

AJRAL

-do-

16-11-73

-do-

21.

ANJAN

-do-

29-6-74

-do-

22.

ANUP

-do-

30-JO-74

-do-

23.

ATHAK

-do-

30-4-75

-do-

.24.

KHADAN

Grab Dredger

01-5-75

-do-

25.

KICHODHARA

Bucket Dredger

t r a n s i t i o n TO TRIUMPH/105

t h e 1971 INDO P A K I S T A N W A R

7

The Events Prior to War

ships. In early 1969, a S oviet team studied the The Pakistan Navy's D evelopm ent be tw ee n 1965

problem. In due course, the Soviet side informed the

and 1971

Pakistan Navy that they had no plans for building

The Pakistan Navy's Interaction with the Soviet

larger missile boats nor was it feasible to install the Union (1966 to 1969)

m issile boat ro ck ets in the existin g ships of the Pakistan Navy; they advised the Pakistan Navy to go

After the Rann of Kutch incident in May 1965, the US

in for the m issile b oa ts w h ich had already been had suspended all military and economic aid both to

offered.

India and to Pakistan. In July 1965, the Soviet Union

“The Story of the Pakistan Navy’ states:*

offered economic and other assistance to Pakistan, in

an endeavour to entice Pakistan away from its

‘After the Russian ‘verdict’ , there was much soul

dependence on the US .and on China.

s e a rc h in g in N H Q .

L en gth y discussions

In November 1965, in preparation for the

eventually produced a consensus that it would

Pakistan Foreign Minister’s delegation to Moscow to

not be in our in terest to opt for the Osa C^ass prepare for the later discussions at Tashkent, Pak

missile boats. Apart from the obvious

NHQ put in a requirement for six submarines, eight

of weather, there were other conslderf

the

missile boats, twelve motor torpedo boats, maritime

U n lik e th e In d ia n N avy in tim e °

olook

reconnaissance aircraft, mines and torpedoes.

Pakistan Navy missile boats would

In June 1966, a Pakistan naval delegation visited

for targets in an area 500 ^ H e s o r m o ^ y the Soviet naval bases in Odessa and Sevastopol in

from their base. The range, endu

^ ,uoefully

the Black Sea. They were shown a submarine, an

aircraft defence of Osa class boats were w

anti submarine vessel, a missile boat, a Landing Ship

inadequate for such operations.

ected-the

Tank (LST) and a motor torpedo boat. Neither mines

‘In any future conflict, Pakis*a

^ m a rin es

nor maritime reconnaissance aircraft were offered or

main

m th

nre

r a

e t

ai to

to e

cm

n an

w a

u te

a

^ fro

--- m

-- n 1 ^ be ai

a n

l iost

shown.

and m issile boats. The Osas

best, they

In May 1968, a two ship Soviet naval squadron

irrelevant in countering the sam .

ile boat

visited Karachi. It was the first ever visit of Soviet would give a fifty percent chance

worthwhile

warships to Pakistan. Discussions centred on the

vs m issile boat encounter,

a

impunit^

Soviet side being able to help modernise the ships of

when you can destroy such a

e s tio n e d the

the Pakistan fleet. The Pakistan Government also

and at w ill from the air. (CN Q

^

no

formally requested for a feasibly study of fitting Soviet validity o f this statem ent as

QSas had no

surface to surface missile on the Pakistan Navy’s

aircraft' Against submarines,

^

the oVer-

destroyers.

role to play whatsoever. Th^r

h ^ s s ile boa •

In July 1968, a high powered Pakistani

riding tear that having p r o v r fr fU * ™ as )t „ s .

delegation to Moscow was offered six missile boats

the Government, strapped

replacern®

t

and associated support infrastructure. However, the

Pakistan Navy's assessment was that the smallness

w o u l d b e u n w i l l i n g t o a P P r 0 ^

o f t h e P N F

,

t0

t h e a g i n g a n d o b s o l ^ e d e ®, w o U l d b e L e o n t y

k

WŮld deniSrate its effectiveness in

If that happened, the r

be effectl

r h? pr : b6C! , T the vert'cal accelerations likely

being a coastal navy which

^

ex c e e d ^ h T T f t T ng ^ monsoon months would

exceed the safety limits for missile firing Thev

at certain times of the year-

evant f act0

0\d

•With due regard f o r M r £ )ng

case w as p re p a re d

fri£ates to be o

0f

destroyers with Type 21

from the UK w ith o u ^ a c tu a ll)^ --------

•

Page 288

"

------- ------------- -----------

the missile boats. The implication was that the

missile boats, personnel were selected and given

Navy’s primary requirement was replacement of

Russian language courses. And then suddenly in

its aged surface ships. The missile boats, if the

July 1969, a Shift in policy at the political level altered government wished to buy them, should be in

the whole course of events. Although some Russian

addition and not in lieu. Admiral Ahsan, while he

equipment was delivered to the Army and the Air

was the Commander-in-Chief, personally took

Force, the chapter on naval assistance from the

the file to President Ayub Khan. ‘The President,”

Soviet Union was abruptly closed.

he later said “would agree to missile boats only

This brief interaction between the Soviet side and

and nothing else.”

the Pakistan Navy, when viewed in the context of Indo

In March 1969 the Soviet Defence Minister,

Soviet naval relations, pinpoints three aspects

Marshal Grechko, led a large militaiy delegation to

relevant to the events in the 1971 war:

Pakistan. Admiral Smirnov, the Commander of the

•

In 1966, after their mediation at Tashkent, the

Soviet Far Eastern Fleet based at Vladivostok, visited

Soviet side offered and showed to the Pakistan

Karachi and held discussions with the Pakistan Naval

Navy the same ships and submarines as they had

Chief. ‘The Story of the Pakistan Navy” states:*

done to the Indian Navy in 1964.

•

Whereas the Indian Navy showed no interest in

■Admiral Ahsan’s impressions of the Soviet policy

the Soviet missile boat offer in 1964 and

objective in regard to Pakistan at the time were

contracted for their acquisition only in 1969, the

recorded, and some of them were valid for many

Pakistan Navy’s acquaintance with the

years thereafter. Briefly, the main points were:

capabilities of these boats started as early as

•

The Russians aimed to replace Chinese and

October 1965 when due to the distance involved,

western influence in Pakistan.

the Indonesian Navy’s Soviet supplied “missile

•

N orm alisation of relations could be

boats arri\ ed in Pakistan waters after the cease

fire and then stayed on till such time as the

encouraged without a serious attempt to

chances of hostilities had receded". The Pakistan

solve the Kashmir dispute to avoid a common

Navy then had detailed interaction with the Soviet

Indo-Pak outlook.

side between 1966 and 1969 regarding the

•

The Indo-Soviet interest inhibited Soviet

capabilities and limitations of the missile boats.

actions to resolve the Kashmir dispute on

And again in May 1971, Pakistan’s C-in-C Navy

terms unfavourable to India.

visited Egypt where he was given a

•

The stoppage of US military aid had created a

comprehensive briefing on the So9iet Osa and

problem .

A Russian offer of military

Komar Class missile boats acquired by the

assistance could be irresistible if the terms

Egyptian Navy. All this interaction would have

were attractive.

confirmed Pakistan naval assumptions that the

•

M ilitary aid w as the quickest and most

missile boats were meant solely for harbour

effective means of gaining and developing

defence. This would explain the total surprise

powerful influence.

achieved during the Indian Navys first missile

•

The Soviets hoped to gain influence in the

action off Karachi on night 4/5 December when

formation of Pakistan’s foreign policy by a

three ships were sunk.

generous supply of military aid.

•

During their interaction with the Pakistan Navy,

•

The R u ssian s hoped to create within

the Soviet side frankly reiterated that “Indo Soviet

Pakistan’s Armed Force, a cadre of personnel

interest inhibited Soviet actions to resolve the

oriented towards Russia.

Kashmir dispute on terms unfavourable to India”.

•

Gain a secure foothold on the littoral of the

Indeed, when India protested to the Soviet Union

Indian Ocean which has a vast potential for

about the impending military sales to Pakistan,

furthering Soviet interests, and in providing

the Soviet side told India that weaning Pakistan

enormous dispersal for maritime units in

away from the US and China was as much in

war’.

India’s interest as that of the Soviet Union.

© The further development of a Soviet Pakistan

^^bsequ en t discu ssions culminated in an

military relationship is likely to have been

p^erstanding to supply Soviet military equipment to

constrained as much by US pressure as by the

*stan. In preparation for the Navy acquiring

page 286 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/107

start in 1969 of discussions on the Indo Soviet

1967, a short refit in Karachi made GHAZI seaworth

Treaty of Friendship which was eventually signed

enough to undertake the long voyage to Turkey via

in August 1971.

the Cape of Good Hope. GHAZI sailed for Turkey on 6

March 1968 and arrived back in Karachi on 2 April

The Pakistan Navy’s Underwater Forces

1970. Until November 1971, when her next refit was

Programme

due, GHAZI was operational.

In the early 1960’s, the Pakistan Navy seems to have

Daphne Class French Submarines

decided that in view o f its in ab ility to obtain In 1963, the French Government agreed in principle

budgetary priority for warship acquisitions, it was

to build three Daphne class subm arines for the

preferable to concentrate on bu ildin g up its

Pakistan Navy. However, it was not until after the

underwater offensive capability. This started with

1965 war, that the French Government agreed to give

the acquisition on lease of an American ocean going

a loan. The deal for three Daphnes was signed on 25

submarine. It was to be followed by the acquisition

February 1966.

from France of Daphne class submarines for coastal

The first Daphne, HANGOR, was commissioned

operations and from Italy of midget submarines (X

on 1 December 1969, the second, SHUSHUK on 12

craft) and chariQts.

January 1970 and the third, MANGRO on 5 August

The primary targets for the Daphne class

1970. HANGOR and SHUSHUK arrived in Karachi on

submarines were the large units of the Indian Navy -

20 December. MANGRO arrived a few months later.

the aircraft carrier VIKRANT and the cruisers

MYSORE and DELHI. The primary tasks of the X

X Craft, Chariots and the Special Services Unit (SSU) craft and the chariots were to incapacitate ships of

In end 1965, a contract was signed with an Italian the Indian Navy in harbour.

company for the acquisition of:

The GHAZI

°

Six X craft (midget submarines), armed with a

In 1963, the US Government approved the transfer of

conventional torpedo.

a submarine to the Pakistan Navy on a four year

•

Six chariots armed with limpet mines.

lease. The US Navy’s 2500 ton submarine DIABLO,

These craft were to be manned by a newly raised,

after an extensive overhaul and conversion to “Fleet

elite frogman commando unit named the Special

Snorkel" configuration, was transferred on 1 June Service Unit.

1964 as part o f the US M ilitary Assistan ce

By April 1968, the construction/assem bly of

Programme. It was renamed as PNS GHAZI (SS 479)

these craft for the SSU had reached an advanced

and arrived in Karachi in September 1964.

stage. However, major problems had already been

In the September 1965 Indo Pakistan war, GHAZI

experienced. The torpedo con tracted for was

was deployed o ff Bombay with specific orders to

incompatible with the X craft. Nor did the X craft

attack only the heavy units of the Indian Navy. No

design permit it to carry a torpedo. These X craft encounter occurred. GHAZI’s records state that she

(midget submarines) were eventually commissioned

fired four torpedoes at an Indian frigate INS

without a torpedo capability. The SSU establishment

BRAHMAPUTRA and scored three hits. However

was commissioned as PNS Iqbal.

BRAHMAPUTRA suffered no such hits.

Because of its elite status, SSU facilities had been

Thereafter GHAZI’s primary role was the ASW

accorded higher priority than the new Daphne

training of the Pakistani surface flotilla and the submarine in the allocation of waterfront space for

training of submarine personnel to man the new

their slipway jetties, hangars and working spaces.

Daphne class subm arines being acquired from

After March 1971, SSG (Navy) personnel were

France.

sent to East Pakistan to support Army operations.

In end 1967, the Pakistan Navy applied to the US

They returned to West Pakistan in September 1971 to

to renew GHAZI’s lease. This was duly approved.

man the X craft and chariots for which they had been

Between 1966 and 1968, GHAZI’s material state

trained.

deteriorated. She was due for refit but there were no

Until the war started in December 1971, the

facilities in Karachi. This was aggravated by the US

problem of providing a mother ship for the support

embargo on spares for American supplied equipment.

and conveyance of these underwater craft had not

Arrangements were made for GHAZI to be overhauled

been solved.

in Turkey. With the Suez canal having closed in

1Q8/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

The Pakistan Navy’s Surface Ships

o

eir training abroad. Those batches which went

The high cost of the Daphne submarine programme

for the longest duration came back well trained in the

and its supporting infrastructure had seriously

Soviet practice of austere equipment usage, with first

depleted the naval budget. The cessation of the US

lme maintenance being carried out on board by the

Navy's supply of spares after the 1965 war affected

operators who used the equipment. The knowledge of

the m aterial state o f the four US supplied

the batches who went abroad tor shorter periods

minesweepers and the fleet tanker DACCA.

depended on the duration of their training. The

shorter their training, the less they absorbed. After

In 1966, four British, Brooke Marine, fast patrol

arrival in India, personnel who had undergone the

boats were commissioned (RAJSHAHI, SYLLHET,

longest training were the first to be transferred out

JESSORE and COMILLA) and based in East

because they had been longest in the ship. They took

Pakistan.

their knowledge with them. This continuous bleeding

By 1968, material failures in the ex Royal Navy

of the expertise acquired at high cost in time and

destroyers led to serious unreliability. In August money, resulted in the inefficient use of Soviet

1968, TUGHRIL suffered a boiler explosion and was

weapons.

never fully operational thereafter. In August 1971,

The West and the Soviet Union had been engaged

BADR’s bows sheared off in rough monsoon weather

in a Cold War since 1947. Until 1965, naval

in the Arabian Sea. ALAMGIR had serious defects.

acquisitions were primarily from Britain. In 1964,

Attempts to acquire new frigates from Britain and

contracts had been signed for British collaboration in

France to replace the ageing ships proved fruitless.

the indigenous construction in Mazagon Docks

After March 1971, the urgent need to augment patrol

Bombay of their latest Leander class frigates. In 1965, craft in East Pakistan was met by the transfer of two

contracts had been signed for naval acquisitions from

German built, Royal Saudi Arabian Navy fast patrol

the Soviet Union. To ensure that India continued to

craft to the Pakistan Navy. These were commissioned

get the best possible naval equipment from both

as PNS SADAQAT and RIFAQAT. Their modification

sources, the Navy had to reassure each side that it

for riverine service in East Pakistan completed in May

could be trusted to safeguard the other side's naval

1971, by which time the monsoon precluded their

technology. Two major decisions had therefore to be

passage. They were reconverted to the fast patrol

taken:

craft role and retained at Karachi.

•

To safeguard the security of information, the

knowledge of all Soviet acquisitions was strictly

The Indian Navy’s Development Between

controlled on a ‘Need to Know’ basis. Soviet

1965 and 1971

equipment

handbooks

had

security

classifications which differed from those of the

1969 and 1970 had been busy years for the Navy. The

Indian Navy. The Navy was chary of downgrading

first series of Soviet acquisitions had arrived. These

these Soviet classifications. As a result, the Navy

were :

as a whole got to know very little about the new

•

Five Petya class submarine chasers (KAMORTA.

concepts which had arrived in the Soviet

KADMATT, KILTAN, KAVARATTI and KATCHALL)

acquisitions. Tactically, operationally and

•

Four subm arines (KALVER1, KHANDERI.

technically, the Navy started over-utilising the

Soviet ships which had been carefully designed

KARANJ and KURSURA)

only for essential usage. As a result, considerable

•

Submarine depot ship AMBA

wear and tear had taken place in the Soviet

•

Submarine rescue vessel NISTAR

acquisitions by the end of 1971 when the war

•

Two Polish built landing ships LST(M)s (GHARIAL

brokeout.

and GULDAR)

.

It was decided to physically segregate all the

•

Five Police patrol boats (PANVEL, PULICAT,

Soviet acquisitions by basing them on the East

PANAJI, PAMBAN and PURI)

coast in Visakhapatnam and set up entirely new

In the preceding years, several major, decisions

facilities comprising:

had been taken which were later to affect operations

A new submarine base together with

associated submarine headquarters,

lr* the 1971 War.

.

To minimise the cost of training in the ovie

berthing pens, batteiy charging facilities and

^ i o n , the crews of the ships and the submarines shore accommodation for submarine crews.

had been split into batches, according to the dura o

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/109

Officers and sailors o f all branches who

with only one of everything and therefore had no back

would be manning Soviet ships and

up in case of battle damage. All these eight frigates submarines would be given ‘type training’

operated on 440 volt 60 hertz AC power generation

(training appropriate to the type of vessel they

There was no source of this shore supply at any port

would be going to) in a new Integrated Type

in India to meet the ships’ power requirements when

Training Establishment, the ITTE, (later

in harbour for maintenance. Ships generators had to

named INS Satavahana). The Soviet side

be kept running all the time. This led to deferring would install in the ITTE. as per Soviet

their overhaul routines, which led to breakdowns at training practice, full suites of worklng'and

critical moments. The maintenance, repair and refit

sectionalised weapons, system s and

facilities for these ships had been slow in coming up

machinery, departmentwise for all the Soviet

in the Bombay Dockyard and had generally lowered

ships and submarines supplied to India.

the material fitness of these frigates for war.

A new Naval Dockyard would be built at

In 1970-71, the Navy’s latest acquisitions being

Visakhapatnam to maintain, repair and refit

inducted were:

all Soviet ships and submarines.

A new Combined Equipment Depot would be

•

Eight Soviet missile boats which were at various

set up to stock the spare parts and spare

stages o f acceptance and delivery (NASHAK,

machinery of all Soviet acquisitions.

NIPAT. NIRGHAT, NIRBHIK. VINASH. VEER.

A Torpedo Preparation Workshop for the new

VIJETA and VIDYUT). These boats were being

torpedoes in Soviet ships and submarines.

loaded on board heavy lift merchant ships in the

An enlarged Naval Armament Depot to stock,

Black Sea and unloaded in, Calcutta which was

maintain and repair the new Soviet

the only port in India having a 200 ton crane. To

munitions.

conserve their engine hours, the boats were then

being towed to Bombay, where they were to be

The Navy had inherited from the British Navy, the

based, and where their surface to surface missile

concept of periodic transfer of officers and sailors preparation facility called the Technical Position

between ships and shore establishments. Ever since

(later named INS Tunir), was being set up. A large

the partition of the Navy in 1947, there had been a contingent of officers and sailors were undergoing

constant need to increase the number of officers and

training in the Soviet naval base at Vladivostok.

sailors and give them sufficient sea time so as to be

*

Six British Seaking anti submarine helicopters,

able to man the steady inflow of new acquisitions.

equipped with a dunking sonar which could be

Whereas this had worked satisfactorily for the old lowered to variou s depths, and aprmed with

World War II acquisitions like DELHI, MYSORE, the

British MK 44 anti submarine homing torpedo.

RAJPUT class destroyers, the GODAVARI class

After acceptance trials in UK. these helicopters

destroyer escorts and the old frigates, it proved totally were utilised to train Indian aircrew. The first unsuitable for the eight new post war frigates from

batch returned to Cochin in April 1971. On

Britain which brought entirely new technologies and

arrival, all access to the Seakings and their

concepts into service between 1958 and 1960.

documentation was restricted on a ‘Need to Know’

The three new anti

a ircraft

frigates.

basis. The second batch, after tactical training at

BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and BETWA. were wholly

the B ritish Naval A ir Station at Culdrose,

diesel propelled, with controllable pitch propellers, reported directly to Bombay in October 1971 two

and had the latest available radars, sonars, fire months before the war started.

control systems.and weapons. The two new anti

In hindsight, it is clear that the cumulative effect

submarine frigates. TR ISH U L and TALW AR,

of continuous bleeding of new acquisition expertise

(designated first rate because they had back up

caused by perpetual transfers, the ignorance of the

systems and machinery to cater for battle damage)

capabilities and limitations of the Soviet acquisitions also had new sonars, radars, fire control systems and

and the Seakings resulting from enforcement of “Need,

weapons, some of which were the same as in the anti

to Know" and the inescapable lag in creating new aircraft frigates. The three new anti subm arine

shore support facilities posed formidable difficulties.

frigates. KHUKRI, KUTHAR and KIRPAN had anti

The Navy’s achievements and failures in the 1971 war

submarine system s id en tical to the 'firs t ra te ’

have to be viewed in this context.

TRISHUL and TALWAR but were designated second

rate because to minimise cost, they had been fitted

110/TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH

The Dramatis Personnae in the 1971 War

alu

arCa and’ fr0m the veiT beginning,

The Chiefs of Staff were General S H J F Manekshaw,

n]

r

s Political, military and economic

A d m ir a l S M Nanda and Air Chief Marshal P C Lai.

clout. The feeling of neglect by the Urdu speaking

General Manekshaw was the Chief of the Army

unjabi rulers, more than a thousand miles away in

S t a f f and Chairman of the Chiefs of Staff Committee.

arachi and Rawalpindi, led to growing tension

Lt Gen JFR Jacob, the Chief of Staff, Eastern Army

between the two parts of Pakistan. As early as 1969,

Headquarters in 1971, published his memoirs “Birth

the Pakistan Navy started preparing plans for East

of a Nation” in 1997.

Pakistan and generally ensure the operational

Admiral Nanda was the Chief of the Naval Staff.

availability of whatever was available there. Chinese

mines, held in stock were also to be transferred to

Admiral SN Kohli, the Flag Officer Commanding in

Chittagong.

Chief, Western Naval Command in 1971, published

General elections in 1970 gave the eastern based

his memoirs titled “ We Dared - Maritime Operations

Awami League an absolute majority in the National

in the 1971 Indo Pak War”. Vice Admiral N Krishnan,

Assembly and committed it to a programme of

the Flag Officer Commanding in Chief, Eastern Naval

autonomy. The military rulers and political parties in Command in !971, published his memoirs titled “ No

West Pakistan could not countenance this. After

Way But Surrender - An Account of the Indo Pakistan

unsuccessful negotiaUons, the Awami League leader

War in the Bay of Bengal 1971". Rear Admiral V A was arrested and imprisoned. A ruthless military

Kamath was the Flag Officer Commanding Southern

crackdown began on 25 March 1971.

Naval Area in 1971. Rear Admiral E C Kuruvila was

The authorities declared martial law and

the Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet. Rear

unleashed severe repression to suppress the

Admiral S H Sarma was the Flag Officer Commanding

agitation. Within months, the flood of refugees fleeing Eastern Fleet.

into India from East Pakistan swelled to several

On the political side, Mrs Indira Gandhi was the

millions. This massive influx into the border districts Prime Minister. Mr Jagjivan Ram was the Defence

of West Bengal created severe inflammatory

Minister. Mr Chavan was the Finance Minister ( he

complications-communal. demographic and of

had earlier been Defence Minister from 1962 to 1969

revenge. It became impossible for India to cope with

). Mr Swaran Singh was the Foreign Minister. Mr DP

such a vast refugee problem. The Indian Government

Dhar headed the Foreign Policy Planning Committee.

initiated immediate diplomatic action to apprise

Professor PN Dhar took over as Secretaiy to the Prime

world opinion of the atrocities being perpetrated in

Minister in September 1971 from Mr PN Haksar.

East Pakistan, to mobilise pressure to persuade

On the civil service side. Mr K B Lall was the Pakistan to stop the genocide and to create conditions

Defence Secretary, Mr Govind Narain was the Home

for the refugees to go back. Initial responses were

Secretaiy (and subsequently Defence Secretary after

tardy. Eventually, the international media’s poignant

Mr ball) and Mr S K Mukherji was the Additional

accounts of the genocide awakened the conscience of

Defence Secretary, looking after the Navy.

the world. But attention focussed more on mobilising

humanitarian relief than on creating the political

The recollections of Vice Admiral M K Roy. the

conditions for the refugees to return. The ensuing

Director of Naval Intelligence in 1971 have been

months witnessed considerable diplomatic activity

published in his book “War in the Indian Ocean

but achieved little to meet India’s basic requirement

Published in 1996.

that the refugees must go back. Dunng this period,

Air Chief Marshal PC Lai took over as Chief of the

three developments took place gradually.

A*r Staff in July 1969. His memoirs “My Years with

The first was that groups of refugees coalesced in

the I a F" p ro vid e in valu ab le insights into the the refugee camps, thirsting for revenge against the

Solution of plans in 1971 and the higher direction of war.

W est P a k is ta n i tro o p s w h o h ad d e s p o ile d th e ir womenfolk and destroyed their homes. These groups

« m e to be called the 'Mukti Bahinf - the freedom

T1*e Political Crisis in East Pakistan Leading

fighters - whose aim became to liberate East Bengal

up the 1971 War

tvrannv of West Pakistan and declare their

u

[anH Bangladesh, as an independant state. The

^ er the partition of India in 1947, the eastern part of homeland,

®

East Bengali officers

engal had becom e East Pakistan. Its Benga

COr; s

e

S

had either deserted or been

Peaking Muslim people became the majority o

e

retrenched from the Pakistan Army for suspected

PoPulation o f all Pakistan. However, it had the

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/111

THE EASTERN THEATRE 1971

T I B E T

disloyalty. The core of the naval wing were East Bengali officers and sailors who had deserted or a p p r e c ia tio n o f th e m ilita r y s itu a tio n in E a st Pakistan. A ir Chief Marshal p p t o iv

whose services had been dispensed with. Both wings

marsnai PC Lai s memoirs state:*

operated from their camps in India. In the months

W hile .the military build up in the Eastern Wing

prior to December, their guerrilla activity caused w a s s ig n ific a n t, th e r e a p p e a re d to b e no considerable dislocation by damaging power stations, immediate danger to India from that quarter. All

bridges, communication systems, port facilities and w e could do w as to w ait and see h ow m atters shipping.

developed”

The second development was the evolution of

contingency plans in the Indian Armed Forces for In A pril, the refu gees started flood in g in to the countering a m ilitary attack by Pakistan and

border districts o f West Bengal, bringing w ith them

consideration o f w h eth er and when a military harrowing tales o f massacre, rape and plunder. This

operation could be mounted in the East to help the

steadily increasing influx created a serious risk o f communal riots, Air Chief Marshal PC Lai’s memoirs

emergence of Bangladesh and thereby enable the

state:**

refugees to go back. As regards the latter, no military activity could be envisaged in East Pakistan until the Public opinion in India at that time w as divided

end of the year, well after the monsoon wetness had as to the a ction to be taken. W h ile e v e ry o n e dried out. As regards the former, it was expected condemned the m anner in w hich th e Pakistan

that, as in 1965, Pakistan would initiate hostilities Government was persecuting its own nationals,

with a preemptive attack in the West. Pakistan’s there were some who thought India should take

strategic concept had always been that the defence of advantage o f the disturbances in East Pakistan to

East Pakistan lay not in the East but in posing a neutralise that area militarily. O bviously such a

threat on India’s border in the west.

measure would have amounted to interference in

The th ird developm ent w as the change in

the domestic affairs o f another country and our

geopolitical alignments. To resolve its stalemate in Governm ent did not give any support to it. The

Vietnam, the US decided in 1971 to establish links official attitude was that the Pakistanis should

with China. Pakistan, who was not only a CENTO

th em se lve s fin d a p o litic a l s o lu tio n to th e ir and SEATO ally o f A m erica but also had close d is p u te . B ut th a t g a v e w ay to c o n c e rn an d relations with China, helped the US to establish links eventually alarm, with the increasing persecution

o f Bengalis, both Hindu and Muslim, who came

with China. In gratitude, the US stance in the latter pouring into India, seeking sanctuary .

half .of 1971 w as pronouncedly pro-Pakistan and anti-India. To counter-balance this US tilt, India M r KB La ll. the D efen ce S e c r e ta r y in 1971.

concluded in August 1971, a Treaty of Friendship

recalls:

with the Soviet U n io n w hich had been under discussion since 1 9 6 9 .

“The basic problem with East Pakistan w as the

vast flood o f refugees entering India. Both H indus

a n d M u s lim s w e r e f le e in g fr o m P a k is t a n i India’s Response to the Deteriorating

a tro cities. T h e d em ogra p h ic co m p o sitio n o f th e Situation in East Pakistan

b ord er districts w as gettin g altered to the extent

^fter the hijacking and public burning of the Indian

o f the. m a jo rity bein g o f foreign origin . T h is w as v ie w e d as d a n g e ro u s , in th e lo n g ru n . for■our all p ® F 27 aircraft in January 1971, India banned

territorial integrity. T h e problem w a s two fold: akistan International Airlines flights between

TjfSt an<^ E a st P a k ista n from overflying India.

.

H u m a n ita ria n .

r .e^ea^ e r»

com m un ications

and

military

.

F a c ilita tin g the re p a tr ia tio n o f r e fu g e e s for ceylo°rCement;S were either by sea or, if by air. via safegu ardin g our territorial integrity.

'T h e Prim e M inister w as u nder popular pressu re the Th<?politicaI crisis in East Pakistan climaxed on L

to secure the repatriation o f refu gees

milit

° f 25/26 March-1971 with the imposition of

met ^ m le' ° n 27 March, the Indian Prime Minister

°

S ervK e

C M tfs and the M inistry o f D efence .aid they w ere prin~^e Defence Minister and the Chiefs of Staff. The ___M inister &sked for and w as given an

** Page 152

ibid

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/113

completely unprepared for military intervention

were pouring into West Bengal, into Assam and

in East Pakistan because their attention had all

into Tripura. She said to me 'Look at this - so

along been focussed on the frontier with West

many are coming in - there is a telegram from the

Pakistan. If it was felt that military intervention

Chief Minister of Assam, a telegram from .... what

could become unavoidable, the Defence Forces

are you doing about it ?’

would need time to ensure that such intervention

I said "Nothing. What has it to do with me T

was effective and successful. In any case, no

She said ‘Can’t you do something ? Why don’t

military operations were feasible during the

you do something ? I want you to march in !’

monsoons. Hard information would also be

I said Th at means war’ and she said ‘I don’t

needed of East Pakistan’s rivers, bridges and

mind if it is war’.

roads to ensure the success of m ilitary

So I sat down and I said ‘Have you read the

intervention".

Bible?’

Sardar Swaran Singh said ‘W hat has the

Lt Gen Jacob’s memoirs state:*

Bible got to do with it ?’

“At the beginning of April, the Army Chief called

‘ In the first book, the first chapter, the first

me on telephone to say that the Government

paragraph o f the Bible, God said “Let there be

required Eastern Command to move immediately

light and there was light” - so you feel that “Let into East Pakistan. I protested that this was

there be war and there is war”. Are you ready ? I

impractical (because troops who had earlier been

certainly am not ready.’

trained for mountain operations would require to

Then I said. ‘I will tell you what is happening.

be retrained for riverine operations. There were

It is now the end of April. In a few days time, 15 to

large, wide, tidal rivers, there was no bridging

20 days time, the monsoon will break and in East

equipment and the coining monsoons would

Pakistan when it rains, the rivers become like

make access to unbridged rivers extrem ely

oceans. If you stand on one side you can’t see the

difficult).

other. I would be confined to the roads. The Air

“General Manekshaw then asked by what

Force would not be able to support me and the

date we would be ready. Provided we got bridging

Pakistanis would thrash me - that’s one.

and suitable weapons and equipment. I said, we

“Secondly my arm oured division is in the

could be ready earliest by 15 November. This

Babina area, an oth er d ivisio n is in the

would leave adequate time after the monsoon for

Secunderabad area. We are now harvesting. I will

the terrain to become passable. Manekshaw.

require every vehicle, every tr u ^ ^ a ll the road upset and impatient, replied that he would get

space, all the railway space to ffiove my soldiers

back to me.

and you will not be able to move your crops and I

“Gen Manekshaw called again the next day,

tu rn ed to Shri Fakru ddin A li Ahm ed, the

sounding very agitated, to say that senior

Agriculture Minister and said ‘if there is a famine

bureaucrats in the Government were accusing

in India, they will blame you. I won’t be there to

the Army of being over-cautious, if not cowardly.

take the blame’. Then I turned around and said

‘My armoured division which is supposed to be

He said we should reconsider. I reiterated my

my strike force has got twelve tanks which are

views and suggested that he could, if he so

o p e r a tio n a l o u t o f th e w h o le lot'.

wished, tell the Government that it was Eastern

YB Chavan asked. Sam, why only twelve ?’

Command who were dragging their feet. This led

‘I said ‘Sir, because you are the Finance

to an outburst of invective. Even so. it is to the

M in is te r. I h a v e b e e n a s k in g , b e en p le a d in g , for credit of Gen Manekshaw that he had the courage

m o n th s . Y ou s a id y o u h a v e g o t no m o n e y th a t's to uphold our stand and inform Prime Minister

Indira Gandhi accordingly."

w h y T h e n I s a id 'P rim e M in ister, i f in 1962, y o u r r

Hnrl a s k e d m e a s th e A rm y C h ie f an d n ot General Manekshaw, in an interview to the naval

G e n T h a p a r an d y o u r fa th e r had said 'T h r o w the magazine “Quarterdeck 1996" stated:

n u t” I w o u ld h a v e tu rn e d a ro u n d and

“Sometime in April, there was a cabinet meeting

“Look, th ese are th e prob lem s". N ow I am

w h a t th e p r o b le m s a re . I f y o u s till to which I was summoned. Smt Gandhi was

t e lli n g y o u ^ aheadt prim e Minister, I guarantee terribly angry and terribly upset because refugees

Page 35 el seq.

114/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

vou 100 per cent defeat. Now, you give me your

orders.'

MfJ ntl rVgnti0n gradua]iy narrowed down to end

November - early December 1971.

Then Jagjivan Ram said ‘Sam, maan jao na’.

I said ‘I have given my professional view, now

The Pakistan Navy’s Perceptions and Plans

the Government must take a decision'.

The Prime Minister didn’t say anything. She

“The Stoiy of the Pakistan Navy" states:*

was red in the face and said “Achccha, cabinet

char baje milenge’. Everybody walked out. I being

The political deadlock over the transfer of power

the juniormost, was the last to leave and I smiled

from the Martial Law administration to an elected

at her.

government developed into full fledged

'Chief, sit down’.

insurgency in East Pakistan in early 1971. The

So I said ‘Prime Minister, before you open

insurgency had India’s full moral and material

your mouth, do you want me to send in my

support from the outset. It was India’s strategic

aim to exploit Pakistan’s predicament and the

resignation on the grounds of mental health or

physical ?’

growing discontent in the eastern wing to its own

advantage, and cut Pakistan to size.

She said ‘Oh, sit down Sam. Everything you

‘In March 1971. the Government directed

told me is true ? ’

that all East Pakistan defence personnel were to

'Yes. Look its my job to fight. It is my job to

be segregated and taken off active duties. The

fight to win. Are you ready ? Have you internally

Pakistan Navy lost a third of its personnel, the

got everything ready ? Internationally, have you

worst affpcted being engine room, electrical and

got everything ready ? I don’t think so. I know

domestic branches. This led to numerous

what you want, but I must do it in my own time

desertions, including those from the elite SSG

and I guarantee you 100 per cent success. But I

group.

want to make it quite clear. There must be one

‘India made the political decision as early as

Commander. I don’t mind. I will work under the

April 1971 to provide assistance to the irregulars

BSF. the CRPF, under anybody you like. But I will

of the Mukti Bahini who were operating

not have a Soviet telling me what to do and I must

frequently from bases across the border against

have one p o litic a l m aster who will give me

the Pakistani forces. India was directly involved

instructions. I don't want the refugee ministry,

both in providing intensive training to volunteers

home ministry, defence ministry all telling me.

of Mukti Bahini and in launching a campaign of

Now, make up your mind'.

sabotage against strategic facilities and

She said “All right Sam, nobody will interfere,

installations such as power stations,

you will be in command."

communication systems and ships in Chittagong

‘Thank

you.

I

guarantee

you

harbour.

accomplishment’.

The success of Pakistan’s counter-plans

In response to a query about ‘ the other two

hinged largely on reinforcements and resupply of

Chiefs, where did they come in?", Gen Manekshaw the eastern theatre of war by sea. which could

said . They were not in on the initial meeting. I had to only be accomplished by a strong Navy capable of

r*ef them. I had to tell them about it."

breaking India’s naval blockade. The possible

effects of a blockade of Pakistan’s seaports by the

^r0rn

f ° regoing, it emerges that by end April

Indian Navy had all along been vigorously

71, the political decision had been taken to prepare

T

brought to the notice of the Government.

q

intervention in East Pakistan in the end of

However, such a force had not been developed

71, in case a satisfactory political situation had not

a lt h o u g h plans for a two-flotilla Navy (one each been found by then.

based in the two wings) had been put up to the

Another critical factor in the timing of military

Government as early as 1949. The plans

°Perations in East Pakistan was whether the Chinese

unfortunately had become victim of seemingly

^ould intervene. Most of the Himalayan passes would

endless bureaucratic indifference and of vague

c impossible to cross in December and January.

concepts such as "the defence of East Pakistan

t v en in 1962, the Chinese had declared a unilateral lies in the West" and "a short, sharp war" which Cease fire and withdrawn before the passes became

stood in the way of the Pakistan Navy’s

snowbound. As events developed in 1971. the timing

pages 329 et seq.

T R A N S IT IO N T O T R IU M P H / 115

expansion and reorganisation from the early

boats from the air at great height, especially at

fifties.

night, was an insurm ountable proposition, it

The Navy continued to be accorded a lower

was envisaged that a con ven tion al attack on

priority, and the fleet was allowed to degenerate

Karachi harbour would draw the fleet out into

into a shrinking force quite incapable of taking on

d eeper w a ters, m a k in g it vu ln erable to

the task of providing protection to the sea lines of

interception by the enemy.

communication between the two wings. The

‘A bou t th ree m on th s b e fo re the actual

addition of-three Daphne class submarines to the

outbreak of hostilities, on 15 September 1971,

fleet in the late sixties was the only redeeming

NHQ issued an emergency directive to the fleet

feature. However, their lim ited endurance

p la cin g it at a high level o f operational

confined them to duties in the Arabian Sea. The

preparedness. This meant ensuring availability

Navy particularly lacked an air reconnaissance

o f the maximum number o f fighting units and

capability which was to prove a significant factor

putting them on high alert to go to war. The

in the outcome of the 1971 war.

dockyard at K arach i w as ca lled upon on to

The mission of the Navy in the event of a war

provide round-the-clock refit'/repair facility and

was visualised as a veiy limited one:

mobile repair parties were detailed to provide on-

the-spot repair service to ships in anchorages

•

Seaward defence of the ports of Karachi,

ou tsid e K arach i to en su re a va ila b ility of Chittagong and Chalna.

alternative repair facilities'.

•

Limited protection of the shipping traffic from

the Persian Gulf to West Pakistan.

The Indian A rm y ’s Plan to Capture K hulna and Chittagong

The entire sea-going fleet (with the exception

of the submarines), under the command of the

In his book. Lt Gen Jacob states:*

Flotilla Commander, was required to maintain

‘At the beginning o f August, Gen Manekshaw,

maritime superiority in waters of interest to West

accom pan ied by the D ire c to r o f M ilitary

Pakistan. The submarines were under the direct

Operations. Maj Gen KK Singh, came to Fort

control of NHQ. In the east, only four gun boats

William to discuss the draft operation instruction

were available for operations against the Indian

sent a few days earlier. The aim stated therein

carrier group in the Bay of Bengal when the war

was to take as much territory as possible, with

started. Thus the Indians enjoyed preponderance

the ports o f Khulna and Chittagong as prime

in the Bay.

objectives. Dacca was not even mentioned. This

As the crisis deepened, the shortfall in the

implied liberating large enough areas for setting

Pakistan Navy’s manpower and operational

up a free Bangladesh Government.

capacity could be clearly seen as a major limiting

'At the meeting, held in the operations room,

factor. The situation becam e critical when

Manekshaw, KK Singh, Arora and I were present.

Bengali personnel belonging to East Pakistan had

Sam Manekshaw let his DMO do all the talking.

to be assigned duties which would not place the

KK Singh spelt out the objectives, maintaining

fighting capacity of the Navy in jeopardy, and the

that if we captured Khulna and Chittagong, what

Service was depleted by over 30 percent of its

he termed the entry ports, the war would come to

strength to all intents and purposes. The

an end. Further, Khulna was the key and the

technical cadres were particularly adversely

•weight’ of our main attack should be directed at

affected.

Khulna. The Hardinge bridge was also to be

Keeping in view the state of the fleet, even in

secured. Both Manekshaw and Arora nodded

its limited role, the Pakistan Navy was confronted

approvingly but I was flabbergasted. I got up to

with serious handicaps. Firstly, there was the

explain that in the event of hostilities, we should

preponderant strength of the Indian Fleet to

utilise our naval superiority and have an effective

reckon with. Secondly, there was virtually no

naval blockade in place. Next. Khulna was only a

defence against a possible missile attack from

minor port: the main anchorage lay several miles

India’s Osa boats. Thirdly, heavy reliance had to

downstream, at Mangla/Chalna. Cargoes for

be placed on air support which in fact was not

K h u l n a were off-loaded into light river craft for available, and in any case identifying the Osa

Transportation to K h u l n a . There were several

*

Page 65 et seq.

116/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

t-Hil rivers, u n b rid g e d , betw een o u r border and change, namely that he would delete the word

K hulna The te r r a in re str ict ed m a n o eu v re as.

‘weight’ in connection with the main thrust to

tersected by several subsidiary water channels,

Khulna. The meeting then ended.”

It narrowed dow n con sid era b ly. As far as

During my discussions with Lt Gen Jacob. I

Chittagong was concerned, it was well east of the

enquired whether the Army’s plan envisaged any

main ccntre of gravity, almost peripheral.

participation by the Navy in the taking of the ports of

■I maintained that the geopolitical heart of

Khulna and Chittagong. He said that no naval

East Pakistan was Dacca and that if we wanted to

participation was envisaged - these ports were to be

ensure control of East Pakistan, it was imperative

taken by the Army. In his book. General Jacob

that we ca p tu re D acca. At this stage Gen

states:*

Manekshaw in terven ed saying Sweetie (an

expression he used to precede a mild or harsh

“I had earlier asked the FOC in C Eastern Naval

rebuke) 'don't you see that if we take Khulna and

Command. Vice Admiral Krishnan. whether we

Chittagong, Dacca will automatically fall? I said I

could use his landing craft to ferry troops across

did not and reiterated that Dacca should be the

the River Meghna. Krishnan and Commander

Dabir. who had brought one of them (the

key objective. T h ere were further exchanges

GULDAR) to Calcutta in June, stated that the

between the DMO and m yself. Dacca, both

landing craft, of Russian origin, were unsuitable

Manekshaw and Singh maintained, was not a

because of their draught. The Question of

priority and no troops were being allotted for its

crossing the River Meghna had to be shelved and

capture. Arora agreed with them and maintained

we shifted our attention to the possibility of

this view till 30 November. Eventually,

obtaining additional helicopters.

Manekshaw said he was prepared to make one

The Evolution of the Navy’s Plan of Operations

When the military crackdown occurred in East

Staff with the Prime Minister, discussions mainly

Pakistan on 25 March 1971, the Eastern Naval

centred on the Army and the Air Force. After each Command deployed a few ships on patrol across the

meeting, the Prime Minister would politely ask the

sea lane to Chittagong and Khulna. Soon thereafter,

Naval C hief w hether he had anything to say and in April 1971. Ceylon requested India’s help to quell Admiral Nanda would say no. To him, this was a clear

an imminent leftist uprising. It was suspected that

indication that not even the Prime Minister expected

North Korean merchant ships were ferrying arms to

the Navy to make any significant contribution to the

the insurgents. The Navy reacted swiftly and silently.

forthcoming operations. Admiral Nanda resolved that

Ships of the Western Fleet patrolled Ceylon’s west

the Navy had to prove its mettle this time.

coast remaining out of sight. A frigate entered

Admiral Nanda recalls that when he asked his

Colombo harbour to act as communication link.*

staff in Naval Headquarters what the Pakistan Navy

Ships from Visakhapatnam patrolled Ceylon’s east

was likely to do, the reply was that they would not coast, also remaining out of sight. After a few weeks,

seek action on the high seas but would remain under

the crisis blew over and ships returned to their base

P akistan A ir Force air cover for the defence of ports. This was the Navy's first ever deployment in

Karachi, which was West Pakistan’s only sea port.

support of foreign policy to assist neighbours in When he asked them what the Western Fleet should

distress. Its successful outcome made a significant

do, the reply was that it should deploy for the defence impact in the Ministries of Defence and External

of Saurashtra and Bombay to prevent a hit and run

Affairs.

raid of the kind that took place on Dwarka in 1965. In

From the naval side however, the ships which had

Admiral Nanda’s view, such defensive deployment of

participated in this operation needed several weeks in

our Navy was not acceptable. He was determined that

harbour to catch up on their maintenance which had

the Navy’s frustration in 1965 at not having achieved

been planned for the first half of 1971. In his book “No anything significant should not recur.

Way But Surrender" Vice Admiral Krishnan states:**

The

basic

con cep t th a t em erged was

straightforward: to take the offensive, attack Karachi,

"Our ships were in a fairly bad way, as they had to entice the Pakistan fleet to battle - and cut the sea do a considerable amount of steaming at high

lin e o f com m u n ication betw een W est and East speeds in connection with the operations o ff

Pakistan.

Ceylon in response to that Government’s appeal

for help. To get them all operational in the time

The Deploym ent o f the VIKRANT

available would need an all out effort’ .

Since June 1970, the aircraft carrier VIKRANT had

In May, Naval Headquarters started formulating

been lying immobilised in Bombay due to serious

the tasks to be assigned to the Western and Eastern

cracks and leaks that had developed in the wa er Naval Commands and deciding the allocation of

drum o f A1 boiler. S u bsequ en t radiograp ic

forces.

These tasks had to derive from the

examination revealed that the water drums o

e

capabilities and limitations of the ships, submarines

remaining three boilers also had a large number o

and aircraft at that point in time. The Navy’s success internal fatigue cracks and fissures at each of tne circum ferential rivetted join ts that were beyona

in December 1971 was the outcome of the altogether

repair by welding. It was clear that long term repairs unexpected way in w'hich these tasks eventually

synthesised.

to VIKRANT’s boilers were not feasible indigenously.

Orders were placed in Britain for the supply of four

Taking the Offensive

new water drums. Naval Headquarters directed that

the boilers were not to be used till further orders. A 1

In so far as the Navy's role was concerned, Admiral

boiler was blanked off.

Nanda recalls that in the meetings of the Chiefs of Mr Inder Malhotra recalls:

,,n a t io n s with the outside world had been cut.

I got to Colombo with the first lot o f Gurkhas that were flown in. All c o m m r m in ic a t io n s . there was great Joy. Whilst the When the first Indian naval frigate arrived in Colombo and reestablished com 0f curfew and shoot at sight orders, our

Gurkhas at the airport were not visible, the ship was plainly visible. Even in the sailors were being hugged in the streets".

Page 17.

eventually, on 26 February 1971. the ship made

able to at least steam? Not at the speed required

M move' from the Ballard Pier Extension to the

for catapulting aircraft, but at steaming speed ?”

3 h m se The objective was to flash up each boiler

And I got the staff to agree that she could steam.

So I said “Alright, let her steam". We sent the

W i n c e d steam pressure and try out the main and

VIKRANT out from Bombay.

n lh t dcck machinery which had been lying idle for

pn months The boilers were first flashed up on 1

In his book, Vice Admiral Krishnan states:*

S c h T m and Basin Trials- u p .. 40 RPM (ahead

‘There were many in the service, some of them

I d astern) were carried out. after securing the ship very senior officers, who considered VIKRANT a

lo El Buoy. Fast pullout catapult trials were also

liability in any war with Pakistan. They argued

completed on the same day. The catapult steam

that deployment of the VIKRANT involved certain

supply modification in the forward machinery room

inherent risks, especially from underwater

was tried out and found to be fully satisfactory. As threats, so considerable escort effort would be

events were to prove later in the 1971 war. without required. Many doubted her exact role in a war

this modification the Seahawks could not have been

with Pakistan. Some even went to the extent of

launched at 160 RPM. The ship proceeded to sea for

suggesting that the VIKRANT should take no part

Preliminary Sea T ria ls on 18 March 1971 an

in the war but should be tucked away inside

returned on 20 March 1971. She went to sea again

Cochin. I am not suggesting that the pessimists

on 26 April, returning the next day.

did not have sufficient grounds for their

As a result of these sea trials, it was considered

misgivings. There was an overwhelming body of

technically feasible to operate the boilers at 400 psi professional opinion that considered that

pressure thereby restricting the ships speed to

steaming the VIKRANT in her current state was

knots, maximum revolutions 120 ahead an

n0t ^Secondty^n any war at sea, VIKRANT would

revolutions astern.

,

obviously be the most worthwhile target for die

In May 1971, when Naval Headquarters started

working on the con cept of operations, the irs

problem that needed decision was what to do wi

VIKRANT. Admiral Nanda recalls:

“ " S J T .

«

d ^ c l ' S their

“When the circumstances became clear that we

capability as wen

^ ^

Qnce the ship was

may have to go to war, there was a feeling a

torp ed oe

screen o f escorts pierced, the

should leave VIKRANT in Bombay harbo^ ; l ® ^ L

VIKRANT would stand in mortal danger. Even as

“No, because during the 1965 war also,

six escorts would not guarantee any

was sitting in Bombay harbour and did no 6

to sea. If in the 1971 war the same thing

COmS r a ^ ra n d p s ? c S « U a c t o r s weighed

happens, V IK R AN T would be cal e a

elephant and Naval Aviation would be wn

^ K R A O T were to’ b e ^ u n k ! U would rep resen t a VIKRANT has to be seen as being opera

V 1KRAN

magnitude to the enemy, ju s t

victory “ f . f ^ ^ ^ a U o n a l d isaster to us.

even if we do not fly the aircraft.

„^Koh1v

"There, has been this fear, an P

, rif

VIKRANT was the core round which our Fleet was

rightly so, that if the VIKRANT gets torpedo

her loss would be something too temble

VIKRANT sinks, the Navy and

^ co n tem p T a le Ever since w e had acquired the

to contemp

for severe critlcism and

of prestige. Therefore to send VI

0ne

Carr,h controversy . invariably to her detrim en t.

was a difficult decision for anybody 0

*

re

Rut we w ere not con cern ed at p u b lic criticism had to take cognisance of the facts.

i.hpref0re

i np Obviously as professional men in positions

that VIKRANTs boiler had a crack and

^ ^

r p^nonsibility we would not send any ship into

the speed of the ship was restricte .

ft or

™ w ere satisfied that it w .u id b e

ship may not be in a position to

question

operate the catapult. Then I ask

happen

worth our w hile to do so.

“If we operate on three boilers, w

a^je

A characteristic of A d m ira l N a n d a 's s ty le o f

?" The answer given was that we m^ h decision leadership w as that w h en ever he w a s co n fro n ted to catapult the aircraft." So kno ng

..^ e we

had been taken not to fly aircraft, a____________

Page 8 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/119

with a vexed problem, he would go down to where the

conviction, b ord erin g on an obsession, th

ships were, sit down with those he considered

should w ar com e, the N avy should th

knowledgeable about the problem, listen carefully to

everyth in g it had into b a ttle and our entiT

all views, ask basic commonsense questions and

strategy from the very onset of hostilities should

gradually evolve workable solutions, making it clear

be one of bold offensive. We must scrap, erase and

that the responsibility for the final decision would be wipe off from our minds any ideas of a defensive

his. He would then go back to Naval Headquarters,

pos.ture, we must seek action, taking any risks

discuss the suggested solutions with the Naval Staff

that were necessary and destroy the enemy in his

and quantify the risks and the benefits on a

ports and at sea. There was never any difference

commonsense basis. This helped to arrive at a

of opinion between us over the fact that it would

consensus in the formulation of which each one felt

be a calculated risk well worth taking in putting

that his concerns had been considered, that as much

our only aircraft carrier to fullest use in the war.

care as possible had to be taken to minimise the risks

It was the pleasantest of surprises when Nanda

and that should things go wrong, then everyone knew

told me that VIKRANT would be assigned to the

that no single individual could be blamed. In May

Eastern Naval Command and deployed in the

1971. Admiral Nanda personally chaired numerous

Eastern theatre, along with two gun ships of the

discussions on the VIKRANT problem.

BRAHMAPUTRA class, two ships of the Petya

After careful consideration at all levels, it was

class and one su b m arin e. W ith this was

decided to auxiliary steam the rem aining three

conceived the entity of an ‘ Eastern Fleet."

boilers for 500 hours and thereafter take a further set of radiographs to study the behaviour of the cracks.

The Western Naval Command did not take kindly to

This trial proved encouraging as there was no

Vikrant being sent away to the East. In his book. "We evidence of any deterioration. In June 1971. it was

Dared”. Admiral Kohli states:**

decided to carry out sea trials. To allay the

“The a irc ra ft c a rrie r INS V IK R A N T and INS

watchkeepers’ lears of the boilers bursting, heavy

BRAHMAPUTRA and INS BEAS were transferred

safety harnesses of steel were designed and strapped

from the Western Fleet to the East Coast. The

over the water drums of the remaining three boilers.

main naval battles and activity would take place

As a further precautionary measure, observation

in the North Arabian Sea. At the time, I felt that

windows were fitted to detect traces of steam leaks

this depletion in the Western Command's Fleet

that could occur in the initial stages of rupturing. To strength and fire power was not justified and I

balance the forcing rates of the forward boiler and

vehemently protested in writing to my Chief of the

minimise the pressure fluctuations when launching

Naval Staff.”

aircraft, a modification had been carried out on the

main steam range that enabled the two boilers aft to

In his book. V ice A d m iral Krishnan has

be cross connected to the catapult steam

elaborated the thought process which led to his

accumulator. By end June, it was clear that the sea

concept of operations which Naval Headquarters a er

trials had been successful. As a measure of abundant

approved. In brief, it was to strangle the

precaution. Naval Headquarters restricted VIKRANT’s

Army's supply line from West Pakistan to ^ e a

speed to 14 knots.

Pakistan ports of Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar an

Chalna-Khulna-Mongla river port complex. T is \

The Evolution of Plans in Eastern Naval

to be achieved by attacking these ports from seaw

Command

apprehension/destruction o f Pakistan nierc

ships and amphibious landings, if require .

In his book, Admiral Krishnan states:*

m ovements out o f East Bengal by sea wou

prevented.

“On 10 June. Admiral Nanda asked me to meet

him at Bangalore where he was the chief guest at

His detailed analysis was as follows.

an Air Force ceremonial parade. We talked at

T h e aim is 'To destroy the

length on the tasks ahead. All our discussions

e n

e m

y

’ s maritime

stemmed from one overriding thought, a firm

Page 7.

Page 32.

Pages 19. 26 et seq

120/TRANSITIQN TO TRIUMPH

,

„ nce from reaching the enemy from the

of operations for fuelling. The basic problem was

This aim would involve keeping under the

that if reasonable anti submarine protection had

sea . “ reful surveillance the area of a triangle to be provided to VIKRANT and the escort ships

S h a base of 270 miles and two sides of 165 and

had to be in close company for this purpose, then

how were 18,000 square miles to be kept under

925 miles, involving 18,000 square miles. Apart

surveillance? We had decided to commit the

from actual sui^eillance. each merchant ship in

entire striking power of VIKRANTs aircraft to

his area would have to be challenged, identified

offensive operations against enemy ships and

and boarded. If neutral and carrying contraband,

installations and could not, therefore, afford the

the ship would have to be escorted to the nearest

luxuiy of aerial surveillance.

Indian port. If Pakistani, she would be boarded,

“Having appreciated Pakistan s difficulties

captured and takeri in as a war prize. Ships that

and having assessed our own. we decided that in

refused to stop would have to be forced to do so.

preparing our plan, we would rely much more on

The main task w ou ld be the isolation of

deception and other measures against the GHAZI

Chittagong. This would mean physical attack on

and ignore the air threat, in the hope that

this port from the sea and the air. The

Pakistani aircraft would be fully committed

responsibility for this, it had been agreed with the

against our Air Force and the land battle, and

Army and Air Force would be, in the main, that of

would be chary of operations over the sea.

the Navy.

"The forces allotted to me to carry out the The Operational Plan of Eastern Naval tasks were pitifully limited. The VIKRANT woul

Command

naturally be the core, the nucleus round which

the Eastern Fleet (yet to be formed) would revolve.

The following tasks emerged from this analysis:*

The su rface sh ip s allotted to me were

.

Attack from the sea on

BRAHM APUTRA,

BEAS,

KAMORTA and

C h i t t a g o n g harbou

.

Attack from the sea on harbours at Cox Baz ,

KAVARATTI. One fleet submarine, KHANDEK1

was also to be mine. I felt that they were qui e rh'ilna Khulna and Mongla.

.

Destruction of enemy shipping o It the ports «n

inadequate to fulfil the tasks ahead and also that

we would be under-insuring the safety o

e

.

S u b s e q u e n t and similar offensive actions on VIKRANT.

“The problem o f VIKRANT s security wa

serious one and brought forth several hea ac

By very careful appreciation of the su

threat, we had come to the definite conc u

d e p lo y e d a c r » «

R fvo u ld be ta s k e d to a tta c k

that the enem y was bound to

eP oy

,

C e y lo n to C h l“ a g

f

and merchant s h ip s an d

submarine GHAZI against us in the Bay o

Pakistan i n

a

v

a

l

{ anl maritime forces,

w ith th e sole a im o f destroying our ^

a

provid e in telligen

MAGAR and the

V I K R A N T . T h e t h r e a t fr o m th e G H A Z

The three U n c ^ h i p s d the l d a r fro m R u s s .a .

co n sid era b le one. A p a rt from the leth

a

- ate

tw o n ew ones,

, gistic s q u a d ro n a n d ta s k e d fo r

a t th e p re -e m p tiv e stage, V IK R A N T s a P P ™ "

^

e

S

"

S

s

C until required for an

p o s i t i o n w o u ld b e c o m e J i now£ e vic in ity o f c o m m e n c e d o p e r a tin g a irc ra ft

th e E a st B en g a l coast. O f th e four surface a v a ila b le , o n e ( th e K A V A R A T T

n tin u a lly in

been de-comrms

juvenated locally to impart

a n d u n le s s th e o th e r th r e e w ere contonua^y f0r d.sposal. h ad b een

j

re c ru lted sailors.

close co m p a n y w ith V IK R A N T ( w

com pletely

r h e w a esa r d e s ^ o r t ^ y a n d t a s k e d fo r g e n e r a .

5 to 10 m ile s ), th e

could

vu ln e ra b le to attack from the G

•

and at

take up her p osition surreptitiou^

P ^ O f th e t h r e e R u s s ia n P C a s s p a tr o l b o a ts . INS

P A N V E L w a s f it t e d w it h t w o 4 0 m m g u n s a n d leisure await her opportunity.

. it w0Uld

deployed

that no operational defects deve ^

^ area

fo r o f f e n s i v e p a t r o l s in t h e r i v e r i n e s^ill be' necessary to withdraw s i p

_______

Ibid Page 28.

T R A N S IT IO N T O T R IU M P H / 121

approaches to the Khulna-Mongla-Chalna river port

VIKRANT and I would like him to accompany me

complex. PULI CAT and PANAJI were tasked for local on board. We had a lon g discussion on board

patrols, together with the seaward defence boat, between the Commanding Officer of the VIKRANT

(C apt S P a rk a sh ), F O C IN C E A S T (Admiral AKSHAY.

In July, FOCINCEAST proceeded to New Delhi

Krishnan) and myself.”

with his analysis and plan for detailed discussions.

Captain (later Vice Admiral) S Parkash recalls:

By and large, all his submissions found favour. The

Chief of the Naval Staff gave him the go ahead to

“A very serious discussion took place regarding

implement the plan should the need arise. He was

the role o f VIKRANT if h ostilities were to take

also authorised to commence a dialogue with his

place. I told CNS and the C in C that “My biggest

opposite numbers in the Eastern theatre, the

concern is that we have an aircraft carrier and we

GOCINC, Eastern Command and the AOCINC,

cannot fly any a ircra ft. I have got the most

Eastern Air Command.

dedicated aircrew on board. Can you imagine

their morale if I were to just sit in Madras or show

VIKRANT’s Passage to the East Coast

o ff som e tim e at sea. How do we tackle this

On 23 July, VIKRANT sailed in company with the

situation?” They said "Well, you are restricted in Western Fleet to Cochin.

speed. Try and make the best of it". So I said “I Lieutenant Commander (later Vice Admiral) B

have done that already. W hen ever the fresh

Bhushan was the Senior Engineer of VIKRANT. He

breeze in the afternoon starts giving me an extra

recalls:

10 knots, 1 do carry out rollers with Alizes. To

start with, What I want is permission for them to

“Even our eventual sailing for Cochin was not

hook on and fin a lly to em bark the Alize

without some ‘hiccups’ . Shortly after leaving

Squadron, so that at least in a given period

harbour, we found that one of our boiler feed

during a day, I can carry out flying which will

water tanks was contam inated and as a

make all the difference to the morale of toe ship.

consequence, we were very short of usable feed

Can I make a signal to Naval Headquarters asking

water. A ‘ council o f w ar’ was held. The

approval to hook on an A liz e ”? I distinct y

Commander (E) asked me whether we should go

remember CNS’ reply “Parkash. who in Nava

on, or ask the Command to go back to harbour. I

Headquarters is going to give you permission

reported that our seawater distilling plants were

finally producing clear w ater and unless

embark an Alize with your speed restri^tl0?'

you think you can hook an Alize on board, e

something drastic happened, we should be able

know, then I will give you permission to em ar

to build up our feed water reserves in due course.

The conversation stopped there. He flew a

It was decided to go ahead and take a final

decision after a few hours. The rest, of course, .is

history.”

“At this point of time, it was evident thatsome

semblance of flying operations was possible on y

After an intensive shake down en route, VIKRANT

if two factors could be resolved.

carried out Seaking landing trials before entering

•

Steam the second forward boiler at full lo

Cochin on 26 July. She sailed on 28 July for radar

and communication trials, on completion of which

achieve a higher speed.

~ rrraft under

•

Accept launch and recovery of aircra

she

departed

for

Madras,

escorted

by

BRAHMAPUTRA and BEAS.

marginal speed conditions.

At the very outset, a short sea trial off Madras

••Commander (E) (later Vice-AdmiralIjBj*

proved that a speed of 16 knots at maximum

Chowdhury, who had earlier

r officer,

revolutions 140 could be maintained for short

board the VIKRANT. was my ^ p r o f e s s i o n a l periods, without causing undue strain on the three

W ith h is past exp erien ce

Hecision-making

boilers. This restored confidence in the sh ip ’s competence. h,»

“m^

t

. >» « ■

machinery, which was operating under limitations.

at this crucial juncture

Admiral Nanda recalls:

VieW:

rhinery on passage

“Next the question arose, was VIKRANT capable

•

The behaviour of the ma

^ given Engine

of flying? So I spoke to Vice Admiral Krishnan

from Bombay to Ma J *

ble confidence to

and told him I am going to come and see

Room personnel con

122/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

s t e a m t h e t h r e e b o ile r s d e - u n it is e d . T h is VIKRANT and the escorts continued to work up

a lo n e w a s t h e d e c i d i n g f a c t o r to u s e th e and were in Port Blair in end September.

re m a in in g th r e e b o ile r s to fu ll lo a d capacity, FOCINCEAST embarked there and carried out

so a s to b u ild u p s p e e d to o p e r a t e a irc r a ft tactical exercises enroute to Visakhapatnam.

u n d er m a r g in a l co n d itio n s .

Thereafter, VIKRANT went to Madras for self

«

T h e s e c o n d a n d m o r e im p o r t a n t fa c to r w as maintenance and the escorts stayed on at

w h e th e r fly in g o p e r a t io n s s h o u ld b e risked Visakhapatnam for assisted maintenance.

u n d e r m a r g in a l c o n d it io n s ? T h is w ou ld call Rear Admiral SH Sarma was appointed FOCEF

fo r e x t r a o r d i n a r y s k ills on th e p a r t o f th e designate and arrived Visakhapatnam on 14 October.

p ilo ts a s a m a tte r o f rou tin e.

In mid October, Naval Headquarters signalled

that Pakistan may launch a pre-emptive attack. All

“T h e e m b a rk e d a irc r e w w e re w ell experienced ships interrupted their maintenance and came to

and th e w illin g n e s s o f th e pilots, in this instance, immediate readiness. The alarm receded. After

w a s o v e r w h e l m i n g a n d e x e m p la r y .

T h e ir

further work up in October, ships participated in the

p r o fe s s io n a l e x c e lle n c e a n d r e s o lu tio n to go to second phase of tactical exercises, culminating in a

w ar w a s in d e e d c o n ta g io u s an d creditable. Thus mock attack on Visakhapatnam during the night of

th e o v e r a ll r is k s in v o lv e d w e r e ca lcu la ted and a 26/27 October. VIKRANT returned to Madras to

d e c is io n w a s ta k e n e v e n t u a lly to h ook an A lize resume maintenance.

a irc r a ft on b o a r d . T h is w a s su cc e s s fu l. In due The Eastern Fleet was formally constituted on 1

course, N H Q s ig n a lle d a p p ro v a l to em bark m ore November 1971. On 6 November, the Chief of the

A lizes an d la te r th e S e a h a w k squ adron .

Naval Staff embarked for a days exercises. All ships

sailed from Madras on 13 November and assembled

in the Andaman and Nicobar Islands. The intention

W o rk u p fo r W ar

was that in the final stages. when hosUlities were

B e t w e e n A u g u s t a n d O c t o b e r , t h e C a p ta in o f imminent, the Fleet, and especially the VIKRANT,

VIK R AN T w o rk e d u p h is grou p o f ships. A t first, a few would be secreted away at a remote anchorage, with

of the slo w er A liz e a irc ra ft landed and w ere launche .

no means o f communication with the outside world,

T h e n S e a h a w k f i g h t e r a i r c r a f t w e r e la n d e d an where ships could complete their readiness.

launched. S lo w ly b u t su rely, all aircraft w ere w or e Concurrently, deception messages started being

originated to give everybody the impression that

up for o p era tio n a l tasks.

In m id S e p te m b e r , F O C IN C E A S T embar^ e VIKRANT was still operating between Madras and

1

VIK R A N T o f f V isa k h a p a tn a m . His book states: Visakhapatnam. The submarine, KHANDERI. was

sailed for her patrol area in mid November with

“ I t o o k t h e s h ip s o u t to s e a a n d to o k orders to return to harbour on 14 December.

t h r o u g h a g r u e l l i n g p a c e c u lm in a in;g

^

The other measures taken to sustain operations

sim u la te d fle e t a tta c k on V lsakhapa E ffic ie n c y in remote waters were.

w a s fa r fr o m s a tisfie d , eith er w it

e

.

The ballast tanks of the old World War II landing

a tta in e d b y th e fle e t w o rk in g as a w

^

ship MAGAR were modified to carry furnace fuel

the defences o f Visakhapatnam . There

oil to supply to VIKRANT in distant anchorages.

leeway to be made up, so even more mtens.v

•

VIKRANT provided her escorts with fuel, water,

p rog ra m m es w ere draw n up.

bread and workshop facilities.

On 24 Septem ber, Naval HeacLq^ Q ^ Q E A S T the On 21 November, Indian and Pakistan troops

O p e r a t io n a l D i r e c t i v e g iv in g F

clashed at Bayra in East Pakistan. On 22 November.

follow in g tasks:

FOCINCEAST proceeded to Delhi, where all the

•

Destruction o f enemy forces a n d ^ ‘PP^ wjiere

Commanders in Chief of the Army. Navy and Air

Force briefed the three Service Chiefs and the Defence

•

S t r ik e e n e m y P o r ts ®nt0 ground forces

Minister on their Command.s plan for war. That

possible, provide ^ R p n g a l of ships o f all nations.

night, President Yahya Khan of Pakistan announced

•

D en y a ccess to East B

g.

b lo ck a d e w hen

b y c o n tr a b a n d co n tro

that he would be away fighting a war in the next ten

days. On 23 November, a state of Emergency was

ordered

d bases. including the

declared in Pakistan. On 2 December, the Eastern

•

Secure own PN°icobar Islands.__________________

Andaman and Nj_______— —-

Page 31.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/123

Fleet sailed towards its patrol area in anticipation of Pakistani preemptive attack.

modern conventional submarines with

and armament which arc far superior 1 SCnsors

The Evolution of Plans in Western Naval

our subm arines but also our

° ^ 0I%

frigates.

U1 Sut>marine

Command

In his book “We Dared". Admiral Kohli states:*

T h e O p e r a t io n a l P la n o f W e s te rn N .v a l C o m m a n d

“The objectives of the 1971 action as defined by

the Chiefs of Staff and by each respective Service

The gist of Admiral K ohlis plan, as re c o rd s • , Chief was to gain as much ground as possible in

book was as follows:***

recorded in his

the East, to neutralise the Pakistani forces there

to the extent we could, and to establish a base as

it were for a possible State of Bangladesh. In 'the

West, the objective was to hold the Pakistani

forces. It was realized that the war could not go on

indefinitely, not so much because of limitations of

chance to interfere with our trade or to mourn

manpower or aircraft but because the UN

any bombardment attacks on our homeland If

Security Council and other influential bodies

K a ra rh ^ h

UnitS meant aPPr°aching

were bound to intervene. It was realized that any

Karachi where they would be on patrol, we would

tem toH es that might be gained in the West

have to take the risk.

would most likely, as earlier, have to be handed

off

second and complementary aim was to

back to Pakistan ac the end of the fighhng

tack Karachi and to carry out a bombardment

o

wa ar and Pasni and along the coast up to

arachi to create panic in the minds of the

coastal populations and weaken confidence in

~

5

th eir Navy and G overn m en t. A blockade of

^

e « bottled up

arachi was to be instituted to prevent petroleum

and petroleum products and other essential

d

e

f

e

n

c

e

f

"

'

b' d' pl° ^ d <"

supplies needed in war from reaching Karachi.

expected that It would v e n t u r e ^ d e o f l h '

The W estern F leet was given a broad

provided by the Pakistan Air Force OfThe*

directive to seek and destroy enemy warships,

protect our merchant shipping, deny sealanes to

enem y sh ip p in g and ren d er in effective the maritime line o f communication between West

Pakistan and East P ak istan to prevent any

reinforcements from reaching the beleaguered

Pakistani forces at that end.

be W

a

to

"A submarine patrol was to be instituted off

Saurashtra coast and a ga iL t t h . f h

Y> ° f f the

could fmd it.

g

Indlan Fleet if they

Karachi to sink their warships and merchant

ships proceeding to Karachi.

“Elaborate plans were made to deal with the

threat from the Pakistani midget submarines and

ch ariots, which could be carried on board

merchant ships, warships or large dhows and be

released in the vicin ity o f Bombay harbour.

S t .* » e r T

r i ? “ ‘^ ',h Pa k l5,an l S“ fa“

Liaison was established with police, fishermen

Power of their destroyers COu S k ŮrS' The fire be marginally superior to ouri

C° nSidered to

and port authorities to report any such activity.

The water around our ships in the stream was

floodlit to enable sentries on board to see any

Indian N a ^ was m'the^r

SC° red ° Ver the

approaching underwater craft carrying limpe

mines. To deter chariots, special two-poun

•

Page 100.

•• Page 33.

*** Pages 36 et seq.

124/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

charges were dropped frequ en tly by harbour

new necklace’ and towing pendant were tried out

patrol boats and craft.

for towing fully laden boats with fu

l fuel,

“To destroy th e e n em y ’s m ain units and

armament and personnel. The Dockyard

harbour installations, it was intended to launch

manufactured strengthened elbows on th

e rear

an operation to attack Karachi from Bombay on

struts to divide the towing strain over a wider

the first day of a war. The Fleet would then launch

area. Also deeply discussed was w

hether the

their attack with missile boats on the second day

propellers should be free or s

ecured during the

from a south-westerly direction. After observing

tow and the e

fect this would have on the engines.

the outcome o f these attacks, a third attack

“An advance base with fu

eling facilities was

would be launched from Bombay.

set up at Okha, fo

r use before hostilities

“The plan provided for 'W ar Stations’ for

commenced, to

deter another exploit by Pakistan

different, naval forces to which they were to

like the 1965 bombardment of Dwarka. It was

proceed in time for effective offensive action as

accepted however that on commencement of

and when hostilities became imminent.

hostilities, Okha would be bombed and become

“The Western Fleet comprised the cruiser

untenable as an advance base. A dockyard

MYSORE, the 15th Frigate Squadron TRISHUL

tanker, POSHAK, was therefore positioned on the

and TALW AR, the 14th Frigate Squadron

Saurashtra coast near Diu as a mobile fuelling

KHUKRI, KUTHAR and KIRPAN, BETWA (an anti

facility.

aircraft frigate) KADMATT (a Russian Petya).

“Karachi was defended by shore based

RANJIT (an-old destroyer) DEEPAK (a tanker).

military aircraft. It was essential therefore to

SAGARDEEP (a requisitioned lighthouse tender)

minimise the possibilities o

f the boats being

and two missile boats VTJETA and VINASH.

attacked from the air. It was planned that the The sp ecia l task group for the missile

attacking force would arrive 150 miles fro

m

attacks on K arachi com prised KILTAN and

Karachi at sunset, g

o in at maximum speed

KATCHALL (Russian Petyas) and four missile

during darkness, cariy out the attack, withdraw

boats. T IR (a train in g frigate), DARSHAK,

at maximum speed and be 150 miles away at

INVESTIGATOR and SUTLEJ (survey ships) were

dawn. Darkness would make it difficult for enemy

utilised for towing missile boats to and from

aircraft to see and attack the force.

Saurashtra. CAUVERY and KISTNA (training

'There were grave risks in sending the fragile

frigates) were used for coastal patrol.

boats to the heavily defended port o f Karachi.

“All the smaller patrol craft, seaward defence

Even if the element of surprise prevented the

boats and requisitioned dhows were used for

detection of these boats on the approach and

harbour patrols and limited seaward patrol.

whilst launching their missiles, tftey would most

“Three Super Constellations were available

certainly be subjected to air and perhaps surface

for maritime reconnaissance. Surveillance of the

attack in the withdrawal phase. One has to

imagine the dilemma of the Commander-in-Chief

coastal belt would be carried out by two IL-14

in Bombay.

On the one hand was the

aircraft operating from Santa Cruz. The medium-

tremendous danger to young naval officers and

range surveillance would be carried out by the

sailors and to many crores worth of ships: on the

Navy using Alize aircraft.

other the Navy had to show its mettle. A

O ffensive U tilisa tio n o f M issile Boats

calculated risk had to be taken. But some losses

had to be accepted. All these factors were very

For the defence o f Bombay and other major

ports, the small Russian Osa class missile boats

carefully weighed."

would by their meie presence deter the enemy

These apprehensions surfaced during the final

from embarking on an attack. These boats had

presentadan of operational plans in New Delhi.

started arriving from Russia in Calcutta in early

1971 and had to be towed to Bombay.

23 November Presentation in Delhi of

“The idea of towing these boats to Karachi

Operational Plans

first found expression among the young officers

who were involved in towing of these boats to

On 23 November, all the Commanders in Chief of the

Bombay. An important aspect which neede

three services made a presentation of their

experiment and research was the maximum

operational plans to the Chiefs of Staff in New Delhi.

speed at which these boats could be towed.

T R A N S IT IO N T O T R IU M P H / 125

The Defence Minister and Defence Secretary were

of this plan. And I said that I was going to see th *

also present. These presentations enabled each CinC

Defence Minister and request him to relieve hi *

to know what the others were planning to do and tie

of his Command. He replied "I have only given

up the loose ends.

views and I will of course carry out the orde/

In his book Admiral Kohli states:*

given to me". I was a bit uneasy about this and felt that he was trying to evade responsibility.

“A special feature of the preparatory stages was

"A fter th is m eetin g in D elh i, I was a bit that, for the first time ever, the Chiefs of Staff of worried about how things were going to work out.

the three Services join tly examined in the

So I decided to go to Bombay at very short noticc

minutest detail the plans of the various

and called a meeting of all Commanding Officers

Commands of the three Services. Like the other

in the Navy Office. I informed them that in the

Commanders-in-Chief, I made my presentation

event of a conflict with Pakistan over Bangladesh,

which was subjected to detailed scrutiny, and

we had plans to launch an attack on Karachi..I

some very searching questions were asked about

also said that there were some misgivings in the

the legal aspects of blockade and contraband

minds of certain people about the advisability of

control and the effect it would have on neutral

this attack. I told them that if any Commanding

and friendly merchant ships and their countries.

Officcr had any misgivings about these plans, I

Also discussed at length was the grave risk

would be quite happy to relieve them of their

attached to sending small boats right into the

Command. I told them that I wanted every ship to

allegedly impregnable defences of Karachi."

be ready and out for the operations, especially in

The fallout of this presentation was serious.

view o f the escalation after two o f our aircraft In his book “Sailing and Soldiering in Defence of

were attacked by Pakistan on the eastern border."

India", Cdr SD Sinha has reproduced an interview in which the CNS, Admiral Nanda. states:**

In retrospect, it is to the credit of both Admirals

that they let this acrimony subside. But it did affect

"We had decided that in the event of a war, we the conduct o f operations during the war on two would use the missile boats for carrying out an

occasions:

attack on Karachi harbour. There were, however,

a lot of misgivings about this plan as it was felt by

•

When Naval Headquarters intervened on 6 Dec to

C-in-C Western Naval Command, who was

cancel a missile attack when forces were well on

assigned this task, that Karachi was a very

their way towards their targets and

heavily defended port w ith all ships o f the

•

In p rod d in g W estern Naval Command to do

Pakistani Navy patrolling outside the harbour, as

something about the submarine off Bombay.

well as availability of Pakistan air cover from the

two airfields of Drigh Road and Malir, from where

Operational Plan of Southern Naval Area

akistani aircraft could attack our forces. They

Four tasks w ere given to the Flag O f f i c e r also had 16 inch gun batteries at Manora and

Commanding Southern Naval Area (FO C SO U TH ).

Sandspit. which could blast our ships out of the

water. He also felt that Pakistan had superiority

•

The destruction of enemy warships encountered

in gun power with their destroyers acquired from

in his area.

the British Navy and that it would be a suicidal

•

The interception of Pakistani merchant sh*PP!IJ®

a tempt on our part to try and attack Karachi.

transiting his area, either inter-wing or boun

ese views were expressed by C-in-C West at a

and from ports in East Asia and China.

presentation of Cs-in-C of all the three services at

•

Contraband Control.

Delhi.

•

Defence of the ports of Cochin and Goa.

I was taken aback at this performance. After

F or th es e ta s k s F O C S O U T H w a s

^ pJ^sentaUon- 1 called him and my Vice Chief

and FOCINCEAST to my office and informed him

(s u b m a rin e d e p o t sh ip ), G O ° AV^ k O N K A N (an old at I felt it was unfair on him and the men under

destroyers). CAUVERV Cojd K

« T b A S S E W

c o a s ta l m in e s w e e p e r ), H A i r i i

&

Command to burden them with this

(an inshore minesweeper).

responsibility if he did not believe in the success

Page 38~

~

*• Page 229 et seq.

1 2 6 / T R A N S IT IO N T O T R IU M P H

“Since the Mukti Bahini later would need

F O C S O U T H ’s p la n w a s to d e p lo y .

more craft to convert into gunboats in the event of

a M B A on p a tro l e a s t o f f C e y lo n .

full scale hostilities, we approached the West

#

p o D A V A R I a n d G A N G A a c r o s s th e ro u te betw een Bengal Government for assistance. They wer~

#

C o lo m b o a n d th e 8 a n d 9 D e g r e e C h a n n els.

most helpful and gave us two craft on loa

C A U V E R Y a n d B A S S E IN o f f Goa.

Pa I ash from The Calcutta Port Trust, and MV

I

k O N K A N a n d H A T H I o f f C o c h in .

Padmcf. Our workshops reinforced the decks and

mounted Bofors L/60 Inti-aircraft guns on them.

W h e n N H Q s i g n a l l e d t h e lik e li h o o d o f a p r e

Crews for these were to be found from amongst

em ptive P a k is ta n s t r ik e o n 14 O c to b e r, th re e A lize Bengali naval personnel of the Pakistani Navy.

anti s u b m a rin e r e c c e a ir c r a ft a n d fo u r S e a k in g anti Commander Samant of the Indian Navy, an

subm arine h e lic o p te rs w e r e m o ve d up to B om bay outstanding submariner, was assigned to assist.

On 3 D e c e m b e r, A M B A . G O D A V A R I an d G A N G A The Task Force was, in the evenLof war, to

sailed for th e ir in itia l p a tro l p o sition s.

operate directly under the orders of Fort William

and not Eastern Naval Command. Later when

The Naval E le m e n t of the M u kti Bahini

operations commenced, these two gunboats

operated with considerable success.”****

In his b o ok L t G en J a c o b sta tes.

Vice Adm iral MK Roy was the Director o f Naval

“On the re q u e s t o f th e P rovision a l G overnm ent o f Intelligence in 1971. In his book “War in the Indian B a n g la d e s h , th e G o v e r m m e n t o f In d ia d irected Ocean

he has .given some details o f Mukt, Bahini

th e A r m y t o p r o v id e a s s is t a n c e to th e M u ti frogmen and th e'a c h iev em en ts * * » * T h e nuc eus of B a h in i w h o c o n t r o lle d a r e a s o f E a st P a k is ta n riverin e frogm en w as in itially built around a hard co n tigu ou s to o u r b o rd ers.* T h e decision ma e a T n f R e n e a li s a ilo r s w h o had d e s e rte d from th e en d o f M a rc h 1971 to h elp th e M ukti Bahini o ° l L I 1 f h i r d n e w F ren ch . D a p h n e c la s s w a s c o n fir m e d p u b lic ly la te r b y th e M in ister o E xtern al A ffa irs . O n 29 J u ly, in a statem ent to the Parliam en t, h e said.

,

" T h e P a r l i a m e n t h a d u n a n im o u s ly reinforced by

nudeus of twenty four

a d o p te d a re s o lu tio n p led gin g sym pathy and m e rc h a n t seam

hnrktfround was later joined

su pp ort, an d w e a re pu rsu in g that resolu 1

persons having^a nava,

Chittagong

in th e b e s t p o ssib le m an n er and we a r e 0 '

e v e r y t h in g p o s s ib le to len d s u p p o r b ya la ; gH 1U

30 ' t h e K h u ln a / C h a ln a re g io n 100.

p r o v id e d 1 3 0 .

from ch an d p u r

freed o m figh ters.**

onnn

Narayanganj,40 and 3 0 ^ gtudents were highly

“ W e h a d v i s u a l i s e d t r a in in g s o m e and D audkhan .

Thev were given rigorous

g u e rilla s in th e b o rd er areas. Recruits we

motivated educated youth They were g ^

^

given th ree m on th s training. A n additional period training. T h ey w ere

^

through a reed w hile

o f s p e c ia lis e d t r a in in g w o u ld be r e ^

w o u id

com plete

^

le a d e r s . O n c e t r a in e d , th e s e g u e ri cells

manoeuvring

before ^

mjnes exploded.

p e n e tr a te d e e p in to E a st P a k ista n o rorces

t h e T h eefrogm en con cen trated on a tta c k in g ports and fu n c tio n in th e m a n n er th at g u e n lla forces inland harbours, ferries, pontoons, buoyage and all th rou gh o u t h is to ry have done ’ *

d frogm en

"S o m e 4 0 0 n a v a l co m m a n d o s an g

types o f vessels. Their aims were.

w ere trained. T h ey w ere effectl^®.'2(lhini gunboat

♦mlise the main seaports o f Chittagong on

fa cilities. T ^ f f i a r w ith a,M ukt. Ba

£

d>

•

S«n K»rrl«“ “

. River and O . l n . , Mongla

m o u n tin g a B o fo rs 4 0 m m g u » . they n

K h u lna on th e P u ss u r R iv e r so as to p re v e n t sa n k or d a m a g e d so m e ^

2 tankers and

su p p les to support the A rm y being brought in by

co a sters, 7 g u n b o a ts . 11

&

he m 0st

sea.

19 r iv e r c r a ft . T h e s e w e r e in

sign ifica n t a ch ievem ents o f t______ —-------------

Page 90.

*

Page 42.

Page 90.

Page 91.

“ Page 151.

T R A N S IT IO N T O T R IU M P H / 127

•

to stop traditional exports of jute, tea, coir and

lungis and banians so as to merge with the 1

.

to disrupt inland waterway systems and the river

populace near their targets. High quality frogma3'

ports of Narayanganj, Daudkhandi, Chandpur

equipment like.fins, w rist compasses and o0gei °

and Barisal.

were provided from abroad by non resident Easr

B en galis. T h e fro g m en ch osen for each target It was planned that co-ordinated attacks would

generally belonged to that particular area and hence

be carried every month, commencing 15 August

were familiar with the local terrain, the local people 1971. depending on the state of tide and moonrise/

and the estuarine characteristics. They carried out

moonset. The frogmen carried minimum arms and

four major attacks before the operations started in

used bamboo/papaya reeds when flo a tin g

December:

downstream under the surface. Their dress was

Month

Shipping

Tonnage

Targets Damaged

Sunk

Damaged

Frogmen

August

16.000

14,000

176

Chittagong, Chalna/Khulna

Narayanganj, Chandpur,

Barisal

September

6.000

17.000

160

Chittagong, Chalna/Khulna

Chandpur, Barisal

October

8.000

16.000

150

Chittagong, Narayanganj

Nagarbari, Barisal

November

20.000

18.000

172

Mining o f Pussur River

entrance, Chittagong,

Khulna, Mongla, Narayanganj. Alashpur, Chandpur,

Tarorhat, Mahanpur.

Bhadur Ghat, Barisal

Overall, the frogmen of the Mukti Bahini sank or

The E sca la tio n Tow ards War

crippled over one lakh tons of shipping, immobilised

jetties and wharves and blocked navigable channels.

From June 1971 onw ards, P ak istan i Army

In his book “Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership"

form ations started m oving up all along the Indo written after the 1971 war. Maj Gen Fazal Muqeem

Pakistan border. In July 1971, it seemed prudent

Khan states:

that although v i g o r o u s dip lom atic e f f o r t s for a political settlement should continue, preparations

"Ships were attacked in Chittagong and Chalna

should also be m ade to m eet any Paki st ani

harbours by trained frogmen. They were daring

aggression . In A u gu st 1971, the President o

attacks. At Chalna, in three consecutive attacks

Pakistan. General Yahya Khan, announced that India

on alternate nights between September 18 and

and Pakistan were very close to war.

22. frogmen armed with limpet mines damaged or

Until mid 1971, the Mukti Bahini had not been

destroyed SS Lightning. SS Teviot Biock. SS AC

able to prevent the Pakistani Army from regaining Murtaza. SS Imtiaz Baksh, oil tanker Sibtadinga,

control in East Pakistan. Nor had it been able to one barge and two flats. Barges were set on fire,

establish even a tenuous au th ority on the Eas

blocking the export of jute.

Pakistan - West Bengal border. During the monsoon

“By mid November, the strategic and tactical

months that followed, however, the Mukti B a h i n i m obility of the Eastern Command had been

were able to launch successful sabotage campaigns

reduced to the minimum due to extensive guerilla

directed at strategic facilities like bridges, power activities in the rear and numerous road bridges,

stations, com m unication systems, and ships in

ferries, river-craft and ships, which were the sole

harbour.

means o f tran sp ort for sh iftin g troops and

In his book, Lt Gen Jacob states:

logistics from one place to another and from one

geographical compartment to another across

“The Army Headquarters operation instruction,

river obstacles, had been damaged."

based on th e earlier discussions in C a lcu tta , was issued on 16 August. Based on th is instruction,

a d d it io n a l m o v e s and d e p lo y m e n t s were ordered 1 2 8 / T R A N S IT IO N T O T R I U M P H

w ith p r o v i s io n a l o b je c t iv e s a n d t h r u s t lin es.

had been shelling across the border. A similar

C o n firm a to ry o r d e r s , b a sed on w ar gam es, w ere engagement took place near Belonia on 11 November

to be issu ed later.*

where there were heavy casualties on both sides. The

"By September, the operations of the Mukti

confrontation reachcd a new peak of intensity on 21

Bahini were beginning to have an effect on the

November in the Bayra sector opposite Jessore.

morale o f the Pakistan Army. Raids and

Lt Gen Jacobs book states:***

ambushes were carried out and culverts and

bridges blown up”.**

At the beginning of October, preparatory moves

of the formations started in accordance with the

The expansion of Mukti Bahini activity alarmed

outline tasks given to them. It was important that

Pakistan that it was a prelude to Indian military realistic training be given on the type of terrain on

intervention to establish a “liberated zone” in which a which the formations and units would be

Bangladeshi Government would be established on

fighting. We had a pretty good idea by now of

Bangladeshi soil. In September 1971. the Pakistani

Pakistani tactics and techniques employed

Government ordered mobilisation of reserves. India

against the liberation forces. We had also noted

was uncertain whether Pakistan intended to attack in

the construction of defences around the main

the West and brought its armed forces to immediate

towns and the approaches to them. We trained

readiness.

the units to bypass the main centres of resistance

From O ctober onwards, skirmishes steadily

and to use subsidiary approaches: movement

increased. However, the Mukti Bahini forces rarely

was to be the key to the conduct of successful

held their ground when the Pakistani Army

operations.

counterattacked. On occasions, the Pakistani Army

"The Pakistan Army's will to fight,

chased the Mukti Bahini into Indian territory to

particularly of the rank and file, progressively

destroy the Mukti Bahini camps. And on one

eroded as the effectiveness of the Mukti Bahini

occasion, the Indian Army chased the Pakistani Army

raids increased. The raids led to reprisals.

back across the border and thereafter withdrew. This

Pakistan artillery started shelling the Mukti

limited Indian support of the Mukti Bahini totally Bahini. Some of our border posts came under

perplexed Pakistan about Indian objectives. Did

artillery fire. In November, it was decided to allow

India have only a limited objective of establishing our troops to go into East Pakistan up to a depth

Mukti Bahini control over a section of Fast Pakistan?

of ten miles to silence these guns. We took

Or was India's objective to invade East Pakistan and

advantage of these instructions to sccure specific

help establish an independent Bangladesh?

areas to improve our offensive posture.

On the Indian side, at that stage, the objective

“On 20 November, our infantry launched a

preliminary operation in the area of Bayra. The

was limited to assisting the Mukti Bahini to liberate a Pakistan Air Force reacted but ended up losing

part of East Pakistan where the refugees could be

three of its aircraft. Our infantry was supported

sent from India to exist peacefully under a

by tanks. A Pakistani squadron of tanks charged

Bangladeshi Government.

over open ground to be met by concentrated tank

In October, Pakistan intensified its preparations

and recoiilcss fire. In this battle at Bayra. the

for war. The skirmishes between Indian and Pakistan

Pakistanis lost 14 tanks. 3 aircraft and a large

troops in the East became more serious. Tension

number of men.****

rose so high that a pre-emptive Pakistani attack was

“General Yahya Khan, the President, and

thought imminent and both the Western and Eastern

General Hamid, the Army Chief, felt that India's

Fleets sailed out o f harbour. By end October.

move on 21 November was a limited action, that

Pakistan had concentrated infantry divisions and

had India wanted an excuse for war. it had

tanks on the Jammu border. In the East, heavy

already existed for several months, that Pakistan

artillery exchanges were taking place in Agartala and

would not benefit by declaring war and that

Tripura.

Pakistan’s strategy had been to avoid war and

The first military engagement between the two

contain India diplomatically. The other view, held

armies took place near Karnalpur on 30/31 October

when Indian troops silenced Pakistani guns which

*

Page 74.

**

Page 87.

••• Page 86 el seq.

•••• Page 73.

T R A N S IT IO N T O T R I U M P H / 129

by the rest of the officer corps, was to declare war

as a matter of pride, prudence and necessity".

date was postponed to 3 Decemh, r

preparations."

e r fo r addtti

-----------------

- - « t u 0 n a |

On 23 November. Pakistan declared a national

Thpr •

emergency and the Pakistan Navy assumed control o f

h n - , nere reason to believe that

disinfm-

Pakistani merchant shipping. Very soon thereafter

Pa

k

‘ nte' 1,gence agencies was able to

by

FOC1NCWEST was given control tfln d la n

3 n * T V

t0 ‘aUnch a

3 D ecem ber. T h is

shipping. All Indian ships were recalled from the Gulf c e m b e r - T h is h elp ed thp

». _ acko'i

tahndpall T rChant shipPin§ directed not to approach

the Pakistan coast.

The Pakistan Navy announced closure o f Karachi

S i n ni War,ned fmCrChant shiPPing not to approach

in p i™ f S of Karachi during the dark hours.

O ur S ign a l In te llig e n c e Unit was capable of In Pakistan, events had acq u ired th e ir own

imited code breaking. Even though they had only

momentum. The Story of the Pakistan Navy states:

little success with critical Army codes, they were

"A plan for a counter offensive in the West was able to break the N aval code. We intercepted

presented to the President of Pakistan on SO

signals from the subm arine GHAZI, off Ceylon

and on her entering the Bay of Bengal. These were

S

S

T

1971 and 1116 high - « d e c i d e d

to initiate operations in the West on 3 December

p a ssed on to th e N avy, both in Delhi and

Visakhapatnam.

StrikCS Were c a rrie d out by

On 1 December, we intercepted a message

alonff fh

at Several Indian air bases

from West to East Pakistan advising them of the

P a k * t a „ 7 r

" b0rder and ° " 3 December

warning sent to all Pakistani merchant shipping

P » n cL and S

la u n ch «d ” P =ratio „s in

not to enter the Bay o f Bengal. We passed this on

to the three Service Headquarters, Army, Navy

and Air Force, as also an intercept warning civil

aircraft not to fly near the Indian borders."

in the WeM T O a S S S f PaklS,a" ' s offensive P'an When Pakistan initiated the war on 3 D ecem b er

1971:

• Cruiser BABUR and minesweeper MUHAFIZwere

at the anchorage.

bargaM igf" f t “ c S

S

posslb1'

Tanker DACCA was at Manora anchorage.

• D e s tro y e r S H A H JA H A N and two coastal N a u S o ® ^ ^ Pressu re » " * » e United

m in esw eep ers‘w ere in harbour preparing

blatant Indian attack

° f lh '

passage to East Pakistan. Arrangements ha

been made for them to refuel at Colombo.

itosl"aute tha°t°” " ™ " “ d Se“ ssion-, Sissen and

• Destroyer BADR and the two ex Royal Saudi Navy

fast Jagu ar class patrol craft SADAQAT and

RIFAQAT were in harbour.

S « S

i S

a n„ ? “ C‘are War

f™m

• Destroyer ALAMGIR was under repair and friga*-e

publicity

*« ,h‘ adverse

TUGHRIL was under refit.

M

Press, the incident in r ”

‘ng ln the Western

• Destroyer KHAIBAR and frigate TIPPU SULTAN

international response

,3d n0t evoked an

were 80 miles southwest of Karachi.

the pressure within Paki«t°rCe

t0 desist and

• Destroyer JAH ANG IR was on patrol 60 miles

India's aggreTs^n 2 ? S S ^ "

f f° ^ e f u,ly to

south of Karachi.

for declaring war on India

• Frigate ZULFIQAR was on the inner patrol 3

miles south of Karachi.

130/TRANSITION TO 1 R1UMPH

9

Naval Operations in the Eastern Naval Command

B

l o c k

a

d

e

Th is a cco u n t o f n a v a l o p era tio n s in th e Eastern Naval Blockade was declared but lifted the same evening.

C om m and h a s b e e n rec o n stru c te d from

e A d ™ a

K ris h n a n 's b o o k “N o W a y B u t S u rre n d e r , from the C

o n t r a b a

n d

C

o n t r o l

“S to ry o f th e P a k is ta n N avy", a n d from d iscu ssion s C ontraband C ontrol w as declared. N eu tra l sh ips w ere given 48 hours to be clear o f the com bat zone.

^

r C

S

S

v

e

b e e n d e a .t w ith ,n se p a ra te

Eight ships were inspected and cleared to proceed to

sections:

their destinations.

•

The Sinking of the GHAZI.

•

The Commando Operation at Mong a/

u

5 December

•

A m p h ib io u s O p e ra tio n Beaver.

Throughout the day, there w as not enough wind to

•

The ENTERPRISE Incident.

la u n c h aircraft. Contraband Control continued. Wind The ensuing account deals with the ope™^0" * ° f

conditions improved at night.

the Eastern Fleet, VIKRANT's air stnkes. submar

6 Decem ber

operations and contraband control.

Day to Day Events - 4 to 16 December

A

i r S

t r i k

e s

Results

4 December

T im e

Target

N ig h t b o m b in g a n d

Night

M o n g la / C h a ln a

rock et a tta c k by tw o

Having sailed from the f ^ ^ s withm striking

Alizes.

December, the E a s t e r n Flee

m o r n i n g of 4

Damaged two ships in

d i s t a n c e o f C o x ’ s .Bazar o n

^

A ir F o rc e had

Pussur river.

December. A s p r e v io u s ly aiTa£ ^ ’ and Chittagong, D a m a g e d

h a r b o u r

c a r r i e d o u t s t r i k e s o n Coxs

tQ strike these

in s t a lla t io n s

at

after which V IK R A N T was c

Chalna.

p o r t s .

Encountered m edium

AA fire.

A ir Strikes

H it fo u r g u n b o a ts -

Dawn

Mongla/Chalna

Time

Target

Results

rjnpr attack on

tw o d e s t r o y e d , tw o

Rocket and stranng

AM

C ox’s B azar

dam aged.

O n e tu g d e s t r o y e d ,

one dam aged.

E n c o u n t e r e d h e a v y

F u e l‘ ^

a nd c o n tr o l to w e r

AA fire.

PM

Chittagong

h Fuel dum p se t on

D a m a g e d

o n e

dam aged.

^

g u n b o a ts

Khulna

m erch an t sh ip w h ich

firC nhilised. one on fire. Six

opened fire.

im m obilise •

h ips in

D am aged tugs, sm all

PS r * n c » o « e a tta c k e d .

c r a ft a n d h a r b o u r

dam aged

h e a v ily .

installations.

Medium and heavy AA fire.

E n cou n tered ligh t AA

fire.

N A VA L OPERATIONS IN THE B A Y OF B E N G A L IN D E C E M B E R 1971

EAST PAKISTAN

Pussur

Strafed and damaged

Replenishment. Urgently needed stores, which had River

Pak cargo ship which

been sent in an LST from Visakhapatnam. were

opened fire.

delivered to ships of the Fleet.

Pilot W/T station set

on fire.

Firing on United Nations Aircraft

Merchant

ship

On 6 December. NHQ had signalled that a United

ONDARDA sunk at

Nations aircraft would be transiting the Fleet’s area to entrance.

evacuate foreign nationals from Dacca. This aircraft

A fter

Chittagong

Damaged merchant

was not seen on the 6th. On 7 December however, an

noon

ship and gunboat

aircraft approached to within 5000 yards. VIKRANTs

which opened fire.

close range guns fired a burst. The aircraft, which

Attacked Harbour

was later recognised as a United Nations C 130

installations

and

Hercules, turned round and departed. Two Seahawks

control tower.

followed the aircraft until it crossed the coast. No

Encountered heavy

prior intimation had been received of this UN flight on AA

fire

over

7 December.

Chittagong airfield.

Night

Chittagong

Runway bombed by

8 December

Airfield

Alize.

Intercepts of enemy transmissions indicated that

Encountered AA fire.

Pakistani forces were arranging escape routes by sea.

Cox’s Bazar

Runway bombed by

air and overland. All types of craft were being

Airfield

two Alizes.

camouflaged to carry fleeing Pakistan troops down

the rivers. Troop concentrations were reported at

Contraband Control

Barisal. VIKRANT was told that a large number of

Two ships were apprehended and sent to Sandheads.

craft were assembling between Barisal and

(Calcutta).

Narayanganj in a bid to break out and their means of

escape should be destroyed.

7 Decem ber

There was not enough wind to operate Seahawks.

The Alizes continued air strikes on the night of 8/9

■Air Strikes

December.

Tim e

T arget

Results

9 December

Dawn

Chittagong

Runway damaged.

Air Strikes

Airfield

H a n g er and veh icles

d e s tr o y e d .

F u el

Time

Target

Results

dumps set on fire.

Night

Barisal Area

Night bombing by two

Encountered medium

Alizes.

AA fire.

No ships or craft sighted.

Vehicles and W/T

No AA fire.

Cox’s Bazar

station destroyed-.

No craft or army

Airfield

Dawn

Barisal/

R e cc e o v e r M o n g la ,

Bakarganj

concentration sighted.

Afternoon -

Chalna, Barisal.

Patuakhali

Three cargo barges and

an army camp destroyed.

t

rnntf F O C E F signalled FO C IN C EAST

In th e ev en in g . FOOisr

s

E astern

AM

Hatia/

No craft capable of

th a t a ir s u p e r io r ity had be

a ircra ft w ere to be

Dakhin

conveying troops sighted.

F le e t's a re a a n d *h a t

®

Shahbazpur

^

Wind conditions were

seen in the groun d or-in

wks arm ed w ith bombs

PM

Hatia/

Two tankers attacked by

in a d e q u a te to la u n c" / V re being used for bom bing Dakhin

Alizes and damaged.

and h en ce A lize s only

Shahbazpur

One gunboat attacked in

sorties a t night.

Meghna River.

Chittagong

Seahawks

strafed

Contraband <&ntrol hended and sent to Sandheads.

Ordnance Factory and

S ix sh ips w ere appre

W/T station.

T R A N S IT IO N T O T R IU M P H / 133

Encountered m edium to

1 1 December

heavy AA fire.

Adm iral Krishan’s book states:**

Inadequate wind precluded fu rth er S eah aw k

operations.

“W e in te r c e p te d a sig n a l o f the utmost significance. It w as a message from Commodor

Contraband Control

Chittagong to the Flag Officer Commanding East

Due to shortage of ships to escort apprehended ships

Pakistan Navy:

6 ast

all the way to Sandheads, an assembly anchorage

“Two coasters ready at Gupta Crossing. A/A

was established. Apprehended ships were made to

defence strengthened. All foreign ships cleared of

anchor in this area and, when a sizable number had

harbour. Own merchant ships disguised. Naval

been assem bled, one ship w ou ld esco rt them to personnel deployed in defensive positions and

Sandheads.

integrated with fortress defence. Pilot for RK 623

On night 9/10 December, pursuant on a report

w ill be r e a d y by 1800 - 1900 in speed boat.

from Cdr Samant’s Commando Force Alfa which was

Further mining o f approaches will be carried out

on its way to a ttack C h a ln a -M o n gla , P a k is ta n i after RK 623 enters.

merchant ships ANWAR BAKSH and BAQ1R w ere

“By this time it was also becoming clear that

apprehended whilst leaving the Pussur river. ANWAR

th e US S e v e n th F le e t w as in fact speeding BAKSH was masquerading as a Japanese ship and

towards the Bay o f Bengal and the Fleet was a

had some Pakistan troops on board disguised as

large one and in clu d ed the nuclear-powered

civilian s. In ad d itio n , one m ore sh ip w as aircraft carrier USS ENTERPRISE. But this'Fleet

apprehended.

was still far away and it would be at least 72 to 96

hours before they could make their presence felt

10 December

in the Bay. But once the Fleet reached near

enough to the op eration al area, the situation

could well change with a dramatic suddenness

A ir Strikes

that would make us lose all the initiative in

Time

Target

Results

naval war.

. e

AM/PM

Cox’s Bazar Alizes bom bed the runway.

“So it was o f the utmost importance

a ^

Wind conditions continued to

evaluate all available information, reaP^re^tive

be unsuitable for operating

the situation and take corrective and preve

Seahawks.

action in good time.

went

Contraband Control

“The reap p reciation o f the situati° ntery of

something like this. We had complete T^aSQtj1|ng

One ship was apprehended.

the approaches to Bangladesh ports an

Jn

Replenishment.

could go in and out of the ports without co ^ tain

Requisitioned tanker DESHDEEP

was directed to anchor in the approaches to the Matla

for very heavy a tta ck s and alm ost c , Qurs

river. Ships re fu e lle d in p rep a ra tio n for the destruction. We had subjected their ha

amphibious landing scheduled for 12 December.

and installations at Chittagong, Chalna,

Mongla, and C o x ’s Bazar to roun(^’ t . e t had

American Intervention. Admiral Krishnan's.book atten tion from the air. The craft t a

states:*

assembled at Narayanganj and Barisa

“At about 5.30 PM on Friday 10 December, we

could be used for troop transportation ha

intercepted a signal to the effect that the US Navy

sunk or disabled. M ongla and C h aln a

was sending ships Into the Bay of Bengal, for

already been evacuated.

k n it

possible withdrawal of the Pakistani Army.

“If the Pakistanis wanted to try a “Dun

•

“I also spoke to Admiral Nanda regarding the

would have to be by ships or air from Chittag 7th Fleet but he had heard no more than what

Cox s Bazar was too far south, could not

^

was in the signal. We ended our conversation on

large ships, her a irp ort runw ay was

eCj

advan^

the note that we should not be surprised by

shambles and in any case, we were well auv**- ^

anything that happened from now onwards."

in our plans to carry out a combined operation

landing our own troops there.

*

Page 52 et seq.

— ibid.

134/TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH

“By a p rocess o f elim ination, therefore,

study of the USS ENTERPRISE and her

Chittagong was their only hope for a getaway.

capabilities. This carrier of 75,000 tons tonnage

From experience we knew that no harbour can be

(as against 16,000 tons of the VIKRANT) was the

totally immobilized. A determined and desperate

world’s largest warship.

enemy can always get sufficient services to use

“Powered by eight atomic reactors, her four

the harbour in a bid to get away. And here, we

geared steam turbines could work up a speed of

had evidence that they had assembled several

35 knots. In addition to her normal complement

m erchant ships, camouflaged and obviously

of 2,870, she had an additional 2.000 personnel

ready to break out. Our estimate was that some

to form the attack air wing consisting of 100

5.000 per ship making a total of 30,000 men

aircraft of various types.

could make a getaway. It would have been a

“In company with her were the amphibious

gamble that could possibly succeed under certain

assault ship TRIPOLI, the guided-missile ship

circumstances.

KING and three guided missile destroyers,

“The enemy could easily have guessed what I

DECATUR. PARSONS and TARTAR.

certainly knew, that we could not keep VIKRANT

“The TRIPOLI was a large 17,000 ton

in the area of operations much longer as she was

amphibious assault ship, especially built to

running dangerously low on fuel and she would

operate up to 24 medium, four heavy and four

have to be withdrawn for at least 48 hours to

observation helicopters, but she did not carry

replenish. The withdrawal of the VIKRANT would

landing craft. She had a sustained speed of 20

mean releasing the pressure on the enemy. A

knots. With a complement of 528. she could

breakout under these circumstances had a

transport and land a marine battalion of about

chance of success. The courses of action before

2,100 officers and men with guns, vehicles and

the Pakistani Naval authorities could be assessed

various support personnel.

as follows:

“The KING, a guided missile frigate was

primarily designed to screen a carrier force and

•

Lay minefields to seaward of Chittagong,

besides sonar, her main armament consisted of

allowing themselves a narrow lane, close

surface to air missiles and torpedoes. Similarly,

inshore and along the coast southwards. This

the destroyers TARTAR and DECATUR, ships of

lane would not be known to us and the mines

over 20 years age. were primarily fitted with

would prove a deterrent to our own ships as

surface to air missiles, but with advanced

we would not like to blunder into unknown

electronic equipment.

mined waters.

“The ENTERPRISE and her escorts posed at

•

Use the cover of darkness to assemble and

first glance a fantastic threat. And yet. on closer

embark troops, wait for some relaxation in

inspection, what exactly could she achieve to tilt

the blockade-stranglehold, and slip through

the battle in Pakistan's favour?

the thinned out patrol lines.

“None of us ever fell for the announcement

•

Use the runways of the airport for lifting

that the Fleet’s object was to evacuate a handful

senior officers with helicopters an

*£

of American subjects from Dacca. Obviously, her

aircraft. Make efforts to repair the runway

primary intention was to frighten us into

sufficiently for use of

^ircr^ •

withdrawing our forces from the operational area

•

Use demolition charg

th

and let the escape ships break out. Suppose we

extensively as part of the “scorched earth didn’t get scared that easily and persisted-in our

policy" to make Chittagong untenable for as stranglehold on Bangladesh? Evacuation of any

long as possible.

but a handful of troops was a possibility, using

helicopters. Clearly the use of heavier and very

'The last two of the above were the key to the

powerful aircraft was quite out of the question as

♦

f RK 623 It must be a convoy carrying

mystery of RK 623- I

^

mines and other

however thorough the temporary repairs, the

s o m e s e n io r o ffic e r

^ & „scorched earth» on

runways of both Chittagong and Dacca had taken

means ofdemolitio

^ ]eam that the

a considerable beating.

Chittagong. Later

Uon was the .Denial

“The offensive capabilities of the American

P a k is ta n n a m e for tni

p

task force therefore, consisted of:

Plan>

o th is s c h e m e o f th in g s w o u ld th e

•

Landing up to a marine battalion as an

••Where, m

ca rrie d o u t a ca re fu l

S e v e n th F le e t co m e in,'

assault group using helicopters.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/135

.

Using the ENTERPRISE'S aircraft for ground

H a v i n g s p e n t t he w hole-forenoon

support role.

December on the above thoughts and

° f 11

a series of

•

Providing close support a ga in st a irc ra ft

discussions with the CNS, Admiral Nanda as\

attacking their fleet and

as my Arm y colleague, Lt Gen Aurora. I signal^

•

Surface and aerial attack on Indian warships.

the Eastern Fleet at 1.15 PM as follows:

1. “Appreciate enemy with senior officers including

“We did not know if the marine battalion was

FOCEF planning m ajor breakout and will try to

carried on board the TRIPOLI at the time, but

get away by h u gging the coast. Senior officers

even assuming that they were, how were they

may try to escape by air. Approaches to harbour

going to land them ashore except by helicopters.

likely to be mined.

It was quite obvious th a t*m a n p o w er-w ise,

2. “Your mission is:

landing some 2 ,000-odd persons was not going to

•

Put Chittagong airport out of commission.

materially alter the land battle.

•

Attack ships in harbour by air and surface

“It was unthinkable that they would commit

units if they break out.

their aircraft on a ground support role against

3

“This is undoubtedly the most important mission

our army or air force or wantonly attack our naval

o f the war in the East. The enemy ships must, I

forces at sea.

repeat, must, be destroyed. Good Luck."

“To my way of thinking, the most effective

“The important requirement was to locate and

method of helping the Pakistanis would be to

destroy the m ysteriou s RK 623 on which the

close Chittagong within range of their air-power,

Pakistanis seemed to be setting so much hope.

put up a form idable air u m b rella over the

The last known position o f this convoy was the

merchant ships awaiting escape and actually

village of Rajapur. At 6 AM on the 11th morning,

provide air escort for them till they reached the

therefore, a sortie was sent to bomb and flus ou

waiting fleet. They knew that our tiny force of

the enemy from their hideout.

aircraft from VIKRAN T could n ever hope to

“Once the RK 623 realised that their

challenge their air cover.

hideout had been discovered and

e

“Summing up, we came to the fo llo w in g

attack, they would try to get away from

e

conclusions:

quickly as possible.

a for

•

A critical point was being reached in the war

“At about 10 AM, one of our Alizes

■

a

and the Pakistanis were desperate and would

this particu lar quarry sa\*( what loo e ^ ern

try to break out at the earliest opportunity.

small island, the tide lapping overJ^f

it was

•

For this purpose, they had at lea st five

shore. Covered in thick green shrub eiy*

too tiny to bother about. A second loo r

waS

merchant ships ready and.camouflaged in

Chittagong. They had m ade d esperate

doubt in the pilot’s mind that the is a

^

attempts to make the runway at Chittagong

probably moving and what looked li e

nts.

wash might well be from

sufficiently serviceable to take light aircraft

p r o p e l l e r mov

and helicopters.

He decided to have a closer look and no

^ ade

•

The safe arrival of the convoy RK 623 would

to waste precious ammunition unless su

be the starting point o f p u ttin g their

the first attack into a dummy dive. By 1tn

“Scorched Earth Plan” into action.

straightened out, there was no doubt m

^ 3!

•

The removal of VIKRANT from the scene of

that here was the precious and elusive r bargeS

operations would ease the way to a break-out.

He saw a gun boat, a tug with a coup e

0f the

•

A break-out of ships could be facilitated by

all in close formation and within the iac

the Seventh Fleet providing an impregnable

cam ou flage he cou ld see the w h o e

sonie

and continuous air umbrella till they joined

bristling with A/A guns. It w as Per

the surface forces of the Seventh Fleet.

forlorn hope or sudden surprise tha

hold their fire.

n the

“Clearly, everything turned on the merchant

“On the second round, now a tirln& r0CRet

ships assembled in Chittagong for the actual

A liz e p r e s s e d h o m e its a t t a c k , u s i n g

&

troop carrying. Not an instant must be lost in

p rojectiles for th is p u rp o se . T h e convoy P ^

destroying or so heavily damaging them as to

fu rio u s A re a g a in st the aircraft b u t ln v *

p.

make them totally immobile. Time was running

w a s severely hit in tu rn by the rockets. Givi B ’ d

out.

s

the fight, the boat abandoned its charge^

136/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

made for the beach and grounded herself. A

Time Target

Results

second Alize came on the scene and attacked the

AM

Rajapur

Bombed by one Alize.

barges which simply disintegrated. This second

Chittagong

Recce’d by Alize.

Alize confirmed the beaching and abandonment

Airstrip

Reported that runway

of the tug and the gun boat, both out of the war

was unusable for

forever. So foundered the Pakistani hopes from

flying operations.

their much-vaunted RK 623! The gun boat was

No shipping traffic

identified after the war as one of the “Rajshahi”

sighted in Meghna

class PNS JESSORE.

river.

“This action was cause enough for some

Cox’s Bazar,

Alize sighted well

jubilation, but the main job of putting the escape

camouflaged enemy

fleet out of action still remained. And just as I

gun boat escorting

had feared, the Wind God was not on our side on

two small craft full of

the 11th, th rou gh ou t the day. As Captain

troops.

Alizes

Parkash put it: “Since this appeared to be one of

attacked and craft

the most important tasks of these operations,

beached.

there was a feeling of helplessness in VIKRANT

Kutubdia

Alizes depth charged

that the Seahawks could not be flown due to lack

Island

two

craft

with

of wind and we had to make, do with Alizes only.

concealed cargo.

One could do no more than pray for a little wind

PM

Coastal Recce

Alizes reported that

in the near future... Wind conditions continued to

there

was

no

remain poor to the extent that the sea was like a

movement of troops

sheet o f glass. It was impossible to fly off

by road or water in

Seahawks. Moon conditions were also becoming

the Cox’s Bazar area.

poor and therefore even Alize sorties had to be

No movement of craft

along the coast and

restricted during dark hours and that too only

waterway up to five

when absolutely necessary.”

miles

south

of

“Saturday was a day of utter desolation and

Chittagong.

heart-break. Would the enemy break out under

Coastal Patrol

Alize homed ships on

cover o f darkness and make good their escape

to

small

craft

towards the Seventh Fleet speeding into the Bay

proceeding south.

o f Bengal? Were we to fail, after all, in our

Ships sank six craft.

mission of bottling up the enemy? Our ships were

Chittagong

Runway bombed by

getting dangerously low on fuel and the fuelling

Alize.

programme of smaller ships meant thinning ou

Chittagong

Airfield bombed using

of the patrol lines, weakening the blockade.

flare bombs.

“I decided that if wind conditions did not

Encountered heavy

improve by the morrow, we will have to send the

AA fire.

surface ships BEAS and BRAHMAPUTRA1 to, * *

w ith in gu n ra n ge of C hittagong ar

Contraband Control. One ship was apprehended..

c arry ou t d irect bom bardm ent of the shipping

Amphibious Operation: Postponed to 14 December.

inside.”

Air Strikes

12 December

Wind conditions

Seahawks. Alizes could only

. 0ff

A ir Strikes

sorties to keep the " " “ “

"u ssu rl ver under

Wind conditions improved considerably after two

Chittagong, Cox’s Bazar and Pussur

days of no wind conditions and a number o f air

surveillance.

strikes were launched. Admiral Krishnan’s book

states:*

Page 62 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/137

“I owe it to the gallant Captain of the VIKRANT to

with two 500 pound bom bs each . The

tell the story of that day in his own words.

airfield an d sh ip p in g w as on ce again

“V IK R A N T steamed north in order to launch a

causing heavy dam ages.”

Seahawk strike with optimum am m unition

possible, by reducing aircraft fuel. From 0600

The results of the day’s work were summed un h

onwards. 29 Seahawk strikes armed with 500

FOCEF in a signal to FOCINCEAST as follows:

Y

pound bombs and rocket projectiles were flown

“BE PLEASED TO REPORT THAT AT THE END

against shipping and other targets around

OF TW ENTY-FO U R HOURS OF CONTINUOUS

Chittagong. The very first strike made at least six

SORTIES COMMENCING 1 11930 INVOLVING

direct hits on the runway and rendered it

CONSTANT ALIZE RECCE AND BOMBING AND

unserviceable.

TWENTY EIGHT HAWK SORTIES, COX’S BAZAR

"The second strike of four Seahawks armed

AND C H ITTA G O N G A IR F IE LD HAVE BEEN

with rockets was launched against the merchant

REND ERED IN O P E R A T IV E IN THE NEAR

shipping in harbour. They attacked two merchant

FUTURE. THERE IS NO MERCHANT SHIP OF

ships leaving harbour with 6 to 8 direct hits and

ANY SIZE IN THE CHITTAGONG HARBOUR OR

another two inside the harbour with 13 to 15 hits.

APPROACHES WHICH HAS NOT BEEN STRUCK

Moderate to heavy gu n fire was still bein g

AND INCAPACITATED. THERE IS A COMPLETE

experienced from inside the harbour and

ABSENCE OF SHIPPING ALONG THE ENTIRE

although one aircraft received a direct hit on the

COAST FROM CHALNA EASTWARD THROUGH

canopy which was shattered, all aircraft returned

MEGHNA SANDWIP UP TO COX’S BAZAR AND

to the carrier safely.

SOUTHWARD."

"Flight operations were slightly interrupted at

0945 when VIKRANT had a breakdown. The

"In addition to the air strikes, we also decided

defect was however rectified most expeditiously

to carry out a surface bom bardm ent of Cox s.

and the ship was under way again at 1035.

B azar to ob viate even a m arginal use of the

resuming flight operations at 1100.

aerodrome there by any type of aircraft.

“Two strikes of 4 Seahawks each, armed with

"The frigates BRAHMAPUTRA and BEAS were

bombs were launched again at 1 100 and 1115

cleared for th is a tta ck and commenced the

respectively. Targets once again were the airfield

bom bardm en t from 3.50 PM onwards. The

and shipping at Chittagong. The first strike

airfield installations were the principal targets.

consisted of three Seahawks. The runway was

The Air Traffic Control tower got a direct hit.

once again bombed and a hit was observed on the

intersection of the runway. Gun positions on the

13 December

airfield were silenced. The first strike also carried

out photo reconnaissance of the area. The second

A ir Strik es

division attacked three merchant ships off Gupta

Results

Point with rockets scoring direct hits on the

Tim e

Target

Alize dropped bom

superstructure. Medium AA fire was experienced

AM

Cox's Bazar

on runway.

,.

over the target area. One Seahawk returned with

N o

c o n t a c t s

0

a shattered wind screen.

shipping or craft.

“Another strik e o f four Seahaw ks was

First Seahaw k s t r ^

launched at 1315 against shipping at Chittagong.

Chittagong

bom bed

'

Aircraft were armed with 500 pound bombs and

m erchant

sn‘ ^

scored direct hits on two merchantmen of 10.000

damaged ea^ erhawk

and 15.000 tons each.

Second

Se , „ ne

“While air strikes over Chittagong airfield and

strike damage

shipping were continuing, a call for air strike on

tanker and blew

troops and vehicle concentrations at Kaptai was

received from the Army at about 1300. Four

AA gun P0Siti° nS;Hke

PM

Chittagong

Third Seahawk s

Seahawks were launched at 1340 for the target

area.

bombed

run^ker

dam aged a ta

“The last strik e o f four Seahawks on 12

and sank a merchant

December 1971 was launched at 1530 armed

1 3 8 / T R A N S IT IO N T O T R I U M P H

ship, set a warehouse

One day, the after lift got stuck because one of the

ablaze and attacked

twelve keeps would not retract. Two Seahawks

the

Ordnance

were waiting to be recovered and were running

Factory.

low on fuel. A huge hammer had to be used to

Encountered medium

blunt the nose of the stuck keep, after which the

AA fire over port area.

aft lift unstuck and the aircraft landed just in

time. Had this not been successful, both

R e p l e n i s h m e n t . The Fleet refuelled and prepared for Seahawks would have had to ditch.

the Amphibious Operation.

The flooding of the forward machineiy space. One

of the turbo generators had low vacuum because

14 D ecem ber

its condenser needed cleaning. In peacetime, this

would only have been attempted in harbour. It

was decided to attempt this at sea. The inlet and

Air Strikes

outlet valves were 20 feet below the waterline and

Time Target

Results

operated by rod gearing. The top plate of the

AM

Chittagong

Seahawks attacked

turbo generator suction filter was loosened for

the Cantonment area.

cleaning the filter before opening the condenser

Several hits on Army

door. Within minutes, water came gushing in.

Barracks.

One of the valves had not been fully shut and the

Encountered medium

water was coming past the loosened plate. The

AA fire.

situation was saved by the 1000 ton pump in the

Cox’s Bazar

Beach-head

area

machineiy space.

bombed by Alizes.

Vice Admiral (then Lt Cdr) Bhushan was the

Recce

Search

around

Senior Engineer of VIKRANT. He recalls this

Pussur area and

incident:

Cox’s Bazar revealed

no contacts.

“When I arrived in the Forward Engine Room.

I observed nearly a foot high flow of water

VIKRANT detached to Paradip for refuelling.

emerging from the turbo generator sea water

Contraband Control One ship was apprehended.

strainer housing. My senior watchkeeper, Lt

Amphibious Operation. All forces R/Vd. but: j-1® °

KS Bhasin - no lightweight himself - was

delays in trans-shipment of troops from

actually sitting on the strainer cover in an

VIJAY to the LST’s, the operation was postponed to id

effort to make it seat against the flow of water,

December.

but

without

much

success.

After

unsuccessfully trying all other means of

15 D ecem ber

stopping the flow, I asked for the largest

available wheel spanner to be brought. When

Amphibious landing attempted at ^ ^ t ^ ^ L S T s was

one

it came, we used it to close the seawater

pla toon could be landed. One of.the two L S T s was

damaged. Due to diff.culties experienced, the land.ng

suction and discharge valves and to our

immense relief, the flow stopped.

force moved overnight to Cox s Bazar.

On 11 Dec, Lt Cdr Ramsagar’s Alize. whilst

16 Decem ber

attacking a camouflaged boat carrying troops was

t> i

r

-n F a s t Pakistan surrendered.

hit by small arms fire which caused a total

Pakistan s forces in bast

at Cox’s-Bazar

hydraulic failure. He managed to operate the

L a n d in g o f t r o o p s and equ ip

Decernber.

landing gear manually and land by the skin of his

u sing local boats continued till 19

teeth. His was the heaviest damaged aircraft of

V IK R A N T ’S A ir Operations

the war.

VlKRANT's fuel state became a cause of worry on

his greatest worries and

13 and 14 Dec. when it came below 25%.

When asked what w

1971 war, Captain

VlKRANT's close calls du

Parkash recalls:

,

. ,

conditions.

T R A N S IT IO N T O T R IU M P H / 139

Damage Inflicted by V ikrant s A ir S trik es

“In addition to the above 57 thousand t

merchant ships, PNS JESSO RE COMn

°f

Admiral Krishnan's book states:*

SYLHET were destroyed".

'

ubLA and

“The following wrecks of large merchant ships

Submarine Operations

sunk, run aground or split into two were

identified:

INS KHAN DERI was sailed on 28 November 1971 to

GRT

patrol an area across the shipping route from Ceylon

KARNAPHULI

6876

to Chittagong. Her mission was:

SURMA

5890

AL ABBAS

9142

• To destroy Pakistani naval ships.

AN IS BAKSH

6273

° To destroy Pakistani merchant ships.

OCEAN ENTERPRISE

5909

• To p ro vid e tim ely in te llig e n c e on Pakistani MATERAN

1198

maritime forces.

UNIDENTIFIED SHIP

1800

Like her sister submarines off the West coast of

MAIHAR

5938

India, she was also tied down to the requirements of

RANGAMATI

5888

positive identification and informed that Pakistani TWO UNIDENTIFIED SHIPS

• merchantmen were masquerading as neutrals. Like

CAPSIZED - APPROX.

8000

the others, she also had an uneventful patrol and TOTAL

56,914 TONS

returned to harbour on 14 December 1971. _

The Sinking of the Ghazi

The Pakistan Navy’s D eploym ent of G H AZI in Indian Navy, which made up stories about its

the 1971 Indo P akistan War

sinking”.

The Story of the Pakistan Navy’ published twenty

In his book. “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership'’, written in 1972 soon after the war. Maj G eneral Fazal

years la ter in 1991, gives a slig h tly differen Muqeem Khan states:**

account:***

“The submarine GHAZI was despatched to the

“The Navy ordered the submarines to slip

harbour quietly on various dates between 1 a

Visakhapatnam Naval Base in the Bay of Bengal.

The GHAZI's task was to carry out offensive mine

22 November. They were allocated Patr(^ rwaS

laying against Visakhapatnam.

covering the west coast of India, while GH

'

"GHAZI

which

had

sailed

tow ards

despatched to the Bay of Bengal with the Pn^ .er

Visakhapatnam with spccial instructions, had to

objective of locating the Indian aircraft ca

INS VIKRANT, which was reported to be oper

reach its destination on 26 November 1971. She

was to report on arrival but no word was heard

in the area.

*ai

fr )m her. Efforts were made to contact her but to

“GHAZI’s deployment to the Bay ol

* a

no avail. The fate of the GHAZI was in jeopardy

must be regarded as a measure taken to reC.ngjy

before 3 December.

The Indians made

strategic posture that was getting increa^ onSe

out of step with military realities. Our reY g aSt

preposterous claims about the sinking of the

to Indian m ilitary deploym ents aroun

GHAZI. However, being loaded with mines, it

seems to have met an accident on her passage

Pakistan were a series of adhoc measuJ*eSJnCiian

from time to time, as a reaction to the

rn

and exploded. A few foreign papers at that time

build-up. Despatch of GHAZI to India s ea^

also reported that some flotsam had been picked

seaboard, not part of the original plans, w ___ _

up by Indian fishermen and handed over to the

Page 64.

Page 153.

Pages 337 el seq

1 4 0 / T R A N S IT IQ N T O T R I U M P H

such step taken on the insistence of our Military

could, however, be attributed to the failure of the

High Command to reinforce Eastern Command.

submanne to communicate.

Pressure on the Pakistan Navy to extend the

The first indication of GHAZI’s tragic fate

sphere o f its operations into the Bay of Bengal

came when a message by NHQ India, claiming

increased with the growth of Indian and Indian-

sinking of GHAZI on the night of 3 December but

inspired naval activities in and/arourid East

issued strangely enough on 9 December, was

Pakistan.

intercepted. Both the manner of its release and

“The strategic soundness of the decision has

the text quoted below clarified very little: “I am

never been questioned. GHAZI was the only ship

pleased to announce that Pakistan Navy

which had the range and capability to undertake

Submarine GHAZI sunk off Visakhapatnam by

operations in the distant waters under control of

our ships on 3/4 December. Dead bodies and

the enemy. The presence of a lucrative target in

other conclusive evidence floated to surface

the shape o f the aircraft carrier VIKRANT, the

yesterday - 091101 EF". Their mysterious silence

pride of the Indian Fleet, in that area was known.

for 6 days between 3 December, when the

The plan had all the ingredients of daring and

submarine was claimed to have been sunk and 9

surprise which are essential for success in a

December, when the message was released could

situation tilted heavily in favour of the enemy.

not be easily explained.

It gave rise to

Indeed, had the GHAZI been able to sink or even

speculations that the submarine may well have

damage the Indian aircraft carrier, the shock

been sunk earlier, at a time when the Indians

effect alone would have been sufficient to upset

were not ready to accept their involvement in the

Indian naval plans. The naval situation in the

war. Failure of the GHAZI to communicate after

Bay of Bengal would have undergone a drastic

26 November strongly supported such a

transformation, and carrier-supported military

possibility. As it happened, the release of the

operations in the coastal areas would have been

message on 9 December also served to divert

affected. So tempting were the prospects of a

attention of their public from the sinking of

possible success that the mission was approved

KHUKRI on this very date, even though the claim

despite several factors which militated against it.

of sinking GHAZI was apparently made a few

“Against it was the consideration of GHAZI s

hours before the loss of KHUKRI”.

aging machinery and equipment. It was difficult

to sustain prolonged operations in a distant area,

The Indian Navy’s Assessments of GHAZI’s

in the total absence of repair, logistic and

Deployment

recreational facilities in the vicinity. At this time, submarine repair facilities were totally absent at

In his book ‘No Way But Surrender - An Account of

the Indo Pakistan War in the Bay of Bengal 1971’,

Chittagong, the only port in the east. It was on

Vice Admiral N Krishnan, then Flag Officer

these grounds that the proposal to deploy GHAZI

Commanding-in-Chief of the Eastern Naval

in the Bay of Bengal wa s opposed by Captain

Command, states:*

Submarines and many others. The objections

were later reluctantly dropped or overruled due to

“The problem of VIKRANT’s security was a serious

one and brought forth several headaches. By very

m

s GHAZI. u nder

careful appreciation of the submarine threat, by

th e c o m m a n d o f C d r Z a fa r M oham m ad Khan, analyzing data such as endurance, distance

sailed out o f harbour on a reconnaissance patrol.

factors, base facilities, etc we had come to the

O r d e r s h a d b e en is s u e d to the C o m m a n d m g definite conclusion that the enemy was bound to

O fficer A report expected from the subm arme on

deploy the submarine GHAZI against us in the

u nicer.

F

rpreived Anxiety grew with

26 N ovem ber w a > not receded,

t y

g

^

^

Bay of Bengal with the sole aim of destroying our

every day

nicati0ns with the submarine

aircraft carrier VIKRANT. The threat from GHAZI

establis co

results. Before hostilities broke

was a considerable one. Apart from the lethal

failed to Pr°

3 DeCember. doubts about the

advantage at the pre-emptive stage. VIKRANT's

approximate position would become known once

? «te or“

« fnbm .r.ne had ..ready begun to

she commenced operating aircraft in the vicinity

ft t e the minds o f subm arin ers and many of the East Bengal coast. Of the four surface

toers at Naval Headquarters. Several reasons

Pages 26 et seq.

T R A N S IT IO N T O T R I U M P H / 141

ships available, one had no anti-subm arine

evidence to look for and so on. They were briefed

detection device (sonar) and unless the other

on exactly what to do with any information fu

three were continually In close company with

they gathered.

n that

VIKRANT (within a radius of 5 to 10 miles), the

“We decided to use INS RAJPUT as a decoy t

carrier would be completely vulnerable to attack

try and deceive the Pakistanis into believing that

from the GHAZI which could take up her position

V IK R A N T w as in or arou n d Visakhapatnam

surreptitiously and at leisure and aw ait her

RAJPUT was sailed to proceed about 160 miles off

opportunity.

Visakhapatnam. She was given a large number of

“We decided that in preparing our plan, we

signals with instructions that she should clear

would rely much more on deception and other

the same from sea. Heavy wireless traffic is one

measures against the GHAZI.

means for the enemy to suspect the whereabouts

“We had to find some place to crouch in, to

of a big ship. We intentionally breached security

spring into action at the shortest notice. After

by making an unclassified signal in the form of a

embarking the remaining aircraft of Seahawks,

private telegram, allegedly from one of VlKRANT’s

Alizes and Alouettes, the Fleet left Madras on

sailors, asking about the welfare of his mother

Saturday 13 Novem ber for an unknow n

“seriously ill.”

destination which I shall call “Port X-Ray,” for

“Our deception plan worked only too well! In

reasons of security. Port X-Ray was a totally

a secret sign al w h ich we recovered from the

uninhabited

place w ith

no

m eans

o f

sunken GH AZI, C om m od ore Submarines in

communication with the outside world and it was

Karachi sent a signal to GHAZI on 25 November

well protected and in the form of a lagoon.

informing her that “INTELLIGENCE INDICATES

“Having sailed the Fleet away to safety, the

CARRIER IN PORT” and that she should proceed

major task was to deceive the enemy into thinking

to Visakhapatnam with all despatch!”

that the VIKRANT was where she was not and

On the evening of 3 December, Pakistan initiated

lure the GHAZI to where we could attack her. I

hostilities. Admiral Krishnan’s book states:*

spoke to the Naval Officer-in-Charge, Madras on

the telephone and told him that VIKRANT, now off

“By the time I arrived at the Maritime Operations

Visakhapatnam, would be arriving at Madras and

Room, orders for commencement of hostilities

would require an alongside berth, provisions and

had b e e n re ceived , the sh ore defences o

other logistic needs. Captain Duckworth thought

Visakhapatnam were immediately put o n

I had gone stark raving mad that I should discuss

and the Coast B attery w as b r o u g h t .t0

so many operational matters over the telephone. I

Degree of Readiness. I had already decide

told him to alert contractors for rations, to speak

the RAJPUT should also jo in the rest oi

to the Port T ru s t th at we w anted a berth

Eastern Fleet for operations off B a n g la d e s h .

alongside for VIKRANT at Madras, etc.

“I sent fo r Lt Cdr In d er Singh.

“In Visakhapatnam, we ordered much more

Commanding Officer of the RAJPUT for

^

rations, especially meat and fresh vegetables,

briefing; as soon as she completed fuelling ^

from our contractors to whom it must have been

must leave harbour. I had already orcierCfteSt

obvious that this meant the presence of the Fleet

navigational aids to be switched off. so £rca^

at or o ff Visakhapatnam . I was banking on

care in navigation was necessary. O nce < Ct bazaar rumours being picked up by spies and

the harbour, he must assume that an ^ . Qn

relayed to Pakistan. I had no doubt that such

submarine was in the vicinity. II our c eCC*\,ing

spies did exist and I hoped that they would do

plan had worked, the enemy would be pro

their duty.

about looking for VIKRANT. Before clearll^ L at

During the several weeks before the war, we

outer harbour, he could drop a few charg

had taken special pains to contact the various

random.

, . r 3 /4

fish in g

com m unities

in

and

around

“The RAJPUT sailed before m id n ig n t o

Visakhapatnam and motivate them to act as a

December and. on clearing harbour, proce ^

sort o f visual lookout for anything out of the

along the narrow channel. Having got c e a

^

ordinary that they may see when out fishing.

Commanding Officer saw what he thougr}^

This meant explaining to them all about oil slicks,

severe disturbance in the water, about hall

^

what a submarine looks like, what sort of tell-tale

ahead. He rightly assumed that this m ign — .

*

Pages 39 e t seq.

142/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

submarine diving. He closed the spot at speed

recovered. As the hatch was opened, it was

and dropped at the position two charges. It has

clogged up with bloated dead bodies and it was

been subsequently established that the position

quite a job to clear the same to make an entrance.

where the charges were dropped was so close to

The Hydrographic correction book of PNS GHAZI

the position of the wreck of the GHAZI that some

and one sheet of paper with the official seal of the

damage to the latter is a very high probability.

Commanding Officer of PNS GHAZI were also

The RAJPUT, on com pletion o f her mission,

recovered. The aircraft standing by finally took

proceeded on her course in order to cany out her

off for Delhi the next morning with the evidence”.

main mission. A little later, a veiy loud explosion

was heard by the Coast Battery who reported the

The following four signals recovered from the

same to the Maritime Operations Room. The time

GHAZI have been reproduced in Admiral Krishnan’s

of this explosion was 0015 hours. The clock

book:

recovered from the GHAZI showed that it had

•

FM COMSUBS TO SUBRON-5 INFO PAK NAVY

stopped functioning at the same time. Several

DTG 221720 NOV 71

thousand people w aiting to hear the Prime

FOLLOWING AREAS OCCUPIED.

Minister’s broadcast to the nation also heard the

1. PAPA ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR

explosion and many came out thinking that it

2. PAPA FIVE, SIX, SEVEN. EIGHT.

was an earthquake.

3. BRAVO ONE. TWO. THREE. FOUR. FIVE. SIX

“As per our arrangement with them, some

4. MIKE.

fishermen reported oil patches and some flotsam.

•

FROM COMSUBS TO GHAZI MANGRO INFO PAK

The Command Diving Team were rushed to the

NAVY DTG 222117 NOV 71.

spot and commenced detailed investigations. The

ARM ALL TORPEDOES.

divers established that there was a definite

•

FROM COMSUBS TO SUBRON-5 INFO PAK NAVY

submerged object some distance out seawards, at

DTG 231905 NOV 71

a depth o f 150 feet o f water and that it was a

ASSUME PRECAUTIONARY STAGE.

probable submarine. Even though there were a

•

FROM COMSUBS TO GHAZI INFO PAK NAVY

number of floating objects picked up, there was

DTG 252307/NOV 71

nothing to indicate the identity of the submarine.

OCCUPY ZONE VICTOR WITH ALL DESPATCH

Everything had American markings. I told the

INTELLIGENCE INDICATES CARRIER IN PORT.

Chief o f the Naval Staff that personally I was

Admiral Krishnan’s book states:*

convinced that we had bagged the GHAZI. He

wanted “ocular proof’ that it was the GHAZI,

“The GHAZI story, as related below is pieced

before authorizing the announcement. This was

together from much evidence that has been

easier said than done. Diving operations were

collected from the sunken submarine itself, and

extremely difficult and highly hazardous as the

detailed analysis of track charts of the attacking

sea was very choppy and the divers were

ship, INS RAJPUT as well as that of the GHAZI.

operating some 150 feet below. T e oa

a

From a recovered chart, it is clearly revealed that

was not a suitable one to con uc

^

the GHAZI sailed from Karachi on 14 November,

operations. By Sunday 5 December we were able

on her marauding mission. She was 400 miles off

to establish from the silhoue e a

Bombay on 16 November, o ff Ceylon on 19

characteristics that the subm ne w

November and entered the Bay of Bengal on 20

GHAZI. B u t t h e r e was no means of ingress into November. She was looking for VIKRANT off

„ o il e n t r v h a t c h e s f r o m t h e

t h e s u b m a r i n e a s a l l em . y

Madras on 23 November.

conning tower aft were tightly screwed down from

“From the position of the rudder of the

GHAZI, the extent of damage she has suffered,

t h e i n s i d e .

.

^

c h i e f o f N a v a l S t a f f h a d

and the notations on charts recovered, the

"In the me

Force aircraft to be positioned

arranged for an AJr F ^

Qcular proof. that

situation has been assessed by naval experts as

in Visakhapa^

be flown t0 Delhi before the

follows:

he insisted on coula

“The GHAZI had evidently come up to

announcement was ma

managed to open

periscope/or surface depth to establish her

navigational position, an operation which

one

body » , »

I b i d .

TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH /143

was made extremely difficult by the blackout

m ista k in g R A J P U T for VIKRANT, would

and the switching o ff o f all navigational

shadowing her and VIKRANT would be safe in k

lights. At this point of time, she probably saw

hiding place. FOCINC said he knew it Wa

or heard a destroyer approaching her, almost

suicidal mission for RAJPUT. He was sure th *

on a reciprocal course. This is a frightening

the Pakistani submarine would make RAJPUT^

sight at the best of times and she obviously

target the moment hostilities were declared and

dived in a tremendous huriy and at the same

he was definite that RAJPUT would not return

time put her rudder hard over in order to get

from this mission and that he was giving RAJPUT

away to seaward. It is possible that in her

as a bait to Pakistan for the safety of VIKRANT. He

desperate crash dive, her nose must have hit

w as sorry for the m ove but he had no other

the shallow ground hard when she bottomed.

choice. I told him that I considered myself very It seems likely that a fire broke out on board

lucky that he had selected me for this great cause

for'd where, in all probability, there were

and that I was ready to take the challenge.

mines, in addition to the torpedoes, fully

“ On 2nd D ecem b er 1971, I sailed out of

armed".

harbour in the afternoon as VIKRANT and set

course for Madras. 1 sent some telegrams through

Analysis of GHAZI’s Sinking

Bombay WT seeking confirmation for sickness of

p a ren ts etc and o th er sign a ls including a

Two points merit analysis:

LOG REQ sig n a l to NOIC M adras. It was

•

When did the GHAZI sink?

considered necessary to increase the signal traffic

•

What caused the GHAZI to sink?

as VIKRANT, being a large ship and a flagship,

naturally was to have heavy signal traffic. Basic

When did the GHAZI Sink

code was used for the signals. I later o n came to

know that NOIC M adras was baffled by the

According to the ‘Story of the Pakistan Navy,’ GHAZI

quantity of provisions and other items dem anded

failed to make its check report from 26 November

at such short notice in my LOGREQ signal. He

onwards.

phoned up FOCINC, who showed his a n n o y a n c e

Lt Cdr (SDG) Inder Singh was the Commanding

and asked NOIC M adras to supply w h a t e v e r

Officer of INS RAJPUT in 1971. He recalls:

VIKRANT wanted.

.

“On 3rd December 1971, RAJPUT was as e

“At about 1600 hrs on 1st December 1971, I was

to return to harbour, berth at fuelling jetty, top

called by the FO CINCEAST V ice A dm iral

up and get read y for the next a s s i g n m e n Krishnan to his office. He said that a Pakistani

RAJPUT was secured alongside by 1900 hours^

submarine had been sighted off the Ceylon Coast

No sooner had we secured, a despatch rider ca

a couple of days back which would be heading for

on board and in form ed that Pakistan

^

Madras/Visakhapatnam. He was absolutely

attacked Indian airfields. Before procee ing

certain that now the submarine was expected to

HQENC, I left instructions to speed up fuel *

be anywhere between Madras and Vizag and that

collect rations, naval stores and fresh

^ef 0f

she was sent here to attack VIKRANT the moment

required. At Command Headquarters.

hostilities were declared at a time chosen by

Staff told me that FOCINC wanted RAJP

i f r0m

Pakistan. Till that time, the submarine would be

for Chittagong as soon as possible. I cast o

ef

looking for VIKRANT and shadowing her. So the

fuelling jetty at about 2340 hrs on 3rd Dece

^

submarine would have to be prevented from

1971 with a pilot on board. Scare charges

locating VIKRANT at any cost before hostilities

being thrown overboard w h ilst the s

commenced.

secured at the jetty and while leaving ^ar

nei,

“With this thought in mind, he wanted to hold

“When the ship was half way in Ihe c

the Pakistani submarine off Visakhapatnam till

it suddenly occurred to me that wha * ^

such time hostilities were declared. To achieve

Pakistan submarine which I was looking

^ ^

this, he unfolded his plan of action and said that

last two days, was waiting outside ^iar^)0ur.i0t at

he would like INS RAJPUT to sail out and act as

torpedoes RAJPUT while disembarking P1 reCj

decoy of VIKRANT. He wanted RAJPUT to proceed

the Outer Channel Buoy." I immediately ° r.jot \ tow ards M adras and send some m isleadin g

to stop engines, and disembarked the p

signals as from VIKRANT, so that the submarine

slow ly increased speed and was doing

144/TRANSITION T O TR IU M PH

maximum speed I could manage by the time I

“I was with the C-in-C in the MOR on the 3rd

reached Outer Channel Buoy.

evening when CO RAJPUT was being briefed by

“Shortly after clearing Outer Channel Buoy at

him. As CO RAJPUT was leaving the MOR, he

about midnight of 3/4 December, when the Prime

mentioned to me that his ship did not have

M inister was addressin g the nation, the

wooden shores for damage control. I instantly

starboard lookout reported disturbance of water,

went with him to the Shipwright Shop, gave him

fine on the starboard bow. As the ship was

some shores and accompanied him to the jetty

already doing maximum speed and nearing the

where RAJPUT was fuelling. I personally saw

disturbed water patch and since the ship was

RAJPUT cast off. Thereafter, I-went home which

already closed up at action stations, appropriate

was on a hill which overlooked the sea. The

depth was set on the depth charges and two

distance from the jetty to my home was a 15

depth charges were dropped at the reported

minute drive. After I reached home, whilst I was

position. The ship got a heavy jolt after the

listening to All India Radio, an announcement

deafening blasts. Then the ship turned and the

was made that the Prime Minister’s speech had

area was searched for any sign of a contact.

been delayed. It was during this delay period that

Satisfied that there was no sign of any contact or

I heard a massive explosion and the windows of

anything on the surface, the ship resumed

my house rattled.

course.

"The next morning at 8 o’ clock I went to the

“There were a few reasons which prompted

Jetty. The Commander in Chief and the Chief of

me to carry out an immediate attack. First, as

Staff were talking about the GHAZI. The C-in-C

stated earlier, I had an intuition while leaving

went on board a boat and I went with him. We

harbour when the ship was in mid channel.

went to the site of the explosion where. I

Secondly knowledge of a Pakistan submarine in

remember, Lt Sajjan Kumar was diving. He came

the area, for which RAJPUT had been operating

up and told the C-in-C that he had put his hand

for the last two days to mislead her. Thirdly, plain

on the ships side and felt the letters of GHAZI”.

speaking by the FOCINC to me when he had

Capt (later Commodore) KS Subra-Manian, was

called me to his office on 1st December and told

the Indian Navy’s seniormost submariner at that time

me that RAJPUT mistaken as VIKRANT. would be

and Captain of the 8th Submarine Squadron (Capt

torpedoed by the Pakistani submarine on

SM 8) in the Submarine Base at Visakhapatnam. He

outbreak of hostilities. And lastly, the distur e

recalls:

water patch made me to think that the submarine

'The first indication of GHAZI having sunk came

had just dived".

in the middle of the night. A muffled but powerful

L t (TAS) ( l a t e r C o m m o d o r e ) KP M a t h e w recalls: explosion resembling a deep underwater

explosion (distinctly different from gunfire) was

“I clearly recall that I was on watch in the

heard in the naval base during the night of 3/4

W e w e r e all w aitin g for Mrs G andh.s a ddressto Dec. The next morning (4 Dec) fishermen

th e nation. Th at w as delayed y a

^

reported finding flotsam. It was only after this

D u rin g that delay, we received a r e p o rt: from the discovery that it was appreciated that possibly

PWSS8 which « . . .

there had been a sinking off Visakhapatnam. The

Battery w h i c h overlo° ^ t/or£ exp lo sio n w h ic h next morning (5 Dec), we went out to the spot and

that there had been a . y

thcy looked out,

located the wreck. The Clearance Diving Team

rattled the w-ndow P

e ofwater going up quite

from Vizag was ferried across. I was there with

they could s,ee a big P

nce from them. Though

them. They found the GHAZI sunk in fairly

high into the sky

c] early. nothing much

shallow water.

t h e r e p o r t cam e

7 everybody w as keen to

“On the day before the hostilities actually

w a s d on e abou

^

f thjnk jt was reported by

broke out, she was already in position which

perhaps we didn’t anUcipate. She had laid mines.

fhea p D H 9 to^he MOR that this report had come

One of her own may have blown her up and she

in from the PWSS’ .

sank outside Vizag harbour before she could do

D, nr A d m iral) GC Thadani was the

any further damage".

Cdr (E)

cering in Headquarters Eastern

S t a f f O f f i c e r E n g i n e e r i n g ^

C o m m a n d in 1971. He recaUs:

N a v a l

TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH /145

Lt (later Lt Cdr) (Diving) Sajjan Kumar was the

message back to AKSHAY saying “Do not senri

any more signals.

na

O f f i c e r -in-Charge Command Clearance Diving Team in 1971. He recalls:

“A fter a b o u t an h ou r, C apt Subra-Manian and Admiral K rish n an cam e on board AKSHAY

“As far as I can remember, the explosion was in

and we had a m eeting. I told them what I saw the middle of night of 3rd/4th Dec. I was fast

about the subm arine, and th at there was massive

asleep when I heard a very big explosion and my

dam age in th e portion forw ard of the Conning own window panes rattled loudly. I must have

Tower”.

been dead tired because I fell asleep again. It was

definitely on the 3rd/4th night that there was an

T h e su b m a rin e re s c u e vessel, INS NISTAR

explosion. I heard only one explosion, not more

undocked on the e ven in g o f 5 December. On 6

than one.

December, she anchored on top of the GHAZI and

“On 5 December I embarked on board SDB

commenced diving operations.

AKSHAY with my Gemini dinghies. We were

Commodore Subra-Manian recalls:

accompained by a number of catamaran type

‘T h e submarine rescue vessel INS NISTAR, which

fishing boats to the site o f the wreck. Before

had ju s t gon e in to dry dock, was. hastily

sailing, I was briefed to go and locate the object

undocked and sent out to the area on 6 Dec. The

and was told that it may be a submarine.

wreck was located by sonar in about 55 to 58

"So we went and the team dived at the site,

metres of water. After the NISTAR had moored

using the fishing boats as diving platform s. I

herself over the wreck and attached a line to it.

anchored the fishing boats some distance apart

divers who went down found that the wreck had

and sent the divers down from the fishing boats.

cra ck ed open at the top forw a rd end of the The first diver came up and reported that it is a

submarine, but they couldn’t get in. So they had

submarine. The first message sent to the C-in-C

to use plastic explosive to make an opening and

was that we have located a submarine. I felt, the

enter. They then identified it as the GHAZI and

urge to dive myself but had to postpone it to a

recovered docum ents and bodies. This too

more

decisive

m om ent

b ecau se

the

about a day and probably happened on 07 Dec .

decompression regime required we could not dive

to that depth more than once in a day. After the

Lieu ten an t (later Com m ander) Shafi Syed, a

first diver had reported that it was a submarine, I

submariner, was embarked on board NISTAR during

sent another better diver to find out what type of

the diving operations on GHAZI. He recalls:

submarine it was and how big. The second diver

Game up and said that it was a big submarine. So

"I was instructed to embark in INS NISTAR and

a second message was then sent that it is a big

liaise with the Command Diving Officer to 6^*

submarine.

the divers on to the GHAZI, which had sun

“At this stage I decided to dive myself. The

the northern side o f the entrance c^ianrir ttie

visibility underwater was about 10 feet. At the

Vizag. NISTAR positioned herself on top 011

depth of nearly 110 feet, the current was fairly

GHAZI. from w here we could c° nduct dlV1 J

strong, in the sense that it was not possible to

operations. The alignment of GHAZI, as in

^

swim against the current. But since a line had

by the divers, showed that it was lying 0

been snagged, we w ere able to reach the

heading which was at 90 degrees to the en r? m

submarine. I first saw the silhouette from about

channel. This would be an ideal aspec

n

10 feet away. I caught hold of the variou s

which to fire a torpedo salvo at any ship comi g

projections, the gratings, the railings and went

or going out, which would be sunk in the c a aS

round the entire submarine.

and block it. The depth of water where she ,

“Naval Headquarters had earlier provided us

lying was around 30 meters. She was wi

documents which included photos of the GHAZI

torpedo firing range of the harbour entrance-

.

from various angles, so I knew what GHAZI would

“ By draw in g a sketch o f the gen ^

construction of the submarine. 1 explained o ^

look like. A fter I swam around and saw the

various things. I came to the conclusion that this

diver going down, the entry point into the co

_

tower. The diver reported that he had 6

was the GHAZI and I came up. The third signal I

around the conning tower and saw tha

sent to C-in-C was that it was GHAZI. After that

periscope was in the raised position. He also

^

signal was received in HQENC, they sent a

a gyro pelorus, which had on top a binocula

146/TRANSITION T O T R IU M P H

very high magnification which could be swivelled

Madras on PM 23 November.

right around. Opening the hatch the next day on

7 December, the diver entered the conning tower.

•

‘Off Madras she did crossover patrols

He reported that there were two fully bloated

between the 23rd and the 25th. The tracks

bodies which were stuck in the conning tower.

were very very clear. She had a series of fixes

These were removed. Divers were then sent to

and she was concentrating exactly at the

entrance to Madras, 10 to 15 miles either

recover whatever books and equipment could be

side, at a distance of 12 to 15 miles.

brought up from the conning tower. The divers

•

“She then set course for Visakhapatnam

reported that there was a small plotting table in

where she seems to "have arrived on 27

the forward end of the conning tower with some

November traversing a distance of about 340

charts, GHAZI’s flag and some other flags. Most

miles.

She commenced patrolling off

of the material which was inside the conning

Visakhapatnam on the 27th and did a series

tower was recovered".

of crossover patrols, put out to sea eastward

for a short duration, came back towards

Cdr (later Rear Admiral PP Sivamani) who was the

Visakhapatnam to an area 5 to 10 miles from

Eastern Fleet’s Navigation Officer, recalls:

the Entrance Channel Buoy and hung

around there. The last entry made was on the

“A few weeks after the hostilities ended, I was

midnight of 2/3 December. The chart was in

called to the Headquarters Eastern Naval

fairly good condition, but the Log Book and

Command one day and handed over GHAZI s

the Navigators Note Book, written in pencil

track charts, the Navigator’s Note Book and the

and in pen were smudged and took a little

Log recovered f r o m GHAZI during the diving time for me to decipher.

operation. I was told to analyse the track charts

•

“GHAZI’s cross over patrol off Visakhapatnam

and subm it a written report on GHAZI s

was confined to a very small area within a

movements. The salient points which emerged

radius of about 2 miles centered on a position

out of the analysis of these records indicated that.

to the east of the Entrance Channel Buoy at

about three to four miles. If a unit keeps on

•

GHAZI left Karachi for a post refit trial around

doing cross over patrols in such a small area,

November 1971. She came back after a day,

it will be very difficult to sift out the fixes or

apparently to rectify the defects found in the

for that matter, translate the entries from the

post refit trials. Then she left Karachi on the

Navigators Note Book on to the chart and vice

14th and set course South for deplojmient on

versa. Maybe she had put some entries or

the East Coast. She stayed between Ion^ u d e

since the Navigator’s yeoman knew the

64 East and 65 East till she passed west of

submarine was in the same position, he did

Mangalore and then slowly PUI^ n g in . she

not keep on repeating the same position over

made a landfall fix at Minicoy. She=

passed

and over again".

close to Minicoy island and gave a wide berth

T h

e S

e q u

e n

c e o

f E

v e n t s

to Colonibo. South o f Cey.on *

The sequence of events after 5 Dec, when AKSHAY

N° r , hf

—

started diving operations, appears reasonably clear.

?,tChS I ' T u , GHAZI was d o in g 8 to 9 knots As regards events prior to 5 Dec. there are two

•

A t s n o r t ^ e p

'

f a c e a t n lg h t it w a s b u i ld i n g

recollections which state that the explosion occurred

and maybe on

^ Tha{ gpeaks very

on the night of 2/3 December.

UPu,° fPHAZI's performance capabilities at

In his book “Surrender at Dacca - Birth of a

highly of G H A ^ s P distance from Karach) tQ

Nation”, Lt Gen JFR Jacob, who was Chief of Staff

the time.

Minicoy and south of Ceylon is

Eastern Army Command at Calcutta states:

Madras via

To have traversed this

about 2 2 0 0

„ d

and night between

“We had signal intercepts o f the GHAZI. a

distance, ^ ™ sc0° e or snort depth, would

Pakistani submarine, entering the Bay of Bengal

surface an

was averaging 10 knots. She

and we had passed on this information to the

mea? * v e been making good not less than 8

Indian Navy. (Page 49)

m

“On the morning of 3 December, Admiral

w h a te v e r be the speed made good,

knots, vv

or against the current, the

Krishnan, Flag Officer Commanding in Chief of

with the c

that GHAZI fetched up off

our Eastern Naval Command, telephoned me to

say that the wreckage of a Pakistani submarine

TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH/147

had been found by fishermen on the approaches

Dhingra personally went to the site of a wreck

to the Visakhapatnam port. Krishnan said that

after which Clearance Divers went to the scene in

the blowing up of the GHAZI. either on I or 2

a Gemini dinghy on 4 Dec. The Command

December whilst laying mines, was an act of God.

Clearance Diving Team dived from the SDB-INS

He said it would permit the Navy greater freedom

AKSHAY, on AM 5 December and identified the

of action. Next morning on 4 December. Krishnan

GHAZI. INS NISTAR started diving operations on

again telephoned asking me whether we had

6 Dec. On 7 December, divers gained access into

reported the blowing up of the GHAZI to Delhi. I

the GHAZI’s conning tower and recovered

said that we had not as I presumed that he had

documents. On 8 December. GHAZI’s artefacts

done so. Relieved, he thanked me and asked me

were sent to New Delhi. On 9 December. Naval

to forget our previous conversation. The official

Headquarters announced that the GHAZI was

Naval version given out later was that the GHAZI

sunk off Visakhapatnam on night 3/4 December.

had been sunk by the ships of the Eastern Fleet

•

In view of Gen Jacob's recollections about

on 4 December", (ibid Page 104)

Admiral Krishnan’s phone calls on 3 and 4

According to Lieutenant (later Commander) H

December, Cdr Dhingra’s recollection that the

Dhingra, who was a qualified Deep Diver serving on

explosion occurred on night 2/3 December and

Rear Admiral Sivamani's recollecUon that the last

board the NISTAR:

entry made on GHAZI’s track chart was on

"The explosion was heard a little after midnight

midnight 2/3 Dec, an alternative sequence of

between 1st and 2 December i.e. prior to the

events emerges as follows:

breaking out of war. During the night of 1/2

That GHAZI exploded at midnight on 2/3

December itself, I received a message that an

December. Debris came to the surface,

explosion had been heard and that at dawn I had

fisherman picked up and brought lifejackets

to go to the jetty and report to the C-in-C. At

to the Naval Base, which reached the C-in-C

on 3 December. (On 1 December, the C-in-C

dawn on 2 December. I. together with the C-in-C

was in Calcutta with General Jacob and made

Adm iral Krishnan and CO Virbahu/Captain

no mention of the GHAZI).

SM8 , Captain Subra-Manian, we went out of

At dawn on 3 December, the C-in-C. Captain

Vizag harbour in the Admiral s barge. In t e

Subra-Manian and Lt Dhingra went to the

barge itself I saw two lifejackets which had been

site of the wreck in the Admiral’s barge. The

picked up earlier by fishermen and han e over

C-in-C ordered diving operations to start.

to the Navy. We found an oil slick and a lot

Clearance divers went to the site on 3

flotsam. Immediately thereafter, we were o

December. The C-in-C rang up General

s t a r t d i v i n g . N IS TA R w a s f lo a te d < out ofr doc:k

Jacob on 3 December. On the evening of 3

t h e 5 t h e v e n i n g and b r o u g h t to t h e a t e t h e n e *

December war broke out.

d a y B y t h a t t i m e t he C o m m a n d C l e a r a n c e On 4 December, everybody was busy coping

U ay. Dy m

oireadv gone down from

Diving Team’s divers had airway s

with the war. The C-in-C rang up General

A K S H A Y and tied a rope on to the bollard o f the Jacob for the second time. AKSHAY

sunken submarine .

embarked the diving team and its equipment

during the 4th and started diving on the 5th.

TVo alternatives therefore present them.el.es:

Thereafter the sequence would be the same as

„ ,vns heard around midnight 3/4

in (a) above.

A loud explosion was hea

M i n i s t e r .s

D e c e m b e r j u

It was accompanied by a

Rear Admiral Thadani is absolutely certain that

b ro a d c a st to the n a O o n .n o s jo n

s e v e ra l

he personally sent RAJPUT off as she sailed from the

jetty on night of 3/4 Dec and soon after reaching

f l a s h o f lig h t . T£

dings near the beach. Th e

home heard the explosion. Available records

w in d o w Panes l"

ted the explosion to

P W S S / N a v a l B a tte jy

^ ^ ^ ^

M a r U i m e

substantiate INS RAJPUT being sailed out on 2

December, recalled on 3 December and sailed again

t h e P D H Q w ^ During the night, fishermen at midnight 3/4 December. Quite clearly, if GHAZI

O perations

jon picked up two lifejackets

w ho saw th

had sunk prior to night 3/4 December, there would

£ ^ th g N a v y A t d a w n on 4

have been no need for RAJPUT to masquerade as

a n d t o o K

p o C I N C A d m i r a l K r i s h n a n . t h e VIKRANT. It is reasonable to conclude that GHAZI

D e c e m b e r .

^

S u b r a - M a n i a n and L t

Captain

exploded on night 3/4 December.

'

TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH /149

What Caused the GHAZI to Sink

out into a sharp cut, which ran from right fonva

Commodore KS Subra-Manian recalls:

tow ards the con n in g tow er. He could nnt

progress veiy far ahead of the casing far'd of the

“In the course o f the diving operation, I

conning tower.

interrogated the divers to find out how exactly the

Ingress into the Control Room through the

damage had happened to the submarine. From

low er lid o f the con n in g tow er was also not what I gathered, it looked to me that there had

possible as the diver reported that the whole

been an internal explosion. The hull had blown

hatch was a mass o f pipes running right across

outwards. That could only be attributed to an

with jagged edges. It was very difficult to push

internal explosion of a mine which was still in the

aside any pipe. Keeping the diver’s safety in

tubes. Again a hydrogen explosion inside could

mind, ingress through this route was impossible.

also be the cause. At that time, I put down the

“Diving effort then shifted to the aft escape

cause of the GHAZI’s sinking as a case of internal

hatch. The diver managed to open it easily and he

explosion due to her own mines blowing up or

gain ed access in to the subm arine.

The

due to hydrogen. Looking back now after the

compartment was fully flooded and he found the

lapse of so many years, it seems to me that the

sam e ja g g e d set o f p ip es w hich he had

cause of her blowing up was most probably a

encountered under the lower lid of the conning

hydrogen explosion. I base this conclusion on the

tower.

fact that the hull had blown outwards near the

“The divers found another small hatch. We

mid section o f the subm arine and not right

slid the diver into the provision room of the

forward near the torpedo tubes. Had a mine

GHAZI and the diver sent a good amount of

exploded in the tube or in the forw ard

p ro visio n s up to the su rface.

Although

compartment while being handled, the damage

considerable damage to steel pipe lines had been

would have been ford.

seen at the for’d control room end and the aft end,

“ Moreover, if she had alread y laid some

not much dam age was n oticeab le in this

mines, we would have found some sooner or later.

compartment probably because of the lagging in

To date no m ines have been found there.

the compartment. But what is surprising is that

Secondly, a mine is safe until it is laid and arms

aIthough*the explosion had destroyed the ford

itself after a twelve hour time delay to enable the

end o f the subm arine, the eggs inside the

laying vessel to clear the area. But in this case,

submarine were totally intact.

some malfunction of the mine may have taken

“In my view, the likely cause of the explosion

place inside the submarine, either while she was

which led to the sinking of the GHAZI appears to

preparing to lay the mines or, while the mines

be hydrogen accumulation, which takes place

were lying in the tube, something happened. I do

du ring norm al ch argin g and discharging o

not know what vin tage G h azi’s m ines were.

subm arine b a tteries. A subm arine of the

Perhaps due to age, perhaps due to lack of

displacement o f GHAZI would have something

maintenance, a mine could have gone off inside

like 350 tonnes o f battery. In a 1900 ton

the submarine, resulting in this sort of damage.

subm arine h avin g 350 tonnes o f battery, a

The only reason that I surmised that it was an

hydrogen explosion can be crippling. The e ec

internal explosion was the fact that the hull was

on the hull, as described by the dive**, was t a

blown outwards. A mine going off underneath the

the hull had split open. It had jagged ends,

submarine or in its vicinity would not create this

split was longitudinal, running a l o n g the *e

t0

sort of damage. That led me to think that due to

of the submarine. The entire submarine, ore

some malfunction o f the safety mechanism, a

aft, was intact except for the splitting open, o

mine in side had gone o ff and sunk the

of the conning tower. The explosion did notca^

submarine. A hydrogen explosion is, as I have

the en tire hull to com pletely b rea k .up

said, even more probable."

portions. It was fully intact. The diver e^c

that the fo r ’d section o f the casing

C om m ander Shafi Syed, the subm arin er

unwalkable.

,

em barked on board N ISTAR du rin g the divin g

“I rule out the explosion being caused J ?

operations, recalls:

extern al mine because the intens y

he

“The diver reported that the pressure hull had

explosion was such that the en“ reT®

was no

submarine was affected internally-

been split open and was jagged. It had opened

150/TR AN SITIQ N T O TR IU M PH

external damage to the submarine casing or the

whether it is on account of hydrogen from the

conning tower. If she had gone over a mine, the

batteries or from some other kind of explosion

conning tower, the periscope, the fin area should

inside the compartments."

have completely buckled or shattered. We found

that the seventh compartment aft, whi.ch was

Commodore K P Mathew, who also dived on Ghazi’s wreck, recalls:

almost a 100 meters away, from end to end. was

also affected in a similar manner, all the internal

‘The first time I went down, I saw the submarine

fittings and pipes, everything, had been smashed,

lying upright, as if she had bottomed there, with

ends distorted and contorted and jagged. The

no tilt on either side from the normal straight

possibility of torpedoes exploding was also ruled

bottoming position. The submarine was fully

out, because of the inbuilt safety arming devices.

intact from the stern right up to the forward

A torpedo does not get fully armed until after it

portion. In the forward portion. 10 to 15 ft or

runs out. Torpedoes exploding within the tubes

maybe upto 20 ft, there was hardly anything to

is unlikely because there are so many in built

see. The whole place was blasted off. The next 15

interlocks. Unless the forward caps are open, the

to 16 ft were split open - you could see the various

torpedo cannot be armed. So many interlocks

air bottles and the torpedo launching tubes and

exist in the configuration of the firing devices,

all their jagged ends. It was quite clear that

that anything to do with impact can be ruled out.

something had happened in the forward portion

Sympathetic explosions taking place is also ruled

of the GHAZI, in the torpedo tube area. It

definitely looked like an internal explosion, either

out. If the 6 or 8 torpedoes she was carrying in

of explosives or maybe caused by an

the forward tubes or the torpedoes in the racks

accumulation of hydrogen. I am not sure of that

had exploded, the entire submarine would have

but it was definitely in the forward portion and it

jumped out o f the water, nothing would have

appeared to be an explosion which had sent it

remained. But here was an intact submarine,

lying on the seabed. Something interna

a

d°Wnif GHAZI had been damaged from an

taken place.

,

.

r

external explosion, the damage would have been

“I recall that ju s t before the outbreak

all internal and not of the kind which I saw. of the

h ostilities. I heard a BBC news ite™ 0

Sea totally split and all ripped apart. This can

explosion that had taken place in a ri i

from an explosion taking place next

submarine, whilst battery charging in ar o •

to the damaged portions. This leads to the

I recall correctly, the submarine was ex ens

mnrlusion that it could only have been an

damaged and she sank within the har our

internal explosion that caused the damage to the

view, the most likely reason for the si

ng

GHAZI the way it did".

GHAZI seem s to be the explosion o

L t (la te r C o m m o d o r e ) V im a l Kumar, also a d e e p accumulated hydrogen gas from the a e

d i v e r e m b a r k e d in NISTAR d u r i n g the diving Commander Dhingra, the deep diver from NIS

op era tio n s, reca lls:

recalls:

"The explosion had taken place in the forward

“The first thing that we observed was

j bris.

section. All the projections were mostly

forward of the conning tower was in 0

were

outwards. 1 clearly remember that when this

The entire thing was shattered.

on

picture of the damage to the fonvard area was

jagged ends around the hull. You cou

^ that

being correlated with the mine trials not having

been successful. the inference that emerged-was

the casing up to a certain Pomt-

jnt0 the

there was no way which you cou

g

conning

that probably the mines inside had exploded^

debris. Nothing could be seen for d

down

either while laying or something had happened

tower. It was not safe for any diver

^ ^gre.

iust'before ejecting the mines.

into the debris in case explosives wer

We

“ S o m e h o w we were v e r y sure fr o m th e In fact, nobody dived on the debris a

t 0f

OHAZTs signals that there was something wrong

only saw it from the top. The

with the

r e m a in in g P

m ines and therefore we concluded that

the outside of the entire hull was m

blown

the explosion could only be because of the mines.

"As regards to the explosion being caused by

“I have no doubt that the u ,osionfrom

outwards. I think it was due to an

F

^ gure

hydrogen, it is a very light gas, it is veiy soluble in within the submarine. But I canno

t r a n s i t i o n T O T R I U M P H / 151

water and it will get dissolved. When hydrogen

facility to spit out mines from one of her tubes) t

explodes, it will explode wherever the hydrogen

must have hit som ewhere and then exploded

is. But in this case the explosion took place only

The oth er th eo ry w as th a t it was a battery in the forward area. The compartment having the

explosion. If a batteiy explosion had taken place

arrangement for connecting the rescue bell was

it could have h ap p en ed on ly in the f o r w a r d totally intact and had not exploded. I therefore

b attery com partm en t. T h is possibility a'lso

believe that the explosion took place because of

certainly cannot be ruled out”.

the mines".

Lt Cdr Sajjan Kumar recalls:

Commander (ND) (later Com m odore) CVP

Sarathy, who was in NHQ’s War Room during the war,

"I personally think that the explosion was caused

recalls analysing the problem:

by b u ild up o f h yd ro gen gas within the

submarine. In this, I am supported by a number

“A lot of theories were going around at the time

o f signals that we read in the message logs of

and including one that our own ship had

GHAZI which said very explicitly that they have

attacked and that it was a delayed action and the

this major problem of hydrogen building up in the

GHAZI ultimately blew up. Eveiybody was trying

subm arine. P rob a b ly w hen the build up of

to claim a little credit for this incident. The fact

hydrogen was beyond limits, the explosion took

was that the GHAZI Was ap p roach in g

place and at the same time, whatever ordnance

Visakhapatnam with the intention of attacking

she was carrying - mines, torpedoes everything -

any ship coming out of the harbour. If it managed

went off all together and that was the big bang".

to sink any ship in the channel, it would take

some time before the channel could be cleared

Cdr (TAS) Utful Dabir, the Commanding Officer of

and till then the naval ships which were inside

INS GULDAR which was in Visakhapatnam in early

would be bottled up. If that was the Pakistan

December, recalls:

Navy’s plan, then I think it was a well conceived

“A pparently an explosion was heard by local

plan. The GHAZI came to do that.

fishermen just off the beach, but they were not

“As regards how it blew up, the fact is that

paid heed to by anyone from the Port Trust and

she had primed her torpedoes, and was cruising

the Coast Battery. The second explosion, a short

along just above the surface to the sea bed. There

while later (probably GHAZI's blowing up) too

is a little ridge which runs out along the coast. It

was not paid heed to until local fishermen found

is slightly to the North o f Vizag harbour. The

some pieces in their nets. It was only then that

theory is that the GHAZI did not know o f the

HQENC realised the possibility of a submarine

existence of this ridge and that while cruising

having sunk near the channel.

along, she actu ally bum ped into it and the

“Both mines and torpedoes have fairly £00

collision triggered off the torpedoes which were

safety devices to prevent their getting a r m e

already armed. One of them blew up and then

whilst inside the torpedo tubes of a s u b m a r in e .

subsequently all the others blew up along with it

Since one explosion is known to have occurre in

causing the GHAZI to go down. This seemed to be

shallow waters near the beach, the only cor/*eCi

the theory we all ultimately believed when we

surmise is that it was caused by a torpedo w ic

were in NHQ at that time".

missed its intended target. The a p p r o x i m a ^

position s o f the explosion place near Oui e

Rear Admiral Sivamani recalls:

Channel Buoy and the location of the sun e

“My own view is that she m ust have been

submarine, makes it appear that the target s i

apparently tiying to shift the torpedo tubes into a

must have just crossed the Outer Channel u

weapon mode o f mines or vice versa and an

before the torpedo began its run of set ran~t

explosion took place resulting in her sinking. The

around 3000 to 4000 yards. The s u b m a r in e ^

explosion, if I remember right, having questioned

that point may have just been able to niainv^icj

some of the divers at that point in time, seems to

periscope depth, making it very difficult to a ^

have been from inside out, not from any external

any oncoming ship. It is likely that a s*fc0 ce

object. It could be that as the mine was being

torpedo too was about to be launched and

thrown out of the tube, (as you know, intelligence

on impact with the sea-bottom, it got launc _

indicated that GHAZI was fitted with some sort of

without the intentional firing taking place or

152/TR ANSITIO N T O TR IU M PH

launch was made while the submarine was in a

been charred badly by the almost instantaneous

steep dive.

combustion of hydrogen and the raising of

“I had heard that GHAZI was carrying eight

internal temperatures to charring level. Also,

mines. I also heard that there were only two

hydrogen explosion could have affected only one

torpedoes in the forward tubes. Thus GHAZI

or two compartments and not the personnel in all

hitting her own mine, launched deliberately or

other compartments.

accidentally, is a distinct possibility. If there were It is not possible to be comprehensive or

mines or torpedoes in an unarmed state, either

definitive about what led to the explosion in the

on the front racks or in the rear tubes, these

forward section. As far as I know, the incident

would m ost p rob ab ly have remained intact

was not studied in a comprehensive manner

unexploded. If these could have been counted/

while the required evidence was still fresh".

inspected by divers, it would have helped in

arriving at a more probable cause.

Afterword

“From what I remember, available evidence

led to a conclusion that one torpedo from the

GHAZI's Mines

forward tube was fired and a second one too

Intelligence gained after the war indicated that: appeared to have been launched and it is this

second one which appears to have exploded,

•

It was unclear whether GHAZI carried the new

either in side the tube or ju st outside, after

accoustic influence mines acquired from France

completing its set run without actually running

with the Daphne class submarines or the much

older American magnetic/accoustic mines

linearly. These two fired tubes could have had

acquired during her refit in Turkey.

mines instead o f torpedoes, but it is highly

•

Till mid 1971, GHAZI’s torpedo tubes had not

unlikely for a mine to explode immediately on

been modified to carry French mines and after

launching because of the much longer arming

April 1971, GHAZI was mostly at sea.

delay normally set on the clock.

•

Neither GHAZI nor the Daphnes had carried out

“It is certain that the explosion was inside the

minelaying exercises with any degree of success.

GHAZI because the hull was splayed outward and

•

If at all GHAZI had mines in her torpedo tubes,

upward. Apparently the lower side of the hull

they were more likely to have been the older

showed little damage. Whilst the mines and

American mines.

torpedoes would have been safe in stowage, there

is the greatest possibility of a mine or a torpedo

Salvaging the GHAZI

being completely readied for launch in the tube

Captain (later Vice Admiral) MK Roy, was the Director

and GHAZI hitting the rocky bottom just as the

Naval Intelligence in 1971. In his book, "War in the weapon was about to be launched or actual y

Indian Ocean", he states:*

launched but could not go out because the outer

doors of the tubes had jammed hard against a

‘The Americans offered to raise the submarine to

c liff like structure. The post-launch safety

the surface at their own expense. The Soviets

devices can run out if the tubes are oo e

made a similar offer. The Government of India

the holding lever is released/withdrawn. Such

however deliberately allowed the submarine to

accidents have been recorded in the past.

sink into the mud off the Fairway Buoy of

Torpedoes completing their entire run in the tube

Visakhapatnam and marked the hazard by a

were not uncommon in the older submarines.

buoy (which has since been removed) and where

“Hydrogen explosion is unlikely to have been

it still rests buried under the mud".

the cause, as the bodies and papers would have

Page 206.

TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH /153

Naval Commando Operation at Mongla - Khulna 8 to 11 December

In his book. “Surrender at Dacca", Lt Gen Jacob Lt Gen Jacob’s book states:***

states:*

‘T h e Task Force was ordered to attack Pakistani

“Since the Mukti Bahini later would need more

shipping at the anchorages o f Chalna-Mongla.

craft to convert into gunboats in the event of full

Samant wanted to attack Khulna but was told

scale hostilities, we approached the West Bengal

that he sh ou ld n ot p roceed beyond Chalna-

Government for assistance. They were most

Mongla as our ground troops would be attacking

helpful and gave us two craft on loan, MV

Khulna and there were considerable Pakistani

PA LASH from the Calcutta Port Trust, and MV

forces at Khulna. He was also apprised of the

PADMA. Our workshops reinforced the decks

bomb line given to the Air Force. Khulna was

and mounted Bofors L/60 anti-aircraft guns on

in clu d ed

in

th a t bom b

line. Advance

them. Crews for these'were to be found fromv

Headquarters Eastern Air Command asked me to

amongst Bengali Naval personnel.of the Pakistani J

inform Sam ant to p ain t the superstructures

v T^avy\ Cdr~Samant o f the Indian Navy, an

yellow as identification. As soon as this was done,

'outstanding submariner, was assigned to assist.

the air sq u a d ro n s o p e ra tin g there were The Task Force was, in the event o f war, to

informed".

operate directly under the orders o f Eastern

Command at Fort William and not Eastern Naval

Captain Samant recalls:

__

Command. Later, when operations commenced,

"We form ed a grou p called Force A J f a n v h i c h these two gunboats operated with considerable .^-^comprised Mukti Bahini gun boats'PADMA and success".

PALASH , INS P A N V E L and the BSF craft

In his book "No Way But Surrender”, Vice Admiral

VCHITRANGADA. I was Senior Officer of this forces

Krishnan states:**

We sailed'from Hasnabad on the Indian side and

proceeded through various backwaters of East

'In addition to the air strikes and the blockade,

Pakistan, using Indian Arm y Ordnance Maps,

we decided to m ount a s p e c i a ], com m a nd-o and arrived Akram Point which is ju st off t e

operation on the harbours oLCHalna and Khulna.)

entrance to the Pussur River. The force a rriv e

Cdr Samant was allotted._£AN_VEL and in

very early in the morning at about 2’o clock an

company- with"’ two" gu n boats P A D M A '-^R h saw two radar contacts escaping to seaward,

j

fJACASH, manned mostly by the Mukti Bahini J

force cquld not'engage them because they w ere

fheywould enter these harbours and attack the

out of the gun range of our Bofors 40/60

sjjij^s and soldiers there. This operation took

sent a flash sign al in form in g FOCINCE

•

pla<?eron-9-and-10-December”

VIKRANT and Headquarters Eastern Cornrna.n s

As a result, both these ships were capture ^

Captain MN Samant recalls:

soon they came into the open sea. They turn

After the war was declared, Lt General Arora and

out to be Pakistan merchant ships BAQIR a

ANWAR BAKSH carrying some

Major General Jacob ordered me to organise a

B a l u c h i - troop

maritime attack on Chalna and Mongla. This was

^pd families to Pakistan.

\\Si

because the Indian A rm y ’s 41 B rigade w as

"After that we turned towards Cfralna-M ^*^.

directly locked in com bat with its Pakistani

and arrived there by midnight. One could see.

the harbour was ablaze with

counterpart to take over the Chalna and Khulnai

a couple of mere

,

\ships. One was NORTH POLE

area, which was not falling. So the next best

and the other

, _

the OCEAN ENTERPRISE (which was a Pak *s l :

alternative was to mount an attack from seaward

ship). Both were ablaze because of Indian ^

to dislocate the Pakistan troops”.

Force/Fleet Air Arm attacks on the ^ar^oUrent

the previous.day s. Next morning w h e n

Page 91 et seq.

*• Page 50.

*** ibid

154/TRANSITION T O TR IU M PH

N A V A L CO M M AND O OPERATION AT KHULNA - DECEMBER 1971

KHULNA

OU Pvxair fVr*r

alongside a jetty, I found out that the Pakistanis

almost all PANVEL’s ammunition to

had already left the harbour, except for a small

Pakistani attack. A fter that, I c o l l e c t ? S'

pocket of resistance which we managed to clear

wounded people on board and after h o istw ^

up.

Bangladesh flag on Khulna Jail, we returned t

“The force then proceeded towards Khulna to

Hasnabad to attend to the wounded people"

capture it. We arrived in the Khulna area by

about 11 o clock in the morning and found that

Lt Cdr JPA N oronha was the CO o f PANVEL H

recalls:

‘ e

the town was working normally. After passing the

Qureshi Steel Mill area, we came near a small

“Having been fired upon by Indian aircraft, the

shipyard on the west bank of the Pussur River.

Pakistani themselves thought us to be Pakistani.

There we found an old merchant ship which had

I made full use o f that confusion. I opened fire

been damaged by the Mukti Bahini commandos

against the aircraft to disturb their aim. I thought

during the first attack on the n igh t o f 14th it preferable if one pilot’s life was lost as against

August. The ship’s name was MV LIGHTNING, an

losing my entire ship and its crew. I tried to weave

Ehiopian ship. When in proximity of the Khulna

to avoid being hit. But, finding that I could not

Jail, the local population started cheering us and

outgun or out-manouvre the aircraft doing such

responding to our shouts o f \Jai Bangla’ . My

high speeds, I decided to climb up the river bank

intention was to go upto PNS TITU M IR , the

and keep my engines at full ahead, so that the

Pakistan Naval establishment in Khulna, capture

sm oke could give the appearance of the ship

vLit and thereby support’ our Army from the rear of

having been hit. This helped me in the second

the defending Pak forces.

and the third sorties when they flew over me and

“Uitfpi^tunately at; that time,/three Indian Air

they did not attack me. They attacked the port

Force Gnat fighters appeared in the sky arid,

and other installations and went away".

despite#thexfact that we were displaying our pre

“I was very happy that I had managed to fool

arranged recognition signal o f a very large yellow

the aircraft but there was the ground reality in

flag, they attacked us in broad daylight. We

front of me. The ‘ razakars’ were there. They were

opened fire on these Gnats, not with the intention

ta k in g up p o sitio n s. I had got my ship

of hitting them, because they w ere our own

abandoned, ju s t in the interest of my crew, to

fighters, but just to put them off. Unfortunately,

save their lives. The first time I grounded on the

the Gnats got both the boats, PAD M A and

right bank, the second time on the left channel,

PALASH, which were set ablaze and sunk. INS

which w as d irectly in fron t o f the Razakars

PANVEL escaped dam age by v io le n t evasive

Headquarters, the railway yard and rest of e

m anouvres

and

the

use

o f

en gin es.

town. And now I had to face this new challenge,

CHITRANGADA, fortunately, was not involved

becau se they m ust h ave realised , proba y

because I had left her back in Chalna-Mongla

having seen my white ensign, that I was no *

port because o f her slow speed and her lack of

P a k ista n i ship. T h ey took up Positionl 0H

manoeuverability.

apprehend me and capture my crew who

“After the Gnats went away, I started picking

abandoned the ship. I got rriy men b^ck. with r

up the survivors o f these two boats. The total

the ship and opened fire on them, to keep the

casualties were 4 or 5 Mukti Bahini sailors dead,

bay.

tke

one BSF Jaw an who w as b a d ly in ju red who

“I then went to rescue the people from

subsequently died and quite a few o f us were

other two ships, the PALASH and the

, its

injured, including myself. I had a grazing bullet

One o f those ships was already destroye

^

wound.

davits had flown past my ship but. ^ortuIl f f^el

“Then, half an hour later, the second wave of

was not hit. The ammunition exploded or

fS

Gnats came and again swooped down on us

caught fire. I managed to pick up 14 su

F ortu n ately for us th is tim e, the G nats did Then I started the attack on the shore de e

recognise that we were a friendly force and peeled

“Now some of the Pakistani ships w *c

irs

off to attack shore targets. At about this time, the

hit earlier had been brought to Khulna for r

Pakistanis opened fire on us, including on those

and w ere b eing used as fortresses.

e)j ^rorn

survivors who were swimming in the water to

firing at me through the port holes an ^

save themselves. This w as something which I

whatever vantage point they could get.

could not tolerate, so I replied furiously, firing

gunfire to silence them".

156/TRANSITION TO TR IUM PH

Lt Gen Jacob’s book states:*

area and fortunately there were no casualties.

"Cdr Samant in his overeagerness, decided to Even so we at the Eastern Command

attack Khulna. Unfortunately, the Air Force failed

recommended Samant for the award of the

Mahavir Chakra for his action."

to identify the vessels though they were clearly

painted yellow. The craft were attacked and sunk

Both Commander Samant and Lieutenant

in what is called in NATO terminology, ‘ friendly

Commander Noronha were awarded the Maha Vir

fire’. Samant and the crew were able to swim

Chakra for this operation.

ashore. The Mukti Bahini were in control in that

The Enterprise Incident -

Deployment of the American Naval Task Group into the Bay of Bengal Preamble

American nationals had chosen to stay behind. On

13 December, the American Defence Secretary

By 10 December 1971. the Pakistani offensive in the

announced in Washington that the US Government

West had run out of steam. The Pakistani Army in

had contingency plans to evacuate these 47 American

£he East had made its first tentative move to obtain a

cease fire. The United Nations effort to obtain a Group transited through the Straits of Malacca and

ceasefire resolution had been stalled by the Soviet

e i B S m e d a y oi Bengal'. However, |nsl

veto. America was concerned how to safeguard West

proceeding

E£st Pakistan, it altered-cporse

away towards Ceylon. On 15 December, it was

Pakistan from disaster.

A m e r i c a w a s f a c e d w i t h a c o m p l e x s i t u a t i o n .

officially stated in Washington that after the ceasefire^

theajFask Group .might help to evacuate Pakistani

T h e r e w a s u n c e r t a i n t y in s o m e m i n d s w h e t h e r n ia Foopsfrom the East. On 16 December, the Pakistani i n t e n d e d to t r a n s f e r h e r t r o o p s f r o m E a s t to W e s t anc armed forces in East Pakistan surrendered.

d e c i s i v e l y d e f e a t P a k i s t a n . P a k i s t a n h a d invo e e

In India, the spectrum of reactions to the

s e c r e t c l a u s e w h e r e b y A m e r i c a h a d p r o m i s e

° c o m e

Enterprise Task Group

ranged from public

t o P a k i s t a n ’s a s s i s t a n c e i f a t t a c k e d b y n *a_

indignation at American gun boat diplomacy, to naval

w a s A m e r i c a n d e t e r m i n a t i o n to a vo i

, , f inf \ v n o t u e

deserting a

perplexity regarding American motives, to poise at the

C E N T O / S E A T O ally. A n d ‘ here was the

highest political level.'In January 1972. the

realisation that politically there w a . n ^ r ° f

Enterprise Task Group left the Indian Ocean.

s , „ p p , „ g East Pakistan

The reconstruction of events yields interesting

:ember. Am®r^ | ^ ^ r i n g of We

insights of how. in sensitive situations, naval

deployments can convey signals of intent and how

airggWfKBBrteF.

these signals are interpreted differently at different

levels, nationally and internationally.

BfPirB lngSlT

o n w a r d s , t h e P a k i s t a n

The Situation on 10 December 71

From 1 I D e c e ™

H 9 i n I s l a m a b a d s t a r t e d

Government an

^

Army commander in

In the West, the Pakistani land offensive had come to

c o n v e y i n g to i t s O o v

w e r e c o n l i n g t0

a halt. The Indian advance in the Shakargarh bulge

East P a k i s t a n that incnuiy h

was drawing Pakistani forces away from Chhamb. In

Pakistan's assistance.

Air Force aircraft

Punjab. Pakistani pressure across the bridgeheads

By 12 December.

^

Qacca 4y

had been resisted and the threat to Fazilka warded

h a d e v a c u a t e d i

_____ ____ ________________

ibid.

TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH/157

off. On the Rajasthan front, the Indian attack was

help them, it would have established contin

penetrating deep into Sind. The Indian Air Force had

his Headquarters by now.

^

established its dominance in the air. At sea, the

“On 12 December the CGS sent a telenh™

Western Fleet's blockade was complete. Pakistan’s

message in Pushto informing Niazi that fric i

strategy of relieving the pressure on East Pakistan by

“yellow from the North and white from the Souih:

attacking India in the West had been checkmated.

were coming by midday 13 Dec. The next dav i

In the East, the Indian advance towards the

message from GHQ indicated that the friends

Meghna River precluded the evacuation of Pakistani

would be delayed by 48 hours”.

forces. By the 10th, the Indian Army had reached the

banks of the Meghna at three points: at Ashuganj, at

Sources for the Reconstruction of Events

Daudkandi - less than 40 air kilometers from Dacca -

and at Chandpur, which dominated the route from

T h e W ash ington S p ecia l A c tio n Group Minutes

Dacca to' the sea. The Indian Air Force had grounded

the Pakistan Air Force Sabres in East Pakistan by

In 1971, w h e n e v e r an in te rn a tio n a l crisis was putting the Dacca airfields out of action. The Eastern

b rew in g, the A m e ric a n G overn m en t used to Fleet had established a total blockade.

constitute a Special Action Group comprising senior

officials from all concerned departments. Its task was

Speculation now arose as to how conclusive the

to examine all the implications for American policy

Indian victory, on both the eastern and the western

and to suggest to the President the action that could

fronts, was going to be. For Pakistan’s friends in

be taken.

Am erica and for China, th is q u e s tio n had two The Washington Special Action Group (WSAG) on

aspects: could som eth in g be sa lvaged from the India - Pakistan was constituted in Aug 1971. It held

debacle in East Pakistan; and more important, how to

occasional m eetings until end November. When

safeguard West Pakistan from being overwhelmed.

h o s tilitie s eru pted on 3 Decem ber, it met more By 10 December, it was clear that the United

frequently. The “Secret Sensitive” minutes of these

Nations would not be able to stop the war. Russia

m eetin gs w ere m ade p u b lic by an American

had twice exercised its veto in the Security Council.

journalist, Mr Jack Anderson. These minutes were

Before 10 December, the international reaction to the published in the New York Times Paris Edition on 6

war was focussed on the American attempts to secure

and 15 January 1972.

a ceasefire through the United Nations. After the 10th. Am erica and R u ssia becam e m ore directly T

h

e

A

n

d

e

r s

o

n

A

r t i c

l e

o n

N

a

v

a

l M

o v e m

e n

t s

involved on how to safeguard West Pakistan from

On 10 January 1972. the Daily Telegraph o f London

disaster.

published Mr Jack Anderson's article regarding t e

On 10 D ecem ber, A m erica took two actions.

American State Departments apprehensions, as a

President Nixon ordered a Task Group of naval ships,

Naval Task Group steamed towards a Soviet Nava

headed by the nuclear aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE

Task Group at the height of the Indo Pakistan War.

to proceed towards the Bay of Bengal. And he sent a

letter to the Russian Chairman, Mr Brezhnev, urging

A

d

m

i r a

l Z

u

m

w

a

l t ’ s M

e

m

o

i r s

Russia to join America in a joint appeal for a complete In his memoirs “On Watch". Admiral Z u m w a l t . who cease fire. He also informed the Russian leadership

was the Chief of Naval Operations of the US Navy ^

that Am erica had a treaty commitment to support

1971, has recorded his views on the movernen s

P a k is ta n a g a in s t In d ia n a g g ressio n and that Task Group 74.

American naval forces had started moving towards

S

o

v

i e

t A

m

b

a

s

s

a

d

o

r D

o

b

r y

n

i n

’ s M

e

m

o

i r s

East Pakistan.

In his m em oirs “In C o n fid en ce” . Mr

In his book “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership” Maj

D obrynin, who was the S oviet Am bassa 0 at Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan states:

Washington in 1971, has recounted the interac

^

“ On 11 Dec. it was reported that the USA had

the h igh est levels o f the S oviet and Amer

ordered the 7th Fleet to move towards the Bay of

Governments.

Bengal: The news of this move and the adverse

“ W a r a n d S e c e s s i o n ” b y R i c h a r d S i s s o n a n d Indian propaganda about it again raised hopes in

R

o s e

Pakistan. T h ese, however, did not last long.

Adm iral S harif advised the Eastern Command

D

r H

e n

r y

K

i s

s

i n

g

e

r ’ s M

e m

o

i r s

^

that if the Am erican Fleet had been coming to

Mr Kissinger was the National Security

American President Nixon. In his memoirs The

15 8/T R A N SITIO N T O T R IU M P H

House Years", he recalls the geopolitical compulsions which led to the despatch of the American Task Force

Dr Kissinger said that it is quite obvious that the

to the Bay of Bengal.

President is not inclined to let the Paks be

defeated. Mr Sisco said that from a political point

of view, our efforts would have to be directed at

Reconstruction of Events

Indians from "extinguishing" West Pakistan".

The WSAG Minutes of 3 December 71 state:

The WSAG Minutes of 8 December state:

“Dr Kissinger said we need to think about our

Mr Helms (CIAJ opened the meeting by briefing

treaty obligations. I remember a letter or memo

the current situation. In the East, the Indians

interpreting our existing treaty with a special

have broken the line at Comilla. Only major river

India tilt. When I visited Pakistan in January

crossings prevent them from investing Dacca.

1962, I was briefed on a secrct document or oral

The Indians are advancing rapidly throughout

understanding about contingencies arising in

East Pakistan. All major Pak L.O.C.’s in the East

other than the SEATO contcxt. Perhaps it was a

are now vulnerable. In the West, the Paks are now

Presid en tial letter.

This was a special

claiming Poonch. inside the Indian border.

in terpretation of the March 1959 bilateral

However, the Paks are admitting fairly heavy

agreement”.

casualties in the fighting. Tank battles are

apparently taking place in the Sind/Rajasthan

The WSAG Minutes of 4 December state:

area. Mrs Gandhi has indicated that before

"Admiral Zumwalt thought that the Paks could

heeding a UN call for cease-fire, she intends to

hold the line in East Pakistan for approximately

straighten out the southern border of Azad

Kashmir. It is reported that, prior to terminating

one or two weeks before the logistic problems

present hostilities. Mrs Gandhi intends to

became overriding. He expected the Soviets to

attempt to eliminate Pakistan’s armor and air

cement their position in India and to push for

force capabilities.

permanent usage of the naval base at Vizag. He

“Mr Sisco inquired how long the Paks might

anticipated that the Soviets’ immediate short

be expected to hold out in East Pakistan, to

range objective would be to gain military

which Mr Helms replied 48 to 72 hours. The Ume

advantage through their current military

to reach the ultimate climax is probably a

relationship with India".

function of the difficulties encountered in river

The WSAG M i n u t e s o f 6 D e c e m b e r state: crossings.

“Assessing the situaUon in the West. General

“Gen Westmoreland stated there was no means of

Ryan indicated that he did not see the Indians

evacuating West Pak forces from the East Wing,

pushing too hard at this time, rather they seem

particularly in view of Indian naval superiority.

content with a holding action.

“ D r K i s s i n g e r a s k e d a b o u t a l e g a l p o s i t i o n

“Dr Kissinger asked how long it would take to

c o n c e r n i n g t h e c u r r e n t I n d i a n n a v a l ' b l o c k a d e shift Indian forces from East to West. General

M r S i s c o s t a t e d t h a t w e h a v e p r o t e s t e d b o t h Ryan said it might take a reasonably long time to

i n c i d e n t s i n w h i c h A m e r i c a n s h i p s h a v e b e e n move all the forces, but that the airborne brigade

i n v o l v e d . H o w e v e r , n o f o r m a l p r o c l a m a t i o n could be moved quickly, probably within a matter

a p p a r e n t l y h a s b e e n m a d e i n t e r m s o f a of five or six days.

d e c l a r a t i o n o f w a r , t h a t it i s e s s e n t i a l l y s t i l l a n

“Dr Kissinger suggested that the key issue if

u n d e c l a r e d w a r. w i t h t h e I n d i a n s c l a i m i n g p o w e r the Indians turn on West Pakistan is Azad

t o e x e r c i T e t h e i r r ig h t s o f b e l l ig e r e n c y . T h e S t a t e Kashmir. If the Indians smash the Pak air force

D e p a r t m e n t w o u l d , h o w e v e r , p r e p a r e a p a p e r o n and the armored forces, we would have a

t h

e l e g a l

a s p e c t s o f t h e i s s u e . A m b a s s a d o r deliberate Indian attempt to force the

J o h n s o n s a i d t h a t s o fa r a s h e w a s c o n c e r n e d , th e disintegration of Pakistan. The elimination of the

I n d i a n s h a d n o l e g a l p o s i t i o n t o a s s e r t a Pak armored and air forces would make the Paks

defenseless. It would turn West Pakistan into a

b l ° C. ^ r K i s s i n g e r a s k e d t h a t a d r a f t p r o t e s t b e client state. The possibility elicits a number of

d r a w n u p If w e c o n s i d e r e d it ille g a l, w e will m a k e questions. Can we allow a US ally to go down

a f o r m a l d i p l o m a d c p r o t e s t . M r S i s c o s a i d t h a t h e completely while we participate in a blockade?

w o u l d p r e p a r e s u c h a p r o t e s t .

Can we allow the Indians to scare us off. believing

TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH/159

that if US supplies are needed they will not be

P a k ista n h ave tak en b lo c k a d e action

provided?

though the Pak blockade is essentially a

“Mr Sisco stated that if the situation were to

blockade. Dr Kissinger said that we should ak"

evolve as Dr Kissinger had indicated then, of

p ro te s t to the Paks. A m b a ssa d o r Johnson course, there was a serious risk to the viability of

indicated we do not have a legal case to protest

West Pakistan.Mr Sisco doubted, however, that

the blockade. The belligerent nations have a right

the Indians had this as th eir objective. He

to blockade when a state of war exists. We may

indicated that Foreign M inister Singh told

think it unwise and we may question how it is

Ambassador Keating that India had no intention

carried out. We have, in fact, normally expressed

of taking any Pak territory. Mr Sisco said it must

our concern. On the oth er hand we have no

also be kept in mind that Kashm ir is rea lly

problem in p ro testin g the incident of the SS

disputed territory.

B u ckeye S ta te w h ich had been strafed in a

“Mr Helms then stated that earlier he had

Pakistani port.

omitted mentioning that Madame Gandhi, when

“Dr Kissinger said that we are not trying to be

referring to China, expressed the hope that there

even-handed. There can be no doubt what the

would be no Chinese intervention in the West.

President wants. The President does not want to

She said that the Soviets had cautioned her that

be even-handed. T h e President believes that

the Chinese might rattle the sword in Ladakh but

India is the attacker. We are trying to get across

that the Soviets have prom ised to take

the idea that India has jeopardized relations with

appropriate counter-action if this should occur.

the United States. Dr K issin ger said that we

Mr Helms indicated that there was no Chinese

cannot afford to ease India’s state of mind. The

build-up at this time but, nevertheless, even

Lady’ is cold-blooded and tough and will not turn

without a build-up they could 'make motions and

into a Soviet satellite merely because of pique. We

rattle the sword’.

should not ease her mind. He invited anyone who

“Dr Kissinger stated that what we may be

objected to this approach to take his case to the

witnessing is a situ ation w h erein a country

President”.

equipped and supported by the Soviets may be

Admiral Zumwalt was Chief of Naval Operations

turning half of Pakistan into an impotent state

and the other half into a vassal. We must consider

of the American Navy. In his memoirs “On Watch , he

what other countries may be thinking o f our

states:*

action.

“The Naval situation in the Indian Ocean just

“ Mr H elm s asked abou t our CENTO

then was complicated and confusing. Quite y

rela tion sh ip s w ith P ak istan . A m b a ssa d or chance, a la rg e B ritish Navy task

Johnson stated we had no legal ob ligation s

in clu d in g two carriers, the last ships of

e

towards Pakistan in the CENTO context. Dr

British Fleet to remain East of Suez, was

^

Kissinger agreed but added that neither did we

way home through the Indian Ocean at the

have legal obligations toward India in 1962 when

India marched into East Bengal. Two days a ^

we formulated the air defense agreement. We

th at in vasion , a .Soviet d estroyer an ^

must consider what would be the impact of the

minesweeper came through the Malacca

a

current situation in the larger complex of world

whose mission had been to relieve the des °^ ie

affairs.

and minesweeper that had been on station I wax,

“A fte r

d iscu ssin g

va rio u s

p ossib le

Indian Ocean) for 6 months. In view of

. -naj

commitments to both Pakistan and India, Mr

the relief became a reinforcement: the ong , .

Packard stated that the overriding consideration

contingent stayed on. Furthermore on

is the practical problem of either doing something

December, the Russians detached a

effective or doing nothing. If you don’t win, don’t

armed with cruise missiles, and escorts

^

get involved. If we were to attempt something it

from their Pacific Ocean Fleet and seni

would have to be with a certainty that it would

towards the Indian Ocean. They were sig

^ ^

affect the outcome. Let’s not get in if we know we

the Japanese in the Straits o f Tsushima ^

are going to lose. Find some way to stay out.

December. Though these ships did not rea

rge

“Tu rn in g to the question of the blockade.

Malacca Straits until 18 December, we o c

Ambassador Johnson said that both India and

knew they were on/their way”._______________— "

•

P ages 360 et seq.

160/TR A N SITIO N .TO TR IU M PH

Mr Jack Anderson’s article states:

carrier task force from Southeast Asia. In

"On 7 December a top secret warning was flashed

response, a number of warships from the Soviet

Indian Ocean Fleet were sent northward.

to Washington that three Soviet naval ships, a

“Kissinger made it clear to us that the United

seagoing minesweeper and a tanker have begun

States was mostly concerned about the western

to move northeastward into the Bay of Bengal.

section of the India-Pakistan front which.

The units entered the Indian Ocean from the

Washington feared, would collapse after

Malacca Straits on 5 December and were located

Pakistan’s defeat in the East. As Kissinger later

approximately 500 nautical miles east of Ceylon

wrote, he believed Mrs Gandhi was planning to

on 7 December.

attack the Pakistan-held portions of Kashmir,

“Urgent huddles in the White House led to a

recover them for India, and thus precipitate

decision on 10 December to assemble in the

through a humiliating defeat, the disintegration

M alacca Straits a United States task force,

of what remained of Pakistan in the West: (In the

spearheaded by the aircraft carrier Enterprise,

East, the White House had to accept that the war

the Navy’s most powerful ship. The primary

was as good as won by India.) As part of his

purpose was to make a 'show of force’ and to

maneuver, Kissinger then asked Vorontsov to

divert Indian planes and ships from Pakistan.

assure Moscow that the White House was not in

“As the task force moved into position,

contact with Beijing over the conflict, even though-

Admiral John McCain, our Pacific commander,

Pakistan was close to China. He simultaneously

inquired on 11 December about the feasibility of

proposed, referring the matter to the United

aerial surveillance of a Soviet task group located

Nations".

approximately 180 nautical miles south-west of

Ceylon’. Authorisation was flashed back the same

Admiral Zumwalt’s memoirs state:**

day 'in the event Task Force 74 is directed to

“On 10 December, a Presidential order that was

transit the Straits of Malacca, at that time

not discussed with the Navy in advance, created

appropriate screening-surveillance flights are

Task Group 74, consisting of the nuclear carrier

authorised".

Enterprise and appropriate escorts and supply

ships and sent it steaming from the Gulf of

Mr Anatoly Dobrynin was the Russian

Tonkin, where the ships had been on station, to

Ambassador in Washington in 1971. In his memoirs

Singapore. The order did not specify what TG 74’s

“In Confidence’ , he states:*

mission was, nor could anyone, including the

“On December 10, Nixon asked us to join himina

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs tell me. I sought to

joint appeal for a complete ceasefire In a clear

be sure that these ships either had a mission or

attempt to pressure both the Soviet Union and

were not sent in harms way. The ships were held

off Singapore for two days. On 12 December they

India, Nixon made an extraord i'"^ n c^ h T h ad

were ordered through the Malacca Straits into the

theSovietleader.!,*- In « « “ ^

' “ 1

Indian Ocean. Within an hour, that order was

Kissinger m

beUveen the Un[ted

rescinded. Next day it was reissued with the

“

L r s E5S zsstpss. additional proviso that as much of the passage through the Straits as possible be in daylight, ie

in full view of the world. At the same time

“sources" in Washington let it be known that the

- . a

governm ent would >uppor. P .k i.t t n .g .m s t object of the exercise was covering the evacuation

of American civilians from Dacca in East

' “ ‘ " E

w

t * ” pressure Kissinger told

Bengal .This clearly was a cover story since that

,

, n.ir able charge d affairs during

evacuation, after having been impeded by the

YUU h°enceSin Moscow for consultations, that the

fighting for a week, was successfully completed

my absen

had already been ordered to

two days before TG 74 entered the Indian Ocean”.

American

^ f{jr assistance t0 Pakistan

start P ^ P

0f tactical redeployment of its

Mr Jack Anderson’s article states:

Tforces including the despatch of an aircraft

•

Pages 236 et seq.

** Ibid.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/161

“As the American warships moved through the

Admiral Zumwalt’s memoirs state:**

Straits and headed into the Bay of Bengal, even

more ominous reports reached Washington from

“The first orders to TG 74 had been to g0 on the Defence Intelligence Agency.

station in the Bay o f Bengal, off the East Bengal

“Recent indicators have been received which

coast. I argued again st station in g the ships

suggest the People’s Republic of China may be

there. I felt it was taking an unnecessary r is k to planning actions regarding the Indo-Pakistan

put a task group w ithou t a stated mission in

conflict’.

precisely the place where harm was most likely to

“A top secret m essage reported tersely:

befall it. I won my argument and the group was

‘According to a reliable clandestine source,

sent south of Ceylon, where the Russians, when

(Pakistan’s) President Yahya Khan claimed ...

they a rrived , p ro m p tly began trailing it.

today that the Chinese Ambassador in Islamabad

Meanwhile, a second Russian task group, similar

has assured him that w ith in 72 hours the

in composition to the first - a cruiser with escorts-

Chinese Army will move towards the border.

was sent to the scene, obviously in reaction to TG

“And from New Delhi, the CIA reported:

74’s appearance. What prompted the despatch of

‘According to a reliable clandestine source, Prime

the first Russian group is unclear. The best guess

Minister Gandhi told a leader of her Congress

is that it was the presence, fortuitous though it

party that she had some indications that the

was, of so many British ships in troubled waters.

Chinese intend to in terven e alon g In d ia ’s

In any case, by the first o f the year when the

northern border. Mrs G andhi said th at the

second Russian group arrived, the American

Chinese action might be in the Ladakh area.’

ships w ere put at a d isa d va n ta ge by the

"Russia’s Ambassador to India, Nikolai M

Russians. While Soviet ships were in close trail of

Pegov, however, promised on 13 December that

US ships, the British were no longer on the scene.

the Soviets ‘would open a diversionary action’

As soon as D acca had been evacuated

against the C hinese and 'w ill not allow the

su ccessfu lly, they had con tin u ed on their

Seventh Fleet to intervene.’

homeward journey. For the first week or so of

“According to Pegov, the m ovement o f the

1972, the American and Russian ships circled

Seventh Fleet is an effort by the US to bully India,

arou nd each oth er w a rily , much as their

to dis.courage it from strik in g a ga in st W est cou n terp a rts

had

been

doin g

in the

Pakistan, and at the sam e tim e to boost the

Mediterranean for years. Then on 8 January. TG

morale of the Pakistani forces.

74 was ord ered out o f the In dian Ocean as

“Pegov noted that a Soviet fleet is now in the

mysteriously as it had been ordered in.

Indian Ocean and that the Soviet Union will not

"I still do not know exactly what to think

allow the Seventh Fleet to intervene”.

about th^ TG 74 episode. Obviously it could not

have been intended to influence the course of the

Mr Anatoly Dobrynin’s memoirs state:*

war in East Bengal. On the contrary, the tas

group was not formed until the outcome in EaS

‘‘The tension was broken upon my return on

Bengal was perfectly clear. Perhaps the Presiden

D ecem ber 1 2 . M oscow sent a p a rticu la rly

and Kissinger, both of whom quite clearly were

important message to Nixon: “Our contacts with

frustrated by their inability to influence events on

Prime Minister Indira Gandhi suggest that the

the subcontinent, impulsively organised T

Indian government does not intend to take any

and sent it on its way in a final effort to

m ilitary action against West Pakistan". With

world that America was not to be taken lig

noticeable relief, Kissinger said that was good

More likely, they wanted to show China tha

news. At the same tim e, he com plained that

US was a relevant military actor in that part o

Indian assurances lacked clarity and called upon

world and had the will to deploy military P°we,rng

us to con tin u e close co n su lta tio n s in the a situation in which a Soviet client was

confidential channel. But what really mattered

a Chinese ally. In either case, my hunch is ^ ^

was that, after taking Pakistan’s side as a payoff

the gesture was untimely and futile. ^ ut

_ nS

for helping open up China, Nixon and Kissinger

just a hunch. Mrs Gandhi may have had desi

had to rely on Moscow’s word that India would

on West Pakistan as well as East Pakistan

not attack West Pakistan”.

arrival o fT G 74 may have caused her to—

*

Ibid.

•• Ibid.

162/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

RECONSTRUCTED TRACKS OF THE DEPLOYMENT TO THE INDIAN OCEAN

IN DECEM BER 1971 OF THE AMERICAN NAVY'S ENTERPRISE TASK GROUP

A N D SOVIET NAVY'S AND MISSILE CRUISER TASK GROUPS

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twice. In other words, the gesture may have been

themselves would not have been decisive

extremely timely and useful. Until the private

"Another important consideration for the Us

papers of the “lady” are made public, no one will

government was the presence o f a Soviet naval

know for sure”.

force in the Indian Ocean. When the war began

the USSR had only a small force on station two

In their book “War and Secession", Richard

destroyers, two minesweepers, and an oiler. But

Sisson and Leo Rose state:'

on 6 December a three-ship Soviet naval force

“On 10 December, the Enterprise and four escorts

including a missile cruiser, left Vladivostok, and

were ordered to sail from their station in the Gulf

on 13 December a second task force, consisting of

of Tonkin towards Singapore. On 12 December,

four ships, including a missile cruiser and missile

they met another naval detach m en t o ff the

destroyer, was dispatched to the Indian Ocean

Singapore coast and on 14 December, after two

from V ladivostok-u n der im m ediate American

days' unexplained delay, sailed down the Strait of

su rveillan ce, o f cou rse. Th e first task force

Malacca during the dayligh t hours into the

entered the Indian Ocean only on 18 December

northernmost section of the Bay of Bengal. Task

and the second on 24 December, both after the

Force 74 then turned south and was operating in

war had ended: thus neither served as a deterrent

the Indian Ocean to the southeast of Sri Lanka

to the Enterprise during the couple of days Task

when Dhaka surrendered on 16 December and

Force 74 was in the war zone while the war was

the war ended the next day with the cease-fire on

goin g on. T h is also ca lls in to question the the western front. It remained in this general

frightening accounts in some American sources

area until 7 January, when it rejo in ed the

about how close the United States and the Soviet

Seventh Fleet off the Vietnam coast.

Union were to a naval confrontation during the

“A number of explanations and accusations

war. Whether the Enterprise task force served any

have been made concerning the objectives of Task

useful purpose is doubtful. But it can be safely

Force 74, none of which are very persuasive. One

assumed that it was basic American policy that,

that received considerable attention at the tirne,

in any crisis in the Indian Ocean area in which

particularly in India, was the report that the

the Soviet Union had a fleet immediately a va ila b le

Enterprise was to be used to rescue Americans

(as happened again in the 1973 Arab-Israeli war),

trapped in Dhaka. But as the Am ericans who

an American naval detachment would be sent in

wanted to leave Dhaka had already been flown

as well, even if there were no obvious tasks, for it

out on 12 December, two days before the task

to perform”.

force left Singapore, a rescue mission made no

In his m em oirs “The W hite House Years , Dr

sense, and nothing in the orders to the task force

Kissinger states:**

referred to this subject. Indeed, the orders to the

Enterprise were ambiguous and all-inclusive-

“ Our p aram ou n t con cern transcended the

nam ely, to con du ct “naval, air and su rface

su bcon tin en t. The S oviet U nion could hav

operations as directed by higher authority in

restrained India; it chose not to. It had, in ac ^

order to support US interests in the Indian Ocean

a c tiv e ly en cou raged w ar by signing

area” - not specifically in the Bay of Bengal.

Friendship Treaty, giving diplomatic suppo

“Kissinger and Nixon have generally tended to

India’s maximum demands, airlifting m

a t

explain and ju stify the Enterprise episode in

supplies, and p led gin g to veto lnconvenJLe

b road er g e o p o litica l term s, p rim a rily the resolu tion s in the UN Secu rity C ůnc * * .s

supposed im pact o f this sym bolic gesture o f

Soviets encouraged India to exploit P a k is

^

support for our Pakistani “ally" on China, just at travail in part to deliver a blow to our syste.

the time when the United States was beginning

alliances, in even greater measure to demons

the process of norm alizing relations with the

C hinese im potence. Since it was a co?1.ven

People s Republic. Some others in the State

concern about S oviet power that had r

^

Department placed greater importance on the

P e k i n g

and

W ash in gton

together,

impact of American support of a Muslim state on

demonstration o f American irrelevance

the international Islamic community. Both were

severely strain our precarious new re*a^ OTlSour

factors th at were considered, but in and o f

with China. Had we followed the advice o

*

Pages 263 et seq.

** India Today November 1-15, 1979.

164/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

critics - m assive public dissociation from

Pakistan and confrontation with it in its moment

The treaty with Pakistan was identical to

several other bilateral and multilateral

of desperation - we would have been operating

agreements - all of which our pronouncements

precisely as the US - Soviet condominium so

seemed to cast into doubt. And it had been

dreaded by Peking; this almost surely would have

buttressed in the case of Pakistan by many

undone our China initiative.

additional assurances of support. The fact was

“ Nor were we defending only abstract

that over the decades of our relationship with

principles of international conduct. The victim of

Pakistan, there had grown up a complex body of

the attack was an ally - however reluctant many

communications by the Kennedy and Johnson

were to admit it - to which we had made several

administrations, going beyond the 1959 pact,

exp licit prom ises concerning precisely this

some verbal, some in writing, whose plain import

contingency. Clear treaty commitments

was that the United States would come to

reinforced by other undertakings dated back to

Pakistan’s assistance if she was attacked by

1959. One could debate the wisdom of these

India. In an aide memoirs of 5 November 1962.

undertakings (and much of our bureaucracy was

the United States promised assistance to

so eager to forget about them that for a time it

Pakistan in case of Indian aggression.

proved next to impossible even for the White

“Pakistan, moreover, was an ally of other

House to extract copies of the 1962

allies - Iran, Turkey - and a friend of Saudi Arabia

communications), but we could not ignore them.

and Jordan, then isolated in a still largely radical

To do so would have disheartened allies like Iran

Middle East. And it was a friend of China and in

and Turkey, which sympathized with Pakistan,

close touch with a Peking that was gingerly

had the same commitment from us, and looked to

feeling its way toward a new relationship with us

our reaction as a token of American steadiness in

based on the hope that we could maintain the

potential crises affecting them. High stakes were

global equilibrium. A reputation for unreliability

therefore involved. On December 5, I told Nixon

Was not something we could afford.

that the India-Pakistan conflict would turn into a

“Pakistan was an ally to which we had treaty

dress rehearsal for the Middle East in the spring.

commitments backed up by private assurances;

“There was no question of “saving’ East

its fate would thus affect the attitudes of several

Pakistan. Both Nixon and I had recognized for

key countries that had rested their security on

months that its independence was inevitable, war

American promises. It would be watched carefully

was not necessary to accomplish it. We strove to

by China. And those countries in the Middle East

preserve West Pakistan as an independent state,

eager to settle the issue by force could easily be

since we judged India’s real aim was to

tempted to adopt militaiy means. And if its policy

encompass its disintegration. We sought to

in the sub-continent succeeded too easily, the

prevent a demonstration that Soviet arms and

Soviet Union might resort to comparable tactics

diplomatic support were inevitably decisive in

in other volatile areas - as indeed it later did when

Watergate had sapped Executive authority. The

crises

“We had to become sufficiently threatening to

dismemberment of Pakistan by military force and

discourage similar moves by Soviet friends in

its eventual destruction without any American

o t h e r a r e a s , e s p e c i a l l y t h e M id d le E a s t A n d i f w e reaction thus would have profound international

a c t e d w i t h e n o u g h d a r i n g , w e m i g h t s t o p t h e repercussions.

I n d i a n o n s l a u g h t b e fo r e it e n g u l f e d a n d s h a t t e r e d

“Because of India’s access to Soviet arms and

a large arms industiy of its own, India was bound

West Pakistan.

“W e w e r e c o n c e r n e d t h a t a P a k i s t a n i a t t a c k in to crush Pakistan’s armed forces. Our minimum

t h e W e s t w o u l d m e r e l y s u p p l y t h e f in a l p r e t e x t for aim had to be to demonstrate that we would not

I n d l a S c o m p l e t e t h e d i s i n t e g r a t i o n o f a l l o f compound our weakness by fatuousness. We had

to act in a manner that would give pause to

Pakistan.

“On D e c e m b e r 2. Pakistani Ambassador Raza

potential Soviet adventures elsewhere, especially

Hplivered a letter from Yahya to President Nixon

in the Middle East, where Egypt’s President had

invoking Article I of the 1959 bilateral agreement

now proclaimed 1972 as another year of decision.

between the United States and Pakistan as the

“In foreign policy. Bismarck once said

is for US aid to Pakistan. The American

“courage and success do not stand in a causal

obligation to Pakistan was thus formally raised.

relationship, they are identical". Nixon had many

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/165

faults, but in crises he was conspicuously

precisely the m argin o f uncertainty n eed ed

courageous. An aircraft carrier task force that we

force a decision by New Delhi and Moscow”

had alerted previously was now ordered to move

Mr Anatoly Dobrynin’s memoirs state:*

toward the' Bay o f Bengal, ostensibly for the

evacuation of Americans but in reality to give

“T h e S oviet U n io n ’s d ip lom a tic intervention emphasis to our warnings against an attack on

h elped p re v e n t th e m ilita ry con flict from West Pakistan. We held it east o f the Strait of

sp rea d in g to th e p oin t w h ere it would have Malacca, about 24 hours steaming distance from

resulted in a total defeat and breakup of West

the Bay of Bengal, because I wanted to consult

Pakistan, not ju st an amputation of its eastern

the Chinese before we made our next move. In

province fifteen hundred miles away. I suspect

explaining the purpose of the Fleet movement to

that Pakistan’s arrogant behaviour at the start of

Mel Laird (American Defence Secretaiy), I pointed

the conflict was probably to some degree fostered

out that we recognized the Indian occupation of

by manipulative American diplomacy, which left

East Pakistan as an accom plished fact; our

the im pression that the United States would

objective was to scare o ff an attack on West

strongly be on Pakistan ’s side, but, if so, the

Pakistan. (I did not add that we also wanted to

Nixon administration failed to fulfill the Pakistani

have forces in place in case the Soviet Union

military regime’s great expectations. Pakistan,

pressured China.) As always in crises, Laird was

actually an American ally, lost half of its territory.

staunch and supportive. When I met Huang Hua,

“The final word came in January when we

he came to the real Chinese concern - that a

began work with Kissinger on the details of the

precedent was being set by which other countries

summit. A dm itting that he had been unduly

might be dism em bered by In d ia n -S o v ie t

nervous about Soviet intentions during the Indo-

collusion. I told him that the United States would

Pakistan War, he virtually admitted that he had

not be indifferent to further Soviet moves.

taken some “unreasonable steps” at the time. He

“Our Fleet passed throu gh the S tra it o f

acknowledged that our assurance about India s

Malacca into the Bay of Bengal and attracted

in te n tio n s at the c ritic a l m om ent was a much media attention. W ere we threaten in g

breakthrough in ending the war. For him, that

India? Were we seeking to defend East Pakistan?

was an extraordinary confession but not one that

Had we lost our m inds? It was in fact sober

he made in public”.

calculation. We had some 72 hours to bring the

war to a conclusion before West Pakistan would

Indian Reactions

be swept into the maelstrom. It would take India

that long to shift its forces and mount an assault.

Mr Peter S i n a i was D irector ( B a n g l a d e s h ) in the.

Once P a k ista n ’ s Arm y and A ir Force w ere

Ministry of External Affairs in 1971. He recalls.

destroyed, its impotence would guarantee the

“On 14th December, the Political C o u n s e l l o r in country’s eventual disintegration. We had to give

the US E m bassy in D elhi sou ght an ur^e>eX

the Soviets a warning that matters might get out

meeting in MEA with me and handed over a e

of control on our side too. We had to be ready to

copy o f US Defence Secretary M e lv y n L a ^ g

back up the Chinese if at the last moment they

statement that the Carrier Group ENTL

^

came in after all, UN initiative having failed. The

had been ordered to proceed to the Bay °

j

Krem lin needed an excuse to accelerate the

“for evacu ation and oth er contingenc e

pressures it claimed it was exerting on India.

poin ted out th a t all US n a tion a ls

es

^

However unlikely an Am erican m ilitary move

evacuation had already been evacuatea

against India, the other side could not be sure; it

demanded to know for whom “evacua o

«

might not be willing to accept even the minor risk

intended and w hat the "other continue

^

that we might act irrationally. It was also the best

might be. Mr Irwin said that his instruc °

nt.

m eans to sp lit the S oviet Union and India.

only to deliver the Defence Secretary s ®

Moscow was prepared to harass us; it was in our

“I r u s h e d th e m e s s a g e to Mr DP D I » r .

judgem ent not prepared to run military risks.

Moving the carrier task force into the Bay of

Bengal committed us to no final act, but it created

Ibid.

166/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

message to the South Block War Room. The

In their book War and Secession" Richard Sisson

immediate reaction of the naval personnel there

and Leo Rose state:**

was one of incredulity and concern. Awareness

that the range of the aircraft on the ENTERPRISE

“As several responsible Indian officials around

posed a threat to VIKRANT and other naval

the Prime Minister and in the Defence Ministry

vessels op ating off Chittagong well before they

noted in comments to the authors, there were no

could be in any position to retaliate was the main

apprehensions that the US Fleet would intervene

expression of that concern”.

in the East Pakistani campaign or indeed that it

could do much in that sector. New Delhi

Captain (later Vice Admiral) MK Roy, was the

recognised that the dispatch of the Fleet was a

Director of Naval Intelligence in 1971. In his book

symbolic gesture intended to impress China and

“War in the Indian Ocean", he states:*

the Islamic states in Southwest Asia as well as to

counter the reinforced Soviet fleet in the Indian

“The composition of the US Task Force as seen

Ocean".

from satellite photographs included the nuclear-

propelled aircraft carrier ENTERPRISE, the

In his book ‘No Way But Surrender’, Vice Admiral

am phibious assault ship, TRIPOLI with

Krishnan states:***

helicopters, and an escort of three guided missile

“At about 5.30 PM on the eighth day of the war,

ships, four destroyers, nuclear attack

Friday, 10 December, we intercepted a signal to

submarines and tankers. Prime Minister Gandhi

the effect that the US Navy was sending ships into

arrived early in the Naval War Room and queried

the Bay of Bengal, for possible withdrawal of the

Admiral Nanda as to the implications of this US

Pakistani Army.

move. I was asked to give a quick appreciation of

“I also spoke to Admiral Nanda regarding the

the capabilities of the US Task Force. I concluded

7th Fleet but he had heard no more than what

by stating that it could be any of the

was in the signal. We ended our conversation on

undermentioned operations:

the note that we should not be surprised by

anything that happened from now onwards.

•

In te r v e n e by invitation as the ENTERPRISE

“None of us ever fell for the gimmick that the

co u ld w re st aerial supremacy over the skies

Fleet's object was to evacuate a handful of

o f East Pakistan. The marines could then be

American subjects from Dacca. You do not

a irlifte d a sh o re by helicopters to assist the require an elephant gun to shoot at a flea.

Pakistan Army. This was however thought to

Obviously, her primary intention was to frighten

b e im p r a ctica l as the Vietnam war was not

us into withdrawing our forces from the

operational area and let the escape ships break

.

f n t e r p o s e ' b e t w e e n ^ h e c o a s tlin e and the out. Suppose we didn't scare that easily and

persisted in our stranglehold on Bangladesh?

Evacuation of any but a handful of troops was a

p,nrt.curM y Involving the p .™ of Chittagong

possibility, using helicopters. Clearly the use of

S SSi j-s- rsKE

heavier and very powerful aircraft was quite out

.

of the question as. however thorough the

c a p a c it y to ev

onaJ arms to ships in

temporary repairs, the runways of both

d iv is io n w i t h t h e i P

^ w o u ] d t h e n b e

Chittagong and Dacca had taken considerable

in tern ation a

t them t0 west Pakistan

beating.

P O » ib l« “ 'r ‘ X

. helr Army f « , „ g tho

“The offensive capabilities of the Fleet,

by sea to b

after the surrender

therefore, consisted of:

impending att

^ pakjstan and US were

•

Landing up to a marine battalion as an

in East

actions imposed on civilian

assault group using helicopters

aware of the

Raiiways in order to

•

Using the ENTERPRISE’S aircraft for ground

traffic by tn

^ Indian divisions from the

expeditiously

theatre of operations".

support role

Eastern to tne v________ _____________________

•

Pages 212 et seq.

•• Page 217.

••• Ibid.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/167

•

Providing close support against aircraft

and continuous air umbrella till they j0-

attacking their fleet and

the surface forces of the Seventh Fleet

•

Surface and aerial attack on Indian warships.

"Having thought out the various possibilities

“We did not know if the marine battalion was

it was necessary to plan out our line of action

carried on board the TRIPOLI at the time but even

Clearly, everything turned on the merchant ships

assuming that they were, how were they going to

assembled in Chittagong for the actual troop

land them ashore except by helicopters. It was

ca rryin g.

Not an in s ta n t m ust be lost in

quite obvious that manpower-wise, landing some

destroying or so heavily damaging them as to

2,000-odd persons was not going to materially

make them totally immobile. Time was running

alter the land battle in which som e 93,000

out.

soldiers were gasping for breath!

“ H avin g sp en t the w h ole forenoon of 11

“It was unthinkable that they would commit

December on the above thoughts and a series of

their aircraft on a ground support role against

discussions with Admiral Nanda as well as my

our army or air force or wantonly attack our naval

army colleague Jagjit Aurora, I signalled the Fleet

forces at sea. If they did, it would possibly mean

at 1.15 PM as follows:

war between the United States and India and, as I

said to my colleagues in the Maritime Operations

•

A p p re c ia te enem y w ith sen ior officers

Room, "that might mean the end of the world or

including FOCEP planning major breakout

the Americans would find in us a Vietnam to end

and will tiy to get away by hugging the coast.

all Vietnams.

S enior o fficers may try to escape by air.

“To my way o f thinking, the most effective

Approaches to harbour likely to be mined.

method o f helping the Pakistanis would be to

•

Your mission (i) Put Chittagong airport out of

close Chittagong within range of their air power,

commission: (ii) Attack ships in harbour by

put up a fo rm id ab le air u m b rella over the air and surface units if they break out.

merchant ships awaiting escape and actually

•

T h is is u n dou btedly the most important

provide air escort for them till they reached the

mission o f the war in the East. The enemy

waiting fleet. They knew that our tiny force of

ships must, I repeat, must, be destroyed.

aircraft from V IK R A N T could n ever hope to

Good Luck.

challenge the air cover and we could at best

“The results of the day's work were summed up

watch the trapped animals getting away from our

by FOCEF in a sign al to FO C-IN-C EAST as

clutches.

follows:

“Summing up the appreciation, we came to

the following conclusions:

BE PLEASED TO REPORT THAT AT THE END OF

TW E N TY-FO U R HOURS OF CONTINUOUS

•

A critical point was being reached in the war

SORTIES COMMENCING 111930 INVOLVING

and the Pakistanis were desperate and would

CONSTANT ALIZE RECCE AND BOMBING ANU

try to break out at the earliest opportunity.

TWENTY EIGHT HAWK SORTIES, COX BA^ N

•

For this pu rpose, they had at lea st five

AND CH ITTAG O NG A IR FIE LD HAVE

merchant ships ready and camouflaged in

RENDERED IN O PE R ATIV E IN THE

C h ittagon g. T h ey had m ade d esperate

FUTURE. THERE IS NO MERCHANT SHIP

attempts to make the runway at Chittagong

ANY SIZE IN THE CHITTAGONG I_IARBO

sufficiently serviceable to take light aircraft

APPROACHES WHICH HAS NOT BEEN s1^ li rE

and helicopters.

AND INCAPACITATED. THERE IS A c o M ^ ,| RE

•

The safe arrival of the convoy RK 623 would

ABSENCE OF SHIPPING ALONG THE EN

be the s ta rtin g p oin t o f p u ttin g their

COAST FROM CHALNA EASTWARD THR^ m D

“Scorched Earth Plan” into action.

MEGHNA SANDWIP UP TO COX'S B A Z A K t

•

The removal o f VIKRANT from the scene of

SOUTHWARD.

operations viould ease the way to a break out.

The Pakistanis m ust have hoped that we

“In addition to the air strikes, we also

would withdraw VIKRANT to “get out of the

to carry out a surface bombardment o ^

way of the Seventh Fleet”.

Bazar to obviate even a m arginal use o

•

A break-out of ships could be facilitated by

aerodrome there by any type of aircraft.

the Seventh Fleet providing an impregnable

168/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

"There could now be no question whatsoever

the nonchalant attitude o f the G overnm ent of

of evacuation of the West Pakistani Army by sea

India".

and General Manekshaw’s warning: “Nobody can

reach you from the sea. Chittagong, Chalna.

A n a ly s is and C o m m e n t

Khulna, Mongla are all totally blocked." was entirely meaningful.

The basic issue which precipitated the despatch of

“To make absolutely sure. I thought of a

the ENTERPRISE Task Group towards India was

deception and sent this signal to Naval

America s assessment that after completing

Headquarters.

operations in East Pakistan. India would move its

I SUBMIT THAT SHOULD GOVERNMENT

forces to regain territory in Pakistan Occupied

DECIDE TO PREVENT SEVENTH FLEET

Kashmir. In the face of the Indian onslaught, the

APPROACHING CHITTAGONG IN ORDER TO

Pakistan Army and Air Force in the West would be

BUY TIME SUGGEST ANNOUNCE THAT MINING

shattered. The elimination of armoured and air forces

OF APPROACHES HAS BEEN CARRIED OUT.

would make West Pakistan defenceless and it would

FOR FAVOUR OF CONSIDERATION".

then disintegrate. America was well aware that

Pakistan Occupied Kashmir was disputed territory

Lt Gen Jacob who was Chief of Staff. Eastern

and not recognised by India as part of West Pakistan.

Army HQ, recalls:

However, since the disintegration of West Pakistan,

an American ally, was totally unacceptable. America

“Admiral Krishnan was very worried. He rang me

disregarded every Indian assurance that it had no

up on 14 December and asked "What is this

intention of attacking West Pakistan or taking any

about”? I told him “I am already talking to Lt Gen

Pakistani territory. Instead America kept on seeking

Niazi about his surrender. If on the 14th, the

assurances that India would not try to regain

Americans are in the Straits of Malacca and the

territory in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir.

cease fire is to come on the 15th, how can the

Mr LK Jha was India’s ambassador in

American naval task group move up to the North

Washington in 1971. Responding to Mr Kissingers

Bay of Bengal in time to give them any help? Why

memoirs, he stated:**

then are you worried"? He seemed to be obsessed

with the ENTERPRISE Task Group. I don’t know

‘Turning now to the second charge that India was

why”.

determined to dismember West Pakistan.

Kissinger makes much of the fact that while I

In his book ‘We Dared’ Admiral SN Kohli states:*

gave the assurance that we had no intention

whatever of making any territorial gains in the

“On one of my visits to the Soviet Union, Admiral

West, with respect to portions of Kashmir under

Gorshkov mentioned to me that he had a

Pakistani occupation I could give no such specific

“brigada" o f submarines following the

assurance. Kissinger concedes, what the USA

ENTERPRISE squadron. It is now known that

was not prepared to admit at the time, that “on

Gorshkov surfaced all the Soviet nuclear

December 3 he (President Yahya Khan) launched

submarines in the Indian Ocean when the US

his army into an attack in the West". Then, the US

satellite was overhead the 7th Fleets incursion

asked me for assurances from India of a kind

into the Bay of Bengal".

which would reward Pakistan for its attack by our

Prof PN Dhar, the Secretary to the Prime Minister

agreeing to treat Pakistan Occupied Kashmir

(POK) on par with the other provinces of Pakistan.

in 1971, recalls:

Further Kissinger does not bring on record that,

" T h e i m p r e s s i o n t h a t t h e E N T E R P R I S E w a s a while giving India’s answer. I also asked Under

r e s p o n s e to t h e S o v i e t m o v e to h e l p u s i s j u s t not Secretary Irwin whether he was in a position to

c o r r e c t . T h e E N T E R P R I S E g r o u p w a s fo llow ed by give India the counter assurance that if Pakistan

t h e S o v i e t s a n d n o t t h e o t h e r w a y r o u n d . T h e succeeded in occupying any part of Jammu and

S o v i e t s d i d t e ll u s w h e r e t h e E N T E R P R I S E w a s .

Kashmir across the cease-fire line it would not

t h e y h a d t h e i r o w n w a y o f c h e c k i n g o n annex it to POK. If not. I asked, how could India

E N T E R P R I S E ’S p r o g r e s s a n d t h e y d i d k e e p u s possibly give a one-sided assurance to USA on

i n f o r m e d a b o u t t h a t . A n d t h a t i s w h y t h e the subject? Jack Irwin admitted that he had no

A m e r i c a n E m b a s s y h e r e w a s a little s u r p r i s e d a t

*

pajje 21 •

•• India Today November 1-15 1979.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/169

such assurance in his pocket and he could not,

doorstep on the Punjab border. It was

without asking Pakistan, give it to me. He was

preferable

by far to keep it fu rth e r aw ay on Pakistn -

without a positive response from Pakistan till the

Western border".

dn s

day on which India declared a unilateral ceasefire".

It is clear from Mr Dobrynin’s account that at the highest geopolitical level, both America and Russia This American uncertainty on India’s intentions

clearly knew each others moves and were acting in in Pakistan Occupied Kashmir was compounded by

concert to minimise escalation.

America’s specific treaty commitments to support

W h ilst the gestu re o f sen din g American and

Pakistan against Indian aggression. In the context of

Russian naval task groups towards the Bay of Bengal

the global geopolitical considerations recounted by

evoked public appreciation in Pakistan and India

Mr Kissinger, America’s despatch of the ENTERPRISE

respectively, there were no risks of any clash between Naval Task Group was a sym bolic gesture, and

the opposing naval task groups. Indeed, there is a Russia’s sending its Naval Task Group was an equally

view that the surfacing o f the Soviet submarines symbolic gesture. India’s unilateral offer of a cease

when a US satellite was passing overhead was to fire reassured all concerned that India had nothing to

enable the American Task Group to know where the

gain from the disintegration of West Pakistan.

Soviet submarines were and thus avoid incidents due

Dr KB Lall, who was the Defence Secretary in

to mistaken identity.

1971, recalls:

In India, the political level accurately recognised

the deployment of the ENTERPRISE Task Group as a

“After Gen Niazi’s surrender on 16 Dec, lengthy

sym bolic gesture. At the naval level, there was

discussions were held in New Delhi regarding a

considerable concern. Vigorous action was taken by

unilateral cease fire. There were two schools of

the Eastern Naval Command to thwart possible

thought. One in favour of an immediate unilateral

attempts to evacuate troops from East Pakistan.

ceasefire. The other in favour of consolidating the

A fte r the war. the ENTE R PR ISE incident

gains made before d ecla rin g a u n ila tera l

awakened awareness at the higher decision making

ceasefire. I recall a discussion on whether the

levels in India of the finesse with which naval forces disintegration o f West Pakistan was at all in

could fa c ilita te dip lom acy.

T h is awareness,

India’s interest. My view was and is that the

combined with the public appreciation of the Navys

disintegration of West Pakistan would only serve

oth er ach ievem en ts in the 1971 war, helped to to bring the tu rm oil o f C entral A sia to our reinforce naval proposals for a stronger Navy.

The Amphibious Landing at Cox’s Bazar

Operation Beaver

Preamble

The seizure of East Pakistan’s Pussur river^°my

of Khulna- Chalna-Mongla was to be a purely

^

The Army’s initial plans for military operations did

operation. W hilst w orking out their plan

n

not envisage the need for any amphibious operation.

occu p ation o f te rrito ry in East P a i utta

The Army would help in occupying territory in East

Headquarters Eastern Army Command in

0f

Pakistan from which the Provisional Government of

foresaw the problem of how to ferry large num e

Bangladesh would operate. With the help of their

troops across the River Meghna. Maj Gen Jaco •

Mukti Fauj and the Mukti Bahini. the Provisional the Chief of Staff in Eastern Command Headqu ^aS

Government would gradually enlarge the area under

in 1971. In his book "Surrender at D a cca ,

its control until the eventual liberation of Bangladesh stated:*

from Pakistan. The ten million refugees in India could

then return to their homes.

“ I had ea rlier asked the Flag

Commanding-in-Chief Eastern Naval Con*—^— -

•

Pages 62.

170/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Vice A d m ir a l Krishnan. whether we could use his So it was a futile exercise to plan an amphibious

l a n d i n g c r a f t to fe r r y t ro o p s a c r o s s the river o p e r a t io n . H ow ever, c e r ta in fo r c e s w e r e M eghna. C dr Dabir, w ho had brought one of them

earmarked by the Arm y in case the eventuality

to C a lc u t t a in J u n e, stated that landing craft of arose".

R u s s i a n o r i g i n w e r e u n s u i t a b l e du e to their d r a u g h t . T h e q u e s t io n o f cro s sin g the Meghna T h o u g h a m p h i b io u s o p e r a t io n s w e r e n o t had to be shelved and w e shifted our attention to s p e c i f ic a l ly lis t e d in the ta s k s w h ic h N a v a l t h e

p o s s i b i l i t y

o f o b t a i n i n g

a d d it io n a l

Headquarters gave to Eastern Naval Command, the

h e licop te rs” .

F O C IN C E A S T ’s plan ca tered for an a m p h ib i o u s assault. Th e three amphibious ships (LSTs) in the

V ic e A d m i r a l N K r is h n a n w as the F lag Officer Navy were the old. Sfccond World War. Landing Ship C o m m a n d i n g in C h i e f E a s t e r n N a v a l C om m an d M A G A R and the two newer, smaller, P o lish bu ilt (F O C IN C E A S T ). In his book “No Way But Surrender"

Landing Ships, the GHARIAL and the GULDAR. All

he states:*

three LSTs were already in Eastern Naval Command

and w e r e c o n s t it u t e d as the 4th L a n d i n g C r a ft

“ S in c e o u r aim w a s on all em bracing one of the Squadron. “4th LS.”

d e s t r u c t i o n o f e n e m y forces, our plan required In the months till December 1971, M A G A R was

f l e x i b i l i t y w h e r e i n s e v e r a l o p t io n s w ou ld be m o d ifie d to c a r r y oil fo r r e f u e l l i n g V I K R A N T .

i n d i v i d u a l l y or c o l l e c t i v e l y im p le m e n t e d .

GHARIAL and GULDAR continued to be deployed for

A cco rd in g ly an om nibus plan was evolved. One of logistic duties, ferrying men. rations, s p a r e s and the c o u r s e s o f a ction in this om nibus plan was stores to the-E astern F lee t and to the A n d a m a n

" D iv e r s io n a r y or real a m p h ib io u s landings" for Islands.

w h ic h e l e m e n t s o f the Naval Garrison from the On 1 December, Naval H ea dq u arters in form ed

A n d a m a n s w ould be trained."

Eastern Naval C om m and at V is a k h a p a t n a m and E a s t e r n A r m y C o m m a n d at C a l c u t t a t h a t an In

S e p t e m b e r

1971,

A r m y

and

N aval

a m p h ib io u s l a n d in g m a y be r e q u i r e d to la n d a H e a d q u a r t e r s

s t u d i e d

t h e

i m p l i c a t i o n s

o f

battalion o f the Arm y and an elem ent o f the Naval u n d e r t a k i n g a n a m p h i b i o u s o p e r a t i o n in East Garrison at Cox’s Bazar.

P a kista n in case this contingency arose. In his book On 2 December. M A G A R and G U L D A R w e r e in

‘S a ilin g and S o ld ie r in g in Dcfence o f India . Cdr SD

th e A n d a m a n s , and G H A R I A L w a s e n r o u t e to S in h a , w h o w a s s e r v in g in Naval H eadquarters in Paradeep from Visakhapatnam.

1971. has stated:**

In response to Pakistan’s air a ttacks on Indian

“A n o p e r a t io n o f la n d in g troops south o f Cox s airfields on the evenin g o f 3 Decem ber, full sc a le B a z a r from s h ip s had been mooted as early as hostilities against East Pakistan co m m e n ce d on 4

December. By 8 December, the Indian troops w hich

S e p t e m b e r 1971. C d r V erno n F Rebello, along had entered from West Bengal had captured Jessore

w ith an A r m y Lt Col and m yself were formed up and arrived at the ferry on the River Madhumati. The

as a pla nnin g g roup in Naval/Army HQ. However,

Indian troops which had advanced from eastward in

a f t e r a b o u t a m o n t h , th e o p e r a t io n w as Tripura were within reach o f three key points on the

cancelled".

e a s t e r n b a n k o f t h e R iv e r M e g h n a : A s h u g a n j , Cdr Rebello recalls:

D a u d k a n d i and C h a n d p u r, the c a p t u r e o f w h ic h would lay open the a p p ro a ch es to D acca from the

"One o f the options being considered was that an east. India n tro op s w e r e a lso a d v a n c i n g t o w a r d s a m p h ib io u s la n d in g m ight be required in East Dacca from the north.

P a k is ta n . T h e r e w a s c o n c e r n th a t the Unite The Eastern A rm y’s rapid advance between 4 and

S tates m ig h t la n d an a m p h ib io u s force in the 8 D e c em b e r led to an a s s e s s m e n t t h a t P a k is ta n i vicinity o f C hittagong and establish a beachhead

t ro o p s m ig h t a t t e m p t to e s c a p e s o u t h w a r d in to so that Pakistan's right to the territory would be

Burma past Cox’s Bazar.

maintained.

Captain (later Admiral) Dawson, was the Director

" B u t

t h e p l a n n e r s n e i t h e r had any

o f Naval Operations in 1971. He recalls:

intelligence o f the area, nor the wherewithal nor

prop er charts nor gradients o f feasible beaches.

•

Page 28.

•* Page 154.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/171

“At the height of the land battle in East Pakistan,

belts, scrambling nets or suitable landing cr

it became evident that the Pakistan Army,

and most importantly, the troops he wanted us t

numbering about 90,000 troops would try to

send (ie the Gurkhas) had never been to sea H°

retreat from the area by one of the following

cut me short saying that these were the orders of

means:

the three Chiefs of S taff’.

•

By air through Ceylon if that country

Naval Headquarters im m ediately deputed two

permitted the movement or by cutting across

officers to Calcutta. Cdr (later Commodore) RP Bhalla

the southern peninsula of India.

was nominated the Naval Force Commander. He was

•

By sea in Pak merchant ships which were at

accompanied by Cdr VF Rebello who had recently

that time berthed in Chittagong, Khulna and

undergone the Am phibious Warfare Course in the

Chalna.

USA. Cdr Rebello recalls:

•

By the land route into Burma.

“Suddenly, at 3 o’clock in the afternoon of 9

It was assessed that it would not be possible

December, the Director of Naval Operations came

for Pakistan to evacuate the large number of

to me and said “Pack up and go to Calcutta. You

troops by air owing to its inadequate air lift

have to do an amphibious landing. I have fixed up

capabilities. Since the sea lift capability had been

a merchant ship for you. The two LSTs will meet

neutralised by the air strikes from VIKRANT, the

you at sea, you transfer the troops to the LSTs.

only other means available to the Pakistani Army

VIKRANT will give you air cover. One of the gun

was by the land route from Cox’s Bazar to Burma.

frigates will give you gunfire support and will give

To prevent this from happening, it was decided,

you the communication facilities for air support.

though at very short notice, to m ount an.

“W hen w e a rrived in C alcu tta on 10

amphibious landing at Cox’s Bazar’ .

December, the Navy was nowhere to be seen. We

met only the Trade Warfare officer who had gone

On this very same day, 8 Decem ber; • an

and requisitioned a coal carrier, Vishwa Vijay,

Argentinean resolution in the United Nations General

who was carrying bulk coal from C a lc u tta to Assembly, demanding a cease fire and withdrawal of

Tuticorin".

troops, was passed by an overwhelming majority. The

disadvantages o f in d e fin ite ly d efyin g the U N ’s On 10 D ecem ber, Maj Gen Jacob chaired a

ceasefire resolutions which had been stalled, thanks

meeting. Cdrs Bhalla and Rebello were present. Two

to the Soviet Union’s veto, combined with the need to

decisions were taken. The landing scheduled for 1

conclude military operations in East Pakistan as

Decem ber would have to be postponed since t e

swiftly as possible.

troops to be embarked were being pulled out from e

front line and had yet to assemble in Calcutta.

O peration Beaver

second and more important decision, which

,

the nature of the subsequent operations, was

^

On 9 December, the Chiefs of Staff decided to launch

instead of the force being landed in Cox s B^zdx<

^

an amphibious operation to cut off the escape route

would land on a beach further south near the t0'

into Burm a o f any P ak istan i troop s retrea tin g Ukhia. The Army felt that if Pakistani troop8^

southw ards. NHQ d irected the E astern Naval

escaping into Burma, they would first secure

_

Command to carry out Operation Beaver ‘T o land and

Bazar: a landing there would therefore me^

t0

support a battalion group at dawn on 12 December to

opposition. The beach at Reju Creek was c

capture Cox’s Bazar”.

Ukhia town, which was located on the ma_in

In his book, Lt Gen Jacob has stated:*

Burma and a landing on the beach there was

“Gen Manekshaw telephoned me on 9 December

to be opposed.

Commodore Bhalla recalls:

ordering us to send a force by sea to Cox’s Bazar

to prevent Pakistani troops escaping from there

'The place where the amphibious l^ in g [w a s ^

into Burma. I told Gen Manekshaw that there

take place had not been v e r y clear y P

the

was no indication of this, but he was adamant. I

was to take place south ° f Co* ®

practice

pointed p u t that we had no troops trained in

vicin ity o f Reju Creek, w ^ ere , e during the

amphibious operations, that there were no life

amphibious landings had taken p

---- ----

*

Page 124 et seq.

172/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Second World War. Cox’s Bazar was considered to

announced the despatch of a Naval Task Group,

be heavily mined and therefore unsuitable for

headed by the nuclear powered aircraft carrier

landings. It was clear to me that we did not have

ENTERPRISE, towards the Bay of Bengal. This

any detailed knowledge about the beach

resulted in NHQ ordering the immediate embarkation

conditions and also that some runnels were

of troops so that VISHWA VTJAY, the merchant ship

present."

requisitioned for this purpose, could sail from

Cdr Rebello recalls:

Calcutta as early as possible and land the troops on

14 December. VISHWA VIJAY eventually departed

"The beach was selected by Gen Jacob because he

from Sandheads, off Calcutta, in the early hours of 13

had practised on that beach in the Second World

December.

War".

The Regimental History of the 1st Battalion

Gurkha Rifles states:

In his book, Lt Gen Jacob has stated:*

“On 10 December, the battalion was ordered back

“At the meeting in Eastern Command with the

to Fort William to form part of a Task Force

Navy, we discussed the operation. I had taken

“Romeo” under Brig SS Rai which was allotted the

part in several amphibious operations and was

task of moving up the coast of East Pakistan and

aware of the special training and equipment

cutting off the withdrawal routes of enemy forces.

required. I had served in Burma during the

At 1830, hours that same day orders were

Second World War and had trained for

received to move to Kidderpore Docks

amphibious operations on the beaches stretching

immediately for loading into a merchant navy

south of Cox’s Bazar, I was familiar with the

ship, 'VISHWA VIJAY1.

coastline and beaches there. The beach at Ukhia

“Romeo Force’ consisted of 1/3 Gorkha Rifles,

was gently sloping and there were a number of

two Companies 11 Bihar, 881 Light Battery, an

runnels on the approaches to the beaches. I

Ambulance Platoon and an ASC Detachment.

brought this to the notice of the Navy.

“Being a cargo vessel, there was much

“As life belts and other necessary equipment

confusion during the loading as guns, vehicles

were not available and the troops to be used had

and supplies had to be loaded by cranes, whilst

not seen the sea, I persuaded the Navy to beach

the men were to climb a vertical rope gangway up

the landing craft and refloat them at high tide.

the steep sides of the ship, as high as a three-

The troops would then land dry shod. The Navy

storey building. A sad incident occurred when

agreed, but later changed its plan with disastrous

Maj Mastana. AMC, Officer Commanding the

consequences at sea.

Ambulance Platoon slipped off the ropeway into

"The force was to be transported in a

the water between the ship and the dock and was

merchant ship that was to sail on 10 December

drowned. It was an inauspicious start to the

and be in position by 12 December. Two LSTs

venture.

were to transfer the troops from the merchant

“As the high tide off Hooghly River is crucial

ship at sea and land them dry shod. The aircraft

to sailing times, and the loading could not be

carrier VIKRANT was to provide air and fire

completed in time, the ship sailed at 0445 hours

support. The force, code named ‘Romeo’, was

leaving behind most of the supplies of the

hurriedly

assembled.

We

earmarked

Battalion. However, Maj HS Jaswal had the

Headquarters of 8 Mountain Artillery Brigade

presence of mind to rush the stores to the flood

commanded by Brig SS Rai, 1/3 Gurkha Rifles,

gates of the Docks and managed to load all stores

two companies of 11 Bihar and a detachment of

before the ship entered the Hooghly.

artillery. A naval contingent of 150, which was to

“VISHWA VIJAY with a cargo capacity of

participate, did not arrive. The force sailed from

15,000 tons had only limited crew space for living

Calcutta on 12 December, two days behind

and cooking for about 50 to 60 men. Cooking and

schedule".

toilet facilities for 1500 men therefore posed a

major problem onboard’

A s a r e s u lt o f th e A r m y ’s d e la y in em b a rk in g

‘The Battalion was to establish a beachhead

t r o o p s N a v a l H e a d q u a r t e r s h a d to p o s tp o n e near Nidania Airodrome on Ukhia Beach at first

O peration B eaver by two days from 12 D ecem ber to light on 14 December and thereafter erect blocks

1 4 D ecem ber. M ean w h ile on 10 Decem ber, A m erica

*

Ibid.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/173

AMPHIBIOUS L A N D IN G A T COX's B A Z A R - D E C E M B E R 1971

*

BAY OF BENGAL

i e.

B U R M A

Tracks

Dtf4b C oatoua m

at Remu and Idgaon to prevent the escape of East

this effect was made to all concerned and the R/V

Pakistan forces into Burma.

with VISHWA VIJAY was cancelled. When we

“ For the initial landing, fire support was

approached this object, we found that it was an

available from INS VIKRANT. INS BEAS and INS

abandoned boat at anchor. We suspected that

BRAHMAPUTRA. After the landing, fire support

this may be a ploy and that there may be some

was to be given by the Light Battery and own 4.2

explosive charges kept in it. So we fired on this

inch mortars.

boat. After firing, we sent a few personnel to the

"Sailing across the Bay of Bengal on 13

boat. Finally we hoisted this boat on board".

December, the Task Force reached the

rendezvous with INS VIKRANT and LSTs

As a result of MAGAR’s report. VISHWA VIJAY

‘GHARIAL’ and ‘GULDAR’ on the night 13/14

altered course away from the submarine’s reported

December. A submarine alarm postponed the

position. By the time the confusion had cleared and

landing to 15 December.

VISHWA VIJAY resumed course, precious time had

“On night 13/14 December the Battalion was

been lost.

transshipped to the LSTs as follows:

Commodore Bhalla recalls:

A and B Companies

-

INS 'GHARIAL'

“When we were about six to seven hours out of

C and D Companies

-

INS ‘GULDAR’

Calcutta, we received a signal that there was a

with Battalion HQ

submarine which had been sighted right ahead of

us and that we should avoid this. So we hugged

B Echelon of the Battalion remained on VISHWA

the coastline and retired towards Calcutta.Some

VIJAY. Naval divers who had reconnoitered the beach

three or four hours later, we received the signal

raised an 'All Clear’ flag to denote that the beaches

that the coast is clear. That meant that we could

were not mined and no enemy were present’ .

not carry out the landing on 14 December".

VISHWA VIJAY was a bulk coal carrier and

Meanwhile the Flag Officer Commanding Eastern

urgently needed scrambling nets to assist

Fleet. FOCEF. had assembled the landing force for

disembarkation of troops. These were to have been

refuelling in preparation for the operation. Whilst

delivered to her at Sandheads. The scrambling nets

refuelling, the Commanding Officers of GHARIAL and

never arrived and this was later to delay the transfer

GULDAR discussed the forthcoming landing and

of troops from VISHWA VIJAY into the LST s. The

agreed that the site selected for the landing was particulars of frequencies for communicating with

unsuitable. GHARIAL signalled FOCEF that the LSTs

VIKRANT had also been placed on board. VISHWA

required a gradient between 1 to 30 and 1 to 70 and VIJAY for VIKRANT to collect at Sandheads. This too

that available information indicated that the beach

never took place because VIKRANT was busy with air

gradient was not suitable.

strikes. The inability to communicate delayed

VISHWA VIJAY eventually R/V’d the Eastern

VISHWA VIJAY’s R/V with VIKRANT.

Fleet on the night of 13 /14 December. A meeting was

Meanwhile MAGAR had been sailed from

immediately held on board VIKRANT the same night.

Visakhapatnam on night 9/10 December with one

It was decided that:

company of the Andaman Naval Garrison embarked

to rendezvous with VISHWA VIJAY. When VISHWA

•

The landing would take place on the 14th

VIJAY’s sailing got delayed from 10 December to 12

morning as planned.

December, MAGAR was directed to proceed to

•

Troops should start transferring from VISHWA

Paradip and await further instructions. As soon as

VIJAY to the landing ships GHARIAL and

VISHWA VIJAY sailed from Calcutta, MAGAR was

GULDAR as quickly as possible.

given a new position to rendezvous VISHWA VIJAY.

•

BRAHMAPUTRA would land the divers to recce

Enroute to this R/V, MAGAR sighted a yellow object

the beach gradients and place flags at the places

which looked like a submarine.

where the landing ships were to' beach.

Lt (later Commodore) Man Singh was the

•

VIKRANT’s aircraft would provide air support.

Navigating Officer of MAGAR. He recalls:

•

MAGAR would go back to Calcutta to bring the

petrol and medical stores which would be

“It was in the forenoon, on an easterly course that

required by the troops after landing and which

this object was sighted on the horizon. There was

had inadvertently been left behind. As a result,

no doubt in anybody’s mind at that time that this

the Naval Garrison personnel embarked in

was a submarine on surface. A flash signal to

MAGAR would be landed later.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/175

Without scrambling nets, the transfer of troops

the ball is in your court. I remember the reply

and their stores from VISHWA VIJAY to the LST s

came “Go" and I went".

^

during night 13/14 December took longer than

VIKRANT, who had been at sea since 2 December

expected.

was scheduled to refuel at Paradip on 14 December

Cdr Rebello recalls:

The postponement of the landing to 15 December

“We were very lucky when we transferred the

meant that VIKRANT would not be available on the

troops from VISHWA VIJAY to the LSTs.

m orning o f 15 Decem ber. On the 14th, FOCEF

Fortunately, the wind and sea were calm, so we

tra n sferred from V IK R A N T to BRAHMAPUTRA.

were able to do it without any serious problem.

VIKRANT’s aircraft attacked and recce’d the landing

Even then, we had some dicy moments in landing

area before departing for Paradip.

the jeeps and ammunition boxes*’.

On the night of 14/15 December BRAHMAPUTRA

landed the divers by boat. The divers carried out the

It became clear that the landing could not take

beach recce, sent back information that the beach

place at dawn on 14 December. The Naval Force

gradient o f 1 in 40 was suitable for landing and Commander therefore made a signal on the 14th

suggested that the landing ships should beach at

morning, postponing the landing to 15 December.

0530 the next morning when it would be slack water

Cdr Dabir. the CO of GULDAR, recalls:

at low tide.

‘There was a briefing by Cdr Bhalla at which Cdr

Lt Cdr (later Cdr) G Martis was the diving officer

Rebello, Lt Cdr AK Sharma and m yself were

in charge of the beach recce. He recalls:

present on board VISHWA VIJAY. I expressed my

“We landed on the beach ju st after 2100 on 14

anguish at bein g forced to u n d ertak e an

December. Our instructions were to recce the

operation which firstly was most likely to be a

g ra d ien t and give all the oth er information

failure and secondly could have been done by

necessary for a successful landing. At the time we

other means in a surer and cleaner manner.

were carrying out the recce, it was slack water at

“I had s p e c ific a lly said th a t in stead o f low tide. A similar condition was to prevail the

carrying out the ill advised landing on the beach,

next morning at dawn. So we had a clear idea

which had two to five sand bars and a 5 to 6 knot

reg a rd in g the g ra d ien ts and the sandbars.

cross current all the time except for a short period

Between the beach and the deeper water, there

o f slack water, it would be easier to land the

was a bar. We sent a message by hand of the boat

troops in the Cox’s Bazar directly on the jetty or

to FOCEF that the landing ships should come at

via local dhows.

dawn, at the time of slack water at low tide in e

“Lt Cdr Martis came in to confirm that he

morning. We stayed ashore to check whet er

would recce the beach and about 60 to 80 yards

there was any Pakistani build up and found

ere

seaward of the area. The recce’d area would be

wasn’t any".

marked by a set of two flags on the beach.”

Based on the report received from Lt Cdr Martis,

Cdr (la ter Com m odore) AK Sharm a, the CO

FOCEF signalled to the landing force that beac

GHARIAL recalls:

conditions were suitable, that the landing wou

a-

place at 0530 on 15 December and that divers wo

“The first time I had an opportunity to discuss the

mark the spots where the LST’s should beach.

landing with Cdr U Dabir, who was commanding

the GULDAR, was when we were both alongside

Cdr Martis recalls:

the VISHWA VIJAY for embarking troops. He said

"Next morning we were eagerly waiting

to me “1 don’t think this beach is suitable." I said GHARIAL and GULDAR to come. To our,

st a

“Yes. I agree with you, the gradient of 1 in 200 is

we found that both the vessels were a rn

^

not suitable. I am making a signal to FOCEF that

k ilom etre south o f the poin t w hich w

^

we need a gradient of between 1 in 30 and 1 in 70.

recce’d. This took us by surprise. We were ^

“When making the signal to FOCEF that this

position to attract their attention. Afrai

‘ we

beach was unsuitable for beaching because of the

tide may turn and ruin the entire opera i

gradient, I did not wish to give the impression

waved at them. Finally they located us an

ing,

that I was chickening out of the operation. I had

to the correct spot around 0730 in the m

g

therefore said “I am ready for execution in all

by which time the tide had turned.

respects. Request instructions." That meant that heavy swell and the bar on which the

176/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

and GULDAR were to have landed as per our

anchor when about one cable from the beaching

previous recce was fully submerged. Both the

point. The rear anchor wire was paid off

LST’s could not cross the bar.

apparently a little too fast, perhaps to avoid

“Between the bar and the beach, the water

straining the anchor hold during the run in. She

was now deep. The Gurkha soldiers were asked to

put the nose on the last sand bar, which I could

land. Not realising that they were heavily

not make out clearly, opened the forward doors

weighted with rifle, helmet, boots, grenades,

and lowered the landing ramp. This occurred

rations, water etc. one by one they began to

about five minutes before GULDAR made a touch

jump. They might have thought that this is how

down about 2 cables to the north of GHARIAL.

wars were fought. To my horror, one by one they

“While running in. I had deliberately ordered

went down. I shouted to GHARIAL to stop the

trimming the ship with the fore-end down to the

operation, but there was loud music and

maximum extent by flooding the forward ballast

announcements saying “Bhartiya Jawano, jump

tanks. This would ensure that firstly the fore-end

into the water" and all sorts of martial songs were should touch bottom first and thus leave the

being played on the loudspeaker. Finally our

rear-end and propellers clear of bottom.

divers literally had to shout and make desperate

Secondly, the fore-end would thus sit hard in the

signals. Then only they realised that the Gurkhas

mud/loose sand and prevent forward yawing.

were drowning. They were hardly five feet tall. At

The rear anchor was dropped at the earliest

this stage, GULDAR withdrew without landing

calculated point to ensure that the anchor wire

any troops. The landing operation was stopped

stayed at as low an angle as possible. At steep

temporarily. The Gurkha bodies were recovered.

angles, the wire tends to reduce the ships hold in

We managed to revive two. but the other three we

the fore-and aft direction, thus allowing the stern

could not help.

to yaw or drift with the cross-current. Also at

"Then there was an apprehension that the

steep wire angles, the anchor breaks ground hold

remaining Gurkhas would not land because, if

easily, whereas at shallow angles it tends to dig in

they came to know that their comrades were

firmly. The calculations and planning, with

dead, they would not take part in the war. So we

possible alternatives for changing situations, had

were advised to tell them that they were

kept me awake the whole of the previous night.

unconscious and we would take care of them.

Each key officer and sailor, including engine

Their bodies were shifted and thereafter we did

room hands, was briefed individually to report

the landing, passing a rope from the ship to the

back to the bridge any changes or unforeseen

beach and the divers assisting the Gurkhas to get

occurrences in a specific understandable

to the beach holding on to the rope".

manner.

“GULDAR’s fore-end touched down fairly

Cdr Rebello recalls:

hard and dug itself in on what appeared to be the

third sand bar from seaward, leaving about a 100

“I had given specific instructions to the Battalion

yards of water to be traversed to reach the beach.

Commander and to the Company Commander

After lowering the landing ramp, the depth of

that the Gurkhas should remove all their

water between the ships fore-end and the beach

equipment, except their pouches of ammunition

was tested by two sailors wearing lifejackets,

and small arms, and go across. Their remaining

held by a line controlled from the foxle. Their

equipment would be transferred later. But being

boat hooks showed that the depth of water

Gurkhas, they decided that it was against the law

increased sharply after the sand bar on which

to remove their battle order. They went with full

ship’s fore-end rested. When it was seen that the

battle order which means 85 pounds of weight. So

entire boat hook was immersed, the sailors were

what happened was that though they all had their

recalled.

life jackets on, they drowned with their life

“My estimate was that the depth of water

jackets".

would be six feet or even more at the deepest

Cdr Dabir, the CO of GULDAR recalls:

point between the sand bar and the beach. In

consultation with the Army officers on board, we

“Both GHARIAL and GULDAR started the run for

decided that it would be foolhardy to land the

beaching in the early hours, at nearly slack water.

troops, knowing fully well that almost all of them,

GHARIAL went in confidently, let go the rear

being short in height, would be drowned.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/177

Accordingly, I made a signal to FOCEF who was

through water for quite a distance before the

embarked on BRAHMAPUTRA and requested

could get on to the beach. And in that wading

permission to unbeach and anchor off the beach.

process, we lost three Gorkhas. They d r o w n e d in Whilst awaiting reply, we had to drop both the

spite of the fact that we had rigged nylon ropes

forward anchors to prevent too much yawing with

from the bows o f the ship. But these heavily

the increasing surf after the slack water period.

loaded Gorkhas went down and were lost”.

In the meanwhile, I concentrated on seeing what

GHARIAL was doing, through binoculars and a

At this stage, GHARIAL retracted from the beach

telescope. I saw that her stern was sitting on the

and anchored. It was decided that some troops be

bottom and rising fully with the surf.

landed by ships boats. Almost a platoon was landed.

“I immediately requested CO GHARIAL to

Commodore Bhalla recalls:

come on our voice net and told him of the danger

"When I fetched up on the LST, I found that she he was in. I explained that with the stern

had not been able to land the troops with

touching the bottom he may not be able to use the

equipment, but they had landed a platoon or so

propellers at all because of the peculiar design of

ashore, who were patrolling and guarding the

the gearless, high RPM, static clutch propulsion

area around the beach. Seeing that we had lost

system. Further, it appeared that the ship was

our opportu n ity and that su rprise had been

trimmed down aft, which could lead to the bows

completely lost. I swam ashore from the LST to go

loosening from the bottom and tending to swing

and find fishing boats in Cox’s Bazar which could

the ship abeam to the surf. Lt Cdr AK Sharma

ferry the troops ashore".

told me that he would discuss this aspect with

FOCEF and his staff. A short while later, he came

Commodore Sharma recalls:

back on the line to tell me that FOCEF had

“I came off that beach, anchored and informed

considered these aspects and ordered him to land

the troops. Very shortly thereafter, I could see

FOCEF in BRAHMAPUTRA that the gradient was

not suitable. However, I was told by FOCEF that

commotion on GHARlAL’s foxle, which I came to

the troops must be landed and go in. FOCEF was

know later was due to some soldiers getting swept

on board for a long time after my first beaching. I

away by the current. I could barely see these

went in again. This time because the tide had

persons. But from our foxle, some sailors saw the

started receding, I beached on another sand bar

soldiers struggling to hold on to the line which

which was even farther out than the first sand

had been passed from GHARlAL’s fore-end to the

bar. I got stuck and soon a time came when the

beach. It looked as if they w ere fin d in g it ship started broaching, beam on to swell and

impossible to hold on to the line simultaneously

w ind, and it w as becom in g m ore and more

while tiying to hold on to their helmet and rifle.

difficult to save the ship. By then, I had on ^oaT

“ In the m ean w h ile, it was d iffic u lt for

Rear Admiral Sarma FOCEF, the CO of BEAS Cdr

GULDAR to remain beached safely. The surf was

Ramdas and the advisors from NHQ, Cdrs Bha a

increasing and the bows were yaw ing far too

and Rebello. Eveiybody was trying to tell me hovv

much because they were coming up from the

to handle my ship. I remember having to shou

bottom off and on, only to sit again with a small

"Shut up” and FOCEF saying "Yes, let’s leave it to thud. Any more increase in height of surf could

the young man, he knows what he is doing •

lead to heavy dam age to the fore end. The

I must say that I had a lucky break. I tol

inadvisability of landing troops made continuing

Chief Engineer that I will give you just one rT*°

to remain precariously beached an unacceptable

order and do what you can. I ordered Full As e

risk to the ship and the men. I started

Both Engines and somehow the swell came^.^at

unbeaching without awaiting FOCEF’s reply to

at the right time, the engines went astern ^

my signal. W hilst withdrawing, until the stern

time, the ship lifted a little and next thing

anchor w as aw eigh . we had con sid era b le

the ship was receding astern into deeper wa e

difficulty in remaining perpendicular to the surf

and avoid broaching to.”

Cdr Dabir, the CO of GULDAR. recalls:

Commodore., AK Sharma, the CO of GHARIAL recalls:

“Anchored in deeper water, I was able

GHARIAL. What I saw was horrifying.

“When we beached, we found that we were far

was bobbing up and down with the sur

away from dry land and the troops had to wade

178/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

broached to condition and coming down heavily

stern, step by step (or rather tug by tug) towards

on the sea bottom as the troughs passed her. I

deeper waters. The tugs were being applied very

saw the life rafts coming off the ship and her mast

cautiously despite the urgency expressed by

shudder heavily. She appeared to be climbing the

GHARIAL. because of two reasons. Firstly the

sandbar with every successive wave. Her rear

towing wire could take only a limited strain and

anchor seemed to have come off completely.

pulling against the surfs action any quicker

Realising the tremendous danger she was leading

would have resulted in exceeding that strain.

to, we quickly weighed anchor and proceeded as

Secondly, if the tow had parted, it would have

close as possible to GHARIAL. Several attempts

been a Herculean task to pass a hawser again

to have a line passed by Coston Gun proved

and GHARIAL may have again broached to during

unsuccesful. Swimmers with lifejackets were

the time required for repassing the tow.

unable t o take even a heaving line, bccause of the

“On reaching slightly deeper waters.

surf alternately rushing towards and away from

GHARIAL started using her propellers. But I

the beach.

could see that they were not having much effect. I

“Suddenly 1 saw a motor whaler coming

suspected that much of the propeller blades were

towards us with Lt Cdr (later Vicc Admiral) KASZ

damaged or worn out when they were used

Raju in it. How he managed to steer the whaler

against the sand and mud at the sandbar. At this

and keep it from capsizing appeared miraculous.

point, the FOCEF appeared to have become very

What was even a greater miraclc. he was able to

impatient. He ordered me directly on R/T to go

take a cordage line from GULDAR’s bows to

full astern on both props and pull on a

GHARIAL’s stern. Soon we were able to pass a

continuous basis. When I explained to him that

good size wire hawser. GHARIAL appeared to

this would be dangerous for the tow-line as well

have connected the hawser to her rear einchor

as for GHARIAL. he responded that I must go full

cable wire and paid it out under power slowly,

astern regardless of the consequences. I could

before applying brakes.

not disobey this direct order. After a prudent

“As soon as I saw that the wire was not being

interval I started increasing the RPM on the

paid out, a cautious tug was given with only one

astern going engine gradually. Luckily by the

engine going Dead Slow Astern for a short while.

time the tow wire became fully taut, GHARIAL

GHARIAL’s stern seemed to come out ever so little

seemed to be in sufficiently deep water and with

in the first tug. A second tug and then

enough distance away from the beach. At that

subsequent tugs were applied every time

point, the engine which was going ahead was

GHARIAL’s stern seemed to be going up with

stopped and restarted in the astern direction.

wave action. The tug was stopped immediately

However, as soon as both engines were going Slow

when the stern was seen to be going down. This

Astern, the tow wire snapped due to over strain. I

was being done by using one engine ahead and

had already warned all hands on our foxle and

one astern, while controlling the line with twin

GHARIAL’s quarterdeck to clear the deck before

rudders. This was quite normal for these ships

restarting the second engine astern. There were

because the engines could be started only a

thus no casualties, despite the tow wire snapping

limited number of times, depending upon the

with a great jerk.

quantity of compressed air available in the

“ By then GHARIAL was in deep enough

bottles Each time an engine’s direction was to be

waters and her propellers were responding just

changed, it had to be stopped and restarted in the

adequately to give her mobility for reaching the

new direction. There was always a danger of

anchorage. She was, however, shipping in water

running out of compressed air and thus not being

from several leaks and we all provided whatever

able to restart the engine till the compressor

pumps were available.’

refilled the air bottles.

Only a complete

Commodore Sharma. the CO of GHARIAL. recalls:

understanding of this unique system could

enable good maneuverability in difficult

"My problems did not stop at that. As soon as I

situations.

came off the sand bar and anchored about half a

"Bv increasing the RPM of the engine going

cable away, most of the aft mess decks and

astern for a short while as GHARIAL seemed to

spaces were flooded and the machinery spaces

rise and simultaneously neutralizing the turning

were just about six inches away from the holes.

effect by rudders, we were able to pull GHARIAL’s

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/179

Thereafter the help given by BEAS and the other

The remaining 600 troops were landed on 18 and

ships and the use of all their pumps saved the

19 December. V1SHWA VIJAY transferred her troops

situation. I was able to repair the damage quite a

to GULDAR by 18 December and sailed for Calcutta

bit and go to Calcutta under my own steam".

with the vehicles, none of which could be landed at Cox’s Bazar. At midday on 19 December, GULDa'r

Cdr Martis, the diver officer, recalls:

and BEAS sailed to rejoin FOCEF o ff Chittagong.

“GHARIAL withdrew as the tide was falling, and

This marked the completion of Operation Beaver.

unfortunately sat on her own stern anchor. She

was high and dry at low water. At that time, the

Th e L an d in g O p eration in R etro spect

distance from the highest water level at the time

of landing and the lowest water was almost 50

The Reconstruction o f Events

meters. Had they come at the right time, they

In retrospect, the sequence o f events emerges as

would have been able to land the troops on the

follows:

bar and withdraw within a matter of half an hour

and not suffer any casualty or damage at all.

The jo in t planners in Delhi had foreseen the

“GHARIAL had a veiy bad stern trim because

possibility of a US Naval Group intervening in

of shipping a lot of water at the stern. I carried out

East Pakistan but concluded that we did not have

an under water inspection and found that the

the wherewithal to carry out a landing in the face

stern post was damaged, dented inward with a

of opposition.

big crack and water was gushing in. The Engineer

0

With the collapse of the East Pakistani troops by

O fficer carried out em ergency sh orin g and

8 December, the Chiefs of Staff decided to cut off

pumped out the water.”

their line of retreat into Burma and expedite the

com p letion o f o p era tio n s in the East. On 9

The end position on the evening of 15 December

December, General M anekshaw overuled Gen

was that:

J a c o b ’ s p ro te s ta tio n s abou t the lack of

•

Only a platoon of troops had been landed.

preparation and NHQ ordered troops to be landed

•

Carrying out a recce of alternative beaches was

on 12 December to capture Cox’s Bazar.

not

practical.

•

On 10 December, the joint planners in Calcutta,

•

Pakistani forces were expected to surrender at

apprehensive that a landing at Cox’s Bazar would

any moment

meet with opposition, decided to land at Ukhia a

•

Cdr Bhalla had a lrea d y swum ash ore and

few miles further south, instead of at Cox’s Bazar.

proceeded to Cox’s Bazar in local transport with

The date of the landing had to be postponed to 14

the platoon already landed.

December because the troops were still being

•

It had therefore been decided that the remaining

withdrawn from the front line. These troops had

troops would be landed at Cox’s Bazar itself,

never been to sea.

using local boats.

•

On 10 December, the move became known of the

American Naval Task Group towards the Bay o

On arrival at Cox’s Bazar, Cdr Bhalla, with the

Bengal. The same evening, the troops in Calcutta

help of the Mukti Bahini, commandeered all available

were told to embark VISHWA VIJAY immediate y-

mechanised fishing boats to commence disembarking

The embarkation of 1400 troops into a bulk coa

troops on AM 16 December.

c a rrier was d is o rd e rly and a fatal acciden Ships proceeded to Cox’s Bazar overnight and

occurred. Embarkation was completed in t e

anchored eight miles from the Cox’s Bazar jetty,

ea rly hours o f the 1 2 th m orn in g but some

where weather and depth conditions were least likely

essential stores were left behind.

to delay the landing of troops.

•

VISHWA VIJAY reached Sandheads on the

On 16 December, 600 troops were landed. After

afternoon and anchored, awaiting scram

n

disembarking troops, GHARIAL sailed for Calcutta to

nets which did not arrive. The scrambling ne

effect repairs.

were essential for the troops to scramble into

Despite the surrender o f Pakistani forces in East

LSTs. She sailed from Sandheads early'on

Pakistan on PM 16 December, Naval Headquarters

13th m orn in g, b u t on receivin g MA

directed that the disembarkation o f troops was to

submarine sighting report, had to reverse c° _

continue. On 17 December, 86 troops, rations, first for a few hours. She was able to join up

aid and ammunition were landed.

FOCEF, VIKRANT and the LST’s only on n g

13/14.

18O/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

A t the co nference on board V IK R A N T chaired by pump out the flooded co mpartm ents and effect

F O C E F on the night o f 13/14, it w as decided to patch repairs. By this time, the s u r r e n d e r o f t r y a n d l a n d a t f i r s t li g h t on 14 D e c e m b e r .

fo r c e s in E a s t P a k is t a n w a s i m m i n e n t and W it h o u t s c r a m b lin g nets, the transfer o f troops FOCEF decided that the remaining troops should

from V IS H W A V IJ A Y took too long. The landing be disembarked at Cox’s Bazar.

had to be p o s t p o n e d to 15 December. M AGAR

•

GULDAR. VISHWA VIJAY and BEAS proceeded to

w h o carried 1000 tons o f fuel to refuel VIKRANT

C ox’s Bazar, overnight, w h er e the u n o p p o s ed w a s s e n t b a c k to C a lc u t t a to b r i n g back the t r a n s fe r o f t r o o p s w a s e f f e c t e d .

B o a ts

essential stores which had been left behind.

requisitioned from local sources with the help o f T h e C O ’s o f the Landin g Ships signalled FOCEF

the Mukti Bahini ferried troops and stores from

that the la n d in g site w as unsuitable. They took the anchorage into the harbour at Cox’s Bazar.

w hatever precautions they could and pressed on

•

GHARIAL escorted by RAJPUT proceeded to Cox’s

with preparations for the landing.

Bazar, d is em b a rk e d tro op s in local c r a ft and T h e beach recce carried out by the divers on the proceeded to Calcutta for repairs.

e v e n i n g o f 14 D e c e m b e r w as as seam anlike as c o u ld be e x p e c t e d in the t im e a va ila b le. Th e Could the Operation Have Been Better Managed

g r a d i e n t w a s fo u n d s u i t a b l e . T h e a p p r o a c h In the years since the war, this landing operation has c o u r s e for L S T ’s w ould be m arked, a sw im m er been r eg a rd ed as a fiasco. Every m is h a p in this w o u ld m ark the bar on w hich the bows should o p e r a tio n w as a tt r ib u te d to th e la c k o f d e t a i l e d r es t and s h ip s w ou ld rig ropes to help ja w a n s p la n n in g . V ery l it t l e w a s k n o w n o f t h e w i d e r w a d e through w ater on landing. Ships were told compulsions which precipitated the ordering o f the

to be r e a d y to low er all available boats and life operation at short notice. Given these compulsions, rafts. La st b u t not least. LSTs w ould beach at several factors made it unlikely that this operation 0 5 3 0 , the s la c k tide at low w ater so that they could have been managed better.

c o u l d u n b e a c h on a r i s i n g tid e. D e s p it e T h e r e w as a m b ig u it y o f w h e t h e r t h e la n d i n g B RAH M APU TRA. with FOCEF embarked, leading

should be effected in the face o f opposition or at a the LSTs towards the beach at 0400 hours in the

location where there would be little or no opposition.

m o r n in g , the ex act landing point could not be At the planning stage in September, the pla nners in

sp otted. By the time the rec ce’d spot had been Delhi ruled out an opposed landing. NHQ order o f 9

r e a c h e d , it w a s an hou r and a h a lf after slack December stated “T o land and s u p p o rt a battalion w ater, the tide had started rising, the shallow g r o u p at daw n on 12 D e c e m b e r to c a p t u r e C o x ’s r u n n e l s h a d b e c o m e d e ep er and s tron g cross Bazar". At Calcutta, it was concluded that landing at currents had set in.

Cox's Bazar w as im pru den t - the w a ters m ig h t be G U L D A R took the precaution o f taking manual

m in e d and th e e n e m y w o u ld h a v e t a k e n t h e soundings, found it too dangerous to land troops

precaution to defend Cox’s Bazar as it protected their escape route to Burma. Th is led to the d ecision to and retracted.

G H A R I A L beached amid fanfare. T h e very first land near Ukhia, where opposition was less likely.

s e c t io n o f t e n troops experie n ce d difficu lties.

The beach at Ukhia was known to have sandbars.

T h re e ja w a n s drowned. GHARIAL pulled off and It was concluded that these sandbars would help in

a n c h o r e d . F O C E F e m b a r k e d G H A R IA L . W ith the dry shod landing o f troops, who were completely difficulty. GHARIAL managed to land some troops

unfamiliar with the sea.

by boat F O C E F decided that both LSTs should

In spite o f all the other d ifficu lties w h ic h w e r e rebeach at 1430. further to the North. Cdr Bhalla

e n c o u n t e r e d , this m ig h t h a ve b e e n s u c c e s s f u l l y swam ashore and with the platoon already landed

a c h ie v e d i f th e b e a c h i n g h a d t a k e n p l a c e at th e proceeded post haste to C ox’s Bazar which had

d e s i g n a t e d t im e o f s l a c k w a t e r at lo w t id e . T h e r e p o r t e d ly fa llen into the h a n d s o f the Mukti runnels w ould have been shallow. T h e LSTs w ould have u nbeached on a risin g tid e w ell be fore cros s G H A R IA L beached first. Th e unfavourable tide

currents, w ind and swell set in.- T h e b e a c h in g w a s a n d s w e l l c a u s e d G H A R I A L to b r o a c h to, effected nearly two hours late b e ca u se the precise w h e r e a ft e r G H A R IA L ’s stern a n ch o r holed her area marked by the divers could not be located in the

s t e r n G U L D A R w h ic h h a d not y e t b e a c h e d , limited visibility at 0430 in the morning. Th ereafter ru s h ed to help pull G H A R IA L o f f the sandbar.

e v e n t s f o l l o w e d t h e s e q u e n c e t h a t h a v e b e e n T h e r e a ft e r , all the s h ip s h e lp e d G H A R I A L to described.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/181

MAGAR which had been specially converted to

Finally, there are certain basic realities:

carry 1000 tons of fuel for VIKRANT was in fact

present in the area when VIKRANT’s fuel was running

•

To ensure that the enemy does not come to know

low on 14 December. Had MAGAR transferred her fuel

when and where we will land, prior planning has

to VIKRANT:

to be highly classified and known to very few

people. In this case, the place o f landing was

•

VIKRANT would not have had to retu rn to

changed, the day o f la n d in g got repeatedly

Paradeep on 15 December for refuelling.

postponed and the time oflanding got delayed.

•

MAGAR having been emptied of fuel could have

•

The kind of meticulous planning and extensive

participated in the landing and the sailors of the

training stipulated in the amphibious warfare

Andaman Garrison who were familiar with the

manuals, which are based on the experience of

sea could have constituted the first wave.

prolonged wars, are unlikely to be achieved in the

short sharp wars typical of our sub- continent. In

However, in the rush of events, MAGAR was sent

1971, despite months of preparation time, no

back to Calcutta to fetch stores which would be training whatsoever could be carried out.

needed by the troops after landing.

VISHWA VIJAY, a 15000 ton bulk coal carrier

In the final analysis, the u n predictable will

with a crew of only 60 persons, was totally unsuitable

invariably happen during actual operations. Only

for cariying 1400 troops, who had never been to sea,

first rate seam anship and profession alism will

for landing on an enem y shore. It can only be overcome the unpredictable.

presumed that no other vessel was available for

immediate requisitioning.

The Pakistan Navy’s Account of Naval Operations in East Pakistan

“The Story of the Pakistan Navy", states:*

Troop concentrations in Barisal. Bakarganj and

Patuakhali areas were subjected to attacks by

“Starting on 4 December, the aircraft carrier

carrier aircraft on 8 and 9 December. Pounding ol

VIKRANT launched a series of air strikes on a

Chittagong and Cox’s Bazar airfields by carrier-

variety of targets along East Pakistan's coast.

borne aircraft continued on the request, at least

Using Seahawks by day and Alizes by night, the

on two occasion s, o f A O C -in -C Eastern

pressure was kept up by the aircraft carrier

Command, (the Indian Air Force Commander in

throughout the war. On the very first day. during

the East), who suspected that these airfields were

raids carried out over Chittagong harbour, the

being used by the PAF for air operations.

outer anchorage, and the airfield, and the airstrip

"With no opposition from the Pakistan Navy

at Cox’s Bazar, the Indians succeeded in inflicting

at sea, and by the PAF in the air. defence again

con sid erab le dam age to ships and shore

air strikes by carrier-borne aircraft was con ^

installations. The gunboat COMILLA was sunk

to a n ti-a irc ra ft fire by gu n boats an s and RAJSHAHI severely damaged during an air

batteries. The Indians have a c k n o w l e d g e y

attack on the outer anchorage.

resistance to most of their air strikes y a

Qf

“On 5 and 6 December, carrier-borne aircraft

anti-aircraft defence and accepte

e

carried out attacks on Chittagong, Khulna, and

some aircraft. But such a limite e or

Mangla harbours, and at ships in the Pussur

itself, insufficient to curb, in any nieaningfu ^

river. The oil installations at Chittagong caught

the onslaught by the Indian naY* **

d by the

fire and the Greek merchant ship Thetic Charlie

seaward. On 12 December,

Navy

was sunk at the outer anchorage. In strikes over

lack of any serious retaliation.

,ed oUt a

Chittagong on 7 December, the oil installations

ships closed C ox’s Bazar an

. daylight-

and the airfield were again hit and damaged.

bornbardment of the a i r f i e l ^ m _ b r o a ^

* Page 341 et seq.

182/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

They succeeded in damaging the control tower at

of Bengal.

the airport during this operation.

The Indian Navy Task Force comprising the

Fearing a possible amphibious landing, the

carrier VIKRANT and her escorts the

approaches to Chittagong were mined by the

BRAHMAPUTRA and BEAS. while maneuvering

Pakistan Navy on 7 December. This minefield,

freely in the Bay of Bengal, interdicted shipping

laid as a defensive measure to check the

traffic to and from East Pakistan ports. Reports

movement of Indian ships towards the harbour,

from Chittagong indicated that this group

was subsequently reinforced by more mines on 9

sometimes closed the coast to a range as close as

and 12 December. This proved to be a most

12 to 15 miles, not surprising in a situation in

useful step in that it denied to Indian forces direct

which the Pakistan Navy lacked altogether any

access to Chittagong port for a long time, even

means to react or retaliate from Chittagong.

after the instrument of surrender had been

Commodore in Charge Chittagong could do no

signed.

more than report the approach of these ships.

‘The Indians therefore decided to cany out an

The sinking and capture of several merchant

amphibious landing at Cox’s Bazar with the aim

ships by the carrier group and the diversion to

of cutting off the line of retreat of Pakistani troops

neutral ports by the Naval Control of Shipping,

from this direction. Having embarked a battalion

reduced shipping traffic to East Pakistan to a

of Gurkhas, the amphibious force comprising the

trickle within a few days. The unchallenged

merchant vessel VISHWA VIJAY and the LSTs

presence of this force in the area ruled out

GHARIAL and GULDAR, sailed from Calcutta on

possibility of reinforcements from the West in the

12 December. The landing was carried out at the

beginning of the war, and evacuation of our

chosen site south of Cox’s Bazar on the night of

troops at a later stage when such a need was felt".

15/16 December, after bombardment of the

“PNS Rajshahi the sole survivor of the Navy in

beach a day earlier. Though no opposition was

East Pakistan, escaped capture and found her

offered by Pakistani forces the Indians, after

way to Penang in Malaysia. The Malaysian

experiencing some difficulties, succeeded in

Government and Navy treated her ship's

putting troops on the beach. At least two Indian

company in a most hospitable manner and

soldiers are reported to have lost their lives in the

rendered assistance to enable the patrol craft to

operation, which appears to have served no

remain seaworthy. A number of naval personnel

purpose at this belated stage except to show that

had crossed the border into Burma at the

it had an amphibious capability, and that the

surrender of East Pakistan."*

Indian Navy was free to operate at will in the Bay

A R etrosp ect o f Naval Operations in the Eastern N aval C om m an d The Pakistan Navy did not send any major surface

Ambiguity persists about the role of RAJPUT in

warships to East Pakistan. There was therefore no

the sinking of the GHAZI. Admiral Krishnan’s

surface threat. After the GHAZI sank, there was no

book reproduces a photograph of GHAZFs clock

submarine threat. The Indian Air Force attacks on

stopped at 0015. RAJPUT was very much near

the Dacca airfields made the runways unusable The

Visakhapatnam at that time and yet there is no

Pakistan Air Force Sabre squadron was grounded.

mention of RAJPUT having heard or having seen

This removed the air threat. The operations of the

the flash of GHAZI’s explosion.

Eastern Fleet were therefore unopposed at sea.

Neither the ‘Story of the Pakistan Navy' nor the

Whatever difficulties were experienced were the

records relating to the ENTERPRISE incident

result of our own limitations.

substantiate FOCINCEAST's assessment that the

In retrospect, the following points bear noting:

ENTERPRISE Task Group's move into the Bay of

Bengal was linked with the intelligence intercepts

Ibid Page 368.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/183

•

VIKRANT’s contribution to naval operations were

of Convoy RK 623.

beyond anyone’s expectations. VIKRANT was

Indian Air Force Gnats sank the PADMA and the

steaming on only three boilers instead of four.

PALASH at Khulna du ring the Com m ando

Operations on Mongla. Force Alpha was not

Each boiler drum was strapped with steel bands

to minimise damage in case o f explosion. To

supposed to go to Khulna at all - it was an

impromptu decision taken when it was found

offset the reduction in speed and the low wind

that Pakistani troop s had w ith draw n from

conditions at that time o f the year. VIKRANT

stretched everything and everybody to the limit to

Mongla. Even if Cdr Samant had informed his

Headquarters of this decision on the morning of

launch and recover Seahawks aircraft, including

the 10 December, it is doubtful w hether the

accepting the hazards of aircraft dipping after

information would have reached the Gnats in the

being catapulted and approaching lower than

few hours that it took Force Alpha to go up the

normal during recovery.

river from Mongla to Khulna.

In addition to the achievements of the air strikes.

Even though ‘Diversionary or Real Amphibious

VIKRANT’s assistance in contraband control was

landings’ were foreseen, there is no mention of

invaluable. Without VIKRANT, the limited number of

any preliminary rehearsal for the amphibious

ships that constituted the Eastern Fleet could not landing. Neverthless, despite all the difficulties

have coped with the faster merchant ships.

experienced, it would have succeeded if only the

This contraband control role of an aircraft carrier

LSTs had beached at the appointed time.

was not foreseen eith er by FO C IN C E AST or by VIKRANT herself.

184/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

10

Naval Operations in the Western Naval Command

The ensuing account of naval operations in the

proved the facilities provided at the advance base

Western Naval Command has been reconstructed

there.

from several sources. Admiral Kohli was the Flag

“As the Fleet would be operating not far from

O fficer Commanding in Chief, Western Naval

Karachi, a demarcating line was established

Command in 1971. His book “We Dared - Maritime

which neither the ships of the Fleet nor the

Operations in the 1971 Indo Pak War" was published missile boats would cross. This would prevent

in 1989. The Pakistan Navy’s account is contained in

any unfortunate incidents of own forces engaging

the “The Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947 to 1972”

each other.

published in 1991. The present account is based on

“The Pakistani authorities had warned all

the above sources and on discussions with the main

merchant ships bound for Karachi not to

participants. The thought process which preceded

approach the harbour to within 75 miles between

each major operation has been correlated with what

sunset and dawn. This meant that any unit

actually transpired and the reasons for its success or

picked up on the radar within that distance was

failure. The evolution of the plans which preceded

most likely to be a Pakistani naval vessel on

these operation has been discussed in the chapter on

patrol.

the “Evolution of the Navy’s Plan of Operations.” The

“The Karachi strike group consisted of two

operations have been discussed under the following

Petyas and four missile boats armed with four

headings.

missiles each. One of the four boats was to

remain on patrol off Dwarka in order to provide

•

The First Missile Attack on Karachi.

cover for the force on its way back. The Petyas

•

Western Fleet Operations and the Second Missile

were intended to provide communication and

Attack on Karachi.

control and, with their better radar, give

•

Anti Submarine Hunter Killer Operations and the

indication of suitable targets. In the event of an

Loss of the KHUKRI.

emergency, they could take a boat in tow and. if

•

S u b m a r i n e O p e r a t io n s .

necessary give fuel.

•

Loss of Alize 203.

"After arriving at a certain point south o f

•

Trade Warfare.

Karachi, the Task Group Commander in the Petya

•

D e f e n c e o f B o m b a y .

was to release the missile boats to proceed at

.

A Retrospect of Operations in Western Naval

maximum speed towards Karachi; the Squadron

Command.

Commander embarked in one o f the boats would

allocate targets and the boats thereafter would act T he F irst M issile A tta c k on Karachi

independently keeping in touch with the Squadron

Commander. The Petyas would follow at a slower

Events Before the Attack

speed, but stay not too fa r away fro m the V i c e A d m i r a l ( l a t e r A d m i r a l ) K o h l i . w a s t h e F l a g rendezvous.. Naval

Headquarters

and

O f f i c e r C o m m a n d i n g - i n - C h i e f . W e s t e r n N a v a l Headquarters Western Naval Command were to

C o m m a n d ( F O C I N C W E S T ) . In h i s b o o k “W e D a r e d ” .

listen in on Pakistani wireless circuits and pass

h e s t a t e s :*

the relevant intelligence to the force.

“The plan had been to strike Karachi with a

“After Pakistan proclaim ed a National Emergency

composite force on the very day that Pakistan

on 23 N o v e m b e r, three m issile boats were placet!

carried out their first act of war. The Pakistanis

at Okha to carry ou t pa trols. T h e y gain ed ve ry attacked our airfields on the evening o f 3

v a lu a b le ex p erie n ce o f th e a rea and th e w a ters December 1971. Since it was not possible for our

a r o u n d an d in th e v ic in it y o f O k h a an d a ls o forces to attack Karachi the same evening, it was

Page 45 et seq.

OPERATION TRTDRMT

FIRST MISSILE ATTACK ON KARACH1 - NIGHT 4/5 DECEMBER 1971

g Y I N SHIPS KILTAN, KATCHALL. NIPAT. N TR flH A T md VEER

POK0ANDAR

decided to launch the operation on the following

boat VEER, everybody else had turned round and

day, i.e. the night 4/5 December."

was headed back towards Saurashtra at full speed.

Due to a machinery problem, VEER had reduced

T

h

e A

t t a

c k

speed to effect repairs.

On the afternoon o f 4 December, when the Strike When KILTAN turned round to head for home,

Group was on its way to Karachi, FOCINCWEST sent a

VEER mistook KILTAN for a Pakistani warship and

signal directing the Petyas and the missile boats to almost fired a missile at her. Fortunately

remain in company throughout

communications and identity were reestablished and

The Task Group’s approach to Karachi was by

a catastrophe averted.

and large uneventful. Despite some confusion,

In due course, ships of the Task Group arrived on

contacts detected en route were eventually analysed

the Saurashtra Coast in ones and twos, refuelled on 5

as undeserving of missile attack.

December and arrived in Bombay on 6 December.

When 70 miles south of Karachi, a target was

detected to the northwest at a range of 45 miles. It

E

v e n t s A

f t e

r t h

e A

t t a

c k

was classified as a warship. A second target was

In Bombay, there was elation at the Task Group's

detected to the northeast at a range of 42 miles,

unprecedented achievement. At the professional level

heading for Karachi. Both targets were tracked and

however, there was disquiet as to the reasons for not

missiles prepared for launch.

bombarding the Karachi installations with missiles.

The contact to the northwest was engaged by

The Commander of the the Task Group, Cdr (later

missile boat NIRGHAT with two missiles. The target

Commodore) KP Gopal Rao was the Commanding

sank. It was later learnt that this was the Pakistan

Officer of the Petya KILTAN. ^he Commander of the

Navy destroyer KHAIBAR.

Missile Boat Squadron (K 25) was Cdr (later

The contact to the northeast was engaged by

Commodore) BB Yadav, embarked in missile boat

missile boat NIPAT with two missiles. The target

NIPAT. FOCINCWEST received differing accounts

sank. It was learnt later that this was a merchant

from them. He directed both of them to put up an

agreed report. They were not able to agree. The

ship MV VENUS CHALLENGER.

disagreement hinged on who was in command of the

A third contact appeared to the North. It was

attack, particularly after all contacts had been sunk.

engaged by missile boat VEER with one missile. The

K 25’s stand was as follows:

target sank. It was learnt later that this was the

Pakistan Navy coastal minesweeper MUHAFIZ.

•

In the process of attacking KHAIBAR, NIRGHAT

At this stage of the attack, when there were no

had fallen back by several miles, whilst KILTAN,

contacts on radar, what should have happened was

NIPAT and VEER sped towards Karachi.

that all ships o f the Task Group should have

KATCHALL, the second Petya, was with NIRGHAT

continued to close Karachi and, from the

to provide protection from air attack.

predetermined point promulgated by KILTAN, each

•

NIPAT had raced ahead to attack VENUS

missile boat should have fired one more missile at

CHALLENGER while VEER had fallen back.

Karachi. This did not happen. Missile boat NIRGHAT

•

After VEER had fired at MUHAFIZ, he decided to

mistook anti aircraft tracer shells and reported

fire missiles at the Karachi installations.

sighting aircraft. Fear of Pakistani air attack sharply

•

At this stage, he found that NIPAT was closest to

increased. KILTAN’s accurate and aircraft radar also

Karachi. So he told NIPAT to fire both his

mistook as aircraft the shells being fired from

missiles. One missile failed prelaunch checks.

Karachi’s gun defences. It took some time for this

NIPAT fired the other missile towards Karachi.

confusion to clear.

•

NIRGHAT had started reporting that aircraft were

Meanwhile K 25. the Commander of the missile

visual and KILTAN had promulgated Air Raid

boats, told missile boat NIPAT. in which he was

Warning Red.

embarked, to fire one of his two remaining missiles

•

Taking into account the likely confusion between

towards Karachi which NIPAT did. K 25 then issued

friendlies due to the dispersal of own forces and

the order for the boats to withdraw. Due to a fade out the possible development of air and surface

in communications, the Commander of the Task

threat. K 25 decided to withdraw.

Group in KILTAN did not receive this withdrawal

The CO KILTAN’s stand was that K 25 was not

signal. He continued to close Karachi. When he

authorised to order withdrawal. This was his

arrived at the predetermined point, 20 miles south of prerogative as the Commander of the Task Group in Karachi he found himself all alone. Except for missile KILTAN.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/187

In an article in the Indian Defence Review of July

A t about 2014 hrs I a ltered course again

1990, Commodore Gopal Rao has described the

n orth w ard and in crea sed the speed o f th

sequence of events as he saw it. In it he stated:*

formation to 28 knots. Because o f the w e s t e r l y

“The rendezvous with^KATCHALf and m issile

alteration of courses on two occasions the Pak

boats N IRG H AT and V E E R w as e ffe c te d o ff warship heading northwest towards Cape Monze

Dwarka on the afternoon o f 4 December 1971.

increased its distance and the contact was lost on

C la rifica tion s on the p o in ts ra ised by the our radar. She was picked up again only at about

Commanding Officers of the ships were given and

2300 hrs, 4 December 1971 at a range of 40 miles

when she was nearing Cape Monze.

the Task Group sa iled from D w ark a PM 4

December to cany out Operation Trident$]XILTAN

T

h

e

A

t t a

c k

ar8 6 Rffi§H3 d|B6 were in the vanguard and the

"The T ask Group in fo rm a tio n was heading three missile boats stationed slightly in the rear.

northward at high speed and was about 70 miles

This formation was maintained throughout the

to the south of Karachi at 2150 hrs. Soon after,

approach towards Karachi. A t about 1800 hrs, 4

KILTAN detected a target to the northwest at a

December 1971, when we were 150 miles from

range o f 45 mile^s, w hich was classified as a

Karachi, course was altered northward to head

warship on patrol. A second target was detected

towards Karachi.

to the northeast, at a range o f 42 mil^s and

“Three incidents o f interest occurred during

classified as a large unidentified ship, proceeding

our approach towards Karachi. The first one was

in shallower waters at 16 knots towards Karachi.

at about 1810 hrs on 4 December 1971, when

Pakistan had issued a warning that no merchant

KILTAN’ s radar picked up a surface contact on a

ships should approach closer than 75 miles from

northwesterly bearing at a range o f 45 miles. This

the Pakistan coast at night. All the ships of the

contact, which was classified as a warship was

T ask Group w ere ordered to sw itch on their

doing a speed o f 24 knots and steering a north

radars and acquire the targets. After the missile

w esterly course, heading towards Cape Monze,

boats confirm ed that they had acquired the

situated to the west o f Karachi, oblivious o f our

targets, I designated the enemy warship to the

presence. The reason for the presence of this Pak

northwest to NIRGHAT! and the unidentified

w arship in this area was to become clear only

shiptom en orth east to I^IPAT at about

after the war. The second incident occurred at

and ordered them to proceed for the attacks.

about 1945 hrs when KILTAN’s radar picked up a

Both the m issile boats h au led out o f the

reconnaissance aircraft and I immediately altered

fo rm a tio n and p roceeded at high er speeds

the cou rse o f the T a sk Group w estw ards and

towards their respective targets.

su c c e e d e d in m is le a d in g the a irc ra ft. The

“T h e Pak d estro yer PNS KH AIBER was

recon n aissan ce a ircra ft’s m essage to Karachi

patrolling the southwest approaches to K a r a c h i

“ F irm C on ta ct, C ou rse 270. Speed 20” was

and only at about 2215 hrs was she able to

intercepted by our shore authorities. At about

appreciate that an enemy force was a p p r o a c h in g 1900 hrs, w h en my rad ar scan w as clea r o f Karachi. She then altered course and increased

aircraft echoes, I altered course northward again.

speed to intercept us, the rate o^closing was

The third incident occurred at about 2000 hrs,

when

w h en a s u rfa c e c o n ta c t w as picked up on KILTAN’s radar on a northeasterly bearing at a

range of 25 miles. This contact then increased its

sp eed to 24 k n ots and started steerin g an intercepting course. I verified from my Navigation

roomBJas hit

and Gunnery radars that this was not a spurious

echo. W hen the contact closed to 15 miles, I

“I ordered a second missile to be fired at her

altered course of my Group to westward and did

and after the second hit, her speed came down 0

not permit the contact to close upon us further.

zero and dense smoke started rising from t e

A fte r a w h ile, the con tact reduced its speed ship.

She sank a fter about 45 minutes^

considerably and its radar echo started becoming

approxim ately 35 m iles south-southw est o

smaller and smaller until it finally disappeared.

Karachi. She had mistaken this to be a n j^ .

•

Pages 42 to 50.

188/TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH

attack and reported accordingly to Maritime

inability to do so, due to engine problems. Then

Operations Room (MOR) Karactfi, which perhaps

PNS MUHAFIZ, an ocean going mine sweeper was

resulted in the anti-aircraft guns in Karachi

detailed and she was approaching my Task

opening fire for a few minutes. The trajectories of

Group from right ahead. I designated this target

these tracer shells were seen by us from seaward.

to missile boat VEER. The speed of advance of the

KHAIBER’s VHF transmission to Karachi in'plain

Task Group was 28 knots and VEER was not able

language was picked up by our shore wireless

to do more than 29 knots at this time due to a

stations due to anomalous propagation.

minor engine problem. Since PNS MUHAFIZ had

“The other large iM ^ f i e d vship to,the

come well within the missile range, I ordered

northeast was comple^I^darkened and was

VEER to fire the missile at the Pak warship from

proceeding at 16 knots. At about 2300 hr{s ^

inside the formation. VEER was j ust abaft my

NIPAT was ablelto get her within range and fired

port beam when she fired the

the first missile which scored a hit. A second

2320 hrs. PNS MUHAFIZ^vas set on fire by this

missile was fired soon after and when this hit the

missile hit and was seen burning fiercely for over

ship, I saw a huge flash going up to about twice

70 minutes, and finally sank in that position,

the height of the ship. My inference at that time

about 19 miles to the south of Karachi.

was that ammunition had exploded on board.

“At about 2325 hrs, NIRGHAT reported

The ship was seen on radar to have broken into

sighting a reconnaissance aircraft on top of her.

two and she sank in less than eight minutes,

No contact was seen in my warning radar nor

about 26 miles south of Karachi. After the war, it

were my visual lookouts able to spot any aircraft.

was reliably learnt from merchant shipping

I informed this to the Task Group and asked

circles and from Pakistan Navy officers who went

NIRGHAT whether he was still in visual contact

over to Bangladesh, as well as from Military

with the reconnaissance aircraft and he replied in

Attaches of foreign embassies in Pakistan that

the affirmative. I then ordered the Task Group to

this ship had been carrying a near full load of US

assume first degree of anti-aircraft readiness. We

ammunition from Saigon, for the Pak Army and

had already been briefed about the lack of

the Pak Air Force. Lloyds Register of Shipping,

capability of Pak Sabre jets to carry out night

London, gave the nanje of the ship as MV VENUS

attacks by radar as well as considerable decrease

in accuracy in attacks at night by visual aim.

CHALLENGER, a ship chartered by Pakistan,

This was one of the calculated risks that we were

which had sailed from Saigon, called at Singapore

required to take in the achievement of our aim

en route and was due to arrive at Karachi at 0130

and this risk was warranted. Moreover, KILTAN

hrs, on 5 December 1971. In addition to the

and KATCHALL had excellent anti-aircraft

ship’s crew, the ship was reported to have had on

capability with their fully automatic 76.2 mm

board a small number of Pakistan naval officers

guns. I was now required, as per the Operations

and sailors for communication and ordnance

Orders, to navigate the Group to a predetermined

duties.

position which was a further nine to ten miles

“The Pak warship which I had detected at

ahead. Immediately on arrival at this position. I

1810 hrs on 4 December 1971, had obviously

was to order the missile boats to fire on shore

come down to rendezvous

targets.

jJgjggJjSfeNGER^d after satisfying herself that all

“The reported presence of a reconnaissance

was safe, she headed northwest at high speed

aircraft in the area caused undue concern in the

towards Cape Monze.

mind of the Missile Boat Commander and the

“During their attacks, the missile boats

manifestation of this were two serious violations

NIRGHAT and NIPAT had moved ahead of the

of the Operations Orders. One was that he fired a

force by four to five miles. On completion of the

missile without orders at about 2330 hrs,

attacks, they rejoined the force, which took them

towards the shore from a wrong position and in a

just about five minutes, as the rate of closing

wrong direction. I saw this missile travel to the

during the rejoining maneuver was 60 knots. This

westward of Karachi and hit the sea. When asked

is the correct doctrine to be followed to prevent

on VHF the reasons for firing this missile, there

being fired at by ships of the own force.

was no answer. Just then my navigating officer,

“PNS SHAHJAHAN, a destroyer, was now

requested me to come over to the display of the

ordered by MOR, Karachi, to proceed to the

navigation radar in connection with the

assistance of KHAIBER. But she regretted her

navigation to the predetermined position.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/189

“It was reported to me that all the other ships

us, we could have easily fired at least three

o f the group had disappeared from the radar

m issiles on sh ore targets.

T h is excellen t

display.

opportunity was wasted. At about 0100 hrs on 5

“I altered the range scale of the navigation

December, I sent the message 'Angar to the C-in-

radar from 24 miles to 12 miles scale and noticed

C signifying the completion of Operation Trident.

four small echoes about seven miles to the south

“M eanw hile, I had a sc e rta in e d that

of my ship. After repeated calls on VHF for about

KATCHALL, NIRGHAT and NIPAT were together

five minutes, the Missile Boat Commander replied

but not in contact with VEER. At about 0045 hrs.

that he was heading for the withdrawal point and

5 December 1971, I gained radar contact with

at that moment, they were 12 miles to the south

VEER at a range of 12 miles to the south of myself

of K1LTAN. The rate of opening between K1LTAN

and established contact with her. VEER was able

and the other four ships was 60 knots i.e. a mile a

to do a speed of only 16 knots and her Estimated

minute. KATCHALL had also joined the missile

Time of Arrival (ETA) Withdrawal Point was 0115

boats in the ignominious retreat. KILTAN had not

hrs. I informed her that I was to her north and my

kept watch on VHF on the missile boat net as any

ETA W ithdraw al Point w as 0200 hrs. I then

spare capacity in communications was required

passed the in fo rm a tio n ab ou t VEER to

to search and intercept enemy transmissions.

KATCHALL and the other two missile boats and

This unauthorised withdrawal was the second

directed them to proceed as per the withdrawal

and more serious violation o f the Operations

plan given in the Operations Orders. Due to the

Orders by the Missile. Boat Commander. If he was

panic caused by the hasty withdrawal. VEER

so obsessed by the need to withdraw, the only

mistook KILTAN for an enemy warship and got a

legitimate course o f action open to him was to

missile ready to fire at her. Fortunately, at that

su ggest th a t to me as the T a sk Group

time VEER’s engines were repaired and she was

Commander. He had no authority whatsoever to

able to regain her m axim um speed. The

withdraw on his own.

Commanding Officer o f VEER therefore decided

“Even if the reconnaissance aircraft were

not to fire the missile. This was revealed to me by

present, there was no. necessity to flee from the

the C om m anding O ffic e r o f VEER, after my

area, as it w ou ld n ot have m ade m uch o f a return to Bombay. After she regained her speed,

difference to the strike aircraft whether the ships

VEER was also directed to proceed as per the

were 20 miles or 40 miles from the coast, as the

withdrawal plan given in the Operations Orders.

reconnaissance aircraft would be able to home

“ D u rin g the w ith d ra w a l phase, one gas

the strike aircraft on to its target. In actual fact,

turbine engine of KILTAN failed at about 0045

as shown on KILTAN’s w arning radar display,

hrs. The second gas turbine engine also failed at

there was no reconnaissance aircraft airborne at

about 0130 hrs. KILTAN was now running on her

all. Major General Fazal Muqeem Khan states

main diesel engine and her speed came down to

that when the shore authorities in Karachi saw

13 knots. KILTAN finally arrived at Mangrol at

the glow from the burning MUHAFIZ, they sent a

about 1800 hrs on 5 December 1971. All t e

patrol boat to investigate. Had there been any

other ships of the Task Group had already arrive

reconnaissance aircraft airborne, it would have

there.

.

reported the incidents of dense smoke emanating

“After completion of refuelling when I

from K H A IB E R and the fie rc e ly b u rn in g to sail the Task Group to Bombay, KILTAN

MUHAFIZ to MOR Karachi.

diesel engine failed to start and she becal*\

immobile. I therefore detached KATCHAL a

W

i t h

d

r a

w

a

l P

h

a

s

e

the three missile boats to proceed to Bom

^

“A fter arrival in the predeterm ined position,

where they arrived on thfe evening of 6 Decern

KILTAN turned around at about 2355 hrs, 4

1971. KILTAN stayed overnight at Mangro

D ecem ber 1971, and I s a w ’the near p erfect

after getting one gas turbine engine 0P ^ *vgd in

blackout in Karachi remaining intact.

by the morning o f 6 December 1971

‘Th e other ships of the group were now about

Bombay on the night of 7 December

•

16 miles to the south o f KILTAN. After having

“I called on the C-in-C on the afternoon o ^

performed the difficult task of transporting the

D ecem ber 1971 n arrated the deJ f !1

ort 0f

m issiles to the vicinity o f Karachi and having

Operation to him and handed ove*

notice the

sunk the enemy warships which tried to intercept

the Operation. I also brought to his

190/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

serious violations of the Operations Order

T h

e P

a

k

i s t a

n

N

a v y ' s A

c c o u

n

t o

f t h

e F

i r s

t M

i s s i l e

committed by K 25, due to which an excellent

A

t t a

c k

opportunity for attacking shore targets in Karachi

was wasted.

The First Missile Attack

‘The Admiral stated that he was pleased that

the primary task of sinking enemy warships had

“The Story of the Pakistan Navy" has given a detailed been accomplished. Since this was the first

account of the first missile attack on Karachi as seen

major operation undertaken by the Indian Navy

from their end.**

since Independence, he would rather condone the

“On the morning of 4 December, the three ships

lapse of failing to attack shore targets in Karachi;

joined the flotilla and at 0700 KHAIBAR was

any inquiry would attract adverse publicity to the

despatched for the outer patrol. She arrived at

Navy."

the western edge of the patrol area at 1030 and

In his book, Admiral Kohli states:*

commenced her patrol; the day remained

uneventful. After darkness had set in, KHAIBAR

“It is quite obvious that a serious command and

intercepted an HF radio transmission at 1905

control problem engulfed the Trident force and

emanating from a south-easterly direction. This

could have led to serious difficulties:

radio transmission could well have originated

from the missile force.

•

The escorts and boats had not worked

“The attacking force was first picked up by

together as a Task Group. There was no

the surveillance radar on Manora at 2010. more

combined briefing. Understanding of each

than two hours before the attack, at the range of

other by Commanding Officers which is born

75 miles to the south (bearing 165 degrees) of

out of intimate knowledge of each other and

Karachi and tracked. Detection of the missile

their reactions under different conditions of

force more than an hour before it detected

stress was lacking.

1

KHAIBAR and MUHAFIZ-which was not until

•

The limited Action Information Organisation

2130-by our shore radar station was a creditable

facilities in the missile boats did not allow an

performance. No better warning could be

adequate picture to be built up for the

expected in the circumstances. The radar contact

Command. This imposes a great burden on

obtained by the shore station was reported to

control of escorts and missile boats. The

Maritime Headquarters as an unidentified

facilities for such command and control on

contact approaching Karachi on a northerly

Petyas were limited. But also the existing

course (345 degrees) at speed 20 knots.

facilities were not used to best advantage.

“Another radar contact was detected at 2040

•

There were also some communication lapses.

by the tracker radar at a range of 101 miles south

Those units who lost touch on VHF did not

of Karachi on a northerly course. Long ranges are

automatically come up on H/F resulting in

possible under conditions of anomalous

loss of communication between ships of the

propagation of radio waves prevalent in winter

force.

months in this area. These radar detections led to

•

Identification Friend or Foe between different

the issue of a signal by NHQ at 2158 to ships at

types of ships, and the compatibility of code

sea warning them of the presence of two groups of

numbers was not checked prior to

surface contacts approaching Karachi from the

commencement of the operation. It was

south. KHAIBAR was ordered to investigate these

subsequently established that they were

contacts but she never received the message.

different. In my opinion, it was just as well

“In KHAIBAR. a bright light was observed

that the attack was broken off by K 25.

approaching from her starboard beam at 2245

•

Had the command and control by CTG been

when she was on a course of 125 degrees and her

more close and a plot maintained of friendlies

speed was 20 knots. Action stations were

and enemy contacts, it might have been

sounded immediately and the approaching

possible to achieve an even greater victory

missile thought to be an aircraft was enga'ged by

than was achieved."

Bofor guns.

The first impression of the

Commanding Officer, soon after arrival on the

Page 54.

Page 344 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/191

bridge, was that the bright white light was a flare

“MUHAFIZ had sailed on the evening of 4

dropped by an aircraft. But observing the speed

D ecem ber to relieve Z U LF IQ A R on the inner of approach, he appreciated it to be an aircraft.

patrol in compliance with orders from the Task

“The deadly missile struck KHAIBAR on the

Force Commander. She arrived at her patrol area

starboard side, below the aft g a lle y in the at 2245, just in time to witness the missile attack

Electricians messdeck at about 2245. The ship

on KHAIBAR and to become a victim of the next

immediately lost propulsion and power and was

The tra je c to rie s o f the two m issiles fired at plunged into darkness. A huge flame shot up in

KHAIBAR were observed on board from MUHAFIZ

Number One Boiler Room and thick black smoke

plunging into the outer patrol area to her south.

poured out o f the funnel. When the fire was

The wavering whlite lights, when first observed by

observed spreading towards the torpedo tubes, a

the Commanding Officer, were thought to be star

sailor was sent to train the torpedo tubes and

shells but later evaluated as aircraft-impressions

jettison the torpedoes. But the torpedo tubes

which were very similar to those o f Commanding

were jam m ed in the fore and aft position and

Officer PNS KHAIBAR. It appears that none of

could not be moved.

those who saw the missiles that night recognised

“A fter the ship was hit, a m essage was

them as such.

immediately sent by hand of the Yeoman to the

“As MUHAFIZ altered course southward, the

Radio Office for transmission to MHQ by means of

glow of light from the burning wreck of KHAIBAR

the em ergency tran sm itter. Th e v o ice pipe

could be seen on the horizon. Action stations

between the bridge and the Radio Office had been

were closed up as the ship headed towards the

damaged and could not be used to pass the

scene of action. She was on course 210 degrees,

message. The message read: “Enemy aircraft

speed 9 knots, when at 2305, the third white light

attacked ship in position 020 FF 20. No 1 Boiler

was observed heading straight for the ship. The

hit. Ship stopped" The transm ission o f this fast approaching missile hit MUHAFIZ on the port

message in total darkness and prevailing chaos,

side abaft the bridge. Upon being hit, the ship

reflects creditably on the part of the staff. It was

(which was of wooden construction) disintegrated

u n fortu n a te th a t th e p o s itio n o f the ship instantly and some crew members were thrown

indicated in the m essage was incorrect ; this

into the water. The ship’s instantaneous collapse

caused considerable hardship to ship’s survivors

gave no time for the transmission of a distress

later.

message. The ship’s debris continued to burn for

“It w as a fter eva lu a tion o f the exten sive

qu ite som etim e w h ile the su rvivors floated

damage, for the first time appreciated that the

around the burning remains.

ship was hit by a missile. But no attempt was

“The Indian Navy’s first missile attack on

made to amend the previou s signal to avoid

December code-named Trident, was a p p a r e n t y delaying its transmission.

planned well in advance and carefully r e h e a r s e ^

"A few minutes later, another m issile vas

It was based on the assumption that units 0

seen approaching the ship at about 2249 and was

PN Fleet would be on patrol some distance

engaged by Bofors. The second missile, a few

Karachi at the outbreak o f hostilities, an

moments after it was sighted, hit No 2 Boiler

assumption happened to be correct. The^ mlS

Room on the starboard side. The ship, which till

attack force consisted of two Petya class riga

•

then had been on an even keel, began to list to

IN Ships TIR and KILTAN, and three Osa cia

port. The ship’s boats were shattered by the

missile boats, IN Ships NIPAT, NIRGHATan

explosion. At 2300, it was decided to abandon

The T riden t force operated directly 1

wFST

ship when the list to port had become dangerous

command of Vice Admiral Kohli. F O C l N C W E b

and the ship had becom e en velop ed in

while the rest of the Western F '^etw aS p ^

u n co n tro lla b le fires. By 2315, it had been separately under the command of F

f rce

abandoned by all those who could leave the ship.

topping up with fuel o ff Diu. th e T n d e n U o r ^

M ore exp losion s, possib ly o f b u rstin g o f

headed towards Dwarka keeping c os

.- riving

ammunition, continued to rock the ship as men

shallow waters to avoid PN s^ bma" n ‘ missiie

jum ped overboard from the sinking ship. The

off Dwarka, 150 miles from Ka^ a

'

ct route

ship went down at about 2320 stern first with a

boats began their final approac on

joints,

heavy list to port.

to Karachi at their maximum s p e e d 32

A fourth missile boat was left at Dwarka

192/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

the withdrawal of the attacking force on its return

“After the attack INS TIR (actually KATCHALL

passage.

not TIR) and INS KILTAN, the two supporting

“INS NIPAT’s radar apparently picked up two

Petyas, had been monitoring our signal traffic

contacts, presumably KHAIBAR and MUHAFIZ,

and were able to pick up MHQ message ordering

at 2130 at a range of about 40 miles, when the

SHAHJAHAN to assist KHAIBAR. This broadcast

force was approximately 50 miles south of

in plain language enabled the Indian Navy to

Karachi. NIPAT fired two missiles at KHAIBAR.

announce the sinking of KHAIBAR the veiy next

INS NIRGHAT engaged MUHAFIZ from a range of

day. Fortunately, SHAHJAHAN was recalled and

about 20 miles. The missiles fired at Karachi

thus was saved. The Indian estimates of damage

harbour at 2330 were also from NIPAT. The oil

to SHAHJAHAN and sinking of two minesweepers

installations had also been subjected to an aerial

and a merchant ship were exaggerated versions of

attack earlier in the day at 0830 when two oil

the result of their missile attack.

tanks at Keamari had caught fire. The glow from

“The rescue operation launched to locate and

the fire helped NIPAT as it approached Karachi

recover survivors of KHAIBAR was a somewhat

harbour. Of the missiles fired by the Trident

disjointed and haphazard effort. The incorrect

force, two hit KHAIBAR and one hit MUHAFIZ.

position of KHAIBAR indicated in her last signal

“Having launched their attacks, the Indian

also contributed towards the late recovery of

missile boats turned and headed for the R/V

survivors. The search effort was. therefore,

position off the coast of Mangrol where the tanker

centered on a position which was more than 20

Poshak was waiting to refuel them. At this time

miles away from the location where the ship had

TIPPU SULTAN, which was about 40 miles aheg.d

sunk. The location of survivors of MUHAFIZ was

of the formation picked up three radar contacts at

by chance.

a range of 49 miles. TIPPU SULTAN was on her

“The credit for the rescue of survivors of

Karachi bound passage to effect repairs to her

KHAIBAR and MUHAFIZ goes to the gunboat

main evaporator that had developed some defect

SADAQAT whose single handed efforts saved

the preceding day. FOFPAK on board BABUR on

many lives. It would be recalled that this boat,

learning of the contacts by TIPPU SULTAN could

sent from Saudi Arabia and manned by a PN

do no more than take evasive action and move his

crew, was operating under the direct control of

force further inshore.

MHQ and had been employed on miscellaneous

“Following their attack, two of the missile

tasks. On the night of 4 December, soon after the

boats, VIR and NIPAT, suffered some mechanical

attack on KHAIBAR. COMATRON in SADAQAT

failure. VIR was virtually disabled but managed

was ordered to proceed and look for KHAIBAR’s

to move at slow speed after effecting emergency

survivors.

repairs at sea. It is estimated that she went

“Soon after leaving harbour at about

nearly 100 miles off her intended track in the

midnight, the Commanding Officer observed over

process and NIPAT was also forced to reduce

the horizon a glow of light to the south-west. The

speed. By 0130, the latter could not have gone

light emanated from the burning remains of

too far from Karachi and advantage could have

MUHAFIZ. but the fate of MUHAFIZ was not

been taken of the vulnerability of the two boats

known to anyone at this time. He thought he had

had the information available at. MHQ been more

succeeded in locating KHAIBAR and steered for

precise.

what he thought was the burning wreck of

“The missiles more than once had been

KHAIBAR.

mistaken for approaching aircraft. In fact, the

“It was upon the recovery of survivors that it

attention of the controlling authorities ashore

was for the first time learnt that MUHAFIZ had

was distracted towards the threat of an aerial

been sunk. The information was passed promptly

attack once too often to the extent that all

to MHQ. and must have come as a shock for those

warnings of a surface attack given by the tracker

who were busy organising the search for

radar on Manora ware largely ignored or not given

KHAIBAR and attempting to untangle the

due weightage. Tracker radar was a good radar

confused picture in the Headquarters. After an

set loaned by SUPARCO to the Navy; Its

unsuccessful attempt to locate KHAIBAR’s

performance was extremely good. It was installed

survivors, the ship returned to harbour early on

in PNS Qasim near the entrance of the harbour.

the morning of 5 December.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/193

“ZULFIQAR joined the search effort at 0830

attack on 4 December, the PAF responded by

on 5 December, when she was on her way to join

carrying out bombing raids over Okha harbour-

the Task Force having completed the inner patrol.

the forward base o f missile boats. In one such

At this time the Commanding Officer, having

attack, the fuelling facilities for missile boats at

missed the original message, for the first time

Okha were destroyed. The strikes would have

learnt the ship was required to conduct a search,

been m ore e ffe c tiv e had not the Indians

but the message received m erely stated that

anticipating our reaction, dispersed the missile

SHAHJAHAN was to jo in the Task Force while

boats to less prom inent locations along their

MAD AD GAR and ZULFIQAR were to continue the

coast.

search. The Commanding Officer, not knowing

“In the early hours o f 6 December, a false

the position or the purpose o f search, joined

a la rm o f a m issile a tta ck was raised by the MADADGAR which was seen emerging from the

circulation o f a number o f reports indicating the south of Churna Island at this time. Thus until

presence o f missile boats in the area west o f Cape the afternoon of 5 December, MADADGAR and

Monze. MHQ asked the PAF to carry out an air

ZULFIQAR had made no headway in the search

strike on a ship which had been identified as a

for KHAIBAR’s survivors.

missile boat by Naval observers flow n on a Fokker

“COMATRON was again ordered to proceed

F rien d sh ip a irc ra ft f o r this sp ecific task.

out at 1000 to make a second attempt to locate

ZULFIQAR was informed by MHQ that a PAF sortie

KHAIBAR and her survivors. A fresh search

was on its way to attack a missile boat in the area.

centre was chosen by COMATRON and the search

Shortly afterwards, at 0 6 4 0 , an aircraft appeared bore fruit when one of KHAIBAR’s life rafts with

and strafed ZULFIQAR. The attack was broken off

survivors on it was sighted at 1555. By 1745 on

only when the ship's fra n tic efforts to get herself the evening o f 5 December, the survivors were

identified as a friendly unit succeeded. There was recovered. When it became dark, the ship set

a loss o f lives and some were injured. The ship course for harbour and on the way back picked

sustained minor damage on the upper deck and

up 4 more survivors.

returned to harbour to effect repairs and land

“In the meantime, a concerted search effort

casualties. ”

w as m ou n ted at 1425 w h en MHQ ord ered

COM KAR to ‘con d u ct a th orou gh search for

In R e tro s p e c t

survivors of KHAIBAR’. A search force under the

Viewed in retrospect, it is doubtful whether the first tactical command o f COMMINRON in MUNSIF

missile attack on Karachi could have achieved any

was despatched to the area. MADADQAR and

more than it did because:

ZULFIQAR joined MUNSIF for this search effort.

•

The planning for such operations will always be

An expanding square search based on a new

highly classified, Earmarking forces before an

search datum was commenced by the search

and working them up for their tasks is li e ^

force on arrival in the area towards the evening.

b reach secu rity.

It is also not PraC 1 t0

This attempt was abandoned at 1913, when the

Unforeseeable defects cause earmarked ore ^

search force was ordered to withdraw towards the

coast, as a reaction to a false alarm o f a missile

fall out at the last minute, as haPp^

w1

ARon

subsequent attacks on Karachi when

,j

attack. By this time the search had, in any case,

6 December and KADMATT on 8 Decern

become redundant as KHAIBAR’s survivors had

been picked up by the gunboat SADAQAT a few

•

The dispersal of friendly forces w

a

s

vaS

hours earlier.

W hen N IR G H AT found th at K H A ^ A ^ ^

“W ith th e p rim acy o f the m issile th reat

approaching her at high speed, N

iete pre

recognised, a reappraisal of defence measures

reverse cou rse to gain tim e to

Jcd

against this threat was done. It was obvious that

launch missile checks. In so do.ir}£

racing

the missile boats must be tackled at their base or

miles astern o f the other ships ^

^ could

during transit before they could launch their

towards K arach i at high speed.

. at the

missiles. It was equally clear that this task could

n e v e r h a v e c a u g h t u p a n

*

a v a i la b le -

not be accomplished without the support of the

p r e d e t e r m i n e d p o i n t d u r i n g t h e t i m e a v

^

PAF. Tlie Navy had initially found it difficult to

get firm Commitments from the Air Force due to

I m p o n d e r a b l e s like th e s ®

d e p e n d on

their involvem ent in Arm y operations. Once

n a v a l o p e r a t i o n s . O v e r c o m i n g t h e m wi convinced o f the necessity, after the m issile

the reactions of the man on the spo .

194/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

As to who set the oil tanks on fire on 4 December,

us all. Within 72 hours of sailing on 2 December

“The Story of the Pakistan Navy” clearly states that it KUTHAR had a major blow-up in the engine room

was the Indian Air Force.

and some personnel were injured. She had to be

In its account o f the first m issile attack on 4

taken in tow by KIRPAN to retu rn to Bombay

December, it states:*

escorted by KHUKRI. VIJETA, a missile boat with

the Fleet, also suffered a breakdown on the day

“The oil installations had also been Subjected to after sailing from Bombay and had to be towed

an aerial attack earlier in the day at 0830, when

back by SAGARDEEP. Throughout the period the

two oil tanks at Keamari had caught Jire. ”

F leet was at sea, th ere w ere m achinery

In its account of the second missile attack on 8

breakdowns which reduced the speed of the Fleet.

December, it states:**

Fortunately, the ships engine room crews rose

magnificently to each occasion and repairs were

“The first m issile flew over the ships at the expeditiously completed. It can well be imagined

anchorage, crossed Manora Island and crashed

that the material state of ships of the Fleet was

into an oil tank at the Keamari oil farm. There

uppermost in the mind of FOCWEF and he had to

was a huge explosion and flames shot up so high

take this im portant factor into account when

that Qamar House-a multi-story building in the

embarking upon an operation.

city- was clearly visible. The Jire caused by the air

‘There is no doubt that Pakistani submarines

attack on 4 December had been put out only a day

were lurking in the North Arabian Sea. During

earlier after three days o f concerted efforts. Fires the first few days, a number of ships of our Fleet

once again raged in the oil fa rm after a short lived picked up sonar contacts. They prosecuted these

respite o f a day. A distressing sight no doubt fo r contacts, but were unable to collect any evidence

everyone, but p a rticu la rly f o r those who had of actual damage to a submarine, though in at

risked their lives in a tenacious battle against the least two instances, the attacking ships felt very

oil fa rm Jires earlier. ”

strongly that they w ere hunting a confirmed

submarine.

Western Fleet Operations and the Second

“On the afternoon o f 3 December, the Fleet

Missile Attack on Karachi

observed reconnaissance aircraft circling around

it, taking good care to remain out of gun range.

In his book Admiral Kohli states:***

Whilst the ships were tracking the aircraft, the

Fleet received the signal that hostilities with

“The Western Fleet sailed on 2 December 1971 to

Pakistan had commenced.

operate in their assigned exercise area. For the

“It was evident that the submarine contacts

Flag O ffic e r C om m an din g W estern F leet

which had been prosecuted the previous nig

(FOCWEF) to have complete freedom of movement

and the snooper aircraft reports, would give

e

to carry out the directive given to him and with

enemy a reasonably accurate position °*

the possibility that a task force from Bombay may

Fleet. FOCWEF decided to split the force into two

be employed on a special operation, a line was

divergent groups under cover o f ^ar^ne^.S,|°

indicated which the Fleet and the Special Task

shake o ff the snooper. This was success u y

Force would not cross, to prevent interference

achieved by midnight. As it happened, this sp

with each other.

had taken the Fleet so far south that t“ fe /.an

“Two missile boats had been allotted to the

simultaneous attack on Karachi and the

a

Fleet which were to be in tow by ships of the Fleet.

ports had to be postponed.

j

These boats would be released to carry out their

“On 5 D ecem ber, the F leet re^r,ŮJ l /g

attacks either on enemy surface units at sea or on

refuelled and replenished. On the nigh o

^

ships in or near the harbour of Karachi, the main

December, FOCW EF detached tw o f ^ ^ ther

port of Pakistan. Any missiles left over after the

ships - one group to attack Karachi an

destruction of enemy units were to be directed to

group to attack the Makran ports. Due

the neutralization of shore targets.

minute defect TALWAR had to drop ou

“The material state of our ships, including the

Karachi strike group.

flagship MYSORE was a source of some worry to

Page 347.

Page 352.

Pages 58 et seq.

196/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

“ On the a ftern o o n o f 6 December, quite

would not be prudent to expose the Karachi group to

inexplicably and for reasons not known to us in

such a high probability of attack by an alert enemy

Bombay at that time, Naval Headquarters (NHQ)

Karachi had already been attacked on night 4 /5

decided to assume control o f operations. NHQ

December and could again be attacked later. He

made a signal at about 1600 hours cancelling the

therefore cancelled the attack which the Fleet had

attack on Karachi scheduled for the night of 6/7

already launched on Karachi and the Makran ports.

D ecem ber. Later the F leet was ordered to

The situation on the 7th morning was that the

rendezvous (RAO TIR off Saurashtra to pick up a

various groups of Fleet ships had assembled at the R/

second missile boat VIDYUT. The various groups

V. But TIR and VIDYUT had not reached the R/V. Had

o f Fleet ships which were well on their way to

the enemy been D/Fing the signals made by TIR

their targets had to continue to steam at high

during the night and had the Pakistan Air Force

speed to m ake th is d istan t R/V in time.

launched an air strike to attack the TIR group, there

Meanwhile TIR repeatedly broke wireless silence

was a possibility that this strike might by chance find to report her position and Pakistani aircraft. She

the Fleet and attack it instead o f TIR. Indeed, after could well have become the target of shore based

intercepting a Pakistani transmission, FOCINCWEST

Pakistani fighter bombers."

signalled TIR to “prepare to repel air attack" and the Indian Air Force swiftly sent aircraft to protect the TIR

R easons fo r C an cellation o f th e A tta c k o f N ight 6/

group from air attack. At this stage, the missile boat 7 D ecem b er

VIDYUT, which TIR was towing to hand over to the

Even after Adm iral Kohli’s book was published in

Fleet, started reporting defects which required her to 1989, n ob od y w as ab le to c la rify who in NHQ

return to Bombay. In Admiral Kohli’s words “Things

authorised the cancellation of this attack. The only

had not gone too well and NHQ reinstated control of

clarification available was that it was felt necessary

maritime operations on the w estern seaboard to

that the Fleet should have an extra missile boat for

FOCINCWEST."**

the attack. Recently it has been possible to clarify this These events confirmed FOCWEF’s assessment

grey area.

that after the first m issile attack on night 4/5

A fte r th e fir s t m is s ile a tta ck on n igh t 4/5

Decem ber, the P akistan N avy w as keeping the

December, the Pakistan Navy intensified its aerial

approaches to Karachi from Saurashtra under close

surveillance o f the approaches to Karachi. “The Story surveillance so as to detect the approach of our of the Pakistan Navy" states:*

missile boats. He therefore decided to launch the

second m issile attack from w est-southw est and

“After the first missile attack, a mixed bag o f a

altered the Fleet’s course westward. On the 7th,

dozen civilian aircraft were lined up at Karachi

FOCWEF had to break wireless silence more than

civil airport where a Fleet A ir Arm was set up

once in an exchange o f signals with FOCINCWEST

immediately, manned by civilian volunteer crews

regarding the second missile attack.

from PIA and the F lying Club. There was no

Admiral Kohli’s book states:***

problem in operating 3 or 4 light aircraft during

the day, in their respective sectors on an arc 200

“FO CINCW EST ordered FOCW EF to e x e c u t e

miles from Karachi, covering the entire area from

Operation Python- the attack on Karachi - during

Jam nagar to the Makran Coast. A t night, two

the night 7/8 December, if feasible. The forces o

radar flitted aircraft at a time covered the same

be used were left to the discretion of FOCWEF. n

arc. Thus from the afternoon o f 5 December, it

another message, the C-in-C directed FOCWE 0

was difficult for a missile boat to approach within

press home the attack as the enemy forces wer

200 miles o f Karachi undetected."

In disarray. FOCWEF reported inability due

weather conditions. The weather improved on ^

On the m orn in g o f 6 D ecem ber, NHQ had

December and the Fleet planned the next a a

in tercep ted the P ak istan N a vy ’s sign a ls o f the on Karachi on the night of 8/9 December.

Pakistan Air Force strafing one of its own warships,

th e P a k ista n i frig a te ZU LFIQ AR . T h is caused On 8 December. FOCWEF split his force into

considerable concern in the mind of the Chief of the

three groups:

Naval Staff, A dm iral Nanda. He assessed that it

• Page 349.

~ ~ ~

~

•• Page 60.

••• Page 60.

198/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

The fast frigates of the 15th Frigate Squadron.

soon thereafter. The anti aircraft guns at Karachi

TRISHUL and TALWAR to escort missile boat

opened fire as the TRISHUL group withdrew

VINASH for the second missile attack on Karachi.

unobserved. Post war intelligence indicated that

•

The cruiser MYSORE accompanied by BETWA

Karachi’s guns set fire to a Greek ship ZOE which

and RAN JIT to raid Makran.

Lloyds List of 10 December stated as “set ablaze and

•

The tanker DEEPAK. accompanied by KADMATT

sunk”.

to continue contraband control. KADMATT had

During the withdrawal. VINASH reported defects

dropped out of the Karachi strike group due to a

and had to stop. However before the need arose to

last minute defect.

take her in tow, VINASH repaired her defect and the

The Second Missile Attack on Karachi

group continued its withdrawal at high speed. They

R/V'd the Fleet on 9 December.

FOCWEF’s primary concern now was to distract the

Pakistan Navy’s attention towards the MYSORE

The Pakistan Navy's Account o f the Second Misile

group so as to reduce the probability of the Karachi

Attack

group being detected during approach and

The Second Missile Attack*

withdrawal.

TRISHUL. TALWAR and VINASH set course for

"The second missile attack code named ’ Python’

Karachi at high speed. En route, electronic emissions

was planned and executed under the direction of

were detected on a Pakistan Naval frequency which

Flag Officer Commanding Western Fleet from his

was being monitored. It was appreciated that a vessel

flagship INS MYSORE. The Western Fleet sailed

was reporting the presence of the group to Karachi.

out of Bombay on 2 December, just one day before

The vessel was soon sighted. TALWAR was told to

the commencement of hostilities and was

sink the vessel which she did and rejoined.

detected moving north towards Karachi by the

During the approach to Karachi, TRISHUL’s

submarine HANGOR. Two missile boats had been

taken in tow. The fleet maneuvered to take up a

electronic surveillance reported that the radar at

position to launch a missile attack.

Karachi had stopped rotating and was pointed

“The first missile attack having been handled

directly at the group, a sure sign that the group had

directly by the FOCINCWEST, the Fleet

been detected. At 2300. the group arrived off Karachi

Commander was tasked to launch the second

and on radar detected a group of ships. FOCWEF had

missile attack on the following day. But in a bid

already told the CO of TRISHUL that VINASH should

to shake off our submarines and reconnaissance

fire all four missiles. VINASH proceeded to do so:

aircraft, the Indian Fleet moved so far south that

• The first missile homed on to the oil tanks at the attack was no longer feasible on schedule.

Keamari and started a huge fire.

This shows the extent to which Indian plans were

•

The second and third missiles homed on to

foiled by our submarines and meagre

merchant ships. It was subsequently learnt that

reconnaissance effort by a few requisitioned civil

the British vessel HARMATTON had been

aircraft.

damaged and the Panamanian vessel GULF STAR

“An attack planned for the night of 6

December was also aborted, when Indian Naval

had sunk.

•

The fourth missile homed on to the Pakistan

Headquarters cancelled it after assuming direct

Navy’s tanker DACCA which had been

control over fleet operations. Weather conditions,

camouflaged and anchored amidst the merchant

which were unsuitable for missile boat

ships because, laden with oil. she could not seek

operations, precluded an attack on the night of 7

safety inside Karachi port as the other Pakistan

December. During this period, when the missile

attack was postponed several times, the Pakistan

Naval ships had done.

fleet was at sea. Deeply conscious of the missile

It had been pre-arranged that the Indian Air

threat. FOFPAK continued to manoeuvre his fleet,

Force would attack Karachi’s airfields at Masroor and

mostly in an anti-submarine formation, along the

Drigh Road at the same time as the second missi e

coast.

attack. It so happened that the TRISHUL group

“After much discussion and debate, the

arrived off Karachi and carried out its attack before

decision to recall the surface ships back to

the prearranged time. The air attack commenced

Pages 350 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/ 199

harbour was taken sometime on 7 December and

Fires once again raged in the oil farm after a short

by the afternoon of 8 December, all major surface

lived respite of a day. A distressing sight no

units except DACCA had entered harbour.

doubt for everyone, but particularly for those who

DACCA was at Manora anchorage and remained

had risked their lives in a tenacious battle against

there as its entry into harbour was precluded by

the oil farm fires earlier.

its deep draft and tidal conditions in harbour.

"The other three missiles homed on ships at

The men on board watched the ships steam into

Manora anchorage. The British-owned merchant

harbour with a growing feeling of uneasiness.

vessel HARMATTAN, SS GULF STAR flying the

“DACCA had performed admirably its basic

Panama nag,-and PNS DACCA were hit by a

role of keeping the ships topped up with fuel,

missile each.

The HARMATTAN sank

rations and other stores necessary for the

immediately, but GULF STAR survived. PNS

sustenance of the fleet at sea during its

DACCA’S miraculous survival after absorbing a

operations. She had been out at sea since 10

missile hit in an oil tank can be attributed to the

November carrying out underway replenishment

courage and vigilance of the Commanding Officer

of ships at sea as and when required. When her

and crew. Timely operation of the steam

services were not required, she lay at anchor.

smothering system by engine room personnel

Having camouflaged herself as a merchant ship a

after the missile hit the ship certainly averted a

day earlier, the ship happened to be at Manora

major explosion that could have been fatal for the

anchorage on the fateful night of 8 December.

ship. A first hand account of this missile attack is

“This missile attack was carried out by a

given from a special report submitted by PNS

single missile boat VINASH, supported by two

DACCA.

frigates TRISHUL and TALWAR of the 15th

'At about 2245, a pale light was seen

Frigate Squadron, under the command of F-15 on

travelling towards Manora. parallel to

board TRISHUL. The Indian Fleet appears to

Manora breakwater and when it was abreast

have remained well to the south, while the missile

of AA School, it turned right and. directly hit

attack unit was detached to sortie out towards

the oil tank which immediately burst into

Karachi from a southwesterly direction.

flames. A little later, another light was seen

“On the way to Karachi, one of the escorting

travelling from the same direction and hit the

frigates INS TALWAR engaged and sank a ship,

ship anchored very close to the breakwater;

which was believed to be a Pakistani patrol craft

the ship sank immediately. At that moment

suspected of having reported the position of the

action stations was sounded and in no time

approaching force. Since none of our patrol craft,

the ship had manned her guns and was ready

or for that matter any other warship, was engaged

to engage the target. In the meantime, a third

or sunk that night, it can be surmised that the

light was seen travelling towards another

victim of this attack must have been a civilian

ship at the southern corner of the anchorage,

craft. It appears that the unfortunate vessel was

she caught fire immediately. A little later, a

mercilessly pounded with shells from the frigate s

bright light was seen coming up from behind

guns until she caught fire and sank.

the horizon gaining height on port bow (ship

‘The missile boat VINASH closed Karachi to a

was lying 280-100 degrees). It appeared

range of 12 miles and fired four missiles in

stationary for sometime, and then rushed

succession at four different ships chosen at

steeply towards the ship. It was engaged by

random by the Unit Commander from the cluster

port guns. It hit on the port side piercing No 7

of about a dozen ships at Manora anchorage.

port FFO tank just above the water line. It

DACCA was unfortunate enough to be one of

ripped open the cargo and jungle decks. The

motor boat and spare fuel hoses caught fire.

them.

“The first missile flew over the ships at the

Abandon ship was piped immediately. A

anchorage, crossed Manora Island and crashed

number of officers and men jumped

overboard and only eight officers and 37

into an oil tank at the Keamari oil farm. There

CPOs and sailors stayed.’

was a huge explosion and flames shot up so ig

that Qamar House-a multi-storey building in the

“The Commanding Officer stayed on board

and. with the help of those who had not

city- was clearly visible. The fire caused by the air

abandoned ship, brought the fire on the upper

attack on 4 December had been put out on y a

deck under control. He has maintained that the

day earlier after three days of concerted efforts.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/201

hasty and controversial order to abandon ship,

towards Karachi. The C-in-C, PAF was contacted

cancelled soon afterwards, was given without his

on the direct telephone and asked to strike the

approval. His presence of mind in a moment of

Osas from the air. The C-in-C PN also had a word

crisis saved the ship, and deprived the Indian

with him to em phasise the urgency. The Air

Navy of the satisfaction of having sunk a warship

Marshal regretted his inability as according to

of the Pakistan Navy in the second missile attack.

him “No air effort was available".

As m atters stood, th eir score w as on ly one

‘Th e circumstances surrounding the sudden

defenceless merchant ship sunk and another

disappearance of the merchant vessel VENUS

damaged.

CHALLENGER from the high seas have remained

“It is surprising though that while the missile

somewhat of a mystery. It is certain though that

threat was uppermost in everyone’s mind, the

the ship was sunk in one o f the two missile

missiles when first observed on board DACCA,

attacks at Karachi. The ship, loaded with a cargo

were mistaken for aircraft flying with search

o f rice, had sailed for East Pakistan from the

lights switched on to locate their targets. The

United States on 10 September. Arriving off

reaction of many others who saw the missiles in

Chittagong in late November, she was diverted to

the air that night was no different.

Karachi where she was expected in the first week

“There was an air strike at Karachi by LAF just

of December. Thereafter, the ship could not be

about the time the Indian Navy launched the

traced until the identification of her wreck by a

missile attack; but there is no positive evidence of

team o f naval divers 26 m iles to the south of damage to the harbour due to the air strike,

Karachi a few days after the war.

which was in all probability directed at PAF air

“If the objective o f the attack, as claimed by

bases in Karachi. There were reports of bombs

the Indian Navy, was to destroy the Pakistan

h aving been dropped in B ihar and A gra Taj

Navy, not much contribution was made by the

colonies near Mauripur. The chance attack by IAF

second missile attack towards that goal. True,

at about the same time as the missile attack had

PNS DACCA was damaged by a chance hit, but

led to a controversy between the IAF and the

she was rep a ired in less than a month and

Indian Navy for claiming credit for the damage to

continues to serve the Navy till today. On the

oil tanks at Keam arL In all p rob ab ility this other hand, if the objective was to scare away

m issile had strayed away from its target and

m erch an t ships, the u n scru p u lou s method

locked on to the strong echo o f the oil tank.

adopted for this purpose is without precedence.

“The approach in g m issile was sighted by

“The p rovision s o f in tern ation al law and

look ou ts on M anora Islan d and rep orted to

conventions that forbid attack on merchant ships

COMKAR who passed the information on to Air

w ithout w arning w ere blatantly violated. No

Defence Sector Operation Centre, Korangi. Not a

effort at maintaining even a semblance of legal

single shot was fired as the missile whizzed past

propriety was made by declaration of a blockade

over harbour defenses and plunged into the oil

or a war zone before em barking on a callous

tank. Perceived, by those who saw it, to be an

slaughter o f m erchantm en and their crew by

aircraft, it was not engaged because of the gun

th ose who claim to h ave tak en up arms o

restrictions in force. It was nearly six minutes

champion the cause of the oppressed. For it was

after the missile hit the tank that a tremendous

well known to the Indians that missiles hur e

barrage of fire was let loose by anti aircraft guns

blindly at ships at Manora anchorage were boun

in harbour at 2248, when air raid warning red

to take a toll of neutral merchant ships.

was promulgated and gun restrictions lifted. No

“MUNSIF which was anchored in the WeinHy

aircraft were actually sighted over the harbour.

o f DACCA at Manora anchorage proceeded p

There were more blasts as other tanks exploded

a ssist D ACCA and picked up some

in the spreading fires. Starshells, which looked

survivors. Other personnel of DACCA an

like missiles, fired by PNS Himalaya at this time

o f merchant ships were recovered by au*V

fu rth er con fu sed th e p ictu re. Th e harbour cra ft p rom p tly desp atch ed to the see5

t

reverberated with the sound o f guns and blasts as

COM KAR. M AD AD G AR w as sent to

t

innumerable shells were pumped into the air.

DACCA but by the time she arrived the

“On the evening of 8 December at about 1800,

m idnight, the fire had been put ou a

a radar-fitted Cessna on patrol reported sighting

situation was under control. By the eve

Osa boats ju st leaving Jamnagar and heading

December, DACCA’S power had been rest

202/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

she moved to a position close inshore off Buleji

ADAMANT to masquerade as a neutral ship

Point, anchored and remained there until she

registered in Manila. The ship was boarded and

was towed back to harbour on 19 December.

apprehended.

“There followed in the wake o f the second

FOCWEF assessed that the MADHUMATI’s call to

missile attack yet another controversial decision:

Karachi would have distracted attention from the

orders were issued at 1400 on 9 December to

TRISHUL group headed for Karachi. This was

ships at Karachi to reduce their ammunition outfit.

confirmed when, soon after sunset, BETWA reported

“After the return of the ships to harbour on 8

a slow moving aircraft circling with lights on but

December, their vulnerability in the port

staying out of gun range. FOCWEF told CO MYSORE

remained a topic of continuing debate. In the

that there was no need to bombard Jiwani. The

early hours of 9 December, only a few hours after

MYSORE group withdrew with MADHUMATI and

the missile attack, dockyard workshops and

headed for the R/V where all groups were to rejoin on

buildings were severely damaged in a low level

9 December.

attack - facilitated, no doubt, by the light emitted All groups rejoined on the 9th evening and were

by the huge flames of the fire at the oil farm - by an replenished. By the 10th morning, the Fleet had been

LAF bomber. Under these circumstances anxiety

steaming at high speed for 8 days and cumulative

about the catastrophic consequences of an

defects were'beginning to reduce the speeds that

explosion in a ship fully loaded with ammunition

ships could sustain. FOCWEF decided that the Fleet

was only natural.

should return to Bombay, effect repairs, pick up two

“The decision to reduce the ammunition

missile boats and return to the operational area.

outfit, not withstanding the logic behind it,

To outflank the enemy submarines deployed off

continues to be questioned by many. The adverse

Bombay, FOCWEF maintained absolute wireless

effect on morale of men, who were inclined to see

silence, made landfall well south of Bombay and

it as a step to limit the surface ships operational

proceeded up the coast inside the 10 fathom line,

role, was immediate. Not accepted by most as a

through waters too shallow for submarines to

necessary rational step, the decision remained a

operate. The ruse succeeded and the Fleet arrived

controversial issue.

safely at Bombay on 13 December. By the time the

“It was perhaps in consideration of the morale

ships .were ready to sail again, the Pakistan Army in

factor and to avoid the impression that the fleet

the East had surrendered on 16 December and West

was immobilised that a strategy of high speed

Pakistan had accepted India’s unilateral offer ot

probes was introduced. This required random

ceasefire on 17 December.

sorties of short duration to be carried out at high

speed by designated ships. Destroyers and

A fter the War

frigates were employed in this manner until the

After the war there were differing views about the raid end of the war.”

on the Makran Coast. One view, held by high quarters

in NHQ, was that FOCWEF should have let the

The M ysore G rou p ’s Raid on the M akran

MYSORE group bombard Jiwani so as to give ships

Coast

companies a feeling of having played a part in the war

At the same time that the TRISHUL group had been

and the satisfaction of having fired their guns in

detached to attack Karachi, FOCWEF had detached

anger.

the MYSORE group to bombard Jiwani. On the

Another view has been stated by Admiral Kohli

evening of 8 December, 75 miles south of Jiwani, the

himself in his book:

MYSORE group, encountered a merchant ship who,

“The Pakistani naval raid at Dwarka in 1965 left

on seeing the MYSORE group reversed course

the officers and men of the Indian Navy infuriated

towards Karachi and was heard calling Karachi on a

and somewhat humiliated. I was then the Deputy

frequency being monitored. The ship was signalled to

Chief of the Naval Staff and I vowed to myself that

stop but she did not comply. MYSORE fired a

if ever there was another round involving naval

broadside ahead of her and she stopped. ftANJIT was

forces and I was in any kind of a position of

sent to investigate and reported that it was the responsibility, I would go to the farthest extremes

Pakistani merchant ship MADHUMATI registered in

to teach the enemy a lesson and to avenge this

Karachi who had over - painted her name to read

dastardly act.*

*

Page 1.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/203

“By not bombarding Gwadar and Makran, the

transmitted her message to Karachi, achieved thi

Fleet robbed its e lf o f the glory and the kudos

purpose. Had th ere been no MADHUMATI th*3

which would ju stifiably have been theirs, and

MYSORE group would have bombarded Jiwa’ni to

denied me th e s a tis fa c tio n o f aven gin g the divert attention from the Karachi group but not to

bombardment of Dwarka in 1965 by the Pakistan

avenge Dwarka or to give sh ips com panies the

Task Force.”*

satisfaction of firing guns in anger.

The second m issile attack had unexpected

As regards the first view, Makran would have

results. As is evident from the Pakistan Navy’s been bombarded if NHQ had not cancelled the attack

account, the hit on one oil tank set several adjacent

on 6 December because o f apprehensions that the

oil tanks on fire. The ships of the Pakistan Flotilla Karachi group would be exposed to too high a risk of

who had withdrawn into harbour the previous day

air attack.

were told to reduce their outfits of ammunition so as

As regards the second view, FOCWEF had no

to minimize explosion damage in case of being hit.

enthusiasm whatsoever for bombarding worthless

Most significant o f all, the neutral merchant ships

targets on the Makran Coast. Even at the planning

who had witnessed the two missile attacks started

stage, the sole purpose of such bombardments was

seek in g assu ran ce o f safe passage from the

“to repeatedly provoke the Pakistan Flotilla to come

Government o f India before sailing out of Karachi.

out and fight.” After the success of the first missile

Since no neutral shipping was heading for Karachi

attack, the purpose o f bombardment changed “to

either, the W estern F leet, desp ite its limited enhance the success of the second missile attack by

resources, had achieved a de facto blockade without

distracting attention towards the bombarding group.”

it having been declared. With the Pakistani Flotilla in In FOCWEF’s view, the capture of the MADHUMATI

harbour, the Western Fleet controlled the approaches

close o ff the Makran coast, soon after MADHUMATI

to West Pakistan from 9 December onwards.

Sinking of the KHUKRI

P r e a m b le

causing concern. However all the anti submarine frigates were away with the Western Fleet and no In his com parative assessm ent o f Naval Forces,

ships were immediately available to deal with this FOCINCWEST had accepted that the Pakistan Navy’s

submarine.

latest Daphne class submarines were far superior to

The 14th Frigate Squadron KHUKRI, KUTHA

not only our submarines but also our surface ships.

and KIRPAN had sailed with the Western Fleet on 2

Accordingly all naval ships coming to or departing

December. KUTHAR suffered a boiler explosion on from Bombay hugged the shallow waters of the coast

PM 4 December. FOCWEF detached KIRPAN to tow

north and south of Bombay and altered landwards/

KUTHAR back to Bombay escorted by Captain F 14 m

seawards at random so that enemy submarines could

KHUKRI. Enroute to Bom bay, at midday on

never predict where to wait for targets.

D ecem ber KHUKRI carried out an attack on

Im m ed ia tely a fte r P a k ista n attacked on 3

submarine, recorded the entire attack and exp

g

December, systematic attempts were commenced to

on tape and sign alled that she considere

interfere with the Pakistan Navy’s shore to submarine

submarine destroyed. The 14 FS arrived Bom

rQ

V

broadcast. This yielded a series of D/F positions of

AM 6 December and KUTHAR was taken in an

Pakistani subm arines transm itting m essages to

repairs.

i Q

f\tf

Karachi. Progressively these D/F positions helped to

FOCINCWEST decided to deploy the 1 4 ^

confirm that one submarine was moving northwards

with the N avy’s latest Seaking anti su m

^

from o ff Bombay towards Diu. Since Diu was the

helicopters operating from Bombay to e imin

fS

assembly area for ships to be deployed for missile

submarine threat off Diu. The Seaking ® search

attacks on Karachi, this submarine threat started

were to operate in the southern sector o

________ ,

•

Pager 62.

204/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

area closer to Bombay and thereby have longer time

withF 14. who accepted decreased A/S capability

on task. The frigates were to operate in the northern

of the two ships. KHUKRI and KIRPAN were sailed

sector of the search area, closer to Diu Head.

for the hunt."****

The H unter Killer Operation

Sinking o f the K H UKRI

In his book, Admiral Kohli states:

"The Story of the Pakistan Navy" has recounted the events as seen from the submarine HANGOR which

“Where the Pakistan Navy scored over the Indian

sank the KHUKRI.

Navy was in their submarine arm. The French

HANGOR had sailed from Karachi on 22

Daphne class submarines were the most modern

November for a patrol off the Saurashtra coast. On 1

conventional submarines, with sensors and

December, she was ordered to shift to the area off

armament far superior to not only our

Bombay to relieve her sister submarine MANGRO

submarines but also our anU submarine frigates.

who was completing her patrol.

This is how the KHUKRI was detected by a

On 2 December, HANGOR sighted the Western

Daphne much before the frigate became aware of

Fleet which was on its way to its patrol area.

the submarines presence."*

HANGOR reported this to Karachi and continued her

“It was appreciated that the Pakistan Navy

patrol off Bombay. She was unable to find good

would have deployed at least two Daphne class

warship targets. Thereafter "The Story of the submarines to cover focal points on the likely sea

Pakistan Navy" states:*****

lanes used by Indian ships for passage to and

from Bombay port or any attacking force

“In an effort to locate the evasive enemy,

transiting between Bombay and Karachi. While

HANGOR extended her patrol northwards to

the destruction of hostile ships would have been

investigate some radio transmissions that she

the primary mission of enemy submarines

had intercepted on her sensors: In the early

operating off the West Coast of India, they would

hours of the morning of 9 December, when she

also provide early warning of Indian warship

was off the Kathiawar coast, two contacts were

movements.**

picked up on her passive sonar on a north

“As expected there were sonar contacts and

easterly bearing. They were easily identified as

reports of occasional sightings of periscopes by

warships by their sonar transmissions: radar

Indian ships and maritime reconnaissance

indicated a range of 6 to 8 miles. A pursuit of the

aircraft. There were subsequently confirmed

enemy began.

sighting reports of an enemy submarine in the

“When the first attempt to intercept the ships

area west of Diu Head. D/F bearings obtained of

failed, the submarine began snorkelling to gain

a submarine which had transmitted a wireless

speed. HANGOR. however, failed to attract the

message to Karachi also confirmed the position.

attention of the ships and contact was lost as the

This submarine was a potential threat to our

range increased. By the evening of 9 December,

shipping and it was decided by ihe Western Naval

she was able to make out the pattern of their

Command to eliminate this threat. The 14th anti movement by tracking them with the aid of her

submarine squadron comprising KHUKRI (FI4),

sensors.

The ships were carrying out a

KIRPAN and KUTHAR was the only force available

rectangular anti-submarine search.

for the task, together with some Seakings.”***

“Forecasting their movement along this

"Urgent operational orders for a hunt were

search pattern, the submarine succeeded by

prepared in consultation with Captain MN Mulla.

1900 in taking up a tactically advantageous

Senior Officer of the Squadron, requiring the

position on the path of the patrolling frigates. The

squadron to sail on 8 December for the last

range of the ships, which were moving at a speed

known position of the submarine. KUTHAR’s

of 12 knots, began to close. The crucial moment

problems were too serious to permit early

which the submarine had patiently worked for

readiness of the ship for sea. After considering

since the early hours of the morning had arrived.

the gravity o f the situation and in consultation

HANGOR was finally in a position to launch an

attack.

•

Page 33.

••

Page 75.

••• Page 75.

•••• Page 75.

•••••Pages 357 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/205

RECONSTRUCTED TRACKS OF P A KISTANI SUBMARINE HANGOR’s A T T A C K O N INS K H U K R I A N D INS KIRPAN ON 9 DECEMBER AND

SUBSEQU E N T O PER ATIO N F A L C O N 10 TO 13 DECEMBER 197]

H A N G O R ’s A T T A C K O N K H U K R I A N D K IR P A N - 9 D E C E M B E R 1971

(Not to Scale)

“At 1915, she went to action stations. Fifteen

the fact that about 150 underwater projectiles

minutes later, she came up to periscope depth,

were fired in this period. Only on one occasion

but could see nothing in the dark night when the

were the explosions close enough to shake the

range of the ships indicated by her periscope

submarine.

radar was only 9800 meters. The ships were

‘The Commanding Officer was naturally keen

completely darkened. The Commanding Officer

to pass the information of this successful attack

decided to go down to 55 metres depth and make

to Naval Headquarters. The submarine had to

a sonar approach for the final phase of the attack.

come up as it cannot transmit radio messages

Unaware of the submarine’s presence, the

while submerged. She took the risk of being fixed

frigates continued on their track. At 1957,

by enemy direction finding stations ashore while

HANGOR fired a down-the-throat shot with a

transmitting the message. Enemy aircraft were

homing torpedo at the northerly ship from a

overhead soon after the message was sent.

depth of 40 metres. The torpedo was tracked but

Intense air activity throughout the day forced the

no explosion was heard. This was not the time to

submarine to run silent and run deep, reducing

brood over the situation. The control team sprang

her speed of advance to 1.5 knots.

into action and fired a second torpedo. After five

“There were, of course, many close calls

tense minutes, a tremendous explosion was

during the passage back to Karachi. The Indian

heard at 2019 hours. The torpedo had found its

Navy called off the futile hunt on the evening of 13

mark. The other enemy frigate came straight for

December. There were claims by some of their

the submarine. HANGOR fired a third torpedo

units to have sunk the submarine, but she

and turned away at maximum speed. A distant

arrived unharmed at Karachi on 18 December.

explosion was heard subsequently.

“In this spectacular action which took place

“Moving west towards deeper waters, where

about 30 miles south of Diu off the Indian

she would be less vulnerable, the submarine

Kathiawar coast, KHUKRI, the ship of the

passed very close to the scene of action and heard

Squadron Commander of the 14th Frigate

distinctly the noise of explosions emanating from

Squadron, was sunk within two minutes after

the burning wreck. Later she came up to

receiving a hit in the magazine where explosives

periscope depth and took a last look. In the dark,

were stowed. 18 officers and 176 sailors

nothing could be seen except a faint glow on the

including the Commanding Officer, who

horizon near the scene of action.

deliberately stayed back on the sinking ship, lost

“In an extremely vulnerable position in enemy

their lives. This came as a shattering blow to the

controlled shallow waters where no help could

Indian Navy, deflating in one stroke the

reach her. the task that lay ahead of HANGOR

exuberance generated by highly exaggerated

was to evade her pursuers in the hunt that

success stories of the missile attacks at ships off

followed-the first signs of which came when a

Karachi."

number of underwater explosions were heard just

The Pakistan Naval Historical Review of March

about half an hour after the attack. For the next

1979 contained an article by a French naval officer.

four days, HANGOR braved the might of the

Cdr Courau. It states:

Western Fleet. All their anti-submarine assets-

frigates, Seaking helicopters and Alize aircraft-

“At the beginning on the afternoon of the 8th,

were thrown into the chase that followed. A

there had been only two radar echoes, detected

hunter killer (anti-submarine) operation fully

twice in the same formation at an interval of one

supported by IAF reconnaissance aircraft based

hour: this was enough to class them as warships

ashore in the area, was put into effect.

on a south-easterly course. The hunt began.

“The first priority of HANGOR after the attack

"Since the sighting, the enemy had continued

was to get into deeper waters and put as much

to change course, which gave the hunter some

distance between her and the position from which

problems. On the evening of the 8th the enemy

the torpedoes were fired, the datum (reference

was on a north-westerly course, then on the

point) for the search by enemy units. Having

morning of the 9th. they changed to a northsuccessfully done that, she began her journey easterly course, then to a south-easterly course

back home. For four days and nights, she was

about noon.

harassed* by the enemy. The dimensions of the

"HANGOR now realised that the enemy ships

enemy anti-submarine effort can be gauged from

had been on a course that described a rectangle.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/207

Then at 1900 the ships set a course to the north

tracked on sonar all the way as it acquired “lock

west. A t 1915 the CO estim ated their mean

on” to the target and passed under it (as it was

course and dived to attack. He altered course on

supposed to do). However, the newly acquired

the frigate on the western side (KIRPAN) at very

torpedoes, whose test facilities had not yet been

slow speed in ord er to presen t the sm allest

set up, failed to explode and kept going. Until the

silhouette to the enemy’s sonar. He decided not

time that the torpedo was fired, neither of the two

to hurry the moment of firing, but to wait for the

frigates had any inkling o f being under attack.

moment the enemy would be on target judged to

However, the moment the torpedo passed under

be at 2000.

INS KIRPAN, she suddenly-woke up, realised she

“At 2013, a sharp order broke the silence -

was under attack and turned away at maximum

“Fire". Everyone was tense. The torpedo left the speed. HANGOR had struck first, but had failed

tube and was heard moving towards the target,

to hit hard. The new torpedo had let it down.

but then they heard it passing under without

“The advantage had now shifted completely in

exploding.

favour of the enemy. If the enemy had kept their

“There was no time to criticise this failure.

cool, it is difficult to say what would have been

The frigate on the eastern side (KHUKRI) passed

the final outcome. Perhaps, this article would not

in her turn at a range of about 5000 meres. There

have been written in such detail. But one thing is

was ju s t tim e to set the range and at 2017 a

sure - the fate of INS KHUKRI would still have

second torpedo was fired. A loud explosion was

been what it was.

heard.

“As KIRPAN turned away and ran, KHUKRI,

“KIRPAN returned to pick up survivors and

which was to its sou th, now knowing the

h er cou rse b ro u g h t h er in lin e w ith the direction from w hich the torpedo had come,

submarine which promptly fired a third torpedo

increased speed and came straight for an attack

but the frigate was prepared for the attack and

on HANGOR.

left at high speed. After 8 or 10 minutes a very

“It was now HANGOR’s turn to keep it’s cool

c le a r e x p lo s io n w as h eard follow ed by the and this, the submarine did well. As KHUKRI

stopping o f the KIRPAN’s machinery. HANGOR

came in for the attack, HANGOR’s attack team

considered that he had hit the frigate, but he

calmly shifted target to KHUKRI, obtained a quick

.decided to abandon the attack and made for deep

solution and fired the second torpedo at it. This

water. KIRPAN had a badly damaged stern and

quick shot was mostly meant to spoil the attack

was unable to steam, she was finally towed into

by KHUKRI. However loss of nerve by KHUKRI s

Bombay.

Commanding Officer on hearing the oncoming

“There followed three days o f depth charge

torpedo, made him try to turn away from it. This

attacks by Shackeltons, Alizes and escorts.. The

greatly helped to “pull” the torpedo towards the

submarine suffered 156 depth charges, most of

frigate. As soon as the torpedo acquired “lock on .

w h ich w e re a lo n g w ay off. E very tim e the it went straight for the target, passed under it an

submarine used the schnorkel, it was spotted by

when it was directly under the keel it explode

aircraft, but the escorts led to the position by the

breaking the keel of INS KHUKRI which sank in a

aircraft never made contact. Finally the HANGOR

matter of two minutes; with all hands on boar ^

managed to escape and carry on her mission.”

There were no survivors. There was

time for the myth of the “CO nonchalantly lig

In 1997, the Pu blic R elations D irectorate of

a cigarette as the ship sank under him t0

Pakistan Naval Headquarters published “Sentinels of

enacted.

the Sea - The Pakistan Navy 1947-1997”. It contains

“The sinking of KHUKRI had now made u

an article by Rear Admiral RA Qadri, who was the

balance of advantage even between HANG

Electrical Officer of HANGOR. The following excerpts

KIRPAN and the action had not yet finished.

d escrib e the a tta ck on KHUKRI as seen from

“Seeing its sister ship sink in such a s lng

HANGOR.

tim e m ust have been a n e rv e -s h a ^ cer,

experience for the KIRPAN’s Commanding

“After having obtained a perfect (fire control)

for he came charging in for an emergency a

solution, HANGOR commenced the attack at

1957 by firing one homing torpedo, “down the

fired o ff a pattern o f depth charges,

g Ut

scare HANGOR into breaking off its attac •

d

throat” at the more northerly target, which was

INS KIRPAN. The torpedo ran true and it was

when he found that HANGOR was not in

208/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

and instead had fired the third torpedo at

subsequent technical enquiry also revealed

KIRPAN, he broke off the attack just as quickly

certain failings and non compliance on the part of

and ran “hell for leather" in panic trying to outrun KHUKRI’s A/S Team with the laid down A/S

the torpedo locked on to the frigate’s tail. That

doctrine."

was the last seen (actually heard) of her.

What followed this action was a massive

KIRPAN, who was searching for the submarine

anti-submarine effort by the Indian Navy, in the

together with KHUKRI, reported detecting torpedoes

form of Operation Falcon to hunt down and kill

going past her at the time KHUKRI was torpedoed.

ju st one submarine, PNS/M HANGOR. The

She took vigorous evasive action and fired mortars on

operation continued for four days till the night of

the torpedo bearing. After a few salvos, her mortars

13 December.

went non operational KIRPAN now faced a dilemma -

"A number of anti submarine charges were

should she rescue KHUKRI’s survivors - either by

fired, on what the HUK groups thought was

going amidst them on a dark night or should she

HANGOR. In the submarine itself, 24 salvoes

lower her boats to rescue survivors. Both actions

(each of three charges) on 10 December and 12

would require KIRPAN to stop and this would make

salvoes on 12 December were registered. The

her an easy target for the submarine, if it chose to

latter depth charging took place after the Indian

attack KIRPAN. Or should KIRPAN leave the area,

Navy’s shore stations had taken cross bearings

repair her mortars and return to the area with an

on HANGOR’s radio message to Naval

additional ship to rescue the survivors and start

Headquarters regarding the action.

hunting the submarine? This however would give the

“Throughout these four days, HANGOR

submarine time to get away from the scene of the

remained completely aware of the huge effort

sinking and consequently greatly enlarge the area to

underway (though the details of Operation Falcon

be searched. The CO of KIRPAN decided to withdraw

as such were known only after the war). It is a

from the scene and return later.

measure of HANGOR’s efficiency that in spite of

Admiral Kohli’s book states:**

leaving the action area with a highly depleted

“There was some controversy about KIRPAN

battery, and with such a massive hunt for her in

withdrawing from the scene of the sinking instead

progress, she managed not only to recharge her

of picking up survivors. She had heard the

batteries but was able to successfully lay a false

hydrophonic effect of more torpedoes and she had

trail for the HUK groups to follow. How successful

defective mortars. In the circumstances she took

the false trail was, can be judged from the fact

the wisest course. After meeting with KATCHALL,

that of the more than 36 salvoes fired, none came

she returned to the scene in her company to carry

anywhere near the submarine; only two slightly

on with the hunt."

shook the submarine. Most, being far away, could

just be heard on sonar.”

On receiving KIRPAN’s signals reporting the

sinking of KHUKRI, FOCINCWEST rushed rescue

Admiral Kohli’s book states:*

forces to the scene. By the time KATCHALL and

KIRPAN returned the next morning, only 6 officers

“While in the process of hunting, the enemy

and 61 sailors had survived to be rescued.

submarine with her superior sonar facility,

FOCINCWEST cancelled the third missile attack

obtained contact of KHUKRI before her own

on Karachi which was to be have been carried out on

detection by the ship and struck KHUKRI by a

the 10th night and deployed forces to hunt the

salvo of three torpedoes in quick succession. The

submarine.

ship sank in a matter of minutes at 2055 on 9

December, taking down with her 18 officers and

A nti Subm arine Operation Falcon

176 men including the Commanding Officer,

Captain MN Mulla. It was a serious blow in an

Admiral Kohli’s book states:***

encounter in which the superior underwater

destruction capability and its allied weapons

“A massive hunt was launched for the killer

systems of a modern submarine turned the scales

submarine with all available A/S ships, Seakings

and thus the hunter became the victim. A

and Alizes.

•

Page 76.

•* Page 77.

Page 77.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/209

“The Alizes laid a barrier of sonobuoys and

decreased anti submarine capability of th

the Seakings continued to operate from Diu until

two ships, KHUKRI and KIRPAN were sailJi

the passage became so long that time on the job

for the hunt.”

was much reduced. The IAF mounted sustained

®

The imprudent actions o f the CO KHUKRI in a

maritime reconnaissance searches in search of

known very high submarine probability area.

the submarine. For the next four days, all forces

°

The glaring inadequacies in lifesaving equipment.

w ere engaged in relen tless and coordin ated

activity. Ships reported successful attacks on all

Notwithstanding these sensitivities, intensive

four days. The submarine was slowly making its

enquiries were initiated.

way tow ards K arachi w h ere air cover w ould

prevent fu rther attacks and save her. It was

Post War In q u irie s on the Loss o f the KHUKRI evaluated by those taking part in the hunt that

S in c e th e D a p h n e c la s s s u b m a r in e 's a n ti ship

the submarine was certainly severely damaged

c a p a b ility w a s k n o w n to be a n d a ccep ted to be

and that her arrival in Karachi was problematic.

s u p e r i o r to o u r a n t i s u b m a r i n e c a p a b ili t y ,

The hunt was term in ated relu cta n tly on the

sh o u ld the a n ti su b m a rin e o p e ra tio n have been

even in g o f 13 D ecem ber as our fo rces w ere

launch ed at a ll?

a p p ro a ch in g w ith in ran ge o f sh ore based The consensus was that in war, it is unacceptable

Pakistani aircraft."

to let an enemy subm arine threaten you on your

doorstep - it has to be hunted.

A f t e r t h e W a r

Were the two fr ig a te s and S eak ings deployed

After the war, there was considerable debate on:

o n 8 D e c e m b e r a d eq u a te to co p e w ith a Daphne

cla ss su b m a rin e?

• Whether two ships were a viable enough force to

It emerged that the Seaking helicopters, which

send on an anti Daphne Hunter Killer mission

w ere the N avy’s la test and best anti submarine w ith o u t an ti su b m a rin e a ir e ffo r t in d irect system, could have been better utilised operating

support.

from Diu but they were considered to be defenceless if

• W h eth er K H U K R I’s doing so low a speed was attacked by Pakistani aircraft. However, available

re la te d to th e e x p erim en ta l S on ar

170

Super Connie maritime recce aircraft and Alize anti

modification.

subm arine aircraft should have been utilised in

•

Whether the Seakings could have been utilised

support of the operation from the moment it started

more offensively.

on 8 December.

•

W hether KIRPAN was ju stified in withdrawing

W h y w a s K H U K R I d o in g s lo w s p e e d when

from the scene after KHUKRI’s sinking instead of

tactical d octrine laid dow n high speed?

immediately rescuing KHUKRI’s survivors.

It emerged that with the assistance of the B h a b h a

•

Why Operation FALCON was unable to locate the

Atom ic Research Centre in Bombay, a secret but

Pakistani submarine.

promising experiment had been initiated to increase

th e ran ge at w h ich sh ips son ars could detec Since the action of the Commanding Officer of the

submarines. The modification equipment had been

KHUKRI going down with his ships had seized the

tried at sea, resu lts w ere prom ising but further n ation ’s atten tion , each o f th ese issues bacam e improvements were needed. These were comple e

sensitive and controversial, because they called into

after the Western Fleet sailed on 2 December,

question:

the 14 FS returned to Bombay, approval was given y

•

T h e v e ry p ru d en ce o f F O C IN C W E ST h avin g Admiral Kohli for the modification kit to be embar e

launched the operation, more-so as he himself

in KHUKRI w h en she sa iled on 8 Decem e ■

Throughout the search on 8 and 9 December, w ^

was later to admit in his book “We Dared” that:

“The French Daphne class submarines were

the m odification equipment was connected up'

the most modern conventional submarine,

KHUKRI’s sonar, the CO o f KHUKRI had detai*ed

with sensors and armament far superior not

discussions on the pros and cons of doing

/^er

only to our submarines but also to our anti

to increase detection range vis a vis doing

° s

submarine frigates.

speed and decreasing detection range. A consC1tjrljS

“In consultation w ith F 14, who accepted

decision was taken by him to do slow speed. n

connection, Admiral Kohli’s book states.*____ ____ _ '

*

Page 40.

2 10/TRANS1TION T O TRIUMPH

“It is of the utmost importance that any new

•

A new computer aided Tactical Teacher was

sensors which have a direct bearing and

installed at Bombay. In due course, this was

importance on the safety of the ship should not be

augmented by a Tactical Evaluation Group.

experimented with during war. when the ships

•

Major tactical exercises and debriefs were

are engaged in active operations, especially so if

organised under NHQ’s direct supervision to root

this experimentation would place restrictions on

out the ignorance of anti submarine tactics

the speed and movement of the ship."

resulting from the lack of knowledge of own sonar

and weapon capabilities and annual transfer of

Why weren’t torpedo decoys streamed?

ASW officers and sonar operators. These helped

It emerged that this too was a conscious decision. The

to gradually standardise tactical doctrines and

background noise generated by the noise maker to

enhance operator efficiency.

distract a torpedo’s homing head was so high that it

swamped the sonar which was trying to detect a weak

The most important lesson that was learnt from

submarine echo.

the loss of the KHUKRI was that longer range sonars

and longer range weapons had to be inducted if ships

Could more lives have been saved?

were to have a fighting chance against modern

It emerged that in the few minutes that it took the

submarines and their long range homing torpedoes.

ship to sink, not many could jump into the sea. Of

Immediate action was taken to improve the anti

those that did, not many had lifejackets. Due to the

submarine capability of the Leander Class frigates

shock of explosion, neither did all life rafts get then under construction in Mazagon Docks at

released or inflated nor were those that did inflate

Bombay. The significant improvements which were

made full use of.

achieved have been described in the chapter dealing

Follow up action was initiated on diverse fronts:

with the Leander Project.

In retrospect, KHUKRI’s tragic loss did not go in

®

An Anti Submarine Warfare Seminar exposed, for

vairt.

the first time in the Navy's history, the sharp and

serious differences in opinion on how to cope with

Subm arine Operations

a modern silent submarine having long range

homing torpedoes. The basic issues were whether

Western Naval Command was allocated two

to sidestep a submarine or confront it? Whether

submarines KURSURA and KARANJ operating

to do slow silent speed against passive homing

directly under FOCINCWEST. Since the approaches

torpedoes? Or whether to do high speeds to

to Karachi and the Makran Coast were going to be

outrun the torpedoes?

transited by the Western Fleet and by the

® The pre 1971, fatalistic acceptance of insuperable

submarines, waiting stations and submarine havens

hydrological limitations in anti submarine

were established. To exclude any possibility of

mistaken identity, two precautions were taken:

efficiency was rooted out.

® The causes of poor sonar performance in the

•

Corridors were demarcated which were not to be

waters off the Indian coast were pinpointed and

crossed.

remedies identified.

•

Submarines were required to positively identify a

• Longer range sonars and anti submarine

target before attack.

weapons were inducted, as also electrically

controlled noise makers which could be remotely

K U R S U R A s Patrol

switched on to decoy homing torpedoes.

Admiral Kohli’s book states:*

• A Tactics Committee was consUtuted to formulate

tactics for the Navy’s unique mix of Russian,

“KURSURA was deployed on patrol during the

Western and indigenous sensors and weapons.

precautionary stage, before the outbreak of

Systematic effort began to keep up with the rapid

hostilities. The aims of the patrol were:

advances taking place in submarine and anti

•

To attack and sink all Pakistani warships.

submarine warfare, sonars, anti submarine

•

To sink all merchant shipping sighted/

torpedoes and rockets, torpedo homing

detected when specifically ordered.

mechanisms and torpedo decoys and integrate al

•

Patrol and surveillance.

this into a simple effective anti submarine

doctrine.

___________ _________

• Page 82.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/211

“A waiting station and two patrol areas were

along the Makran coast. Warship activity

established. The submarine was to proceed to her

frequent in Sonmiani Bay and off Ormara but

waiting station prior to the commencement of

close to the coast. Intense aerial recce east

hostilities and move into her patrol area only after

and south o f O rm ara from M onze and

receiving a signal 'Com m ence hostilities with

following the same route while approaching

P a k is ta n ’ . She sa iled from base p ort on 13

from the south.

November 1971 and arrived in her waiting station

®

11 to 14 December. No shipping activity west in the forenoon o f 18 November. She stayed on

o f Ormara. Intense aerial activity east of

patrol in her waiting station till 25 November.

Ormara and m oderate to the west. Some

Thereafter, she was shifted to another area where

warship activity possible near Ormara.

she remained till 30 November. On 30 November,

“On the even in g o f 14 Decem ber, the

she was ordered to R/V KARANJ at sea to pass

submarine was directed to withdraw from her

necessary information and instructions which

p atrol and she retu rn ed to base port on 20

she did and thereafter she entered Bombay on 4

December 1971.

December.

“KARANJ thus became the longest deployed

“She encountered a number of tankers in her

naval unit during the 1971 Indo-Pak conflict.

w aiting station, and two or three commercial

She had been out from 30 Novem ber to 20

aircraft daily on international routes. She had

December 1971. On four d ifferen t occasions

fair weather throughout.”

during this patrol, the submarine almost released

her weapons on merchantmen. The requirement

K A R A N J s P atrol

to positively identify these precluded any firings.”

Admiral Kohli’s book states:*

“ KARANJ, w ith orders sim ilar to KURSURA,

In R e t r o s p e c t

sailed on 30 November 1971 for her patrol. She

In Admiral Kohli’s words:**

e ffe c te d R /V w ith K U RSU RA at sea on 2

December 1971 and thereafter proceeded to her

“The stipulation of “positive identification” prior

waiting station which she entered at 1600 hrs on

to attack in g any enem y sh ips deprived our

3 D ecem ber. T h e sam e n igh t, she received

submarines of any real action. The correct line of

action would have been to have declared War

inform ation that hostilities with Pakistan had

Zones’ and sink any ship tran sitin g through

broken out. She was, however, ordered to remain

these, after a suitable warning period. Only the

in her waiting station. On 5 December at 0145

su bm arin es cou ld have ach ieved this with

hrs she received orders to move to her patrol area

impunity in enemy waters."

which she entered on the morning of 6 December.

On tra n s it she rece iv e d news o f the F le e t’s L o s s o f A liz e 2 0 3

bombardment of Karachi and the sinking of two

PN warships. Morale on board was high.

Immediately after KHUKRI sank, two Alizes were sent

"The Com m anding O fficer, traversed the

from Santa Cruz at short notice to operate ^r01^

entire patrol area assigned to the submarine. His

Jam n agar on 10 D ecem ber and a ssist in an

deductions at the end of it were:

submarine operations.

On the afternoon of 10 December, reports we ^

•

Upto 8 D ecem ber. S hips w ere u sin g the received from Okha o f suspicious warship an &

normal shipping route traversing the route

a ctiv ity n ear Jakhau on the In do-Pak k ° r

east o f O rm ara by night. A ir recce was

FOCINCWEST decided to recce the area. One ot ^

‘moderate’ east of Ormara and ‘slight’ west of

two Alizes at Jamnagar was directed to carry ° ^

it. Warship activity was ‘slight’.

low level recce o f the area b efo re re ^urni/1^ to

•

On the night o f 8/9 December. Hectic aerial Bombay. Air Force Canberra aircraft were tas ®

recce and warship activity to the west, northbe ready at Poona to attack w h atever the west and south-west of Cape Monze. Radio

reported.

niflg*

Pakistan announced a hunt for an Indian

The Alize did not arrive at Bombay that eve ^

submarine off their coast.

Pakistan Radio announced that an Indian Navy

•

9/10 December and thereafter. All shipping

has been shot down “near K a ra ch i.”

« ters

_______ traffic moved inside the 10 to 15 fathom line records state that Pakistan Air Force S ta rT g ^ .

•

Page 82.

**

Page 80.

212/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

returning from a raid on Okha chanced to encounter

harbour because it was our main port, and the

the Alize and shot It down with an air to air missile.

home of the Western Fleet and the premier

dockyard of our Navy. It was appreciated that the

Trade Warfare

enemy would deploy two submarines off Bombay

In his book, Admiral Kohli states:

in order to pick up our main naval units. They

would also employ their Midgets and Chariots to

“Towards the third week of November 1971,

indulge in sabotage inside the harbour. There

Pakistan declared a National Emergency and the

was also a possibility that their ships or

Pakistan Navy assumed control of Pakistani

submarines may lay mines in the approaches to

merchant shipping. Very soon thereafter,

Bombay harbour. Provision had to be made for

FOCINCWEST was given control of Indian

all these forms of threats. Any air raid attacks by

merchant shipping. The first action taken was to

the Pakistan Air Force would be dealt with by our

recall all Indian ships from the Gulf and direct all

Air Force and by the anti-aircraft fire from our

merchant shipping not to approach the Pakistan

ships and shore batteries located at different

coast.

strategic points.

“The Pakistan Navy also announced the

“Patrols were organised by surface ships

closure of Karachi port and merchant shipping

inside the harbour and upto 20 miles at sea. Air

was warned not to approach within 75 miles of

reconnaissance was instituted upto 60 miles at

Karachi during the dark hours".*

sea. Missile boats were at immediate notice to

“During the operations of the Fleet, a number

proceed to sea and deal with any attempt by

of merchant ships and dhows were intercepted

enemy naval units which approached Bombay

and examined for contraband. Thus a Swedish

harbour to carry out any bombardment. Our 6

ship and a dhow on 6 December and a

inch shore batteries were brought to immediate

Panamanian ship on 7 December were sent to

readiness also.

Bombay under the charge of a boarding party.

“Merchant ships were warned not to

On 9 December, a large dhow was apprehended

approach Bombay harbour to within 40 miles

carrying Rs 60 lakh worth of gold which was not

between dusk and dawn; it was hoped that this

measure would ensure that any radar echoes

in the manifest; the crew of the dhow were all

obtained during the night could only be that of an

Pakistani nationals. On 9 December, the

enemy ship.

MYSORE group raiding the Makran coast

‘The harbour patrols were ordered to explode

apprehended the Pakistani merchant ship

two-pound charges (especially made for the

MADHUMATI. On 10 December, the ATHENIAN

occasion) ever so often to scare away any Midgets

was apprehended."**

or Chariots. All ships anchored in the stream

In Admiral Kohli’s words:***

were made to illuminate the water around the

ship so that patrols on board would be able to

“It was very satisfying to note that foreign neutral

visually apprehend any danger to their ship.

merchant ships and their representatives

“Close liaison was established and

approached the Indian Government and the Navy

maintained with the police and the Home Guards:

for grace to leave Karachi in safety during those

they were shown photographs of Midgets and

three hectic weeks.

They had seen the

Chariots and frogmen and given detailed

devastation that had been wrought by the attack

instructions on how to deal with personnel

of the Indian Fleet. The Indian Navy was truly in

landed by such craft to carry out sabotage.

command of the waters in the North Arabian Sea

“Plans to lay minefields off Bombay harbour

during those fateful days."

and arrangements for swept channels were

progressed and mines prepared for this purpose.

D efence o f Bom bay

“Fishing boats and vessels were mobilized

and their cooperation enlisted. They were

Admiral Kohli’s book states:****

encouraged to go out to sea and report any

“Contingency plans were made for the defence of

suspicious movements. Fishermen were

familiarised with silhouettes of Pakistani

all the major ports on the West Coast but special

warships and submarines and also Midget

emphasis had to be directed towards Bombay

*

Page 58.

** Page 65.

*•* Page vili.

•••‘ Page 85.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/213

submarines and frogmen.

A R e t r o s p e c t o f O p e r a t io n s in th e Western

“Close and constant liaison was established

N a v a l C o m m a n d

with the port authorities and the Port Advisory

Committee to undertake necessary measures for

Of the three threats posed by the Pakistan Navy, the important port installations and merchant ships

surface warship threat was contained by the missile in harbour to come under the umbrella o f the

attacks on Karachi. These confined the Pakistan overall defensive measures instituted by the Navy

flo tilla inside K arachi h arb o u r to escape further losses.

for the defence of Bombay.

“Additional batteries ashore were installed -

The submarine threat was more serious. Despite

two 4” guns at Okha, two 40/60s at Jamnagar,

the known limitations in anti submarine capability, one 40/60 at Valsura. At Bombay, the existing

the question was whether:

b a tteries w ere au gm en ted by p u ttin g two

«

to do something i.e. hunt and kill the submarine additional 40/60 guns each at Colaba Point and

or

Worli. Three additional 40/60 guns were installed

•

do nothing i.e. let the subm arine look for its

at Oyster Rock and Middle Ground. Four 40/60

targets while ships got on with other missions.

guns were installed at critical points in the Naval

Dockyard.

In retrospect, it is clear that even if all available

“T he W ar W a tch in g O rg a n isa tio n w as

air effort and three or more ships had been deployed

instituted: suitable tem porary telephone lines

to hunt the submarine, the subm arine torpedoes

were installed so that watchers at lighthouses

could not have missed KHUKRI doing so low a speed.

and other promontory points would report enemy

If air effort had been better managed, it could have

warships or suspicious vessels as soon as they

driven the submarine away from the Diu area and

were sighted.

th ereb y redu ce the th rea t to the m issile forces

“We had acquired one dozen fishing trawlers

assembling at Diu. The loss of the KHUKRI was a

from the trad e and these w ere fitted out for seriou s blow .

But it did lead to .extensive

carrying out harbour patrols and limited seaward

improvements in anti submarine capability.

patrols. Naval personnel were appointed to them

The air threat too was serious. But no one could

and the existing crews were signed on for limited

have anticipated that the Pakistan Air Force would be

naval service.

so slow in responding to the requests of the Pakistan

“Our seaward resources o f ships and crafts

Navy. The chapter on the “Analysis of the Pakistan

were augmented by two Alizes, four Seakings and

n avy’s Accounts o f the 1971 W ar” discusses the

two A lou ettes. T h e A lizes w ere deployed on

causes for this lack of support.

seaward patrols of 60 miles from Bombay.

In Admiral Kohli’s words:*

V a rio u s o th er s e c u rity m ea su res w ere also

“Our Fleet was lucky to have got away without

instituted:

any air attacks by shore based aircraft from

Pakistani territory. However enemy attacks on

•

Screening of antecedents of officers and crews of

naval shore targets did take place. From 5

In d ian m erch a n t sh ip s to p re v e n t vita l December onwards, Okha received concentrated

information from leaking out.

attention by the Pakistan Air Force aircraft an

•

Naval publications withheld from coastal vessels.

was bombed almost every day. Our special o

•

Adoption o f strict security m easures against

fuel tank was blown up in the very early stages o

p ossible use o f dhows and n eu tral ships for

the war and our use of Okha as an advance base

landing of saboteurs and for towing Midgets from

came to an end.”

Pakistan.

•

Supervision on the steering of foreign ships in

In spite o f the m aterial state o f ships being so

harbours.

poor, ships companies managed to achieve almo

•

G u ard in g o f s e n sitive p oin ts and vita l

continuous high speed operations for a full sev

installations in harbours.

days after 2 December.

n

•

C on trol o f W /T and sign al sta tio n s and

By 9 December, after the second missile attac

lighthouses to avoid their misuse.

Karachi, the Navy had achieved maritime dominan

•

Tightening of restrictions on landing of Chinese

of the approaches to Karachi.

and P a k ista n i n ation als from n eu tral ships calling at Indian ports."

•

Page 64.

214/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

11

Naval Operations in the Southern Naval Area

FOCSOUTH’s responsibility was to interdict enemy

which position she could cover all ships making for

shipping between the two wings of Pakistan and thus

either the 8 or 9 Degree Channels.

prevent any seaborne reinforcement of the East

On midnight of 12 December, AMBA detected two

Bengal garrison. When war broke out, AMBA was

contacts near the 9 Degree Channel heading

deployed east o f Ceylon whilst GODAVARI and

southeast at high speed. Air reconnaissance the next

GANGA were patrolling across the route from

day revealed these to be British warships, one of

Colombo to the 8 and 9 Degree Channels.

which was the aircraft carrier ALBION. Since Naval

On 4 December, GODAVARI captured Pakistani

Headquarters were aware of the movements of this

merchant ship PASNI and sent her under escort to

force, further action became unnecessary.

Cochin. Interrogation of the PASNTs crew indicated

In the course of their patrols during the war

that Pakistani merchant ships had been instructed to

AMBA, GODAVARI and GANGA interrogated a total of

use the 8 Degree Channel. AMBA was therefore

144 neutral merchant ships for contraband and

redeployed to the west of the 9 Degree Channel from

cleared them as not bound for Pakistan ports.

SOUTHERN N A V A L AREA IN DECEMBER 1971

1 2

Analysis of the Pakistan Navy’s Accounts of the 1971 War The perceptions, plans and activities of the Pakistan

sea. It had also expected that the promised

Navy can be discerned from the following source

limited air support would be made available

documents:

within eighty miles of Karachi.

•

“Pakistan's Crisis in Leadership" by Maj Gen

“As for the Indian intentions, the Navy had

Fazal Muqeem Khan published in 1972, soon

visualised that with Osa class missile boats and

after the war.

submarines available to the Indians, together

•

“The Story of the Pakistan Navy 1947-1972”,

with the threat from Pakistan submarines, their

Navy would not attempt to attack Pakistan ships

compiled by the PN History Section in 1991,

twenty years after the war.

by their surface ships unless submarines,

missiles and air attacks failed to neutralise the

•

“The History of the Pakistan Air Force" by Syed

Pakistan Navy. Therefore its plans were based on

Shabir Hussain and Squadron Leader M Tariq

the appreciation that it had no answer to the

Quareshi published in 1982 by the PAF Press.

Indian Navy’s missile boats. The surface ships

To present a balanced overview, excerpts which

were not to be exposed to this danger until the

relate to specific naval operations have already been

missile boat threat had been neutralised. The

conjoined with the Indian accounts of these

ships had to remain at sea within the Air Force

operations eg the First Missile Attack, the Second

fighter cover. The submarines, however, were to

Missile Attack, the Sinking of the KHUKRI and Naval

be deployed on offensive patrols off the major

Operations in East Pakistan. The remaining excerpts

Indian ports and other focal areas.

of relevance have been presented in this chapter.

“Like other major military decisions, the C-in-

To facilitate analysis, the source material has

C Navy had neither been consulted nor

been rearranged under the following headings :

associated with any of the deliberations that

resulted in the decision to counter-attack from

•

Pakistan Flotilla Operations

West Pakistan. He was merely called up by COS

•

Pakistan Submarine Deployment

Army, to Rawalpindi on November 29, 1971, and

®

Assessment of Pakistan Air Force Performance

informed of the President’s decision to open

•

Pakistan Navy and Air Force Cooperation

hostilities in the West in a few days. He was not

•

Pakistan Maritime Reconnaissance

given the actual date and time, which were to be

conveyed to him by C-in-C Air through a

The timings in the Pakistan documents are

mutually agreed code word at the appropriate

Pakistan Standard Time. 30 minutes should be

time.

added to Pakistan Standard Time to bring it to Indian

“The mutually agreed code word was passed

Standard Time.

to C-in-C Navy at 1515 hours on December 3.

1971, personally by the C-in-C Air. The

Pakistan Flotilla Operations

commanders concerned were hurriedly collected

and given their instructions and signals were

Excerpts fr o m “Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership”

despatched to all ships by 1700 hours. The Navy

“The naval war plans had last been reviewed in

had been deployed in their war stations earlier,

March 1971 and were based on the limited aim

when Indian belligerent intentions had become

achievable by the available strength and state of

clear and on subsequent Indian invasion of East

weapons and the equipment that the Navy held.

Pakistan on November 21, 1971. Some ships

As there had been no changes in the Navy, no

were patrolling 40 miles off Karachi and others 70

miles off the port. This was done for monitoring

need was felt to review or revise them after that

and checking the incoming ships and suspected

date. While planning, the Navy had assumed that

craft approaching Karachi.

it would be given a minimum of one weeks’ notice

before the war to redeploy and alert its units a

“On December 3, the PIA Fokker flying along

“A bout the sam e tim e HQ PNS Qasim

the Kathiawar coast reported the sighting of

Manora, reported having seen a big fire glow o

India’s Western fleet. The Pakistani submarines

the horizon out at sea. A fast patrol boat was at

deployed in the area were not able to attack it, as

once despatched to investigate. On arriving at they got th eir orders to com m ence their

the site, it found mine sweeper PNS MUHAFIZ 40

op era tion s late th at evening.

Indeed the

miles off Karachi, burning. The first person to be

submarines had themselves seen the Indian Fleet

picked up by this boat from the water was the

proceeding overhead on December 2 but were

Captain of the minesweeper. It only came to light

unable to attack for the same reasons. As an

throu gh him th a t th e sh ip had been hit by alternative, an air strike was requested by the

missiles. No report o f this incident had been

Navy but it was not available. Thus, by not giving

received from this ship. The Indians had hit the

sufficient notice of starting the operations to the

two ships simultaneously. Other survivors were

Navy, a good opportunity to attack the Indian

also picked up. On receiving information of the

Western Fleet was missed.

missile hit on PNS KHYBER, the boat despatched

“The first Indian Naval action took place on

to pick up its survivors returned without success

December 4, 1971. The Indian Air Force and the

with the excuse that the weather at sea was very

Navy seemed to have first class coordination.

choppy and the survivors picked up from the

They had already established a Joint Centre in

m inesw eeper w ere in a bad w ay and needed

Bom bay a few m onths earlier. Indian Naval

medical attention immediately. All efforts were

attacks were always covered by the Indian Air

made to locate the KHYBER’s survivors and 70 of

Force by keeping Karachi under air attacks. At

them were rescued the next afternoon after about

0800 hours, the Indian Air Force started strafing

18 hours of its sinking, although the search had

Karachi. Two a ircra ft flew very low over the

continued by sea and air for the whole day.

harbour and an oil tank in Keamari was hit by

“A t m idnight on D ecem ber 4, the local Air

rockets. Indian aircraft strafed at intervals for the

Force Commanding O fficer was approached to

whole o f the day on December 4. While the air

order an attack on the retreating missile boats. It

ra id s w ere go in g on, the ra d a r picked up a was calculated that they would take six hours to

suspect contact at 2100 hours about 40 miles

reach their nearest sanctuary and thus allow

south o f Karachi. It must be mentioned here that

enough time for the Air Force to attack them early

the presence o f Osa M issile Boats o f Russian

next morning, but no air strike could be made

origin, which had been taken over by the Indians,

available. It was known later that after the missile

was known and upto the m iddle o f November

attack, the Indian boats instead o f retreating

1971, Russian naval personnel w ere seen on

south, had sailed westward o ff Gawadar where

these boats in Bombay harbour. The Russian

method o f deploym ent which was followed by

they stayed for three days. T h is fact came o

th ese b oa ts w a s th a t they op erated w ith notice by a chance conversation with someone

subm arines w hich acted as w atch-dogs and

travellin g in a Cessna w h ich had flown ove

observation posts. The Indian submarines were

Gawadar on December, 5; After having se^ 1,jie

keeping 60 miles off Karachi and closed up only

p ictu res o f the boats, he cam e out with ^

during the night. The Osa Boats had to have the

information that he had seen two o f them ne

subm arines as d irectin g platform s for their

Gawadar.

, 0t

operations.

“Anyw ay the A ir Force in Karachi

q

“A fter h avin g been in form ed abou t the

react to the Navy’s request; therefore, the

^

suspect contact, efforts were made to identify this

Navy rang up the C-in-C PAF in Rawalp n ^ ^

contact. While this was being pursued, the attack

0400 hour§ and woke him up. After alis® 0jd

came. At 2330 hours the Indian Air Force attack

pleading, the answer he obtained was

gj^ps

was still on, when PNS KHYBER out on patrol 70

boy, this happens in war. I am sorry yoU*

jn

miles off Karachi, signalled that it had been hit by

have been sunk. We shall try to do some

an aircraft bomb. The NHQ was taken aback by

the future’.

n o f ^ 6

this information.They could not believe that an

“After the missile attack, the positio

aircraft could do this in the middle of the night.

surface ships at sea became almost unten

^

They asked for further information. No reply

they had no d efen ce a g a in s t m iss

came from the ship as all communications with it

December 7, the Flag Officer Comman

Jng

had been lost in the meantime.

F lo tilla , a fte r co n s u ltin g his sea

218/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Commanders, met the C-in-C. He acquainted

the means nor the responsibility for the air

him with the prevailing situation and suggested a

defence of Karachi. The Navy’s presence in the

withdrawal of the ships inside the harbour in

harbour, however, acted as a deterrent to Indian

order to escape a missile attack which was most

aircraft.

The dockyard was bombed but

likely to occur. The ships would of course be more

providentially remained safe. Four Indian aircraft

susceptible to air attack there, but could also

were brought down by the Navy’s anti-aircraft

provide a powerful anti-aircraft threat,

guns that night.

particularly against a low flying attack. It was,

“In the meantime PNS BABUR while

therefore, decided to withdraw all ships to the

operating with other units of the Flotilla off the

harbour on December 8 , except for the fleet oil

Makran coast in the evening on December 5,

tanker which was fully loaded. It had to stay out

engaged a submarine.

Destroyers were

because of fire hazard within the harbour by its

immediately despatched to carry out antipresence and also that its deep draught restricted submarine operations. Sonar contact was

her entry into port. The oil tanker DACCA was,

achieved with the submarine which had by now

therefore, ordered to anchor with the other

submerged, and a number of attacks were carried

merchant ships away from the port.

out with anti-submarine mortars. Later, on basis

“The Indian missile boats on their passage

of the evidence collected, the Navy claimed to

from Gawadar to Bombay, attacked the merchant

have damaged the Indian submarine"

ships outside the anchorage at night on

December 8. Gulf Star, flying the Panama flag and

Excerpts from "Story of the Pakistan Navy"*

the US owned ship Venus Challenger were sunk

“On 22 November, the Government of Pakistan

and Harmatton, a British vessel was severely

issued a proclamation of state of emergency. The

damaged. DACCA along with three merchant

Pakistan Navy took on added precautions on 24

ships, was also hit. Her company valiantly fought

November, and the fleet came to standby with

the fire and saved the ship after heavy damage

instructions to avoid creating the impression of

had been done. One of the missiles fired by the

an aggressive posture, as directed by the

missile boats flew ov^r Manora and hit the first

Government. Harbour defence measures were

big steel structure it came cross. That was one of

advanced and the Pakistan Navy took over control

the oil tanks at Keamari which started huge fires

of all merchant shipping. Sea traffic from the

in the oil farm. The course followed by this missile

west was diverted to a safe route.

was strange, perhaps its homing device had

“A critical element in the war at sea was the

failed.

correct and timely deployment of the submarines.

“The withdrawal of the naval surface ships

As tensions with India continued unabated,

into harbour was thus claimed by NHQ as a

hostilities were inevitable. The Navy ordered the

sound tactical move as otherwise, all the naval

submarines to slip out of harbour quietly on

units would have been attacked by the missile

various dates between 14 and 22 November. They

boats and in all probability most of them would

were allocated patrol areas covering the west

have been sunk. Some officers of the Navy

coast of India while GHAZI was despatched to the

thought that it was a shameful act for the Navy to

Bay of Bengal with the primary objective of

retreat to the harbour. This withdrawal is

locating the Indian aircraft carrier, INS VIKRANT,

however a point on which any verdict is best left

which was reported to be operating in that area.

to Naval experts who would probably be

Interdiction of merchant shipping was, however,

discussing this as a case study for years.

not permitted due to lack of Government

"On December 8, air attacks on Karachi had

approval«for this form of warfare. It may be

started at 2000 hours. Again the air attacks were

mentioned that the Indians suffered no such

well coordinated with the missile attack at .2300

inhibitions.

hours. Karachi was kept under air attack till

“On 27 November, NHQ instructed FOFPAK

0200 hours on December 9 to give enough time to

(Rear Admiral MAK Lodi) to supplement the

these missile boats to get away. The Navy was

patrol undertaken by the minesweepers. The

blamed all along by the public for doing nothing

minesweepers were employed on an Inner patrol

against the constant air attacks on Karachi. But

and destroyers on an outer patrol. The object of

the public did not know that the Navy had neither

the outer and inner patrols was to provide early

•

Pages 333 et seq.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/219

warning of an enemy attack developing towards

at Karachi under the direct operational control

Karachi and to enable the fleet to make a timely

MHQ.

ot

interception. It was mistakenly thought that a

“K H AIB AR and T IP P U SULTAN were

missile attack would be neutralised by the PAF.

searching for MV Jhelum about 80 miles south

At one stage commanding officers of ships of the

west o f Karachi on a m ission to escort her to

flotilla expressed the view that greater emphasis

Karachi. JAHANGIR was on patrol about 60

should be placed on the possibility of a missile

miles south of Karachi She had been tasked to

attack, and the concept of inner and outer patrols

assist KHAIBAR to locate MV Jhelum and was to

w as aban don ed.

T h is w as su b sequ en tly

resume patrol thereafter. ZULFIQAR was on the

reins tituted.

inner patrol 30 miles south of Karachi.

“A plan for a counter-offensive in the West

“On the outbreak o f hostilities, BADR and

was presented to the President of Pakistan on 30

SHAHJAHAN were ordered to join FOFPAK at

November, 1971 and the high command decided

Gaddani. The m inesw eepers were sailed and

to initiate m ilitary operations in the West on 3

tasked to carry out check sweeps outside the

December 1971. Pre-emptive strikes were carried

harbour and m aintain a patrol between Cape

out by the PAF at several Indian air bases along

Monze and Manora lighthouse. Within a few

the western border and 3 December 1971. NHQ

hours o f the outbreak o f war, all operational

announced the outbreak of the war at 1845 on 3

Pakistan Navy ships had put to sea and were on

December.

their war stations as planned: the surface fleet

“T h e o p era tio n a l orders issu ed to the

op eratin g o ff the M akran coast and the

subm arines confined them to attacks against

submarines in their allocated areas off the Indian

warships only and interdiction of merchant ships

coast.

w as not p erm itted . The Indian naval units

“ KHAIBAR, w ith TIPPU SULTAN and

operated with no such inhibition; they attacked

JAH AN G IR in com pany, lea rn t about the

and captured several merchant vessels. However,

outbreak of hostilities through Radio Pakistan

the im portant point was that the submarines

broadcast at 1800, when she was searching for

were at their war stations on 3 December when

MV Jhelum which was to be escorted to Karachi.

open hostilities started, poised to attack Indian

C -in -C ’s m essage re g a rd in g outbreak of

naval units.

hostilities was received by these ships about an

“The PN reconnaissance aircraft sighted a

hour later at 1905. Three hours later at 2200,

formation of eight enemy ships when the war had

this task unit was alerted to the presence o a

ju s t s ta rted ; b u t the naval observer, being force consisting of two merchant ships screene

unaware of war having started, made his contact

by 8 warships o ff Diu Head on the Kathiawar

re p o rt h ou rs la te r a fter lan d in g. Had the coast (in position 20 50N. 67 23E at 2140 on

P a k ista n N avy been con su lted or at least December) through a message transmi*tethis

informed in time, this enemy force would have

ships at sea by MHQ. Ti e information in

been destroyed or seriou sly dam aged by our

message was based on an enemy report ma

submarines and PAF effort. The outcome of naval

PN S/M HANGOR on patrol in the area.

w a rfa re w ou ld then have been com p letely

“The presence and composition of this

^

different than just being able to draw equal blood.

had also been confirmed by a reconnaiss ^

“On 3 December 1971, most of the Pakistan

a irc ra ft on the even in g o f 3 Decem e • ^

N avy sh ips w ere o p era tio n a l. BABUR and

amplifying report indicated that the or ^ 4

MUHAFIZ were at anchorage. DACCA was at

m oved 30 m iles sou th w ards by

n0rth'

M anora an chorage for a 5 day m aintenance

December, although it was reported on

^ i s

period w ith d ock yard hands on board.

westerly course in the initial mes^a?lari Fleet

SHAHJAHAN, MUJAHID and MAHMOOD were in

tallies with the movement of Western ‘ ”

ernber.

harbour preparing for passage to East Pakistan.

which had sailed out of Bombay on

our

The only other operational destroyer in harbour

and subsequently, suspecting °*eteC * raft haC*

was BADR.

submarines and reconnaissance ai

“ALAMGIR was under repairs scheduled to be

split and moved south. P r o b a b l y

teCj tw °

completed on 15 December, 1971 and TUGHRIL

MYSORE group, which had been at

w as under refit. Tw o gun b oats from Saudi

Osas for a missile attack on Karac

Arabia, re-named SADAQAT and RAFAQAT, were

220/TRANSITIQN TO TRIUMPH

Pakistan Army officers laying down arms - 16 December 1971

PKIMK M IM nTKK

N o.3l2-F#H /7l

Now D elh i,

December 22, JP71.

Dear Admiral Hand a,

The R av y 's e x p lo it s in these fourtoon days o f f ig h t in g w i l l long be remembered. The achievements o f our Naval Forces have t h r i l l o d the n a tio n -

Your le a d e rsh ip and the d arin g

and the s k i l l o f our F leet have made s in g u la r co n trib u tio n to the success o f tho war on both fr o n t s .

I should l i k e to express the g rs titu d o o f the Government and the people o f In d ia to you and to your o f f i c e r s and nan.

None o f t h is would have boon p o s s ib lo without the most exacting le a d e rsh ip and

d e d ic a tio n a t a l l l e v e l s .

In th i3 , your r o lo

has been c r u c ia l. No words can be a b e t t e r recompense f o r your la b o u rs than the p e o p le 's adm iration and In d ia *a success.

With kin dest regards,

Yours sin c e re ly ,

It—

' - f

• I •

(I n d ir a Gandhi) j

A d a ira l S.M.Nanda,

C h ie f o f the Haval S t a f f ,

Haw D e lh i .

Prime Minister’s letter to the Chief of the Naval Staff after the 1971 War The Chiefs of Staff in the 1971 War with Defence Minister Jagjivan Ram. (L to R) Air Chief Marshal PC Lai (CAS), Admiral SM Nanda (CNS) General SHJF

Manekshaw (COAS)

Admiral SM Nanda handing over charge of the Navy to Admiral SN Kohli - 1 March 1973

rnmmissionine ceremony of the second Leander frigate INS HIMGIRI (L to R) Cd^KM Zadu (CO) Sardar Swaran Singh (Defence Minister), Vice Admiral EC

KumvilalcMD of M^docks), Vice Admiral J Cursetji (VCNS), Mr■ VNI Gadgil, Minister of Defence Production, Shri MM Sen, Secretary Defence Production -

23 November 1974

On the occasion of the taking over of the Super Connie Maritime Reconaissance Squadron from the Air Force - 18 November 1976. (L to R) Commodore SL Sethi (NOIC GOA), Vice Admiral VEC Barboza (FOC IN C SOUTH), Commodore RAJ

Anderson (CO HANSA), Air Chief Marshal A Moolgavkar (CAS), Amiral J

Cursetji (CNS)

Prime Minister of India, Smt Indira Gandhi and Admiral of the Fleet of the Soviet Union SG Gorshkov

“Although this was not the force which

frigates were employed in this manner until the

launched the first missile attack off Karachi on 4

end of the war.

•

December, MHQ’s assessment was substantially

“This speaks much for the mettle of officers

correct; for the ships of this force did, in fact, have and men who readily undertook these operations

missile boats in tow to be released for an attack

with enthusiasm, inspite of the knowledge that

which had to be postponed from 5 to 8 December.

the ships had no viable defence against the

“After ordering TIPPU SULTAN to release an

surface missiles.

Indian dhow which had been taken in tow by her

“While evaluating the performance of the

earlier, the OTC increased the speed of the force

surface fleet, it must be noted that in spite of the

to 25 knots and at 2345 signalled his intention to

tremendous advantage, particularly in weapon

join the flotilla. It will be recalled that the last

range, which the Indian Navy enjoyed, our actual

orders for this unit were for KHAIBAR and TIPPU

physical losses amounted to only one destroyer

SULTAN to take MV Jhelum under escort and for

and a minesweeper sunk. This cannot be

JAHANGIR to resume outer patrol. With the

construed as the destruction of our fleet which

changed situation, however, the ships expected

was the Indian objective. The Indian Navy did

new orders, but having received none decided to

succeed in gaining initial advantage through

Join the flotilla”.

surprise but failed to fully press home its gains.

The second missile attack cannot be called an

“As has been related in the section on Naval

unqualified success when evaluated against the

Operations in the Western Naval Command, two

strategic objective of destruction of the Pakistan

missile attacks took place. The “Story of the Pakistan

Navy Fleet. The shock effect created by the missile

Navy" states:

attacks was more significant and it was

“There followed in the wake of the second missile

aggravated by the thought that we would not have

attack yet another controversial decision: orders

ajir support.

were issued at 1400 on 9 December to ships at

“As far as the Pakistan Fleet is concerned, the

Karachi to reduce their ammunition outfit.

psychological impact was far greater than that

“After the return of the ships to harbour on 8

warranted by physical losses. Though the surface

December, their vulnerability in the port

force managed to survive, it failed to retain its

remained a topic of continuing debate. In the

threat and deterrent value as a Fleet-in-Being.

early hours of 9 December, only a few hours after

The obsolescence of its weapons apart, lack of

the missile attack, dockyard workshops and

adequate air support inhibited the success of its

buildings were severely damaged in a low level

operations. It must also be a admitted that our

attack - facilitated, no doubt, by the light emitted

surveillance capability and command and control

by the huge flames of the fire at the oil farm - by

facilities were far from satisfactory. The neglect of

an IAF bomber. Under these circumstances

the Navy over several decades came through

anxiety about the catastrophic consequences of

clearly in the 1971 war.”*

an explosion in a ship fully loaded with

ammunition was only natural.

Pakistan Submarine Deployment

“The decision to reduce the ammunition

In Dec 71. the Pakistan Navy had four submarines -

outfit, not withstanding the logic behind it,

the GHAZI on loan from America since 1964 and

continues to be questioned by many. The adverse

three new Daphne class submarines HANGOR,

effect on morale of men. who were inclined to see

MANGOR and SHUSHUK acquired in 1970/71.

it as a step to limit the surface ships operational

role, was immediate. Not accepted by most as a

IZxcerpt from Pakistan’s Crisis in Leadership

necessary rational step, the decision remained a

“With the outmoded surface fleet almost

controversial issue.

neutralised by the missile threat, the burden of

“It was perhaps in consideration of the morale

the Pakistan Navy’s entire offensive effort hinged

factor, and to avoid the impression that the fleet

on the small but effective submarine force.

was immobilised, that a strategy of high speed

“The submarines were to be deployed on

probes was introduced. This required random

offensive patrols off the major Indian ports and

sorties of short duration to be carried out at high

other focal areas. Three Daphne submarines were

speed by designated ships. Destroyers and

• Page 356.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/221

deployed o ff the Bombay and Kathiawar coast

R o le o f P a k ista n i S u bm a rin es

and the submarine GHAZI was despatched to the

The Story of the Pakistan Navy’ states:*

Visakhapatnam Naval Base in the Bay of Bengal.

The GHAZI’s task was to carry out offensive mine-

“In terd ictio n o f m erch an t sh ip p in g was not laying against Visakhapatnam and the other

permitted due to lack of Government approval for

three submarines had to attack Indian warships

this form of warfare.

when ordered.”

The operational orders issued to the submarines

confined them to attack against warships only."

E xcerpt f r o m “ S tory o f the Pa k ista n N a v y ”

“The Navy ordered the submarines to slip out of

H ANGOR*s M ovem en ts T ill 9 D e c e m b e r**

harbour quietly on various dates between 14 and

“H AN G O R slip p ed in th e e a rly hours of 22

22 November. The Daphnes were allocated patrol

N ovem ber 1971 fo r a p a tro l o ff the Indian areas covering the w est coast o f India, w hile

Kathiawar coast. On 23 November, when a state

GHAZI was despatched to the Bay of Bengal to

of emergency was declared by Pakistan, HANGOR

locate VIKRANT.

was off Porbandar close to the Indian cost. On 1

“The o p era tio n a l ord ers issu ed to the

December, she received orders directing her to

submarines confined them to attacks against

shift to a patrol area off Bombay vacated by PNS

warships only and interdiction of merchant ships

Submarine Mangro on completion of her patrol.

was not permitted.”

“HANGOR was on the surface on the night of

2 Decenlber when, at 2340, a large formation of

On 22 November after the skirmish off Boyra in

ships was detected on her radar on an easterly

East Pakistan the previous day, COMSUB signed DTG

bearing about 35 miles away. Such abnormal

221720 to SUBRON 5 stated:

detection ranges are frequently obtained in this

“Following areas occupied.

area in the w inter m onths due to anomalous

propagation of radio waves, a phenomenon which

•

PAPA ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR.

results from the trapping of radio waves in ducts

•

APA FIVE, SIX, SEVEN, EIGHT.

form ed due to tem perature inversions in the

•

BRAVO ONE, TWO THREE, FOUR, FIVE, SIX.

atmosphere. HANGOR closed this formation to a

•

MIKE”.

range of 26 miles at 0049 on 3 December, when

she dived to a depth of 40 metres and tracked the

The occupied areas referred to as PAPA ONE,

ships on her sonar till the early hours of the

TWO, THREE. FOUR, FIVE. SIX. SEVEN, EIGHT were

morning. A quick sweep by her radar at periscope

the inner and ou ter p atrol areas o f ships o f the depth revealed that the formation consisted of 6

Pakistan Fleet. The BRAVO areas were off Bombay

escorts screening a main body of four ships. This

occu pied by M ANG RO . A rea M IKE w as M adras was undoubtedly the Western Fleet comprising

occupied by GHAZI.

the cru iser INS M YSO RE w ith supporting

On the evening of 22 November, COMSUBS signal

auxiliaries and her escorts which had sailed from

DTG 222117 addressed only to GHAZI and MANGRO

Bombay on 2 December.

directed them to “Arm all torpedoes.”

“A t this tim e, though an all out war wa^

On 23 November, the day Pakistan declared a

ragin g in East Pakistan, h o stilities had no

national emergency, COMSUBS signal DTG 231905

broken out in the West. HANGOR coul n

to SUBRON 5 directed the submarine squadron to

attack these ships as she did not have

“Assume Precautionary stage”.

to do so. It was not until 0820 on the morning

On 25 November, COMSUBS signal DTG 252307

D ecem ber th a t H ANG O R le a rn t abou

addressed only to GHAZI stated “Occupy Zone Victor

outbreak of hostilities through C-in-C s m^ ast

with all despatch. Intelligence indicates carrier in

received on the su bm arin e t>roa^ tj1eir

port”. Zone VICTOR was off Visakhapatnam.

Frustration and disappointment at missl^1^)r the

On 1 December, one Daphne class submarine

prey by such a narrow margin was grea

was seen entering Karachi harbour. This appears to

Com m anding O fficer and the cr^WJnVain.

have been SHUSHUK.

HANGOR’s endeavours were not entire y

Location of the Indian Fleet at . this cruc^------ —

*■ Page 335.

*• Page 356.

222/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

was by itself a significant accomplishment. In

From 4 Dec to 8 Dec HANGOR operated in the

this case, however, her vigilance also contributed

approaches to Bombay. She found that Indian

towards the cancellation of a missile attack which

warships were operating In waters too shallow for her

this force was scheduled to launch at Karachi on

to approach and attack. She extended her patrol

the night of 5 December. Suspecting detection by

northwards towards Diu. On five occasions, she

the submarine, the Indian Fleet split and moved

transmitted on HF, which enabled her position to be

so far south that it was no longer in a position to

established.

execute its attack plan.

“HANGOR

continued

her

patrol.

•

On 4 December at 1004 in position 271 Dabhol Lt

Occasionally she closed Bombay harbour and

71.

detected some warships operating In waters too

•

On 4 December dt 1745 In position 285 Khanderi

shallow for the submarine to make an approach

Lt 135.

and launch its torpedoes. At other times, her

° On 7 December at 1538 in position 265 Khanderi

limited submerged speed-the main handicap of

Lt 285.

conventional submarines-prevented interception

• On 9 December at 1045 in position 239 Diu 59.

of good targets. The officers and men of HANGOR

• On 9 December at 1720 in position 220 Okha 60.

were not deterred by these disappointments.”

By 8 December her

identity as HANGOR had been

established. In the early hours of 9 December, she

Analysis of Pakistani Submarine Deployment

located KHUKRI and KIRPAN, who had been deployed

to locate and attack her.

Deployment o f GHAZI

HANGOR sank the KHUKRI at 2045 on the

GHAZI, having the longest distance to go, sailed from

evening of 9 December, eighteen miles southwest of

Karachi on 14 November. She was off Madras on 23

Diu and headed for Karachi. Operation FALCON did

November in Area Mike, until she was ordered on

not succeed in crippling her and she reached Karachi

night 25/26 November to occupy Zone Victor off

on 18 December after the ceasefire.

Visakhapatnam, where she sank on night 3/4

December.

SHUSHUK

“The Story of Pakistan Navy” makes no mention of

Deployment o f Daphne Class Submarines

SHUSHUK’s deployment. Intelligence reports after

MANGRO

the war indicated that SHUSHUK was initially

MANGRO sailed around 14 December to her patrol

employed in the approaches to Karachi but had to be

area off Bombay. COMSUBS signal DTG 222117 to

withdrawn for emergency docking to rectify leaks in

“Arm all torpedoes” was addressed only to GHAZI

the stem glands and defects in her torpedo tubes.

(who was nearing Madras) and to MANGRO who was

Deployment o f Midget Submarines

off Bombay till 1 December, occupying the areas

referred to as BRAVO ONE, TWO, THREE, FOUR,

The naval element of the Special Surface Group

FIVE, SIX in COMSUBS signal DTG 221720. This

which manned the midget submarines were an elite,

area stretched from Diu Head to Dabhol on the west

rigorously trained group. The offensive capability of

coast of India. MANGRO vacated her patrol area in

the midget submarine had been seriously depleted as

end November and returned to Karachi.

early as 1968 when It was found that it could not

carry a torpedo. That reduced its role to carrying

HANGOR

frogmen to enemy harbours, into depths where larger

HANGOR sailed in the early hours of 22 November for

submarines could not penetrate.

a patrol o ff the Indian Kathiawar coast. On 23

In mid 1971, some SSG personnel had to be

November, when Pakistan declared a state of

deployed to East Pakistan to cope with the Mukti

emergency, HANGOR was off Porbandar.

Bahini. They returned to Karachi only in September.

On 1 Dec, HANGOR shifted from off Porbandar to

Their absence lowered the combat readiness of the

the patrol area off Bombay vacated by MANGRO on

midgets.

completion of its patrol. On the night of 2 December,

Midget crews had been trained to be towed

HANGOR detected the Indian Fleet and tracked it till

underwater by GHAZI. For sorties longer than three

the early hours of 3 December. News of the outbreak

days, the relief crew took over on passage and the

of hostilities reached HANGOR only on the morning of

attack crew took over just before being detached to

4 December.

attack.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/223

During the 1971 war, midgets could not play any

P a k is ta n N avy. T h e o n ly in fo rm a tio n of n role because GHAZI's role was changed to minelaying

relevance is :

aval

and she was deployed In the Bay of Bengal.

®

In N ovem ber 1 9 7 1 , No 7 C an b erra Squadr

Deployment o f Chariots

based a t M auripur (M asroor)flew six sorties?1

There is no evidence that the chariots were deployed

support of the Pakistan Navy. These were armed during the war. Reportedly, a shortage of spare parts recce m issions in se a rch of hostile naval vessels affected their operational readiness.

within 180 miles south and southwest of Karachi

•

In D ecem ber 1 9 7 1 on 5 D ecem ber, the Indian Assessment of Pakistan Air Force

Naval b a se for m issile b o a ts a t Okha was set ablaze; the fire continued for full six days. Okha Performance

was attacked again on 10 Dec.

In his book, Pakistan’s “Crisis in Leadership”, Maj

Gen Fazal Muqueem Khan analysed the Pakistan Air

Pakistan N avy - A ir Force Cooperation

Force’s p erform an ce d u rin g th e 1971 war. His

E x c e rp ts f r o m “P a k is t a n ’s C risis in Leadership”

conclusions were:

“T h e PAF w as not equipped to support naval

•

The PAF plan was based on the war lasting six

operations. Maritime reconnaissance was only

months.

provided by the Pakistan International Airlines

•

The PAF C-in-C’s main idea was to conserve the

(PIA) and civil aviation aircraft which had been

Air Force. The PAF chose to be on the defensive,

pressed into service after the emergency (i.e. on

both tactically and strategically. It was committed

23 N ovem ber 1971). In all, 59 sorties by PIA

to defending its air bases only and waiting for the

aircraft and 68 sorties by civil aviation aircraft

enemy to come and attack them. This kept the

were provided during the war. In spite of all their

aircraft perpetually busy in air patrols over the

limitations and their pilots’ lack of training for

defended air bases.

this particular task, these aircraft still performed

•

The PAF defensive strategy relied too heavily on

very well. One Fokker aircraft was lost during

the expectation that the IAF would carry out

these operations.

mass raids on the PAF air bases and would thus

“The PAF launched a B-57 mission against

su ffer heavily. C onfining the PAF to selected

the Indian m issile boat harbour at Okha an

airfields away from the border decreased the

some harbour installations were set on ^ire’

e ffe c tiv e s trik e ra n ge o f PAF a ir c r a ft and this was late in the war and much after the

increased the reaction time.

when the Navy had asked for it, and none o

•

The C-in-C PAF over-centralised his command

missile boats, already out to sea, was ax eF .g

and allowed little flexibility to his subordinates.

Repeat strikes were also launched on Decern ^

H ard ly any a ctio n cou ld be tak en w ith o u t and 10 and some other installations an

^

clearance from the C-in-C.

large oil tanks were set ablaze. The lastst

^ted

•

The PAF deployment in airfields a long distance

carried out by a section o f F - 104s, whic s

away from the scene of action affected the ability

an anti-submarine Alize aircraft o f the In ia

o f the PAF to intervene effectively in the naval

and shot it down.

^ the

battles in the South.

“After the Indian air attacks on Kara ^ ^

•

In East Pakistan, there was only one squadron of

people wondered why the PAF did no s '

jn

16 Sabres. Two o f these were lost over Boyra on

Bombay harbour. It failed to attack o aCj1j,s

22 November. Three were lost on 4 December in

retaliation to the Indian attacks on

eeven

th e a ir b a ttle s over D acca. E leven w ere civilian targets. This should have ^e^ V llsSed

immobilised by the PAF itself on the ground in

for psychological reasons, but the PAF

^at

Dacca, to prevent their falling into enemy hands.

opportunity. The excuse for not doing s g ornbay

•

The Indian victory w as due as much to their

it had night capability only for a stri e a ^ j ^ r y careful and patient planning as it was to the lack

and was not convinced of gaining arYment ofa

of all this in Pakistan.

advantage there. The Indian ann0lJI^ L dama^eS

Excerpts from 44History o f the Pakistan Air Force”

PAF strike at Bombay and stories o

done there, were, therefore, surpris ng-

T h is d ocu m en t is con sp icu ou sly sparse on in form ation reg a rd in g sorties in su pport o f the 224/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

A submarine proceeding at speed

Seaking helicopter hovering with its sonar dunked.

INS VIKRANT in the background

Seahawks with wings folded

INS VIKRANT launching an Alize aircraft

A Landing Ship disembarking troops and vehicles on to a beach

“The air support which the Navy wanted was

never catered for. It was vaguely promised a few

coast. It was operating around its forward base at

Okha."

reconnaissance sorties and some close support

sorties which were dependent on availability. It

Excerpts from the Story o f Pakistan Navy

never occurred to the C-in-C Navy to ask for the

“The PN reconnaissance aircraft sighted a

PAF plan.

formation of eight enemy ships when the war had

“The Pakistan Air Force flew 27 sorties in

just started, but the naval observer, being

support of Pakistan Navy Operations.

unaware of war having started, made his contact

'The PAF’s performance in 1971 did not come

report hours later after landing.*

up to public expectation. The C-in-C, PAF failed

“After the first missile attack, Commodore

to provide imaginative leadership to plan and

Hanif took over as DCNS(O) on 5 December and

direct the air effort. Both strategically and

contacted the Air Priority Board which provided a

tactically the air force was kept on the defensive.

mixed bag of a dozen aircraft including the

It was deployed in depth but too thinly. Whereas

Governor of Punjab’s Cessna, a plant protection

it could undertake its own defence, it could not

aircraft, an old DC3 Dakota, some Aero Club

generate offensive effort. When the Indians

Austers and two armed Cessnas. We also

changed their strategy on or about December 7,

obtained two Fokkers and two Twin Otters fitted

after the first three days, the PAF was not

with radar. All these aircraft were lined-up at

prepared to change over during the short war to

Karachi civil airport where a “Fleet Air Arm" was

meet the new enemy threat, and remained

set up immediately. The aircraft were controlled

helpless. In addition, by too much centralized

by naval officers positioned at the airport along

control, it was kept on the leash all the time. It

with a PAF liaison officer provided by MHQ.**

operated at only about 50 percent of its war time

“The aircraft were manned by civilian

capability. As for inter-service cooperation, it

volunteer crews from PIA and the Flying Club and

had not acquired any maritime support capability

maintained by PIA and CAA at Karachi in such an

and did not provide any meaningful support to

efficient manner that there was no problem in

the Navy."

operating 3 or 4 light aircraft at a time during day

in their respective sectors on an arc 200 miles

from Karachi covering the entire area from

Pakistan M aritim e Reconnaissance

Jamnagar to the Makran coast. At night, two

Excerpt fr o m P a k ista n 's Crisis in Leadership

r a d a r -fitted aircraft at a time covered the same

arc. Thus, from the afternoon of 5 December, it

"The Navy, in the absence of any shore based

was difficult for an Osa to approach within 200

radar and maritime reconnaissance aircraft, was

miles of Karachi undetected.

virtually blind. Therefore the services of a civilian

radar were requisitioned and Pakistan

Analysis

International Airlines (PIA) willingly provided a

Fokker

Friendship

flight

to

operate

In d ia n Naval ships and submarines reported

reconnaissance flights. The PIA plane had its

shadowing aircraft on the following dates. Available

own limitations for the purpose it was being used.

records do not indicate whether all the aircraft made

Its radar was a weather radar and it had only 7

detection reports.

degree decline which could not see downwards.

3 Dec - PM - Western Fleet 210 miles south

The civil pilots, however, did an extremely goo

of Karachi

job of work without any previous training in this

4 Dec - AM - Western fleet southwest of

particular field.

Okha.

“At about the same time on December .

- AM- Submarine

KURSURA

when Naval HQ was issuing orders and

returning to Bombay after R/V

instructions, the Fokker flying along the

with KARAN J.

Kathiawar coast - PIA air patrols had been starte

5 Dec - AM - Trident force withdrawing from

on November 30 - reported the sighting of India s

Karachi.

Western Fleet consisting of a cruiser, six

destroyers and an oil tanker off the Rann of Kutc—

Page 335.

** Page 349.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/225

- PM - KHUKRI, KIRPAN off Diu.

PM - TIR and Trident force refuelling

10 Dec - PM - Subm arine KARANJ south of

at Mangrol.

Ormara.

PM - R A N JIT south o f M akran

6 Dec -

Coast.

Naval observers w ere flow n in the PIA Fokker

AM - TIR. KATCHALL.missile boat

recce aircraft which had been tasked with locating

7 Dec -

group west of Okha.

missile boats :

PM - Western Fleet 75 miles south of

8 Dec -

°

T h e n aval o b server c o rrectly recognised the Jiwani.

Su bm arin e

KARANJ

o ff

Western Fleet on 3 Dec and correctly reported Its

Karachi. TIR off Saurashtra.

alteration of course southward,

AM - S u bm arin e KARANJ ea st o f

e

The naval observer mistook the ZULFIQAR for a

9 Dec -

missile boat near Cape Monze on 6 Dec, which led

Ormara. K1RPAN off Diu.

to ZULFIQAR being attacked by the PAF.

2 26 /TRANSITION T O TRIUMPH

13

Retrospect of the 1971 War

The foregoing accounts and analyses of the major

DACCA, was fortuitously hit. The naval ships inside

events of 1971 war have examined why and how

Karachi harbour found themselves in dire straits.

certain operations were successful and other

Their predicament was compounded by the Indian Air

operations less so. As in all wars, many of the

Force air attacks on the 8th evening which

outcomes were not foreseen.

fortuitously hit workshops in the Naval Dockyard

where the ships were berthed. In an unprecedented

Naval Operations in the Arabian Sea

but sensible move, Pakistani warships were ordered

to reduce the ammunition they had on board, so as to

The withdrawal of the Pakistan Fleet into the inner

minimise the damage that an explosion might cause if

harbour of Karachi on 7/8 December yielded

they were hit.

maritime supremacy to the Western Fleet within the

The sinking of the KHUKRI on 9 December and

first six days of the war. This withdrawal was exactly

the loss of Alize 203 on 10 December were unforeseen

the opposite of our expectation that repeated attacks

consequences of the fortunes of war. Despite specific

alternately from Saurashtra and the southwest

mention of Hunter Killer Operations in his pre war

would provoke the Pakistan Flotilla to react and join

plans, the fact that he limited the duration of the

in a gun battle with the Indian Fleet, for which the

operation from 8 to 10 December shows that

latter had so assiduously prepared.

FOCINCWEST had a very limited aim. He wanted to

The destruction of the oil tanks at Keamari on 8

ensure that the Pakistani submarine D/Fd off Diu

December was fortuitious. A radar homing missile

would not interfere with the third missile attack

can be expected to home on to any shore installation

which he planned to launch on 10 December.

which, due to its size, .shape, location and other FOCINCWEST, when according approval for the

characteristics gives the missile’s homing radar a

Sonar 170 modification to be embarked in KHUKRI,

better radar response than its surroundings. Claims

could not have foreseen that KHUKRI, in trying to

that these tanks were targeted and hit on 4 December

increase sonar detection range would do so low a

are not substantiated by the Pakistani records.

speed as to become an easy target for the submarine’s

The Pakistan Navy knew exactly where the

torpedoes.

Western Fleet was from 2 December when it sailed

Similarly, it could not have been foreseen that a

from Bombay till the early hours of 4 December.

Pakistani F 104 returning homewards from an

Submarine HANGOR was the first to report the

evening raid on Okha would, make a chance sighting

Western Fleet’s position, course and speed on the

of Alize 203 and shoot it down with an air to air

night of 2/3 December. Within hours of HANGOR’s

missile.

report being received in Karachi on AM 3 December,

It could not have been foreseen that the Pakistan

Pakistani requisitioned civil aircraft were circling the Air Force would be tardy In responding to the

Western Fleet when the war started on the evening of

Pakistan Navy’s calls for air support on the night of

3 December. The Western Fleet’s southward diversion

4/5 December. When however, the PAF did respond,

on night 3/4 December shook off the shadowers in

it mistakenly struck a Pakistan naval ship ZULFIQAR

the early hours of 4 December. Thereafter the

on AM 6 December. This was to have an altogether

Western Fleet remained undetected. The Pakistan

unforeseen result. The CNS became apprehensive

Navy's account gives no indication that it was

that an alerted PAF might inflict similar damage on

particularly concerned where the Indian Fleet was.

Western fleet ships who were on their way in to attack

All available civilian air reconnaissance-effort was

Karachi on the night of 6/7 December. NHQ not only

concentrated within 200 miles of the approaches to

intervened to cancel this attack but assumed control

Karachi to detect the approach of missile boats.

of separated groups of ships of the Western Fleet and

During the second missile attack on Karachi by

Western Naval Command by ordering R/V’s off

the Western Fleet, the only major Pakistani naval

Saurashtra to give the Western Fleet a second missile

ship which was not inside harbour, the tanker

boat to replace the one which had earlier returned to

harbour. Not only could the R/V not be kept, but the

N a v a l O p e r a t io n s in t h e B a y o f Bengal TIR group off Saurashtra reported Pakistani aircraft

overhead on several occasions. When this second

It could not have been foreseen that the greatp *

missile boat reported defects necessitating return- to

single threat to VIKRANT, the submarine GHAZI

harbour, Naval Headquarters restored the control of

w ou ld sin k o u tsid e V isa k h a p a tn a m at th operations to FOCINCWEST.

commencement o f the war. Had this not occurred

It was not foreseen that Pakistan could not deploy

the entire pattern o f the Eastern Fleet’s operations its midget submarines and chariots in a preemptive

would have been different. It would not have been

attack on the Western Fleet in harbour. Indeed the

p ossib le to stop sh ip s at sea for refuelling and most elaborate precautions had been taken against

tra n s fe rrin g s to re s and p erson n el, troops and this threat. Post war reports indicated that whereas

vehicles whenever convenient. Nor would it have

the crews had been intensively trained in 1968-69,

been p erm issib le for the F leet to break wireless thereafter they did not take the midgets and chariots

silen ce every few h ou rs to m ake long sitreps to out to sea for long enough to prove the endurance

FOCINCEAST and NHQ.

either of the craft or the crews. Spares problems had

On the other hand, it was correctly foreseen that

also begun to affect their material state. By 1971, the after the Air Force had struck Chittagong and Dacca

crews w ere not con fid en t o f s a ilin g the m idgets airfields, the Pakistan Air Force Sabre squadron in

independantly from Karachi to Bombay.

East Pakistan would cease to pose any air threat to

There were also reports that the Pakistani Navy,

the VIKRANT or to offer any opposition to VIKRANTs

on their own, fitted two midgets with external torpedo

air strikes.

tubes for firing Mk 44 torpedoes. During the war,

It was correctly foreseen that by themselves the

these midgets were deployed 30 miles from Karachi.

ships of the Eastern Fleet were too few and too slow to When one of them tried to fire against an Indian ship,

enforce contraband control. It was not foreseen that

the fire control system did not work.

V ik ra n t’s aircraft m ight help. The extraordinary An East Bengal sailor, who had been trained on

ex ten t to w h ich V IK R A N T ’s a irc ra ft actually the m idgets and ch ariots and who deserted the

succeeded in assisting ships in contraband control

P ak istan N avy jo in e d th e M ukti B ahini N aval and apprehending merchant ships, over and above

Commandos in mid 1971. He informed that their

their air strikes against East Pakistan, came to be prime objective was to put a huge limpet mine under

fu lly realised only after the war. A new role had the VIKRANT.

crystallised for an aircraft carrier in limited war.

It was not foreseen that Pakistan submarines

It was correctly foreseen that an amphibious

would be prohibited from attacking Indian merchant

landing might be required in East Pakistan prior to

ships.

western naval intervention. The inescapable need or

On the o th er hand, seve ra l ou tcom es w ere

secrecy and the inability to spare the already heavi y

foreseen and came to pass.

tasked ships of the Eastern Fleet precluded any Pn0*"

FOCWEF had foreseen that in an encounter with

training for a landing. The ENTERPRISE Task Grou>

a P a k ista n D aph n e C lass submarine., su rfa ce came through the Malacca Straits on the afternoonl

warships would be worsted. The sinking of KHUKRI

14 D ecem ber and the forces in East Pakis ^

on 9 December, the failure to sink the HANGOR in the

surrendered on the afternoon o f 16 Decern eT^

intensive anti submarine Operation FALCON from 10

successful landing on the morning of 15 Decem

to 13 December and the consistent lack of debris after

would still have been timely.

innum erable anti subm arine attacks by diverse

However, it could not have been foreseen

^uleCj

ships, all reiterated the basic reality that underwater LST’s would beach over an hour later than sc e

gS

operations in the Arabian Sea favour the submarine.

and thereby get seriou sly affected by t e

It was foreseen that Pakistani merchant ships

currents of a rising tide and sea and swell.

had to be apprehended in the early days of the war.

Only the PASNI could be seized on 4 December. The

S u bm arine A tta ck s on M erchant Ships a

MAQBOOL BAKSH escaped despite being sighted by

In the 1971 war, the policy regarding at

our reco n n a issa n ce a irc ra ft.

T h e seizu re o f

merchant shipping proved to be quite comp

MADHUMATI south o f Jiwani on 8 December was

fortuitious.

228/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

P a k is ta n N a v y ’s P o lic y on A tta c k in g M erch an t With the large number of neutral ships plying the

Ships

Arabian Sea, unrestricted submarine warfare would

‘The Story of the Pakistan Navy” states:*

have had the most serious international

repercussions.

‘ The operational orders issued to submarines

confined them to attacks against warships only

Inadvertent Damage to Neutral Ships in Harbour

and interdiction of merchant ships was not

An American merchant ship, SS BUCKEYE STATE

permitted.

was off Chittagong harbour at the time that

“The Indian Navy made no effort at

Chittagong installations were under attack by

maintaining even a semblance of legal propriety,

VIKRANT’s aircraft. She reported that she had been

by declaration of a blockade or a war zone before

strafed whilst she was in international waters. The

embarking on a callous slaughter of

American Government lodged a protest. Naval

merchantmen and their crew by those who claim

Headquarters was able to prove that the ship was

to have taken up arms to champion the cause of

close to a Pakistani merchant ship which was being

the oppressed. For it was well known to the

attacked and may have suffered inadvertent damage.

Indians that missiles hurled blindly at ships at

A useful insight on the American thought process

Manora anchorage were bound to take a toll of

which led to the American protest regarding the

neutral merchant ships.’

BUCKEYE STATE can be had from the following

excerpts of the Minutes of the Washington Special

Indian N avy’s Policy on Attacking Merchant Ships

Action Group:*

There were two basic problems to be resolved:

•

6 Dec 71. “Dr Kissinger asked about a legal

•

Clearly neutral ships were not to be attacked.

position concerning the current Indian naval

But what was one to do when a Pakistan

blockade. Mr Sisco stated that we have protested

merchant

ship

changed

identity

and

both incidents in which American ships have

masqueraded as a neutral merchant ship - as

been Involved. However no formal proclamation

MADHUMATI did in the Arabian Sea and ANWAR

apparently has been made in terms of a

BAKSH did in the Bay of Bengal? The only way

declaration of war, that it is still essentially an

out was to put the onus for positive identification

undeclared war, with the Indians claiming power

on the attacker.

to exercise their rights of belligerency. The State

•

How was a submarine expected to positively

Department would however prepare a paper on

identify a warship or a merchant ship before

the legal aspects of the issue. Ambassador

attack? The Pakistan Navy solved its problem by

Johnson said that so far as he was concerned, the

restricting its submarines to only attacking

Indians had no legal position to assert a

Indian warships. The Indian Navy directed its

blockade. Dr Kissinger asked that a draft protest

submarines to attack only positively identified

be drawn up. If we considered it illegal, we will

Pakistani merchant ship and warships. No

make a formal diplomatic protest."

encounter occurred between Pakistani warships

•

8 Dec 71 “Turning to the question of blockade.

and KARANJ in the Arabian Sea or with

Ambassador Johnson said that both India and

KHANDERI in the Bay of Bengal. As-regards

Pakistan have taken blockade action, even

Pakistani merchant ships, the only way a

though the Pak blockade is essentially a paper

submarine could positively identify a

blockade. Dr Kissinger said that we should also

merchantman by day was to surface and board.

protest to the Paks. Ambassador Johnson

This Was unrealistic. By night, it was even more

indicated we do not have a legal case to protest

unrealistic to expect a submarine to effect

the blockade. The belligerent nations have a right

positive identification. In the event, the Indian

to blockade when a state of war exists. We may

submarines did not carry out a single attack.

think it unwise and we may question how it is

carried out. We have, in fact, normally expressed

Giving submarines carte blanche to lire torpedoes

our concern. On the other hand, we have no

would only have been legitimate if unrestricted

problem in protesting the incident of the SS

submarine warfare had been resorted to - as between

BUCKEYE STATE which had been strafed in a

Germany and Britain in the Second World War.

Pakistani port."

Neither India nor Pakistan had any such intention.

•

Page 335.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/229

The unambiguous provisions of international law

protests were handled by directives to the Fleet

regarding blockade, contraband control and attacks

careful and by genuine expressions of regret Bvth

on merchant ships make it clear that our submarines

the war at sea had been won.

en-

w ill continu e to be dep rived o f the freed om o f If one takes an overview of the Navy’s success unrestricted attack on merchant shipping.

operations in the 1971 war, the following stand out Even when a war zone is declared, as was done by

Britain in the Falklands War o f 1982, the British

•

In the W est, the m is s ile attacks on Karachi Navy’s sinking of the Argentinean cruiser BELGRANO

ach ieved m aritim e su prem acy and the Fleet

outside o f this war zone invited opprobrium even

remained “in being.’ The Pakistan Navy’s surface

though BELGRANO, b ein g a w a rsh ip , w as a

th reat w as bottled up. The air threat did not

legitimate target.

m aterialize. The subm arine threat proved its

A d ifferen t kind o f p reced en t w as set in the deadliness; the midget submarines and chariots

Persian Gulf in the Iran - Iraq war of the mid 1980’s.

were not seen.

Iraq declared a war zone and freely fired missiles at

°

In the East, VIKRANT’s air superiority over the

all tankers goin g to or su spected to be goin g to sea a ch ieved m a ritim e su p rem acy and the

Iranian ports. In retaliation, Iran responded by firing Eastern Fleet remained “in being.’ The Pakistan

missiles at tankers seen to be heading for Iraqi ports.

Navy had not deployed any major units in the

In both cases, tankers of all nationalities were hit.

East, so there was no surface threat. The GHAZI’s

In retrospect, a striking contrast can be discerned

sinking rem oved the sub surface threat. The

between trade-warfare in the 1965 war and the 1971

Indian Air Force strikes grounded the Pakistan

war:

air threat.

•

In the South, the few ships keeping vigil on inter-

•

In 1965, the Indian Fleet, prohibited from taking

w in g P a k is ta n i tr a ffic h elped capture one offensive action, could do nothing to prevent

Pakistani merchant ship and alert NHQ on the

m erchant ships STEEL V E N D O R and STEEL

movement of western naval ships.

PROTECTOR from going to Karachi. The Chief of

•

Given the density o f neutral shipping and the

the Naval Staff was constrained to state:

im prudence o f m istakenly attacking innocent

"When naval officers generally and senior ones in

m erch a n t sh ip s in w h a t was already an

particular, who ought to know better, talk glibly of

internationally sensitive political situation, there

blockade, contraband control, seizing enemy

was no option but to in sist that s u b m a r i n e s merchant ships and attacking enemy warships at

positively identify targets as enemy vessels.

n

sea and their ports without a proper and formal

the one hand, p o s itiv e ly id en tified eneiri^

declaration o f war, one wonders whether they

warships were legitimate targets for s u b m a rin e ^

j-ealise that any such action on the high seas

to attack but they were not to be found at sea.

w ith ou t the declaration o f war is liab le to be the oth er hand, p o s itiv e ly iden tified ene^ ^

branded as piracy, especially if any neutral ships

merchant ships could only be apprehen

become involved."

subm arines had boardin g parties, ^o r ^ n(j er

•

In 1971, the second missile attack inadvertently

su b m a rin es do not have space.

coUid

dam aged m erch an t ships. W hen d iplom atic

international law, enemy merchant ships

protests were received, NHQ issued an IG:

only be sunk after all crew and Passel?^e^rjnes

FROM : NHQ

TO : 254 IG

DTG 102101

been removed to a place of safety - su ni ^ ^.p

“ IN O RD ER T H A T NO N E U TR A L SH IPS ARE

have no space to accommodate mere a

DAMAGED INADVERTENTLY DURING NAVAL

crews. For all practical purposes, the su

realfli

OPERATIONS AGAINST PAKISTAN’S MILITARY

remained a force in being. It remains in

^

T A R G E TS IN W E S T PA K ISTA N PO R TS AND

o f speculation w hether the d e c la r a t io tions of TERRITORIAL WATERS, OPERATIONS WILL BE

zones could have sidestepped the stipu

SO CONDUCTED BY THE INDIAN NAVY THAT

international law.

soite *he

N EU TRAL SH IPS MAY LEAVE TH E PO R T OF

•

Th e Navy ach ieved w hat it did

^he seCtion

KARACHI BY 1800 HOURS ON 12 DEC.’’

considerable limitations describee° *n ,

oite the

on “Events Prior to the War an

g th e vvar

In 1971, there was near unanimity between the

material state of ships before and un

Chief o f the I'faval Staff, the Commanders in Chief being so poor.

and the Fleet Commanders that offensive action alone

would carry the day. And so it transpired. Diplomatic

230/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Lest the lay reader feel that the war was won just

country like India which had no vital interests

by the missile boats and the VIKRANT, it is essential

overseas”. The maritime world accepted India’s naval

to remember that both these elements .were entirely

predominance in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of

supported by ships, submarines and aircraft in all

Bengal.

three dimensions of naval warfare - on the sea, below

Within the Navy, there was an upsurge of self

the sea and above the sea.

confidence to overcome problems. In its wake, there

followed a remarkable synergy of events. The success

A ft e r w o r d

of the Leander frigate programme, the admiration of

Russian and Western navies for the Indian Navy’s

There were many significant spinoffs after the 1971

professionalism and innovativeness, the remarkable

war.

Within India, for the first time since

interaction which helped in integrating the latest

independence, there was public jubilation at the

weapon systems from Russian, Western and

Navy’s startling contribuUon to victory. There was

indigenous sources into Indian hulls, all these

the Government’s realisation of the effectiveness of

combined to propel the Indian Navy upwards to the

seapower. Both of these dispelled the earlier doubts

seventh rank in the world’s navies.

about the “relevance of a Navy for a peace-loving

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/231

14

Naval Assistance to Bangladesh after the 1971 War Preamble

Reopening the Port o f Chittagong

B efore the w ar started, the Mukti Bahini had laid Im m ediately after the surrender on 16 December

mines across the entrance to the Pussur river. Three

1971, the Flag Officer Commanding Eastern Fleet

merchant ships and a Pakistani gunboat had sunk or

took charge o f the activities to reactivate the port of run aground as a result o f mine explosions. Shipping

Chittagong. By 3 January 1972, a swept channel had

tr a ffic to th e riv e r p orts o f M on gla/C h aln a and been established skirting the minefield and basic port

Khulna came to a stop.

facilities had been restored. The enormous effort

Prior to surrendering, the Pakistan Navy had laid

involved in this achievement can be glimpsed from

a la rg e m in efield in the approach to Chittagong the sequence of events.

harbour and shipping traffic ceased.

D u rin g th e war, air attacks by In dian naval

E sta b lish in g a S w e p t C h a n n el

aircraft operating from the aircraft carrier VIKRANT

•

Interrogation of the prisoners of war revealed that

had sunk several ships and damaged several facilities

the Pakistan Navy, using coastal craft, had laid

in th e M o n g la / C h a ln a p o rt com p lex and in about 94 moored contact type mines in an area of

Chittagong port.

450 square m iles (30 m iles long by 15 miles

By 16 D ecem b er, w h en P a k ista n i forces

wide). During laying, one mine had exploded and

surrendered at Dacca, all shipping activity in East

sunk the co a ster in vo lved in layin g it. The Pakistan had ceased.

perimeter of the minefield having been broadly

To help restore maritime activity in Bangladesh

esta b lish ed , a ch a n n el w as m arked by 2

as early as possible. Naval Headquarters established

December through which ships up to a draft of

N a va l A d v is o ry G rou ps (NAGs) to w ork in close feet cou ld s k irt the m in efield and enter collaboration with Army Eastern Command and the

Chittagong port at high water.

C iv il A ffa ir s

G rou p

esta b lish ed by A rm y

•

On 23 and 24 December, Alize aircraft fromi

Headquarters in Bangladesh. Their tasks were:

aircraft carrier VIKRANT bombed the minefie

explode as many mines as possible.

•

Re-opening o f Bangladesh ports for resumption of

•

S in ce m in esw eep ers w ere not lik ely o

sea borne traffic.

a va ila b le im m ed ia tely, in ten sive e o ^

•

Taking control o f erstwhile Pakistani naval craft,

commenced to locate trawlers and coasterS s to

units and installations in the area with a view to

their crews (who had fled to their villages) sc\ geCj

getting them operational as early as possible.

p ress them into service for im Pr 0^ jers

•

Minesweeping and mine clearance.

minesweeping. By 27 December, four^tra

•

Clearance o f wrecks in harbours, restoration of

had been selected and smaller boats a

^

n a v ig a tio n a l aids and reh a b ilita tion o f port earm ark ed to m ark the sw ept c^\aIl ^orT1 28

facilities.

suitable marker buoys could be foun • gtarted

December onwards, trawlers and coasters

N A G s w e re p o sitio n ed in Khulna and in

C h itta g o n g u n d er the o vera ll con trol o f the wire sweeping for mines.

arked W

•

By 2 Januaiy, a deeper safe channe , m

up

Commodore in Charge of NAGs (COMNAG) in Dacca.

channel buoys, had been established lor

A total o f 34 officers and 410 sailors were deployed : to 21 feet draft.

•

COM NAG Dacca had 11 officers and 100 sailors.

•

NAG Chittagong had 13 officers and 210 sailors.

R estorin g P o r t F a cilities

^

g as

•

NAG Khulna had 10 officers and 100 sailors.

By 3 January, the state of Chittagong Port w

follows:

•

Of the total of 28 cranes, 26 cranes had been

The minesweepers then sailed for Chittagong to

made operational.

commence minesweeping there.

®

The 125 ton floating crane had been made

Lt (later Rear Admiral) A Tewari was the

functional.

Commanding Officer of BULSAR. He recalls:

•

Of the total of 17 jetties,, ten had been made fully

usable and wrecks were being removed from four

“Immediately after the surrender, Indian Naval

more usable jetties to the three old, unusable

minesweepers were ordered to proceed to

jetties.

Bangladesh to clear mines. The ships involved in

•

Water supply had been restored to 3 out of 7

this operation were CANNANORE. a coastal

jetties.

minesweeper, and BULSAR, an inshore

°

All coastal navigational aids, and such aids as

minesweeper. They were later joined by another

existed in the Karnaphuli River in mid November

inshore minesweeper. BHATKAL.

1971, had been restored.

“We had been on our toes since August 1971

0

Coastal traffic carrying oil and essential food

and the wear and tear was showing on men and

supplies, from Chittagong to inland ports had

machinery - both needed rest. But with the latest

been restored and fishing boats were proceeding

orders, that had to wait as a lot of preparations

to sea again.

had to be done to get ready for operational

®

Chittagong Port Commercial Radio had been

minesweeping. The Navy’s 18th Minesweeping

manned and reoriented to maritime use.

Squadron comprised four coastal and four

inshore minesweepers. The two best ships finally

Reopening the Pussur River Ports

selected were BULSAR and CANNANORE. The

Senior Officer of the 18th Minesweeping

Khulna

Squadron. M 18, was embarked in CANNANORE.

“CANNANORE and BULSAR anchored off the

After visiting the ports of Khulna and the Mongla/

Pussur River entrance at 0400 on 18 January

Chalna complex, the Officer-in-Charge NAG Khulna

1972.

reported that:

“M 18 was of the view that it was too risky for

•

The jetties and warehouses at Khulna had

CANNANORE to sweep and therefore BULSAR

suffered only negligible damage.

had to carry out the actual minesweeping by

•

Ships at Mongla had suffered considerable

itself. The best M 18 was prepared to do was to

damage during the Navy’s air attacks. The pilot

standby to render assistance from his anchorage

vessel and mooring vessel had been damaged and

position nearly four miles away.

were non operational. Of the six heavily damaged

“So off we went with our biggest ensign and

and abandoned ships in port, four were Pakistani

commissioning pennant to commence sweeping

(OCEAN ENTERPRISE, MUSTALI, MAKRAN and

at 0500 hrs, just one hour after arrival at the

SHAPTA DINGA), one was Danish (NEDE COLE)

Pussur river.

and one Greek, (MASTRO STELIOS).

“When the ship made its first pass over the

The clearance of wrecks was beyond the Indian

minefield, we were expecting the mines to explode

Navy’s capability. A United Nations agency had

at any moment - nobody really believed that the

already approached the Bangladesh Government

degaussing done at Cochin was effective. Either

to undertake this task.

it was that or the mines were no longer active. At

that moment neither mattered as we were already

With the assistance of the NAG, the port of

committed. The ship crossed the “Danger” line

Khulna was declared open on 7 January and the first

with our hearts beating in resonance with the

ship entered on 17 January. The NAG Khulna was

propellers. We were still afloat and moving! The

withdrawn on 20 January 1972.

mine-hit wrecks were now behind us on the port

quarter as a reminder of what lay below. With this

Minesweeping the Entrance to the Pussur River

baptism, the ship's company soon got down to the

The Indian Navy's minesweepers CANNANORE and

business of serious minesweeping. We completed

BULSAR sailed from Visakhapatnam on 16 January

seven runs that day and on completion secured

1972 and arrived at the entrance to the Pussur River

alongside CANNANORE at 2200 to take water and

on 18 January. Minesweeping commenced the same

then anchor for the night.

night and completed by the evening of 21 January.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/233

MNESWEEPING OPERATIONS AT THE PUSStJR RTVFP ENTRANCE

IN JAN U A R Y 1972

“Only those who have served in minesweepers

Minesweeping commenced on 25 January. A

can really understand the difficulties of

number of mines were cut. Initially a shallow

minesweeping and how tedious, hard and

channel was swept to allow ships of 24 foot draft to

demanding it can be. Handling the heavy sweep

enter Chittagong. This channel was marked with

gear, cables, floats and wires requires

buoys. By 12 February, a deep draft channel, one

seamanship and professional competence of the

mile wide and 26 miles long had been established.

highest order. With the limited complement, all

hands have to contribute their mite - there is no

Damage Caused by Drifting Mines After they

exception to this rule. There are no watches, no

had been Swept

special duty men and no time for rest. An

engineering mechanic comes out of the engine

The Hague ConvenUon requires that on being cut or

room, joins hands with the seamen in pulling the

on coming adrift, mines should render themselves

wires and cables as the sweeps are streamed and

safe. It soon became evident that the mines laid in

recovered and then goes back to the engine room

Chittagong did not comply with this requirement.

freshened. There are no breaks for meals and the

The drifting mines were seen to be behaving in a

work goes on uninterrupted and takes priority

random and unpredictable manner:

over eveiything else.

•

They were found to drag with the tidal stream,

“This routine was maintained conUnuously

shifUng their posiUon while still underwater, thus

for four days, starting from 0400 till 2400 hours

requiring periodical check sweeps of the areas

each day and ended with almost every one

which had already been cleared.

exhausted and dog-tired after being on deck for

•

While some of the cut mines rose to the surface,

20 hours at a stretch, followed by less than 4

others tended to remain below and drift

ho.urs of sleep.

underwater. As the mines were small, it was very

“Carrying out magnetic sweeping involved

difficult to see them, even on the surface.

streaming a 250 to 300 meter long and heavy

cable behind the ship along with associated

In effect, once they were cut, these drifting mines

floats, kites and depressors. Normally this sweep

became a danger to ships transiting the area.

should be streamed in waters where depths are in

On 5 February, the Shipping Corporation of

excess of 10 fathoms (18 meters). The mines had

India’s ship MV VISHWA KUSUM was struck by a

however been laid in about 4 to 5 fathoms (9

drifting mine. She flooded and ran aground. She was

meters) of water. This caused considerable

refloated and brought to off Chittagong by 12

problems because the cable was found to be

February, where, however, she sank on 13 February.

dragging on the bottom of the sea especially

On 11 February, the tanker ESSO ARK was

during turns, which resulted in it getting cut. It.

struck by a drifting mine whilst alongside. She broke

therefore, had to be repaired repeatedly in order

into two and sank.

to improve its insulation.

On 13 February, inshore minesweeper BULSAR

“As compared to an inshore minesweeper, a

was hit by a submerged drifting mine. Both

coastal minesweeper like CANNANORE was

propellers were damaged. Fortunately, the mine did

better suited for shallow water tasks because of

not explode on contact but surfaced. It was promptly

her higher superstructure, which enabled lessor

sunk by gunfire. BULSAR had to be towed by

sag when towing the cable. There were therefore,

DARSHAK to Calcutta on 27 February to effect

no technical limitations in the participation of

repairs.

CANNANORE if she had so desired.

The Commanding Officer INS BULSAR. Lt (later

“The minesweeping task at Pussur river was

Rear Admiral) Tewari recalls the minesweeping

unique because no Indian Naval ship had ever

operation off Chittagong:

done operational sweeping of influence mines in

“Based on the intelligence obtained from the

the past.”

interrogation of the Pakistani naval officers and

the masters of the Bangladeshi coastal vessels

Sweeping the Minefield at Chittagong

which had been employed for laying the mines,

CANNANORE and BULSAR arrived at Chittagong on

we were able to make a fairly reasonable

25 January.

They were joined by inshore

assessment of the location of the minefields, the

minesweeper BHATKAL on 27 January.

lines along which they were laid and the likely

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/235

depth to which they were placed. Based on our

engines could take her! In the process of doing

assessment of the situation, the following

this and probably by design, her Captain decided

decisions were taken:

that it was safer to be a derelict than an

underwater wreck. She ran aground at the

An area of 25 miles by 13 miles was taken as

entrance of the Karnaphuli River. That ended the

the “Danger" area. A swept channel of 25

first and the only contribution of the emerging

miles had to be established through this.

Bangladesh Navy.

Out of this, another area of 9 miles by 13

"As a consequence to this unexpected turn of

miles was the “hard core” area confirmed to

events, I realised that there was no alternative

be having mines.

but for BULSAR to complete the job, as

15 danbuoys were to be laid at a distance of

CANNANORE was unlikely to do so under any

1.5 miles apart.

circumstances. Intuitively, she had also

The danbuoys were to be laid on bearing 185

developed a defect in her diesel generators.

degrees - 005 degrees through the deepest

Realising the gravity of the situation and the fact

water to allow deep draft vessels to approach

that the work had to go on, I volunteered even

Chittagong port.

before being asked, to continue laying the

The Bangladesh gunboat SAHAYAK was to lay

remaining danbuoys through the “hard core"

danbuoys through the “hard core” area, as

area and beyond.

her draft was 4 feet.

“Since it was unlikely that a ship of BULSAR’s

BULSAR was to standby to rescue the

size could have survived a mine explosion, the

Bangladesh gunboat if struck by a mine.

ship’s company was briefed in detail about the

BULSAR had to lay the first six danbuoys,

risks and the safety precautions required. To

through the "soft core" area and the later minimise injury, all personnel were told to remain

ones beyond the “hard core" area.

on the upper deck.

“We also knew that the mines had been laid

"By now, BHATKAL had joined CANNANORE

by .the Pakistan Navy in a hurry just before

and BULSAR at Chittagong and was deputed to

surrender and therefore they may not have had

keep an eye on BULSAR. This she did very

adequate time to prepare the mines and arm

faithfully even through the “hard core" area,

them properly. The chances of encountering dud

although her orders were to wait outside the

mines were therefore a possibility, but this could

area and remain in communication. The

not be pre-judged at that juncture. Based on M

Commanding Officer BHATKAL’s reason for doing

18’s advice, BULSAR was once again nominated

so was simple - “We are sister ships, wherever

for the task. Once again, M-18 kept CANNANORE

BULSAR goes, I too will go.

well clear of any involvement, except for behind

“Till now, the laying of danbuoys had

the scene activities.

progressed smoothly and as per schedule. The

“The laying of danbuoys for a minesweeping

last group of danbuoys was finally laid on the

operation is a very precise evolution and a

third day but on this occasion. BHATKAL had not

number of factors have to be kept in mind.

sailed out with BULSAR. This was the first time

Foremost amongst them is that each danbuoy

that I had a major emergency. While entering

should be anchored firmly at the bottom, to

harbour on completion of the task, in the

prevent it from drifting, especially off Chittagong

Karnaphuli river, my port diesel generator (DG)

where the currents were known to be up to 5

exhaust caught fire due to under loading and the

smoke spread quickly in the entire Engine Room.

knots. The next important factor was that they

There was a danger that the reserve fuel tank,

should be laid in the exact positions given in the

chart, because they were to be the datum for all

located just below the DG, might catch fire. The

engines had to be stopped and fuel shut off to

further minesweeping tasks.

fight the fire. As the ship had by now lost way, the

“On the first day. the danbuoy laying task

only anchor available in the ship was let go to

went as per plan. The first five danbuoys were laid

hold the ship in the channel.

by BULSAR in the "soft core" area, with the

“The Karnaphuli river is well known for its

Bangladesh gun boat SAHAYAK following behind.

very strong ebb tide which sometimes reaches

When SAHAYAK’s turn came to lay the danbuoys

speeds of 10 to 12 knots. On that particular day,

through the “hard core” area, she turned around

it must have been around 5 to 6 knots, which was

and headed back to Chittagong as fast as her

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/237

too strong for BULSAR’s weak, non-ferrous chain

in a fishing net. This was taken ashore hv

cable to hold. As the ship had also gained a

unsuspecting fisherman, who probably th o L ^

certain amount of stern way before the decision to

it contained some treasure and tried tinke •

let go the anchor was taken, the chain cable had

with its horns. The mine soon exploded killing k

even lesser chance of holding the ship. Thus, on

persons and burning down 10 huts of that villas?

letting go, it ran out and snapped. I helplessly

This incident was the last straw that broke M i f ,

watched the ship being carried down rapidly. By

nerves which were already on edge - he suffered

some stroke o f luck, the ship rem ained in the

heart attack. He had to be evacuated back to

centre o f the channel and did not drift towards

Calcutta by Red Cross aircraft. He was brave

the shore. In the m eantim e, the C h ie f ERA,

enough to walk out o f his ship on his own two

appreciating the danger, entered the smoke filled

legs.

engine room, stopped the DG. and shut its fuel

supply. Soon the fire was also extinguished. In

‘T o us now it was amply clear that:

the process of canying out all this, the Chief ERA

°

Mines were definitely there - live and properly

collapsed due to smoke. This act o f the Chief ERA

laid.

allowed us to start one engine and get underway

°

They did not have much positive buoyancy

again. For this act o f bravery and presence of

and therefore, unlike other buoyant mines,

mind, the Chief ERA was later decorated with a

they did not rise to the surface immediately

Nao Sena Medal.

on b ein g cut.

T h is m ade them more

■

“On a rriv a l at th e n a va l je t t y , w e had dangerous, as they were inconspicuous.

something to cheer about. Captain Bawa was

•

They were live even after being cut.

fully aware of the importance of the task carried

out by BULSAR. He paid his com plim ent with

“Undaunted by the tragedy, we were on task

this signal.

the next day, th is tim e w ith m ore watchful

FROM : NAG CHITTAGONG

TO : BULSAR

lookouts and sharpshooters. During our second

NOT ONLY HAVE YOU TH E D ISTIN C TIO N OF

run CANNANORE, which was stationed behind

BEING THE FIRST WARSHIP TO SAIL THROUGH

BULSAR’s swept path, was the first to sight a

THE M INEFIELD BUT YOU HAVE ALSO LAID

mine ahead of us. This was probably cut by us

TH E FO U ND ATIO N FO R SU B SEQ U ENT MINE

during the run earlier in the day. It was ahead of

SWEEPING. W ELL DONE.

my ship and was fired at by the 20mm H isp a n o

“It took only one day to repair BULSAR’s port

gun and hit after a few attempts. It slowly sank

DG as n eith er w a ter nor foam had been used

but did not explode.

in d iscrim in a tely to pu t out the fire. The lost FROM : CANNANORE TO : NAG CHITTAGONG

anchor was replaced with an old metallic anchor

HAVE CUT ONE MINE MRN I IN POSITION 21

and chain found in the form er Pakistan naval

51.4' N, 91 41.5’E.

y

stores. W ith no threat from influence mines, we

A LL SH IPS OPENED FIRE. MINE SUNK W

could safely disregard magnetic discipline. The

BULSARs 20MM.

,.

ship was made ready for sea again, as we did not

‘Two days later, 3 more mines were

w a n t to m is s o u t from the in au gu ral

the same area and destroyed, two by BHA

minesweeping run.

and one by BULSAR. By now, every one knew

“ B U L S A R s a ile d o u t o f C H itta go n g on 1

duty, no one had to be told what to do.

y ^

F e b ru a ry 1972 to jo in C ANNANO RE and

February, we had succeeded in e s t a b l i s *

BHATKAL who were waiting for her to commence

swept channel 25 miles long and one mi e

th e firs t-e v e r operation al sweeping of contact Our first mission of minesweeping

tue

maintain the

m in es in the h istory o f the Indian Navy. The completed, the next mission was to

inshore minesweepers were positioned on either

swept channel free of mines.

, and

side o f the danbuoy line. BHATKAL on the west

“By this time, we had been opera'tio

^

and BULSAR on the east o f the line. Two runs

away from home port continuously

ernent

w e re m ade on the first day, which passed o ff months. By itself, this was no mean ac t

without any incident.

for a small ship like an inshore mines^ he end of

“Unknown and unnoticed by us was the fact

little shore support. But this was no

that this time we were right on target and mines

our problems.

had already been cut. One such mine got caught

2 3 8 /TRANSITIO N TO TRIUMPH

“The minesweepers had probably cut many

were needed to see a single drifting mine.

more mines than were accounted for, some of

Suddenly, when the ship was in the process of

which were adrift. These mines were small and

turning and under helm, there was a loud ‘thud’

had low buoyancy, which made them difficult to

and a strong jerk as if something was pulling the

locate and distinguish. NAG Chittagong’s

ship back. Due to the list caused by the turn, it

problem was that if he promulgated this fact then

appeared as if the ship was taking in water. The

it could have led to the stoppage of all shipping,

initial’panic disappeared when the ship was

which we were trying to revive. Before we could

found to be on even keel, with a mine rolling

make up our minds, the mine struck its next

behind the wake. We had struck a moored mine

victim. This was the SCI ship VISHWA KUSUM

and cut it with our propellers. It was our good

which was leaving harbour, when it was not in the

fortune that for some reason this mine had not

channel swept by the minesweepers.

exploded. Finding ourselves safe, we wasted no

“CANNANORE, which was at anchorage and 2

time in sinking this mine. That ended our

to 3 miles away rushed to the site to help the

minesweeping deployment.

stricken ship. BULSAR, which was inside the

FROM: NAG CHITTAGONG TO : NHQ

harbour repairing the main engine megator

BULSAR HIT A SUBMERGED DRIFTING MINE

pump, was ordered to sail out at night to R/V

AT 131740F IN POSITION 22 07.8 N, 91 40.6 E.

CANNANORE to bring the survivors back to

MINE DID NOT REPEAT DID NOT EXPLODE ON

Chittagong. BULSAR reached the area at about

CONTACT BUT SURFACED AND SUNK BY

0001 hrs and brought the survivors back to the

GUNFIRE.

harbour the same night, as there was no place for

SUSPECT DAMAGE TO PROPELLERS OR

them on board either CANNANORE or BULSAR.

SHAFTS AS CONSIDERABLE VIBRATION

“On interrogation of VISHWA KUSUM’s crew,

EXPERIENCED ON RETURN PASSAGE TO

it came to light that they had indeed seen the

HARBOUR. FURTHER ASSESSMENT AFTER

mine floating towards them but they had

DIVER INSPECTIONS.

mistaken it to be a submarine. When the mine

HAVE POSTPONED DEPARTURE OF MV

exploded, they thought that they had been

HOOGHLY WITH CAPTURED AMMUNITION

attacked by a submarine and abandoned the ship

SCHEDULED FOR TOMORROW MONDAY.

in a state of panic without attempting any

INTEND ADVISING PORT TO SUSPEND TRAFFIC

damage control action, as they anticipated

THROUGH PRESENT CHANNEL AFTER

another attack from the same submarine.

CONSULTATION WITH COMNAG."

Finally, VISHWA KUSUM sank on 13 February

“The damage to BULSAR’s propellers ended

despite all the efforts of the Navy and the SCI to

her participation in minesweeping operations.

save her.

Soon thereafter. BULSAR was towed by

“On the same day that VISHWA KUSUM sank

DARSHAK to Calcutta for repairs in Garden

o ff Chittagong harbour, a merchant ship

Reach Workshops".

COSMOS PIONEER, reported sighting a mine

while leaving harbour at 3.15 p.m.. I was ordered

Check Sweeping of the Swept Channel

to sail with dispatch and destroy the errant mine.

The danger posed by drifting mines made it clear that

“On plotting the position and the likely drift

continuous check sweeps would be necessary to keep

due to current, I appreciated that we would be

the swept channel clear of mines. Meanwhile, to

able to reach mine only by sunset and thus may

avoid any Bangladesh suspicions that the Indian

not be in a position to see a drifting mine.

Armed Forces were an “occupying forcc", the

Prudence dictated that I should sail the next

Government of India had directed that all Indian

morning since COSMOS PIONEER had safely

Armed Forces were to be withdrawn by 25 March

sailed out and no other sailing was scheduled

1972.

until the next day. Despite this. NAG Chittagong

The Navy had informed the Government that it

wanted me to search for the mine and anchor for

did not have the capability either to clear wrecks or to the night if necessary. We sailed out and by dusk,

clear the entire minefield at Chittagong. The

the ship was slightly short of the estimated

Bangladesh Government then requested that Indian

position of the mine.

minesweepers continue check sweeps. Concurrently,

“The entire ship’s company was on the upper

it sought the Russian Navy’s assistance to clear the

deck keeping a sharp look out. All pairs of eyes

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/239

wrecks in the rivers of Bangladesh and the minefield

Retrospect

at Chittagong.

The minesweeping operation o ff Chittagong was the

Coastal minesweepers KAKINADA and KARWAR

Indian Navy’s first real encounter with live mines.

arrived at Chittagong on 17 March and started

carrying out regular check sweeps o f the swept

For nearly twelve months, these sm all, over-aged minesweepers operated 2500 miles from their home

channel.

Starting early April 1972, a flotilla of Russian

base in Bombay and 600 miles from the nearest naval

ships (naval minesweepers, salvage ships and their

base in Visakhapatnam , w ith o u t p ro p e r logistic supporting vessels) arrived in Chittagong. By end

support, in extremely hazardous conditions, in a port

May, they had widened the swept channel to 2 miles.

ravaged by war. Both officers and men came through

Meanwhile the Indian naval minesweepers who

the arduous experience well and with confidence. The

had been carrying out check sweeps from mid March

minesweepers, however, needed extensive repairs for

onwards without a break began to report major

several months before their operational capability

defects. This led to their withdrawal to Calcutta and

could be restored.

Visakhapatnam to effect repairs. M 18 therefore

Of the 94 mines believed to have been laid pff

recommended that the responsibility for carrying out

C hittagong, 18 m ines w e re c u t by Indian

check sweeps be formally taken over by the Russian

minesweepers and 2 by Russian m inesweepers. 6

minesweeping force.

mines were washed ashore and destroyed.

In May 1972. the Flag O fficer Commanding

Eastern Fleet. Rear Admiral (later Vice Admiral)

Diving Operations in C hittagong

Sarma flew to Chittagong to discuss the coordination

of the Indian and Russian naval minesweeping effort.

A few hours before the surrender, the Pakistan Navy

It was agreed that in view of the need for Indian had reportedly dumped into the river. Rupees 22

minesweepers to undertake long overdue

lakhs o f coins, a large quantity o f looted gold and maintenance and repairs, only one Indian

silver ornaments and six large trunks o f gold taken

minesweeper was likely to be available in the

from the N ation al Bank. D iv in g o p e ra tio n s at foreseeable future. It was agreed that the

Chittagong were undertaken at the requ est o f the responsibility for check minesweeping would be

Bangladesh Navy and the Bangladesh Bank.

taken over by Russian minesweepers.

Diving operations commenced on 3 July 74 and

Minesweeping operations at Chittagong were

completed on 24 October, 1972.

suspended in July 72 with the advent o f the

To avoid any suspicion o f misappropriation, the

monsoons. By then, the swept channel had been

procedure followed was:

swept

t0 3 mileS and a t0taI ° f 24 mines had been

•

Diving operations were conducted in the presence

of two officers of the Bangladesh Bank and one

b i l a ^ i ' y 1? 72' RuSSia and BanSladesh signed a officer of the Bangladesh Navy.

w iirh ? Pr°t0C01 f°r Salvage and Minesweeping,

•

The items recovered w ere handed over to the

o ff ch

i^ Sr Ule complele c*earance of all mines

Bangladesh Bank representatives in the presence

2

s ? end 1972 and check

tm

of a Bangladesh naval officer after the necessary

supply and receipt vouchers had been signed by

OclobcMndianSWeCpmg operations were resumed in

the B angladesh o ffic ia ls and the O ffic e r in -

maintenance " T neSWCeperS had n0t * * s p i e l e d Charge of the Diving team/Commanding Officer

operations with th^R u

mi~ p i n g

o f the Indian naval ship supporting the diving

revealed that it ,

Russian minesweepers had

operation.

or‘gin mineswr>P dS n0t possible to marry British mineswecpine en'"^ equipment with the Russian

The total recovery was 52.75 tolas o f gold, 70.05

therefore w T h d rel th ? 601- NaVa' Head^ a^ e rs kgs of silver and large quantities o f coins.

November 1972 t h ^ remaining minesweeper in

Navy's m i n < ~

Ůght to a close the Indian

Transfer o f Seaward D efence B o a ts

Russian Navy aKo^ a®®‘®tarice to Bangladesh. The

'eaving only tw0 m

CW most of “ s vessels,

At the request o f the B angladesh Navy. S e a w a r d sweeping till December

Defence Boats AKSHAY and AJAY were

T w l™ * ^

^

t r a n s f e r r e d in

April 73 and July 74 and recom m issioned as B

PADMA and SURMA resp ectively. C o n c u r r e n t y-240/TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH

Bangladesh naval personnel started undergoing

training in India.

5

ADHAR and used for the transportation of stores

and material between the mainland and the A&N

Islands and between the naval ports. In January

Transfer of Captured Pakistani Merchant

1974, ADHAR was chartered to the Mogul Line for

Ships to Bangladesh

four years at Rs 75,000 per month and renamed

as LOK ADHAR. She was used for coastal service.

Of the four Pakistani merchant ships seized in the

On completion of the charter, LOK ADHAR was

1971 war:

disposed of by the Navy.

®

On 17 Apr 72, BAQIR was renamed MV

•

In June 72, the Government of India decided that

ANWAR BAKSH, MADHUMATI and PASNI would

HOOGHLY and manned by the Shipping

be handed over to the SCI who would run these

Corporation of India for transporting troops and

ships and pay the Navy an agreed amount. Later,

stores from Bangladesh to India. Thereafter, she

as a gesture of goodwill,-these ships were handed

transported the Army Garrison to Port Blair.

over to Bangladesh, MADHUMATI and PASNI in

Later in 1972, she was commissioned as INS

April 73 and ANWAR BAKSH in November 74.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/241

15

The Russian Acquisitions 1972 to 1975

Preamble

s p e c ific a tio n on o c c a s io n s w h en Russian specified lubricant was not available.

Indo Russian naval interaction between 1972 and

•

P ro v id in g a d v a n c e d ta c tic a l and technical 1975 centred on a number of key issues:

training for officers.

•

In view of the delay in setting up repair and refit

1972

facilities at Visakhapatnam, how to solve the

growing backlog of biennial refits of submarines

B a s in g o f R u s s ia n A c q u is it io n s in B o m b a y and Petyas which had become due from 1970

As soon as th e w ar en ded in 1971, th e Navy onwards and for six-yearly refits which would

con sidered it essen tial that a certa in num ber of become due from 1973 onwards. Ships and

operational Petyas and submarines should always be

submarines had developed major defects which

available on the West Coast. This would minimise the

needed immediate attention. A stage had been

using up of engine hours in long transits from coast

reached when the new equipment received for the

to coast and make ships and submarines available for

Training Complex was being used to replace

longer periods for operations and training. Some new

defective equipment on board ships.

acquisition ships would also have to be based on the Consequent on the decision, immediately after

West Coast as replacement for the older ships being

the 1971 War, to base some P etyas and

paid off. 1 he Navy th erefore d ecid ed to base in submarines at Bombay and some missile boats at

Bombay the five newer Petyas and the four newer Visakhapatnam. the maintenance and repair

submarines for which the agreement had been signed

acilities at Bombay and Visakhapatnam had to

be augmented.

in 1971. The main repair facilities how ever would In the light of the experience gained of operating

remain concentrated at V isakhapatnam and only

facilities up to annual refit level would require to be ussian ships and su b m arin es in In d ian

set up at Bombay.

conditions and of their performance in. the 1971

War. the acquisition of better ships, submarines

R e q u ire m e n ts F o r w a r d e d to th e R u s s ia n S id e and missile boats with better sensors and longer

range weapons.

A fte r the 1971 w a r , the N avy f o r w a r d e d a The acquisition for the A ir Arm o f m aritim e

comprehensive list of requirements to the R u s s i a n side. This list included Hunter Killer

reconnaissance a irc ra ft and. if p ossib le, o f s u b m a r i n e s ,

vertical-take-off-and land aircraft to replace

anti submarine a ir c r a ft , missile boats, landing ships.

VIKRANT’s aging Seahawks.

e n ™

SSile destr°y ers- a fleet tanker, aircraft for

•

The fitment o f surface to su rface m issiles in

viKKAisn. torpedo recoveiy vessels, m inesweepers, existing ships and coast batteries.

so i

p rop ella n t m issiles, an ti m is s ile d e fe n ce

•

The fea sib ility o f ‘D esign C ollaboration* for system s, harbour defcn ce system s, tra in in g of building future warships in India.

technical personnel in Russia and setting up a Design

•

Finding ways and means to resolve the mounting

Organisation in India.

problem s o f sp a res and R epair Tech n ical

Documentation.

Acquisition of Improved M issile B o a ts

•

Resolving the difficulties being experienced as a

result of the Russian side’s restriction that only

t l a! l eenief Was si£ned for the acquisition of a use of lu brican ts supplied by them or of the

now hn S.quadron of !onger range missile boats. These

brand approved by them was permissible during

conrhtin

WŮ 1 haVC better tropicalisation, extra air

the guarantee period. In effect, this prohibited

also howmng*a

m0Fe P °werflJl engines. They would

use o f other available lubricants of identical

of visnniC vrL! missile 6unfire control systems instead sights as in the earlier boats. An agreement

w a s a ls o s ig n e d fo r the supply o f these svstp ™ r retro fittin g in the earlier boats.

ystems for

imrod would have to be paid for in foreign exchange

which was scarce. The Navy had therefore pressed for R u ssian Technical Delegation to India

t e Russian IL 38. The Russian Navy was unable to

spare any because they did not have sufficient

T h e I n d ia n d e le g a t io n s to M oscow in 1971 had aircraft for their own needs. Production had stopped r e q u e s t e d th e R u ss ia n side to depute a high level and a new model was being developed. The Russian

tea m to In dia to help resolve major pending problems side agreed however to ask their industry if they

These were:

could produce a few IL 38s for India.

•

Ships and submarines were overdue biennial

Six-yearly Refits of Subm arines

refits.

The new workshop facilities at

Due to delays in the Visakhapatnam Dockyard

Visakhapatnam were not expected to be ready for

Project, the earliest that six-yearly submarine refits years. The Visakhapatnam Project needed to be

could be undertaken in India was end 1978. The

reviewed to investigate the feasibility of setting up

existing ‘interim’ facilities were already fully stretched the critical workshops on a priority basis so that

coping with the annual and biennial refits. The Navy biennial refits of ships and submarines could

therefore suggested that the Russian side accept one commence as early as possible.

submarine per year for sLx-yearly refit in Russia, with

•

Indian technical personnel needed to be trained

effect from 1975. for the first three submarines. The fourth submarine could be considered for refit in

in Russia to acquire the expertise to carry out the

Visakhapatnam depending on the progress of setting

six-yearly and ten-yearly overhaul of equipment

up refit facilities.

and m achinery. The services of Russian

specialists would also be required to assist in the

Commissionings in 1973

biennial refits of the first Petya and submarine in

Two submarines VELA and VAGIR and the Petya

India.

ANDAMAN commissioned in 1973.

•

The scope of biennial refits, the necessary

technical documentation and the standard work

1974

lists for ships and submarines, all needed to be

known before the first refits were undertaken in

Russian Technical Delegation to India

India.

The 1972 Russian Technical Delegation had

These problems were discussed with the

concluded that if certain essential facilities could be T ech n ical Delegation which visited Indi

set up in Visakhapatnam on a priority basis, the

biennial refits of Petyas and submarines could

workable solutions were agreed upon.

commence in 1974. Target dates had been agreed for

Com m issionings in 1972

the completion of buildings and the installation of Russian supplied equipment and indigenous

Three Petyas. ARNALA. ANDROTH and ANJADIP

machinery.

commissioned in 1972.

By 1973. it had become clear that the target dates could not be met. A Steering Committee was

1973

therefore set up in the Ministry of Defence to direct and take decisions on the progress of the

A cquisition o f Im proved Landing Ships from Visakhapatnam Project. The revised target dates

Poland

nnoroved by the Steering Committee showed that the

drv dock the alongside refitting berth, workshops,

Pursuant to Russian■

advic®

an

cprvices test facilities, manpower and know-how

acquired d irectly

Poian d fo r the supply of

were not’likely to be ready before 1977.

agreement was signed with

The six-yearly refit oi the first submarine was due

four improved landing ships.

nd 1973 beyond which it would have to be laid up

^un safe for operations. The Navy had suggested

M a r i t i m e R e c o n n a i s s a n c e Aircr types

fh at least three submarines would need to do their By 1973. th e I n d ia n Navy b ^ ^ fh e V it is h N im rod six-yearly refits in Russia, one per year commencing of a i r c r a f t t h e F r e n c h A an

• g eriev \2 did no

1974.

and t h e R u s s i a n B e r ie v

•

A t la n t ic a n d the

m e e t t h e N a v y ’s r e q u i r e m e n .

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/243

IL 38 M RASW Aircraft

W h e n this h a d b e en su gg este d to the R u s s ia n side they felt that it w a s better to expedite the w ork In 1974, the Russian side intimated that it would be

in Visakhapatnam . The R ussian side therefore sen t a possible to give three IL 38 MRASW aircraft.

Technical Delegation to India to find w ays and m ean s Six-yearly Refit of Subm arine in R u ssia

to do the refits in India.

From the ou tset of the d is c u s s io n s , it b e c a m e In end 1974, an agreem ent w as signed for the first c le a r th a t th e T e c h n ic a l D e le g a t io n w a s in th e submarine KALVARI to be refitted in Russia.

awkward position of:

C o m m issio n in g s in 1 9 74

•

Not wanting to do the six-yearly refits in Russia.

Tw o subm arines V A G IR and V A G S H E E R and the

•

Knowing that in the V isa k h a p a tn a m D o c k y a rd , Petya AM INI w ere com m ission ed in 1974. In the neither bu ild in gs n o r equ ip m en t w e re re a d y to sam e year,

th e

In te g r a te d T y p e T ra in in g

undertake these refits in India.

Establishment in Visakhapatnam was commissioned

•

Nevertheless, trying to find ways and means to do

as SATAVAHANA and the M issile B oa t Technical

the refits in India to avoid their going to Russia.

Position in Bombay was commissioned as TUNIR.

After discussion, the gen eral p ictu re th at

emerged was that the Russian side might reluctantly

1975

accept only the first submarine for refit in 1975 but

that the refits of the remaining submarines should be

Inter G overnm ental A gre e m e n t fo r the New

done in India.

A cqu isition s

Meanwhile, in view of the steep increase in the

In February 1975, an Inter Governmental Agreement

estimated cost of the Visakhapatnam Project, the

w as signed for the N a v y ’s la r g e s t a c q u is itio n of Steering Committee decided that the remaining work

R ussian ships and a irc ra ft and th e ir supporting should be planned in phases. In the im m ediate

phase, only those core items were to be provided

infrastructure. The agreement was for:

which were essential for undertaking the major refits

•

3 multi-role guided missile frigates frigates with

of submarines and Petyas.

KAMOV anti submarine helicopters.

•

3 ocean g o in g ro c k e t b o a ts w ith s u rfa c e to Acquisition of Newer Larger Ships

surface and surface to air missiles.

•

6 coastal minesweepers.

Since 1972, discussions had been in progress about

•

3 IL 38 MRASW aircraft.

the acquisition of larger newer ships. As regards

•

Ammunition and support equipm ent for all the

frigates, the Navy preferred that they be fitted with

surface to surface missiles, surface to air missiles,

above acquisitions.

•

Technical Positions for each of the new missiles

medium and short range gunfire systems, long range

sonars, long range anti subm arine rockets and

and torpedoes.

torpedoes and an anti submarine helicopter. At that

Spares for the submarines.

point in time, the Russian Navy’s frigates were being

equipped either for the anti submarine role or the anti Professional D elegation to R u ssia

ship role because combining the two roles in one ship

To minimise the kind of difficulties which had been

resulted in an unacceptable increase in ship size.

experienced with the earlier Russian acquisitions, the

The Indian Navy’s reasoning however was that since

Navy had p rep ared a d e t a i l e d q u e s t i o n n a i r e it could afford only a limited number of frigates, it regarding the new acquisitions and forwarded it to

was preferable to have multi role frigates. In 1973, the Russian side.

the first APEX C om m ittee approved the N avy’ s The Russian side’s answers to this questionnaire

proposals for acquiring multi role frigates, ocean

provided the basis for further detailed discussions. A going rocket boats, m inesw eepers and anti

submarine aircraft. By then, the Russian side had

Professional Delegation went to Russia in mid 19 75.

veered round to the view that a multi role frigate

Its aim was to obtain detailed information:

might be possible. During 1974, discussions were

•

On the characteristics, perform ance data and

held to finalise the weapons and systems to be fitted

exploitation of machinery and equipment of the

In the new acquisitions.

ships and aircraft being acquired.

244/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

For the timely establishment of support facilities

Commissionings in 1975

for th eir refits, maintenance, logistics and

T h ree Landing S h ip s G H O RPAD , KESAR1 an d

training.

SHARDUL were commissioned in 1975. Th e fourth

»

On the fea s ib ility of fitting indigenous

and last of this class, SHARABH, was commissioned

communication equipment in the frigates.

in January 1976.

•

On the technical documentation and spares and

the time frame for their supply.

Developments After 1975

•

On the content and duration of training courses,

a v a ila b ility o f training equipment

and

Surface Vessels:

Eight new improved missile boats

simulators.

arrived in 1976.

•

On whether the Russian weapons and systems

T h e three 800 ton rock et boats

being acquired could be retrofitted in our older

arrived between 1976 and 1978.

Th e six co a sta l m in e s w e e p e rs

ships or into the frigates being constructed in

arrived between 1977 and 1980.

India.

The three guided missile frigates

The delegation’s discussions proved extremely

arrived between 1980 and 1983.

useful in the subsequent management of the new

A ircraft:

The three IL 38 MRASW arrived in

1977.

acquisitions.

The Kamov 25 helicopters am ved

M issile C o a st B a tte ry at Bombay

with their respective frigates.

During 1974, a missile launcher and a fire control

Infrastructure:

T h e

new

N a va l

D o c k y a r d

co n tin u e d to e x p a n d t ill tn e

system had been removed from a non.operaicna^

1980s.

m issile boat and fitted on a rotatmg platform

cannibalised from an obsde e^gu

then

—

i s

. . ™

’

“

successfully test fired in

ncher

Th e T e ch n ica l P o s itio n fo r th e

commenced of a second similar launche .

m is s ile

b o a ts

b a s e d

in

r l t m e n , o f

. o

M is ,.. . a s t e r n i »

Visakhap atnam

w a s

commissioned as KALINGA in

TALWAR

.

TALWAR

1985-

, ^ *

The repair facility for missile boat

In 1975. work

>"'J » flre

Bombay •

engines was completed in 1980.

■—

-

■ ~

operational missile boat

Retrospect of the Russiao Acquisition Programme

(nm pnt w ere o f a lm o s t th e sa m e

and oth er e q u i p m e r L

^ ^

N a y y

t e c h n o l o g i c a l vin

g ^

the Navy up t0 date w i t h

C o u ld th e A c q u is it io n s Have Been

^

^

^

B ritish naval feedb

P ^ ^

flelds o f operati 0ns.

In th e lig h t ° f h in d sigt“ ontoperroegrain m e b e tw e e n 1965

the problems e

lo g is tics. S p a res w e re r e a d ily

th e R u s s ia n a c q u is iti

P

nag ed better,

r aS

e o f f l e Shelf, Often through direct sourcing a n d 1 9 7 5 c o u ld h a v e b

^

Material Bran ^

w e r e s tr o n g p re s s u re s

u is itio ns becau

from the Bl^ sh^ ? Y need after 1966. Th e vessels o f s lo w d o w n th e p a c e

.^ icers and lac

jh e re

This Pictur® Chc* rf d fr om R u ssia w ere den sely various types p

^ w h ose m a in te n a n ce w a s

s h o r ta g e o f .

packed w ith ^ P

ge The Russian operating -

fa cilities co u ld not Keep

causes.

mblence of

g o v » « « W

£ * ” “ ; S e d Ur«s w ere O e.lgned to

maintenance log

F

combat. Th is required

th e ea riy lg S O s

“ ntjl l 9 66,

d riven

,e,st iS ? S ” S '-

*” ' " f 5,v:

w e r e su d d en ly i J

t )s h o rig in -^

v ir tu a lly

Th' rep“ " “ n<1

w e r e e n t i r e l y o

i l i a r j e s p erm

sensors

T R A N S IT IO N T O T R IU M P H / 2 4 5

m achinery .n d « « > ' “ cbl„ eW.

u n lim ited usage. Th e

designed to do".* The Indian Navy’s dilemma was that refit cycles were more closely spaced. All this required it just could not countenance not giving every officer

timely logistic support.

and sailor sea time. It was a mandatory prerequisite

After the vessels arrived in India, it was found

for their next promotion. The annual compulsion of

that the procurement of spares from Russia required

taking new crews to sea and the inability to accept strict conform ance with an in flexib le, tim e-that Russian equipment would break down as soon

consuming process which the Navy was neither used

as its design limits were exceeded led directly to “over to nor could it comply with, because of the paucity of

spare part reference num bers, d iffic u ltie s in exploitation”. Subsequently, rather ironically, the preparing indents in the Russian language etc.

Navy had to accept that time spent in ships which

The subm arines, when inducted, requ ired

barely went to sea would have to be treated as sea stricter technical monitoring and stronger logistic

time.

support. They had their own unique maintenance

and logistic requirements. Soon thereafter, the thin

The Technical C om pulsions

skinned, high speed missile boats arrived. They too

From the very outset, it was known that:

had a novel support philosophy involving special to

type base support and training complexes for the

•

The new Dockyard at Visakhapatnam would take

boats and their missiles.

several years to come up.

In a very short space of time, all the existing

•

The rudimentary Base Repair O rganisation at

maintenance and logistic facilities came under

Visakh apatn am w as not, and c o u ld not be,

pressure. The number o f items handled by the

equipped to cope w ith th e day to day

Logistics Organisation doubled and the rupee value

maintenance, annual refit, biennial refit and six

of material used in the Naval Dockyard Bombay

yearly refit workload o f four subm arines, five

trebled. Cum ulatively, the induction o f large

Petyas, two landing ships etc.

numbers of new types of ships and weapons and the

new procedures requiring intensive usage-hour-

The only sa lva tio n w as to c o n c e n tra te the based maintenance and instant logistics strained the

experience of the officers and men trained in Russia, prevailing system to its limits.

utilise the workshop facilities in the submarine depot

These stresses and strains were compounded by

ship and avail o f the e x p e rtis e o f th e R ussian the inability of the Navy to perceive that the only way guarantee specialists which cam e w ith each new it could overcome the constraints of austere usage for

acquisition. In the event, for diverse reasons, none of which the equipment had been designed, was by

these resources were effectively dovetailed. To save

indenting substantially more spares than what even

on training costs, the experienced personnel o f the the Russian side had recommended. As a result, the

first few vess e ls w ere sen t b a c k to R u ssia to interaction between operational and technical

commission the subsequent vessels, m uch to the

compulsions, which should have been positive,

detriment of vessels so deprived.

became negative.

The su bm arine dep ot ship w a s d e p lo y e d to support the subm arines operating from Bombay-The Operational Compulsions

Since Bombay did not have the appropriate shore

supply, the depot ship’s generators soon ran out of

As mentioned earlier, a major compulsion was the

operating hours. Efforts focussed on getting the depot

need to give sea time to every officer and sailor by

rotating ships’ crews every year.

ship itself back into shape, so that it could be used to help maintain the Petyas and submarines. And as

From the very outset the Navy, which was used

regards u tilis in g the s e rv ic e s o f th e R u s s i a n to unrestricted usage of steam propelled ships,

guarantee specialists, the difficulties of interacting in blithely ignored the repercussions of not adhering to

the R u s s ia n language and the fierce pride in “not the limitations laid down regarding the operating

b ein g tech n ica lly d ep en d en t on the

hours of critical machinery like diesel engines and

R u s s i a n s

diesel generators. There is substance in the Russian

constrained meaningful interaction.

view, which was stated to every Indian delegation

which complained about the non availability of

Retrospect

critical operational spares, that the shortage derived

Despite all these vexatious problems, the transition

more from what, by Russian norms, was “excessive

from British to Russian acquisitions did manage to

usage" and “beyond what the equipm ent was

succeed, slowly and tortuously to begin with and 246/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

something better.M

painful years that the solid Z ^ L n s Z e l * ? £

future interaction. After the initial resentment at the IndoAI W , amiaI S!lare °f the credR for the success of Comm,-it

r1

cooPeration must go to the State

tem erity o f Indian crews to decline the weeWy

m

i

,for Fore>gn Economic Relations and its

political lectures and the persistent questions of

much m aligned d epartm en ts - the G en era l

Indian officers and artificers seeking to know more

Engineering Department (GED) and the G eneral

and m ore about their equipment, the Russian

Technical D epartm ent (GTD). T h e ir en o rm o u s Training Centres realised that they were dealing with

patience and tolerance was able to bridge the Indian p erson s who were not only intelligent and

side s inability to understand the in e rtia o f the professional but also diligent and innovative.

centrally planned, totally Government owned and

controlled. Russian industrial system.

This professional respect began to over-arch the

An equally great, if not greater, share o f credit

complex mindsets and inhibitions of each side, firstly

must go to the Indian M in istries o f D efencc and at the Training Centre level and then at the Soviet Finance (Defencc). Their agility in negotiations and

Fleet level, when the Russians saw how confidently

the painstaking discussions with their counterparts

and competently the crews they had trained sailed

in the State C om m ittee for F oreign E c o n o m ic th eir vess e ls back to India, which none of the Relations belies the widespread naval belief that the previous Navies trained by them had done. On the

Navy was treated lik e a ste p c h ild . T h e N a vy 's Indian side, as soon as the crews commissioned their

incredible technological leap frog in ju st ten years ships and submarines, they realised how invaluable

after 1965 would not have been possible without the

the thoroughness of their Russian training had been.

whole-hearted support of these two institutions.

As mutual respect increased at the local fleet

But the largest share of credit for laying a sound

level, it percolated upwards to Moscow and got

foundation for Indo - Russian naval cooperation

reflected in the greater candour, width and depth of belongs to Admiral Gorshkov. He intervened adroitly interaction with naval delegations to Moscow.

at every impasse. His calibrated release o f larger, A remarkable achievement of these high level

better and more modern ships, su b m a rin es and interactions in Moscow was that each successive

a ircra ft w ere not only in step w ith th e la rg e r objectives of Indo - Russian political, economic and acquisition was an improvement on its predecessor -

defence cooperation but also in step with his growing

the second lot of VELA class submarines were better

confidence that the Indian Navy would confidently

than the KALVARI class; the second lot of Petyas were

cope with whatever Russia gave. His confidence, and

better than the KAMORTA class; the second lot of

indeed that o f the entire Russian establish m en t, extended range missile boats were better than

e

soared after the spectacular success o f the missile earlier lot and the second lot of GHORPAD class

boat attacks on Karachi harbour during the 1971

were better than the earlier GHARIAL class.

war. These attacks not only brou ght glory to the Much of the credit for this achievernen j™

efficacy of Russian weapons when properly exploited;

to the tenacity and dexterity with w ic su

d

they also validated Russian confidcnce in Indian

CNS’, VCNS’ and COMs pursued the brief p 1

professional competencc.

for them by the eager C°™ m™ C™ re kee'ping It was this confidence and mutual rcspect which

p r o f e s s io n a l d ire c to ra te s . The la Western

flowered in the years that followed to produce the Heprant

abreast of the latest

g u i d e d missile corvettes o f the KHUKRI class

n a v ie s v ia the L e a n d e r an d Corvet

j

^ ^

and sleek destroyers like DELHI and MYSORE.

In retrospect, desp ite all the p r o c e d u r a l of the latest developments in the “ f ^ own as Jane's

limitations of each side, the absorption of the Russian in t e r n a t io n a l n a v a l c o m p e n d iu

^ were

ornnisitions was as monumental an achievement as

Fighting Ships. The ^ f ^ ^ n a i i y remark in jest

the Leander Programme and the 1971 war.

good humoured enough to occ

^est and give

that “India should accluire^

J a would give India

it to us and very soon Russ

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/247

16

The Submarine Arm

Developments Until 1965

However, the Navy k ep t a c lo s e w a tch on the The Navy's

design and developm ent of po st w a r su b m arin es very first plan form ulated after

France had developed the D aphne class. Holland had Independence in 1947 proposed to the Government

the

d ev elo p ed the D o lp h in c la s s . B r it a in h a d first acquisition of four submarines. The plan did not developed the Porpoise cla ss w h ich had evolved into specify in which year of the plan the subm arines the Oberon class. The B ritish Navy had increased the should be acquired. This was because of uncertainty submerged endurance of some of its earlier World War in the source of supply and the d iffic u ltie s II subm arines by cutting the h u ll in two and inserting anticipated in starting to operate submarines.

a m id s h ip s s e c t io n to p r o v id e a n a d d itio n a l In 1948, due to budgetary constraints, the Navy propulsion battery compartment. The A m erican Navy was asked to recast its requirements. The Navy’s 10

year plan 1948 - 1958 gave lesser p riority to the had im pro ved th e ir c o n v e n tio n a l s u b m a rin e s by Submarine Arm because it could not be created by giving them “Greater Underw ater P ro pu lsio n Power”, 1958. In 1951, since large scale naval expansion which came to be known as the GUPPY conversion.

could not be afforded, the Navy proposed a sh ip The Navy also kept a watch on the development of

replacement programme instead of a ship acquisition the Subm arine A rm s by the Com m onw ealth Navies.

programme. Submarines found no mention in this Both the Canadian and A u stra lia n Navies had taken plan.

British manned A and T class su b m arin es on loan in By 1956, Pakistan had joined CENTO and SEATO

^hifih their personnel received on jo b training under and was going to be given extensive naval assistance B ritish su b m a rin e rs. Both C a n a d a a n d A ustralia by America and Britain. The Navy had to propose the were aw aiting the fin a lis in g of the O b e ro n design acquisition of ships to match Pakistan's a i q u S o M

before purchasing them.

No menbon was made of submarines.

By 1956, the feed b a c k fro m th e a n n u a l n m a l ng a11 these y e a rs * there had been no C om m o n w ealth J E T e x e rc is e s in d ic a te d that the progress on the acquisition of subm arines There arrangem ents for p articip atin g N avies to sh a re anti were several weighty reasons:

Dm annes- There

s u b m a rin e e x e rc is e tim e w i t h a v a ila b le British submarines were becom ing inadequate for o u r ships.

Until 1956, the Navy itself was fully stretched D efence M in iste r K rish n a M enon w rote to the First Wrs.mie'wise a„d budgetw.se. in rem edyingfte

Sea Lord, A d m ira l M o u n tb a tten in M ay 1 9 5 7 for after-effects of the partition of the Royal Indian acquiring a target subm arine service com prising the Navy, ships and aircraft were being acquired

o est and cheapest su b m a rin e s, s in c e it w as not setup^shom^ ^ l0giStiC faCilities were being

at India w ould need to em ploy them in

r n r r ^ ° t a U S e . ° f

th e B r it is h N a v y ’ s e x t e n d e d

A

’ r e d u c e d s t r e n g t h

p r o c e d u r a l

o a n o f a T m l0aning British naval Personnel etc, the e o n v ic tta ,e "u ,.r,‘ T f d,nSly dirr,cult ‘ ° c a n y N a w then

g Submar>ne did not find favour. The

Submarine r m " "

° r 'n BHtaln' that th=

the British N avy’s suggestion for

the context o f a

Pn ° n t y requirem ent. In

S

K

W ith in c r e a s e d a n ti s u b m a r i n e

member of the British" ~ 10lent’ Pe a c e -lo v in g over-riding nrim-it?

C °m m onw ealth w hose

Indian waters-

r e p la c e m e n t ?

nCW British frigates o f the naval

nobody was preDareH? eC° nomic development,

secon d hand Rn f tarted a rriv in g in In d ia and t needed a patently o ffe n siv lT u b m ^ n j11^

Purchased VheN a1*

^

To >

Submarine Arm

Y r e ’ s t a r t ed its c a s e fo r

In his book "Indian Navy’s Submarine Arm,"

Admiral Chatterji slates:*

We were trained along with British officers. After

classroom training, we were attached to various

"A paper was subm itted to the Government in British submarines for six months. During afloat

1959 for the acqu isition o f three operational

training, we had to q u a lify p ra c tic a lly as s u b m a r in e s w h ich w ou ld also natu rally be watchkeeping officers in a submarine. I started

a v a ila b le as ta rg e t su b m arin es for the anti in HMS Porpoise and then w ent to oth er

su bm arine ships. Protracted discussions took

submarines of the Porpoise class. Overall, the

place with the Government at various levels over

period of training was just under a year”.

years without much progress.

"The British were adamant in their views that

Captain MN Samant (then Lt Cdr) and later

Commanding Officer of the Navy's third submarine

subm arines were sophisticated weapon systems

KARANJ, recalls:

which were difficult to operate, that the Indian

N avy w a s s till too you n g to venture into the

"There was no holding back on anything, except

subm arine field, that submarines were accident

for classified m atters such as th eir la te s t

prone, that the loss of a submarine at sea would

submarine sonars.

lead to the loss o f confidence in the Navy at

“T rain in gw ise, it was very m uch m ore

G overnm ental and national level which would

instructive from the practical point of view, than

gravely impair the Navy’s further development.

later in Russia. In Russia they placed tremendous

"Examples were quoted of the Australian and

emphasis on the theoretical aspect, including the

Canadian Navies which operated submarines on

mathematical basis, but our actual sea time in

loan from the British Navy, manned by British

Russian subm arines was very very low as

personnel with a few junior officers and sailors as

compared to the British Navy. The British Navy

trainees.

did not emphasise so much on the mathematical

"H a v in g ju s t attain ed independance, the or theoretical aspects, but they made up for it by

thought of adding any warship to the Indian Navy

giving you 6 m onths o f actu al seatim e iii

commanded by a British officer and manned by

subm arines. In addition , d u rin g our sh ore

B ritis h s a ilo r s w as rep u gn an t to Indian training, we went to sea in submarines almost

sentiments.”

40% of the time”.

T h e N a v y re fin e d its lin e o f argum ent. It Adm iral VS Shekhaw at (then Lt) and la ter

impressed on the Government that_every Navy worth

Commanding Officer of submarine KARANJ in the

its nam e had to have submarines. It took several 1971 War, recalls:

y e a rs to tra in an o ffic e r in the operation o f a su b m arin e and give him su fficien t experience to

"Training started with an intensive three and a

en s u re th a t he w o u ld be com peten t to assume half month theoretical course in which all the

command o f a submarine. The Navy urged that the

technical aspects o f submarine construction,

G overnm ent accept the creation o f the Submarine

engineering and electrical systems, diving and

Arm in principle and allow the Navy to depute a few su rfacin g system s,

su b m arin e

con trol,

officers to Britain for training in submarines.

ventilation, salt water, fuel, fresh water, distilled E arly in 1962, the Governm ent agreed to the

water and other systems were covered. Practical

deputation o f personnel to Britain. The training oi instructions consisted of visits to old submarines

ju n io r o ffic e rs w as accepted on the premise t a secured alongside the je tty .

T h e re w ere

in tim ate k n ow led ge o f subm arines would help to instructional visits to the works of the suppliers

increase the efficiency o f our anti submarine ships.

o f subm arine b a tteries and to h y p erb a ric

Since su bm arin es were still viewed as o en

research laboratories to understand the effects of

v e s s e ls , the G o vern m en t m ade it clear that tne sea water pressure and underwater explosions on

approval to depute officers for submarine training 1

the human body.

n ot in an y w a y c o m m it the G overnm en

o

“The training imparted was o f a tiigh order,

acquisition o f submarines.

compressed into a very short tim e fram e and

entailing long hours of study and practical work.

Submarine Training With the British Navy

Perhaps it did not go into as much detail as was

Commodore KS Subra Manian (then Lt Cdr) and later

to be our subsequent experience w ith S oviet

Com m anding O fficer o f the Navy’s first submarine KALVARI, recalls:________

*

Page 36.

TRANSITION TO TR IUM PH /249

gave us tne opportunity to lea rn as m uch as we

training, but it was adequate for the trainees to

form crews of British submarines and learn on

could.

‘'Even in their system o f a s s e s s in g officers, the job.

U0ur officers deputed to British submarines

they were very free and frank. W h en w e sailed in

form ed p a rt o f th eir crew s for all p ra ctica l HMS Astute, the Captain SM cam e on board and

purposes, kept watch independently, and gained

told our Commanding Officer, w h o w a s aspiring

invaluable experience and self confidence which

to become a Commander, “In the next exercise, if

was to stand them in good stead indeed when

you catch the other submarine, you w ill become a

th ey la te r

com m issioned

the R ussian

Commander. Otherwise you w ill n ot”. For nearly

submarines.

72 hours, we sat on watch on the sonar, trying to

“The attachments of our personnel was to all

locate the other submarine but unfortunately we

the classes of submarine then operating in the

were caught by that submarine. T h e Captain SM

Royal.Navy. Thus in a short period of time, Indian

very n icely cam e to th e W a r d r o o m a n d said submarine personnel were exposed to several

“Sorry, Tim, you have to retire as a Lt Cdr” . That

different types of submarines, with concepts of

was the end o f th e s to ry . T h e r e w a s no machinery design spanning more than twenty

heartburn”.

five years. This further helped in widening their

perspective and experience.

Utilisation o f British Trained Personnel Pending

“Indian officers and sailors, were always

the Acquisition o f Submarines fr o m R ussia

welcome as their presence relieved the strain of

To ensure that the batches returning from Britain dia

constant watch keeping at sea and in harbour.

not forget what they had learnt, arrangem ents were

With our close familiarity with the Royal Navy at

made for officers to be attached to British submarines

that tim e and the British origin of our surface

dunng the JET exercise of 1964.

ships,

equ ipm ent,

docum entation

and

administrative set up, it was easy for our people

Approval to Com m ence N e g o t i a t i o n s f o r

to assimilate and absorb the training imparted

Acquiring Submarines

and in gen eral they were treated as equals,

After the military revere

th ou gh w ith som e restrictio n s on security

J

crses l

China in October' 1969 T " ^ th-f r 'Drder WaF ^

matters.

initiated to remedy

"?aj0r defence review waS

“Indian personnel were particularly welcome

Nam

w th

th f

e _____ _ y T ^

“ ad

4CAe

“ q

c u

4 a

u c

a i

c e

i s

e . T h

m is gave th

m e

because of their' quick learning and special skills

* c 7 u . i « r „ T s™

, 2 1

r“ " b“ * « • case for the

which enabled them to rectify difficult machinery

argum ents used e a r l i e r '" ? ’ In a d d ,t l o n to , h '

defects and render the submarine operational.

China possessed

*

Was em p h a s is e d th a t

Brought up as they were in the older Indian ships

sufficient i ^ e to 0S

T

ineS‘ SOme o f w h ich had

with inadequate base support, shortage of spares

Navy therefore n e e d e d ^ * * * * * of B^ g a l . The and tools, the Indian sailor had developed fine

only for the earlier reaso a?^uire subm arines, not

skills in the art of improvisation and in making-

in the H un tet-K ille ^ i ^ a^S0 ^0r employment do, allied with native ingenuity. No wonder they

submarines.

r role a g a in st C h in ese

w ere p o p u la r on board w ith the m asses of The new proposal

complejx machinery in the highly confined spaces

asked for three submarinel U£ J n N ovem b er 1 9 6 2

of the submarines."

was that to keep one subm J u s t ific a t io n given Rear Admiral JMS Sodhi (then Lt) recalls:

pa ro in an area about 1 5 0 0 ^

COntlnuou sly on

as the Malacca straits, t w

f ? fr° m Indi* ' such

“Submarine training in Britain was to the point.

required: one would be u n r if Submarines would be

resungthe crew ^ ^ und r g *

would be

Even the escape training was only o f three days

duration. We used to do six weeks o f sailing,

follow ed by two weeks o f rest and recreation.

V oT

a h

t h e t h lr d a c t u a U y n S it t0 a n d f r o m t h e V i c e A d m i r a l Bs S r ,™

y on P a t r o l

During sea training, in view of the shortage of RN

N a v a l S t a f f i n 19fi? « ,

a n W a s t h V o v . , r

o ffic e r s on b oard , w e w ere given m axim um Q u a r t e r d e c k 1 9 9 7 hpW r l t l n g *n t h e M VC J“ e f 0 f t h e a 9 7 ' h e r e c a l le d :

a v a l m a g a z i n e

opportunity to do everything we could. In fact, we

“A s e r i o u s b o n e 0 f „

got our independent watch keeping at sea very

very quickly and to that extent we learnt a lot.

Government w a s the a c q ui°s?t! e n t lo n w ith the w a s c o n v i n c e d t h a t

T h e British Navy officers, being disinterested,

e crucial for a

25 0 /TR AN SITIO N T O T R IUM PH

balanced force, but Prim e Minister Nehru and

However, British shipbuilders were willing and eager

Admiral Mountbatten thought otherwise.

to build an Oberon class submarine for India. The

“A fte r a lo t o f discussion, I was allowed to

Navy was agreeable to buy one new Oberon but

raise the m atter with the Admiralty when I went

sought deferred credit terms to cover the cost of the

to Britain in 1963. As expected, they turned it

submarine, which at 1963 prices was working out to

down - it was clear that the British would only sell

about Rs five crores - three crores for the submarine

us

v e s s e ls

w h ic h

con fo rm ed

to

their

and two crores for the infrastructure. The British

Commonwealth Indian Ocean Defence Plan. This

were unwilling to extend soft credit and India could

w a s n o t a c c e p ta b le to the Navy and I not spare the foreign exchange.

recommended that we look elsewhere, suggesting

By early 1964, the 1964-1969 Defence Plan had

that Russia m ight be a likely substitute.

taken shape and the requirements therein had been

“We found the Russians not only ready to sell,

indicated to Am erica, B ritain and R u ssia in

but to accept part o f the payment in rupees. Thus

preparation for the visit to these cou n tries of it came about that the Russians got our custom

delegations led by the Defence Minister. Commodore

and rem ained our m ajor and reliable suppliers

(later Admiral) SM Nanda was the Deputy Chief of the

Naval Staff at that time and represented the Navy in

over the years.”

all three delegations.

D u rin g 1963 and 1964, in the expectation of

assistan ce fro m B rita in and Am erica, there was D

i s c u

s s i o n

s i n

A

m

e

r i c a

- M a y 1 9 6 4

c o n s id e ra b le

d is c u s s io n to c ry s ta llis e the

Admiral Nanda recalls:

requirements for w hat eventually became the 1964-

“During these discussions, Mr Me Nam ara

1969 Defence Plan. As regards submarines, the Navy

reiterated that in the context of our problem with

had four options before it:

China, the Army and Air Force will have priority.

•

T h e o ld e r B r itis h s u b m a rin es w hich the He said “Your threat is from China. All your ships

up to now have been from Britain. So you will

Adm iralty had earlier offered. They were already

have to go to Britain. As far as the US is

20 years old. Their remaining life was too short to

concerned, the Navy has no priority." We came

make purchase worthwhile.

•

Older A m erica n F leet class submarines w ic

back empty handed."

a fte r m o d e r n is a t io n w o u ld have five years Mr PVR Rao was the Defence Secretary from after

o p e r a tio n a l life . P o litic a lly , however, 1 was the Chinese war in 1962 till after the Pakistan war of unlikely that Am erica would give submarines

1965 and accompanied the Defence M in ister s

India.

,

delegation to America. He recalls.

•

New British subm arines o f the Porpoise/

er

"At the Ministry level, we did not broach naval

supplies with the US at all. We knew it would be

•

N e w 'R u s s ia n F c la s s su b m arin es whose f i X e because the US could not supply any naval

specifications were similar to those of the

^

ships without Congressional approval. We were

Porpoise class and the American Fleet c ass.

extremely doubtful whether that approval wou d

^ fo r t h c o m in g . The US was com m itted to

I n v i e w o f t h e N a v y ’s l a c k o f f a m l l i a n X J t h e Pakistan and under the law o f the time, only R u s s i a n n a v a l h a r d w a r e , t h e N a v y r e c o m m e n Congress could approve the transfer o f naval

a c q u i s i t i o n o f t h r e e P o r p o i s e c l a s s s u b m a r i n ic In fact even the tran sfer o f the

B r i t a i n .

G o v e r n m e n t

a c c e p t e d

t h e

N avys

submarine GHAZI on loan to Pakistan was illegal

r e c ° m m e n d a t i o n s i n p r i n c i p l e . N e g o t i a 10

h e

s t a r t e d w i t h t h e B r i t i s h G o v e r n m e n Un% e alsThad a very low priority for the Navy

a c q u i s i t i o n o f o n e s e c o n d h a n d P o r p o .s e c l a s s

•

i qfi5 After the 1962 battle, the first problem

submarine to start with.

m

riefence planning was with regard to

facing Indian

and china-s Navy had a low

^ Scussions with Britain in 1963

Pakistan and

The A

primarily,

dtfft963, the B rlt is h w ere experie^ Cin5nnCm their Acuities and were considering

to

J ^ a l f o r C e S . T h e B r i t i s h N a v y w a s n o t w

^ ^

J ^ ^ o n e o f t h e i r o w n P o r p o i s e class sub_________

The Air Force had already turned to Russia in 1962 for the man TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/251

memoirs “Debacle to Revival”, he states:*

A m e ric a n re c o r d s a re n o t y e t a v a ila b le w h ic h

“Lai Bahadur Shastri felt that before m aking any

could throw ligh t on precisely ^

o f

India’s request for submarines. The reasoninS

commitment to the Soviets, the D efence Minister

“traditional supplier" appears odd becausetin that should visit Britain to find out the attitude of the

very same year 1964. Pakistan was given the

British Governm ent. A p p a ren tly, th e situation submarine GHAZI on loan for a penod of three years

had becom e favou rable w ith th e a d v e n t o f the to start with. It is more likely that Congress would

Labour P a rty in 1964 u n d e r P r im e M in ister not have agreed to loan submarines to India because

Harold Wilson”.

India was not a CENTO/SEATO ally of America,

whereas Pakistan was. The American Administration

Discussions in Britain

Novem ber 1964

may also have reconciled themselves to the Indian

Admiral Nanda recalls:

Navy turning to Russia as the Indian Air Force had

done, in case the West was unable to meet its needs.

“In the UK, the L ab o u r G o ve rn m e n t h ad ju st On the eve of the Defence Minister’s delegation to

taken over and M ountbatten w as the C h ie f of Russia in September 1964, the position was:

Defence Staff. A lot of d is c u s s io n took place.

E v e n tu a lly the F ir s t Sea L o rd , S ir M ich ael

•

The British were not willing to spare a Porpoise

P ollock, asked me over fo r a s e s s io n at the class submarine. The shipbuilders were keen to

Admiralty. He felt that the Lab o u r Government build on Oberon but the British Government

may be more sympathetic to India and he might could not extend a soft credit o f five m illion

be forced to give u s the Oberon cla ss submarine pounds for its construction.

and the Daring class destroyers we were asking

•

India was unable to spare this huge amount in

for. So he said “The Royal Navy is being run foreign exchange for purchasing a submarine.

down. I cannot give you D aring class destroyers.

Under the circumstances, the delegation’s task

Please do not p re ss for them . A / T ’ cla ss was to explore the a va ilab ility o f the N avy’ s submarine is being returned to UK from Australia requirements from Russia and the fin a n cia l

to be scrapped. Please accept this subm arine”.

implications of doing so.

“I had to say “Sorry, Sir, I cannot re c o m m e n d this to my Defence Minister. You h ave got the

Discussions in Russia - September 1964

in fra s tru c tu re for th e m a in te n a n c e o f y ůr In Russia, the response to the Navy’s requirements

subm arin es. I f you fe e l th a t th is ‘T ’ class was positive. The Russians offered four of their new F

submarine cannot be maintained by you, how do

class submarines, a submarine depot ship and other

you expect us to maintain this T class submarine

vessels.

in India?

Then he said “Look the w hole thing *s

Admiral Nanda recalls:

that you have no e x p e r ie n c e o f ru n n in g Russia was keen to meet our requirements for

submarines and if you want to learn driving, yoU

ships and submarines. In Leningrad, we were

don’t go and buy a new car. You learn driving on

taken to sea in a submarine and were quite

an old car". So I said "Sir, I accept that also, that impressed with what we saw. But Delhi had sent

when you want to learn driving, you learn driving

instructions not to sign for any naval equipment

on an old car. But you don’t go and buy an old car

fr6m Russia.

to learn driving. We have, as you know, been

“When we came back, 1 got to know what had

o ered four brand new submarines from Russia-

happened. It appeared that the instructions had

How do you expect my Defence Minister to stand

come from the Government, who had been

up in Parliament and say that w e have refused

influenced by the British and the American

our brand new submarines from R ussia, but we

Governments, that the Navy should not go in for

are going to take from Britain a submarine which

Russian acquisitions. And so in 1964 we did not

goin& t0 be scrapped? What I am prepared to

o £ e d to us •Sian SUbmarineS that

^ i n g

commend to my Minister is that we sign for an

It wiuntG aSS submarine and that you agree to it-

ESSb'SZ S S frZTu

D u r in a t w y Ů tW0 to three yea rs to bu ild it-Cia„_

,

Period you can loan us the old T

and r ^

*lrine 0n which we will train our crew

________ rn

e submarine back to you as soon as

252/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

you give us the Oberon class submarine". But even to that he would not agree.

predominant Communist Party o f Indonesia had

close links with Communist China and the Soviet

“As the First Sea Lord, he felt that his job was

Union. Between 1958 and 1965, the Soviet Union

to see that the British Navy did not lose any ships

gave Indonesia a substantial naval fleet. Indonesia

and s u b m a rin e s . H is jo b was to see that it wanted to rename the Indian Ocean as the

remained strong. He did not want his Navy to be

Indonesian Ocean and intrusions were observed in

cut down by handing over ships and submarines

the Nicobar Islands, the nearest of which was only 90

to India w h ich he, at that time, felt he could ill nautical miles from the northern tip of Sumatra.

afford to give".

Mr K Subrahmanyam was Deputy Secretary

Mr PVR Rao, the Defence Secretary, accompanied

Budget and Planning.in the Ministry of Defence in

Mr Chavan’s delegation to Britain. He recalls:

1964 and 1965. He recalls:

“In E n glan d , ou r m ain effort was to get some

“In March 1965, the British told us that they will

not be able to give us deferred credit for building

m on ey - d e fe rre d cred it - on soft terms. The an Oberon class submarine.

differen ce betw een In dia’s naval demands and

“In early April, there was a meeting of the

w h a t th e B r itis h w ere p rep ared to give was Secretaries Committee in which the activities of

su bstantial. Even Lord Mountbatten, who was

the Indonesian Navy around the Andaman and

C h ie f o f D efen ce S ta ff at that time, could not Nicobar Islands were discussed. The Navy

prevail w ith the Adm iralty, though he pleaded

stressed the need for m ain tain in g a naval

India’s cause better than even India did. He even

presence thfcre to deal with the situation. On the

told the First Sea Lord that India may be driven to

basis of that discussion, the Navy prepared a

seek help from the USSR. But the First Sea Lord

draft paper in which it described the situation

was adam ant that he could not spare an Oberon

around the Andaman and Nicobar Islands and

submarine.

recommended that we again approach the United

"Our Navy was still keen on the Oberon class

States, Britain and Russia for naval vessels.

submarine and the probability of obtaining it was

“I felt this was not the right approach. I

hard to die. The Admiralty were building this new

pointed out that going back to the Americans.

class o f su b m a rin es. T h ey had ju s t given an British and Russians was not going to give us any

order for three submarines and India wanted one

additional benefits because:

of those submarines. The British Admiralty said

•

The Americans had told us that they will not

“No, we have got only three submarines on order,

give us naval equipment and

they are absolutely necessary for us, we cannot

•

The British had already told us they couldn’t

release any .of them ”. They were prepared to give

give us credit for building the Oberon class

us older submarines, which our Navy refused to

submarine.

take.

“T h e B ritish Prim e M inister Harold Wilson

"Therefore the best course was not to delay

remarked, h a lf humorously, to Mr Chavan; I did

any further, but to accept the Russian offer which

n ot k n o w th a t s u b m a rin e s could clim b the had been pending since August 1964. Mr Chavan

Himalayas”.

agreed. Naval Headquarters were asked to put up

definite proposals for acquisition o f Russian

To avoid a distruption in the naval relationship,

ships and submarines.”

the British agreed to reconsider whether they cou

ind ways and means to give India deferred credit or

The Navy's Hesitance to Switch Over to Russian

building a new Oberon class submarine in a Britisn

A

c q

u

i s

i t i o

n

s

shipyard.

There is no doubt that Naval Headquarters had grave

r e s e r v a t io n s about going in for Russian acquisitions, developments in Early 1965

indeed the Navy appears to have been alm ost

lonesian Bellicosity

apologetic. Admiral Kohli, who was the Deputy Chief

o f the Naval Staff in 1965. states in his book:*

u ^ r

c o n f e r e n c e in B a n d u n g in In d on esia in.

r

w h e n t h e p r i n c i p l e s o f P a n c h s h e e w

•■Having tried both th e USA a n d UK a n d d ra w n a

° ' m a l l y a c c e p t e d , r e l a t i o n s b e t w e e n I n d ia a n blank

hnth countries, w e had no a lte rn a tiv e

l n d o n e s i a

h a d

s t e a d i l y

d e t e r i o r a t e d .

Appendix C Page 117.

TRANSITION TO TRIUM Ptf/253

Submarine Training in Russia

but to go to the Soviet Union. This decision was

taken after the most careful consideration as it

Commodore KS Subra-M anian recalls:

would mean going to the Communist camp for the

first time. We are often blamed by spokesmen

‘The USSR Navy at that time consisted mainly of from Western countries, more particularly the

conscripts who spent three years in service and USA, for going to Russia - but they are not aware

then went out, unless they were retained for any that a first approach to their country had drawn a

reason. They were all raw recruits and they were blank.”

trained for a specific job. O ur sailors and officers who went there had been in the se rv ic e for a In 1965, the agreem ent was signed for the

number of years, about eight to ten years. They acquisition of Russian ships and subm arines.

were all experienced in th eir p a rtic u la r trades.

Admiral Kohli, then Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff,

Now the trade structures of the Soviet Navy and of

headed the Naval team of this delegation. In his book, o u r Navy w ere not q u ite c o m p a tib le . They he states:*

trained each sailor for a specific jo b and he only

‘The first submarine was to be ready at the end of

concentrated on that. O ur sailo r w as trained to 1967. The Soviets undertook to train two

do multifarious duties.

complete submarine crews in their naval base at

“One of my first headaches on arriva l there

Vladivostok on thfe Pacific Coast. Our crews

was to draw up a syllabus for training our sailors began their training in July 1966. Credits were

and to convince the Soviets that th eir system is made available by the Soviet Union and the

not compatible with ours and cannot work. I had payments were to be made in Rupees. The price

a lot of problem s on th is su b ject. How ever we of each submarine was around 3 crores.”

managed to draw up a sy lla b u s , not only for Admiral Mountbatten, visited the N ation a l

ourselves but for subsequent b atches also. We Defence College after he retired as the British Chief of did evolve some sort of a com prom ise to make the Defence Staff.

He deplored “T h e sh ort

sure that our sailors got the right sort of training.

sightedness of the British G overnm ent who, by

As far as co m p arin g the two sy ste m s of declining a deferred credit of a measly five million

tra in in g is concerned, th ere is good in both pounds for building an Oberon class submarine,

systems. We adopted the best of both”.

orced the Indian Navy to acquire its requirements

rom Russia, thereby limiting the British warship

Capt MN Samant recalls:

industry s market to meeting the needs only of the

Leander Frigate Project."**

We tried to make the Soviets u n d e rsta n d that none of o u r crew had com e d ir e c t ly from Developments 1'966 to 1975

universities and schools. We were c a r e e r officers an crew h avin g 12 to 15 y e a rs o f se rvice,

Selection o f Crew and Pre Deputation Russian

Language Training

alrnost one year’s practical experience

Captain MN Samant recalls:

R r i t ^ , anneS and three m onths' train in g with

w 3 ■=

aV^

that what we wanted

Selection of a submarine crew is critical in that it

basio^rp nCeP^ ° f type training, as a g a in s t the requires high medical and psychological fitness

That ha

™ ch theY were trying to impart,

standards. In those days we had to screen 7 to 8

b a tc h n the\desired effect. From th e second volunteers before we had one man. Then we

training tim ^ f

’ WC Were a b le to r e d u c e the

wanted to get experienced persons, who would

for the thirrT

18 months t0 15 months. And

stay longer in the service and yet we wanted to

further

^

we were able to reduce it

induct ju n ior persons, so that they could be

trained to gra d u a lly take the place o f the

experienced ones".

the

To trv^ n n T poin^noticed was the Soviet’s pride,

esp ecially aJ “ k m a rin e ’s w e a p o n s y stem s.

All personnel selected to undergo t r a i n s •

commi«>^inn0 *

a

new

s u b m a r in e

i s

Russia were given three months of Russian lana

m

training in Bombay.

Russian language

Soviets’ felt v

We recl uire a target vessel. The

The^ said that “After

* ibid!

"—

fo r e ig n s h ip fir e s a t ^

We fe e l v e r y h u r t i f a " Y

--------------- es at a Soviet vessel!" It actually

- Indian Navy’s Submarine Arm by Admiral A K Chatterii P

46.

254/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

^

took tim e to con vin ce them that unless they

Soviets had somehow got grafted on our way of

proved the weapon system, it will not be possible

thinking.

for us to accept their vessels. That too had the

desired effect”.

The training, in my view, was excellent for

the type of sailor that the Indian is. He likes to be

Admiral VS Shekhawat recalls:

told in detail, he likes to know exactly what he

was to do. Methodical, systematic and thorough,

“T h e R u ssia n s b elieved in a lot of class room that is the essence of Soviet training. Perhaps it

instruction and it was very very thorough. I felt

did not leave too much room for initiative in the

that for us the best was a combination of the two,,

sense that everyone carried a notebook indicating

not the very short duration that the British did,

what he was supposed to do when there was a

nor the p rolon ged duration that the Russians

fire, when there was flooding and so on. But all

believed in. Eventually we arrived at our own

these things did help in maintaining a very strict

train in g duration somewhat between the two,

organisation. This was happily blended, I think,

but lean in g m ore tow ards the Russian side in

with those of British experience. In the end, we

th o r o u g h n e s s o f cla s s room instructions, did get a happy blend of thorough Soviet basic

diagram s and so on. I think that has suited us

training but with the experience of those who had

better than the British system might have done.

been trained in Britain.”

O f course, the British system probably is more

Rear Admiral JMS Sodhi recalls:

c o s t e ffe c t iv e b ec a u s e o f less tim e spent on train in g. But the safety aspect has also to be

“The training was slow but it was absolutely

b o rn e in m in d as w e ll as the educational thorough, it was very good and the practical

background and aptitude of the trainees. We have

training was excellent. It was far better than the

b e e n fo r tu n a te in b e in g able to operate in British training. The Russians told us that the

considerable safety over all these very many years

many orders and procedures might seem very

as a result o f the practices that we followed”

silly to you, but please rem em ber that “It is

written in the blood of comrades gone by". So Vice Admiral (then Lt) RN Ganesh had joined the

please do not ignore them. I found their advice to

Submarine Arm after training in Britain had ceased.

be very correct.

He was later to be the first Commanding Officer of the

“We found that because o f the R u ssian

n u c le a r p r o p e lle d su b m a rin e CHAKRA. His system of conscript training, they had many

reco llectio n s o f tra in in g in Russia were, in some safety features on their submarine. That meant

respects, differen t from those who had earlier been

that no single fault could create a crisis in a trained in Britain:

submarine. There had to be a series of faults,

only then could an accident occur. In fact, even

“ O u r in s t r u c t o r s im p re s s e d us with their in the propulsion system, there w ere seven

technical know ledge and we did benefit greatly

alternative modes of propulsion. So six or seven

from the tra in in g. We developed the habit of modes had to break down before the submarine

learning our equipment thoroughly, of being able

was completely immobilised"

to ru n an d m a in ta in our own equipm ent,

Irrespective o f branch. This technical knowledge

Rear Admiral (then Lt) SC Anand underwent his

o f on e’s ow n equ ipm en t stood us in very goo

initial submarine training in Russia. He recalls:

stead. On the m ore general front, the Soviets

“It was only when we were finishing the training

were not gen erally very forthcoming on tactical

that we realised how valuable the training was.

doctrine.

.

Because as we went along, we found our

“T h ere w as undoubtedly a kind of cultura

knowledge of specific actions to be carried out on

divide among the Indians themselves. T h o s e o

board a submarine, specific activities, drills,

had un dergon e training with the British avy,

procedures became that much more thorough.

w e re m o re r e lu c t a n t to a ccep t the

ox*e

We realised how important it was to know the

instructors in that role and very often assumed

specifics of any action rather than knowing it only

kind o f superior attitude. By and large, the) we

theoretically. The only reason we did not know

slightly derisive in their approach to the ov*

’

very much about this type of training was that in

This was largely a spin off of our total y

es

our surface navy, em phasis on th is kind o f

readin g habits. T h e W estern perception 01

practical training was not to be found.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/255

,

im proved v e rs io n o f r a d a r w it h b e t t e r power

“We were also impressed with the knowledge

output and an extra PPI to be fitted in the Chart of the Russian Instructors, as well as the other

House.

sailors who guided us during our first steps in the

•

Im proved v e rs io n o f S H F / D F s e t w ith better submarine. We wanted to emulate the example

presentation.

being set by those instructors, the thoroughness

•

Improvements in the layou t o f th e control room.

of their knowledge, and their total command over

•

Im proved a r r a n g e m e n ts o n e q u ip m e n t and the subject they were teaching."

machinery to ensure a higher degree o f silence.

Submarine Infrastructure Facilities

•

Im p ro vem en ts to M a in d ie s e ls ,

HP air

The 1965 agreement with Russia not only covered the

compressors*, R e frig e ra tio n p la n t, Ventilation delivery o f ships and subm arines, but also the

system, etc.

creation of a modern Dockyard at Visakhapatnam,

•

P ro v is io n in g o f a fr e q u e n c y a n a ly s e r and a along with a submarine base and training school.

cavitation meter.

The basic in frastru ctu re requ ired for the

The 1971 Indo Pakistan War

Submarine Arm was a submarine base, a submarine

training establishment, submarine maintenance and

D u ring the 1971 w a r K U R S U R A a n d KARANJ

repair workshops, facilities to charge the submarine

operated in the Arabian Sea. KH AND ERI operated in

propulsion batteries and the high pressure air bottles

the Boy o f B en gal. T h e ir a c t i v i t i e s h a v e been and facilities for blowing the ballast tanks and

described in the chapters on the 1971 war.

preparing submarine torpedoes.

KALVARI re m a in e d in V is a k h a p a t n a m to Since the new Dockyard would take several years

continue training of fresh inductees for the next lot of to come up, interim arrangements were made for the

four submarines.

Base Repair Workshop in Visakhapatnam to be

expanded.

Basing o f Submarines in Bom bay

After the 1971 war, it was d ecid ed to b ase the four

The Induction o f the Submarines

new submarines in Bombay and create the minimum

' After commissioning, each submarine did a three essential support, maintenance and repair facilities.

month combat work up in the Baltic before departing

T h ese fou r s u b m a rin e s a r r iv e d in Bom bay for India. Since the Suez Canal was closed, the

between January 1974 and M ay 1975. U n til their maiden voyages were around the Cape of Good Hope.

shore facilities were set up, they w ere supported by The first two submarines were escorted by Indian

the submarine depot ship A M B A , w h ic h had been naval ships, the latter two came on their own. The

first four submarines arrived between July 1968 and

moved from Visakhapatnam to Bombay.

May 1970 and were based in Visakhapatnam .

After arrival, these su bm arin es p articip ated in After arrival, the submarines:

anti subm arine e x e rc is e s , e v a lu a t io n s and operational patrols as the ea rlie r su b m a rin es had Participated in anti submarine exercises with

one. They were saved, h ow ever, fro m h avin g

ships, Alizes and Seakings and helped them to

expend precious motoring hours in transits between

evaluate anti submarine sonars and sonobuovs

• Undertook operational patrols

im t

and W est c ° a s t s , w h ic h h a d been

• Helped train the fresh inductees into

the

VisaWiapatnam ^

fŮr su b m a rin es baS6d *

submarine service.

ne

In 1971, an agreement was signed fnr

Personnel A spects

improved Russian submarines of the same class Th I

improvements were the result of experienceTa^eri J

submarine UtSet’

d elivery sch ed u le o f thjj

us in operating the submarines in I n S t

y

conditions:

naian tropical

probl' ms

>9 6 9 '

were t a w L *

cause c°n c e rn . S everal measures

to

•

Design of equipment and machinery to

*

remedy these shortages.

higher ambient air tem peratur^ «

deducing the Rejection Rate

temperature and relative humWiH

Water

•

Improved active and p a s s i v f ^ Parameters.

to

that a major cause of the shortage

requirement of a long’range

the

Psychological t

la rge n u m b er o f r e je c ts in

*n the procedure f-and the Seneral lack o f confiden

256/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

for selection. It w as decided:

•

To do aw ay w ith psychological and mechanical

ready-to-eat m eals w henever, e ith e r for

response test; only the recompression chamber

operational or other reasons, cooking on board

(RCC) test was to continue.

was not possible. However, since calorific value of

•

Sailors rejected in the earlier psychological tests

the revised scale was much lower, it directly

were to be retested for suitability in the RCC test

impinged on the variety of the menus and caused

at Submarine Headquarters.

consternation amongst submarine personnel.

•

T h e in c e n t iv e s and b e n e fits o f service in subm arines were to be widely disseminated and

Catering Units

followed up by liaison visits of submarine officers

•

To overcome the limited facilities and space on

to ships and establishments.

board submarines, an experim ental Catering

Unit was established ashore to issue cleaned,

Monetary Incentives

chopped and ready to cook p ro visio n s to

To make service in the Submarine Cadre attractive,

submarines prior to their sailing.

s p e c ia l b e n e fit s w e re sa n ctio n ed . T h ese were Subm arine Allow ance, Submarine Pay, Submarine

Submarine Depot Ship - AMBA

Rations, Special Submarine Clothing and Hardlying

The Submarine Depot Ship AMBA had commissioned

Money at full rates.

in 1968 and had been based in Visakhapatnam .

Between 1969 and 1971, AM BA su p p orted the

Special Rations

submarines operating on the West Coast. In the 1971

•

Government sanctioned a special scale of rations

war, AMBA was deployed to patrol o ff the

for sa ilors servin g on board submarines. This

Lakshadweep Islands, across the sea lane between

inclu ded sp ecial item s o f pre-cooked foods for

East and West Pakistan.

issue w h en subm erged, when normal cooking

With the arrival of VELA at Bombay in early 74,

would not be possible.

AMBA’s base was changed from Visakhapatnam to

• Ready to Eat Meals. Large scale trials of ready-to-Bombay. From early 1974 onwards, AM BA was

eat m eals, m an u factu red at the Defence Food

commanded by a CO who had com m issioned a

Research Laboratory, Mysore and the Accelerated

submarine in Russia. He was well aware o f what

Freeze D ried Unit, Delhi, were undertaken on

submariners expected from their depot ship. In the

board KALVARI. The trials were found to be quite

following months, AMBA ably fulfilled her designed

s a t is fa c to r y .

A ft e r

e ffe c tin g

further

role as a Depot Ship:

im p rovem en ts, the D FRL Mysore commenced

•

The submarines used to berth alongside and the

bulk produ ction. These meals, however, never

crews were billeted on board AMBA.

became popular.

•

Operational and technical needs were met by

• S p e cia l R a tion s. T h e special scale o f rations, AM BA’s Heads o f D epartm ent w ho w ere

w hich w a s e a rlie r adm issible to sailors when experienced submariners.

s u b m a r in e s w e re su b m erged , was now

•

Since the Torpedo Preparation Shop had not yet

au th orised for both officers and sailors, both been set up in Bombay, the periodic preparation

when su bm erged and on surface, except when

and change round of torpedoes w as done by

they were not messed on board.

AMBA. just as she was designed to do.

• E m e rg e n c y R a tio n S ca le s f o r Subm arines.

•

To conserve submarine engine/machinery hours.

G overn m en t a u th orised an emergency ration

AMBA provided all the power supplies.

s c a le fo r p e r s o n n e l on board subm arines, Submarine Rescue Vessel - NISTAR

com prising boiled sweets/milk toffees,

ar’

mango flakes, pum pkin halwa, refined see ess

The submarine rescue vessel N IS TA R w as

commissioned in 1971 and based at Visakhapatnam.

dates and sweet biscuits.

She conducted the diving operation on the Pakistan

s tandard Submarine Ration Scale

Navy submarine GHAZI, w hich sank ou tsid e

Defence

Visakhapatnam harbour in December 1971.

• Based on the recom m endations o f the

From 1972 onwards, NISTAR helped train divers

In s titu te o f P h y s io lo g y and A llie d S cl®”

(DIPAS). a re v ise d sta n d a rd ration scale tor to meet the Navy’s urgent need for Deep Divers and

submarine personnel was promulgated,

Clearance Divers.

provided a greater variety o f substitutes °

-

In lieu o f basic items. It also provide

or

TRANSITION TO TRIUM PH /257

The actual experience with

Submarine Training School - SATAVAHANA

K H A N D E R I was beset

with delays due to lack of expertise, shortage of The Submarine Training School, which formed part

spares and the low productivity of the Dockyard.

of the Integrated Type Training Establishment for the

Progressively, as expertise built up and the Dockyard Russian acquisitions, was commissioned as INS

facilities developed, it became possible to become self SATAVAHANA in December 1974.

sufficient for subm arine refits. Spares however

Six Yearly Refits of Submarines

always remained a problem.

In subsequent years, six yearly refits were carried

The delays in the completion of the Naval Dockyard at

out both in Visakhapatnam and in Russia. This

Visakhapatnam began to delay the commencement of

helped to mitigate the problems of bunching which

six-yearly refits of submarines. To ensure that the

safety of submarines was not prejudiced, detailed

was a result of four submarines being acquired in

discussions were held with the Russian side. It was

1968-1969 and another four in 1973-1974.

decided that the refit of the first submarine KALVARI

I n

d

i g

e n

o

u

s S

u

b

m

a

r i n

e C

o

n

s

t r u

c t i o

n

would be carried out in Russia and that of the second

submarine KHANDERI in Visakhapatnam. Dockyard

In 1981, almost fourteen years after the initial personnel proceeded to Russia to acquire first hand

dialogue with HDW of Germ any, Kockums of

experience of how these repairs were done.

Sweden, Vickers of Britain, DCN o f France and

Nevesbu of Holland, a contract was signed with HDW

Indigenous Submarine Batteries

of Germany for four submarines - two to be built in

In 1973. Standard Batteries of Bombay went into

Germany and two in Mazagon Docks, Bombay. These

collaboration with Tudor, the Swedish battery

four submarines, called SSKs, entered service

manufacturers, to produce submarine batteries

between 1986 and 1994.

indigenously. After the initial teething troubles had

A

c q

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i s

i t i o

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o

f I m

p

r o v e d

R

u

s s i a

n

S

u

b

m

a

r i n

e s

been overcome, these batteries proved far superior in

Indian conditions than the performance of the

Between 1986 and 1990, eight improved Russian

imported batteries.

submarines of the Kilo class were acquired. These

submarines were quieter, had better sonar and used

Other Activities

indigenously produced subm arine propulsion

In 1975:

batteries.

•

Sanction was accorded for submarine battery

N

u

c l e

a

r P

r o p

u

l s i o n

charging facilities at Bombay.

The Submarine Arm Pictorial History, published in

•

The Escape Training Facility was commissioned

1992, states:

as part of INS SATAVAHANA in Visakhapatnam.

•

A full fledged medical organisation was

“Seeing the advent of nuclear propulsion in

sanctioned to provide cover for submarine rescue

submarines of other navies, a study was

operations.

undertaken by BARC to study a nuclear

•

A new scale of Submarine Pay was sanctioned.

propulsion package for naval ships and

•

The Third Symposium on Underwater Medicine

submarines. A stage arose when it became

was held at Bombay. It focussed on the problems

necessary to train serving personnel in this very

associated with underwater medicine that had

important area of propulsion technology.

come to notice since 1969.

“An agreement was concluded w ith the Soviet

•

Ready-to-eat pack rations were supplied to the

Union and a team of officers under the

Base Victualling Yards for supply to submarines.

supervision of Vice A d m ira l MK Roy was formed to steer the p ro je c t . After a rigorous s e le c t io n Developments After 1975

procedure, the first batch o f the nuclear

submarine crews, under the c o m m a n d of C a p ta in S

i x - Y

e a

r l y R

e f i t s o

f S

u

b m

a

r i n

e s

S Daniel co m m e n c e d their training in the USSR-KALVARI returned to Visakhapatnam in 1976 with no

The training was. perhaps, the most thorough

defects. Her guarantee specialists returned to Russia

a n d t a x in g course that any of the I n d ia n earlier than scheduled. It provided a benchmark of a

submariners, most of w h o m had over a d e ca d e o high quality refit to the personnel in Visakhapatnam

submarining b e h in d them, had ever undergone-who had commenced the six yearly repairs of the

They absorbed the new technology wit

second submarine KHANDERI in mid 1976.

professional aplomb."

258/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Vice Admiral Roy’s book, “War in the Indian

Ocean”, states:*

L e a s e o

f R

u s s i a n N

u

c l e a

r S

u

b m

a

r i n

e

In 1988, a nuclear submarine was leased from the

“Nuclear propulsion in India was first mooted in

Russian Navy. It was commanded and manned by

1967 when a naval officer and a BARC scientist

Indian naval personnel and commissioned as

prepared a feasibility report. A more detailed

CHAKRA. She was returned to Russia in 1991.

report was prepared in 1971 as the Committee of

During this three year lease period, the Navy was

Secretaries felt that R&D on nuclear propulsion

able to better understand:

technology was inescapable if India was not.to be

left too far behind by the end of the century, when

0

Nuclear submarine culture and the practical

atomic energy would be a major source for both

aspects of handling nuclear power plants afloat.

propulsion and energy requirements. A small

0

The tactical benefits of underwater launched

anti-ship missiles.

nucleus of engineers were located in BARC as

early as 1978.

•

Anti submarine operations against nuclear

submarines.

"The offer by the Soviet authorities of a

'nuclear-powered submarine fleet’ for the Indian

V

e r y

L o w

F

r e

q

u

e

n

c y

C

o

m

m

u

n

i c a

t i o

n

s

w

i t h

Navy was made by Marshal Ogarkov during his

S u b m

a r i n e s a

t S e a

visit to India in April 1981. The Soviets offered to

Whereas a submarine on the surface can transmit

arrange a two years’ training programme for

and receive wireless messages just like a ship can.

Indian naval personnel, lease one nuclear

submerged submarines can only receive wireless

submarine for five years for pracUcal training and

messages on Very Low Frequency (VLF). VLF

to render technical assistance for creating

transmitters require huge antennae suspended high

maintenance facilities in India for nuclear

above the ground.

powered submarines. He added that the sale as

The initial discussions were solely with the

also assistance for designing and constructing

Russian side, from whom the submarines had been

nuclear-powered submarines could be taken up

acquired. Inquiries with western manufacturers

later. This offer was reiterated by the Defence

indicated that better technology might be available

Minister, Marshal Ustinov.

from America. Parallel discussions were therefore

“It was in this context that the former

pursued, both with Russia and with America.

President. R Venkataraman, stated in his book

Between 1979 and 1984. modalities were worked

“My Presidential Years” that: (Pages 74, 75)

out for an American company, in collaboration with

an Indian company, to assume responsibility for the

“On September 14, Admiral Roy, Vice Chief of detailed design, manufacture, site installation and the Eastern Naval Command conveyed to me the

commissioning of the VLF transmitting station.

pleasant news that the Government had finally

During the same period, the Defence Research

decided to take the first nuclear propelled

and Development Organisation designed the

submarine from the Soviet Union on lease, as

antennae to be fitted in the submarine for receiving

purchase would entail acceptance of NPT

VLF transmissions.

conditions. The idea of acquiring a nuclear-

Installation of the VLF Transmitter commenced

propelled submarine was floated by me as

in 1987. Trials completed in 1989. On 20 Oct 90. the

Defence Minister and after months of bargaining

VLF Transmitting Station was commissioned as INS

the Soviets agreed. A training programme was

KATTABOMAN.

arranged for Indian sailors. I had visited the

trainees in Leningrad and Riga. I was also happy

In Retrospect

that the lease amount charged by the Soviet

Union was fairly reasonable. The nuclear

If one corelates the justifications for setting up the

propelled submarine had the advantage of

Submarine Arm with events as they transpired

remaining under water longer, which was not

during the decade 1965-1975. it becomes evident, as

possible for the conventional submarines. It was

is usually the case with most new acquisitions, that

also proposed at that time that a second nuclear

either it takes considerable time for expectations to

propelled submarine would be built in India. The

become reality or that expectations mutate as

Atomic Energy were confident of producing an

experience is gained. The following examples are

atomic power pack for the submarine__________ _

illustrative.

Pages 114 et seq.

T R A N S IT IO N T O T R IU M P H / 2 5 9

U

n

d

e r U

t i l i s

a

t i o

n

o

f S

u

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m

a

r i n

e D

e

p

o

t S

h

i p

A

M

B

A

E

x

a

m

p

l e

s

o

f

E

x

p

e

c

t a

t i o

n

s

t h

a

t

D

i d

N

o

t

In hindsight, it is interesting to note that some of the M

a

t e r i a

l i s e

The first expectation was that acquiring submarines

facilities which the submarine depot ship had could

would enhance the anti submarine effectiveness of

not be utilised. These were stated to be:

our surface ships. Commodore KS Subra-Manian

°

“Cater for the annual refits for four submarines

recalls:

and limited repairs for the Petyas. Workshops are

“As far as the anti submarine CASEXs and

provided for electrical, electronic, torpedo,

interaction with the surface forces were

weapon and machinery repairs. Fitted with a 150

concerned, my experience has been that there

ton bow lift crane for liftin g the stern of a has not been enough interaction. There was a

submarine for effecting underwater repairs to the

feeling of smugness in our surface Navy as far as

propeller or the rudder."

submarines were concerned. They had not really

Since AMBA was supporting the submarines on

realised what exactly submarines are capable of,

the West Coast from 1969 onwards, she could not

in spite of umpteen exercises, major and minor,

help in the annual refits of the Petyas.

proving that practically on every occasion a

®

“Training facilities are provided for torpedo firing,

submarine can operate practically undetected in

sonar, communications etc.”

the face of combined opposition, in the face of

unbroken sonar fronts, random patrolling and

Most of these facilities were sim ilar to those

what have you. They still haven’t realised. So I

which were later to be installed in SATAVAHANA. Yet

would say, very regretfully, that there has been

both submarines and Petya pre-occupations

insufficient interaction or appreciation of the

prevented the full utilisation of these trainers.

potential of a submarine by the surface Navy.”

One reason for the u n der-u tilisation of the

submarine depot ship was the differen ce in

The second expectation was that in a war.

perceptions. The Submarine Arm felt that the

submarines could be used offensively. The section on

submarine depot ship should be exclusively

submarine operations during the 1971 Indo-Pakistan

earmarked for the submarines. The Navy felt that the

war clearly indicates why this expectation did not

depot ship’s capabilities could be better utilised in

translate into reality.

general fleet ship functions, in addition to providing technical support to the subm arines. These

E

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t i l i s

a

t i o

n

N

o t F

o r e s e e n

B

u

t W

h

i c h

perceptions never reconciled. AMBA did however fully

P r o v e d

I n

v a

l u

a

b

l e

justify its role when, from 1974 onwards, it extended

If submarines had not been available, it would not

support to the VELA, class submarines in Bombay.

have been possible to undertake the following

In retrospect, the growth of the Navy’s Submarine

evaluations in the unusual hydrological conditions

Arm was phenomenal. Very few navies have acquired

which prevail in Indian waters:

four submarines in three years after the start of a

•

Carry out comparative evaluations of the MRASW

Submarine Arm. Even fewer navies have successfully

Atlantic aircraft in 1969.

built their own submarines in twenty f i v e years after

•

Systematically pinpoint and rectify the

starting a Submarine Arm.

shortcomings in the Seakings’ dunking sonar

In the short span of 30 years from the time: that

after the 1971 war.

submarine training first started in Britain in 1962,

•

Evaluate, modify and progressively improve the

till the time CHAKRA was returned to Russia in 1991.

indigenously designed and produced sonars for

the Navy saw the submarine fleet grow to 20

ships.

submarines - 16 Russian conventional ocean going

•

Carry out comparative evaluations of American

submarines, 4 German conventional Hunter Killer

and French dunking sonars for the later

SSK submarines (of which two were under

Seakings.

construction in India).

•

Evolve anti submarine tactics appropriate to our

This unprecedented achievem ent was only

own hydrological conditions and our unique mix

possible because of:

of Russian and Western anti submarine ships,

•

The enthusiasm, dedication and professionalism

submarines, aircraft and helicopters.

of the young officers and sailors who started the

Submarine Arm.

260/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

The thorough and rigorous submarine training

•

The generous and forthright technical assistance

imparted by the British and Russian Navies and

extended by the Russian and German Navies.

the assistance extended by their Governments.

•

The sagacious handling of all the Submarine Arm

The determination and tenacity of the officers and

acquisitions by the Ministries of Defence and

men in the technical organisations to somehow

Finance (Defence) despite the Navy’s overkeep the submarines going until the maintenance stretched budget.

and refit facilities were set up in the new Naval

Dockyard in Visakhapatnam.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/261

17

The Naval Air Arm

The Growth of the Air Arm Till 1965

with 20 mm cannon and were capable of carrying

rockets and bombs. They marked the advent of

Even though the need for a naval air arm and an

weapon capability in the Air Arm.

aircraft carrier had been accepted in principle before, From 1952 onwards, basic Hying training had

and again, after Independence in 1947, negotiations

been imparted by the A ir Force. To facilitate

for the acquisition of the first carrier from Britain

continuation flying train in g at Cochin, three

concluded only in 1957. Apart from the lack of

Hindustan Trainer 2 (HT 2) a ircraft, made by

resources for so large a project, this ten year delay

Hindustan Aircraft Ltd (HAL), join ed the FRU in

was also caused by the outbreak of the Korean War,

October 1956.

which prevented the British Navy from releasing to

India a British aircraft carrier with British fighter

JOVAS 550

aircraft. This delay was fortuitious for it enabled the On 17 January 1959, the FRU became the first unit

acquisition from Britain of a surface fleet and the

to be commissioned as Indian Naval Air Squadron

creation ashore of Training Schools to remedy the

(INAS) 550. It had ten amphibian Sealands, ten target

dislocation caused by the partition of the Navy in

towing Fireflies and three HT 2 trainer aircraft.

1947.

It was decided to go ahead only with shore based

A

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o

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I K

R

A

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aircraft. The Directorate of Naval Aviation started

Until 1955, the British Navy had not been able to

functioning in Naval Headquarters in 1948. From

spare a light fleet carrier. Nor could the n a v a l budget 1948 onwards, officers and sailors started going to

have been able to afford one. In 1955, A d m ir a l Britain for training as pilots, as observers and for

Mountbatten succeeded in convincing Prime Minister

technical training in aircraft maintenance.

Nehru that the Navy should have a c a r r ie r . F o rm a l F

R

U

a

n

d

I N

S

G

A

R

U

D

A

approval was accorded soon thereafter.

In 1951, the Fleet Requirement Unit (FRU) was

By 1957, the Navy w as a b le to fin a lise the formed to meet the Fleet’s requirement of aircraft

acquisition of the aircraft carrier VIKRANT along with targets for gunnery and radar tracking practices, for

two aircraft squadrons. In April 1957. VIKRANT

radar and communication calibrations and for

commenced an extensive refit cum modernisation in

aircrew training.

Britain, scheduled for completion in 1961. Almost all The airfield at Cochin was taken over from the

e electronic and electrical equipment w as to be Directorate General of Civil Aviation on 1 January

replaced. The ship was to be fitted with an angled 1953. From that date, the Navy assumed

deck, a steam catapult and a mirror landing sight.

responsibility of the operation from Cochin airfield of

^ s e n U a l spaces were to be air conditioned.

all aircraft, civilian and naval.

i

lona accomodation and facilities were to be

Ten amphibian Sealand aircraft were acquired in

prov’ ded t° enable VIKRANT to function as the Fleet

Commander s flagship.

1953 and were based in Cochin.

The FRU was commissioned on 11 March 1953

Naval Jet Flight

and the Navy’s first Naval Air Station, INS GARUDA,

commissioned on 11 May 1953.

p S s h

^

NT,WaS g0ing t0 °P erate jet aircraft,

Since the Sealands were not suitable for anti

aircraft wprp1" 1'

conversion- Three V a m p i r e j e t

aircraft firing practices, between February 1955 and

s

z

t

r r one varm

pir;

December 1958, ten target towing British naval

GARUDAs runway was nnt

U' e A if F° rCfP

Firefly aircraft were inducted. They were fitted with

target - towing winches to tow drogue/sleeve targets.

The last five of these Firefly aircraft were equipped

aM „ d at s „ i L „ r s ; e " g rrom the ,on8' r

In 1960, the Naval Jet Flight at Sulur was

with the French Navy since 1959. A total of 14

designated as INAS 550‘A’ Flight and tasked with the

Alizes were eventually acquired, 12 in 1961 and 2

training of pilots for VIKRANT’s Seahawk squadron.

in 1969.

The FRU at Cochin was designated as INAS 550'B’

Flight.

T h e G

o a O

p e r a t i o n i n

D

e c e m

b e r 1 9 6 1

Within a month of her arrival in India, VIKRANT was

I N

A

S

5

5

0

, 5 5 1

a

n

d

I N

S

H

A

N

S A

S

u

l u

r

deployed for the Goa Operation. On patrol 75 miles

On 1 September 1961, the aviation unit at

seaward of Goa, her task was to counter any action by

Coimbatore was commissioned as INAS 551. On 5

the Portuguese Air Force F - 86 Sabres (which

September 1961, the Naval Jet Flight was merged

according to intelligence reports were operating from

with the Naval Rifle Range Detachment Coimbatore

Dabolim) and to forestall any interference by Western

and commissioned as INS HANSA. The B Flight at

NATO allies of Portugal. VIKRANT steamed up and

Cochin became INAS 550.

down at high speed for two days on 18 and 19

December, with Seahawk combat air patrols airborne

E

s

t a

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e

n

t o

f T

r a

i n

i n

g

a

n

d

M

a

i n

t e n

a

n

c e

from dawn to dusk. No Portuguese Sabre aircraft or

F

a

c i l i t i e

s

a

t C

o c h

i n

any other intrusive air or naval activity was observed.

Airmen Training. The School for Naval Airmen (SFNA) Lt Cdr (later Admiral) RH Tahiliani, flew the

started in August 1956. The Observer School started

Seahawks from VIKRANT in 1961. He recalls:

in March 1960.

AirTecfyiical Training. The Naval Air Technical School

“Early on the morning of 18 December, we were

briefed that the Portuguese had Sabres in Goa

(NATS) started in June 1957.

Aircraft Repair. The Naval Aircraft Repair and that they would possibly be coming out to sea

to attack us. I was the leader of the first combat

Organisation (NARO) started in Februaiy 1960. Its

air patrol to get airborne at first light. I positioned task was to repair and overhaul airframes and major

myself between the ship and Goa and followed

components.

Overhauls of engines would.be

this routine throughout the day. We did not sight

undertaken by HAL and the Air Force.

any enemy at all. After the operation, it

Naval Aircraft Inspection Service. The Naval Aircraft transpired that the Portuguese did not have a

Inspection Service (NAIS) started in November 1960.

single aircraft at Goa. It was faulty intelligence.

Before VIKRANT arrived the basic support

As far as VIKRANT was concerned, we had a fully

infrastructure for the Air Arm had been established

worked up ship and air squadrons and would

ashore in Cochin.

have given a very good account of ourselves if we

had been assigned any targets or if there had

V

I K

R

A

N

T

S

e

a

h

a

w

k

s a

n

d

A

l i z e s

been some inter-services coordinated planning.”

VIKRANT commissioned in March 1961. After an

intensive six week work up in Malta, she arrived in

Captain (late Vice Admiral) N Krishnan was the

India in November 1961 with two air squadrons

Commanding Officer of the cruiser INS DELHI. He

embarked:

stated:

•

INAS 300, the first operational squadron of the

“Incredibly, VIKRANT, our latest and newest

Navy comprising Seahawk ‘Fighters Ground

acquisition, was not taking part in the operation

Attack’ (FGA). The first flight of Seahawks had

but was going to be deployed somewhere in the

been constituted in end 1959 and the squadron

middle of the ocean where she would be 'safe'.

had commissioned in Britain on 7 July 1960. T e

After giving distant support to the Army at Diu, I

Seahawk was a well proven jet aircraft, having

was to join VIKRANT and DELHI was to give her

been in operation with the British Navy s*nc®

close support”.

1953 and also in the German and Netherland

I N

S

H

A

N

S A

’ s S

h

i f t t o D

a

b o l i m

Navies. A total of 74 Seahawks were eventually

acquired, 46 from Britain between 1960 and

After the liberation of Goa in December 1961. the

Portuguese airfield at Dabolim was taken over by the

1964 and 28 from Germany in 1966.

•

INAS 310 comprising Alize anti submarine

Navy in April 1962. In June 1964, INS HANSA and

aircraft had commissioned in France on

INAS 551 relocated from Sulur in Coimbatore to

Dabolim. In July 1964. sanction was accorded for INS

March 1961. The Alize too was a well Pro^e

___ turbo-prop aircraft, having been in opera on

Blueprint to Bluewater Page 395.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/263

HANSA to be a full fledged Naval Air Station,

Bombay and Goa. After the cease fire in Kutch. the equipped with a Ground Controlled Approach (GCA)

squadrons disembarked and VIKRANT resumed her

radar. In November 1964, the Seahawk Squadron

refit which was rescheduled so as to complete in

INAS 300 disembarked from VIKRANT directly to

November 1965. When the Pakistani intrusions into

Jammu and Kashmir started in A ugust 1965,

HANSA.

VIKRANT was still under refit, INAS 300 and 551

H

e l i c o p

t e r s

were at Goa and INAS 310 and INAS 550 were at

Helicopters first entered naval service with the

Cochin.

VIKRANT’s Search and Rescue (SAR) Flight whose

INAS 300 had been programmed for its usual

primaryrole was to rescue ditched pilots. Helicopter

annual armament work up. Eight Seahawks arrived

pilots received their initial training with the Air Force at Jamnagar as planned on 1 September 1965. The

and later in France. The two French Alouette

same morning, the Pakistan Arm y crossed the

helicopters obtained on loan for VIKRANT’s work up

international border between West Pakistan and

in Malta were returned to France. Three Alouettes

India. War appeared imminent.

had been ordered from France for VIKRANT's SAR

Cdr (later Rear Adm iral) RV Singh was the

Flight but their delivery was expected only in 1964.

Commanding Officer of the Seahawk Squadron. He

To bridge the gap between 1961 and 1964, two

recalls:

American Sikorsky helicopters were obtained on loan

from the Air Force. When the Navy’s Alouettes arrived

“We were placed under the operational control of

from France in early 1964, the Air Force had an

the Air Force and ordered to prepare for air

urgent need of Alouettes for their high altitude

defence and air strike m issions. Badin was

operations. The Navy’s Alouettes were therefore

specially assigned to us as a target if the need

diverted to the Air Force. The Sikorskys continued to

arose.

fly in VIKRANT till mid 1964 when more Alouettes

“We set about obtaining live weapons from

arrived from France.

the Armament Depot Bombay or, where there was

compatibility, from the Air Force. A ir Force

T h

u

m

b a

rockets were found to be su itable for the

In 1964, the firing of weather rockets commenced

Seahawks and we equipped the Seahawks with

fromi the launch range at Thumba near Trivandrum.

them. The bombs had to be brought from

The Navy undertook to operate and maintain the

Bombay and arrived after 4 days. There was

Russian MI 4 helicopter belonging to the Indian

some problem with regard to the fuzes. We were

Committee for Space Research’s Thumba Rocket

keen to have a fuze appropriate to low level

Project till such time as their own personnel became

attack. These were not available. Therefore we

available. The task involved range clearance and

were restricted to dive bombing attacks.

rocket recovery.

“With the local Air Force authorities, it was

worked out that Seahawks would carry out the

H

e

l i c o

p

t e

r M

a

i n

t e n

a

n

c e U

n

i t i n

B

o m

b

a

y

a

t I N

S

dawn air patrols and Air Force would carry out

K

U

N

J A

L I

the dusk air patrols. These were instituted by 2

In 1964, INS DARSHAK. the first indigenously built

September.

survey ship was commissioned. She was designed to

“On the evening of 6 September, soon after

embark an Alouette helicopter. A small helicopter

the dusk air patrol landed, Pakistan Air Force B-

maintenance unit was therefore set up in Bombay in

57 bombers appeared overhead. Initially, even

INS KUNJALI to support the Alouette helicopters in

the Air Force thought they were our own bombers

VIKRANT and DARSHAK.

but as soon they started bombing, it was c^ea^

that they were Pakistani B-57’s. After this initial

Naval A ir Operations in the 1965 Indo

raid, a single B-57 continued bombing

Pakistan War

throughout the night to keep the air station on its

toes.

In April 1965, VIKRANT commenced her refit. When

“Fairly early on the evening of 6 S e p te m b e r ,

the Rann of Kutch incident started, an Alize was

we were informed by the OC Flying that we had

deployed at Jamnagar for electronic reconnaissance.

been cleared to carry out the dawn strike on

VIKRANT was quickly boxed up, the air squadrons

Badin airfield.

were re-embarked and VIKRANT patrolled between

“At about 0400 on 7 September, whether as a

result of these attacks or whatever, we were to

264/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

by the Air Force that orders had been received for

every time by the AA batteries on our border and

us to go ba.ck to Bombay.

we had to zig zag to avoid them. Throughout this

“The Jamnagar airfield had been damaged

operation, we survived on our wits and on

quite heavily during the night. The dawn

secrecy. We were unarmed and we could only

inspection of the runway indicated however that

survive by operating on our own. We had a small

the Western half of the main runway was fairly

detachment of our maintenance staff following us

clear. We used that portion to take off for

in a Dakota."

Bombay.

The Pakistan Air Force air attack on Jamnagar on

Developments Between 1966 and 1971

the evening of 6 December was a response to the

The Aircraft Carrier

Indian Army’s thrust towards Lahore in the early

By 1966, VIKRANT had been in commission for five

hours of 6 December. Loaded for a strike as they were,

years and had undergone major refits in 1963 and

the Seahawks were helpless in the fading light.

1965. Between 1966 and 1971, VIKRANT

Fortunately, the bombers failed to notice the

participated in flying exercises whenever she was not

Seahawks parked in the dispersal.

afflicted with defects:

On 7 September, after the Seahawks withdrew to

Bombay to operate from Santa Cruz, they were tasked

•

Despite her refit in 1965, VIKRANT experienced

with the air defence of Bombay since the Air Force

problems on the catapult, the arrestor gear and

resources at Poona had become fully committed in

the boilers in 1966.

the air battles in the North. One hundred dawn and

•

Throughout 1967, problems continued to recur

dusk patrols were flown but without contact.

on the catapult and the arrestor gear. In mid

Meanwhile the Alizes had moved up from Cochin

1967, she suffered a burst boiler and underwent

to Bombay for anti submarine and reconnaissance

a long refit from end 1967 till early 1969.

patrols. Their activities have been described in the

•

In mid 1970, cracks were detected in the water

Chapter on the 1965 War. In addition, an Alize was

drum of one of her four boilers and she was laid

deployed for electronic surveillance duties on the

up in Bombay.

border with West Pakistan. Commander (O) (then

®

By mid 1971, both short and long term remedial

Lieutenant) Dilip Choudhary, who flew in these

measures had been instituted and VIKRANT was

sorties recalls:

made operational to steam on only three boilers

at lower speeds.

“We were briefed to carry out a radar recce of

enemy territory for our Air Force. During the war,

Seahawks

we flew low level sorties below 100 feet all along

A

d

d

i t i o n

a

l S e a h a w

k F

i g h

t e r A

i r c r a

f t

the Pakistan border starting from the Kashmir

In addition to the initial order of 23 Seahawks

sector, then the Punjab sector, Rajasthan sector

acquired with the VIKRANT. 23 more reconditioned

and by the time we had come down to Jodhpur,

Seahawks had been purchased from Britain - seven

the war had ended. The Alize’s direction finding

in 1962, ten in 1963 and six in 1964.

system detected a number of Pakistani radar

In 1965, an agreement was signed for the

stations. We pin-pointed each one with a three

purchase of 28 more Seahawks which were being

point fix and gave the positions to the Air Force.

phased out by the Federal German Navy. These

The Air Force of course did not have any such

aircraft arrived in 1966. Ten were day fighter

capability and they did not take our positions or

bombers (MK 100) and eighteen were all weather

our information very seriously.

aircraft (MK 101).

“Even though we gathered a

o

o

In 1968, Seahawks carried out DART target

inform ation, I don't think the Air

towing trials and the first ever live firing sorties at authorities ever used it. We got into trou e \

towed banner targets.

the Air Force a couple of times, when we pic e

up a radar station like Sargodha an° ot“ ers

M

a

t e r i a

l S

t a

t e o

f S e a h a w

k s

which were still operating, because the r or

From 1963 onwards, the Seahawks had started

had declared that they had destroye

^

suffering the consequences of the temperatures in

radars. We were jumped by our own Air

India being higher than in Britain. The rear fuel tank

aircraft every time, even though our s ou

fire warnings started operating with greater

were available to them. We were even ire up

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/265

“Over the next few years, while operating from

frequency. In 1966 and 1967, there were a large

ashore, the operating procedures were changed.

number of fire warning light incidents.

In 1968, a large number of short service

The max engine RPM for operating from ashore

Commission entry officers started joining the Air

was reduced from 12700 to 12400. From the

Arm. They were keen to become fighter pilots and

carrier, of course, they continued to operate at

often the material state of the Seahawks could not

12700. This appears to have reduced the problem

withstand the demands the enthusiastic pilots placed

considerably.

“In early 67, the German Seahawks MK 100

on the aging aircraft.

Between 1966 and 1970, Lt Cdr (later

and MK 101 joined the Seahawk fleet. Apart from

Commodore) DJ Shahane was the Deputy Air

the Seahawks themselves, we got a very large

Engineer Officer of 300 Squadron, then Air Engineer

number o f spares from the Germ an Navy.

officer of the 551 Squadron and then Air Engineer

Thereafter, with the improved spares position and

Officer of 300 Squadron. He recalls :

with German Seahawks, the availability of the

Seahawks went up considerably.

"In 1966, the availability of the Seahawks was

“The period 1968 to 1970 was one of the

better from the carrier, not so much from ashore.

finest periods of Seahawk operations. When I

On the carrier also, there were frequent problems

joined in November 1968. we had almost 20

of non-availability of hot ends and frequent

Seahawks in the squadron. In February 1969, we

hydraulic leaks, the canopy flying away or canopy

embarked in VIKRANT after a gap of over a year,

being loose or inoperative etc. There was also the

since VIKRANT had been under refit. We

problem of shortage of maintenance personnel,

embarked with 18 Seahawks and the availability

which resolved somewhat after two to three years.

was extremely good. This was the time when we

“Regarding the hot ends, the audio indication

had Mark 100s and 101s joining the earlier Mark

of the rear tank fire warning lights had not come

6s . This was also the time when the manpower

into being. When that was introduced, within an

position had improved considerably. We had a

year or so we found that the aircrew developed

fairly good and adequate maintenance crowd in

considerable confidence in the rear tank fire

the squadron. Throughout my one and a half

warning light system.

years, we were able to keep the operational and

“Another experience was that when the

material state of the Seahawks extremely high.

Seahawks operated from the carrier, there were

"We had two fatal accidents during the

fewer instances of either rear tank fire warning

period, but only one of them could have been due

light or high JPT or saddle tank burst. When the

to a material failure. The other one was most

Seahawks were operating from ashore, and

likely due to pilot disorientation. We undertook

particularly during the practice MADDL sorties,

daring operations in flying. Somehow I felt that

we had saddle tank bursts coining up very often.*

the air crew and the pilots were more confident in

“The saddle tank was a small tank of 40

gallons capacity which sort of straddled the

flying Seahawks at that time than I had seen

hottest part of the Seahawk. During the MADDLs.

them at any other time”.

we found that this area got heated up

Replacements f o r the Seahawk A irc ra ft

considerably and we had a few cases of saddle

tanks bursting, causing structural damage. This

With Seahawks having been phased out from the

could also lead to fuel leaks and fire in the rear

Royal Navy in the early 1960s. the Indian Navy was

constantly on the look out for their

tank area. Actually the saddle tank, having a

rep lacem en ts.

capacity of only 40 gallons, used to get consumed

The American Navy’s A-4 Skyhawk appeared to be tn^

within say the first ten minutes of the sortie. So a

most suitable, but political considerations pred u Q

conscious decision was taken to remove the

their acquisition from the USA. In view of the desig

saddle tanks completely and make up for this 40

limitations of VIKRANT's catapult, a study had bee

gallon shortfall of fuel by fuelling the drop tanks

carried out whether the British GNAT fighter aircra •

with 20 gallons each. Thereafter this problem

which was being indigenously produced by HAL

reduced considerably, though there were a few

the Air Force, could be ‘navalised’. It was not foun

cases when the saddle tank bay itself showed

cost effective.

some sign of explosion.

In 1966. after a major Defence Review, the

Government decided to disband fixed w ingjH ^-r

•

When practising repealed dummy deck landings on a shore air.ield, pllols needed to use high engine 2 66/TR A N S ITIO N T O TR IU M PH

aviation and its Navy’s aircraft carriers. The British

°

CompariUve evaluation of the sonobuoy recorders

Navy managed, however, to safeguard its air arm by

developed by INPL on French Julie recorders.

obtaining sanction for the “Through Deck Cruiser”.

•

Obtaining the latest JULIE sonobuoy recorders to

This was basically a flat topped ship, without

be fitted in the two Alizes being acquired from

catapult or arrestor gear which would operate the

France.

short/vertical take off and land (STOL/VTOL) Harrier

•

Obtaining JULIE systems for retrofitting in all the

aircraft which were then under development. The

earlier Alizes.

subsequent addition of a ski-jump in the bows

0

Importing the minimum essential requirements

enhanced the aircraft operating potential of the ship.

of the latest sonobuoys from France.

The ground version of the Harrier entered service

°

Developing

and

producing

indigenous

in the Royal Air Force in 1969. The US Marine Corps

sonobuoys, which could cope with India’s hot

ordered the

Harriers for their amphibious assault

and humid tropical conditions, as well as

ships. The Royal Navy then asked British Aerospace

minimise the outflow of precious foreign

to develop a maritime version of the Harrier (to be

exchange on these expensive expendable items.

called Sea Harrier) for the roles of shipborne air

defence and strike, with a specific requirement that it In August 1968, the two Julie fitted Alizes arrived

be able to withstand the corrosive marine

from France, just in time for exercises with the

environment. The Indian Navy decided to await the

submarine KALVARI which had arrived from Russia.

developments of the Sea Harrier.

To increase their effectiveness in the

reconnaissance role, the Alizes started carrying out

A liz e A n t i S u b m a rin e and R econn aissan ce the following exercises from 1966 onwards:

Aircraft

•

Joint tactical exercises with Air Force Liberator

Twelve Alize aircraft had been acquired with

MR aircraft, Canberra bombers. Hunters and HF

VIKRANT. As in the case of the Seahawks, difficulties

24 fighters in which Alizes homed these aircraft

were experienced in obtaining additional Alizes,

on to their targets.

because the French Navy was phasing them out.

© Trials with the newly acquired Swedish LEPUS

Eventually, in 1966/67 the French Navy agreed to

flare bombs to illuminate targets at night for

release two Alizes.

attack by Seahawks.

In the anti submarine role, the Alizes were fitted

with radar to detect submarine periscopes/snorts'

During this period, Alizes carried out electronic

and a

surveillance missions whenever and wherever

d irectio n fin d in g system to detect submarine

radar transmissions. For attacking a submarine the

required.

Alizes used sonobuoys to track the submarine and

By 1970, the Alizes were getting older and defects

depth charges to damage the submarine. The two key

were becoming chronic.

elements were the availabilty o f submarines to

Helicopters

exercise with and the availability of large numbers o f The period 1966 to 1971 saw a phenomenal increase sonobuoys to achieve proficiency in tracking. Until,

in the variety and capability of helicopters entering

Indian submarines arrived in 1968, the Alizes did not

service :

have enough opportunities to exercise with

submarines.

•

S

e a

k

i n

g s . The acquisition of the new French

In 1965. the Alizes exercised with the British

Daphne class submarines by the Pakistan Navy

submarine ASTUTE off Madras. In 1967, the Alizes

increased the urgency of acquiring anti

exercised with the British submarine ONSLAUGHT

submarine helicopters. In 1968, a proposal was

off Cochin. After the submarines acquired from

made for acquiring 12 Seakings. Sanction for the

Russia arrived from 1968 onwards, the tempo of Alize

acquisition of 6 Seakings was accorded in 1969

anti submarine exercise steadily increased and ma e

and in 1970 an order was placed for their delivery

Possible the sea trials of the sonobuoys which had

in 1971. Concurrently, an order was also placed

been by then been developed indigeneously.

for the acquisition of the MK 44 anti submarine

F r o m 1965 o n w a r d s , a tte n tio n fo cu ssed on homing torpedoes. On 17 Apr 1971. the Seaking

carrying ou t tria ls on indigenous air dropped m ^ e s Squadron was commissioned as INAS 330.

and on im proving the anti submarine capability o

e

Between May 1971 and end 1971, the Seakings

A lize s b y fittin g a so n ob u oy recordin g system, m e were involved in the following activities:

latter required:

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/267

Conversion flying

Rescue’ role. On 15 March 1969, the Helicopter

Maintenance courses at NATS

Squadron was commissioned as INAS 321 u

-

Evaluation by Tactical School of Seaking

comprised the SAR flights of VIKRANT, HANSA

capabilities

and

limitations

and

GARUDA and DEEPAK.

promulgation of preliminary Tactical

Helicopter Training School

Instructions

This preliminary evaluation was to prove misleading.

On 15 September 1971, the Helicopter Training

The first group who had returned from UK had only

School was commissioned as INAS 561 to provide

done familiarisation flying. At Indian insistence, the

basic training on Hughes 300 helicopters acquired

British Navy was giving the second group tactical

from the USA and provide advanced training on the

flying experience but this group arrived in India only

MATCH and SAR role Alouttes produced by HAL.

in October 1971 and were deployed in Bombay.

INAS 551

Meanwhile, NHQ had based its assessment of

Seaking utilisation on the limited information that

As the Vampires became older and less available, the

had been given to the first group and tasked the

squadron started using Seahaw ks. Since the

Seakings for anti submarine patrols off Bombay

Seahawks were themselves ageing, seven indigenous

harbour. To cap it all, the Tactical School’s Seaking

“Kiran" jet trainer aircraft (HJT-16) were ordered dockets were given high security classification.

from HAL. By mid 1971, all seven Kirans had been

Consequently, the people who mattered remained in

delivered. As Kirans joined, the Seahawks were

ignorance of Seaking performance and potential. The

returned to INAS 300 reserve stock.

defensive utilisation of the Seaking helicopters in the 1971 war was the cumulative result of all these

Naval A ir Operations in the 19 71 Indo

factors.

Pakistan War

Seaking availability was low during May, June

and July 1971. In August. NHQ lifted the ban on

Bay o f Bengal

lowering Sonar 195 and the evaluation of Seaking’s

dunking Sonar 195 commenced in earnest. Since the

The achievements of VIKRANT and her air squadrons

MK 44 torpedoes were not yet available, flight trials

have been described in the Chapter on the 1971 War.

were started for using depth charges. In end August,

The squadrons embarked VIKRANT in August, senior

the squadron started night flying. By October, two

experienced pilots were inducted and aircraft

Seakings were based at Bombay. In November, this

holdings raised to 18 Seahawks and 5 Alizes. They

had increased to four Seakings. The remaining two

worked up in the Bay of Bengal and were ready for

were at Cochin.

operations by November.

Between 4 and 14 December, the Seahawks by

•

MATCH Alouettes. The Leander Class frigates

day and the Alizes by day and by night struck targets

were designed to embark Multi-role Anti

at Cox’s Bazar, Chittagong, Khulna, Chalna, Mongla.

Submarine Torpedo Carrying Helicopters, whose

Barisal, Do Hazari, Chiringa and Bakarganj. Using

acronym became ‘MATCH’ helicopters. After the

500 lb bombs, rockets and guns, they struck

decision had been taken for the Army, Navy and

airfields, harbours, ammunition dumps, gunboats,

Air Force to have a common helicopter, the

armed merchant ships and troop positions. Despite

French Alouette was chosen for indigenous

damage by small arms fire, all aircraft were kept

manufacture at HAL. The Navy’s first three

airworthy. The Alizes proved most useful in assisting

helicopters were imported from France. The

ships of the Eastern Fleet in contraband control.

remainder were supplied by HAL.

Lt Cdr (later Rear Admiral) SK Gupta, was the

•

SAR Alouettes. The Search and Rescue (SAR)

Commanding Officer of the Seahawk squadron on

Alouette helicopter had entered the service with

board VIKRANT. He recalls:

VIKRANT in 1961. The survey ship DARSHAK.

which had been designed to embark a helicopter

VIKRANT with her squadrons was ready f° r

and had entered service in 1964. first embarked

action since November, having learnt to operate

an Alouette inT970 to help survey the Gulf of

aircraft at marginal conditions of wind and lo^

Kutch. The tanker DEEPAK. which was

speeds and with the most experienced S e a h a w

commissioned in 1967, was designed to embark

pilots embarked on board.

an Alouette. By March 1969, ‘Logistic Support’

“The initial Seahawk attacks were by eigh

had been added to the Alouette’s ‘Search and

aircraft with two aircraft, providing air d e fe n c e

268/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

cover. The attacks knocked out the ATC and other

accurate and several aircraft were damaged,

airfield installations at Cox’s Bazar. Similarly.

some requiring emergency landings on board,

Chittagong harbour and gunboats in the vicinity

with the ship about 90 to 100 miles away. The

were sucessfully attacked.

Alizes were busy doing recce sorties by day and

‘Thereafter, for the next 10 days, nearly 2001

bombing the runways at Cox’s Bazar at night. The

sorties were flown between the Seahawks and

Seahawks were very accurate in destroying small

Alizes. destroying pre-planned and opportunity

targets in the city, merchant ships in harbour

targets. Enemy ground fire began to get more

and those that tried to sail out’’.

Operational Sorties Flown in December 1971

Date

CAP

Anti

Cox’s

Chitta

Khulna

Mongla/

Hathazarl

Night

Contra

Armed

Army

Subma-

Bazar

gong

Chalna/

Dohazari/

Strike

band

Recce

Coop

rine

Pussur

Barisal/

Control

Patrols

River

Bakarganj

4

4 HK

5 A Z

8 HK

8 HK

.

_

_

.

.

x

5

-

3 AZ

-

-

-

-

-

2 AZ

4 AZ

-

-

6

3 HK

*

-

4 HK

4 HK

4 HK

7 HK

-

-

1 AZ

3 AZ

1 AZ

1 AZ

7

2 HK

-

2 HK

4 HK

-

-

-

-

2 AZ

2 AZ

2 AZ

8

-

-

-

-

1 AZ

-

-

3 AZ

-

-

9

_

_

_

4 HK

-

7 HK

-

-

3 HK

-

1 AZ

2 AZ

3 AZ

10

_

_

5 AZ

.

-

-

-

2 AZ

-

1 AZ

-

11

_

_

2 AZ

.

-

1 AZ

1 AZ

1 AZ

-

2 AZ

-

12

_

25 HK

-

-

-

-

4 HK

2 AZ

2 AZ

_

13

1 AZ

16 HK

_

-

-

7 HK

1 AZ

1 AZ

1 AZ

14

-* 2 HK

5 HK

.

3 AZ

-

-

-

-

1 AZ

1 AZ

1 AZ

1 AZ

2 AZ

Total

Sorties

Hours Flown

Seahawk

128

108

Alize

63

158

The vertical positioning needs to be adjusted downwards.

was sunk on 9 December, the Seakings carried

The Seahawk Squadron won one Maha Vir

out a few anti submarine searches, staging from

Chakra. five Vir Chakras, one Nao Sena Medal and

the disused airfield at Diu.

three Mentions in Despatches.

•

Alouettes, operating from INS KUNJALI in

The Alize Squadron won six Vir Chakras, six Nao

Bombay, provided air surveillance of the inner

Sena Medals and three Mentions in Despatches.

harbour to deter/detect clandestine underwater

attacks by chariots and frogmen.

Arabian Sea

•

Aircraft of the training squadrons INAS 551 and

On the West Coast of India:

550 carried out coastal surveillance off Goa and

Cochin respectively.

•

Alizes o p e r a tin g from Bombay and Jamnagar

.

R eq u isitio n ed civilian flying club aircraft assisted carried out anti submarine and reconnaissance

coastal surveillance in their local areas.

patr.ols. On 10 December, a Pakistan Air or Prior to the war, two naval pilots, Lieutenant

S ta rfig h te r. r e tu r n in g hom ew ard. haPP en^' , Hater Vice Admiral) Arun Prakash and Lieutenant

sight an Alize and’ shot it down with a Sidewi inter Rear Admiral) P Debrass had been deputed to

missile. All three crew were lost.

0rtrr,hnv

the Air Force as part of an ongoing exchange S e a k in g s o p e r a t in g from Santacruz

nrnunmme During the war. Lt Arun Prakash won

c a r r ie d out anti subm arin e pa ro

Chakra. He destroyed two C 130‘s.

approaches to Bombay harbour. A er

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/269

Alizes

D evelop m en ts B etw een 1972 and 1975

In March 1973, a French team visited the squadron

T h e A irc r a ft C arrier

regarding refurbishment of the Alizes. The production

After the war ended, VIKRANT undertook three

line for Alizes had stopped long ago and the French

crucial requirements before starting her long refit to

Navy had resorted to “refurbishing" their Alizes. It was decided that the Indian Alizes should be similarly

attend to her boiler problems :

refurbished to stretch their life into the mid 1980s.

•

Complete the training of the new aircrews which

Refurbishment commenced in 1975 and completed in

had been interrupted in September 1.971, when

1978.

senior experienced aircrew had been inducted.

S

e a

k

i n

g s

•

Carry out Seaking flying trials to finalise what

was required to be done during the forthcoming

As a result of their extensive flyin g and limited maintenance in the 1971 war, the availability of

refit to enable Seakings to operate from VIKRANT

Seakings fell sharply. It took nearly two years for the

•

Carry out Harrier trials to establish, “prima

situation to get better. Specialists came from Britain facie", its ability to operate from VIKRANT’s fight to improve detection capability of the Seaking sonars.

deck.

It took them over a year to isolate the causes and In Aug 72. VIKRANT started a three year refit during

implement the rem edies. The num erous other

which

problems that accom pany the induction of a

technologically sophisticated new helicopter also took

•

The boilers were refurbished.

time to resolve.

•

Seaking operating and maintenance facilities

In 1973, three new Seakings arrived, followed by

were installed.

three more in 1974, enabling the commissioning of

•

The communication systems were modernised

the second Seaking squadron INAS 336.

and indigeneous communication equipment

Thereafter, Seaking availabilty and efficiency

installed.

improved considerably. With a larger number of

•

All electronic compartments and test rooms were

submarines also available on both coasts, the

air conditioned.

Seakings were able to coord in ate their anti

submarine search and attack tactics and procedures

VIKRANT become operational in May 1975.

with those of the Russian Petyas and the British Seahawks. Alizes and Seakings resumed flying from

Leanders.

VIKRANT and participating in Fleet exercises.

The table on the next page gives an overview of

the delays that had to be suffered in the induction o

A irc ra ft

this potent new weapon platform.

T h

e S

e a

h

a w

k s

A

l o

u

e t t e s / C h e t a

k s

Between 1972 and 1974. the Seahawks. operating

INAS 331. The MATCH flight for the first L e a n d e r from ashore, suffered a number of fatal accidents.

class frigate. NILGIRI, was commissioned as INA

The problems were similar to those experienced

331 on 15 May 1972.

earlier with fire warning lights, but the aircrew were

In the light of experience gained in the 1971 war

new entrants. It took some time for them to gain

of how useful the light Alouette helicopter could be.

experience. By 1974. Seahawk spares became

Alouette flights were sanctioned for a n u m b e r o available in abundance. The firewalls were changed

ships. Apart from the first four Leanders and t e on almost all aircraft and Seahawks serviceability

frigates TR1SHUL and TALWAR. which em barked the

improved.

MATCH Alouettes, SAR Alouettes were sanctioned ° r

the frigates BRAHMAPUTRA. BEAS. BETWA, the new

H

a

r r i e r T

r i a

l s

o n

B

o a

r d

V

I K

R

A

N

T i n

1 9 7 2

training ship TIR and the new survey ships.

In July 1972, Biitish Aerospace, sent their

K

i r a

n

s

demonstrator G-VTOL Harrier to India for landing

tnals on board the VIKRANT. The trials showed that

The Kirans started flying from HANSA in 1972.

VIKRANT would be able to operate VTOL type aircraft.

experience was consolidated in operating an maintaining Kirans, their serviceability impI*°ve

considerably.

270/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Period

Seaking

Performance of

Flying Hours

Serviceability

Role Equipment

January 1972

Low

Poor

to July 1972

August 1972 to

Low

Commenced Sea

Limited

October 1972

trials of Sonar.

Performance poor

(Note: No workshop facilities.

no spares)

November 1972

Improved

Poor

Limited

to July 1973

August 1973 to

- Three new Seakings

- Commenced trials

Improved

November 1973

arrived.

and evaluations

Serviceability

- Workshops and

improved

test equipment set up

December 1973

Good

- Intensive anti submarine

Good

onwards

exercises

- MK 44 torpedo evaluation

July 1974

- Three new Seakings arrived

- Depth charge practices

Very Good

September 1974

- INAS 336 commissioned

1975

- Seakings embarked

Evaluations of tactical

Very Good

in VIKRANT

anti submarine cooperation

- First Fly ex from offshore rig

between:

SAGAR SAMRAT

- Seaking and Petyas

Seakings operated

- Seaking and Leanders

from Advance Landing

- Seaking and Alizes

Ground in Saurashtra

- Seaking and .Seahawks

M aritim e Reconnaissance

During the hostilities with Pakistan in 1965, the

inadequacy of MR become very apparent. During the

M aritim e R econnaissance (MR) was two facets:

Kutch operations in April-May 1965, every available

MR aircraft was deployed to search for Pakistan naval

•

In earlier days, the role o f M R was to search large

forces but without result

During the war in

sea areas b y day and by night to locate and track

September 1965. the MR effort available was barely

en em y w a rsh ip s and m erch ant ships and home

able to cover the approaches to Bombay and that too

air strikes and naval ships against them.

only in conjunction with VIKRANT's carrier based

•

W ith th e in crease in the num ber o f submarines,

aircraft flown from Santa Cruz. Despite the IAF's best

th e M R r o le e v o lv e d in to M R A S W to search , efforts, the maximum that could be provided during

locate, tra c k and a ttack enem y subm arines on the operations in May and September 1965 was

surface and subm erged, and co-operate with own

about 10 hours per day as against a requirement of

s u r fa c e fo r c e s in a n ti s u b m a r in e w a r fa ie 80 hours per day in the Arabian Sea alone.

operations.

In 1966, the Navy recommended to the

Government that the responsibility for MR and the

T h e sy s te m in h erited from the British was that command and control of shore based MR aircraft be

the A ir F orce operated M R aircraft for naval tasks.

transferred from the Air Force to the Navy. The Air

T h e M R a rm o f the Indian A ir Force was formed Force was not agreeable and preferred status quo.

fro m W o r ld W a r II L ib e r a t o r a ir c r a ft. T h e firs t The reasons advanced for and against this proposal

Lib erator S q u a d ro n (No 5) w as raised in November were as follows:

1948. Th ou gh old and inadequately equipped for the

task, Liberators did useful work as a MR squadron as

•

The Navy's position was that enemy ship

w ell as A ir S ea res cu e. In 1961, the IAF acquire recognition at sea and subsequent co-ordination

seven S u p e r C o n s te lla tio n (Su per Connie) aircrait of tactical action with co-operating surface forces

from A ir India for conversion to the MR role.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/271

E v a lu a tio n o f th e F r e n c h A t l a n t i c MRA.SW

required such extensive training that it was most

A ircra ft

cost effective for MR aircrews to be naval officers

familiar with the sea. It was for this reason that

In October 1968, an A tla n tic gave a flight

in all the major navies of the world (USA, Russia,

demonstration in Dabolim. In August 1969, a joint Japan, China, France, Germany and Holland),

Navy Air Force team evaluated the French Navy

MR aircraft were controlled and operated solely

Atlantic anti submarine reconnaissance aircraft. The

by the Navy. The only exceptions were Britain,

Atlantic operated from the Air Force station at Poona

India and Australia. In the early years of the

and the evaluation was carried out with submarine

British Royal Air Force, MR had been solely the

KALVARI. The Atlantic was found to be suitable. A

responsibility of the Air Force. After the First

special study group w as a p p oin ted to further World War. the Coastal Command of the Royal Air

examine the matter, after which a decision could be

Force had been formed from the Royal Naval Air

taken whether the Navy or the A ir Force would

Service and was largely manned by naval

operate MRASW aircraft.

aviators who were transferred en bloc to the RAF

Coastal Command at birth. Naval experience had

Decision f o r Navy to A cqu ire MRASW A ircra ft therefore been available to the RAF and it was on

After the 1971 war, in which KHUKRI was sunk by a

this foundation that the RAF Coastal Command

Pakistan Navy submarine, the Navy pressed the

evolved. The Commonwealth countries had

requirement for a versatile MRASW aircraft which,

unquestioningly adopted the British model. There

with a good radar, could rapidly search a required

was no reason for its continuance.

area and be capable o f attackin g and sinking a

• The Air Force position was that in the British

submarine located by it. In addition to its primary

Manual of Joint Operations, MR was a joint

role of anti submarine warfare, such a maritime

responsibility, that this system had stood the test

aircraft would also meet the surveillance needs of the

in Britain and Australia, that there would be

Navy over large ocean areas and thus act as the eyes

greater flexibility in aircraft utilisation if MR

of the Fleet over the horizon. In an anti submarine

remained with the Air Force, (since the aircraft

operation, MRASW a ircraft, anti submarine

could be used for other roles as well) and that in

helicopters and anti submarine ships had to act as a

the 1965 operations, the Air Force had met the

single weapon system. This required a high degree of

Navy’s MR requirement to the extent possible

coordination and sim ilar m ental response to

within the inadequate resources available.

submarine evasive action. This could only be done i

After prolonged discussions, it was decided to

MRASW aircraft were operated by the Navy. The Navy

maintain the status quo. The Air Force was to remain

therefore urged the Government for an early decision

responsible for MR as long as the existing Super

to acquire a suitable MRASW aircraft to be operated

Constellation aircraft were in service. The question of by the Navy.

command and control of MR would be reviewed when

In May 1973, the Governm ent accepted the

considering the induction of new MR aircraft.

Navy’s reasoning and approved in principle the

In subsequent years:

acquisition of four shore based MRASW aircraft.

In September 1973, a Navad team evaluated

e

•

The IAF continued to operate the Liberators and

British Nimrod aircraft in Britain. However t c

the Super Constellations from Poona and

serious financial situation after the oil cr*s*^

Bangalore.

October 1973 ruled out the purchase in foreig

•

The Joint Sea Air Warfare Committee kept the

exchange of either the Atlantic or the Nimrod.

augmentation of the MR squadrons under

Subsequent efforts focussed on ascertain s

continuous consideration.

whether IL 38 MRASW aircraft could be

•

Every major Fleet exercise repeatedly highlighted

from Russia. The Russian Navy was re^uC^:aI1viey

the number of air attacks that were wasted, time

spare these aircraft from their inventory because

and again, because of mistaken identity.

needed these for their own Navy. After persuas o

It became unmistakably clear that the correct

the Russian side agreed to spalre a few aircraft-

identification of ships at sea required extremely high

In February 1975, the agreement was signe

skills of aircrews to distinguish between and

the acquisition of three IL 38s from Russia.

tQ

positively identify own, enemy and neutral ships.

In June 1975 Government took the ^eC*sl

vest the command, control and operation or

MRASW IL 38’s with the Navy.

272/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Shri Govind Narain, then Defence Secretary

recalls:

the points of view of the Air Force. Then we in the

Defence Ministry prepared an elaborate note of 20

“The control of the air reconnaissance system

or 25 pages, putting down all points of view and

over the sea was in the hands of the Air Force. The

reached the conclusion that it would be more

Navy wanted this control to be transferred to

prudent if maritime reconnaissance was put

itself. This matter had been pending with the

under the control of the Navy but the

Government for nearly 10 years and it could not

maintenance of the aircraft could be left with the

get resolved. In the 1971 war, all the three wings

Air Force. Naturally the Navy was jubilant and

of the defence forces played a very significant part

the Air Force was unhappy, but this solution was

and all concerned could observe their respective

accepted by the Defence Minister, by the Political

roles. The performance of the Navy in Karachi

Affairs Committee of the Cabinet and finally by

was brilliant and the whole country was very

the Prime Minister and was enforced as a

impressed.

Government order.”

“Pressure continued to mount from the naval

Transfer o f the Super (Constellations to the Navy.

side that they would do even better if their

In early 1976, the Air Force wrote to the Navy offering operators felt more confident, if the air recce

to immediately hand over the Super Constellation MR

system was also within their own control. On the

aircraft. The offer had a proviso that should the Navy other hand, the Air Force pleaded that they had

find that they could not cope with the Super

all the airfield arrangements, they had all the

Constellations, then the IL 38's should revert to the

know how, they knew which aircraft from which

Air Force.

country could be best for what purpose, they had

Admiral Tahiliani recalls:

the maintenance facilities. All these were very

strong points.

“On the 5th of April 1976, at the Chiefs of Staff

“When this matter came repeatedly to the

Committee meeting in Delhi, an offer was made

Defence Ministry, what we did was to send the

by the Chief of Air Staff, Air Chief Marshal

whole problem to the Committee of the three

Moolgavkar, to Chief of the Naval Staff, Admiral

Chiefs of Staff and told them to deliberate afresh

Cursetji, that with the Government having

on these problems. We gave them two months

decided that the Navy will operate the IL 38s,

time to come back to the Defence Ministry with an

(which were not due to arrive till the middle of

agreed solution. Whatever agreed solution was

1977), the Navy should now take over the Super

found would be acceptable to the Defence

Connies.

Ministry.

“After a certain amount of discussion within

“At the end of the two months, no solution

the Navy, we naturally decided that we were going

was forthcoming. In individual discussions, the

to do so. .1 first came to know about it on the day

three Chiefs expressed their helplessness that no

after, that is the 6th of April, when then General

Raina, who was Chairman Chiefs of Staff, came

agreement could be reached. We gave them

and spent a day with us at sea on board

another two months time to reconsider this

VIKRANT. At lunch he said “What would be your

matter as it was very urgent, very important and

reaction if I was to tell you that the Air Force has

required their considered views. But again the

said that you can take over the Super Connies?" I matter remained with them for two more months

said “Sir, there must be some catch in it". Then

and there was no solution forthcoming. Then we

he related to me the discussion at the Chiefs of

discussed with the three Chiefs that if they could

Staff Committee meeting. I said “We must take

not reach any conclusion, would they like the

them over. There is not the slightest doubt in my

Defence Ministry to consider the whole matter

mind." He said “How would you manage the

objectively and find a solution. All the three

maintenance and the flying part?” I said “We will

Chiefs agreed that this should be done.

give our aircrew conversions. In three months

‘Thus the matter came to be considered in the

they will be flying the aircraft.

Major

Defence Ministry. We collected the necessary

maintenance is done by Air India and that is no

information from the various countries o t e

hassle for us.

world which had developed a system of maritime

“I must pay tribute to the first team led by the

reconnaissance. Then we analysed our own

late Cdr Ravi Dhir who did a magnificent job.

position. We went into great details of the; pom s

because the loaned Air Force aircrews and

of view of the Navy. We went into great e ai s

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/273

ground crew were all withdrawn, after their initial

it, so I said “Shall I put it down in writing ?. I wiu

loan period of six months. We had requested the

send a note to Defence Secretary with a copy to

Air Force to let them stay with us a little longer,

you, saying that we are prepared to hand over the

because our aircrew had not acquired enough

Super Connies immediately to the Navy ln fact. I

cloud flying, or experience in adverse conditions

suggest you take these aircraft now and we will

for which they were not rated. However the Air

send training teams, pilots and technicians for

Force withdrew every single person of theirs at

this.

the end of six months. This first team got

"But I also mentioned to CNS that “If you find

themselves rated, gained all the experience very

you cannot cope the Super Connies and you have

quickly and we were flying the Super Connies as

a problem, then the same should be returned to

well, if not better than our Air Force friends.

the A ir Force. This w ould su rely be in the

Purely in passing, I will mention that when the

national interest.” Jal was a gentleman and he

Super Connies were transferred from Air India to

agreed. He said “You have my word". I said “Fine.

the Air Force, Air India crews had been loaned to

The battle is closed.

the Air Force for a period of 20 months.

“That is how the w hole th in g was done.

“So, although our Air Force friends might

Naturally, the IL 38 got reflected in the Naval

have thought that they were going to frighten the

budget because the Navy were going to get it. The

Navy into accepting a commitment we would not

Air Force would not want to pay for these then.

be able to cope with, in the bargain they gave us

“Certainly some of us, and certainly myself,

an opportunity, by grabbing which we were able,

realised that the Navy had a point that MRASW

once and for all, to put this question of the

should come under naval control and should be

operation of long range maritime ASW aircraft

operated by navy pilots and maintained by naval

behind us".

personnel. If I may be utterly frank, I think what

the Air Force feared was that after acquiring MR

Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar, then Chief of the

aircraft, the Navy would want to expand their

Air Staff recalls:

carrier fleet and get more and more aircraft and

“The control of Maritime Operations had been

perhaps try to take on some of the Air Force roles

with the Air Force ever since Independence.

like the air defence of Bombay. The Air Force felt

Successive Air Chiefs were able to keep it with the

that their budget would be slashed and the Navy

Air Force, because they felt that air effort should

would get another carrier and more modern

be a single point responsibility. During the time

aircraft.

of my predecessor. Air Chief Marshal OP Mehra,

“I think the approach in the past had been

the question came up again very strongly and it

that we should nip naval suggestions in the bud

was decided that when the new IL-38 Russian

and say no to everything including the MR- I

MRASW aircraft came, then these would be

that “Let us handle each role by itself. Let the

handed over to the Navy and put under their

Navy have the MR and we will see in the future

control. At that time, we were operating the

regarding the air -defence of Bombay, whether the

Super Constellation aircraft in this role.

Navy can control it or do it better than we can."

“At the beginning of my tenure, I felt that it

So that is how the decision about the immediate

would be the right and correct thing to do, that

transfer of MR was taken. I think it was the right

the Navy should be given Super Connies now, a

decision. All the Air Force crew, the pilots, the

year and a half in advance, so that they could

technicians, etc were briefed and told very clearly

fam iliarise to operate heavy aircraft. Any

that everything possible should be done to train

mistakes the Navy made or any accidents would

the Navy personnel quickly and seriously with the

be on these old aircraft and not on the new IL

intention of early transfer of the Super Connies.’'

38’s. Surely this is reasonable thinking.

“In this context, I made the offer to hand over

Vice Admiral (then Lt Cdr) Arun Prakash recalls-

the Super Constellations to the Naval Chief, if I

The Navy had been pecking away at the

recall right, in the Defence Secretary Banerjee’s

Government with its claim to take over MR and

office. The CNS, Jal Cursetji, was in fact taken

we had more than adequate justification. The Air

aback, asked me if I was feeling alright. I said

Chief decided that he would by a “coup de main •

“Yes, I am making this offer because I feel this is

once and for all, put an end to the Navy’s claims

the correct thing to do" He did not quite believe to MR. He suddenly turned round and said “All

274/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

right, I will hand over aircraft belonging to No 6

Squadron Air Force. You have six months to

and a core team of Air Force maintenance

prove that you can fly and maintain that

personnel were bundled off to Goa. Here we

gathered once again into an “ad hoc" squadron

machine. If the Navy cannot do this, then the

which was given the designation INAS 312.

whole thing falls back to the Air Force". It was

although not yet commissioned. We gathered all

something like "double or quits". It could mean our sailors who had any experience at all of

that the Navy would also lose the Ilyushin 38

piston engined aircraft and mulU engined aircraft

MR/ASW aircraft.

and put them in the hands of the IAF technical

“It was quite a challenge, because all our

crew.

experience as far as flying and maintenance was

“Now we were quite clear in our minds that we

concerned was confined to relatively small turbo

had a short lease of time to show that we could

prop or jet aircraft which were single engined.

handle this aircraft, both from the flying angle as

Now the Super Constellation was a giant

well as the maintenance aspects. Fortunately,

(144,000 pound) machine with four piston

the Air Force crew who came along with us as a

engines. She had started off life as an airliner

training team had no qualms or reservations at

with A ir-In dia, and when the aircraft were

all. They were totally dedicated to their task,

superseded by Boeing 707s they were handed

which was to train the naval personnel' to take

over to the Indian Air Force for maritime

over, regardless of what the higher Air Force

reconnaissance.

authorities had in mind. So we got down to our

“So the Air Chief did take a very calculated

work with a will, and within about six weeks, the

first Naval pilot flew solo and that was Lt Cdr

gamble. No naval aircrew had any experience of

Bhide who had jumped from single engine jets to

flying anything more than medium sized twin

a four engined aircraft. That I think was quite an

engine aircraft, and that too was way back in the

achievement. Slowly and progressively, all four

days of the Sealand in the early 1950s. Most of us

pilots went solo. Similarly our observers

were single engine pilots, most of our observers

managed to master the art of navigation over land

had only experience of flying over the sea where

and of procedures and let down into busy

they were more tactically oriented in terms of

international airports, which was quite an

anti-submarine warfare and so on. Whereas

achievement. One fine day, we found that we had

flying these four-engined behemoths required

virtually taken over the squadron. A formal

skills, both of piloting as well as of navigation, of

commissioning ceremony was then organised

an entirely different kind. For example, if you

where both Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar and

had to go and land at an international airfield, the

Admiral Jal Cursetji came down to Goa and the

procedures and the holding patterns, the R/T

squadron was commissioned as INAS 312.

natter and the circuits etc were so complicated,

“We gathered from informal convcrsaUon and

discussions with our Air Force colleagues who

that we really had no experience of this. So it was

had worked with us that this was not as per the

not without a fair amount of trepidation that all of

Air Force game plan. Actually, they had

us gathered in Goa in early 1976 and we were

anticipated that with our background and our

deputed from there to proceed to No 2 Wing at

levels of experience, we would find it extremely

Poona.

difficult to get on top of this aircraft; certainly so

"The Squadron Commander (designate) was

in six months. They had estimated that 12 to 18

Cdr Ravi Dhir, the Senior Pilot was Lt Cdr Bhide

months was the minimum that the Navy would

and there were two more pilots, I being one o

need to be able to fly this aircraft and handle all

them. Similarly, there were four co-pilots and

the maintenance operations that were involved.

about 6 to 8 observers. We all gathered in oa

So I presume, this came as an unpleasant

and proceeded to No 2 Wing. Poona, where we

surprise to the Air Force that we were ready,

were given a short course by the Air Force un er

willing and able to take on this task."

basic flying

t h e a e g i s o f No 6 S q u a d r o n in

Commodore Shahane (then Cdr) was the

procedures, the technical details of the airc

Squadron Air Engineer Officer in HANSA from 1976

and so on. The maintenance crew started their

to 1978. He recalls:

class room and practical training at t e

time. After that, on completion of this

“A large contingent had gone away to Russia for

course, all of us naval aircrew plus s° m

training and induction or the IL 38s. Technical

Force flying instructors, navigation ins ru

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/275

manpower was minimal at HANSA and in the

acquisition. It had already been operating Sea

squadrons and in VIKRANT. Then we were

Harriers. After Government approved its acquisition

suddenly faced with the problem o f sending

and refit, it was commissioned as INS VIRAAT on 19

personnel for training and inducting a huge MR

May 1987.

aircraft like the Super Constellation.

“At HANSA, there were tremendous

Fixed W ing A ircra ft

challenges for developing the infrastructure

INAS 3 0 0

facilities for the Super Constellations, which were

quite different from those which were already in

Phasing out o f Seahawks

hand for the IL 38s. I remember being on 10

The Seahawks disembarked from VIKRANT for the

boards at a time for developing all these facilities.

last time on 8 May 1978. Even ashore, their

We were also very apprehensive about how we

availability could not be sustained. By end 1978, the would be able to operate the Super Constellations

Seahawks phased out. The last Seahawk flight was

because the Air Force was not in a position to give

on 16 Dec 1983, to escort the first three Sea Harriers us things like aircraft jacks and other support

as they arrived over Naval Air Station Dabolim.

equipment. While dealing with the Air Force

however, we found them very helpful at the

Induction o f Sea Harriers

squadron level. And the Air Force technical and

In 1977, Government approved the acquisition of 8

operational staff and the pilots and the aircrew

Sea Harriers, including 2 trainers. The first British who had come to Goa were extremely co-operative

Sea Harrier flew in 1978. By mid 1979, it was

in helping us with the maintenance of the Super

undergoing intensive flying trials. In 1979, NHQ

Constellations. By and large, after the initial

placed an order for 6 Sea Harriers and 2 Harrier teething problems were resolved, not much

difficulty was experienced.”

Trainers for delivery in 1983. The Sea Harrier entered

service with the British Navy in 1980. In 1982. it Developments After 1975

proved its capability in the British operations against Argentina in the Falkland Islands.

A ircraft Carriers

The training in Britain o f Indian Sea Harrier

pilots started in 1982. The first three Sea Harriers VIKRANT underwent two modernisation refits:

landed at Dabolim on 16 December 1983. The first

1979 to 1981. In the first phase of her Sea Harrier landed on VIKRANTs deck on 20 Dec 83.

modernisation, her boilers were-renewed, new

Sea Hamers were acquired in three batches.

radars were fitted, facilities were installed to

Batch

Sea Harriers

Trainers

operate the Sea Harriers, new anti aircraft guns

First

were fitted, the communication systems were

6

o

modernised, the air conditioning was extended,

Second

7

1

and the catapult and arrestor gear were

Third

10

1

overhauled since Alizes would continue to

operate.

e ^ea Harriers carried a variety of weapons; air

•

1987 to 1989. In the second phase of

0 air and air to surface missiles; conventional and

modernisation the catapult and arrestor gear

c uster bombs and runway denial weapons; rockets

an guns. All weapon release modes were calculated

^TssTsTthe Se/H jUmP W3S fittCd in the bows

to assist the Sea Harriers to take off, facilities

by weapon aiming computers and displayed on the

were

installed

to

operate the

newer

head-up symbology.

technologically advanced Seaking helicopters L d

their new missiles and torpedoes.

INAS 310

Phasing Out o f Alizes

VIKRANT continued to operate till 1994, after which

she was laid up and eventually decommisioned t

The Alizes were refurbished by 1978. The last launch

of Alizes from VIKRANT took place on 2 April 1987

The Second A ircra ft Carrier

1 hereafter Alizes operated only from ashore.

*

rom February 1988 to October 1989. during

In 1985, the second hand, 1953 vintage British

T nPe£a 1 u11 Pawan to assist the Government of Sri aircraft carrier HMS HERMES, became available for

nf l T a,T , Alizes °P erated from Madurai in support the Indian Peace Keeping Force. They flew 18°°

276/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

hours and the crew won three Nao Sena Medals and

Cochin on 18 May 76. The remaining three arrived by

four Mentions in Despatches.

end 76.

During the operation to assist the Government of

In 1981, two Islanders of INAS 550 were based at

the Maldives, in suppressing an insurrection, an Alize

Port Blair. In 1984, these were commissioned as INAS

spotted the rebel’s escape vessel MV Progress Light

318 and the naval air station at Port Blair was

and fired at it, forcing it to stop and be apprehended.

commissioned as INS UTKROSH.

The Alizes stopped flying on 12 April 1991 and

the Squadron was decommissioned in Aug 91. Seven

INAS 551

aircraft were left of the total of 14 acquired. During the 30 years of the squadron’s existence, the Alizes

K

i r a n T r a

i n

i n

g A

i r c r a

f t

had flown 35,912 hours and done 7,144 deck

The Vampires were phased out by 1976. In 1978, the

landings.

last of the Seahawks was returned to INAS 300 and

the armed versions of the Kirans joined the squadron

I n

d

u

c t i o

n

o

f D

o

r n

i e

r 2 2 8

for training jet pilots for the frontline squadron and

On 24 August 1991, the first naval Dornier arrived to

for FRU tasks. In 1987 and 1988, 8 Kiran MK II’s

replace the Alizes in INAS 310. Thereafter additional joined the squadron.

Dorniers joined: one in 1991, two in 1992 and one in 1993. making a total induction of five Dorniers.

Helicopters

The Dorniers were progressively fitted with the

latest radar, electronic and sonobuoy systems for the

H

e l i c o p t e r s . i n F

r i g a t e s a n d D

e s t r o y e r s

surveillance and EW roles.

The embarkation of helicopters in ships, which had

started with the light Alouette Ills in VIKRANT,

INAS 312

DARSHAK and DEEPAK in the 1960’s followed by the

MATCH Alouettes in the first four Leander frigates in

the 1970’s, accelerated in the 1980s.

S

u

p

e r C

o n

s

t e l l a

t i o n

s

•

All new front line frigates and destroyers were

Five Super Constellation aircraft of the Air Force's No designed to embark heavy helicopters. TARAGIRI

6 Squadron at Pune were taken over from the Air

and VINDHYAGIRI had one Seaking each. The

Force on 18 November 76 and designated INAS 312.

RAJPUT class frigates from Russia had one

The Super Connies phased out in 1983 and in

Kamov each. The GODAVARI class frigates of

due course were replaced by the Russian TU 142s

Project 16 had two Seakings each, as do the

which arrived in 1988.

DELHI class destroyers of Project 15. The

LST(L)’s were designed to embark the commando

T

U

1

4 2

s f o

r

L

o

n

g

R

a

n

g e M

a

r i t i m

e P

a

t r o l

variant Seakings.

On 30 March 1988, the first three TU 142 M aircraft

•

All other frigate sized ships had the lighter

landed at HANSA after a non stop flight from Russia.

Alouette Ills (Chetaks) - TRISHUL and TALWAR

Two more aircraft arrived on 13 April. The squadron

after conversion, BRAHMAPUTRA, BEAS and

was commissioned at HANSA on 16 April an

BETWA after conversion to the training role, the

designated.INAS 312. The remaining three aircraft

new training ship TIR. the new survey ships and

arrived between August and October 1988.

the new KHUKRI class corvettes of Project 25.

I n d

u

c t i o n

o

f R

u s s i a n K

A

M

O

V

2 5 S

i n

g l e P

a

c k

a

g e

INAS 315

A

n

t i S u b m

a r i n e H

e l i c o p t e r s

M a r itim e R e c o n n a is s a n c e A n ti S u b m a r in e

With the commissioning o f the new guided missile

frigate INS RAJPUT in Russia in March 80. the first

A

i r c r a

f t I L

3

8 s

KA 25 helicopter entered service. On 11 Dec 80, the

Three IL 38’s arrived in Goa in October 1977. Later,

twin engined KA 25 helicopter squadron was

two more IL 38’s joined the squadron in 1983.

c o m m is s io n e d at HANSA and designated INAS 333.

In subsequent years, the KA 28s replaced the

INAS 550

obsolescent KA 25s.

Glanders

INAS 321

The proposal to acquire Islanders for

**

Observer Training and Fleet requirements had

On 1 Aug 80, INAS 321 relocated to Bombay in INS

Vitiated in 1972. The first two Islanders arn

KUNJALI.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/277

INAS 3 3 0 /3 3 6 and Seaking Variants

Seakings

Commando/T roop

On 19 Jul 79, the Seaking Flight and Tactical

Mk 42C

Carrying Helicopters

Simulator (FATs) was commissioned in Cochin.

for

the

Marine

In addition to the ASW Seakings MK 42 acquired

Commandos and for

in 1971. other variants of Seakings were acquired in

the new indigenous

subsequent years:

Landing

Ships

1979/80

Seakings

ASW Helicopters

MAGAR

and

Mk 42 A

designed for being

GHARIAL

hauled down on the

decks of the 5th and

New Naval Air Stations

6th

Leanders,

The naval air station at Port Blair was commissioned

TARAGIRI

and

as INS UTKROSH on 11 May 1984.

VINDHYAGIRI using

The fourth naval air station, on the east coast of

the Recovery Assist

India, commissioned in 1992 as INS RAJALI.

Traverse

system

With the increasing number of helicopters on

(RAST).

board the ships based in Bombay, it became

1987

Seakings

ASW Helicopters for

necessary to have a helipad area from where

to

Mk 42 B

embarkation in the

helicopters could continue flying when ships were

1989

aircraft

carriers

alongside. In view of its proximate location, INS

VIKRANT

and

KUNJALI became the Navy’s helicopter base in

VIRAAT, and the

Bombay.

GODAVARI

class

For similar reasons, a naval air station was

missile frigates. In the

commissioned at Visakhapatnam as INS DEGA in 21

anti ship role, the MK

October 1991.

42B’s were capable of

firing air to surface

Sea Eagle missiles.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/279

18

Weapons

Preamble

launcher-fire control suite had been removed

from a non-operational missile boat and was

The variety and technology of the new weapons that

being installed in TALWAR. TRISHUL was to be

entered service between 1965 and 1975 significantly

similarly fitted in her next modernisation refit.

raised the Navy’s weapon capability. This chapter

Likewise, an entire missile launcher-fire control

describes weapon developments under five headings:

suite had been rem oved from another non-

•

The New Weapons

operational missile boat, installed at the Naval

•

Weapon Maintenance

Coast Battery Bombay and successfully test fired.

•

Naval Armament Service

•

Agreements had been signed for the acquisition

•

Naval Armament Inspection

from Russia of frigates and ocean-going rocket

•

Weapon Acceptance Trials and Work Up

boats having anti ship and anti aircraft missiles

and high rate of fire, small calibre guns for anti

The New Weapons

aircraft and anti missile defence.

The design o f the in digenou s Project 16

S

u

r f a

c e W

a

r f a

r e

GODAVARI class frigates, which would follow the

Until 1967. the Navy’s mindset regarding surface

sixth Leander, featured anti ship and anti aircraft

warfare was totally •‘gun” oriented. The effectiveness missiles and high rate of fire guns, similar to

of Russian anti-ship missiles surprised the world

those in the new guided missile frigates and

with the sinking of an Israeli frigate during the 1967

ocean going rocket boats being acquired from

Arab Israel War. This led to the Navy's acquiring

Russia.

missile boats from Russia.

•

A second squadron o f longer endurance,

Acquaintance with the capabilities of Russian

improved missile boats had been acquired from

missiles, combined with the damage that the missile

Russia for coastal defence.

boats caused during their attacks on Karachi

harbour in the 1971 Indo Pakistan War, led to a

A

n

t i A

i r c r a

f t W

a

r f a

r e

review of future weapon fitment for surface warfare

From 1966 onwards, the Russian acquisitions

It was clear that heavy guns had been superceded

brought in 25 mm. 30 mm and 76 mm high rate of

by anti-ship missiles. It was equally clear that small

fire, anti aircraft guns.

missile boats could not decide a battle in mid-ocean

In 1972. the British Seacat. short range, anti

where operations at long distances from shore

aircraft missile entered service in the first L e a n d e r required not only endurance and sea keeping

frigate, the NILGIRI. In 1973. it demonstrated its qualities, but also a multi role configuration to capability to shoot down a towed target. In 1974. the counter submarines. The future seemed to lie in

second frigate, HIMGIRI, demonstrated its c a p a b ility retrofitting anti-ship missiles in existing ships

to shoot down a pilotless target aircraft (PTA).

having anti-ship missiles in new warships and*

The Seacat missile soon presented the GunneOj

where'er possible, have anti aircraft missiles and

world with a problem. Sailors who had already pr°v(-f

gh rate of fire small calibre guns to provide

eir proficiency as “Gun Layers", having good

missiles.^ Capabl’ Uy against '"com in g enemy eye coordination, were the obvious field from whic"

o select Seacat aimers. During practice runs on

By 1975:

simulator and during Seaca.t firin g practices,

however, it soon became evident that this was not s •

•

Z ST

Si0nS With the Russian side had clarified

the grey areas regarding the feasibility of fitting a

e eacat was a radio command guided missl

missile boat system in the British anti submanne

whose control was achieved by using the right thu«w

frigates TALWAR and TRISHUL. An entire missUe

on a ball, moving it - up/down and left/right - to sen

commands to the missile and optically guide it on

the target in the aimer’s sight. What was actually

required was “thumb-eye" coordination. It took time metres; their anti submarine rockets had a range of a

for the Gunnery brahch to shed its elitist

few thousand metres and the range of their heavy,

anti submarine, homing torpedoes matched that of

possessiveness of this new weapon and accept that

their medium range sonars.

“thumb-eye” coordination was an aptitude which had

The arrival of the Seaking helicopters in 1971,

to be culled after testing sailors of all branches.

with their dunking sonar and lightweight air dropped

Thereafter, they had to be given a Seacat Aimers

homing torpedoes, further increased the Navy’s anti

badge and an allowance as an incentive to hone this

submarine capability.

skill.

The first Leander frigate, the NILGIRI, was being

Anti Subm arine Warfare

fitted with a variable Depth Sonar and her propellers

would have the Agouti system to minimise cavitation

The arrival by 1961 of the British anti submarine

noise.

frigates TRISHUL, TALWAR, KHUKRI, KUTHAR and

KIRPAN had increased the maximum sonar detection

Problem Areas

range from the earlier few hundred metres, to a few The induction of this large number of technologically thousand metres; the range of their anti submarine

advanced fire control radars, sonars and weapons

weapons had increased from a few dozen metres to a

raised two problem areas regarding the overall

few hundred meters.

responsibility for their combat readiness:

The Pakistan Navy’s acquisition of “silent"

Daphne class submarines made it unlikely that they

•

Should the overall responsibility of the ships

weapon system continue to be with the “user"

could be detected on passive sonars. The vagaries of

department as in the past or should it be shared

hydrology in the Arabian Sea favoured the submarine

with the Electrical Department’s maintenance

because the temperature layers in the sea refracted a

personnel?

ship’s sonar transmissions. The range of the

•

Should the responsibility for a complete weapon

Daphne’s class submarine’s latest homing torpedoes

like a missile or a torpedo continue to be with the

exceeded by far the maximum detection range and

armament supply organisation as in the past or

the weapon range of the Navy’s anti submarine

shared with the Electrical Branch?

frigates. There was, therefore, a pressing need for

longer range sonars, longer range homing torpedoes,

Since both fire control systems and weapons now

and variable depth/dunking sonar which could

had considerable electronic content, the Navy’s

overcome hydrological constraints.

Weapon Maintenance Policy and the Division of

The Russian Petyas which started arriving from

Responsibilities had to be revised.

1968 onwards greatly increased anti submarine

Another problem area was the need to reduce the

capability. Their medium range sonars had a

proliferation of gun calibres in service. By 1975, the maximum detection range of several thousand

position was expected to be:

New Calibres

C alibres P h a s in g O u t

Calibres Still in Service

Russian 25 mm

British two pounder

Oerlikon/Hispano 20 mm

Russian 30 mm

Pom-poms

Bofors

40/60 mm

Russian 57 mm

4 inch

British twelve pounders

British

Russian 76 mm

British

4.5 Inch

British

4.7 inch

British

6 inch

electrical instruments were the responsibility o f the

Weapon Maintenance

Electrical Department. The remaining parts o f guns

like barrels, breech blocks and recoil cylinders w ere

E v o lu tio n o f R e s p o n s ib ilit ie s f o r Weapon

maintained and repaired by the A rm am ent Su pply

Maintenance

Organisation. Torpedoes w ere the respon sibility o f

From L939 onwards, gun mountings on board used

the Arm am ent Supply O rganisation, w h ich had a T orp ed o E n gin eerin g Shop lo c a ted in th e N a v a l to be maintained by ordnance engineer

ordnance artificers who formed part of the Sh P

D° CUnmdi958. the Navy’s weapons had been entirely

Engineering Department. The repair of radars

o f Second World War vintage:

s ° n a r s , g y r o s , c o m m u n ic a t io n eq u ip m en TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/?81

•

For surface action, ships had manually opeiated,

the Electrical Officer for the efficient upkeep 0f

hand loaded, 12 pounder, 4 inch. 4.7 inch and 6

weapon systems and the custody of spare gear

inch calibre guns.

and test equipment required for the maintenance

•

For defence against aircraft, ships had manually

of Gunnery and TAS equipment. The Weapon

operated, hand loaded, two pounder pom poms,

Maintenance Officer was to keep the Gunnery

Bofors 40/60 and Oerlikon 20 mm guns.

and TAS O fficers inform ed o f the state of

•

For anti submarine action, ships had short range

serviceability of their respective weapon systems

anti submarine weapons like depth charges and

for operation and firing.

hedgehogs, compatible with their short range

®

The Gunnery and TAS officers, as the users of the

sonars.

weapons, remained responsible for the custody

and accounting o f the G unnery and TAS

From 1958 onwards, the eight new British

equipment fitted on board, naval armament

frigates of post war design ushered in analogue

stores, diving equipment and minesweeps, as

computers and gyro stabilised fire control systems,

applicable.

together with remotely controlled, semi-automatic,

longer range weapons. On board ships, things were

This division of responsibility was recognised to

manageable when everything worked efficiently.

be fragile but no better solution could be found.

When things did not work properly, the problem

The arrival of the Russian acquisitions from 1968

arose as to who was responsible. The statutary

onwards imposed unforeseen strains on the Weapon

regulations unambiguously stipulated that single

Maintenance Policy which had ju s t been

point responsibility and accountability for battle

promulgated:

readiness vested in the Gunnery and the Torpedo

Anti Submarine (TAS) officers. They were responsible

°

The design and technology of Russian electronics

to the Commanding Officer for the efficient

and power electrics differed from that of the

performance of both men and equipment in battle.

British. Russian weapons had greater

Officers and artificers trained in ordnance

automation, longer ranges and higher rates of

engineering and gun mounting hydraulics formed

fire.

part of these departments. Now, with the increase in

•

Russian ships were crammed with electronic and

electronics and power electrics, responsibility and

electric equipment. The cramped spaces imposed

accountability became unclear. How could the

limits on the maintenance and repair that could

Gunnery and TAS Departments be accountable for

be done on board.

problems in the electronic and electrical equipment of

•

Russian ships did not have enough bunks to

their weapon systems?

accomodate the Indian Navy’s separate Seaman

It was clear that major changes were necessary in

Branch weapon users and separate Electrical

sailors’ trades and departmental responsibilities.

Branch weapon maintainers.

Could the seaman user also do the electrical

These difficulties were compounded by the lack of

maintenance - if so, could seaman sailors be trained

Russian maintenance and repair facilities in

to understand electronics? Or was it better that the

Visakhapatnam which took time to be set up. When

electrical maintainer become the user? If so, was it

all this combined with the compulsions mentioned

cost effective for electrical sailors to perform seamen elsewhere, like “Need to Know”, rotation of personnel,

duties? The 1967 Committee for the Reorganisation

of the Sailors Structure (CROSS Committee)

and lack of spare parts, the sh ortfalls in the examined these issues. No satisfactory via media

functional efficiency" of Russian weapon systems’

could be found to evolve a User-Maintainer concept.

became a cause for serious concern.

In 1968. the responsibility for the “functional

In co n tra st, th e w e a p o n s p a c e s in th e Leander efficiency” of weapons was transferred to the

class frigates w ere m ore sp aciou s an d en ou gh bunks Electrical Branch and a new designation of Weapon

had been p ro v id e d to m eet th e n e e d s o f th e N avy s Maintenance Officer was introduced:

sailor trade structu re o f sepa rate u sers and separate m aintainers. Moreover, B om bay b e in g th e m ain base

•

The ships Electrical Officer, as the weapon

o f the Navy, the developm en t o f w ea p on m aintenance maintainer, was made responsible to the

f a c ilit ie s in B o m b a y h a d k e p t a b r e a s t o f the Commanding Officer for the efficient functioning

inductions.

of weapon equipment. The Weapon Maintenance

Officer, where provided, was made responsible to

282/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

E

v

o

l u

t i o

n

o

f W

e a

p

o n

M

a

i n

t e n

a

n

c e F

a

c i l i t i e

s

i n

The half-life strip and rebuild" of electronic

B

o m

b a y

weapon systems after approximately twelve years

In 1959, the Weapon Control Repair Shop (WECORS)

of service.

was sanctioned for the repair of the gunnery and anti

submarine fire control systems. WECORS developed

The Naval Armament Service

in phases:

The Naval Armament Service had its beginning in

•

Phase 1 was completed in 1966 and enabled the

1932 with the formation of the Royal Indian Marine. A

repair of fire control equipment and gyros of all

small Royal Naval Armament Depot was started in

weapon systems in the new British frigates.

Bombay at Butcher Island, manned entirely by

•

Phase 2 was completed in 1971 and enabled the

British civilians. In 1933, the entire British staff were repair of the heavy mountings in these frigates.

transferred to the British naval base at Trincomalee

in Ceylon. The needs of the Indian Navy were met by

In 1965, it was decided that except for those

the Indian Army Ordnance Corps, who established a

functions looked after by the Armament Supply

small group in the Naval Dockyard and at Butcher

Organisation, all the repair work carried out by the

Island.

different departments of the Dockyard on weapon

systems and associated gunnery and electronic

Developments During the Second World War 1939

equipment should be combined. A separate Weapons

to 1947

Department was formed as part of the Industrial

In 1940, the Admiralty deputed a senior Royal Naval

Manager’s Department. Like the Constructor,

Armament Service officer to India, to advise on the

Engineer and Electrical departments, the Weapon

possibility of setting up a Naval Armament Supply

Department was headed by the Assistant Industrial

(NAS) organisation in India. In September 1941, the

Manager Weapons (AIMW) to administer the

first NASO (India) was appointed in Bombay.

WECORS (then under construction), and the Gun

After the British surrender at Singapore in

Mounting Depot and the Torpedo Engineering

February 1942 and the British Navy’s withdrawal

Workshops. In August 1968, the Gun Mounting and

from Trincomalee, a large number of Indian

Torpedo Depots at Bombay were combined and

subordinate officers and senior supervisors from the

redesignated as the Weapons Equipment Depot

Naval Armament Depots (NADs) at Singapore and

(WED) Bombay under the AIMfW).

Trincomalee moved to Bombay. With this experienced

Apart from the maintenance of weapon systems

staff and the storage accomodation readily available

on board ships, the Weapons department.of the

in Butcher Island, the NAD Bombay expanded

overnight. NASO Bombay operated directly under the

Electrical Branch was involved in the following

Admiralty in Britain to meet the needs of the British

activities:

Eastern and Pacific Fleets. In addition to the NAD at

•

The development and laying of deep and shallow

Butcher Island, mine issuing and armament store

degaussing ranges. Degaussing helped to

issuing ships were based in Bombay. The first Indian

minimize the magnetic influence of ships hulls

NASO was appointed in 1944, but for all practical

and thereby decrease the likelihood of their

nurposes, the NAD was run by the Director of

Armament Supply (DAS) at the Admiralty and under

triggering magnetic mines.

The repair, in co n ju n ction w ith INPL Cochin, o the Deputy DAS in Colombo.

In preparation for the offensive against Japan,

sonar tran sdu cers.

small armament depots were opened at Karachi

Settin g u p ca lib ra tio n ranges for anti submarine Cochin Madras, Visakhapatnam. Calcutta and

m ortars and ca rryin g out calibrations.

rhittagong. Bulk naval armament stores were kept at

T e s t in g a n d r e p a ir in g b u o y a n t m inesw eeping the inland Army Depot at Phulgaon. A Director of

cables.

Armament Supply (India) was appointed in 1945.

In d ig e n o u s m a n u fa c tu re by Indian agencies o AftTr the end of the war, all the small depots were

L e a n d e r g u n m o u n tin g s and anti su bm ar n

>

a rfnum in 1946. except for Visakhapatnam

m o rta rs in c o lla b o r a tio n w ith the principa s here the Navy noved into the Transit Depot vacated

Britain.

h v t h e Armv^The British Navy's Torpedo Depot in

•

D evelop m en t o f an u nderw ater noise range.

Bomba^vas handed over to the R.N's Armament

•

? rePa*r o f d iv in g equipm ent.

Supply Organisation m 1946.

M odification o f son ar domes.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/283

Cheetah Camp was revived. The movement of stores

The main problem during 1946 had been the

to Trombay started in 1952 and was completed by

closure of armament depots and the disposal an

1953, whereafter it became NAD Bombay.

redistribution of surplus ammunition. To this was

During these years, the NAS Organisation had

added, in 1947, the problem of division of assets at

two wings. The NAD Bombay, stored the ammunition

the time of partition.

and mines. The NASO’s section, located inside the

Developments from 1 9 4 8 to 1 9 6 5

Naval Dockyard, looked after the Torpedo Depot, took By 1948, the Navy’s expansion plans had crystallised.

wear measurements of barrels, replaced weapon

From 1949 onwards, the development of the NAS

barrels when necessary and maintained and repaired

organisation concentrated on three main activities:

weapon parts like breach blocks and recoil cylinders.

It also served as the front office for liaising with ships

•

Building up the NAS cadres of officers and

regarding ammunitioning and de- ammunitioning.

supervisory staff.

The construction o f the NAD Karanja was

•

Building new NADs to accomodate the war

implemented in phases. It started being occupied in

reserves and practice requirements of

1959 and continued expanding thereafter to store the

ammunition for the ships being acquired from

ammunition of the new British frigates.

Britain.

In 1961, the arrival o f the aircra ft carrier

•

Building up in the NADs the capability and

VIKRANT brought with it large holdings of bombs,

capacity to refurbish explosive items and

rocket and gun ammunition. All these were stowed in

conserve foreign exchange.

the NAD Karanja and older holdings were distributed

Building up the NASO Cadres

to

the

NAD’s

at Trom bay,

Alwaye and

Visakhapatnam.

From 1949 onwards, batches of officers and senior

It was intended that ships go alongside a new

supervisors started being sent to Britain for training.

jetty at Karanja which would have sufficient depth for

By 1951, they were able to relieve most of the

ships to secure alongside and embark/disembark

Admiralty’s British staff in India. The last British DAS

ammunition. During its construction, however, the

left in 1955.

jetty was afflicted by such severe siltation that its In the 1950’s, the first batch of NASOs having

dredging became prohibitive in cost. Various schemes

mechanical and electrical engineering degrees was

were examined to make the jetty usable but to no

recruited to man the NADs. On joining, they

underwent a year’s technical training on naval

avail. Ships anchored in ammunitioning berths in the

armament activities. In 1966, to attract better talent, vicinity of the jetty and barges ferried the ammunition NASOs started being inducted through the Union

between the jetty and these berths.

Public Service Commission’s annual Engineering

Visakhapatnam

Service Examination. The response was short of

expectations. In 1975, approval was accorded to

Until the Russian acquisitions started arriving |n

constitute a separate service for NASOs as a

1966, there were no com batant ships based in

recognised cadre known as the Indian Naval

Visakhapatnam. The Transit Depot which had been

Armament Service.

taken over in 1946 had been converted into a NA

and was being used as a storage depot.

Building the New Naval Armament Depots (NADs)

After China’s attack in 1962, there was a rnajo

Bombay

drive for self reliance in the production of componen ^

required to repair and refurbish ammunition. S*n^

In 1952, the old NAD at Butcher Island had to be

vacated to make way for the construction of an oil

anti aircraft, time m echanical fuzes ^ a(^.^0 .nrf refurbished every seven years, a Fuze Recondition*

terminal jetty. Tankers bringing crude oil to feed the

new oil refineries being established near Trombay

Shop was established to recondition these fuzes,

would secure to this jetty.

shop also manufactured and assembled the fuzes

Karanja was selected as the site for the new NAD.

anti submarine mortars.

Since it would take time for it to come up. an interim

Cochin/Alwaye

NAD needed to be found. The vacation by the Army of

its Transit Ammunition Sub Depot at Trombay was

The construction of the NAD Alwaye c o m m e n c e d W

fortuitious. Trombay was connected by rail and road

1953. With the build up of the training schoo s ^

with Kurla and the disused Coastal Forces pier at

Cochin, there was a steady increase in niusketry

small arms firing. In 1957, a detachment of the N

284/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

was established inside the naval base to repair small

homing torpedoes arrived in Bombay for the Seaking

arms. A full fledged NAD with magazines and

helicopters. In 1972, Seacat surface to air missiles

armament workshops was inaugurated in 1958.

entered service with the frigates of the Leander

Thereafter it supplied the Gunnery School’s Naval

project. Within a short space of five years, the

Battery at Fort Cochin with ammunition for seaward

technology level of naval armaments rose sharply. In

firing practices and it was made responsible for

its wake, there followed the problem of division of

meeting the needs of all Naval NCC Units for small

responsibility for homing torpedoes and guided

arms and small arms practice ammunitiion.

missiles.

G

o a

Homing Torpedoes

The NAD at Goa started in 1963. After INS HANSA The responsibility for the preparation for firing of and the Seahawks moved to Goa in 1964, the NAD

Russian torpedoes was entrusted to the Weapons

was expanded in phases.

Department. The remaining activities remained with

the Armament Supply Organisation. In the case of the

B

u

i l d

i n

g

u

p

S

e

l f R

e l i a

n

c e

British MK 44 torpedoes, the entire responsibility was

From 1952 onwards, emphasis had been laid on

that of DAS. However, in 1974, the responsibility for

attaining self sufficiency in the indigenisation of the preparation of Russian torpedoes was handed naval arm am ent stores. The Navy’s bulk

over to the Armament Supply Organisation.

requirements of cartridge cases, shells, cordite and

shell fillings were projected to the Ordnance Factory

G

u i d e d M

i s s i l e s

Board for inclusion in the annual production plans. It

In the case of the Russian missiles, the responsibility took some time for the Naval Armament Inspection

for non-integrated missiles was given to the Weapons

Organisation to establish itself and for the Ordnance

department of the Electrical Branch, except for the

factories to become familiar with the Navy's special

warhead and the explosive components which

remained with DAS. Integrated Russian missiles and

requirements. By 1965, production had been

Seacat missiles were made the responsibility of DAS.

established for the Navy’s bulk requirements.

A vexed problem however was the non-availability

Responsibility f o r E xplosive H a n d lin g in

of components for repairing ammunition. The

Commercial Ports

requirem ents were too small to make their

The Navy’s Armament Supply Organisation has the

production economically worthwhile, either for the

sole responsibility for-supervising all defence and

Ordnance Factories or for private firms. The

commercial explosive handling activity in the ports of

armament workshops being set up in the new NADs

India.

were therefore provided the wherewithal to undert e

the production of such components.

Naval Armament Inspection

After 1962, when even greater emphasis was

placed on self reliance, the NAD workshops were

D ev elo p m en ts U ntil 1 9 6 5

further augmented to undertake the manufacture ot a

Prior to the formation of the Naval Armament

larger number of components for subsequen

I n s p e c tio n (NAI) Organisation in India, the naval assembly and filling.

. ,

armament stores received from Britain used to be

By 1969, the indigenous manufacture of the oia

inspected by local Army Ordnance authorities on

conventional armaments had been establis le an

beh alf o f the Navy.

production was being farmed out to the civi sec o

In 1949 when !t was decided t0 set up a

This enabled the NAD workshops to concentrate o

Armament Stores Organisation, it was decided also to

the proof and evaluation of older ammuni ion

S up an NAI organisation. In 1950. a Br.Ush Army

extend its life.

Ordnance officer came on deputation from Britain to

hend the NAI D e p a rtm e n t. Along with him came Developments A fte r 1965

RHHc;h civilian technical officers.

From 1966 onwards, homing torPetdoeSf; A h e

Between 1949 and I960, there were four British

submarine rockets and gun ammuni ^

_

. ir 't a in s who came on deputation as Directors

Russian acquisitions started arriving a

T ? firmament Inspection (DNA1). During the

Visakhapatnam. From 1970 onwards. a

in

meperiod thirteen Indian NAI officers underwent

^issiles and gun ammunition starte ar

f e Assistant Inspector of Naval Ordnance course in

Bombay for the Russian missile boats.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/285

Britain. After 1960, Indian officers became DNAIs

•

Calibration Labs were set up in Visakhapatnam

and the initial training of NAI officers was conducted

and Bombay to calibrate imported, special-to-

type measuring equipment.

at the Institute of Armament Technology (IAT) near

Pune, conjoined with the Army s Technical Staff

•

Special targets were produced to test and

evaluate imported and indigenous proximity

Course.

The duties of NAIOs, in conjunction with NASOs

fuzes at the

P roof and

Experimental

Establishment at Balasore.

where appropriate, were to:

•

Inspections were undertaken o f all repaired/

•

Inspect all new ammunition and armament

refurbished guided missiles, homing torpedoes

stores manufactured by the Ordnance Factories

and mines.

and by private trade for compliance with

acceptance standards and conformance to

NAIOs were also associated with the R&D and the

specifications.

indigenisation programmes to:

•

Periodically inspect all ammunition and

•

Improve the capabilities of homing torpedoes and

armament stores in service stored in the NADs

refurbish homing torpedoes in stock.

and select representative samples for proof firing

e Indigenise anti submarine rockets.

to confirm that they remained safe and fit for

• Improve the capabilities of mines.

operational use.

• Indigenise practice missile warheads.

•

Investigate misfires/failures and initiate/

• Inspect and test imported weapons at their place

promulgate remedial action.

of manufacture before despatch to India

•

Inspect modifications to existing weapons and

ammunition.

•

Periodically inspect all gun barrels and launcher

Weapon Acceptance T ria ls and Work up

tubes on board ships to ensure their accurate

Weapon Acceptance T ria ls

and reliable functioning.

By the end 1960s/early 1970s, it was clear that given Senior Inspectors of Naval Armament were

the pace at which new weapons were being inducted

positioned at Bombay and Visakhapatnam. As

and the inescapable lag in settin g up the

indigenous production picked up. Naval Armament

maintenance facilities ashore, some, way had to be

Inspectorates were established at places wherever

found of ensuring that weapon systems were combat

naval ammunition was being manufactured. In

worthy. It was decided to adopt the British Navy s addition, NAI wings were posted at the IAT Pune and

system, whereby the weapon systems of refitted ships

the proof firing establishment at Balasore.

were systematically checked by an Acceptance Trials

Developments A fter 1965

Team, independent of the Dockyard and the ship-

There was opposition. The reasoning was that since

With the induction of guided missiles and homing

the organisational constraints were known, nothing

torpedoes in the Russian acquisitions and the

was going to be achieved by harping on the

Leander Frigate Project, it became necessary to

m aintenance/repair shortcom ings in weapon

enhance the technical knowledge of NAIOs. In 1968, a

systems. The opposite point of view was that user

separate post graduate Naval Technical Staff Course

personnel had no hope of acquiring any practica

commenced at the IAT Pune. In 1978, the shortage of

firing experience on their weapon systems if the

volunteers from the Executive Branch led to the

systems were not working properly.

introduction oi the Direct Entry Scheme for the NAI

The acceptance trials of the NILGIRI showed how

Cadre. The educational qualifications prescribed

imperative the trials were. Eventually, by end 1975.

were a degree in mechanical/electrical/electronic/

the first elements of the much debated H a r b o u r engineering or a post graduate degree in physics or

Acceptance Trial (HATS), Sea Acceptance Trials

electronics.

(SATS), Warship Acceptance Trial Team (WATT) an

The responsibilities of NAIOs also diversified:

Warship Workup Organisation (WWO) were in place-

•

Indigenisation

Cells

were

set

up

in

The procedure was:

Visakhapatnam and Bombay to prepare the

•

During HATS, critical parameters were checked

drawings and specifications for and to inspect the

against laid down schedules and parameters.

indigenous manufacture of perishable and

•

During SATS, the weapon system accuracy

critical components of Russian and Western

weapons.

checked in firing practices. Air targe

286/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

requirements were met by the Target Towing

Weapon Maintenance

Dakotas based in Cochin. Surface target

requirements were met by local ships (tugs/

*

Designations. In 1976, the designation of LSTs/coastal mirtesweepers) towing Pattern II

Assistant Industrial Manager (Weapons) was

targets and the heavier Battle Practice Targets

changed to Manager Weapons. In 1981, the

(BPTs). Moored triplane targets were used to

designation changed to General Manager

check sonar accuracy. Mortars were calibrated on

Weapons.

a special range. On completion of Acceptance

0

WECORS Bombay. Phase 1. commissioned in

Trials, shortcom ings were rectified before

1966 had been established to repair the fire

commencing workup.

control systems of the British frigates. Phase 2.

commissioned in 1970 had been established to

Workup

repair their gun mountings. Phase 3 was

The concept of Workup was that on the satisfactory

established in the mid 1970s to repair BriUsh and

completion of all weapon, radar and communication

Dutch fire control systems of the Leander class

Sea Acceptance Trials by the Warship Acceptance

frigates. Phase 4 was established in the 1980s to

Trials Team, the systematic work up of eveiy ship for

repair the fire control systems of the Russian

combat readiness should follow a progressive, logical

Petyas, submarines and missile boats based in

Bombay. In due course. Phase 4 was augmented

sequence:

to cater for the Russian guided missiles frigates,

•

After a refit, a ship should shakedown off her

ocean going rocket boats and minesweepers, and

base port. This shakedown was to be conducted

the German SSK submarines.

by the Commanding Officer, assisted by

•

Weapon Repair Shop Visakhapatnam. Phase 1

Squadron/Fleet staff.

commissioned by 1972. The shop was augmented

•

After shakedown, the ship should commence

in phases to cater for the new Russian

basic work up with suitable targets under the

acquisitions.

supervision of the Warship Workup Team.

•

After basic workup, the ship should participate in

Naval Armament Depots

multi unit tactical work up with other ships,

Bombay. Over the years, the NAD Karanja

submarines and ' helicopters under the

concentrated on the preparation of sophisticated

supervision of the Fleet Commander and assisted

torpedoes and missiles. Torpedo repair activity was

by the Warship Workup Team.

shared with Trombay.

•

On successful completion, each ship would carry

r,na The NAD expanded to accomodate the weapon out weapon firing practices as laid down in t e

needs of the Sea Harrier fighters, the TU 142 and IL

relevant manuals and participate in tactic an

38 reconnaissance aircraft and the Kamov

Fleet exercises.

It took several years for the concept to take roo .

Wsakhapamam. The NAD expanded to accomodate

t h e torpedoes of the new aubmarines. The repa.r

Developments After 1975

activities of torpedoes were shared with Bombay.

Sunabeda. This new bulk storage NAD was

New Weapons

established on the East Coast in 1988.

Air to surface missiles entered service with the Sea

Harrier aircraft and the improved

ea

Naval Arm ament Inspection

helicopters.

. .,

Longer range anti ship and anti aircr; 1

,

entered service with the guided missile friga e

expediting

8

evaluation facilities.

ocean going rocket boats.

vwter

Longer range anti submarine rockets an

;

£

«

"

«

« NAl Visakhapatnam.

Rubber test

^hicitirated facilities were set up for

°ng range homing torpedoes entered service wi

new guided missile frigates.

d

testing the dy

t r i a l s of torpedo batteries.

Better short range homing torp

^ Srrnn(ers.

responsibilities, the * .

service with the new Kamov and Seaking e 1

recj

Better long range homing torpe

?Srprman

organisation.

service with the new Russian and German

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/287

submarines.

Visakhapatnam started undertaking major refits.

.

diversified into research, design and development

Weapon Acceptance and Work Up Team s were

projects of aripaments and explosives.

established in Visakhapatnam on the same lines as in

.

increased its involvement in developing

indigenous equivalents of unavailable explosive

Bombay.

In the 1990’s, Flag Officer Sea Training was

items.

established in Cochin to conduct the work up of al!

ships after major refit and identify the shortcomings

W

e a p o n A

c c e p

t a

n

c e T

r i a

l s

a

n

d

W

o r k u p

in weapon and combat readiness for remedial actior

The concept of Weapon Acceptance Trials gradually

extended to machinery, particularly diesel engines

before they joined the respective Fleets.

and gas turbines. When the Naval Dockyard

288/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

19

Fleet Activities

The Pattern o f Fleet A ctiv ity Prior to 196'i

,

On arrival in Bombay in end September shins

Until 1965. there used to be two well defined exercise

“ mmenced maintenance and defect rectification in

periods-Spring Exercises (SPRINGEX) and Summer

Preparu

atlon for sPring Exercises. During October

Exercises' (SUMMEREX).

"

‘

~ .......

a n Z l ,';raand D,6Cember’ ShipS comPanies availed of The annual cycle was:

annual leave and personnel were transferred in and

out it necessary.

April/May

Transfers of personnel in

Spring Exercises from January to March were

and out of ships to

carried out off both the East and West coasts. As in

coincide with the end of the case of the Summer Exercises, ships participated childrens’ school year.

in joint exercises with Commonwealth Navies, paid

June/July/August

Summer Exercises.

goodwill visits to neighbouring friendly countries and

September

ended up with the Staff College students embarking

CNS’ Tactical Exercises.

October/November/

fleet ships for witnessing exercise between Cochin

Maintenance and leave

December

and Bombay.

period.

On arrival in Bombay in end March, block drafts/

January/February/

Spring Exercises.

March

transfers were effected to coincide with end of

children’s school year. Maintenance and defect

Several factors had com bined to coalesce into this

rectification were carried out in preparation for the

pattern. T h e critica l d e te rm in a n t w as that there were Summer Exercises whilst personnel availed of annual

not enough a lo n g s id e berth s in Bombay, as a result of leave.

w ich sh ips u s u a lly rem a in ed at the anchorage. This This annual cycle comfortably met several

requirements:

Was n o t p o s s ib le d u r in g th e ro u g h w eath er o f the H ^nsoon m o n th s an d sh ips had either to be brought

•

Giving officers and men sea-time for promotion

^ on gside o r s e n t a w a y fro m B om bay. The general and experience of exercising with other navies.

r a c tic e w a s fo r th e n o n o p e r a tio n a l sh ips to go

•

Dovetailing the completion o f courses in the

ongsicfe fo r r e p a ir s / r e fit and for operational ships Annual Training Programme with block transfers

, 0 s* 1 fo r th e B a y o f B e n g a l w h e re m axim um value in and out of ships.

ser*

d e r iv e d fr o m s e a t r a in in g in a rea s not

•

Sharing the maintenance and defect rectification

ais 10US^ a^ e c ^ed b y th e so u th w est monsoon. This load between ships staff and the Dockyard. Any

n2, ° e n a b le d j o i n t e x e r c is e s w ith C om m onw ealth ship which did not cope with its defects and

depended too much on the Dockyard, missed out

navies at Trincomalee.

a n d

COmP le tio n o f ex e rc is e s , sh ips paid goodwill on the exercises and the foreign cruises.

ců ntri ^S's h ° w i n g v i s i t s to n e ig h b o u r in g frien dly

•

The Staff College, the National Defence College

and visiting dignitaries witnessed fleet exercises

Wa, ^ e fi°a l phase o f the summer exercise period

when ships companies were at peak efficiency.

.

W h e n e v e r cadets from the N ational D efence retur 6

T a c t ic a l E x e rc is e s held on the Fleet s Arademy and the National Cadet Corps could not

each n ^a ssa &e fro m C och in to Bom bay in Septem ber he em barked during these exercises, individual

Centryef r- T h e C N S u su a llY invited Ministers o f the ships or groups of ships took them to sea for short

marit-

G o v e r n m e n t a n d G o v e r n m e n ts o f the Minic-f116 s ^

e s » a s w e ll as se n io r

durations.

o ffic ia ls from t e

Arrnv r *GS

^ e fe n c e a n d F in a n c e (D e fe n c e ) an

TFT Exercises with Commonwealth Navies

exeroia n d A ir F o r c e H e a d q u a rte rs to w itn ess these

, t i t Fvercises a t Trincomalee) started in 1949

eiTlt>arke f

^ a t i o n a ^ D e ^e n c e C o lle g e a so

and wer^organised a t Trincomalee on the easi coast

e d u rin g th is period.

of Ceylon. Initially, JETs were held in the spring.

®

Phases 3 and 4 were the Combined Fleet

Later, JETs were held during the height of the

Exercises in the Bay of Bengal followed by p0st

southwest monsoon when the west coast of India

exercise debriefs.

became unsuitable for naval exercises due to rain

In 1959, 1960 and 1961, a British submarine

and rough seas. Trincomalee and the exercise areas

was made available every year for anti submarine

in the vicinity were sheltered from the monsoon and

exercises during Phase 1 off Cochin, particularly with provided calm seas.

the new British frigates which had started arriving

Ships of Commonwealth navies participated in

from 1958 onwards.

JET, which were held under the general guidance and

In December 1964, exercises were conducted

control of the British Commander in Chief Far East

with the submarine AMBUSH off Bombay and in July

Fleet, using the facilities available at Trincomalee.

1965 with the Submarine ASTUTE off Madras and

The pattern was for individual ships to shake

Visakhapatnam.

do\vn, followed by each Commonwealth Navy working

up its ships and culminating in Combined/Joint

Exercises in the Bay of Bengal. The combined

The Pattern of Fleet A ctiv ity 1965 to 1975

exercises lasted for a period of two weeks during

Until 1965, the N avy’s op eration al cycle was

which a variety, of exercises were carried out,

determined primarily by the fact that the Bombay

including gunnery firing practices at surface and

Dockyard was unable to provide sheltered alongside

aerial targets, anti submarine exercises with British

berths during the monsoon months. After the Indo

submarines as targets, replenishment at sea with

Pakistan War of 1965, the operational cycle was

British tankers, ship manoeuvres and culminating in

governed by the decision that 60% of the Fleet was to

large scale tactical exercises. The basic advantage of

be operational in the Arabian Sea throughout the

these exercises was the exposure to contemporary

year.

tactics and cross-operating with other navies.

Between 1965 and mid 1971, the Petyas and

Until 1958, all exercises were held at

submarines arrived from Russia. They used to transit

Trincomalee:

from their base in Visakhapatnam to exercise with

Month/Year

Participating

the Fleet in the Arabian Sea. With submarines now

Commonwealth Navies

available, there was a marked increase in anti

March-April 1951

submarine exercises in the Arabian Sea. Not many

Britain, India, Pakistan

exercises were carried out in the Bay of Bengal.

March-April 1952

Britain,

After the Indo Pakistan War of December 1971. it

India, Pakistan

April 1953

Britain.

took nearly two years for the Eastern Fleet (which had

India, Pakistan

August 1953

Britain, India

been formed in Novem ber 1971) to c o m m e n c e August 1954

Britain, India, Pakistan,

meaningful exercises. The basic reason was that the

Ceylon

earlier Petyas and submarines were undergoing

August-September 1955

Britain,

repairs and refit after their prolonged utilisation in

, India, Pakistan,

Ceylon

1971. Such ships and submarines as were available

August-September 1956

Britain,, India, Pakistan,

had very lim ited m otoring hours left. The

Ceylon

maintenance, repair and refit facilities had yet to

August-September 1957

Britain , India, Pakistan,

come up in Visakhapatnam. Moreover, in view of e

Ceylon

unpredictability of Pakistan’s intentions after t e

June 1958

Britain,, India, Pakistan

surrender of its forces in East Pakistan, the Navy ha

decided to base the five new Petyas and the four ne

In September 1958, the British Navy’s East India

Station at Trincomalee closed down. From 1959

submarines in Bombay. Overall, the Eastern Flee

onwards, JET exercises started being conducted in

had very few ships it could call operational. By 19 ’

phases:

the position improved and both Fleets star e

exercising in their respective waters.

•

Phase 1, individual ship work up, was held at

The Fleets activities between 1965 and 19'

Cochin with a British submarine and aircraft of

the naval air arm.

marked a transform ation from th e p rc *

r

S p r in g e x / S u m m e r e x pattern to th e 1975 era Phase 2 consisted of sea exercises enroute to join

practice missile firings (PMFs), amphibious ex e rc is

the other Commonwealth Navies in the Bav of

Bengal.

3

(AMPHEXs), individual fleet T actical E x e r c is ^

(TACEXs) and Combined Fleet TACEXs, whilst s

290/TRANSITIQN TO TRIUMPH

meeting the training requirements of the NDA. the

DSSC and the NDC and essential requirements like

Goodwill Visits to Friendly Countries

Joint Exercises with other navies and goodwill visits.

Goodwill and flag showing visits by naval ships have

Tactical Evaluations

traditionally been one of the important peacetime

Junctions of the Navy. These visits fulfilled several

A significant feature of exercises from 1973 onwards

worthwhile objectives.

was the emphasis on the tactical evaluations of the

new weapon platforms. By then, the lessons of the

They enabled officers and sailors to visit the ships

1971 War had been analysed and digested. The

and establishments of the host navies, interact

nature of surface warfare had changed with the

and imbibe new concepts and ideas.

induction of surface to surface missiles. The nature of

•

The enormous sense of pride which Indian

anti air warfare had changed with the induction of

communities settled abroad felt on seeing

Seacat anti aircraft missiles in the Leanders and high

warships flying the Indian flag enhanced their

rate of fire guns in the Petyas and the missile boats.

self-worth in their local community and

The nature of anti submarine warfare had changed

revitalised their bonds with India. The warmth

with the induction of medium range sonars in the

and hospitality which Indian communities settled

Leanders and the Petyas, variable depth sonar in

abroad have extended to visiting Navy ships is

legendary.

NILGIRI, dunking sonars in the Seakings and anti

submarine homing torpedoes in the Petyas, the

•

One of the attractions of volunteering for naval

service has always been "Join the Navy and see

Seakings and the MATCH helicopters in the

the world". Visits to friendly countries help to

Leanders.

recruit the talent the Navy seeks to attract.

Not only had the capabilities and limitations of

•

The exemplary behaviour of Indian naval

each of these systems to be determined, but also their

personnel during visits to foreign ports is usually

utilisation dovetailed into Fleet Operating and

in sharp contrast to those from other navies and

Tactical Instructions. It became timely for the Navy to this makes them very welcome as visitors. Indian

start form ulating its own tactical doctrines,

personnel do not tend to alchoholic intoxication

appropriate to its unique mix of Western and Russian

and the ensuing brawls. Their main interest is to

sensors and weapons.

spend their limited foreign exchange in buying

In 1974, a Tactics Committee was formed in

mementos to take home to their families. Without

Naval Headquarters, with analogous Committees in

exception, host countries have commented how

each Fleet and Command, intensive interaction and

lucky India is to have such a well behaved Navy in

evaluations progressively led to multi- system

such clean, smart ships. All this helps to dispel

evaluations and culminated in structured Joint Fleet

the persistent Kiplingesque images of India -

Exercises conducted by Naval Headquarters to

flying carpets, snake charmers, elephants and

evaluate and validate Fleet tactical doctrines before

tigers - and project the image of a confident,

they were promulgated.

modern India.

In the case of foreign cruises by training ships,

The Pattern of Fleet Activity After 1975

long cruises to distant ports are essential for cadets

The momentum built up by 1975 in tactical

and midshipmen to acquire their sea legs and acquire

evaluations of individual types of ships, submarines,

ihe skills of seamanship and navigation in fair and

helicopters and aircraft, followed by Fleet exercises to foul weather. When they mix with cadets and

midshipmen of other navies, they form the

validate evolving tactical doctrine, continued a ^er acquaintances which mature into friendships in later

1975. This procedure was to stand the Navy in gooc

stead when the new Russian guided missile frigates,

yeaiCaptain (later Vice Admiral) VEC Barboza was the

ocean going rocket boats and IL 38 MRASW aircia

C o m m a n d in g Officer of the training cruiser INS

were inducted along with the improved Leander clas

DELHI in 1969. Admiral Barboza's recollections of

Agates TARAGIRI and VINDHYAGIRI.

this cruise convey the flavour of goodwill visits:

The distance from the mainland at w ic

exercises were held was also steadily increase'a.

“In the second half of 1969. our cruiser DELHI

establish the Fleets’ endurance for sustaine r

visited ports in Australia. New Zealand and Fiji in

°cean operations.

response to long-standing invitations from those

countries.

TRANSITIO N T O TR IU M PH /291

“We set out from Cochin on the 9th

personality, apart from being a very proficient

September and made for Fremantle, our first port

chef. The ladies invited him to spend a day at

their residence and arranged for transport to

o f call in Australia.

"Imagine friendly and inquisitive University

carry him to its location. At the appointed hour

students (some doing post-graduate courses)

an elegant, chauffeur driven limousine arrived to

quite seriously asking us if we had automobiles

collect him and, as he told us later, he was taken

and motor cycles in India, or wide-eyed school

to a palatial building where he was entertained

children telling us that they had learnt in class

right royally. The meals he was served in their

that “Indians live in tree tops”, or astonished

mansion were “haute c u is in e ” , and he

farmers saying: “We thought that Indians were

reciprocated in the only w ay he could - by

like our aboriginals

demonstrating the cooking of some choice Indian

“All this was foreseen and, when I briefed my

dishes in their very modern and well-appointed

men, I had explained to them that none of these

kitchen. They showed him round the city and met

remarks would be made in malice. There was no

him again when the ship visited Sydney, where

cause for taking umbrage at them. Only the need

they renewed their hospitality most generously.

to gracefully present the real India of today.

"All over Australia, in shop windows, clubs,

“One evening, as the last group of visitors to

schools and other institutions, we saw posters

the ship left, a police officer walked on board and

asking for contributions to India’s famine. Most of

told the Officer of the Day that he had been on

them bore the graphic im age o f a sad-eyed,

quayside duty and had observed the way the

skinny, naked Indian child with a distended

visitors were received and conducted on board.

abdomen and a look of utter wretchedness. We

He had seen this happen before, during the visits

had got over the fam ine by then and our

of other foreign ships, but he had been so struck

Government was at pains to thank well-meaning

by the friendliness and smartness of the crew that

friends for their contributions and to politely

he wished to demonstrate his appreciation

inform them that the crisis had passed. But since

tangibly. He had a free Sunday and had planned

the stark appeals and exhortations still stared

to spend it in the countiyside with his family. He

everyone in the face everywhere, the 'idee fixe

invited any two of my sailors to join in the outing,

continued. Indeed, one Australian newspaper,

promising to deliver them back safely on Monday

comparing the lean (but wiry) build of our quite

morning. The offer was willingly accepted and the

well-fed sailors with the natural burliness of the

two sailors returned from their outing, brimming

average Australian, reported that “the Indian

with gratitude and exuberance.

sailors looked under-nourished.

“On another occasion, two well-dressed ladies

“In general, this widespread projection of

visiting the ship requested to see the galley,

India as a mendicant country was disturbing and

where they were introduced to the Chief Petty

we tried hard to dispel this concept”.

Officer Cook. He was a particularly engaging

292/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

2 0

Maintenance, Repair and Refit Facilities

Preamble

• The repair workshop at Cochin grew into a Base

Repair Organisation and eventually into the

When the Navy was partitioned in 1947, its only

Naval Ship Repair Yard (NSRY).

Dockyard was at Bombay. It provided all the

« The small Portuguese Navy workshop in Goa grew

maintenance, repair, docking and refit support that

into a Base Repair Workshop.

ships needed. The only other ports where

•

And in Port Blair, a NSRY came up alongside a

rudimentary facilities existed were at Cochin and at

newly constructed naval jetty and a floating dock.

Visakhapatnam, each of which had minuscule Repair

This chapter describes the developments during

Shops, having a few machine tools, carpentry

the decade 1965-1975.

facilities for minor repairs of wooden boats, a small

slipway and a blacksmith’s shop.

Bombay Dockyard

In the decades that followed, there were

enormous developments:

Naval Dockyard Expansion Scheme

The expansion of the Bombay Naval Dockyard was

•

The Naval Dockyard Bombay was expanded and

undertaken in two stages. The dates of

modernised.

..

commencement and completion of works in each

•

Asia’s newest Naval Dockyard was construc e in

stage are shown in the table below.

Visakhapatnam.

STAGE ONE

1967 to 1970

1954

1962 to 1970

(a)

Dredging o f the Inner T id al Basin

1954

(b)

Reclamation of 27 acres in front of Castle arr

1962 to 1970

between the old breakwater and the Ballar

1954

(c)

Construction of 2300 feet of wharfage on the rec

1962

land for the Barracks and Destroyer wharves.

.

^

1954

1966

1963

(d)

Construction o f a Cruiser Dry D o c k on

(e)

Extension o f the Ballard Pier by 750 fee a

Banard pier.

1966 to 1970

1954

into the Dockyard Extension o f the inner

.

Destroyer and

(0

Provision of ship support services for t e

_11Dniies, fresh

Ballard Pier wharves (namely electrical po\

etcj

water, sea water, compressed air, travel ing

STAGE TWO

1974

1967

(a)

Construction of Rubble Mound Breakwater a

1977

1972

South Breakwater (Deep Water Wharf)

_nrinsed by

lb)

Capital Dredging of the Outer Tidal Basin enclose^ y

the South Breakwater and reclamation

ter> t0 provide

lan

1977

la d

n

in

i t

n he area enclosed by this ne

this new

y b

^ re

re a

* *

\ -

. --

o -

q--

o -

O-f

fe f

et

of w

w h

h a

arfage,

1975

1981 to 1984

space for a new Dry Dock and an addi ion

^ ng QUt Wharf

1976

(c) Enlarging the old breakwater to construct

akwater and

(d)

Provision of ship support services at ou

,ies fresh

Fitting Out W harf (namely electric power

P f mobile rectifiers.

water, sea water, fuel storage, compressc

•

steam supply, travelling cranes, caps an

o

Prepare an Overall M aster Plan indicating th

M

o d

e r n

i s a

t i o n

o

f t h

e B

o m

b a y D

o c k

y

a

r d

location of each department, shop, road, sto

In 1969, the National Industrial Development

area, canteen, toilet, office and shore facility^

Corporation (NIDC) was selected as the official

ships under maintenance.

0r

consultant to prepare a Master Plan for the

modernisation of the Dockyard and to prepare a

NID.C s u b m itte d th e ir r e p o rt in 197x and project report for repair facilities required to. meet the recommended the expansion of the Dockyard in three

demands of a rapidly growing fleet. The intention was

phases, catering for Im m ediate, Intermediate and

that all future expansion of the Dockyard would be

Future requirem ents. T h is rep ort has formed the based on their recommendations.

basis for modernising/expansion of the Dockyard.

The NIDC study would:

Overview o f Developm ent - 1965-1975*

•

Evaluate and analyse present and future

The development of the Bombay Dockyard during this

workload.

decade can be seen from the overview given below:

•

Assess existing and required capacity.

Year Improvements

Additional Facilities

Modernisation

in Organisation

Sanctioned/Established

Sanctioned/Implemented

1964

a) The National Productivity Council (NPC) conducted a survey of the Naval Dockyard to suggest ways and means for improving productivity and higher degree of motivation and training for Dockyard personnel.

b) The NPC studied the stores inventory system of the Naval Stores Organisation (NSO), of the Spare Parts Distribution Centre (SPDC) and of Naval Headquarters.

c) A Planning and Production Control (PPC) Department was set up with NPC assistance.

1965 The PPC Department started -Life Raft Repair Cell yielding good results

set up

-Joiner shop completed

1966

-Weapon Control and

Commenced phased replace

Repair Shop(WECORS)

ment of old machinery,

Phase 1 completed

equipment and machine tools

and Phase II sanctioned

1967

-WECORS Phase 2

do -

commenced

-Workshop facilities

augmented

1968

60 Hz power supply

- do -

extended to Duncan Dry

Dock and Wet Basin

1969

- Boiler Erection Shop

do -

set up for Leander

boilers

- Steam Test House

- Sanction accorded for multi

sanctioned to test

storeyed ICE Repair Shop and

indigenously manutwo parallel workshops for

factured Leander auxiplate and fabrication work

liary machinery and

other ships machinery

repaired/overhauled in

- Augmentation of Power

the Dockyard

Supply and Joiner Shop

sanctioned

•The^History o f the Nava. Dockyard Bombay" by Rear Admiral K Sridharan period.

provides the full details o f developm ents

2 9 4 / T R A N S I T I O N T O T R I U M P H

- SPDC Repair Workshop

sanctioned for repairing

- The National Industrial

spare gear stocked

Development Corporation

by SPDC

(N1DC) was appointed to

prepare a Master Plan for

- Boat Repair Workshop

the Naval Dockyard to

sanctioned

provide a basis for augmenlation of workshops and

- Electric Test House

allied facilities

for AC generator load

test sanctioned

- Base Maintenance Unit

sanctioned

- Service Standards

Room and Calibration

Facilities established

in WECORS

1970

- Test House established

at Kiirla for coastal

minesweeper Deltic

diesel engines

- Computer sanctioned

for PPC Department and

inventory control of

naval stores and SPDC

spares

1971

Naval Stores Organisation

and SPDC merged as a result

of the recommendations of

the Administrative Staff

College of India

1972

NIDC Phase 1 Report under

1973

Computer commenced

consideration

working in double shifts

for production and inventory control

- Interim Auto Control

Bay established for

repair of Leander

control equipment

- WECORS Phase II

completed

- Mobile diesel alter-

1974

nators provided to

conserve running hours

of ships' diesel

generators

- Light ICE Shop

completed

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/295

Sanction accorded for

NIDC recommendations on

1975 Multiple docking achieved

Dockyard workshops

Modernisation o f Naval

Jor the first time when

Dockyard approved

four ships, (two Petyas, an

to be augmented for

ocean going rocket boat

Russian acquisitions

and a Leander class

based in Bombay

frigate) were docked

Joiner Shop augmentation

in the Cruiser Dock

- Steam Test House

commissioned

completed

- Light Diesel Shop,

Boat Repair Shop and

WECORS Phase II

commissioned

Visakhapatnam Dockyard

modern frigate and four small craft. In 1965, two survey ships JUMNA and INVESTIGATOR were

Preamble

permanently rebased at Visakhapatnam.

In 1953, the Boat Repair Shop expanded into a Base

The 1965 Agreement on the Russian acquisitions

Repair Organisation (BRO) and shifted to the location

included the preparation of a Project Report for the

at the mouth of the northwest channel.

Visakhapatnam Project comprising facilities for a

In 1958, the progress of Bombay Dockyard’s

naval base and ship support facilities, a submarine

expansion scheme was behind schedule. With the

base and subm arine support facilities, torpedo

arrival between 1958 and 1961 of the eight new

preparation and repair facilities, a training school for frigates and the aircraft carrier, Bombay Dockyard

the Russian acqu isition s and a modern Naval

would not be able to berth these ships alongside.

Dockyard to repair and refit ships and submarines.

Naval Headquarters therefore proposed that a major

The Project Report was approved in 1968.

naval base be established at Visakhapatnam. starting

The Visakhapatnam Dockyard evolved in five

with a new 1120 foot jetty and a repair workshop. In

phases:

1962, sanction was accorded for the construction of

the new jetty and the workshop building. Sanction

Phase

Maintenance, Repair and Refit

was also accorded for the acquisition of 550 acres of

of Petyas, submarines, landing ships,

land from the Port Trust.

patrol boats, subm arine depot ship,

In 1963, survey ships were temporarily based in

submarine rescue vessel

Visakhapatnam. The decision was taken to set up a

II

Augmentation of Phase I

Naval Base and a Dockyard. Machinery and

III

of guided missile frigates

equipment was procured for setting up repair

IV

Marine Gas Turbine Overhaul Centre

facilities. For the first time, the annual refit of a V

of new subm arines, m issile craft an

survey ship was undertaken by the BRO

minesweepers

Visakhapatnam making use of the dry docks of

Hindustan Shipyard and the Port Trust.

Overview o f Development - 1965 to 1975

By 1964, plans were in hand for establishing a

The development of the Visakhapatnam Dockyard

modern dockyard at Visakhapatnam, capable of

during this decade can be seen from the overvie

undertaking the normal refit and dry docking of one

given below:

Year

Naval Base & Training

Submarine Facilities

Naval Dockyard

Complex

1966

Machine tools sanctioned

for augmenting the workshop

facilities of BRO

Visakhapatnam

1967

- Land acquired

- Construction commenced

- Land acquired for the new

of single and married

Dockyard

accomodation for submarine

crews

- Construction commenced of

additional bays for BRO

296/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

- Capital dredging of existing

channel commenced to

create additional berthing

i c

f n

a i

c li U

li lt C

i S

es

1968

- Construction commenced as soon as the Russian Rennrt «n w i u

Project was accepted. In the draft contracts"it wasagree?thathe VlSakhapatnanl i) Sizeable designing effort would be undertaken in India ii) Large proportion o f equipment and machinery would be of indigenous origin.

iii) Russian drawings for the Dockyard, and Russian equipment and m achinery for the Naval Base, Armament Repair Workshop and Train in g Complex, would arrive within six months of signing each contract.

iv) Th e developm ent o f the Naval Base and the Dockyard, to provide full logistic support, would be spread out over ten years New 1120 foot wharf

- Single and married acco

- Dredging of northwest

completed. Equipment

modation for submarine

arm commenced

indented for converted

crews completed

power supplies

- Construction commenced of

- Construction of

Civilian Dockyard Workers

- Construction of

Submarine Headquarters

Colony. 49 quarters

Torpedo Preparation

building commenced

completed

Complex commenced

1969

- Construction of

- Phase 1 of dredging north

wharves and jetties

west arm completed

commenced

- Construction commenced of

- Torpedo Preparation

Energy Block(charging submarine batteries and Dock

Complex delayed

yard power supply)

- Construction of

- Construction commenced of

Torpedo Repair Work

Weapon Repair Shop

shop commenced in NAD

- Design of South Dry Dock

- Training equipment

commenced

started arriving.

Training Complex

- Civilian Dockyard workers

buildings delayed.

colony: 98 quarters comple

Interim arrangements

ted. EDC 502 more quarters

made for stowage of

1973

training equipment

- Equipment being installed

1970

- Submarine Headquarters

- Construction of

in Energy Block

building completed and

wharves and jetties

commissioned as INS

in progress

-

Additional land being

VIRBAHU

acquired for Dockyard

- Torpedo Preparation

workshops and to cater for

Complex completed

adequate waterway for

manoeuvering ships and

submarines

- Torpedo Repair

Complex in NAD

nearing completion

- Energy Block completed

1971

- Wharves and jetties

- Equipment being installed

completed

in Weapon Repair Shop

- Slipway wharf

- Dockyard Apprentice

completed

School and Hostel completed

- Torpedo Repair

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/297

Workshop in NAD

- Design of South Dry Dock

completed

completed

- Piling work commenced of

the Main Fitting Shop, the

Machine Shop and the Store

Block

- Construction commenced of

1972

South Dry Dock (EDO 1976)

When ready, it would be the

largest dry dock in India,

with facilities for docking

ships in compartments and

more than one abreast

1973

- High level Steering Commit

tee constituted to monitor

execution and completion of

essential repair facilities

by 1977-78

- Phase 1 Weapon Repair Shop

completed

- Dockyard Apprentice

School commissioned

- Training commenced of ex

ITI apprentices to build up

Dockyard technical manpower

1974

- Training Complex commi

- In view of steep increase

ssioned as INS SATAVAHANA

in costs, the construction

schedule of various faci

- Mobile diesel alternalities was reviewed and it

tors provided to conserve

was decided to progress

running hours of ships

the works in phases. In

diesel generators

the immediate phase, only

those items essential for

- Construction commenced

undertaking six yearly reof Sailors Institute

fits of submarines and

Petyas to be provided

- Construction schedule of

South Dry Dock delayed due

to redesign of dock floor to

cater for local soil conditions.

1975

- Construction commenced

- Interim facilities

of Eastern Naval Command

Officers Mess

for three yearly refits of Russian ships

- INCS Complex commicompleted

ssioned

- Workshops to be augmented

for major refits of new

Russian acquisitions

298/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

BRO Cochin

phases. From 1966 onwards, when the newly arrived

Russian patrol boats and the Landing ships started

1963.

plans had crystallised to augment the BRO

operating in the islands, the urgency increased for

at Cochin and b u ild a new naval jetty on the providing some kind of repair facility at Port Blair.

Willingdon Island foreshore.

From 1967 onwards. MAGAR took over the role of

In 1963. the Ministry of Shipbuilding decided to

logistic support for these Russian vessels.

set up the Cochin Shipyard which would have an

In 1967. sanction was accorded for the

1800 fo o t jetty on the Ernakulam side of the channel.

construction of the new wharf. Construction

It became necessary to shift the site of the proposed

commenced in 1968.

naval jetty on the Willingdon Island foreshore closer

In 1969. the old stores ship. DHARINI. which had

to the Ernakulam bridge.

earlier been converted into a repair ship by equipping

In 1965. the three Hunt class destroyers

her with a workshop, machine tools and repair

GODAVARI, GOMATI and GANGA were rebased at

materials to support the coastal minesweepers, was

Cochin and proposals were put up in 1966 for

positioned in Port Blair as an afloat maintenance

additional workshop facilities. However, between

facility. The arrangement did not prove satisfactory

1965 and 1975, the large expenditure on the Bombay and DHARINI returned to Bombay.

and Visakhapatnam Dockyards precluded any

By 1973. it was found that intrusions were

substantial funds being available for augmenting

occurring mainly in the southern group of the

Nicobar Islands and were easier to deal with when

BRO Cochin.

In 1972, the Training Squadron comprising the

ships operated from the island of Kamorta. In 1973. a

cruiser DELHI and the frigate KISTNA was based at

forward operating base was commissioned as INS

KARDIP on the island of Kamorta and patrol craft

Cochin.

started operating from there. Soon, it became

In 1975, approval was eventually accorded tor tne

necessary to set up a SMU in Kamorta.

construction of the new naval jetty.

In 1974 sanction was accorded for establishing a

BRO to provide comprehensive repair facilities to

The Developm ents of Maintenance Facilities

Ships operating in the A&N

at Port Blair

was subsequently commissioned in 1979. As an

interim measure, a small Base Maintenance Unit

After China’s attack in October-November 1962, the

IFlectrical) was established separately. This was

responsibility for the seaward defence o

e

unable to meet all the requirements of the Landing

Andaman and Nicobar Islands was assigne

o

e

Shins A ship maintenance unit was therefore set up.

Navy. The first Resident Naval Officer arrive

or

Rv 1975 the BRO at Port Blair was able to

Blair in November 1962. In mid 1963, the first Naval

increase^he operational availability of the landing

Garrison of five officers and one hundred an

,

Ships and the patrol boats.

sailors arrived in Port Blair. Until the Navy s Seawarr Defence Boats arrived, sea patrols and jn^er' is a ,

Developments After 1975

transportation were supported by craft of t e e

Bom bay D ockyard

Board of Revenue. Soon, the need was lei't

Commenced Completed

maintenance and repair facility to sustain ese

1975

1977

craft which were operating so far away rom

1972

1979

1977

1980

nearest BRO at Visakhapatnam.

,

1976

1981

In 1964, IN S JARAWA was commissioned

SSSSSSSt

1976

1984

Parent establishment at Port Blair. In

Fitting Out Wharf Services

1982

1984

detailed, phased requirements of IJiac

for

Controls E ngineering Shop

1981

1985

H u l l Assembly and

Personnel, buildings and shore supply aci 1

r

Steel preparation Shop

setting up a BRO were included in the overall plan

1982

1985

1984

1988

setting up an advance naval base at Por

vharf.

s s u —

P^an envisaged the construction of a 1200 o

1985

1990

If of which would be for naval use.

d

HeawDiesel EngineWorkshoi

1986

1993

After the 1965 war, Landing ship MAGAR

1995

Under

eing deployed in the A&N Islands.

„ nrded for

E s

- s

b

s

—

construction

Wharves

SeJ.n 1966’ approval in PrinciPle.wafi^ s in three

ttlng up a BRO and berthing faciliti

HON TO TRIUMPH/299

Retrospect

Visakhapatnam Dockyard

Commenced Completed

There persists a widespread misperception that the

1977

South Dry Dock

1972

reason why the operational availability of ships was

New workshop for Hull,

1978

1972

unsatisfactory in the 1960’s and 1970 s was because

Engineering. Electrical and

the Navy acquired too many ships too quickly and

Submarine auxiliaries

funnelled the budget to acqu isition s, thereby

Capital dredging to create space

1980

1979

delaying the setting up of repair and refit facilities.

for the new Armament Jetty and

The reality was different. Basically, two factors are

the Degaussing Basin

Captive power generation facilities

1983

1976

unavoidable:

Augmentation of Weapon

1986

1983

©

There will always be a time lag between the

Repair Shop

1989

induction of vessels and the setting up of their

Degaussing Basin

1979

North Dry Dock

1990

1980

special to type maintenance, repair, refit and

Marine Gas Turbine Repair

logistic support facilities.

Workshop

1990

1984

°

When vessels are acquired from abroad, it is

New jetty on the eastern bank

1991

1987

economical to acquire them in sufficient

Ammunition jetty

1993

1987

numbers, rather than one at a time. Inescapably,

the bunching at the time of their acquisition

NSRY at Cochin

leads, years later, to the bunching of their major

By the end 1970’s, the old ships of the Training refits. Since refit facilities always lag, operational Squadron had been phased out and replaced by

availability diminishes.

BRAHMAPUTRA. BETWA and BEAS which had been

In the Indian N avy’s case, unusual civil

converted to the training role.

engineering d ifficu lties retarded the timely

In 1982. the six new Russian inshore

completion

of the

fa cilities

at

Bombay.

minesweepers were based in Cochin. They were

Visakhapatnam and Port Blair:

joined in 1985 by four new srvey craft and the new

training ship TIR.

•

In Bombay, the lack of a suitable rock breaker

With the number of ships based in Cochin

and prolonged litigation by a defaulting

steadily increasing, it became timely to modernise the

con tra ctor delayed the Naval D o c k y a r d

BRO’s facilities. Taking advantage of the special to

Expansion Scheme.

type equipment being supplied for the maintenance,

•

In Visakhapatnam, the soil conditions were

repair and refit of the Russian inshore minesweepers,

unable to bear the weight of the heavy floors o

new workshops were set up on land adjacent to the

critical priority workshops. Their floors san k ,

old BRO. in such a^way that the workshops could

entailing extensive rework. Later, work on the

maintain, repair and refit larger ships as well, with

new South Dry Dock had to be stopped to enab e

docking being done in Cochin Shipyard.

the dock floor to be redesigned because of p°or

The new 1200 foot jetty was commissioned in

soil conditions.

,

1987 and when the new workshops were ready, the

•

In Port Blair, all construction machinery an

BRO Cochin was re-designated as a Naval Ship

material had to be ferried from the mainlan.

Repair Yard.

This could only gather momentum after t

arrival of the first two landing ships in 196 •

NSRY at Port Blair

Moreover, since Port Blair was also

developed on the civil side, the p r e p a r a t io n o ^

•

The new workshops were sanctioned in 1975.

Master Plan, the zoning o f areas.

completed in 1977. and commissioned as a BRO

acquisition, the funding for water suppheS arJ

in 1979.

electricity generation etc all had their on'

•

A Floating Dock was acquired and commissioned

gestation times, because it entailed interac i

in 1987. This saved ships from having to go to

between several ministries.

Visakhapatnam for annual docking.

Taking all these factors into account. inC^LlC^rJg

•

In 1993. the BRO was redesignated as a Naval

our insistence on maximum indigenisation-

Ship Repair Yard.

momentum achieved in the setting up mainten^ g 5-

repair and refit facilities during the decade 1

1975 was more than commendable.

300/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

A Petya class submarine chaser

A Fleet tanker

A Landing ship

An Islander training aircaft

21

Personnel

Preamble

terms of workload, responsibilities, career

prospects and particularly the less liked duties

The evolution and management of the Navy’s

like cleanship and ship husbandry.

personnel policies have been turbulent since 1939.

During the Second World War, the Royal Indian Navy

The reconciliation of these conflicting

had expanded from 114 officers and 1732 ratings in

considerations was not easy. During the decade 1965

1939 to 3014 officers and 27,433 ratings in 1945.

to 1975, unrest and dissatisfaction manifested in

After the demobilisation of 1945 and 1946 and the

diverse forms. The Navy pulled through. Shortages

partition of the Navy in 1947, the Navy had shrunk to

reduced gradually. Reforms were attempted in the

672 officers and 5508 ratings.

procedures for recruitment, training and manning.

After 1947, the demands for manpower steadily

Some reforms succeeded. Some reforms like fixed

commissions and pre commissioning training (PCT)

increased. Ever since then, personnel policies have

took time to take root. Some reforms like user-

been driven by several considerations, of which the

maintainer failed to gain acceptance.

more basic ones have been:

As regards training, except for the advanced

•

To overcome shortages by constantly innovating

“dagger" specialisation courses and other highly

the schemes of intake.

specialised courses, the entire training of officers and

•

To raise the educational standards of intake so

sailors was being undertaken in India by 1965.

that personnel can cope with the rising

The parent schools, by and large, had the

equipment they needed to impart training for the

technological levels of naval equipment.

older ships. For every new acquisition, however, a

•

To minimise the durations of courses, so as to

balance had to be struck between the cost of setting

release manpower for manning new acquisitions.

up new training facilities ashore or making the

•

To m inim ise the exodus of trained and

maximum use of equipment aboard the new ships.

experienced technical manpower to the Merchant

The main constraint was that the wear and tear

Navy and the civil sector by offering lon ger

caused by “learning on the job at sea" degraded the careers, better emoluments, more domestic

life of equipment on board operational ships.

accomodation, more schools for children, canteen

This chapter discusses the -Personnel

facilities, loans from the Indian Naval Benevolent

developments between 1965 and 1975 under the

Association (INBA), Group Insurance Schemes

following headings:

etc to induce personnel to remain in service or as

long as possible.

.

.

O ffic e r s in ta k e . T r a in in g . P r o g r e s s io n a n d

•

These considerations have had to bejugg

Promotion

within the over-riding constraint of main aim

Sailors Intake. Training and Transfers

parity with the Army and the Air Force in p ysi

and medical recruitment standards, pay sc:

•

C h a n g es in the N a vy 's S a ilo r S t r u c t u r e a n d length of colour service, pensionary en

Branch Responsibilities

Fixed C om m issions

equivalence with civilian trades etc.

„_nPf.s

The Training Reform s ol 1974

•

Within the above framework, to devise a o\

and perquisites like hardlying money,

D iscipline and M orale

bounty, submarine pay. diving mon^ sations

The°Nav/® Civilian Personnel

attract talent into the appropriate speci

of the Navy.

n the

A l l o t m e n t of Personal Numbers to Officers

On board ships, to maintain Parit^ e^ VfnCi the

! " s t a n d i n g Establishment Com m ittee

departments, the branches of the a -

. in

specialisations/ trades within eac

- Changes in Regulations R egarding M oustaches

g r a d u a t e s w e r e t a k e n in fo r th e Executive B r a n c h u n d e r t h e G r a d u a t e S p e c ia l Entry and Beards

S c h e m e ( G S E S ) , s o a s to m a in t a in parity

- Changes in U niform

In crease in th e N avy’s B orne S tren gth B etw een b e t w e e n t h e N D A g r a d u a t e c a d e ts and the N aval A c a d e m y ’s g r a d u a te cadets.

1965 and 1975

•

C h an ges in S a ilo rs ’ C on d ition s o f S e rv ice a fter By 1975, th o u g h th e o v e r a ll s h o r ta g e persisted, 19-75

in ta k e h a d im p r o v e d . G S E S fo r E x e c u t iv e Branch

•

Retrospect

c a n d id a te s a n d th e D ir e c t E n tr y S c h e m e o f offering p e r m a n e n t c o m m i s s i o n s to E n g in e e r in g and Officers

E le c tr ic a l c a n d id a t e s h a d r e c e iv e d g o o d response.

Both sch em es w e re c o n tin u e d .

I n

t a

k

e a

n d

S

c h e m

e s t o R

e d

u

c e S

h

o r t a

g e s

T h e resid u a l s h o r ta g e s w e r e m a d e up through the In S e p te m b e r 1939, w h e n th e S e co n d W o rld W a r U n io n P u b lic S e r v i c e C o m m i s s i o n ’ s Com bined started, th e R oyal Indian N avy had 114 officers. By D efence S ervices (C D S ) E x a m in a tio n , w h ich had been th e tim e , th e w a r en d e d in 1945, th e n u m b e r o f in t r o d u c e d in 1 9 7 4 to r e p l a c e t h e separate officers had risen to 3014. After the dem obilisation of exam inations w h ic h u sed to b e h e ld for cadets to join 1945 and 1946 and the partition o f the Navy in 1947, th e In d ia n M ilita r y A c a d e m y , th e N a v a l Academ ys the Navy had 672 officers.

G SE S en try and th e A ir F o rc e A ca d em y .

T h e a n t ic ip a t e d e x p a n s io n o f th e N a v y n e c e s s ita te d re c o u rs e to in c re a s ed rec ru itm e n t o f direct entry officers, as also increasing the intake o f Manning Plan for Officers

r e g u la r en try o ffic e r s . By 1964, th e stren g th had In en d 1975, s h o r ta g e s p e r s is t e d in th e technical risen to 1870 officers.

branches, albeit a t a red u c ed level. T h e shortage was T h e position, in end 1965, w as that the Navy w as particularly acu te in th e ra n k o f Lt C d r becau se of the s till 26 % s h o rt and for th e n ext fiv e y e a rs a la rg e n ew a c q u is itio n s . L o n g c o u r s e s . S t a f f co u rs e s an n u m b e r w o u ld b e r e q u ir e d to m an th e R u s s ia n a p p oin tm en t in th e n ew u n its lik e Acceptance Tria acquisitions. A series o f steps w ere taken to meet this Team s, T e s tin g and T u n in g T e a m s , W o rk Up T cams.

loom ing shortage o f officers:

W eapon A n alysis T e a m s etc. T h e s h o rta g e o f seam an

•

F rom 1965 on w ard s. D irect Entry recru itm en t w eapon sp ecialist o ffic e rs h a d b e c o m e so acu te tha w as increased: 23 in 1965. 8 8 in 1966 and 216 in

these im p ortan t team s, th e s a n c tio n s for w h ich ha 1967.

taken yea rs o f e ffo rt to ob ta in , w e r e le ft unfilled-

•

In 1965. the U niversity Entry Scheme, w hich till Officers M anning Plan b eca m e in esca p a b le:

then w as a p p lic a b le only to com m issions in the E le c t r ic a l B r a n c h , w a s e x te n d e d to th e

•

Th e requ irem en ts w h ich w o u ld b e fu lly m et were E n gin eering Branch.

th o se o f o p e r a tio n a l s h ip s , c o u r s e s a n d ju n ior

•

In 1968, a n ew R e vis ed S p ecia l En try Schem e officer’s sea time.

(R S E S ) w a s in t r o d u c e d fo r c a d e ts w h o had

•

T h e sh o rta g es w o u ld b e s h a r e d b e tw e e n shore reached the Interm ediate standard in education.

e s ta b lis h m e n ts , C o m m a n d H e a d q u a r t e r s a *1

•

In 1 9 6 9 . a N a v a l A c a d e m y w a s t e m p o r a r ily Naval Headquarters.

e s ta b lis h e d a t C o c h in to tra in 80 R S E S ca d e t Special D uty List o ffic e rs w o u ld in c re a s in g ly fi entry officers annually.

G e n e r a l L is t b i l l e t s a s h o r e a n d a ls o s o m e

•

In 1971. s h o r ta g e s c o n tin u e d to p e rs is t in the Instructor billets in the sp ecia list schools.

Executive. Electrical and E n gin eering cadres. To

•

G reater re s p o n s ib ilities w e re to b e en tru sted to MCPOs.

overcom e these shortages:

- In ta k e w a s in c r e a s e d th r o u g h th e R e v is e d Special E n try Schem e.

Training of Officers

- T h e D ir e c t E n tr y S c h e m e w a s m a d e m o re C

h

a

n

g e s i n

T

r a

i n

i n

g

a

t

t h

e

N

a

t i o

n

a

l D

e f e n

c e

a t t r a c t i v e b y o f f e r in g s e le c t e d c a n d id a te s A

c a

d

e m

y

( N

D

A

)

p e r m a n e n t c o m m is s io n s in s t e a d o f s h o r t service com m issions.

U n til 1965, th e N D A 's th r e e y e a r s y lla b u s h a d a

- In 19 74 . t h e e d u c a t io n a l le v e l o f th e N a v a l com m on content for the first tw o y ea rs and an Army/

A c a d e m y ’ s in t a k e w a s r a is e d . S c ie n c e N a v y / A ir F o r c e s y lla b u s fo r t h e t h ir d y e a r . T h e dra w b ack o f th is sylla b u s w a s th a t c a d e ts w h o did 302/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

not h a ve k n o w le d g e o f s c ie n c e and m athem atics retarded th e p r o g r e s s o f the others, for whom the syllabus rem a in ed elem entary.

In 1965, th e C h iefs o f S ta ff Com m ittee directed By 1968, the shortage of General List officers had the NDA to in tro d u c e a diversified syllabus - one for started to becom e a co n strain t on the N a v y ’s the H u m a n ities - S ocial Scien ce stream and one for expansion. The anticipated strength of 3500 officers

the S c ie n c e s t r e a m .

T h e C h ie fs o f S t a ff also

by 1975 required an annual intake of at least 150

recom m en ded th a t c a d e ts be aw arded a degree on cadets. Since the NDA could not take more than 65

passing out o f the NDA.

naval cadets every year, it became necessary to start a A Syllabu s R evision Com m ittee w as appointed in Revised Special Entry Scheme’’ and set up a separate

1968 w hose term s o f reference were to:

Naval Academy. It was decided that the sailor’s Basic

& Divisional (B&D) Training School would have to R evise th e N D A s y lla b u s to a three year degree move from Cochin to Goa and a Naval Academy set up

course in S cien ce and in Humanities.

temporarily at Cochin to meet immediate needs until

Ensure that the revised syllabus was both broad

the Academy's permanent location was chosen.

based and need based.

In 1969, approval w as a ccord ed fo r the

C onsider m ea su res for the award o f a degree, by

institution o f the Revised Special Entry. Schem e

affiliaUon to a university.

(RSES). Under this scheme, naval cadets in the age

S u g g e s t h o w th e c o n c o m ita n t factors like age grou p 17 to 20 years who had passed the

lim it and m in im u m education standard on entry Intermediate examination could be recruited in the

w ould have to be changed.

Executive Branch. This scheme was identical to the

NDA’s “Special Entry Scheme” except that the initial

R e c o m m e n d th e a d d itio n a l in stru ction a l and training of one year would have to be conducted at a d m in is tra tiv e s t a ff and equipm ent that would Cochin in the Naval Academy.

becom e necessary.

RSES training commenced in January 1970 and

Th e C om m ittee com prised em inent educationists

the first batch of 36 executive cadets passed out of

and s e r v ic e r e p re s e n ta tiv e s . T h e Com m ittee also the Naval Academy on 14 December 1970. They

sought su ggestion s from a wide spectrum of experts.

joined the NDA’s 39th batch o f regular cadets for sea

All agreed th at b e tte r educated officer material was tra in in g on board the tra in in g sh ip s T IR and h ig h ly n e c e s s a r y an d th a t the a w ard o f a degree CAUVERY.

would also h elp in the post-service rehabilitation of G

r a d u a t e S p e c i a l E

n t r y S c h e m

e ( G

S E S )

o ffic e rs . T h e C h a ir m a n o f th e U n iversity Grants In 1973, when the NDA got affiliated to the JNU in Com m ission felt, however, that cadets who were good Delhi, all NDA cadets, on successfully passing their

in s e r v ic e s u b je c t s a n d m a rg in a l in academ ics final examinations, received a bachelors degree o f the should have the option to pass out without a degree, JNU. As a result, the RSES candidate o f the Naval

b e c a u s e th e o v e r a ll d e v e lo p m e n t o f a ca d et s Academy was out of phase with his NDA counterpart.

p e r s o n a lity a s a p o te n tia l o ffic e r w ou ld su ffer if It was decided that instead of taking in pre-graduate

acquisition o f a degree becam e the primary aim.

candidates, it would be more cost effective to recruit Th e C om m ittee’s m ajor recommendations were:

Science gradu ates only and th ereb y red u ce the T h e a ge lim it an d ed u c a tio n a l qualification at duration of their training at the Naval Academy.

e n tr y s h o u ld b e 16 to 18 y e a r s and H igher In July 1974. the first batch o f G SES cadets

entered the Naval Academ y for an in itial training Secondary respectively.

*

T h e N D A sh o u ld be affilia ted to the Jawaharlal period o f only 6 m onths.

W h erea s the o rig in a l

sanction was for a total o f 80 cadets to be trained Nehru U niversity (JNU) in Delhi.

T h e two strea m s, S cien ce and Social Sciences, every year- the Naval Academy now trained 80 cadets

roughly equal in strength, should continue.

every 6 months.

T h e C o m m itte e ’s R eport w as approved and the Afloat T raining and T rain in g Sh ips

_ ree y e a r D egree C ou rse w as started in July 197

T h e N D A w a s a ffilia te d to the JNU on 31 A u g u s t T h e S c o p e a n d C

u r r i c u

l u

m

o

f A

f l o a

t T

r a

i n

i n

g

1973. T h e 4 6 th N D A cou rse w as the first batchi o A flo a t tra in in g is s tru c tu re d to tra in each cadets to pass'ou t o f NDA as graduates in June 1974.

subordinate officer in seamanship, navigation and

man management, so that he will be able to:

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/303

P e r fo r m th e d u tie s o f an O ffic e r o f th e W a tc h Duration of Initial Training

involving the safety and navigation o f his ship.

Cadet E ntry O fficers

Supervise the control o f his ship s radars, sonars

and weapons.

T h e d u ration o f in itia l tr a in in g o f C a d e t Entry Officers

►

T a k e ch arge o f sa ilors ca rryin g ou t d eck du ties w a s red u c ed in 1975:

in v o lv in g a n ch o r w ork, b o a t w ork, rig g in g and D U R A T IO N S

ships hu sbandly.

•

Effectively organise, com m and and look after the

Until 1975

After 1975

sailors in their respective divisions/part o f ship.

Cadets Training Ship

6 m onths

6 months

T h e t r a in in g p r o g r a m m e fo r a c h ie v in g th e s e Midshipmen Training

1 2 m onths

6 months

Sub Lts Courses

1 2 months

40 weeks

objectives is tim e intensive and im parted largely ‘on Sea attachment for

the jo b ’ and by perform ing ‘live’ tasks.

watchkeeping certificate

3 to 6 months

6 months

T h e curriculum broadly consists o f :

Direct Entry Officers

. •

H a r b o u r

t r a in in g ,

p r a c t ic a l/ c la s s r o o m

in s tru c tio n s , h a rb o u r w a tc h e s and o rg a n ised T h e d u ra tion o f t r a in in g fo r D ir e c t E n tr y Executive v i s it s

to

n a v a l/ s e r v ic e / h a r b o u r / s h o r e

O ff ic e r s w a s d i f f e r e n t f r o m t h a t o f C a d e t Entry installations.

E x e c u t iv e o f f i c e r s . It w a s r e v i e w e d co n sta n tly ,

•

Sea tra in in g com p risin g exercises, sea watches, depending on the fe ed b a ck re c e iv e d fro m ships of the a tta c h m e n ts to ea ch d e p a rtm e n t o f th e sh ip , Fleet. T h e tra in in g d u ra tio n w a s in c re a s ed in 1968: organ ised cla ssroom in stru ction s and practical D U R A T IO N S

train in g in navigation and seamanship.

•

M an-m anagem ent in case study/role play modes.

Until 1968

A fte r 1968

5 weeks

T h is t r a in in g c u r r ic u lu m r e q u ir e s in d iv id u a l Naval Orientation 9 weeks

Naval Orientation

a tte n tio n to b e g iv e n to ea ch tra in e e for him to be Sea Training

8 weeks

Sea Training

15 weeks

a ssessed a t sh ort in terva ls th rou gh ou t the training (INS DELHI)

Sub Lt s Courses 34 weeks

Sub Lt's Courses 30 weeks

p e r io d . S h ip s h a v e t h e r e f o r e to b e e x c lu s iv e ly 4 weeks

Leave

ea rm a rk e d an d s u ita b ly staffed, so lely for tra in in g Sea Training

purposes.

(INS CAUVERY)

1 5 weeks

Total

69 weeks

Training Ships

51 w e e k s

Total

Since the 1950’s, th e sea training o f officer cadets had On completion, D E officers w e r e attached to Fleet b een u n d e rta k e n in th e S econ d W orld W ar frigates ships for obtaining their watchkeeping certificate.

K IS T N A , C A U V E R Y a n d T IR .

T h e p r im a r y

re q u ire m e n t w a s th e en d u ra n c e to u n d erta k e lon g Changes in Training at the Naval Academ y in

cru ises a t sea.

1974

By the end 1960’s, these three ships had begun to

age. T h e N avy exam ined w hether the three old Second T h e N aval A ca d em y c o n tin u e d w ith th e tra in in g of W orld W a r d e s tr o y e r s R A J P U T , R A N A and R A N J IT

evised Special En try S ch em e C a d ets u n til January i y /4 .

could be con verted to the train in g role. It w as found th a t th e ir r e m a in in g life did n o t ju s t ify th e cost o f In the beginning o f 1974, it w a s d e cid ed to close conversion.

d o w n th e B & D S c h o o l in C o c h in . A ll th e o ffic e r courses conducted b y this School w ere ta k en over by It w a s t h e r e fo r e d e c id e d to c o n v e rt th e a g e in g the Naval Academ y. A s a result, th e N a va l Academ y'

cru iser DELH I to th e tra in in g role. DELHI underw ent a p a rt from ru n n in g th e b a s ic c o u r s e s fo r cadets, a m ajo r refit from M ay 1971 to A u gu st 1972. DELHI, com m enced conducting the follow in g courses:

K IST N A . C A U V E R Y an d T IR com p rised the T ra in in g S q u a d ro n till th e end 1970s.

Initial Training for Direct Entry officers of the In th e m id 1970’s, it w a s decid ed to con vert the

.

and Electrical branches.

th ree d iesel en gin ed frig a te s B R A H M A PU TR A, BEAS

N au al Science O r i e n t a t i o n C o u r s e fo r o ffic e rs of and B E T W A to th e tra in in g role to take over from the th e S u p p ly B ra n c h a n d o f fic e r s fr o m for^

navies.

old er tra in in g ships.

S p e c i a l D

u t i e s ( S D

) L i s t P o s t P r o m

o t i o n C

o u r s e for.

sailors prom oted to officers in th e ran k o f A g Sub Lts in the SD Cadre.

304/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

•

Divisional & Management Course. The B&D

course done by all Executive Sub Lts during their an“ e n s u T T SdfStUdy of P ^ s io n a . subjects technical courses was re-designated as the D & M

appointments."0

c™ P eten ce to fill higher

Course when it was transferred from the B & D

School to the Naval Academy.

T e c h n i c a l M

a n a g e m

e n t E

x a m

i n a t i o n

.

Lieutenants War Course. The B&D School used to conduct a War Course of four weeks duration

Com m encing 1975, this exam in ation w as in stitu ted for Ag Sub Lts of the Executive branch. In 1974, for officers o f the Engineering and E lectrical b ran ch es it was decided that this course was better suited to prom ote s e lf stu d y o f p ro fessio n a l an d te c h n ic a l to a Lieutenant. The course was re-designated as

m a n a g e m e n t p r a c tic e s a n d e n s u r e p r o fe s s io n a l com petence to fill im portant assignm ents both afloat a Lieutenants War Course and conducted bi-and ashore.

annually at the Naval Academy.

•

Upper Yardmen Course. Sailors who showed early The Select List System of Promotion

prom ise at sea o f being officer material were

designated “Upper Yardmen” and given special

In 1969, NHQ promulgated the working principles on

assignments to test their potential. In end 1974,

the selection of officers for promotion to the ranks of Upper Yardmen o f all branches started being sent

Commander. Captain and Rear Admiral.

to the Naval Academy for their initial training.

S e l e c t i o n P r o c e d u r e

•

Commanding Of icers and Junior Commanders

Course. In end 1974, two new courses were The Promotion Committee would consider the officers branchwise, batch by batch, for promotion to higher

instituted: the Junior Commanders course and

rank, once a year, depending on the likelihood o f the Commanding Officers Course. These courses

fresh vacancies during the ensuing year.

were conducted at the Naval Academy in 1974,

T h e S e l e c t L i s t co m p rised o f fic e r s w h o w e r e 1975 and 1976.

considered fit for acting/substantive promotion to the

By 1976, it was found that it was not practical to

next higher rank.

carry out the initial training of cadets and of Ag Sub G

r a d i n g

Lts of various branches separately. It was therefore

The Selection Committee would grade each officer as

decided th at all in itia l training for cadets of the Executive Branch and Ag Sub Lts of all technical

follows:

branches should be o f the same duration, should

A - An officer who was “head and shoulders above"

have a com m on sylla b u s and should run

his contemporaries.

concurrently. This was implemented from January

B - An officer fit for promotion in his turn.

1976 onwards.

D - Deferred for co n sid eration w ith o u t loss o f seniority

Command Exam ination

R - Not yet fit for promotion

C o m m e n c i n g 1974, t h e C o m m a n d E x a m in a tio n w a s U - Unfit for promotion - having been considered

i n t r o d u c e d f o r E x e c u t i v e o f f i c e r s .

A ll o ffic e rs w h o

three times and not found fit for promotion.

a s p i r e d t o c o m m a n d s h i p s h a d to q u a l i f y in th is An officer graded A would move to the top o f his

e x a m i n a t i o n .

I t s a i m w a s to p r o m o t e s e l f s tu d y an wuuu, Its aim was iu

~

.

Select '

List. In

I

n ex

exceptional cases,

, an

0 acquire professional competence to fill C° mm , a

traded A could be considered for promotion

appointments at sea.

Officers who failed in this

A c o ^

^ ^

examination would not be appointed in command

with the batch im

Officers of the Submarine Arm who had quali ie

Sailors

n the Submarine Commanding Officers ^oursefWf^

exem pted from ap p earin g in that part 0

Intake and S c h e m e s to Reduce Shortages

°m m and Exam ination which had question

T h e N a v y 's p r o c e d u r e fo r th e in t a k e a n d i n i t i a l submarines.

‘ "fnina o f ratings had been ad op ted fro m th e British N avy Its basic prem ise w as that ra tin gs sh ou ld be

^

° 9

i s

t i c s

M

a

n

a

g e

m

e n

t E

x a

m

i n

a

t i o n

inducted w hen y o u n g and g iven lo n g p erio d s ot in itia l Commencing 1975, this examination was ,n®tlt“ ^

tr a in in g to in d o c t r in a t e n a v a l d i s c i p l i n e a n d to for Su pply Branch Officers. It was analogou

familiarise them w ith life at sea. A c c o rd in gly , ra tin gs Command Examination for Executive officer*.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/305

recom m en d a tion , all s a ilo r s c o u ld b e re-engaged up w e r e in d u c te d as ‘b o y s ’ an d tra in e d in th e B o y s to a t o t a l p e r io d o f t w e n t y f i v e y e a r s or age 0f T ra in in g Establishm ent for two years before going to su perann uation, w h ich e ve r w a s earlier. T h e aim was sea. A rtificers w ere inducted as artificer apprentices, to prom ote a grea ter sen se o f s e c u rity o f employment and tra in ed for fo u r y ea rs b efore g o in g to sea. T h e am on gst sailors and en su re a lo n g e r ca re e r for those only w ay o f m eeting surges in dem and w as to resort to w ho volu n teered for fu rth er service.

direct entry intake, curtail the long duration o f initial tra in in g and a cce p t th e a tten d a n t c o n se q u en ce o f In 1973. r e -e n g a g e m e n t w a s p e r m itte d for five years at a tim e up to the c o m p u ls o iy a ge o f retirement lesser discipline.

In Septem ber 1939, w hen the Second W orld W ar

o f fifty five y ea rs for all.

s ta rted , th e R o ya l In d ia n N avy had 1732 ra tin g s.

In 1976. th e in it ia l e n g a g e m e n t w a s increased W hen the w ar ended in 1945. the num ber o f ratings from ten to fifteen y e a rs . A n d . in s te a d o f promotion had risen to 27.433. A fter the dem obilisation o f 1945

a w a it in g v a c a n c ie s , t im e s c a le a d v a n c e m e n t to and 1946, and partition o f the Navy in 1947. the Navy L e a d in g r a te w a s a p p r o v e d fo r s a ilo r s otherwise had 5508 ratings.

qualified.

The division o f personnel betw een the two Navies

necessitated a heavy recruitm ent drive in 1948, both Training of Sailors

o f direct entry a rtificers and direct entry ratin gs as w ell as regu lar en try artificer apprentices and boys.

B

o y s T

r a

i n

i n

g

E

s

t a

b

l i s

h

m

e

n

t ( B

T

E

)

Th is h elped to ea se the sh ortage. A decade la ter in Before the partition o f th e N avy in 1947, th e only BTE

1958. c o n tr a r y to e x p e c ta tio n s . 70 % o f th e 1948

o f the Royal Indian N avy w a s lo c a ted in Karachi. After sailor entrants declined to sign on for further service p a r t it io n , a t e m p o r a r y B T E w a s s e t up in a ft e r t h e ir in it ia l c o n t r a c t . T h is s h o r t a g e w a s V isa k h a p a tn a m . T r a in in g w a s c a r r ie d o u t in a New aggravated by the need to find addition al personnel E n try C am p and a M a in C a m p , b o th o f w h ich were for th e n ew fr ig a te s and V IK R A N T b e in g a cq u ired located in tem porary b a rra ck s in IN S CIRCARS.

from Britain.

In 1954, th e sa n c tio n fo r th e B T E en visaged the By 1962. an oth er recru itm ent drive reduced the

tra in in g in s e a m a n s h ip o f 1645 b o y s a ilo r s for the sh ortages. H owever, the a n ticipated ad va n tage w as seam an, stok er and electrica l trades.

offset by new com m itm en ts ashore and in the inter In 1 9 6 2 , t h e B T E s t a r t e d g e t t i n g c o n g e s t e d .

se rvice s o r g a n is a tio n s lik e NCC to g e th e r w ith th e S a n c t io n w a s o b t a in e d t o e x p a n d t h e B T E and dem ands for the Naval Garrison in the A ndam an and

acquire land from the V isa k h a p a tn a m P o r t T ru st an Nicobar Islands.

from private ow ners.

In 1965, the shortage in the sailor cadre stood at

In 1965, w h en th e d e cis io n w a s tak en to base the 17% and a large requirem ent w as loom ing to m an the

R u ssian a cq u isition s in V is a k h a p a tn a m and build a R u ss ia n a c q u is itio n s . It w a s a n tic ip a te d th a t th e m ajor naval b ase w ith a n ew D ock yard , it w a s d e c i d e sam e situation, as in 1948 and 1958. m ight arise in to shift the B TE to P arad ip p o rt in O rissa. T h is cou 1968 also.

n o t b e p u r s u e d b e c a u s e th e v a c a n t m u lt i- s t o r e y Th e solutions clearly lay in increasing the N avy’s

bu ildin gs w h ich w ere to h ou se th e B TE , g o t oCCU^ie capacity to train new entrants, increase the period o f b y th e p e r s o n n e l o f P a r a d ip p o r t. T h e N a v y the in itia l en g a g e m e n t an d o ffe r g r e a te r in c e n tiv e s to sta rted in v e s tig a tin g a lte r n a tiv e s ite s , th e induce sailors to stay on in service.

re q u ire m e n t b e in g p r o x im ity to th e s e a so that sa ilo rs co u ld b e ta u g h t b o a tw o rk , s a ilin g an d basi I n

c r e a

s i n

g

t h

e P

e r i o d

o

f E

n

g a

g e m

e n

t

seam anship.

j

In 1965. a sa ilor’s in itial period o f en gagem en t w as In 1 9 6 9 , a f t e r v i s i t i n g C h a n d b a li p o r t an ten years. On completion, he could re-engage for five G anjam port, th e N avy ch ose a 1600 a cre site on years and for two years thereafter i.e. up to a total of b a n k o f th e C h ilk a la k e in O riss a , w h e r e 1 2 0 0 0

seven teen yea rs. T h e a u th ority for re-e n g a g em e n t could b e trained a t a tim e.

beyond seventeen years vested in NHQ. N orm ally all C hilka la k e w as a s a n c tu a iy fo r m ig ra tory bn'

sailors w ere re-engaged upto twenty years o f service if T h e en viron m en tslists sought, and th e N avy

rec o m m e n d e d by th e ir C o m m a n d in g O fficer. R e gave and has m eticu lou sly ob served, th e com m it111

engagem ent beyond tw enty y ea rs w as on a selective n--------------------- *

v-viy-h ccmctuary*

to safegu ard the en viron m en t o f th is b ird sane basis.

o f the

T h e Prim e M in is te r la id th e fo u n d a tio n ston e _

In 1966. to co p e w ith th e in c r e a s e d n e ed fo r BTE. C o n s tru c tio n c o m m e n c e d in. 1973 a n d it s a ilo r s , s u b je c t to t h e C o m m a n d in g O f f i c e r ’ s com m issioned as IN S C H IL K A in 1980.

306/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Seaman T ra in in g Establishm ent (STE)

On 9 Oct 69, the Prime M inister laid the

In th e 1 9 5 0 ’ s, d i r e c t e n t r y s a ilo r s started being foundation stone of the STE. The STE was formally

trained a t th e B a sic a n d D ivisional School at Cochin.

commissioned as INS MANDOVI in 1976.

A s th e N a v y e x p a n d e d , th e nu m bers increased and the search sta rted for altern ative locations. Here too, B r a n c h T r a i n i n g S c h o o l s

the p r im a r y r e q u ir e m e n t w a s p roxim ity to the sea By 1965, branch/specialist schools had been

w h e r e y o u n g s a i l o r s c o u ld b e ta u g h t boatwork, established for imparting professional training in

sailing and b a s ic seam an sh ip.

their respective specialisations. These schools

In 1968, th e N a v y ’s proposal w as accepted to site conducted the courses in which sailors had to qualify

the new S T E a t G oa. In 1969, approval was accorded before they could be promoted to higher rank.

for the co n s tru c tio n o f th e STE on a 230 acre site on a Whenever new acquisitions were inducted, every

hill at R eis M a gos, five m iles north o f Panaji, close to effort was made to install the analogous training

equipment in the respective schools, subject to cost

the n o r th e r n b a n k o f th e R iv er M andovi. The STE

considerations.

w as e n v is a g e d to t r a in 50 0 d ire ct entry sailors at a time.

Branch

Specialisation

Parent School

Location

Gunnery School

Cochin

Seaman

Gunnery

Cochin

Torpedo & Anti Submarine

TAS School

Cochin

Communications

Signal School

& Electronic Warfare

Cochin

Navigation & Direction

ND School

INS SHIVAJI

Lonavla

Engineering

Artificers &

Engineering Mechanics

INS SHIVAJI

Lonavla

Electrical

Artificers

(Initial training)

Jamnagar

INS VALSURA

(Electrical training)

Jamnagar

INS VALSURA

Electrical Mechanics

Marve(Bombay)

INS HAMLA

Supply &

Writers.

Stores'Assistants,

Secretariat

Cooks & Stewards

Lonavla

INS SHIVAJI

Shipwright

Artificers

(Initial training)

INS ANGRE. Bombay

Shipwright School

INS KUNJALI. Bombay

Regulating School

INS KUNJALI. Bombay

Provost

School of Music

Cochin

Musicians

Observer School

Lonavla

Air Arm

Observers

INS SHIVAJI

Artificers

S T S n i c a l S c h o o i Cochin

, T v Technical School Cochin

Airm en Technical

Airm en Non Technical

TRANSITION to TRIUMPH/307

o

U

n

p

l a

n

n

e d

D

r a

f t i n

g

: T h i s i n c lu d e d :

P

e t t y

O

f f i c e r s L e a

d

e r s h

i p

s S

c h

o o l

-

C om passion ate d rafts.

In 1959, to ea se th e c o n g estio n in C och in, th e PO

In cidental d ra fts to m a k e u p sh orta ges due to L eadersh ip S ch ool w a s sh ifted to C alicu t. In 1965, u n foreseen in c id e n ts s u c h a s d eath , illness w hen HANS A relocated from C oim batore to D abolim prem a tu re release, etc.

in Goa, the Leadership School shifted from C alicut to Sports drafts

C oim batore, in to the p re m is es v a ca ted b y H A N SA.

E m e r g e n c y d r a f t s in c a s e o f h o s tilit ie s , The School w as nam ed INS AGRANI.

s t r ik e s , n a t i o n a l c a l a m i t i e s a n d civil distu rbances.

Policy for Transferring Sailors into and out of Ships

In a ll c a s e s o f p la n n e d d r a ft in g , t h e D raftin g O ffic e g a v e a p p r o x im a t e ly t h r e e m o n t h s n o tice to T h e d riv in g w h ee l o f th e N avy’s m a n a g em en t o f its enable the affected sa ilo rs to a tten d to th eir domestic sailor cadres w as its “d ra ftin g” policy. T h e A nnu al affairs. Pleas for d e fe rm e n t o r c a n c e lla tio n o f drafts Training Program m e for higher rank courses and the

on a c c o u n t o f s ic k n e s s , f i n a n c i a l h a r d s h ip or annual program m e o f F leet E xercises du rin g w h ich d o m e s t ic r e a s o n s w e r e u s u a l l y n o t c o n s id e r e d .

sailors got “sea tim e” w ere offshoots o f this policy.

W h e r e , h o w e v e r , t h e C o m m a n d in g O f f ic e r was On the one hand, the prom otion regulations required

p e r s o n a lly o f th e o p in io n t h a t t h e c irc u m s ta n c e s sailors to qualify in higher rate professional courses

w arran ted a d eferm en t or c a n c e lla tio n o f a draft, the and to be given adequate sea time. On the other hand,

D r a ftin g O ffic e e x a m in e d th e c a s e on m e r its . To this p olicy o f co n tin u ou sly tra n sferrin g sa ilors into a v o id a c h a in r e a c t io n , th e D r a f t in g o f fic e rarely an d o u t o f s h ip s p r e v e n te d th e c o n s o lid a t io n o f a c c e d e d to la s t m in u te r e q u e s t s fo r d e fe r m e n t or e x p e r tis e . T h e d if fic u lt ta s k o f p r o v id in g e q u a l cancellation o f drafts:

o p p o r t u n it y a n d o f b a la n c in g t h e s e c o n flic t in g requirem ents w as delegated to the Drafting Office.

•

I n

t e

r S

h

i p

D

r a

f t s

: W h e n t i m e d id n o t p e rm it a Th e Drafting Office look the follow ing factors into

prior referen ce to be m a d e to th e D ra ftin g Office, consideration w hen effecting drafts:

th e s e n io r o ffic e r o f a s q u a d r o n o r F le e t could ord er in te r-s h ip d ra fts w ith in h is sq u a d ro n and

•

S u ffic ie n t o p p o rtu n ity to all sa ilo rs to gain the Fleet in cases of:

req u isite ex p erien ce for ad va n cem en t to h igh er A d m iss io n in to h o s p ita l o f a s a ilo r h olding a rates.

key rate in a sh ip a b o u t to sail independently-

•

A dequate sea time, ensuring alternate tenures at

T e m p o ra ry tra n s fe r o f an e x p e rie n c e d sailor sea and ashore, except in those categories w here,

to assist in a tte n d in g to im m e d ia te technical du e to sh orta ges, a lte rn a te ten u res at sea and defects in a ship.

ashore could not be provided.

G r a n t o f le a v e o n u r g e n t c o m p a s s i o n a t e

•

Opportunity for all sailors, otherw ise qualified, to grou n d s to a sa ilo r h o ld in g a k ey billet.

undergo higher rate professional courses in time.

T h e D r a ft in g O ffic e w a s , h o w e v e r , to b e kept-For optim al d ep loym en t o f a va ila b le m anpow er, inform ed o f the p rob a b le d u ration .

th e D ra ftin g O ffic e p ro m u lg a ted a "M a n n in g P la n "

•

D

r a

f t s

f o

r

I n

s

t r u

c

t i o

n

a

l D

u

t i e

s

: T h e D r a f t i n g

every year, indicating the allocation o f sailors to each Office w as req u ired to g ive s u fficie n t n otice to the sh ip and es ta b lis h m e n t. It to o k in to a c c o u n t the tra in in g es ta b lis h m e n ts b e fo re s a ilo rs em p loye shortage in each category o f sa ilors and ju d ic io u s ly on instru ction al d u ties w ere drafted.

distributed w hatever w as available.

•

D

r a

f t s

f o

r

C

o u

r s e s :

C o m m a n d in g o fficers were

Drafting w as divided into two m ain categories:

en join ed to en su re th a t sa ilo rs d ra fted to atten c o u r s e s o f in s t r u c t io n r e a c h e d t h e t r a in in g

•

P

l a

n

n

e d

D

r a

f t i n

g

: T h is in c lu d ed :

establish m en t in tim e, as d irected.

Block drafts to rotate betw een ship and shore

•

C

o m

p

a

s s i o n

a

t e D

r a

f t s

: D r a f t s w e r e s o m e tim e s

b ille ts and to im p le m e n t th e M a n n in g Plan c o n s id e r e d on c o m p a s s io n a te g r o u n d s . Since figures.

such d ra fts u pset th e m a n n in g stru c tu re, it was D rafts for higher rate professional courses.

e s s e n t i a l to k e e p t h e m to a m in im u m -

-

R o t a t io n d r a ft s o f s a ilo r s , e x - b a s ic a n d C om m anding O fficers, after sa tisfyin g themselves specialist courses, for sea time.

th at g en u in e h a rd sh ip existed , w e r e exhorted 0

-

D rafts to new ly com m issioned ships and from

e x p lo r e o t h e r p o s s i b i l i t i e s s u c h a s g r a n t o ships paid off.

3Q8/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

annual

leave,

before

recommending

were:

compassionate drafts.

.

Grant o f L e a v e P r io r to D raftin g: If by the Technical

Non Technical

grant of leave, the reporting date in the new ship

MCPO Class I

15%

or establishment was affected, prior concurrence

12 1/ 2 %

MCPO Class II

25%

of the commanding officer concerned was to be

25%

obtained.

Changes in the Navy’s Sailor Structure

A rtifice rs

Within a few years of the arrival from Britain of the

MYSORE in 1957, .the eight new frigates between The shortages were most worrisome in the case of

1958 and 1961 and the VIKRANT in 1961, it became artificers. Since much better emoluments and

clear that the increase in sophistication of ships and

perquisites were offered by private industry and the equipment called for a comprehensive relook at the

Merchant Navy, most senior technical artificers left existing ranks, rates and trades of the Navy’s sailors.

the Navy after having served the minimum time.

A high-powered committee was appointed to review

With the new technology entering service with the

the sailors structure.

Russian acquisitions, the shortage of artificers By the time this committee convened in 1966, the became a cause of serious concern.

first of the Russian acquisitions, the Landing Ships,

Several proposals were considered to overcome

had arrived. It was abundantly clear that there was

the shortage. One was to recruit holders of diplomas going to be a severe shortage of bunks. At this very

from polytechnics as direct entry artificers. Whilst same time, sailors were being selected to undergo

this would help to meet the immediate need by training in Russia to man the submarines, the Petyas

avoiding the long four year initial period of training and the Submarine Depot Ship and problems had

that artificer apprentices normally underwent, it had arisen on how to accomodate the Navy’s numerous

the disadvantage of insufficient naval indoctrination.

trades in the fewer bunks.

Another proposal was to create a new rate of Master

The CROSS Committee

Chief Petty Officer as an incentive to sign on for longer periods after their initial engagement as also to The Committee for the Reorganisation of the Sailors

improve the career prospects of highly trained senior Structure (called the CROSS Committee) started its

sailors.

deliberations in 1966. It was headed by Commodore

In 1966, recruitment commenced of diploma

SS Sodhi. He recalls:

holders as artificers to be trained for 11/2 years The basic point that we made in our Report was

instead of the 4 years training given to regular entry that user and maintainer should be interlinked.

artificer apprentices.

It was no use saying that a maintainer was

1967, Direct Entry Artificer intake was

responsible for total maintenance from A to Z and

lncreased to 120. By 1971, the deficiency in the the user was only to be an operator. The two had

Artificer cadre had reduced from.30% to 10%. From

hf» lin k e d

T h a t b a s ic a lly m e a n t t h a t th e

loJ 2 0nwards, the artificer shortage persisted at to be Iin

technical input into the user

ivJ%.

educational a n d M M

had tQ

th e s h o rta g e o f artificers in the

Uad ‘ faith ^n^he user's capability to handle the

AUf 1? arine cadre led to the induction of Direct Entry nhistication of the equipment. That was

dini

ers A c ting IV th class o f three or four year

f P Luv the recom m endation which we made,

basically the

seam en h ad t0 come

e

° mas in mechanical, electrical and aeronau ca

The educaUona leve

tQ ^

Qn

DerL?*eerin£' S im u lta n e o u s ly , this entry was fitte d for engineering and electrical artificers.

T , , “

rr S

X

« maintenance „t .h.

Introduction of the MCPO Cadre

' ,U,C enf » S S t ' S e T & m c t e could be

•We also 1

felt: Ui

showed m t our own

abolished. Our exp

ratlng with other

serv!^* as ^ inccntive to re-engagement for l°n^f sailors, ^ e n they

deaning their

equivC,e ' t h e M C P O c a d r e w a s c r e a te d i X

t 0 J C O 's o f t h e A rm y and Warrant/Master

™ * s- “ h

f° r

Tvnt„°ffice rs o f th e A ir Force.

„ e

of thP 6

^ P O C a d re w a s sanctioned as a Perc

TRANSITION to TRIUMPH/309

lhe sanctioned cadre of CPO's. These percentages

C om m ander V F Rebello w as the D eputy D irector

•

T h e division o f resp on sib ilities in h erited from the o f P e r s o n n e l (M a n p o w e r P la n n in g ) in N a v a l B ritish N avy w a s w e ll e s ta b lis h e d in th e Navy’s H e a d q u a r t e r s fr o m 1 9 6 7 to 19 69 w h e n th e trade stru ctu re. T h e seam a n b ra n ch “ user" used r e c o m m e n d a tio n s o f th e C R O S S C o m m itte e w e re th e e q u ip m e n t a n d t h e e l c t r i c a l branch

"m a in tain er" m ain ta in ed th e eq u ip m en t. Since a exam ined. He recalls:

Petya h ad su ch a lot o f e le c tro n ic equ ipm ent, it

“T h e C r o s s C o m m it t e e w e n t in to th e w h o le n e e d e d m o r e e le c t r o n ic m a in t a in e r s . S in ce a m a n n in g p r o b le m o f th e N a v y w ith g r e a t Petya had so m any m ore w ea p on s, it also needed th orou gh n ess. T h ey also exam ined the m an ning m ore users.

s tr u c tu r e in th e A m e r ic a n a n d o th e r W e s te rn

•

Since a Petya had few er b u n k s th an w ere needed

navies and cam e up w ith ve ry good su ggestion s even for a norm al Indian sh ip s com pan y, it could on how to reorganise the m anpow er o f our Navy.

n ot a cco m o d a te th e in c re a s e d n u m b ers o f users It w a s o p e r a t o r - m a in t a in e r a n d v e r t ic a l and electrical m ain tainers.

s p e c ia lis a t io n . U n fo r t u n a t e ly th e t r a in in g

•

H ow then w a s a Petya to be m an n ed ?

re q u ir e m e n ts fo r su ch a s c h e m e w e r e so v e ry ex p en sive afrid exten sive th a t it w as b eyon d the V a riou s op tion s w ere c o n s id e re d lik e red u ce the scope o f the N avy o f th at tim e to im plem ent. We n u m b er o f c o o k s a n d s te w a r d s , a b o lis h topasses, w ou ld re q u ire a la rg e n u m b er o f sc h o o ls and a adopt two w atch stea m in g at sea in stead o f the usual very b ig tra in in g schedule. It w as estim ated that th ree w a tc h e s , c o n v e rt a ll m a in ta in e r s in to users, at any one tim e abou t 1 /3rd o f the sailors w ould

tea ch u sers th e b a s ic m a in te n a n c e so a s to reduce be u n d ergoin g tra in in g and con version and this the num ber o f m ain tain ers on b oard, tra n sfer the less the G overnm ent sim ply could not afford to have.

c o m p lic a t e d p o w e r e le c t r ic d u t i e s o f th e ju n io r T h e r e fo r e th e r e c o m m e n d a tio n s o f th e C ro s s electrical sailors to the E n gin eerin g D ep artm en t and Com m ittee w ere kept in abeyance.

so on. A ft e r d e ta ile d c o n s id e r a t io n , th e follow ing

“T h e a b o lit io n o f T o p a s s e s w a s t h e o n ly directives w ere issued in 1969:

recom m en d a tion o f the C ross C om m ittee w hich 1.

w as taken u p ”

R

e

- a

l l o

c a

t i o

n

o

f B

r a

n

c h

R

e

s

p

o

n

s

i b

i l i t i e

s

a n d

D

u

t i e s .

Changes in Nomenclature of Junior Sailors

. “T a k in g a b r o a d p e r s p e c t iv e , it is im p o r t a n t that th e v a r io u s b r a n c h e s o f th e N a vy ' d e v e lo p with W ith effect from D ecem b er 1967, the term in ology in e q u it a b le d i s t r i b u t i o n o f w o r k lo a d and use to s ig n ify ju n io r ra te s o f s a ilo rs o f th e va rio u s resp on sib ility. W ith in c re a s in g so p h istica tion of b ra n ch es w e re sta n d a rd is e d in “ secon d cla ss " and w eapon system s, sen so rs and da ta processing, it

“first class". For exam ple:

is im p e r a t iv e t h a t t h e e l e c t r i c a l bran ch co n ce n tra te th e ir e n e rg ie s to m a s te r th ese new E

k

i r l i e r N

o m

e n

c l a

t u

r e

S

t a

n

d

a

r d

i s e d

fields. O th er b ra n ch es m u s t b e m a d e capable of N

o m

e n

c l a

t u

r e

d e a lin g w it h th e d ia g n o s is o f fa u lt s a n d the Ordinary Seam an (OD)

S e a m a n S e c o n d C la s s

m aintenance o f less co m p lica ted item s o f systems (Sea II)

a n d e q u ip m e n t. T h is e n t a ils t h e e n g in e e rin g A b le Seam an (AB)

Seam an First Class (Sea I)

b ra n ch s h o u ld e r in g m o re r e s p o n s ib ilit ie s with Stoker

E n g in e e r in g M e c h a n ic

rega rd to th e gen era tion , d is tr ib u tio n o f electric Second/First Class

pow er and allied equ ipm en t, th e sea m a n branc M E II/ M E I

b e in g en tru sted w ith th e n o n -a r tific e r care and m a in te n a n c e o f th e w e a p o n s , r a d a r , a n d A Changes in Branch Responsibilities

e q u ip m e n t a n d t h e c o m m u n ic a t io n bra n ch look in g a fter th e W /T, R / T a n d V / S equipment.

W hen the first three Petyas arrived in India, the Navy In a d d itio n , th e s e a m a n a n d c o m m u n ic a tio n w a s able to see, at first hand, the seriousness o f the b r a n c h e s m u s t s u b s t it u t e t h e lo w e r le v e ls o p ro b lem w h ic h th e C R O SS C om m ittee had tried to pow er and radio electrical sa ilors in assisting

solve:

a rtific e rs . T h e E le c tr ic a l O ffic e r w ill, however*

continue to be the exp ert tech n ica l a dviser to

^

•

T h e P e t y a s w e r e v e r y d e n s e ly p a c k e d w ith C om m an d in g O fficer on e le ctrica l and electron^

electronic equipm ent.

m a tters. In th e in it ia l s ta g e s , th e r e m ay be n savin g in m anpow er, b u t as ex p erien ce is gain 310/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

a n d p e r s o n n e l b e c o m e m o r e c o n fid e n t, the c o m p l e m e n t o f m o d e r n s h ip s w ill sh ow a rndition? /

^ 8’ C°Id R°°m and Alr-

r e d u c i n g t r e n d , w h ic h w ill b e an added E a S m , " o ' 113 ‘nery motors' Domestic

advantage.

Equipment. Capstans and Controllers. Motor

“ C o n s e q u e n t o n t h is r e v ie w , d eta iled Boat Equipment and Batteries, excepting those

used with weapons, including charging sets and

in s tr u c tio n s w ill is s u e fro m tim e to time on the panels."

m e a s u r e s n e c e s s a r y fo r th e r e v is e d training The transfer of responsibilities for power

s c h e m e s a n d p r o g r a m m e o f assum ption of new electrics from the Electrical to the Engine Room

re s p o n s ib ilities. A s a first step, the new measures branch will be implemented in stages.

w ill b e a p p lic a b le o n ly in th e “Petya cadre” and, Pre Commissioning Training (PCI) (Engineering)

based o n th e e x p e rie n c e gained, w ill be extended

- Eight

Weeks

in step s to c o v e r th e re s t o f the service. A start has been m a d e b y c ro s s -tra in in g a num ber o f engine

“On joining the Petya Training School, all Engine

r o o m p e r s o n n e l o f t w o P e ty a c la s s sh ip s in Room sailors of LME and ME rates are to undergo

look in g a fte r c e rta in electrica l equipment of these a PCT for engineering duties. The duration will be

ships.

eight weeks.

“ I t c a n n o t b e o v e r - e m p h a s is e d th at the Harbow Training (Engineering) - Four Weeks

su ccess o f th is m e a s u re w ill depend largely on the

“After the PCT (Engineering) sailors will be given

s p ir it in w h ic h th is c h a n g e is undertaken, and four weeks of harbour training to enable them to

th e re a d y c o o p e ra tio n an d w illingness on the part operate and maintain engineering equipment.

o f a ll c o n c e r n e d to w o r k to th e u ltim a te goal w h ic h w ill- r e s u lt in a d d e d e ffic ie n c y and w ell

Basic Training in Electrical Engineering - Sixteen b ein g in th e service.

Weeks

“ C o m m a n d in g O ffic e r s a re to en su re that

“On completion of the above training, sailors will

e v e r y o p p o r t u n it y is ta k e n b y them and their be trained in the basic elements of electricity fora

h ead s o f d e p a rtm e n ts to explain the implications period of sixteen weeks.

o f t h e s e r e v is e d r e s p o n s ib ilitie s to their ship s

Familiarisation and Pre-Com m issioning Training

co m p a n ies.”

2. Branch Responsibilites - Transfer of Power

(Electrical) ■ Twenty Weeks

•On

Electrical Duties From Electrical to Engine

completion of the basic training in electrical

Room Branch Sailors in "PETYA” Class of

engineering, these saiiors w'H unde g

Ships.

familiarisation training and PCT m elcctrlcai

“ I t h a s b e e n d e c id e d to c r o s s - t r a in all t e a ti>c for a period o f twenty weeks. During this U nH thev are to be instructed by the electrical

E n g in eerin g M e c h a n ic sailors o f the Petya c ass o penod, th y

Training School, to

sh ip s in p o w e r e le c tr ic a l du ties upto the ra e o to carry out the maintenance and

L M E . F o r t h e p r e s e n t , s a ilo r s o f th e rate or en3b tinn o f eleetr7cal machinery covered by

P O E L (P ), w i l l b e p r o v id e d to th e E n g i n e e r i n g Phase I and Phase II of the scheme, on board a

B r a n c h in t h e a b o v e c la s s o f sh ip s from e x i s t i n g c a d r e o f e le c t r ic a l s a ilo r s , Petya class of ship.

neriod they a re to be

in t e n d e d t o c r o s s - t r a i n P O M E s in e ec du ties. P O M E s fo r p o w e r electrical duties

fo u n d , in d u e c o u r s e , fro m am ongs ow er

w h o h a v e a l r e a d y b e e n c o n v e r te d to p Task I and II Training

^

be devoted

ele ctrica l d u ties.

-The first two weeks of ea ^

^

weeks t 0 Task

E

l e

c t r i c a

l

E

q

u

i p

m

e

n

t

t o

b e

^

? J S i ^ S ^ eeciuipmentrelatingt0

E

n g i n e e r i n g B

r a

n

c h

i n t h e P e t y a C l a s s o

f b

n

p

■

^

“ P o w e r e l e c t r i c s w i ll be transferred to E n g in eerin g bran ch , in tw o phases.

tarters

r u „ .»n a ,a |, Une

*

P h a s e I : L ig h t in g , v e n t ila t io n m otors an s

t o t h e p a b u l a r P h a s e .

^ d so u n d p o w e re d telephones.

_vrPOt those

P h a s e I I ; p u m p m o t o r s a n d starters.

ressor

TRANSITION t o t r iu m ph /311

d ir e c t ly a s s o c ia t e d w ith w eapons.

“Thereafter, the equipm ent is to b e taken over

T h e I n d ia n N a v y n e i t h e r h a d w o r ld w id e com m itm ents, n o r th e n u m b er o f sh ips, n o r sufficient by the Engine Room Branch.

Phase I

m a n p o w e r to a d o p t F ix e d C o m m is s io n s . Ship re m a in e d p e r m a n e n tly " in c o m m is s io n ” u n til they

“D u rin g this phase, the equ ipm ent referred to in

w e re "d ec o m m issio n ed " a n d fo r th e r e a s o n s already phase I w ill b e taken over.

d is c u s s e d , o ffic e r s , a n d m e n c h a n g e d r o u n d every

“ D u rin g Ph ase I, sa ilo rs a re to b e g iv e n dog tw elve to eigh teen m onths.

w atch instructions in equ ipm ent for Phase II and

S u c c e s s iv e F le e t C o m m a n d e r s r e p e a te d ly m ay b e u tilis e d to a ssis t th e E le ctrica l B ran ch recom m ended th e a d op tion o f a F ixed C om m ission, at sailors on m aintenance o f Phase II equipm ent, as

lea st fo r o p era tio n a l sh ip s. A s th e fo llo w in g excerpt m utually convenient to the tw o departm ents.

shows, there w ere difficu lties:

Phase II

"F O C IF fu rn ish ed s ta tis tic s to s h o w th a t a large n u m b er o f tra n s fe rs o f o ffic e r s a n d s a ilo rs from

“D u rin g th is p eriod , sa ilo rs w ill co n tin u e to be ships contin ued th ro u g h o u t th e year. Tran sfer of r e s p o n s ib le fo r t h e P h a s e I e q u ip m e n t . O n k e y p e r s o n n e l a ft e r t h e w o r k - u p o f th e ships com pletion o f T a sk I and T a sk II training, sailors d e p r iv e d th e m o f th e b e n e f it o f t h e w o rk -u p , are to take over the responsibilities in respect o f

w h ich had virtu a lly to sta rt a g a in w ith th e arrival the rem aining equipm ent."

o f new personnel.

Th e Electrical Branch did not take kindly to these

" W h ile t h e d i f f i c u l t i e s o f t h e F le e t w ere directives. View s still differ on w hether all th e ju n io r appreciated, it w a s g en e ra lly r e a lis e d th a t so long E n g in e R o om s a ilo r s w h o u n d e rw e n t tr a in in g in as th e p r e s e n t s h o r ta g e s c o n tin u e d , it w a s not c o m p lia n c e w it h t h e a b o v e d ir e c t iv e s w e r e p o ssib le to p la n fixed co m m is s io n s in ships. The deliberately failed in the exam ination conducted after appointm ent o f a n ew sh ip ’s c o m p a n y after every tw enty w eeks fam iliarisation training or w hether the re fit p re su p p o se d th e a v a ila b ility o f a sufficient n o n m a tr ic u la te E n g in e R o om s a ilo r s la c k e d th e n u m b e r o f o ffic e r s a n d s a ilo r s in th e service, a b ility to com p rehend electrics. T o avoid disru pting which, u nfortun ately, w a s n o t th e case.

t h e a c q u is it io n p r o g r a m m e , it w a s d e c id e d to

“C om m on a greem en t, how ever, w a s found to

m ain tain status quo.

a s u g g e s t io n t h a t in s p i t e o f t h e p r e s e n t T h e a p p re h e n s io n s a b ou t th e U s er-M a in ta in er d iffic u lt ie s , a fix e d c o m m is s io n fo r o n e o f the C oncept centred on three issues:

sh ip s o f th e F le e t b e trie d a s a n ex p erim en t. No change in th e sh ip ’s co m p an y w a s th erea fter to be

•

E ro s io n o f th e res p o n s ib ilitie s o f th e E le ctrica l Branch.

m ade at least for a y e a r ” .

•

D e m a r c a t io n o f r e s p o n s ib ilit ie s b e tw e e n E x e c u t iv e a n d E le c t r ic a l O ffic e r s / W e a p o n General

M aintenance O fficers and betw een seam an “user"

Allotment of Personal Numbers to Officers

sailors and electrical “m ain ta in ed sailors.

• P o s s ib le d im in u tio n in th e c a r e e r p r o s p e c ts o f In 1972, the o ffic e r s in s e r v ic e on 31 D e c e m b e r 1971

electrical officers.

and t h o s e j o i n i n g th e r e a fte r w e r e a l l o t t e d f i v e digit p e r s o n a l nu m bers,

s u f f ix e d b y a c o m p u t e r letter.

Fixed Commissions in Ships

B locks o f n u m b ers w e r e a llo tte d to ea ch b r a n c h in s u c h a m a n n e r t h a t th e l e f t h a n d d ig it In th e B r itis h N avy, a s h ip co m m is s io n e d fo r tw o w o u l d

denote the officer’s Branch.

years and could be deployed to one o f B ritain’s Fleets a n yw h ere in th e w orld. On com pletion o f tw o years, General List

Branch

Blocks Allotted

t h e s h ip r e t u r n e d to h e r h o m e p o r t in B r ita in !

decom m issioned, u nderw en t a thorough refit and the Executive

00001 to 3 9 . 9 9 9

40.000 to 4 9 , 9 9 9

recom m ission ed fo r a n o th er fixed com m ission. T h e Engineering

Electrical

50.000 to 5 9 , 9 9 9

two greatest advantages o f the fixed com m ission w ere Supply & Secretariat 60.000 to 69.999

th at officers and m en rem ain ed togeth er for th e full Education

70.000 to 7 4 , 9 9 9

com m ission , g o t to k n ow each others strengths and Medical

75.000 to 78.999

w e a k n e s s e s a n d g o t to k n o w th e c a p a b ilitie s and Dental officers

79.000 to 7 9 . 9 9 9

lim itations o f th eir ship's equipm ent.

312/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

SD List

Specialists

In 1970 and 1971, the Navy began to be exposed

Seaman

80,000 to 84,999

to several influences:

Engineering

85,000 to 86^299

Shipwright

86,300 to 86,799

One of them was the American Navy. As a result

Electrical

86,800 to 88,499

of lack of enthusiasm for the Vietnam War, the

Supply & Secretariat 88,500 to 89,699

American Navy allowed relaxations in dress and

Medical

89.700 to 89,999

personal appearance which, they considered,

w ere acting as a disin cen tive to se rv ic e in Naval Standing Establishment Committee

Vietnam.

(NSEC)

•

The fashions prevalent in America at the time

were long sideburns, moustaches with or without

In 1969, N S E C w a s set up in the Ministry o f Defence, beards, flared trousers etc. These fashions were

on the sa m e lin e s a s th e A r m y ’s A SE C and the Air being imitated by Indian youth in the ports where

Force’s A F S E C .

naval ships were based. The Navy’s youngsters

T h e th re e m e m b e r C om m ittee w as chaired by a found themselves being considered as oddities by

D ep u ty S e c r e t a r y o f th e M in is try o f Defence. The their civilian peer group. Pressures began to

m em b ers w e r e a n a v a l C a p ta in and an A ssistant grow to relax the Navy’s regulations.

F in a n c ia l A d v is e r fr o m th e M in is try o f Finance

•

In mid 1970, the tendency of sailors’ to resort to

(Defence).

agitation manifested in the Topass Incident. This

T h e C o m m ittee’s T e rm s o f Reference were to : triggered widespread demands for change, the

resp on se'to w hich was a series o f w e lfa re

•

A n a ly s e th e e x te n t to w h ich sh ips’ complements measures to help cool things down.

and s ta ff o f sh ore and other establishments of the

•

Last, but not the least, was a genuine Indian

N avy co u ld b e c u t dow n and the tail to teeth ratio problem. In India, since time immemorial, the

reduced.

moustache has been a sign o f m anhood and

•

E x a m in e a n d a p p r o v e t h e te m p o r a r y and valour. Many sailors, well before going on leave,

p e r m a n e n t c o m p le m e n t s o f n a va l ships and sought permission to ‘discontinue shaving’, so

esta blish m en ts, in clu d in g Naval Headquarters.

that by the time they reached their homes, they

•

E v o lv e s u i t a b l e s c a le s a n d y a r d s tic k s for could sport a moustache. On return from leave,

a ssessin g th e com p lem en ts o f various categories thev would seek permission to ‘continue shaving’.

o f u n its on a stan dardised basis.

The irksom eness o f this p roced u re fou n d

•

E x p lore p ra c tic a l a ven u es o f economy and make expression after the Topass incident.

r e c o m m e n d a t io n s fo r o rg a n is a tio n a l or other ch an ges c o n s id e re d desirable.

Admiral Nanda was the CNS from 1970 to 1973.

•

E x a m in e

t h e

r e q u ir e m e n t

o f

naval

He recalls:

e s ta b lish m en ts in regard to motor transport an

“ One day 1 was having a cup o f tea w ith the M T s ta ff a n d evolve yardsticks for sanctioning it.

sailors A Rajasthani sailor came up to me and

“Sir it is a great hardship that beards and a

Changes in Regulations Regarding

S

'

l a c h e must go together. When I go home, i f I Moustaches and Beards

don't fiave moustaches, people ask me "is your

f ° " r dead ?- Because the tradition in Rajasthan The N avy’s R eg u la tio n s on the subject of

^ r

I t if you shave off your moustaches, It is a

and beard s had adopted, verbatim , the regu a °

that your father has died and you are in

the B ritish N avy. T h ese required that a nav

sign that yo

& fradltlon that to show your

or sailor :

m° n C e s s you have to have a m ou stach e,

m anliness,

.

t 0 request to grow a

•

had eith e r to h a ve both beard and moustach

b e f o r e to go

J

ustaches also.

beWdan ° i f go ouTfrom the ship on liberty

•

h a d to o b ta in th e a p p roval o f his

Then we carmo g ^

n The day my leave

O ffic e r to “d is c o n tin u e sh avin g” or to continue UnUl

first thing I do is to go to a barber and

shaving”.

starts, the fir

home

a

A s in th e ca se o f sm artness o f

could

shave off rn^ d show ^

I am a man.

day I

o f these reg u la tio n s w a s to ensure tha c

nce so

h a v e T c S a c k to duty. I have to go to a barber

he ex ercis ed on th e tid in ess o f facial aPP

TRANSITION

^ a t p e r s o n n e l d i d n o t b r i n g d is c r e d it to th e N av y t o TRIUMPH/313

looking untidy.

again and tell him to sh ave m y m ou stach e now, Changes in Uniforms 1965 to 1975

because I have g o t to go to du ty an d w ith o u t a T h e s a m e p r e s s u r e s fo r r e l a x a t i o n w h ic h le d to beard I cannot have a m oustache. So, sir, this is a

c h a n g e s in t h e r e g u la t io n s f o r m o u s t a c h e s and g re a t h a rd sh ip . I co m e to th e sh ip , w ith o u t a b e a r d s a ls o le d to c h a n g e s in u n ifo r m s , “ to b rin g beard, w ith o u t a m ou stach e an d th en I h a ve to o u td a te d t r a d it io n a l B r itis h u n ifo r m s in lin e w ith sta rt g ro w in g b ea rd and m o u s ta c h e a g a in tw o m od ern trends".

m onths before I start m y next leave.” T h in g s like A d m iral N an da recalls:

this started me thinking as to w h at is the va lid ity oi the naval tradition w e adopted from the B ritish

“O th er N avies had m oved a h ea d a n d m odernised Navy. Should this be pushed dow n the throats o f

th e ir u n ifo rm s . I fe lt th a t i f th e A m e r ic a n Navy people w ho don’t like it. w h o are not w ith it?”

can do it and go a lon g w ith th e tim es an d it works In early 1971 th e re g u la tio n s w e re a m en d ed to s u c c e s s f u lly , w h y s h o u ld w e t r y to p u s h som eth in g dow n th e th ro a ts o f o u r ow n sa ilors or read:

ou r ow n officers.

“Th e follow ing p rovision s sh all govern w ea rin g o f

“W e had ch a n g e d o ffic e r s u n ifo r m s . W e had m oustaches and beards:

b ro u g h t in v a rio u s rigs, d iffe r e n t fr o m w h a t the

•

T h e C ap tain m ay p e rm it o fficers and m en to B ritish u sed to do, b e ca u s e it w a s co n ve n ien t for w ear m ou stach es and b eard s or sh ave them

th e o ffic e r s . B u t w e r e f u s e d to d o i t w it h the off. i f they so desire. M ou stach es and beard

s a ilo r s . H o w ca n y o u c o n v in c e th e s a ilo r th at shall be w o rn w ith or w ith o u t the beard and

c h a n g in g u n ifo rm s is g o o d e n o u g h fo r y o u but m o u s ta c h e s r e s p e c tiv e ly .

S id e w h is k e r s

n o t fo r h im ? W h e n h e m e e t s s a il o r s o f o th e r sh a ll b e p e r m itte d d o w n to th e le v e l o f th e Navies and sees th a t th ey h a ve ch a n g ed from the lo b e o f t h e ea r. T h e p r iv ile g e m a y b e B r itis h tr a d it io n , h e w o n d e r s w h y t h e B ritish w ith d raw n in cases o f untidy growth.

tradition is so sa crosan ct w ith u s ” .

•

M o u s ta c h e s , b e a r d a n d w h is k e r s s h a ll b e T h e ch anges in u n iform b e tw ee n 1965 an d 1975

neatly cu t and trim m ed” .

are su m m arised below:

Year

Officers

Sailors

1965

Action rig for officers to be

light blue shirt and dark

blue trousers, as for sailors

Dress No 10

1967

-Dress No 8A. white shirt,

white trousers, white belt

and medal ribbons introduced

-Miniature ribbons authorised

to be worn with evening Dress

6B (Red Sea Rig)(white shirt,

black trousers and cummerbund)

1969

Terycot permitted for white

(Since sailors were issued

uniforms

uniforms at Government expense,

terycot was too expensive to

replace cotton uniforms)

-Name tallies introduced

-Name tallies introduced

1972

Black trousers, black jersey,

-Square rig (Jumper, square

white shirt and black tie

collar, duck cap) abolished.

introduced as winter working rig

-Junior sailors permitted to wear jackets/tunics/shirts/

trousers/peak caps etc analogous to petty officers uniforms, with appropriate insignia of rank and trade

- Black trousers, black jersey,white shirt, black tie

introduced as winter working rig

- Berets permitted with action

-Berets permitted with action

working rig and overalls

working rig and overalls

314/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

The Training Reforms of 1974 and 1975

To man th e n e w a c q u is itio n s , th e N avy had to resort to several u n a v o id a b le a n d u ndesirab le measures like p e rp etu a l I n c r e a s e s in t h e n u m b e r o f tra in ess,

■

f r - r branch sailors were streamed into

Internal Combustion Engines (ICE)' and “steam'

curtailment in th e d u ra tio n s o f courses and denying schools o f h ig h q u a lity in s tru c to rs because the best p t .S^

Streamed l n t 0 BRAHMAPUTRA ICE or

etya ICE, since the diesel engines in these two

men w ere n e ed e d to m a n th e n ew est ships. Over the types of ships were entirely different.

years, this had d e m o tiv a ted th e schools; the methods Electrical branch sailors were streamed into

of teaching an d tra in in g h a d settled into a rut.

power”, “radio" and “control” and sub-streamed

As a re s u lt o f th e le s s o n s lea rn t in the 1971 war into specific equipment systems.

and to cope w ith th e n e w R u ssian acquisitions likely to e n te r s e r v i c e f r o m 1 9 7 7 o n w a r d s , a m ajor The aim was to gradually usher in an era of

reformation o f tra in in g w a s u ndertaken to remedy the vertical specialisation and consolidate expertise,

ensuring that career prospects were not adversely

ennui th a t h a d e n v e lo p e d n a v a l train in g. Between affected.

1973 and 1975, th e D ir e c to r o f N aval Train in g and Sub-stream ed syllabi for the seam en and

the Director o f C o m b a t P o licy and Tactics, under the comm unication branches led in most cases to

direct g u id a n c e o f th e V ic e C h ie f o f the Naval Staff changes in duration of courses leading to a general

and four fla g o ffic e rs effe cted what, by 1975, became economy in effort.

Streamed syllabi in the

a r e v o lu t io n in t h e D a v y 's t r a in in g p ra ctice s.

Engineering and Electrical Branches started being

Expectedly, th e r e w a s r e s is ta n c e to change, mainly Implemented during 1975.

by the m ed iocre, b e c a u s e th ey w ould have to work too At Cochin,

hard. S o m e r e f o r m s h a d to b e a b a n d o n e d and restarted in th e m id 19 80’s, w h en the responsibility

•

All officer training was taken away from the B&D

for t r a in in g t h e e n t i r e N a v y w a s e n tru s te d to School in preparation for its shift to STE Goa. The

NAVAC was reorganised into two wings: Cadets

FOCINCSOUTH.

and Other Officers.

Training Ashore

•

To minimise bureaucratic delays in “chain o f

command", as a trial measure, the parent schools

The first step w a s a T r a in in g Tech n ology Seminar at were allowed to correspond direct with outside

Cochin. M a n y les so n s w e re lea rn t and promulgated.

authorities on routine matters. Responsibilities

Schools w e r e d ir e c t e d to s e le c t th ose lessons that were placed on their shoulders by issue o f a

pertained to th e m a n d sh ow results. In parallel with charter of duties.

this, a Statu s R e p o rt on T ra in in g w as prepared by the

.

A work study of the Signal School and the TAS

D irectorate o f N a v a l T r a in in g an d processed by the School was ordered to im prove in tern a l

C o m m itte e o f F la g O ff ic e r s . T h r e e lo n g -ra n g in g schem es w e r e a p p r o v e d : O rg a n is a tio n a l, Training chemes and T r a in in g A ids.

Aptitude T est, were commence.I to

«

execu tive

O fficers

for

the

d iffe re n t

O^anisational - Stream Training

as was being done for sailors.

^ ith the in d u c tio n o f th e R u ssian ships, the variety of f PCth^ Gunnery Branch, w ith d im in ish in g

^ u ip m e n t b e c a m e so w id e th a t it becam e necessary

’

Jd-Hisation of visual aiming. Gun Layer (GL) and

? ave se p a ra te Stream s fo r training. The three basic Radar Control (RC) trades were merged.

streams w ere:

nhreast with the latest developments in

To keep abrMS

y control lntensive

“A " s t r e a m f o r t h e l a t e s t e q u ip m e n t in the technology and e

fwe years interval, were

•

-^ ?ncler cla ss frigates.

short courses. at

^

These were the

•

strea m fo r th e equ ipm en t in the old sh Ps*

introduced for offi_

the Junior Commanders

C s t r e a m f o r t h e l a t e s t e q u i p m e n t i n Lieutenants; War Co ^

,eadershlp courses for

R u ssian a cq u isition s.

CPO^s^nd POs al^ ^ ^ j n i n g pattern o f Executive

thp 3 ? Cers a n d s a ilo r s w o u ld b e assigned to one that ^ eam s

b e tra in ed for selected equipm

^ t r e a m .

C ro s s tra in in g w a s allowed at certain

r levels to sa feg u a rd career prospects.

tr ans itio n TO TRIUMPH/315

Equipment, Training A id s and M ethods

recast w ith a tw elve w eek post-Lon g C ou rse train in g period and a five w eek J u n ior C om m anders course as T h e eq u ip m en t in m ost tra in in g s c h o o ls w a s o f 1 9 5 0

w ell as a five w eek C om m anding O fficers Course.

v in ta g e a n d r e q u ir e d r e p la c e m e n t . In v ie w o f the T h e g a in a n d lo s s o f s e n io r i t y r u le s fo r a ll d ifficu lt fin an cial situ ation , it w a s d e cid ed to replace b ra n ch es w e r e s ta n d a rd is e d . In th e case; o f ca d e ts o n ly e s s e n tia l ite m s a n d im p r o v is e th e rem aining an d m id s h ip m e n , t h e t r a in in g p e r io d a flo a t w a s w ith in d igen ou s m odels.

r e d u c e d

fr o m

18 m o n t h s

to

1 2

m o n t h s .

T o overcom e the la n g u a g e p ro b le m and disparity M idshipm an’s tim e w a s reduced to 6 m onths.

in e d u c a t io n a l le v e ls , t r a in in g p r o g r a m m e s were revised .

O verh ea d p r o je c to r s w e r e sa n c tio n ed and Training Schemes

Issued to the schools.

•

J o b s p e c ia lis a t io n s w e r e e n u n c ia t e d fo r a ll T h e A n n u a l T r a in i n g G r a n t w a s e n h a n c e d to branches.

e n a b le s c h o o ls to p r o c u r e m o r e t r a in in g a id s. In

•

A t r ia l, lo w a c t iv i t y - c u m - c lo s e d p e r io d w a s 1975, a n ew T ech n ica l T r a in in g G ra n t w a s instituted s t a r t e d fo r s c h o o ls , so a s to o v e r c o m e th e a n d t h e A r t i f i c e r A p p r e n t i c e a n d M e c h a n ic ia n s problem s o f sh ortage o f s ta ff and calibre o f staff.

T ra in in g G rant increased.

•

N ew su b -stream ed sylla b i w ere p rom u lgated for A start for th e G,C, TA S , ND S c h o o ls w as m ade by e x e c u tiv e o ffic e r s ’ s p e c ia lis t c o u r s e s , fo r w a r fo rm in g a T ra in in g A id T e a m w h ich , u n d e r direction c o u r s e e tc . T h e f ir s t E x e c u t iv e a n d S u p p ly from NHQ, visited B E L and sh ips, a n d m ad e a plan to c o m m a n d e x a m in a tio n s w e r e h e ld in A u g u s t deliver L ea n d er tra in in g aids.

1975.

C am eras, film s an d p ro je cto rs, a lre a d y available

•

F o r f o r e ig n o f fic e r s , s e p a r a t e G u n n e r y , a t m o s t s c h o o ls , w e r e to b e u s e d to m a k e o u r own C om m u n ication , TA S , N a vig a tion and D irection film s.

L o n g C o u rs e s a n d S u b L T s T e c h n ic a l C o u rs es T r a i n i n g m a n a g e m e n t a n d m e t h o d s w ere w ere run. O ther officer and sailor courses, ow ing

r e v it a lis e d b y o r g a n is in g c o u r s e s , s e m in a r s and to th e sm a ll n u m b ers in volved , w e re con join ed instru ctional tech n iqu e p rogra m m es.

w ith classes for Indian personnel.

•

N ew sylla b i w ere im plem ented for M C PO (Q ) and

Review o f Educational Policy

Leadership courses. A ll these courses w ere run at

T h e N a v y ’s e d u c a tio n a l p o lic y w a s re v ie w e d . It was A G RANI. Exam inations w ere introduced in these

decided to:

courses to in ject quality control.

•

On th e an alogy o f E lectrical and Su pp ly B ranch

•

S et up an In stitu te o f E d u c a tio n a l an d Training sailors, seam anship courses w ere started for L/S

T ech n o lo g y at C och in fo r im p a rtin g instructions (Q ) a n d PO (Q ) a t th e T e c h n ic a l S c h o o ls . T h e to officers and sa ilors in T r a in in g T e ch n o lo g y and e x a m in a tio n s w e r e c o n d u c te d b y a n e x te r n a l Methods.

agency, the Basic and D ivisional School.

•

Set up a S y lla b u s E v a lu a tio n / F o rm a tio n Cell in

•

A 2 0 0 0 -w o rd b a s ic E n glis h v o c a b u la ry sta rted each tra in in g sch ool/ estab lish m en t. A Standing b e in g ta u g h t a t th e b a s ic s a ilo r s c h o o ls .

T h e

C om m ittee at N aval H ea d q u a rters w o u ld analyse p rob lem w a s to g e t th e in stru ctors to lim it th eir and approve the rec om m en d a tion s o f these cells.

v o c a b u la r y to t h e 2 0 0 0 o d d w o r d s r e a d ily

•

S e t u p L a n g u a g e L a b o r a t o r i e s fo r te a c h in g understood by sailors! Vocabularies o f technical

E n g lis h a n d H in d i in t h e e s t a b lis h m e n t s w o r d s fo r v a r io u s b r a n c h e s w e r e c o m p ile d by condu cting in itial train in g.

schools.

•

R e v ie w th e H E T s y lla b u s to m a k e it m o re jo

•

T o analyse th e syllabi and the quality o f m aterial o r ie n te d a n d to b r in g it o n p a r w it h th e new available, quality control agencies w ere set up in

h ig h e r s e c o n d a r y ( 1 0 + 2 ) s y lla b u s w h ic h w as s c h o o ls . A sy s te m o f o b ta in in g fe ed b a c k an d b e in g ’introdu ced th ro u g h o u t India.

evalu ation w as introduced. In consultation w ith

•

Raise th e entry q u a lifica tio n s for Education schools, a feedback proform a w as m ade to gauge

Officers to M S c / M A in Physics/Mathematics-

efficacy o f training in professional courses. Ships

T h e d u r a t io n o f t h e ir ' i n i t i a l t r a i n i n g w as w ere d ire cted to feed b a ck ex p ed itio u s ly so th at in c re a s ed to 36 w e e k s to p r o v id e fo r a Metho s train in g m ethods or syllabi could be adjusted.

C ou rse and a N aval S cien tific O rien ta tion Course.

316/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Assessment o f Training Load

The repugnance lelt by in creasin gly b etter

/pQ systematise the requirements of officer and sailor educated sailors to perform the tra dition a l

instructors, a detailed assessment of Training Loads cieanship duties which their predecessors used

Was commenced. By 1975:

to do.

•

T h e t r a i n i n g lo a d s o f A G R A N I and the Naval O

f f i c e r s

A c a d e m y h a d b e e n app roved and augmentation During this period, officers were not immune to this

o f th eir c o m p le m e n t w a s under way.

general turbulence. Their misdemeanour manifested

•

T h e tra in in g lo a d s o f SATAVAHANA and the NATS

in incidents of smuggling and m isusing canteen

w ere u n d e r fin alisation .

facilities by gelling items ashore.

A w h olely

•

T h e c a s e s fo r o th e r tra in in g schools were under unfortunate and undesirable resu lt w as the

preparation .

enfeebling of the officer-man relationship on which

discipline and morale depended.

Controlling Manpower Costs

The changing socio-economic clim ate in the

country had a particularly adverse effect on young

By 1974, m a n p o w e r c o s ts b e g a n to cause serious naval officers. Some junior officers were taking to

c o n c e r n . E a r l i e r , t h e e m p h a s is h ad been on hallucinatory drugs like charas, bhang, ganja. LSD

re c ru itin g m a n p o w e r as sw iftly as possible to meet etc.

th e n e w c o m m it m e n t s . T h e D e a rn e s s A llow ance The possible reasons for this m ala ise w ere

in s ta lm e n ts r e s u lt in g fro m th e g allo p in g inflation attributed to lack of proper guidance, unwillingness

a ft e r t h e 1 9 7 3 o il c r is is , c o m b in e d w ith the on the part of seniors to delegate responsibility which im p le m e n t a t io n o f t h e T h ir d P a y C om m ission s generated lack o f job sa tisfa ction ,

over-

recom m endations, n ecessitated drastic measures. To

complementing of junior officers on board ships,

thereby rendering most o f them n o n -effec tiv e, keep m a n p o w er g ro w th u nder control and ensure the communication gap between more senior and junior

s t r ic t e s t u t ilis a t io n o f a v a ila b le m anpower, every officers, etc. The non-availability o f adequate and

single p ro p o s a l fo r in c re a s e or decrease o f service or proper accommodation and escalating costs of living

c i v ilia n m a n p o w e r h a d to b e a p p ro v e d by the were also considered to be causes aggravating the

c o n c e r n e d P r i n c i p a l S t a f f O ffic e r in Naval H eadqu arters b e fo re it w en t to the Ministry.

SltUThe result was a fall in the professional standards of young naval officers. It was felt that they were not Discipline and Morale

heine kept fully occupied, both m en ta lly and

physically. Young officers were not participating in

The rap id ex p a n sio n o f personnel depleted t h ^ ^ y ?

games and other activities.

o ffic e r le a d e r s h ip a n d p a rtic u la rly that o f the and PO ca d res. C u rtailed training programmes to 111

S

a

i l o r s :

C

i e a

n

s h

i p

D

u

t i e s

a

n

d

t h

e

T

o p

a

s s

technical o ffic e r a n d a rtific er shortages erode asi

i n c i d e n t

le a d e r s h ip t e c h n iq u e s . T r a in in g and discip lin e o

cwpral and diverse incidents in ships and

There were severaand aii

^

^

suffered.

i

esfabhshment^cantg®ough t 0 merit mention, since

B e tw e e n 19 65 a n d 1975, th e Navy s Pers°

Incident

g

hange in personnel policy.

w e r e a ls o a f f e c t e d b y th e tu rb u le n c e winch jt

a ^

cultural reasons. Indian naval ships

affecting th e co u n try as a whole. There were

f r f tooasses to clean the bathroom s and

reasons:

always had top

^ bf_ sanctloned as part of

toilets. T°P ass®

w hen ships commissioned in

•

E ffo rts b y e x tr e m is t p olitical elements to s ships complement^ ^

P_ a< p „ , „ r , h e

footh old in th e arm ed forces.

en tire

Britain. t o p a & w

•

T h e i n c r e a s i n g r e c o u r s e . a c r o s s r e d r e s s

com m issioning

r e a s o n s t h e r e h a d

c o u n t r y , to a g it a t io n a l m eth o d s

For simila

f pnt amongst some sailors at

grievan ces.

. . „ nr{Ces of

always beenresen

duties-. T he Inquiry

T h e a n x ie t y r e s u lt in g from the risi _

having t 0 ca 2 L of the Naval Mutiny in 1946 had d a ily

n e c e s s i t i e s ,

c o m b in e

ft h e Third

into the Cause

sailor’s grievances.

d is a p p o in tm e n t w ith th e outcom e

Iisted ^ w T s e d to p erio d ic a lly p r o m u lg a t e its Pay C om m ission .

pertain well

The S

S

Duties. -me p o * « » 1965 c m

T h e co m b in a tion o f these factors

prnentable

I S

?

* ' &

» * * * * * «

in t e n t io n e d b u t c u lt u r a lly un

P

g ranCh.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/317

reform s lik e the abolition o f the T o p a s s

W e s te rn o r ig in sh ip s, it w a s in te n d e d to w ith d ra w

“C leanship du ties com prise the following:

topasses from B ritish b u ilt sh ip s also.

•

H oly ston in g, sw ee p in g an d sc ru b b in g o f decks, T h is d e c is io n to w ith d r a w to p a s s e s fr o m ships m es s d e ck s an d fla ts w ith a n y o f th e a p p ro v ed w a s b y no m ean s u n an im ou s. R e a r A d m ira l K R Nair appliances u sed in th e service for such purpose.

w a s th e C h ief o f Personnel. H e recalls:

•

C leaning and pain tin g o f ship from truck to keel.

•

C leaning o f b rass w ork, m ess tables and benches,

“ I w a s t h e C h ie f o f P e r s o n n e l. U n fo r t u n a t e ly s h ip ’ s m a c h in e r y , a r m a m e n t a n d t e c h n ic a l A dm iral C h a tteiji n ever asked m e a n y th in g about equ ipm ent, store room s, tanks, double bottom s,

r e m o v in g to p a s s e s fr o m s h ip s b e fo r e th e point boats, m asts and rigging, cold room s, cool room s

w a s pu t up in the S en ior O fficers C on feren ce. So and variou s other parts o f the ship not m entioned

I have only got w h a t h e sa id a t th e C on feren ce to herein.

go by. H e to ld u s th a t “I h a v e a lre a d y talk ed to

•

D u ties o f “cook o f m ess” w h ich entail carrying o f the Prim e Minister, th is is th e y e a r o f th e Harijan food, cleaning o f m ess utensils, w ash in g o f plates and ou r co n trib u tio n w ill b e th a t w e w ill abolish o f chiefs and petty officers, etc.

th e T o p a s s B ran ch . T h a t w ill b e a b ig b o o s t for

•

C leaning o f galleys b y cooks or other sailors w hen

th e H a rija n s and I h a v e to ld th e P rim e M inister required.

that". H a vin g sa id all th a t a n d h a v in g sa id that

•

C lean in g o f o fficers’ cabin s b y stew ard s or other h e h a d b r ie fe d th e P r im e M in is t e r , h e tu rn e d sailors w h en required.

around and asked each on e o f u s o u r opinion, one

•

C le a n in g o f h ea d s, b a th ro o m s a n d oth er w a sh b y one. You kn ow in a ca se lik e th is, w h a t used to places, n orm ally b y sailors o f Topass Branch.

happen w as th at everyb od y sa id “Yes, yes, this is

•

Disposal o f sweepings.

a v e r y g o o d th in g . W e s h o u ld h a v e d o n e it. long

•

C le a n in g o f s u c h o t h e r p a r ts o f s h ip a s th e ago". T h ere w a s n ot a sin gle v o ic e o f protest.

C om m anding O fficer o f the ship m ay deem fit.

“T h en I th ou gh t it m y d u ty to s p ea k up. I s:\iri

“Look, th is w ill n ot be a g o o d th in g b e ca u s e first

“It is to b e b ro u g h t h om e to all co n cern ed th at o f all in the y ea r o f the H arijans,' all w e are doing s h ip s ’ c o m p a n ie s a r e r e q u ir e d to p e r fo r m is to d e p r iv e t h e t o p a s s e s o f o n e a v e n u e o f cleanship d u ties as pa rt o f th eir norm al routine.

em ploym ent. Let u s b e th a n k fu l th a t th e topasses In th e i n t e r e s t s o f h e a lt h a n d h y g ie n e , it is do th e ir jo b ve ry w ell w ith o u t a g ro u s e . In ev eiy in c u m b e n t on a ll s a ilo rs to a ssis t clea n in g any ship, the topasses a re a h a p p y s e t o f people. They p a r t o f t h e s h ip a s m a y b e r e q u ir e d . T h e are qu ite happy to g o on w ith th e ir task. So while erroneou s im pression th at such duties are in any

w e have g o t top a sses, it is an a d v a n ta g e th at we w a y d e ro g a to ry is to b e d isp elled and it is to. be have got. W h y th ro w it a w a y ? I f to p a s s e s do not pointed out th at these duties are perform ed by all

do it, som eone else h as g o t to do it. In th e lower navies th rou gh ou t the w orld, and further th at the deck even now, ou r sa ilors re s e n t h a vin g to sweep cleanliness o f th eir ship is a m atter o f pride to all, in w hich each m an plays his part.

up decks. T h is sort o f th in g is th o u g h t to be infra

‘T h e v a rio u s p leas and ob jection s g en erally dig, especially by th e R a jp u ts a n d p e o p le o f that p u t forw a rd from tim e to tim e by certain sailors class. For them , it is on e o f th e th in g s th a t makes fo r t h e ir r e lu c t a n c e to c a r r y o u t " c le a n s h ip ”

the N avy an u n h app y service. W e k n o w it from the du ties are n eith er tenable nor ju stified on either d ays o f the R IN M u tin y , th a t s a ilo r s do n ot like strictly religiou s or a n y other grounds.

c le a n s h ip . I f o n t o p o f t h a t w e a b o lis h th e

“ F a ilu re to co m p ly w ith th e in stru ctio n s on t o p a s s e s , t h a t is g o i n g to h a v e v e r y b a d

“ c le a n s h ip " d u t ie s w ill r e s u lt in d is c ip lin a r y r e p u r c u s s io n s ” .

T h e r e w a s a d e a d s ile n c e .

action b ein g tak en against the offenders".

A dm iral C h atterji g o t a b it a n n o y ed an d said In that case, I th in k I w ill h a ve to in sist th a t you try 1 9 6 6 / 1 9 6 7 w a s g o in g to b e c e le b r a t e d as it out on the E ast C oast. I a m g o in g to w ith d raw M a h a tm a G a n d h i’s C e n te n a ry Year. T h e r e w a s a a ll

th e

t o p a s s e s

fr o m

t h e

s h ip s

i n

vie w th at th e N avy sh ou ld cease h avin g topasses on V ish akapatnam ." T h a t is h o w it started.

board ships. N ot only w ou ld it be a fittin g tribute to

“In re tr o s p e c t. I s u s p e c t th e C N S , Adryiiral th e F a th e r o f th e N a tion , it w o u ld a lso m itig a te to C h atteiji, w a s tryin g to p lease th e P rim e Minister, s o m e e x t e n t t h e s h o r t a g e o f b u n k s in R u s s ia n M rs Gandhi. 1966 had b een d e cla red as the

v e s s e ls . It w a s d e c id e d to s t a r t b y n o t h a v in g o f th e H a rija n ” . C N S to ld h e r h e w o u ld abolish top a sses in th e R u ssian sh ips and su bm arines. In topasses from th e N avy w ith in a year. T h is led to du e course, to avoid d isp a rity b etw een R u ssian and the discu ssions at th e S e n io r O fficers Conference, 318/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

my a b ru p t tra n s fe r as CinC East and the w ith d ra w a l o f to p a sses from Eastern Naval normally drains into a sewerage tank to be later

C om m and ".

own out to sea, gets clogged up. It becomes our

job to clear it up. We can’t call any topasses to

In 1968, th e d ir e c tiv e on C leanship Duties was tackle this sort of messy business.

m odified to o m it a n y referen ce to the Topass Branch.

At one stage, we had just such a clogging. To

c ear it up, there was some reluctance on the part

It read:

of some of the sailors, not all. So my Engineer

“ C le a n s h ip is a n im p o rta n t duty in the Navy. A Officer and I. we decided to set an example. We

c le a n sh ip , b e s id e s p ro v id in g hygienic working said we will do it ourselves. When the sailors saw

and liv in g c o n d itio n s , is a source o f pride to her us doing it, then o f course the problem

sh ip ’s c o m p a n y an d a credit to the service.

immediately vanished. They all came and said

“ It is in c u m b e n t on all sailors to keep the ship

“No Sir, we will do it". From then onwards; I had c le a n and* to p a r t i c i p a t e in cle a n sh ip . The no problem of any sort due to lack of topasses on

erro n e o u s im p r e s s io n th a t cleanship duties are board. In fact, I did talk to them later also, saying

in a n y w a y d e ro g a to ry is to be dispelled. Various

“It is our job to look after our subm arine. If

p le a s a n d o b je c t io n s p u t forw ard from time to anything happens to it. we have to clear it up. We

will be following the example set by the greatest

tim e b y ce rta in sa ilors against carrying out these Indian of our age. Mahatma Gandhi, who made

du ties a re n e ith e r tenable nor justified on strictly no bones about doing such menial jobs“

religiou s o r oth er grounds.

“C lea n sh ip d u ties in the Navy comprise:

By and large, these resentments were contained

by Commanding Officers and officers setting a public

•

S w e e p in g , s c ru b b in g , sw abbing, polishing, example of cleaning their own toilets and bathrooms.

h o ly s to n in g , scrap in g, brushing, oiling and However, on arrival in India from 1969 onwards, the

p a in tin g o f an y su rface in the ship.

resentment on board became more vigorous. To cool

•

W i p i n g a n d c le a n in g o f e q u ip m en t and the issue, the authorities in V isakh apatnam

m ach in ery.

discreetly sent topasses from

the

sh ore

•

C le a n in g o f all office and living spaces, store establishments to ships whenever they w ere in

r o o m s , m a c h in e r y com p artm en ts, oil and w a t e r t a n k s , d o u b le b o ttom s, ventilation

^The:resentment soon spread to the other shore

tru n k in g s, g a lle y s, bathroom s, wash places, establishments in the Navy. Vice Admiral (then Lt

head s, a lley w a y s and passages.

Cdr) KASZ Raju. who was serving in the Naval Air

•

C le a n in g o f o ffic e r s ’ cabins. CPOs and s

Station GARUDA in 1969. recalls:

m e s s e s , p a n t r ie s a n d w a s h in g o f mess

-Soon after an indication was given from Naval

u te n sils an d plates.

.

.

H e a d q u a rte rs th at it w as in te n d e d to a b o lis h

•

C le a n in g o f u p p e r decks, masts and rjggine,'

,o Dasscs. we had several requests from sailors to a e r ia ls , b o a t s a n d o th e r g ea r fitte in lav that “I would not like to remain in the Navy

ca rried in or form in g part o f the ship.

sa> tnai

h

, g back home and if it

•

D isp osa l o f sw eepings.

r ^ k ^ o w n in my village that 1 had been

•

A n y o th e r clea n in g duty as the C om m a

becomes

duties. I would be treated as

O ffic e r o f the sh ip m ay deem fit.

nn

^ o u t r i s t " We were able to promptly get this an outcast.

^

COMSOUTH at that time.

“F ailu re to com ply with the instruc »

“c le a n s h ip ” d u tie s as defined in this

^

" ' f

.nrn contacted Delhi and before anything

who m tur

Cochin I think we were able to

result in disciplinary action being

could happen

that might have come

the offenders".

n ; p ■" tfJn fhis w e learn t a good lesson, that it is about, in tm

diai0 2 ue with our men. who

W h i l s t in R u s s ia , t h e r e w ere

bcttert

resentm ent a t h a vin g to clean toilets an

0 f f f a " w weH ed u cated and v e ry

^

C o m m o d o r e , (t h e n C d r ) K S S u b ra - c ine to

t 0day,Pdceable. before taking any d e cis io n s

C o m m a n d in g O f f i c e r o f th e fir s t su com m ission in R u ssia, recalls:

In Bombay.

w e r e b e

“There was a problem. A submarine do<

onjy

word spread t a i

SailQrs in some ships started

the luxury of having topasses.

ow

offlcers withdrawn from s m y •

one toilet for the entire crew, usee

which

TRANSITION TO TR IU M PH /319

a n d by s a ilo rs . A t tim es, this to

ex p en d itu re for 19 64 -65 on b u ild in g a ccom od a tion d e s is tin g fr o m ta k in g m ea ls. T h is fo rm o f p ro te s t w en t up to Rs 450 la k h s as co m p a re d to a b ou t Rs 128

s p r e a d to o t h e r "s h ip s . T h e r e w e r e a fe w u g ly lakhs in 1961-62. E ven then, a lot o f le e w a y had to be incidents. F irm a ction w a s taken and norm alcy w as restored, w h en it w as m ade known that the decision m ad e up. In 1964, an o ffic e r o r s a ilo r in B om b a y or to rem ove/ a b olish top a sses w ou ld be reconsidered.

Cochin had to w ait six m on th s to a y e a r b efo re he got Since then, status quo has been m aintained.

s o m e s o r t o f a c c o m o d a t io n . B y t h e t im e h e got A dm iral N an da took over from A dm iral C h a tteiji accom odation, it w a s tim e fo r h im to b e transferred.

as CNS in 1970. H e recalls:

In 19 65 , th e o v e r a ll s h o r t a g e in m a r r ie d and single p erm a n en t a cco m o d a tion a t m a jo r n aval ports

“I in h e rite d th e top a ss p rob lem w h en I b ecam e was:

CNS. Topasses w ere still there in ships. We had

n o t a b o lis h e d t h e m . W h e n th e q u e s t io n o f

% Shortages in Accomodation

rem oval came, the thing blew up.

Location

Married

Single

Married

Single

“A lo t o f p e o p le fe lt th a t to p a s s e s w e r e an Officers

Officers

Sailors

Sailors

a n t iq u a t e d s y s te m a n d t h a t w h e n M a h a tm a Bombay

28%

47%

1 0 %

72%

G an dh i and oth ers w ere try in g to do aw ay w ith Goa

99%

1 0 0 %

76%

1 0 0 %

u n t o u c h a b ilit y , w e s h o u ld n o t h a v e a n Cochin

30%

18%

95%

1 2 %

u n t o u c h a b le in o u r o r g a n is a t io n . N o w th e Visakhapatnam

75%

1 0 0 %

80%

1 0 0 %

c o n c e p t w a s a lrig h t, b u t in p ra ctice, th e social system s in ou r country and the thinking o f people

S om e h e a d w a y h a d b e e n m a d e a t B o m b a y and w ere different.

C ochin. S h o rta ges a t oth er p o rts h a d to b e m ad e up

"In the Navy, w e have people brought up in a

b y h irin g h ou ses and u sin g old, tem p o ra ry , w artim e social system w h ich does not ask them do these b u ild in gs and sh ed s for h o u se s. U n fo rtu n a te ly , the things in th eir ow n hom es. Even topasses, w hen

N avy’s p rop osa ls fo r b u ild in g a c c o m o d a tio n usually th ey go b a c k to th e ir hom es, do n ot clean th eir got bogged dow n over w h ere an d h o w m u c h w a s to be ow n b a th r o o m s a n d to ilets, ev en th o u gh they built.

h a ve been d o in g so a t sea. T h e social system is A fter the 1965 War, a co m p re h e n s iv e r e v ie w had t o t a l l y d i f f e r e n t .

T h e r e f o r e in th e s o c ia l

b e e n c a r r ie d o u t o f t h e s h o r t a g e s o f fa m ily e n v ir o n m e n t in w h ich w e a re livin g, to im p ose accom odation in th e A rm y , N a v y a n d A ir F orce. The so m e th in g w h ich is' co n sid ered a ga in st the w ay d e fic ie n c ie s w e r e fo u n d to b e s o la r g e t h a t it w as you h a ve been b rou gh t up, w hen you tell a m an decided th at the aim sh ou ld b e to re m o v e th em over a w h o is ed u cated , w h o has been b rou gh t up in a period o f 20 to 25 years.

p a r t ic u la r w a y o f life , in a p a r t ic u la r w a y o f T h e p r o b le m o f p r o v i d i n g a c c o m o d a t io n to thinking, th at h e has got to clean the latrines, he m arried personn el w as m ore vex ed fo r th e N avy, than r e v o lts a g a in s t it. H e sa y s I n e ver k n ew th a t I for the A rm y and th e A ir Force:

h a ve to do th is an d th is is so m e th in g w h ich is bein g im posed on me. Does the A rm y do it? Th e

•

W h ils t th e A r m y a n d th e A ir F o r c e c o u ld sta rt a n s w e r is no. D oes th e A ir F o rce to do it? T h e se ek in g s a n c tio n s to m e e t th e ir s h o r ta g e s from a n sw er is no. O n ly th e N avy w an ts to introdu ce 1963 o n w a rd s (w h e n fu n d s b e c a m e a v a ila b le this.

after C hina’s attack in 1962), th e N a v y cou ld only

"W e all kn ew it, th e officers kn ew it, th at the start seeking san ction s in 1966, a fter th e Russian topass th ing w ou ld not w ork out. But they did not

a c q u is itio n s in c re a s e d th e A u t h o r is e d M a rried have the co u ra ge to sa y th at this is not g oin g to Establishm ent (AM E).

work. E ventu ally w e had to accept the inevitable,

*

Until 1969, sh ip s w ere b a se d m a in ly a t Bom bay.

and brin g topasses back"

C onstru cting m arried a cco m o d a tion in su bu rban Bombay^ w h ere th e N avy h a d la n d a t M ankhu rd, Accom odation

T ro m b a y and T h a n e w o u ld en ta il len g th y transit tim es to and from th e p la ce o f w o r k in th e N aval Th e fundam ental difference betw een the Navy and the

D ockyard. C on stru ctin g m arried accom odation in sister services has a lw a ys been th at th e-m ajority o f S o u t h B o m b a y , w h ic h w a s c l o s e s t to th e the N avy’s personn el perforce have to be stationed in D o c k y a r d , w o u ld f u r t h e r s t r a in s c a r c e c iv ic m ajor p o rts w h ere the cost o f livin g is high and civil services like w a te r su pply. M oreover, th e lim ited accom odation is not available w ithin th eir means.

a m o u n t o f la n d in w h a t is n o w N a v y N a g a r A fte r C h in a 's a tta c k in 1962, a con certed effort c o m p e lle d h ig h r is e b u ild in g s w h ic h r e q u ir e d w a s m a d e to b e t t e r th e s it u a t io n . T h e c a p it a l 32Q/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

l a r g e r a l l o c a t i o n s o f b u d g e t th a n bu ildin g Augmentation of Water Supply at Colaba

barracks.

T h e N a v y ’s lim it e d b u d g e t p e rfo rce compelled

"Againsi a requirement of 1 2 .5 lakh gallons of water.

h igh er a llo c a tio n to acquisition s, repair facilities e aval residential area in Colaba is receiving only

and lo g is tic s th a n to m arried accomodation. The 5.5 lakh gallons per day. At the instance o f Naval latter co u ld b e h ire d and Compensation in Lieu of Headquarters, this supply has been increased to 6 . 5

Q u a r t e r s (C I L Q ) c o u ld b e p a id to m itigate to 7 lakh gallons per day by carrying out certain

modifications to the existing mains.

in d ivid u a l fin a n c ia l burden.

The Government have now sanctioned a sum of

>1

W h ils t t h e a b o v e r e a s o n s a p p lie d m ainly to Rs 20 lakhs for the Municipal Corporation, Bombay

B o m b a y a n d t o a lim it e d e x te n t in Goa and to lay an independent main from the Malabar Hill

C ochin, th e lo c a l situ ation in Visakhapatnam and Reservoir to Colaba exclusively for the use of Defence

in P o r t B la ir w a s t o t a lly d iffe re n t in regard to Service personnel. This proposal is likely to be linked a v a i l a b i l i t y / a c q u is itio n o f land, water supply etc.

with the Vaitarna scheme and may take two to three

In d e ed , fo r P o rt B lair, all construction material years before the scheme becomes effective.

had to b e fe r r ie d fro m m ain lan d India and this Land Requirement at Goa

c o u ld o n l y b e o r g a n is e d a ft e r th e two new L a n d in g s h ip s a r r iv e d fr o m R u ssia in 1966.

“Land required for building married accommodation

S i m i l a r l y

t h e

c o n s t r u c t io n

o f m arried

for officers and sailors and other amenities at Goa

a cco m o d a tio n in V isakh ap atn am had to await the (except for two small plots) has now been acquired

f in a lis a t io n in 1 9 6 9 o f th e Z o n in g Plan o f the after prolonged litigation. Tenders are being called

during May/June 1968 for contract action to

en tire V is a k h a p a tn a m Project.

commence the building work.

A s a re s u lt o f all th e above factors, the shortage of Situation in Mid 1969

m a r r ie d a c c o m o d a t io n , p a r t ic u la r ly for sailors,

“A d m in istra tive approval for provision o f married u n d e r s t a n d a b l y a f f e c t e d t h e ir m orale. As the accommodation

for

afloat

personnel

a

fo llo w in g e x c e r p t s s h o w , th e a d m in istration was V is a k h a p a tn a m was is s u e d

seized o f t h is p r e s s in g n eed . It w as not until 1

accommodation is to be constructed for 1 2 2 o fficers that the s h o rtfa ll in m arried accomodation was on its an d 406 s a ilo r s at a c o s t o f Rs 153.64 la k h s .

way to b e in g resolved .

a

to

th e

p la n n in g

p r o g r a m m e .

A c c o r d in g

officers and 25 sailors w ill be

S

i t u

a

t i o

n

i n

M

i d

1

9

6

8

“ T t a S S n 70- for 50 officers and 2 0 0 sailors by

“T h e r e c e n t in c r e a s e in a u th o ris a tio n of marrie SOSep 70 £ £ 4 8 officers and 181 sailors by 15

a c c o m m o d a t io n fo r L e a d in g R a tes and be ow wi Oct 71.

difficulUes experienced in hiring

en title s a ilo r s to d ra w C ILQ and facilities or a

-Cons.denng * e d .m cu ^ ^

^ BQmbay on

passage. T h is in c re a s e d au thorisation does n .

a suitable hou

ment haVe sanctioned that

th e tim e b e in g , p e r m it u s to co n stru ct a normal terms. G

.

may be hired on Leave

m arried a c c o m m o d a tio n . T h is restriction are

accom m odation at B

JQ Q c t 6 g fo r a

accepted b y th e th ree S ervice Headquarters a

and Licence bans w

^ scheme, 1 6 fiats have

a lr e a d y l a g g i n g b e h in d in th e con s ru period of 2 yea r-additional flats are under

been hired so far a

^

sanction of

deficient m a rrie d accom m odation.

are

“ A

l t h o u g h l a r g e n

u m

b e r o f o fficers an

^

c ilQ

hving i n h i r e d a c c o m m o d a t i o n or are

^miding

t h e t o t a l s h o r t a g e s o f a c c o m m o d a t i o n 2 0 5 0

S i t u a t e in ^

^

dusion 0f Visakhapatnam in

P u r p o s e s a r e 9 4 0 q u a r t e r s fo r o fflc ^r c u r r e n t

"The proposalfor the

for the purpose of

q u a r t e r s f o r s a i l o r s . T h is is b a s e nCtjons.

the list of dif

,ation t0 defence civilians to the

s a n c tio n s a n d fu t u r e fo r e c a s t o f h e y

^ make

PrOVldinfg ia5C%0onf their authorised strength has been G o v e r n m e n t a p p r o v a l h a s b een obtain surnofRs pr0V7 " f l 5% of their author

g °o d th ese s h o rta g es w ith in 1 5 years

^ruCtion of

approved by * e f ^ T s s u e d by the Governm ent

1 8 c r o r e s h a s b e e n s a n c tio n e d for c ° NaVy %

Naval

“Orders have b

n f m a r r i e d a c c o m m o d a t i o n

p a r r i e d a c c o m m o d a t io n fo r t ^

than the

approving the r * ^ ^ ^

ch,ld rVs education at

h e a d q u a r t e r s i n t e n d to s p e n d

, « re likely t°

f s t a t i o n in the event of transfer.

a u th orised 1 . 2 c ro re s p e r year as fun

1116 la

t r a n s it io n TO TRIUMPH/321

be a va ilab le from oth er sources.

“ G o v ern m en t h a ve a ccep ted th e req u ire m e n t o f success. T h e fo llow in g p ro je cts h a ve b e en sanctioned a d d itio n a l m a rrie d a c c o m m o d a tio n in B om b a y fo r recently:

152 o ffic e r s a n d 2 4 6 sa ilo rs . N e c e s s a ry a c tio n for

•

Single Accom

m

odation

issue o f adm inistrative approval is in hand.

Dhani Khari Schem

e.

168 Sailors at K A R A N J A

Th e Dhani Khari W ater Schem e

210 S ailors in A N G R E

at Port B lair is expected to be com pleted by end 1972.

250 T ra in e e s in SH IV A JI

T h is sc h em e w ill m ee t all c iv ilia n n eed s as w e ll as 44 O fficers and 42 9 S a ilo rs a t G oa

those o f the D efence Services and costs w ill be shared 27 Sailors a t W / T S ta tio n G oa

o n a 1/3 - 2 / 3 b a s is , b e t w e e n N a v y a n d H o m e 70 D SC Personn el at G oa

M inistry".

4 2

O f f ic e r s

a n d

3 2 5

S a ilo r s

in

V isakh ap atn am

S

i t u

a

t i o

n

i n

M

i d

1 9 7 1

“Scale of.Accom

m

odation for Oficers.

240 Sailors in C och in

G overn m en t

•

M

aried Accom

m

odation

h a ve s a n c tio n e d th e rev ised sc a le o f p lin th a rea o f 152 O fficers, 65 C PO s an d 116 J u n ior Sailors

2 1 0 0 s q f t f o r m a r r i e d o f f i c e r s o f t h e r a n k o f in C olaba B om bay.

C o m m a n d e r to C o m m o d o r e a g a in s t t h e e a r lie r 10 O fficers and 24 S a ilo rs a t K a ran ja

authorisation o f 1500 sq ft.

Deficiency at Cochin. The deficiency of married 2 O fficers and 28 S a ilors in T h a n a

a c c o m m o d a tio n fo r 47 O ffic e rs and 141 sa ilo rs at 82 Sailors in V isa k h a p a tn a m

C och in h a s b e en a ccep ted b y the G overn m en t. T h e

- ' 2 9 C PO s in C och in ”

ca s e fo r is s u e o f a d m in is tr a tiv e a p p ro v a l is b e in g By 1975, it had been p o ssib le to m a k e good some progressed. T h e construction o f 60 ‘G’ Typ e Quarters o f th e s h o r t a g e s in B o m b a y , G o a , C o c h in , a t C o c h in in a m u lt i- s t o r e y e d b u ild in g h a s b e e n Visakhapatnam , SH IVAJI and V A LS U R A .

sanctioned b y the G overnm ent a t an estim ated cost o f Rs 25.68 lakhs.

Provision of Accom

m

odation for Civilians at Cochin.

The Navy’s C iv ilia n Personnel

On th e a n a lo g y o f B o m b a y an d V isa k h a p a tn a m , a T h e basic advantage o f civilia n p e rso n n el has always case for the acceptan ce o f Cochin as a difficu lt station been th eir con tin u ity in sh ore b a se d assignm ents, as for p rovision o f m arried accom m od ation for D efence opposed to u n iform ed p erson n el w h o s e assignm ents c iv ili a n e m p lo y e e s h a s b e e n ta k e n u p w it h th e afloat and ashore ch an ge ever so often.

G overnm ent.”

By and large, th e N a v y ’s c iv ilia n p e rso n n el were govern ed by the sam e stru c tu re a s th a t p reva len t in S

i t u

a

t i o

n

i n

M

i d

1 9 7 2

th e A rm y an d th e A ir F o rce . T h e a d m in is tr a tio n of

“Th e existin g deficiencies are:

civilian cadres w as that:

Rank

Entitlement Permament

Accomodation

Deficiency

Accomodation Under

•

G roups C and G rou p D w ere a d m in istere d by the Available

Construction

Com m and H eadqu arters.

Officers 1791

632

308

851

•

G r o u p s A a n d G r o u p B w e r e a d m in is t e r e d by Sailors 4713

2508

892

1315

Naval H eadqu arters.

T h ere is a d istin ct im provem en t in th e provision T h e r e c r u it m e n t o f c iv ilia n o f fic e r s w a s done o f m a r r ie d a c c o m o d a tio n a t G oa , V A L S U R A a n d initially by direct en try and su b s eq u en tly th rou gh the V is a k h a p a tn a m . T h e c o n s tr u c tio n o f 24 6 m a rried UPSC.

qu arters for sa ilors a t B om bay, 64 at V A LS U R A and F ro m th e fu n c tio n a l p o in t o f v ie w , th e N avy s 140 at Cochin w ill provide considerable relief."

d ep en d en ce on civ ilia n m a n p o w e r la y p rin c ip a lly in the follow in g fields:

S

i t u

a

t i o

n

i n

1

9 7

3

“D u e to fin ancial stringency, G overnm ent banned all

•

In N a v a l D o c k y a r d s a n d B R O s fo r th e sanctions o f n ew m arried and single accom odation.”

m a in t e n a n c e , r e p a ir a n d r e f i t o f s h ip s and subm arines, and m an n in g y a rd craft.

S

i t u

a

t i o

n

i n

M

i d

1

9 7

5

•

In the A ircraft Repair Yard - for the maintenance,

“O u r efforts to im prove the dom estic accom m odation repair and refit o f aircraft.

s itu a tio n in th e N a v y h a v e m et w ith c o n s id e ra b le

•

In N a v a l t e c h n ic a l fu n c t io n s lik e D r a fts m e n , Naval technical sp ecialists in D R D O , laboratories etc.

322/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

,

In N a v a l S to r e D ep o ts, N aval Arm am ent Depots and W ea p on E q u ip m en t Depots - for the storage, Dersonnpl'ft Hf ,the duties entrusted to civilian

u pkeep, a cco u n tin g , rep air and indenting of their thp

i

n° l take ,ong for the infirmities in

resp ective stores.

„ ..C'V,!,ianr cadres to affect the operational

a ^ability of ships, particularly in the field of spare

.

In o ffice s fo r s e creta ria l and clerical duties.

parts. This helped to identify the measures which, in

•

In th e N a v a l s h o r e e s ta b lis h m e n ts for motor subsequent years, helped to increase productivity in

t r a n s p o r t d r i v e r s a n d g e n e r a l con servan cy the depots.

duties.

As can be seen from the table below, the increase

In th e c a s e o f th e c iv ilia n personnel performing in the numbers of civilian personnel kept pace with

the increase in the number of naval personnel.

store k e e p in g d u tie s , n o t en ou gh systematic career p r o g r e s s io n t r a in in g h a d b een organised to better Increase in the Navy’s Borne Strength

their p ro d u c tiv ity . T h e resu lts o f this neglect began to Between 1965 and 1975

show from th e 1960’s onw ards. The induction of new te c h n o lo g ie s in th e R u s s ia n a cq u isition s and the In round figures, the increase in the Navy’s borne

L e a n d e r c l a s s f r i g a t e s g r e a t ly en h an ced the strength between 1965 and 1975 was as follows:

NAVAL PERSONNEL

CIVILIANS

Total

AS ON 31

Officers

Sailors

Total in

Gazetted

Non-Gazctted

Uniform

Industrial

Non-

Civilians

DEC

General

SD

Industrial

List

List

300

12.390

10.550

23.240

1965

1520

410

16.900

18,830

24.560

20,430

320

13,340

10.900

1966

1600

430

18.400

25.440

22,620

320

13.820

11.300

1967

1660

460

20,500

25.730

25,030

310

13.990

11.730

1968

1740

490

22,800

26.220

27.480

330

14.000

11.890

1969

1850

530

25.100

26.700

28,710

410

14.040

12.250

1970

1970

540

26,200

28.450

29.730

1971

2250

580

26,900'

29,470

1972

30.070

2470

600

26.400

29,450

510

16.430

13,130

30.370

1973

2550

600

26,300

30.200

510

29.860

■

30.370

1974

26.900

2700

600

30,780

510

29.860

1975

27.300.

2880

600

G rou p C scale o f pay.

Changes iu Sailors Conditions of Service

All J u r e entrants would receive Group B scale

After 1975

Serving sailors who were already matriculates

‘

i,i ^muster into Group B and those who

In

J u l y

1 9 7 6 .

in

c o n s o n a n c e

W lt^

^

qualified subsequently would also remuster

re c o m m e n d a tio n s o f the T h ird Pay ^ orr^rnlSS^ ij,ors-fo llo w in g c h a n g e s w e r e im p lem en tec in

“

"

J

for

Z i t " 20

con dition s o f service:

' l i S m d that ’« Direct Entry ...lors to 18 - 20

•

T h e in it ia l p e r io d o f en ro lm e n t was in years.

^ rctjrement for sailors of all

from ten to fifte en years.

raised

•

™ " ” P, S d » 50 year, and that tor MCPO's

•

T h e ed u c a tio n a l qualification for e

O

' 0f aii

to M a t r ic u la t io n fo r B oy E n try

c

n and

maintained at 5

5

s introduced whereby

b r a n c h e s a n d fo r D ir e c t E n try Seam an

.

Time scale Pr0"

anc, equivalents would be

E n g in eerin g bra n ch sailors. As a re

un,cation

Seaman Fl^ t

rank on completion of five

- D ir e c t E n t r y S e a m e n and

Electrical

Prom° tel ee in man's rank, subject to hav.ng

S e " m the prescribed examinations.

s a ilo r s . E n g in e e r in g M e

assistants and

M e c h a n ic s , W r it e r s . S to res

^ par

t

Rnv Entry w as prop osed tor

M e d i c a l A t e n d e n t s a ll c

Direct Entry

ln 19?6;

r?Hirse on ly D ircct Entry matriculate

e d u c a tio n a lly and pay wise.

T o p a s s e s

abolition. In recruited and trained at INS CHILKA.

S t e w a r d s . C o o k s . M u s ic ia *\ntriCu lale s * on sailors were rccn

traNS,ti0N T0 TRIUMPH/323

c o u ld j o i n , w it h o u t b ein g

w ith the N avy a lread y fu lly s tre tc h e d in inducting and Retrospect

co D in g w ith n e w a c q u is it io n s , p e r s o n n e l policies should n ot b e tin k e re d w ith . M a n y b e liev ed that the Given .he —

« « « » ' “

5

2

'

^

re fo rm s re q u ire d m a n p o w e r in s u c h n u m b ers that op erate, th e a ch ievem en ts in th e Heldi 01 P

th e s h o r t a g e s w o u ld o n ly b e a g g r a v a t e d . Many believed th at th e r e fo r m s w e r e filib u s te re d by interbranch tussles.

t

=

»

L

” H

=

s

=

5

T h e re w a s so m e tru th in e a c h o f th e s e points of the L a n d e r s , m an the Subm arine and A ir A rm s a ^

vie w N o s a tis fa c to r y s o lu t io n c o u ld b e fou nd . The ta k e on n ew r e s p o n s ib ilit ie s a s h o re li dg

very sam e issu es ra is e d th e ir u g ly h e a d s in the mid c o a s ta l d e fe n c e , g a r r is o n s fo r the: A & 1970's w h en th e co m p le m e n ts o f th e gu id ed missile expanding the train in g schools and the N C U

frigates, ocean g o in g ro c k e t b o a ts a n d minesweepers T h ere is a view th at the dilution o f expertise could had to b e decid ed. A s in th e e a r lie r ca ses, the same h a v e b e e n a v o id e d . A s h a s b e e n d iscu ssed ^ th e u n s a tis fa c to ry c o m p r o m is e s h a d to b e resorted to.

e n d e a v o u r to m a k e th e N avy a cce p t co n cep ts lik e T h e basic issues still re m a in u n reso lved .

v e rtic a l sp ec ia lis a tio n , fixed com m ission s and pre co m m is sio n tra in in g took tim e. M any believed th at 324/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

2 2

T h e G ro w th o f the Navy Between 1965 and 1975

pream ble

•

The Leander Frigate Project and Indigenous

Warship Design.

If one ta k e s a b ir d ’s ey e vie w o f thirty years of naval

•

The creation of Submarine Arm in 1968.

planning from 1947 to 1977, three landmarks stand

•

The augmentation of the Air Arm with additional

out very p rom in en tly. T h ese are:

aircraft and helicopters.

•

1 9 5 7 to 1 9 5 9 w h e n th e N a v y took several The highlights are summarised below.

m e a s u r e s to c o p e w it h A m e r ic a n aid to the P a k ista n N avy

The Submarines

•

1963 to 1965 w h en the Defence Plan 1964 - 1969

The arrival of the subm arines from mid 1968

w as fo rm u la te d after the Chinese attack in 1962

onwards gave the anti submarine frigates and the

a n d t h e N a v y t u r n e d to R u ss ia for its anti submarine Alize aircraft their long awaited

acqu isition s.

exercise time with submarines. The increase in anti

•

1973 to 1975 w h e n the Defence Plan 1974 - 1979

submarine effectiveness was, however, short of

w as fo rm u la ted a fter the 1971 Indo - Pak war and expectations. There were several reasons:

In d o R u s s ia n n a v a l c o o p e r a tio n m oved to a For the first time, the Navy came face to face with

h igh er th resh old .

the unusual hydrological conditions in Indian

waters. These conditions fa vou red the

B o th t h e 1 9 6 4 - 1 9 6 9 a n d th e 1974 - 1979

submarines, who could lurk in shadow zones

D e fe n c e P l a n s w e r e a p p r o v e d a fte r detai e below sea layers where ships sonars could not

c o n s id e r a t io n o f t h e t h r e a t s , th e in te r service penetrate. This highlighted the need for ships to

p r io r it ie s , t h e s c a r c it y o f fo r e ig n exchange, e

have variable depth sonars and for helicopters to

lik e lih o o d o f d e fe r r e d c r e d it bein g available for tne have dunking sonars.

.

.

r e q u ir e m e n t s w h ic h h a d to be im ported an

.

The submariners w ere eager not on ly to

c a p a b ilitie s a n d lim ita tio n s o f D efence a

T L L r a t e their offensive potential in pro-sub

Defence Prod u ction .

nofpnnP

exercises but also to work out their capabilities

F rom the ou tset, three realities affecte ir^Ttntions for operational patrols during

budgets g e n e ra lly

Chmarine time had therefore to be shared

a n d th e Navy s

u

War

inti submarine exercises, pro-sub

particular:

betWeC" “ a training more submarine personnel

•

T h e re s o u rc e s req u ired for national

eXefC hip the fledgling Subm arine A rm to grow ,

to enable

^

o f sh ip s c r e w s m e a n t t h a t

n e c e s s a r ily r e c e iv e d h ig h e r p rior y resou rces req u ired for defence.

• The an nel who had acquired precious anti personnel W

n c y had tQ be rep la c ed by

•

T h e p a u city o f F ree Foreign E xch a n g e ^

iniy

submarine p

acquire this proficiency.

•

U n til 1 9 6 2 , d e fe n c e p rep a red n ess was mam y a g a in s t a tta c k b y Pakistan. J^ter

' nd from

%

£

£

£

&

ot , n “

had to ca ter for th reats both from

expertise.

<=Pttin£ up o f sp ecialised

Pakistan .

^

.

The time lag m ^ V f f S e s ' e s u l t e d in the H i g h l i g h t s o f D e v e l o p m e n t s Between sonars themselves not being in top condition.

huted to the sinking o f the

1 9 7 5

the

T h e d e ta ils o f th e m a jo r

All these

disastrous loss

d e v e l o p m

e n t s '

^

the

KHUKRI in the 197

^

tQ the lethallty ofthe

P e r io d 1 9 6 5 to 1 9 7 5 h a v e b een disc a w a k e n e d the Navy

^ ^ extensive m ea s u re s to

respective ch ap ters on:

and l97Z

T h e R u ssian A cqu isition s 1965 to

to 1975.

M e a n w h ile , fo u r n e w im p r o v e d s u b m a r in e s a ssu ran ce o f safe passage. T h is trig g e re d th e Navy’s e n te r e d s e r v ic e fr o m m id 19 73 o n w a r d s . T h e s e effo rts to in c re a s e th e n u m b e r o f v e s s e ls fitted with helped su stain the n u m erou s evaluations to im prove anti sh ip m issiles. T o s ta rt w ith , a s q u a d ro n o f new im p roved m is s ile b o a ts w e r e a c q u ir e d fro m Russia.

anti su bm arine effectiveness.

M issile lau nchers and th eir fire co n trol system s were The Seak ing A n ti Subm arine H elicopters

c a n n ib a lis e d fro m th e o ld e r b o a ts w h ic h w e r e non Th e Pakistan N avy’s acquisition from A m erica o f their operational, and tra n sp la n ted into tw o friga tes and a f i r s t s u b m a r in e G H A Z I a n d it s s u b s e q u e n t m issile coast battery. T h e friga tes w h ic h follow ed the p rogra m m e fo r a cq u irin g D aph n e class su bm arin es Leanders and the corvettes all h a d anti sh ip missiles.

from France m ade it clear by 1968 th at it intended to In du e co u rse, th e n e w im p r o v e d S e a k in g s an d the concentrate its offen sive potential in subm arines and n e w S e a H a r r ie r s w e r e e q u ip p e d w it h a n t i ship use its su rface fleet defensively. A t this time, W estern m issiles.

n a vie s w e re d e v e lo p in g anti su b m a rin e h e lico p te rs The R ussian A c q u isitio n s

eq u ip p ed w ith a so n a r w h ich co u ld be low ered into t h e s e a w h ile h o v e r in g a n d a r m e d w it h an a i r

By 1971, fou r su bm arin es, a su b m a rin e d ep ot ship, a d r o p p e d , a n ti- s u b m a r in e h o m in g to r p e d o . T h is s u b m a r in e r e s c u e v e s s e l, tw o la n d in g s h ip s , five in n o va tion w as m eant to overcom e tw o o f the m ajor su bm arine ch asers and fo u r p a tro l b o a ts had arrived h a n d ic a p s w h ic h a ff lic t e d s u r fa c e s h ip s . T h e and w ere based in V isa k h ap atn a m . T h o u g h they had h e lico p te r, b e in g a irb o rn e , co u ld n ot b e h it b y th e b e e n a c q u ir e d fo r th e B a y o f B e n g a l a n d th e A&N

su b m a rin es leth al torpedoes. Secondly, b y h a vin g a Is la n d s , t h e y h a d s t a r t e d b e i n g u t i l i s e d in the son ar w h ose depth could be adjusted, the helicopter A rabian Sea as well.

deprived the su bm arine o f its ability to hide below the T o s u p p o r t t h e s e a c q u i s i t i o n s , w o r k had te m p e ra tu r e la y e r s o f th e sea. T h e la te s t S e a k in g com m enced in V isa k h ap atn a m on th e con stru ction of helicopters w ere being developed for the British Navy.

a n ew D ockyard , o f s u b m a rin e s u p p o r t fa cilities, of In 1969, ord ers w ere pla ced for six h elicop ters and t o r p e d o p r e p a r a t io n f a c i l i t i e s a n d o f t r a in in g th eir h om in g torped oes. T h e s e a rrived ju s t in tim e facilities. T h e progress o f D ock yard co n stru ction was before w ar broke out in D ecem ber 1971.

s e r io u s ly r e ta r d e d , h o w e v e r, b y th e s in k in g o f the Due to their new ness and sh ortages o f technical

floors o f the new w orksh ops, du e to th e in a b ility o f the e q u ip m e n t , t h e y w e r e n o t u t ilis e d to t h e ir fu ll local soil to b ear th eir h e a v y w eig h t. T h e s e delays in p oten tia l d u rin g th e 1971 War. It took a n oth er tw o s e t t in g u p m a in t e n a n c e a n d r e f i t fa c ilit ie s yea rs for the S eak in gs potential to be fu lly realised.

p rogressively a fflic te d th e o p e ra tio n a l a v a ila b ility of By 1975. s ix n ew im p roved S ea k in g s a rrived and it the Russian acquisitions.

becom e possib le to com b in e the S e a k in g ’s poten tia l w ith t h a t o f n e w a n ti s u b m a r in e s h ip s t h a t h a d The L ean d er F rigate P ro ject

entered service.

T h e c o n s t r u c t io n o f th e f i r s t t h r e e f r i g a t e s had c o m m e n c e d b u t w a s b e h in d s c h e d u le d u e to the The A dven t o f A n ti Ship M issiles

teething prob lem s o f sta rt up, th e ch a n g es in radars, T h e P a k is ta n N a v y ’s b o m b a r d m e n t o f D w a rk a in fire control system s an d A IO from th e secon d frigate 1965 and th e In tern a tio n a l C ou rt’s a w a rd in 1967, o n w a rd s a n d th e p r o b le m s o f in d ig e n is in g m ajo r w h ic h g a v e P a k is ta n a p o r tio n o f th e t e r r it o r y it item s lik e th e p r o p u ls io n a n d a u x ilia r y m a ch in ery claim ed in Kutch, led the N avy to prop ose a plan for system s.

th e D efen ce o f K u tch . In 1969, an a g re e m e n t w as signed for the acquisition o f the Russian m issile boats Aircraft for V IK R A N T

w h ic h h a d fir s t b e e n o ffe r e d in 1964 a n d w h o s e T h e o n ly a ir c r a ft w h ic h c o u ld r e p la c e th e a g e in g e ffic a c y had b een d e m o n s tra te d in th e 1967 A ra b S e a h a w k s w e re th e A m e r ic a n n a v a l A 4 S k yh aw ks.

Israel w ar w hen an Egyptian m issile boat sum m arily Efforts to acquire the A 4 ’s had not b e en successful. It s a n k an Is r a e li frig a te . B y end 1971, th e m is s ile w as decid ed th erefo re to a va il o f th e o p p o rtu n ity to b o a ts 'h a d a rriv e d an d th e ir su p p o rt fa c ilitie s had a c q u ir e th e S e a h a w k s b e in g d is p o s e d o f b y the been located in and around Bombay.

G erm a n N avy. T h e s e a ir c r a ft a rr iv e d in 1 9 6 8 an T h e e f f e c t iv e n e s s o f t h e m is s ile a t t a c k s on w ere to prove very u seful in 1971.

Karachi led to the w ithdraw al o f the Pakistan N avy’s V IK R A N T u n d e rw e n t a r e fit fr o m 1972 to 1 9 7

sh ip s in to K a ra c h i h a rb ou r and to m erch a n t sh ips d u rin g w h ich fa c ilitie s w e r e in s ta lle d fo r op era tin g seek in g from th e G overn m en t o f India in N ew D elhi the S eaking helicopters.

326/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

T h e S e a h a w k s p h a s e d o u t in th e la te 1970s and was possible to finalise the programme for the next

the M iz e s w e r e r e f u r b i s h e d to e x t e n d th e ir life into the series of Russian acquisitions.

1980s.

The debilitating impact of spiraling inflation on

The Defence R eview s of 1973 and 1975

the non Russian dcfence projects made it necessary

to appoint another high level APEX Committee in

In 1973. a n a tio n a l s e c u r ity analysis was completed 1975. It reviewed defence needs in the light of the

bv a h ig h l e v e l A P E X c o m m it t e e . In view o f the strategic developments which had taken place after

p r e v a ilin g m a r i t i m e s i t u a t i o n , th e C om m ittee 1973 and the compulsions of the economic situation.

r e c o m m e n d e d s p e c i a l c o n s id e r a t io n for naval It recommended enhanced allocation of funds to

d e v e lo p m e n t a n d c le a r e d th e N a v y ’s proposals for support core naval schemes which otherwise would

replacing old s h ip s a n d th e developm en t o f support have languished.

facilities.

Developments After 1975

U n fo rtu n a tely , th e sh arp rise in international oil p rices a ft e r th e A r a b Is r a e l w a r o f O ctob er 1973

The

Government’s

acccptance

of

the

s e r io u s ly d i s l o c a t e d n a t io n a l b u d g e tin g and recommendations of the APEX Committees of 1973

d ecelerated a lm o s t all d e fe n c e projects. The Navy’s and 1975 enabled the Navy to progress the following

d is cu ss io n s w ith R u s s ia h o w e v e r continued and it major schemes in the years after 1975.

Ships

G uided missile frigates, ocean going rocket boats and coastal minesweepers.

Russian A c q u is itio n s

Im provem ents to the 5th Leander (TARAG1RI) and 6th Leander (V1NDHYAG1RI).

Indigenous

M issile frigates of the GODAVARI class.

C onstruction

M issile Corvettes of the KHUKRI Class.

S u rvey Ships.

Seaw ard Defence Boats.

Modernisations

V IK R A N T was fitted with new radar.. AIO and

helicopters and Sea Hamer^aircra^

^

^

converted to

The anti aircraft frigates B

‘

Ry krjsHNA and TIR.

Conversions

the Training Role to replace CAUVbK .

Submarines

,m p ro,ed submarines

in the earlier submarines.

Acquisitions

T h e improvements in the

Modernisations

Air Arm

•

\nRAAT from Britain.

Acquisitions

R

C

o

n

s

t

e

l

l

a

t

i

o

n

MR aircraft.

S S £ 2 S £ » j s s s r s i * — « —

■

d ln d lg r t„ —

K ^ s h r n e * o

^

„ „ „ „ „ K .n »- = -

»

Modernisation

Helicopters

S S S S t S S p *

TRANSITION to TRIUMPH/327

Overview of Ships and Subm arines A cqu ired B etw een 1965 a n d 1975

ACQUISITION

STANDARD

NAME

VINTAG E

YE A R

Y E A R

SUPPUpT

DISPLACE MENT (Tons)

O RD ERED

D E LIVE R E D

New

1965

1966

Landing Ships

730

GHARiAL

Tank (Medium)

GULDAR

1965

Patrol Boats

80

PAM BAN

New

1967

PANVEL

PANAJI

PURI

PULI CAT

Fleet Tanker

22,600

DEEPAK

New

1964

1967

Germany

Inshore

170

BHATKAL

New

1961

1968-

MDL

Minesweepers

BULSAR

70

Submarines

1975

KALVARI

New

1965

1967-

Russia

KHANDERI

69

KARANJ

KURSURA

Submarine Depot

5900

AMBA

New

1965

1968

Russia

Ship

AnU Submarine

1000

KAMORTA

New

1965

1968-

Russia

Vessels

KADMATT

69

KILTAN

KATCHALL

KAVARATTI

Seaward Defence

150

AMAR

New

1963

1969

GRW

Boats

AJIT

ATUL

Missile Boats

180

VINASH

New

1969

1971

Russia

V1DYUT

VIJETA

VEER

NIRGHAT

NIRBHIK

NASHAK

NIPAT

Submarine Rescue

800

NISTAR

Vessel

Reserve

1969

1971

Russia

Stock

Leander Class

2950

NILGIRI

New

Frigate

1966

1972

M D L

AnU Submarine

1000

ARNALA

Vessels

1968/69

1971

1972

Russia

ANDROTH

from

ANJADIP

Reserve

Stock

Fleet Tug

700

GAJ

New

1968

Anti Submarine

1973

GRW

1000

ANDAMAN

Vessels

New

1971

1973-

Russia

AMINI

Submarines

74

1975

VELA

New

1971

1973-

Russia

VAGIR

Improved

74

VAGLI

VAGSHEER

Leander Class

2950

HIMGIRI

Frigate

New

1968

1974

M D L

Improved

Landing Ships

1 120

Tank (Medium)

GHORPAD

New

1972

1975-

Poland

k e s a r i

Improved

76

SHARDUL

SHARABH

328/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Epilogue

This v o lu m e o f th e N a v y ’s h istory 1965 to 1975 was The Navy’s achievements in the Arabian Sea

m ade p o s s ib le b y th e u n s tin te d h elp extended by evolved from the initial decision to acquire the missile each o f the p a r tic ip a n ts interview ed. It is clear from boats, the credit for which belongs to Defence

their r e c o lle c t io n s t h a t th e r e w ere successes and M inister Jagjivan ‘Ram. Adm iral Krishnan and

re v e rs e s , t e n s io n s a n d d is a g r e e m e n ts . Factions Additional Secretary DR Kohli. The success o f the

lobbied for th e ir p o sitio n s and sometim es went too far missile boat attacks on Karachi, which played such a

in on e d ir e c t io n . T h e r ig h t s o lu tio n had to evolve decisive role in the Navy’s victory in 1971 evolved through e x p e rim e n ta tio n . Yet there is no doubt that from Admiral Kuruvila’s acceptance of the advice to

these w ere o n ly a rg u m e n ts over w ays and means to use missile boats offensively. The tactic to use these reach the sa m e en d - a stron g and modern Navy. This frail, essentially defensive, small boats as part of the end w as a c h ie v e d b y th e com bined efforts o f several Fleet’s spearhead was entirely unconventional, not

people.

believed possible and therefore doubly effective. In

T h e L ea n d er F riga te Project w as the achievement this part of the epilogue. I can share my feeling of

of D efence M in is te r K rish n a Menon, exceptional civil fulfilment at having helped to mutate these fragile but s e r v a n ts lik e M r H C S a r in a n d M r MM Sen and lethal craft into offensive vessels.

As Captain of TIR in April 1971. jo in tly with

Adm irals N an d a an d S am son - the first two Managing Commander Yadav. the Senior Officer of the Missile

D irectors o f M a za g o n D ocks. Th e notable progress in Boat Squadron, we conducted trials when towing a

a c h ie v in g in d ig e n is a t io n in th ese frigates was the missile boat from Visakhapataam to Bombay using

achievem ent o f C om m od ore Paradkar and his team.

large nylon tow ropes at speeds o f 14 kn ots in T h e b o ld d e c is io n to r e p la c e the obsolescent moderately rough sea conditions.

B ritish r a d a r s a n d fire c o n tro l system s by modern I was'eager to prove that this could be done

Dutch e q u iva len ts from the second Leander onwards, because their fragile hulls and limited endurance

w e ll b e f o r e t h e f i r s t L e a n d e r had even been made it impossible for missile boats to sail in distant co m p leted , w a s a r e s u lt o f the forceful advocacy of waters on their own. Towing missile boats safely and

A d m ira l R a m n a th . It g a v e B h a ra t E lectronics the successfully was crucial to being able to get them

o p p o r t u n it y to l e a p f r o g in to th e in d igen ou s

«

striking distance of enemy targets. By the Ume

And it built

production o f d ig ita l electron ic systems.

TIR and NASHAK arrived in Bombay, w e had

up the co n fid en ce o f th e N avy’s constructors like Shri TIf “ e d the procedures for towing these boats for

P a r m a n a n d a n a n d C a p t a in M o h an Ram an

, n fh o S s Sliding hot food and refreshments to them l o n g hours, si

s

engines were switched

e le ctro n ic s p e c ia lis ts lik e A d m iral Baxi to over the tow ropessmce the

^

the in te rfa c e s in fu tu re frigates and corvettes or

° ff t0lc0bno X w ith in minutes to motor independently Indian N a v y ’s u n iq u e m ix o f Russian, wes ern c missile boats

when required.

indigenous system s.

.

. tue

F i" 1

In th e 1971 War. the N avy’s achievemen

_

™ c„ „ the staff o f Admiral Kuruvfla

B ay o f B e n g a l s p r u n g fr o m A d m ira l

^

Operations Oinc

western Fleet. The need to

■ n sisten ce t h a t V I K R A N T be seen out at

g

w£0 was

discussed. 1 told

Captain P a rk a s h ’s cou rage in letting his cag■

. . -

prepare for hos

^

i artvasn s cou rage

o

irt.mrhinfi

^

tQwed Q missiie boat

push to th e ex trem e , the safety lim its

or c

in

Admiral K^uvila o

and suggested that

froniVisakhapatnan, to I ^

^

^

^

w ou U ,

and rec o ve rin g a irc ra ft in the low wine

co

mi*ral

taking missi e t>

^

cncountCr between the

he n o r th e r n p a rt o f th e Bay o f

' . intrepid

arm a and his E astern Fleet, and the■

^

many

decisively tilt the sc<

, uscd to explain the

'in esw eepcrs. b elon gs the credit ofTu

^

reopening

opposing Flc^ a this would be similar to a falcon concept was that ^

on Us prcy. He directed

1 s»ks w ith so few ships, culm inating

cease

J f lh c port o f C h itta g o n g w ith in weeks o f the being relf SCY ' l v and me to put up a proposal m Commander yaua

writing. G iven below is an excerpt from that proposal d is c u s s io n s h e ld b y A d d it io n a l S e c r e t a r y Sheth’s w h ic h h e fo r w a r d e d to A d m ir a l K o h li, th e D elegation in 1965 an d the p a in s ta k in g resolution of F O C IN C W EST in J u n e 1971:

p r o b le m s b y A d d i t i o n a l S e c r e t a r y M u k h e r je e ’s D e le g a tio n s in 1971. T h e s e c o n d s e r ie s o f Russian

“ I h a v e no d o u b t w h a t s o e v e r th a t th e c o rr e c t acqu isition s ow es its su cc es s to th e p ro d ig io u s efforts u t ilis a t io n o f th e m is s ile b o a ts is to u se th em o f A dm iral B arb oza and h is P ro fes sio n a l Delegation of o ffen sive ly , tw o a t a tim e, in co m p an y w ith the 1975.

Fleet. I f I have these boats w ith m e at sea, as you r A d m ira l B in d ra ’s fa r r e a c h in g R e o rg a n is a tio n of F le e t C o m m a n d er I ca n g u a ra n te e total vic to ry N a v a l T r a in in g in 1 9 7 4 s u c c e e d e d b e c a u s e o f the once contact h a s been m ade w ith enem y su rface

w h o le - h e a r t e d s u p p o r t it r e c e iv e d fr o m A dm irals units, rega rd less o f his su periority in speed and K am ath and Kohli.

gun power".

C ap ta in (la te r A d m ira l) D a w s o n s s in g le minded d e d ic a tio n to s u c c e s s fu lly d e m o n s t r a t e d u rin g his A d m ir a l K o h li res p o n d ed e n th u s ia s tic a lly and c o m m a n d o f N IL G IR I. t h e g r e a t p o t e n t ia l o f her im m ediately ordered a scries o f trials to ascertain the e le c t r o n ic w a r fa r e e q u ip m e n t b e c a m e th e spring effects o f tow in g on the boats’ hull and m achinery. In N aval H eadquarters, Adm iral Nanda w ho had already

b oard for the N a v y ’s lea p fro g in to th is in trica te area resolved that the Navy should take the offensive, also o f naval w arfare.

res p o n d e d p o s itiv e ly to th e o ffe n s iv e u tilis a tio n o f T h e tran sfer to th e N avy o f th e co n trol o f Maritime m is s ile b o a t s . In t h e e n s u in g m o n th s , p la n s R e c o n n a is s a n c e w a s th e o u tc o m e o f th e su stained crystallised for the deploym en t o f the m issile boats.

efforts o f A d m iral T a h ilia n i an d C a p ta in Puri.

S om e b o a ts w e re to be d e p lo y e d o ff S a u ra sh tra to T h e so u n d fo u n d a t io n s o f th e S u b m a r in e Arm deter hit and run raids and, w hen ordered, to launch w ere laid b y th e h ig h ly c a p a b le y o u n g su bm ariners attacks tow ards Karachi escorted by fast ships o f the w h o m a n n e d th e fir s t e ig h t s u b m a r in e s , so m e of Fleet. Som e boats w ere to be taken in tow by the Fleet.

w hom lik e A d m ira ls A u d itto a n d S o d h i b eca m e Flag T h e en d r e s u lt w a s th a t d u r in g th e w ar. m is s ile O fficers S u b m a rin es, a n d A d m ir a ls S h e k h a w a t and attacks w ere su ccessfu lly launched tow ards Karachi G an esh w h o ro se to b e c a m e F le e t C o m m a n d ers and from tw o w id e ly separated direction s, the firs t from C om m an d ers in C h ie f A d m ir a l S h e k h a w a t becam e south and the other from the south west.

C h ief o f the N aval S ta ff in 1993.

D u r in g b o th m is s ile a tta c k s , th e tim in g and Th e d ecade 1965-1975 w a s a cru cia l on e in that it p r e c is io n o f th e a ir a tta c k s b y th e A ir F o rc e w a s not only established th e N a v y ’s cre d ib ility in the eyes im p ecca b le and splendid. By sh eer chance, on both o f th e n a t io n b u t a ls o s o w e d t h e s e e d s fo r the occasions the naval grou p arrived o ff Karachi a little tra n sition to a deep sea N avy. T h e fo u n d a tio n s built earlier than the pre-arranged tim e for the coordinated in these ten yea rs have b een co n sid era b ly augm ented a t t a c k . T h is le f t th e P a k is t a n s id e c o m p le t e ly in the en su in g years. F u tu re v o lu m e s w ill record the p erp lex ed w h eth er the havoc w as b ein g w ro u g h t by a c q u i s it io n o f th e K a s h in c l a s s g u i d e d m is s ile the Indian Navy or the Indian A ir Force.

fr ig a t e s , t h e s t r e n g t h e n i n g o f t h e G R S E a s the T h e a c h ie v e m e n t o f A d m ira l K u ru v ila an d h is n ation’s second friga te b u ild in g y a rd an d th e fruitful W e s te r n F le e t in d o m in a t in g th e a p p r o a c h e s to o u t c o m e o f t h e N a v y ’s c o m m i t m e n t to D R D C ) s Karachi w ithin a w eek o f hostilities, despite the poor Integrated G uided M issile D ev elo p m en t program m e.

m aterial state o f his ships and repeated breakdow ns A ll th e s e a c h ie v e m e n ts w e r e s u s t a in e d by the at sea, is w ell known. I w ould like to place on record c o m m it m e n t w ith w h ic h t h e N a v y ’s o f f ic e r s and m y a p p recia tion o f th is b ig hearted and cou rageou s sailors carried ou t th eir du ties. M o st o f th em w ere too m an w ho took the advice o f his you n g advisers and you n g then to kn ow w h a t in s p ired th e v is io n o f their im plem ented it so successfully.

eld e rs . It is m y h o p e th a t th is v o lu m e h a s h elped T h e s u c c e s s o f th e fir s t s e r ie s o f R u s s ia n them to kn ow w h at w a s d o n e an d w hy.

a c q u is it io n s w a s th e r e s u lt o f th e d e t a ile d 330/TRANSITIQN TO TRIUMPH

24

The N av a l Hydrographic Department

D e v e lo p m e n t s P rior to 1965

Cursetji, was deputed to Britain in April 1949 to General

study the British Navy's Hydrographic Officc and

prepare a project report on the establishment of a

Hydrographic Office in India. He returned to India

On a c c o u n t o f th e s e a s o n a l m onsoons, the survey early in 1950. After visiting all the other survey year w as d iv id e d in to th e Su rvey Season - November organisations and facilities in India, he submitted his to A p r il - a n d t h e D r a w in g S e a s o n - May to report in August 1950.

September.

Su rvey a t sea u sed to b e done by Survey Groups.

1951-1953

Drawing w a s d o n e b y th e D raw in g office established in D u nm ore H o u se in C oonoor since 1900.

S u r v e y V e s s e l s . KUKRI commenced surveying in T h e r e s u lts o f h y d r o g r a p h ic surveys used to be December 1950. In July 1951. KUKRI was renamed

forw arded to th e B ritis h H yd rograp h ic Department INVESTIGATOR. She was the iourth co n secu tn e

for p u b lic a t io n . T h e s e c h a r ts w ere then sen o

INVESTIGATOR in the Marine Survey 01 India to bee

Bom bay. C h a rts w e r e iss u e d to ships by the Nava S t name, the first being a twin paddle steam er Chart D e p o t lo c a te d in a co rn er o f the sail loft of in s tru c te d in Bombay Dockyard in 1881.

The two SDMLs continued to b e.em ployed on

Bombay D ock yard .

m v ie w o f earlier experience th a t a

M a r in e S u r v e y w a s p a r t o f th e o ffic e survey duties.

n ot co p e w it h s u rv e y

Surveyor G en era l o f India.

sin g le su rvey

R 0 H ILK H A N D w a s g iv e n a

1947-1948

f * s s r

Shc'1

the survey fleet in O ctc^cr

5 j an d 1952 ,

S u r v e y s e a r n e d

Out. Dur

^

^

^

W h en th e R o y a l I n d ia n N a v y w a s ctt r ATOR

August 1947, its on ly su rvey vessel. I N V ^ ^ T O ^

surveys w e re e a

hanadi RiVcr entrance and

Andaman islands, tnc

was a lloca ted to th e M a rin e Survey o f n cia*

B o m b ay Harbour

^ 1Qgl Commander

and 19 48 , it s v e r y fir s t ta s k s w ere to su H

y d

r o g r a

p h i c

JJ

S u rvey 0 r - in - C h a r Se

a p proach es to th e b e rth s for naval shlPs

cicar

C u rsetji was appoint

^ ^

prQjecl

rt

and C och in . B y m id 1948 how ever, it c

Marine Suryey o f i n d ^ G overn m en l a p p ro v ed ,th e that th is s h ip h a d r e a c h e d th e end o f her life needed to be rep laced .

w j r '>sr" ," ic o m "

in p

1949-1950

1953-1954

i w orld War

S u rvey V e s s e ls . In 1949'^ ! m r u n d e ° r g o large frigate K U K R I w a s placed u nder reii

^

vvas

alterations for co n version to a surv^ , VQCtober 50.

Re lf supporting suivey

J

^

^

T

h

e sun-ey

com m issioned a s a su rvey ship on

waS still

f s therefore converted

SUTLEJ. t

n pt now comprisCC

uoats constructed by the

S

u

r v

e

y

s

c

a

r r i e

d

o

u

t . W h l *s *

n KHAND. two

u n d e r r e fit , th e m in e s w e e p e r ROi d M L s) and

S n i S and new survey b o a t c o ^

^

^

S e a w a r d D e f e n c e M o to r L a u n c h e s 1

,eted by

su rvey b o a ts c a r r ie d ou t in 1949 an

p r o a c h e s

1950. a d e ta iled su rve y o f K a n d l a an

Kandla as

^ d e r n s u ^ e y ship.

ng l953 and 1954.

as Pa rt,of th e p ro je ct for the devclopme

^

S

u

r v

e

y

s

of Kutch. the Andaman

surveys continued

a maJor Port.

,,rrently with thlS,

H

y

d

r o

g

r a

p

h

i c O

f f i c e

. C one

0fflcer. Cdr J

activity, th e N a v y ’s se n iorm ost surv y

and N ico b a r Islan ds, th e M ahanadi R iver en tra n ce H

y

d

r o

g

r a

p

h

i c O

f f i c e

.

T h e H y d ro g ra p h ic OffjCe

w a s e s ta b lis h e d in t e m p o r a r y a c c o m m o d a tio n at and Bom bay I larbour.

Dehra Dun in J u n e 1954.

S u r v e y P e r s o n n e l . D uring th e preced ing years, a num ber o f officers had been under basic training and

O n 15 A u g u s t 1 9 5 4 , t h e n a m e o f th e Marine had also u ndergone training in Britain. Th e m anning Su rvey o f India w a s ch a n g e d to H y d ro g ra p h ic Branch o f three separate su rveyin g units in 1953 w as m ade o f th e N a v y . T h e d e s ig n a t io n o f t h e S u rv e y o r in possible by the availab ility oi these qualified officers C harge w a s ch an ged to C h ie f H y d ro g ra p h er. Captain w h o h a d p r e v io u s ly b e e n u n d e r t r a in in g . T h e J C u rsetji took o v er a s C h ie f H y d r o g r a p h e r in 1956.

s h o r t a g e o f s u r v e y r e c o r d e r s a ilo r s h o w e v e r Th e office sh ifted into its n e w b u ild in g s in 1957.

continued to persist.

From th e ou tset, it p ro v ed d iffic u lt to g et trained c iv ilia n te c h n ic a l p e r s o n n e l fo r th e H yd rograp h ic H

y

d

r o

g

r a

p

h

i c

O

f f i c e

.

H a v in g d e c id e d to

e s ta b lis h a H y d r o g r a p h ic O ffic e in In d ia fo r th e Office. Su rveyors had to b e o b ta in ed on loan from the p r o d u c tio n o f n a v ig a tio n a l c h a r ts an d a u x ilia r y S u r v e y o f In d ia a n d d r a ft s m a n a n d h y d ro g ra p h ic p u b lication s, the services w ere obtained on loan o f a s s is t a n t s h a d to b e t r a i n e d o n t h e jo b . This th e A ssis ta n t H y d ro g ra p h e r o f the B ritish N avy to expedient con tin u ed for se ve ra l y ea rs.

advise and assist in setting up the office. He arrived in P

u

b

l i c

a

t i o

n

s

.

F r o m 15 F e b r u a r y 1958

India in the capacity o f the Surveyor-in-C harge o f the onw ards, Indian

N otices to M a rin ers started being

M arine Su rvey o f India. A fter considering alternative published from the N a va l H y d ro g ra h ic office.

sites, it w as d ecid ed to esta b lish the H yd rograp h ic N a v ig a tio n a l w a r n in g s c o n t in u e d to b e issued O ffice at D chra Dun. w h ere the p rin tin g facilities o f from the Naval C h a rt D ep ot in B om bay.

the nearby Su rvey o f India could be utilised and close In 1 9 5 6 , I n d ia b e c a m e a m e m b e r o f the lia is o n m a in t a in e d b e tw e e n t h e s e tw o s u r v e y In te r n a tio n a l H y d r o g r a p h ic B u r e a u .

F ro m 1957

organisations.

o n w a r d s ,

t h e

C h i e f

H y d r o g r a p h e r

s ta rte d

rep resen tin g In dia a t th e In te rn a tio n a l Hydrographic 1954-1958

C onferences in M onaco.

S

u

r v e y

V

e s s e l s . In 1954, s u rv e y c o m m itm e n ts b e g an 1959 - 1964

to m o u n t, lt w a s a s s e ss ed th a t a t le a s t fo u r sh ips n e e d e d to b e c o n t in u o u s ly e m p lo y e d on s u r v e y E

x p

a

n

s i o n

o

f t h

e H

y

d

r o

g

r a

p

h

i c B

r a

n

c h

duties. D u rin g these four years:

In 1959, th e N a v y fo r w a r d e d to t h e M in is t r y its p r o p o s a ls fo r th e e x p a n s io n o f th e H y d r o g r a p h ic

•

In 1954, G overnm ent sanctioned a new 2500 ton

B ran ch .

D is c u s s io n s c o n tin u e d till 1963 w ith no s u rv e y s h ip to b e b u ilt in c o lla b o ra tio n w ith a ta n g ib le res u lts. In 1963, th e N a v y p u t u p revised French firm at H industan Shipyard Ltd (HSL) at and u p d a ted p ro p o s a ls , p o in tin g o u t t h a t adequate V isakh apatnam . Its keel w as laid in 1957.

ch a rtin g o f In d ia n w a te r s w a s a p rim e n e ces sity for

•

T h e M in istry o f T ra n s p o rt and C om m unication, the m aritim e d efen ce o f In d ia a n d th e re fo re w as the on w h o s e r e q u e s t m ost o f th e p r o je c t s u rve y s so le re s p o n s ib ility o f th e M in is tr y o f D e fe n c e . The w e r e b e in g c a r r ic d ou t. b o re th e e n tire co st o f 1963 paper en visaged th e re q u ire m e n t o f 4 ships for con vertin g the sloop JA M U N A for the survey role.

seaw ard su rvey and 4 sm a ller su rv e y c ra ft for inshore J A M U N A w as com m issioned as a survey vessel in

N ovem ber 1956.

coastal survey, ph ased o v er a p eriod o f 5 years.

On 25 M arch 1965, th e C h ie f H y d ro g ra p h e r was

•

SU TLEJ had been doing survey tem porarily since

1953. D u rin g her 1957 annual refit, her hull and r e - d e s ig n a t e d a s C h i e f H y d r o g r a p h e r to the m a c h in e r y s ta te w e r e so p o o r as to r e q u ir e a G overnm ent o f India. T h is g a v e o fficia l recognition to m a jo r r e fit. It w a s d e c id e d to c o n v e rt h er fo r the advice he gave to th e va rio u s m a ritim e agencies.

p erm a n en t em p loym en t as a su rvey ship du ring S

u

r v e y

V

e s s e l s . F r o m 19 59 o n w a r d s , th e survey her D2 refit at MDL.

fle e t c o n s is te d o f J A M U N A a n d I N V E S T I G A T E •

S U T L E J r e jo in e d in 1 9 6 0 a f t e r h e r p e r m a n e n S

u

r v e y

s C

a

r r i e d

O

u t . B e tw e e n 1954 a n d 1958.

s u rv e y s c o n tin u e d t o be ca rried ou t in th e G u lf o f conversion for su rvey du ties.

K u t c h . th e G u lf o f C a m b a y , th e A n d a m a n a n d T h e new su rvey sh ip b e in g co n stru c te d in H SL o N ic o b a r Is la n d s a n d p o r ts on th e e a s t a n d w e s t a French design w a s in o rd in a tely d elayed . T e n Year^

coasts.

after it had b een sa n ction ed , sh e w a s c o m m i s s i o n ^

as D A R S H A K o n 2 8 D e c e m b e r 1 9 6 4 . S h e h a d ^

S

u

r v

e

y

P

e

r s

o

n

n

e

l . T h e s h o r t a g e o f s u r v e y officers and sailors continued to persist.

h e lic o p te r to a s s is t in s u r v e y d u tie s ; h e r liv in g an 332/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

w o r k in g s p a c e s w e r e a ir c o n d it io n e d ; she had flu o r e s c e n t

l i g h t i n g

t h r o u g h o u t , au tom atic

£ = £ ? * • M0L ’ ■* “ iy

««■ «*

telephones a n d tw o 35 foot su rvey launches.

S u r v e y s

0 R W "

‘

E“

M up ”

C

a

r r i e

d

O

u t . B e tw e e n 1959 and 1964,

su rve ys c o n t in u e d o f b o th c o a s ts , the Laccadive 19?.2' When consider'ng the distribution of

Islands and th e A n d a m a n and Nicobar Islands.

p construction work between MDL and1

GRW

Government decided that new survey ships would be

S

u

r v e y

P

e

r s

o

n

n

e

l . V a r io u s s te p s w e re tried to constructed at GRW.

The first o f the three

overcom e th e p e r s is t e n t s h o rta g e o f volunteers for replacement ships was ordered on GRW in 1972. The

survey du ties:

ship was to be fitted with modern survey, navigation

•

O ffic e rs fo u n d u n s u ita b le for the A ir Arm were and

manoeuvering equipment,

indigenous

s e le c te d fo r th e H y d r o g r a p h ic Branch. These propulsion machinery with a Pleuger rudder and be

fully aircondiUoned.

o fficers h o w e v e r d eclin e d to volunteer to stay on In 1973, Government approved the indigenous

as su rve y officers.

construction of four survey craft for inshore survey

•

J u n ior o ffic e r s sta rted being attached to surveys work.

sh ips fo r p e rio d s o f 2 to 3 years.

In 1975, due to financial constraints. NHQ

•

O f f ic e r s o f t h e s u r v e y b r a n c h sta rted being rescheduled the placement of orders:

tra n s fe r r e d to g e n e r a l se rvice appointments for experience.

•

Survey ships 2 and 3 were deferred to the 1974-

79 plan. NHQ timed the orders for these two

H

y

d

r o g

r a

h

i c T

r a

i n

i n

g

S

c h

o o

l

survey ships to be delivered in 1978 and 1979.

U ntil 1959. n o p r o p e r fa c ilitie s existed for training

•

The four survey craft were deferred to the 1980-

personnel in H y d ro g ra p h y . O fficers and sailors joined 84 plan.

th e

b r a n c h

o n

r e c o m m e n d a t io n

by their

Surveys Carried out Normal surveys continued C om m anding O fficers. T h e ir skill and dedication was to be carried out on both coasts, and the Andaman,

rew arded in a c c o rd a n c e w ith General Instructions for Nicobar and Laccadive Islands.

H ydrograp h ic S u rveyors.

T h e first a ttem p t at providing systematic training

Other Survey A ctivities:

b e g a n in 1 9 5 9 w it h th e e s ta b lis h m e n t o f a In 1967.

H ydrograp hic T r a in in g U nit at the Naval Chart Depot

. SUTLEJ carried out the survey in connection with

B o m b a y . It c o n d u c t e d s h o r t d u ra tion course for the establishment of the DG Range at Goa.

q u a rterm a ster sa ilors. Progressively', the shortage of

. IN V E S T IG A T O R c a r r ie d

o u t

s u r v e y s

in

ju n io r r e c o r d e r s e a s e d b u t th e sh ortage o f senior V isakhapatnam harbou r in co n n ection w ith the recorders w a s u n a v o id a b le until the junior recorders new Dockyard Project.

a c q u ir e d t h e q u a lific a t io n s and experien ce to be In 1968 D A R S H A K c o n tin u e d th e s u r v e y s in promoted.

,

Due to co n stra in ts o f space, this unit was s i e C° n in C? 969Vj J M U N A S d l u t s u r v e y s o f th e to C o ch in in 1961. It w a s tem porarily located m w in g o f t h e N D S c h o o l a n d n am ed as the Na\ H ydrograp h ic S chool.

<-nPw

D A R S H A K ca rried o u t o c e a n o g r a p h ic s u r v e y s P

u

b

l i c a

t i o

n

s

. A p a r t fro m th e publications

. DARSHAK

^ the G u ]f Qf Cam bay Wlth

c h a rts , S a ilin g D ir e c t io n s a n d In d ia n o i

f r 0 n t i S r ° m Naval Physical & O c e a n o g ra p h ic M ariners, th e In d ia n List o f Lights was publi scientists

^

N ationai in stitu te o f

1961.

L a b o r a t o r y !

N a t i0 n a l G e o p h y s ic a l

0 C ea n 0 f l n s t i t u t e (NGRD scien tists, em b a rk e d D evelopm ents Between 1965 and 197

RCf arC^ ob serva tio n s w ere m ade p e rta in in g to on board. ° “ se

,

, p ro p e rtie s o f s e a w a te r.

S

u

r v e y

S

h

i p

s

. F r o m 19 65 to 1974.

c o n s is te d o f D A R S H A K , INVESTIGATO> .

ned

m arine biology

^ d J A M U N A . IN V E S T IG A T O R was deco

m agnetic promc .

gra p h ic o b serva tio n s

.

SUTLEJ, earn d out oceafrgmPNpoL

° n 30 Sep 74.

replacement

In 1970. G overn m en t sanctionec taivtijNA in 3

With a team of

offshore were obtained,

° f I N V E S T I G A T O R , S U T L E J an d JA M

d

profiles upto J

tRANSITI0N TO TRIUMPH/333

P h a s e d p r o g r a m m e . O r d e rs could n

Survey Alowance/Survey Bounty for oficers

(b )

D u r in g th e 1 9 7 3 -7 4 s e a s o n , D A R S H A K w a s Category

Survey

Survey

e m p lo y e d on D e fe n c e O c e a n o g ra p h y an d M a r in e Allowance Bounty

R e sou rce S u rvey s, in w h ich a ll m a ritim e res ea rc h Rs p.m.

Rs p.m.

agencies o f the nation participated. T h is w as the first A ssl Surveyor Class 4

50

850

minus Survey

venture o f its kind and yielded valu able data.

Allowance

received during

S

u

r v

e

y

o

f t h

e

G

u l f o f K u t c h . S u r v e y o f t h e N o rth e rn p o rtio n o f th e G u lf h a d b e g u n in 1948.

the period

involved

During the 1974-75 season, the M inistry o f Transport

“ “

“

3

60

950

- do -

placed the lighthouse tender MV SAG AR D EE P at the

. . .

-

2

85

1350

- do -

disposal o f the C h ie f H ydrographer. U sin g tw o Side

“

*

“

1

100

1850

- do -

Scan Sonars provided by the Indian Oil Corporation,

Charge Allowance

D A R S H A K and S A G A R D E E P su rveyed m ost o f the Lt Cdr

100

1800

- do -

G u lf o f Kutch.

T h e results o f these surveys enabled

Com m ander

100

1800

- do -

Captain

Nil

1800

- do -

delineation o f the deep w ater channel to the off-shore oil term inal at Salaya for use by the Very Large Crude In 1 9 6 9 , S u r v e y B o u n t y w a s s a n c t io n e d for Oil C arriers (VLCCs) w hich brou ght crude oil from the M C PO ’s

Persian G u lf to the refineries in Gujarat.

M CPO 1

R s 5 7 0 per year

E

l e

c t r o

n

i c S

u

r v e y

i n

g E

q

u

i p

m

e n

t In 1966-67,

M CPO 2

Rs 51 0 per year

the M inistry o f T ra n sp ort provided D ARSH AK w ith a m ed iu m ra n g e p o s itio n fix in g sy s te m , th e H i-F ix M

o d

e r n

i s

a

t i o n

o

f t h

e N

a

v

a

l H

y

d

r o

g

r a

p

h

i c O

f f i c e

ch ain , to p ro g re s s su rve ys in th e G u lf o f C am bay.

D

e h

r a

D

u

n

P rio r to the in tro d u ctio n o f H i-F ix, su rveys in m id

T o cope w ith the g ro w in g v o lu m e o f chart production, o c e a n u s e d to b e d o n e p a in s t a k in g ly b y la y in g th e c o m p le m e n t o f o f f i c e r s a n d t e c h n i c a l and beacons and fixing w ith sextants or taut wire. Hi-Fix a d m in i s t r a t iv e c i v i l i a n s t a f f w a s in c r e a s e d in w a s a m a jo r m ile s t o n e in th e m o d e r n is a t io n o f D e c e m b e r 1966. A ‘ M o r u s a w a ’ P h o to T y p e s e ttin g su rveyin g equipm ent.

M achine w as in stalled in 1967. A ll ‘le tte r’ and figure’

S

u

r v e y

s

i n

B

a

n

g

l a

d

e

s

h

A fte r th e 1971 w ar,

w o r k , w h ic h p r e v i o u s l y u s e d to b e f a ir d ra w n D A R S H A K c a r r ie d ou t s u rv e y s in B a n g la d e s h till m anually, w as ph otogra p h ed in o rig in a l on the photo March 1972.

t y p e s e t t in g m a c h in e a n d t h e p r i n t s w e r e then m ounted on the fa ir-d ra w in g origin a l.

S

u

r v e y P

e r s o n

n

e l

Direct Entry Survey Oficers

In M arch 1971. the p rin tin g o f c h a rts com m enced

Th e intake o f officers into

on the new lith ograp h ic and le tte r-p re s s m achines.

th e H y d ro g ra p h ic B ran ch u sed to be from G en eral In 1975, th e p rin tin g co m p lex w a s au gm ented by S e r v ic e v o lu n t e e r s . S in c e fa r to o m a n y o ffic e r s a d o u b le co lo u r, r o t a r y o ffs e t m a c h in e a n d allied r e v e r te d to G e n e ra l S e r v ic e a fte r a s h o rt s tin t o f printing equipm ent.

s u r v e y in g . S u r v e y O ffic e r s s ta rte d b e in g d ir e c tly recruited from 1965 onwards.

T

h

e E

n

v i r o n

m

e n

t a

l D

a

t a

U

n

i t

S

u

r v

e

y

A

l l o

w

a

n

c e

a

n

d

S

u

r v

e

y

B

o

u

n

t y

In

T h e E n v iro n m e n t D a ta U n it w a s e s ta b lis h e d at 1968. to attract m ore volunteers for survey duty, both the H ydro-grap h ic O ffice in 1974. D u rin g 1975, this these allow ances w ere revised upward.

Survey Bounty for Sailors Employed on Survey unit processed. analysed and interpreted the data (a) Duties

received from :

•

D A R S H A K ’s O c e a n o g ra p h ic E x p e d itio n o f 1973

Rs per year

74.

Su rvey R ecorder

1 - C PO

Rs 450

•

T h e U SA's N ational O ce a n o g ra p h ic D a ta Centre.

S u rvey R ecorder

1 - PO and below

Rs 390

S u rvey R ecorder

2

r s 330

•

T h e In tern ation al India O cean E xped ition .

Su rvey R ecord er

3

r s 240

In 1 9 7 5 , th e N a v a l H y d r o g r a p h ic O ff ic e w as n o m in a t e d b y th e G o v e r n m e n t o f I n d ia a s t e N a tion a l C en tre fo r a r c h iv in g and d is s e m in a tio n 0

334/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

b a t h y t h e r m o g r a p h (B T ) d ^ ca . T h e G overn m en t d ire c te d t h a t B T d a ta c o lle c t e d by all vessels of received from t

h

^

^

rcP ™ * c t i o n m aterial

n a tio n a l a g e n c i e s b e fo r w a r d e d to the Naval under a chnrr ° n

Hydr°graphic Department

Hydrographic O ffice.

Nautical Almn

arrangement. Publication of the

UK and ihr- i iq a '

identical to that produced by the

I n

t e

r n

a

t i o

n

a

l C

o - o

p

e r a

t i o n

arranopm V A' was commenced in 1975 under

Th e I n t e r n a t i o n a l H y d r o g r a p h ic B ureau (IHB) arrangements with these countries.

a s s ig n e d to t h e N a v a l H y d r o g r a p h ic O ffice the Goodwill Cruise

responsibility o f p re p a rin g nine bathymetric plotting sheets, b a sed on s o u rc e m aterial received from data In April - May 1970, DARSHAK undertook a goodwill

centres th e w o r ld over. T h e s e w ere incorporated in cruise to Southeast Asia. This was the first time that the G e n e r a l B a t h y m e t r ic C h a r t o f the Oceans an Indian built survey ship visited countries in this

region.

(GEBCO).

President’s Review o f the Fleet

N

a v a l H

y

d

r o

g

r a

p

h

i c S

c h

o o

l

DARSHAK. JAMUNA and SUTLEJ took part in the

Sanction fo r e s ta b lis l ing a perm anent Hydrographic President’s Review of the Fleet at Bombay on 28

School at C och in w a s first issued in April 1965. Later December 1969.

it was decided to locate th e school at Visakhapatnam.

E v e n t u a lly , in 1 9 7 5 , s a n c t io n w a s a ccord ed to International Hydrographic Bureau

establish th e S ch ool at Goa.

Chief Hydrographers have had the distinction of

being elected to the International Hydrographic

P

u

b

l i c a

t i o n

s

Bureau in Monte Carlo.

L a

t t i c e C

h

a

r t s . T h e p r o d u c t i o n o f D e c c a L a ttice Commodore DC Kapoor was the first C h ief

navigation ch a rts w a s taken up in 1967. The first of Hydrographer to be elected to the D irectin g

the se rie s c o v e r in g th e a p p ro a ch es to Paradip Port Committee in April 1972. He then served as a

was p u blish ed in A p ril 1968.

Director in the Bureau till 1982. having been reelected for two successive terms.

C

o a s t a l C

h

a

r t s a

n

d

I n

d

i a

n

S

a

i l i n

g D

i r e c t i o n s . The

Rear Admiral FL Fraser served from 1982 to 1987

publication o f th e coasta l series o f charts for the West as the President of the Directing Committee.

Coast o f In d ia s t a r t e d in 1968. T h e publication of Indian S a ilin g D irection s for this area commenced in D evelopm ents A fte r 1975

1970.

Re-Scheduling o f the Survey Season

E x t e n s i o n o f C o v e r a g e o f N o t i c e s to M a rin e rs .

As a result of refit programmes and employment on

Com m encing M a rch 1972, the coverage o f Notices to other naval duties, it was found that survey ships and

M ariners w a s e n la r g e d to in clu d e the entire North rraft were not always available in the survey season.

Indian O c e a n a r e a . T h is e n s u re d that important Deployments therefore started being m ade in

in form ation r e la tin g to th e sa fety o f navigation was locations where survey work was feasible even dunng

available to sh ip s ex p ed itiou sly .

the monsoon season.

Survey Vessels

B

a t h y m

e t r i c C

h a

r t o

f t h e N

o r t h e r n I n d i a n O c e a n . This DARSHAK SUTLEJ and JAMUNA continued on

chart w as p u b lis h ed in J u ly 1973.

s u r v e y

duties until the new su rvey ve ss els

I n d i a n N

a

u

t i c a

l A

l m

a

n

a

c . In S e p t e m b e r 1974 the

commissioned

s h a K ^

^

with alI Lhe new

a va l H y d r o g r a p h ic o f fic e p u b lis h e d the n J

i equipment which was being fitted in the new

^ it io n o f th e 1974 N au tical Almanac. It was iden survey ships under cons ruc^

d e d fo r t h e

o the A lm a n a c b e in g jo in tly produced by Britain the

A and w a s prod u ced under arrangements with

,n 19

o f f o u r 185 ton. su rvey cra ft w h ich

construction o

nction with survey ships

would not only w

^

jndependcntly carry out

jn coastal waters

and their approaches.

^

e r n a t i o n a l A r r a n g e m e n t s f o r ^ vc^ia p£-sjan Production

surveys oi an PUI •

M

a

t e r i a

l s . T h r e e c h a rts o f the

u u lf a re a a n d t h e c h a r t o f M a la cca Straits.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/335

New Survey Vessels

Commissioned

D irect E n try officers an d sa ilo rs, a n d fo r C ivilian Fiel A s s is ta n ts , in c lu d in g s o m e fr o m fo r e ig n countries SANDHAYAK

Survey Ship(GRW)

26 Feb 81

NIRDESHAK

Survey Ship(GRW)

04 Oct 83

contin ued to b e co n d u cted on fa c ilitie s b orrow ed from MAKAR

Survey Craft(GSL)

31 Jan 84

oth er N aval u n its a t C och in .

J11

MITHUN

Survey Craft(GSL)

31 Mar 84

In 1 9 8 0 , th e H y d r o g r a p h ic S c h o o l w a s g iVen MEEN

Survey Craft(GSL)

23 Jun 84

U N D P a id o f 3 .5 m illio n U S D o lla r s fo r acquiring MESH

Survey Craft(GSL)

31 Oct 84

m odern su rveyin g tra in in g e q u ip m en t. Thereafter, it NIRUPAK

Survey Ship(GRW)

14 Aug 85

w a s a w a r d e d C a t e g o r y A c e r t i f i c a t i o n b y the INVESTIGATOR

Survey Ship(GRW)

11 Jan 90

I n t e r n a t io n a l H y d r o g r a p h i c O r g a n i s a t i o n and JAMUNA

Survey Ship(GRW)

31 Aug 91

SUTLEJ

Survey Ship (GRW)

19 Feb 93

re c o g n itio n a s th e R e g io n a l T r a in in g C e n tre for the A sia Pacific region.

Old Survey Ships

Decommissioned

T h e p r e s e n t r o l e o f t h e N a v a l H y d r o g r a p h ic SUTLEJ

1 Dec 78

School is:

JAMUNA

31 Dec 80

DARSHAK

15 Jan 90

•

T o tra in In d ia n N a v a l o ffic e r s a n d s a ilo rs in the A ll six su rvey ships o f the SANDHAYAK class w ere

field o f H yd rog ra p h y an d a llied instrum entation.

e q u ip p e d w it h th e la t e s t a v a ila b le e le c t r o n ic

•

T o c o n d u c t c o u r s e s fo r C iv ilia n H y d ro g ra p h ic equ ipm ent and facilities for hydrographic work.

p e rs o n n e l fro m p o rts a n d o th e r C e n tr a l Marine T h e s u r v e y c r a ft w e r e n o t fo u n d to b e s ta b le Agencies.

en ou g h fo r su rv e y w o rk w h en th e w e a th e r w a s not

•

A s the R egion al H y d ro g ra p h ic T r a in in g Centre, to.

calm.

condu ct cou rses fo r civ ilia n an d se rvice personnel o f S ou theast A s ia n cou n tries.

N

a

v a

l H

y

d

r o g

r a

p

h

i c S

c h

o o

l G

o a

In 1997, th e N a va l H y d r o g r a p h ic O ffic e and the T h e n e w sc h o o l a t G oa w a s co n stru cted w ith in INS

N aval H yd rograp h ic S ch ool w e r e re-d esig n a ted as the G O M A N T A K a n d c o m m is s io n e d in t h r e e p h a s e s N a t io n a l H y d r o g r a p h ic O f f i c e a n d N a tio n a l b e tw e e n 1 9 7 8 a n d 19 87 . M e a n w h ile c o u r s e s fo r H ydrograp hic School.

336/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

25

Naval S cie n tific Research and Development

D evelopm ents P rio r to 1965

The NCML

In 1949, the G o v e rn m e n t in vited Dr JE Kevstnn nf tv,,

-ru

m

m

. R c y a , N a v a l

S e ^ c e t„ a dwse „ „ the

£

establishm ent o f a s c ie n tific organisation to assist the was intended to undertake R & D work related to all Navy. In h is r e p o r t o n “T h e R e q u ire m e n ts o f the materials used in the Navy, other than explosive

In d ia n N a v y f o r S c i e n t i f i c A s s is ta n c e " , he foodstuff. The first priority was to be investigations in recom m ended th e s e tt in g o f an U nderw ater Science connection with hull, non-ferrous and boiler

E stablish m en t a n d a D o c k y a r d Laboratory. He also . corrosion, antifouling composition and methods of recom m ended th e im m e d ia te appointm ent o f a Chief hull protection. In due course, the laboratory would

S c ie n t ific O f f i c e r a t N a v a l H e a d q u a r te r s . The be equipped to carry out the mechanical testing of

overnm ent a c c e p te d th es e recom m endations

rnetals, gamma radiography and spectrographic

Th e s e rv ic e s w e r e ob ta in ed on loan for a period of analysis.

two y ea rs o f D r G E G a le, a Prin cipal C h ief Scientific By end 1952. an old building in the Dockyard had

icer o f th e R o y a l N a v a l S c ien tific Service. He took been converted into a Iaboratoiy and a large raft had

over as S c ie n t ific A d v is e r (N avy) in M arch 1951. Ex been constructed to be moored in Bombay harbour

onicio, he w a s a ls o th e C h ie f Scientific Officer (Navy) for conducting experiments on anti-fouling and

[n

e D efen ce S c ie n c e O rgan isation o f the Ministry of protective compositions for undenvater hulls.

IMP?006 ^

r e e maj ° r th ru s t areas w ere identified: the

T h e

S

c i e

n

t i f i c A

s p e c t s o

f t h

e I n

d

i g e n

e o u

s

• the N C M L a n d th e indigeneous production and P r o d u c t i o n o

f N a v a l S t o r e s

inspection o f N a v a l S to res . B oth laboratories were to The first priority was how to make the technical

Junction d ir e c t ly u n d e r th e N aval Research Cell in inspection of naval stores more effective and how to

a v a l H e a d q u a r t e r s . A n In d ia n s c ie n tis t was attain industrial standardistation. The Scientific

p p oin ted to w o r k a lo n g s id e D r G ale and take over Adviser (Navy) was the convenor of the Naval Stores

m him w h e n h e left.

P r o d u c tio n C o m m itte e at NHQ and his s t a f f rpnresented NHQ on nearly twenty com m ittees, sub

TheINPL

committees and pan els o f the Indian Standards

j n^p^s*ca* la b o r a to r y w a s set up on Willingdon Island IllS M ereem ce activity was planned in the fields of:

UnH ° c *l i n * ° d e a l w i t h th e s c ie n t ific aspect o D

Research: In due course, this culminated

min CrSea W a r ^a r e in c lu d in g su b m a rin e detection.

fir Csweepin g, d e g a u s s in g and harbour defence. T e

*

,nathe establishment of the Electronics Research

fn d Development Establishm ent (LRDE) in

s h in P ri° r lty w a s t0 be g iv e n to work on degaussing.

cje1 ^ ° is e a n d m a g n e tic sw eep in g, development o Bangalore.

rch. To c]arify future lines of

(ban?

l o ° P s *

s t u d y

o f

th erm o clm e s

’

PhyS'r°rh an extensive study was carried out in

i n d ^ y t h e r m ° g r a P h d a t a )' u n d e rw a te r accoustics.

reSc6o f hibitability conditions on board naval

co n t ? ? eŮS P r o d u c tio n o f so n a r oscillators an obtaining data on personnel w orking

st.tp s.ob tzlin in g ^ b o.ier room s and engjne Were °i ec*u iP m en t. O ce a n o g ra p h ica l investiga i also p la n n ed .

. o]

und65 physiological stress experienced by divers

S S u e s t i o n of survival rations.

L a b or M a r c h 1 9 5 2 - t h e In d la n NaVal PhyrHmc

^ a r n a L0 r y ^ N P L ^ w a s e s ta b lis h e d in the wa Venn Cks o f 0 n e o f t h e T r a in in g S c h o o ls o f INb end u ru th y in C och in.

s u b m a r in e s . T h e a im w a s t o m e a s u r e their I n

i t i a

l R

8 2 , D

S

t u

d

i e s

u n d e rw a te r ra d ia te d n o is e , p in p o in t th e sou rces of R & D w ork also started in the follow ing areas: this noise and red u ce th e level so a s to m inim ise the p r o b a b ilit y o f t h e ir d e t e c t i o n b y e n e m y sonars.

•

M aterial science and m arine biology studies w ith

e m p h a s is o n c o r r o s io n s t u d ie s , in d u s t r ia l Likewise, the s e lf n oise lev el o f v e s s e ls a lso needed to p o llu t a n t s a n d t h e ir e f fe c t on u n d e r w a t e r b e m e a s u r e d a n d r e d u c e d s o a s to e n h a n c e the corrosion, ch em ical cleaning o f exhaust system s

p erform an ce o f ow n son ars. S in c e n o fa cilities existed a n d t o x ic g a s e s in s u b m a r in e s a n d t h e ir in th e c o u n t r y fo r n o is e r a n g i n g a n d s e lf-n o is e m e a s u re m e n ts . N S T L to o k u p a p r o je c t in 1970 to elim ination.

•

S tu d ies on th e natural deterioration o f tim ber in d e s ig n a n d d e v e lo p th e in s t r u m e n t a t io n system to sea w ater, r e a r in g o f b a rn a cles , to x ica n ts and ca rry ou t n o is e m e a s u r e m e n ts a n d a n a ly s e the self t h e ir in h ib it io n on m a r in e g r o w t h a n d noise o f ships.

d e v e lo p m e n t o f d u a l p u r p o s e s y s te m s fo r N o is e r a n g in g , s e lf - n o is e m e a s u r e m e n t s and inhibition o f corrosion and fouling.

airborne n oise m ea su rem en ts w e r e ca rrie d out on the Pety a s, th e L e a n d e rs a n d th e e a r lie r B rah m a p u tra In 1972, the initial charter o f duties w as modified: class frigates:

•

U n derw ater detection studies w ere deleted since

•

T h e a ir b o r n e n o is e m e a s u r e m e n t s g a v e an these w ere already being carried out by NPOL.

in d ica tion o f th e h a b ita b ility c o n d itio n s in ships

•

T h e M a te ria l and M a rin e B io lo g y d iv is io n w a s c o m p a r tm e n ts a n d a c c o r d in g ly , n o is e -d o s a g e shifted to the NCML, Bombay.

recom m endations w e re g iven .

However, in view o f the im portance o f establishing

•

T h e rad iated n oise an d s e lf n o is e m easu rem ents in d ig e n o u s e q u iv a le n t s fo r R u s s ia n o ils a n d w e r e

r e c o r d e d

a n d

a n a l y s e d

and

lu brican ts, a fu ll fledged laboratory w as established recom m en dation s m a d e to im p ro v e m aintenance u n d e r th e d ir e c t c o n tro l o f th e N a va l D ock y a rd at rou tines and m a ch in ery o p e ra tin g reg im es and to V isakh apatnam . In subsequent years, this laboratory adopt noise red u ction tech n iqu es.

g rew into a la b o ra to ry o f rep u te and m et the N avy’s

•

P e r fo r m a n c e e v a lu a t io n s w e r e u n d e r t a k e n of re q u ir e m e n ts in th e fie ld o f m a teria l sc ien c es and noise red u ction sy stem s lik e th e L e a n d e r s Agouti stu dies on vib ration in 'sh ip s etc.

sy s te m an d th e B r a h m a p u tr a c la s s c o n tro lle d In 1973, th e N S T L ’s c h a rte r w a s rev ised a ga in Pitch Propellors(C PP).

and becam e:

•

A c o m m itte e w a s a p p o in te d to r e c o m m e n d the

•

U n derw ater w eapons

site for a p erm a n en t n oise ran ge.

•

U n derw ater test ranges

•

N oise and vib ration studies

V

i b

r a

t i o

n

M

e a

s u

r e

m

e n

t s o

f M

a

c h

i n

e

r y

o

n

B

o a

r d

•

Stu dies on u nderw ater explosion

S

h

i p

s

•

E lectrical and m echanical m achinery

T h e vibration sign a tu res o f P ety a s a n d L ea n d ers were

•

O th e r m a jo r R & D p ro b lem s p e rta in in g to the m easured. A n alysis o f th ese m e a s u re m e n ts enabled.

Navy. T h e Laboratory w as equipped w ith facilities

fo r e v a lu a t io n o f d a t a r e q u ir e d fo r w a r s h ip

•

Preparation o f a d a ta b a n k o f b a s e -lin e vibration d e s ig n , h y d r o d y n a m ic a n d h y d r o b a llis t ic signatures.

stu dies and hydrofoils.

•

F o r m u la tio n o f c r it e r ia fo r a c c e p ta n c e of

•

S t u d y o n p e r fo r m a n c e o f w e a r o f m a r in e machinery on new construction ships.

propulsion en gin es under fuels and lubricants of

•

Life extension s for m a in p ro p u ls io n g a s turbines.

d ifferen t specifications.

•

F a u lt d ia g n o s is on m a c h in e r y h a v in g s p e c ific

•

S c i e n t i f i c s u p p o r t to th e E a s t e r n N a v a l problem s.

C om m and.

•

Recording on the shop floor o f base-line levels of

new machinery.

T h e m a jo r s t u d ie s c a r r ie d o u t b y th e N S T L

•

Initiation o f techniques for condition m onitoring

b etw een 1969 and 1975 w ere as follows:

o f machinery.

N

o

i s

e

R

a

n

g

i n

g

a

n

d

S

e

l f N

o

i s

e

M

e

a

s

u

r e

m

e

n

t

T h ese stu d ies h elp ed n o t on ly to p in -p o in t faults S

t u

d

i e s

b u t a ls o to a s s e s s t h e h e a lt h o f m a c h in e r y an d T h e n eed h a d in c r e a s in g ly b e en fe lt to u n d e rta k e thereby forestall failu res. T h is p ro je c t b e ca m e a fo ren o is e r a n g in g o f t h e n e w ly in d u c t e d s h ip s a n d ru n ner to later vib ra tio n m ea su rem en t stu dies.

340/TRANSITIQN TO TRIUMPH

«

o a a u s s i n g R

a

n

g

e

f o

r

M

i n

e

S

w

e e p e r s

A breakthrough was achieved by successfully

in s tr u m e n t a t io n a n d s tru c tu ra l frame-work instrumenting a torpedo for evaluating the torpedo

Al1 the m in e s w e e p e r d e g a u s s in g ran ge w as designed decoy developed by the NPOL. Cochin. The towed

for d e v e lo p e d in d ig e n o u s ly . T h e ran ge was installed decoy was a “Controllable Noise Maker"(CNM). To

M iddle G r o u n d a t B o m b a y an d a trial ship, INS

determine its effectiveness to seduce a torpedo, it was w aK IN A D A . w a s r a n g e d .

H o w e v e r , du e to ocean

necessary to record the torpedo's underwater track.

*< r,re rin £ p r o b l e m s a n d s h o r tc o m in g s in NSTL scientists designed a digital recorder which

eng

c a b le t e c h n o lo g y , th e stru ctu re of the optic

opti al

c ly

al

ly p

ic

p ked

ick

ed oi

o l

ff th

e

th

e tr

ac

tr k

ac

k infor

ma

infor

tion

ma

f

tion ror

frotm the

un erw ^

^

an(j w a te r ingressed into the cable

torpedo s course-keeping gyro, converting it into

rang ections

T h e p r o je c t y ie ld e d im portant lessons

di

ug

i i

gta

u l

ai d

a

u t

a a

i

a a

n

a d

n

ar ec

re o

c r

o d

r i

an

i g

n

gi t

1 o

1 n

o

na

at a

t p

a e

p

er e

r c

e o

c r

o d

r e

a r

e .r. The

data, when played back, enabled a complete

foTthe s e tt in g u p o f fu t u r e D G ra n g e s and the DG

evaluation, not only of the torpedo but also of the

ranging o f sh ips.

CNM. With this track recorder, it became possible to

understand all aspects of torpedo dynamics and the

U

n d

e r w

a

t e r S

h

o

c k

S

t u

d

i e

s

performance parameters of torpedo sub-systems.

The p r o t e c t i o n o f t h e h u l l s o f o w n sh ip s and This marked the beginning of a multipronged-submarines a g a in s t en e m y u n derw a ter weapons and multidisciplinaiy approach. Artificial targets were

the effectiven ess o f o w n u n d e rw a te r weapons against successfully developed to evaluate torpedo firing

the h u lls o f e n e m y s h ip s a n d su b m a rin es require k n o w le d g e o f u n d e r w a t e r e x p lo s io n s and their

^

What started in 1973 as a project to develop a

damage p o te n tia l. B e in g se n sitive and classified^ no simple track recorder for recording a torpedo s track

data w as a va ila b le . N S T L took up this stu y in

•

eventually enabled scientists to confidently take up

T h e

l a b o r a t o r y

s t u d y

e s ta b lis h e d

the

projects to enhance the capability of torpedoes m

experimental fa c ilitie s to cre a te scaled explosions, e

naval inventory.

in s tru m e n ta tio n to r e c o r d a n d a n alyse shoe a^

General Research and Development

and u n d e rs ta n d t h e d a m a g e lik e ly to be cause hulls, m a c h in e r y a n d e q u ip m e n t b y un e[ w a f^

« . - ' S

S

S

S

shock p ro p a g a tio n . T h is stu d y laid the foun a ion 1 9 6 9 .

was redesignated as the

control of NPOL and

esta b lish in g th e e x te n s iv e fa c ilitie s for su seque The technical and ad

newly appointed

studies.

Im p r o v e m e n ts t o T o r p e d o e s

>n th e e a r l y

1 9 7 0 ’ s, n e it h e r e x p e r tis e nor

DRDW „h

s y n e ' r p

in fra s tr u c tu r e w a s a v a ila b le e ith e r to r^ c e ^ _

develop to rp e d o e s .

N S T L concentrated there

^

se

im proving th e c a p a b ility o f th e existing n 1S

Project

and R u ssian to rp e d o e s .

.

the

Year

Day and Night

in i t i a l e f f o r t f o c u s s e d o n d e v e lo p in g ^

(al D ev elo p m en t of

1968

instru m e n ta tio n fo r t e s tin g critica l param Distress Signal

test th e e x t e r n a l p r e s s u r e . N S T L

autoclave c h a m b e r to t e s t su b-system s/

(b) Devel0Pemn^

0 kg/cm sq.

, j.

P rojects s u c c e s s fu lly com p leted inc u

g

s

s

s

a

®

-

-

•

t

in tro d u cin g

(c)

i n c r e a s i n g t o r p e d o r a n g e by

arm am ents.

r e d u c e d c h a r g e

Oevelopms

^

guns

addition al b o ttles .

. _ in nlace of

(d)

S u b s titu tin g a n o il h y d ra u lic system propellant

.n d ica U n g la c q u e r to

,

^ e P n e u m a tic sy stem .

do batteries,

(a) a vd d “cook o f f in rapid fire Russian

the d e v e lo p m e n t o f in d igen ou s torp . p rag Disc 1969

T o te s t th e s e in d ig e n o u s batteries, in the

guns

reco n d itio n in g ra d io

test fa c ilit y w a s s e t u p to test a

inValuable

J ^ t ic c o n d itio n . T h is fa cility prov

motors.

^ S m O N T O T B U M W / 34'

0r testin g b a tte rie s an d contra-ro a

th ereb y ex ten d in g the service life o f

c o m p o s i t i o n

g a v e

s a t i s f y

la rg e q u a n titie s o f th ese ex p e n s iv e p e rfo rm a n c e on s h ip h u lls

y

fuzes.

(c) A e r o m e d i c a l

C e ll

R n n „ ,

(c) M o d ific a t io n o f a p r o o f c r a d le fo r develop ed :

a n galore

fit t in g a 4 .5 " g u n in a 4 .7 " g u n (i) A lig h t w e i g h t s t r e t c h e r which m ou n tin g for use at the new V T fuze

c o u ld b e in s ta lle d in all tynes nf

ran ge at B alasore, th ereb y a void in g

a ir c r a f t , h e lic o p t e r s an d moto

the im port o f a com plete 4.5’’ gun and

a m b u la n c es.

mounting.

(ii) P r o t e c t i v e h e l m e t s d o n n ed bv (d) E n gin eer-in -C h iefs branch. Design

a i r c r e w f o r p r o t e c t i o n against

and construction o f a V T fuze range at

s h o c k a n d p e n e t r a t io n during

Balasore w ith the assistance o f DRDO

a irc ra ft a ccid en ts.

laboratories.

1975

(a) T h e

D e f e n c e

F o o d

Research

(e) Design and developm ent o f a naval V T

La b ora tory , M y s o re developed.

fu z e in c o o r d in a t io n w ith D R D O

(i) A n i n d i g e n o u s c o n t a in e r for Laboratories.

1970

A c c e le r a t e d F r e e z e D ried Meat,

(a) D es ig n an d p ro d u c tio n o f R u ss ia n w h i c h g a v e a s h e l f life of 9

76.2 mm ammunition.

m on th s.

(b) D es ig n and p ro d u c tio n o f R u ss ia n anti subm arine rockets.

(ii) A n a u t o m a t i c c h a p a t i making

m a c h in e w h ic h r o lle d ou t fully

(c) D e s ig n o f c h a f f r o c k e ts and th e ir launchers

ba k ed c h a p a tie s a t th e rate of 20

(d) Design o f radio proxim ity V T fuzes for

p e r m in u t e .

T h e m achine

anti aircraft gun amm unition

c o n s is t e d o f tw o u n its , one for

(e) D esign o f a cco u stic p rox im ity fu zes

d o u g h m a k in g a n d kn eading and

for anti subm arine rockets.

th e o th e r fo r r o llin g , b a k in g and

1973

(a) Im proved an ten n a design to provide

p u ffin g.

high radiation efficiency.

(b) T h e N C M L B o m b a y developed.

(b) Im p roved a m p lifiers to in crea se the

(i)

P a in ts b a s e d o n s o d iu m silicate

range perform ance o f radars.

w h ic h u s e d w a t e r a s solven t and

(c) A c o a l- t a r e p o x y c o m p o s it io n as did n o t c re a te fire hazards. These

p a in ts r e p la c e d th e ep o x y based

Ml Z T f S ? . COating for bilSes o f ships.

(d) R ig id PVC p ip in g fo r s e a -w a te r on c o m p o s itio n s b e in g u sed by ships

board sh ips w as found to w ith stan d

for p a in tin g fu el tanks.

(ii) A lu m in iu m a llo y a n o d e s based on

-

Chtr

al ‘ J ^ n a t t o n . degradation

a n d th e rm a l s h o c k s w ith in lim its .

i n d i g e n o u s

h ig h

pu rity

I he piping w as recom m ended fo r use

a lu m in iu m . T h e s e a n o d e s , in

in sm all craft.

v a r io u s d e s ig n s , w e r e fitte d in

s h ip s fo r c a t h o d i c p ro te c tio n -

(6) ' " t i f w n0USly d e v e I° P e d a n o d e s for c a t h o d ic p r o t e c t io n to s h ip s an d C a th o d ic p ro te c tio n to ships and

su bm erged stru ctu res w e r e found to

su b m e rg e d stru c tu re s in the Navy

g iv e p r o te c tio n fo r a lo n g e r p e rio d b r o u g h t a b o u t an a n n u a l saving

1974

than the imported zinc anodes

o f Rs 25 lacs.

(a) A n t,-c o c k ro a c h la cq u e rs / p a in ts fo r (iii) A s o lven tle ss ep o x y com pound f°r

u se a g a in s t co ck ro a ch es in g a lle y s

p ro te c tio n o f p ilin g an d ofi-shore

p a n tr.es and livin g sp aces

^

s t r u c t u r e s .

T h e c o a t in g dried

ships. User trials indicated that these

q u i c k l y a n d

w a s

fo u n d t0

a c q u e rs / p a in ts w ere v e ry e ffe c tiv e w i t h s t a n d t h e m o s t r ig o r o u s

against cockroaches for

„

c o n d itio n s o f s p la s h a n d adhere

(b) N C M L d e v e lo p e d a sh op p rim e r for firm ly on w et su rfa ces.

,

a p p lic a tio n on the steel p fa te T u s e d

(c)

T h e T e x tile an d S to re s R esearch an

fo r c o n s t r u c t io n o f s h i^ s

tT c

D ev elo p m en t E s ta b lis h m en t. Kanpu

d e v e lo p e d w a t e r p r o o f sm ocks an

tro u s e rs fro m in d ig e n o u s m ateria s

342/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

T h e s e w e r e fo u n d su itable on board

su b m a rin e s .

m 5 a y UniSeleCt° r0fASTrRaclar

(d) T h e

D e f e n c e In s t it u t e o f Fire

Ocean Studies

1970

1976

R e s e a r c h , N e w D e lh i, developed

Reverberat ion and Propagation

in d ig e n o u s foam liquid to replace the

studies

1972

1984

i m p o r t e d

fo a m liq u id . It was

s u c c e s s fu lly tried out in a submarine.

Oceanographic Research

(e) T h e R e s e a r c h a n d D evelop m en t

E s t a b lis h m e n t (E n g in eers ), Pune,

1953

d e s i g n e d a s in g le -c o m p a r tm e n t

Oceanographic research commenced in 1 9 5 3 by:

s u r fa c e -ty p e recom pression chamber

f o r d i v e r s . T h e c h a m b e r could

•

Systematising

the

accumulation

of

a c c o m m o d a t e 8 m en at a time and

bathythermograph data

h a d a w o rk in g pressure upto 100 psi.

•

Survey ship INVESTIGATOR taking samples at

depths as far down as 1000 fathoms.

1975

•

Naval ships taking naval scientific personnel and

Andhra University personnel and students to sea

By 1 9 7 5 , N H Q h a d fo r m u la t e d its lon g term on a number of oceanographical cruises.

req u irem en ts in th e fo rm o f a M issile Plan, a Radar In 1960. the flag ship of Soviet Oceanographic

Plan, a S o n a r P la n , a n d an EW Plan to enable these to Research, the VITIAZ, visited Cochin. INPL scientists

be d o v e ta ile d w h e r e v e r p o s s ib le w ith the long term visited the ship’s 13 laboratories and one scientist

plans o f th e o th e r services.

participated in an oceanographic cruise.

T h e A S W c o m p u te r fo r th e 5th and 6th Leanders and th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f o n -b o a rd sim ulators were 1962

entrusted to th e D e p a rtm e n t o f Electronics.

By en d 1975:

International Indian Ocean Expedition

In recognition of the importance of Oceanographic

•

In d ig e n o u s S o n o b u o y s , so n ic ray plotters and Research in the Indian Ocean, it was decided that the

e x p e n d a b le b a t h y t h e ir o g r a p h s (XBTs) were Indian Navy will take part as a major participant in

en terin g service .

the International Oceanographic Expedition in Indian

*

T ria ls o f c o n tr o lla b le noisem aker torpedo decoys Dcpan scheduled for 1962-64.

and th e m o d ifie d S o n a r 170 were in progress.

The main tasks allocated to India within the

framework o f this expedition were:

Projects Started in 1 9 6 5-75 but C om pleted

.

Participation by INS K1STNA. a frigate sp ecia lly

A fter 1975

r

L O cean ic R esearch to th e e x te n t o f 6

Operational Projects

1

Started

Completed

nths in each year in 1962 and 1963.

months '■

*

[ q{ radi0 com m u n ication to

In d igen ou s E x P e n d a b le B a th y

•

the vessels taking part in this expedition in the

^ n erm ogra p h s (X B T )

1971

19/J

Indian Ocean Area.

^

f a c i m i e s t0

£ lver H eld S o n a r

1965

1976

owed T o rp e d o D e c o y C o n tro lla b le 1965

1977

.

p r o v id e a ss

wRhin indian ports.

Noise Maker

Sonic Ray p a t t e r

1969

1976

.

“ N”

' u b o r ,"

“ “

edium Range Sonar for Frigates 1974

J9

and Cochin

Scientists for participation

Pll°t Production of Sonobuoys

1967

1977

.

Make ava.lab

g and a(loat

SuPport for Naval Operations:

High^n11^ 6 ^°r Minesweepers

1 9 6 8

19

p'n, . ressure Underwater Testing

q77

-h it,tie s w it h in th e o v e r a ll

jr ^ ip m e n t

1969

19//

>ndir

rMn

Pr

waters near the coast of India.

Pair and Calibration of

,q7 6

framework lay §

C J

d intensive investigations on

^gn etostrictive Transducers

1970

1976

both East anri WeS jfand super.Jacent waters. The

ra*ning Projects

Started

Completed

the continental sn

s ubmIn^eCtor P r o c e d u re T e a c h e r

1967

j 9^

,'RANSITION TO TRIUMPH/343

marine Echo Classifier

1 9 6 7

O c e a n E x p e d it io n . E le v e n c r u i s e s c o v e r in g 25i m axim u m lim its o f the area o f Indian respon sibility s ta tio n s w e r e c o m p le t e d a n d o c e a n o g r a p h ic data w e r e th e A r a b ia n S ea a b o v e th e E q u a to r w ith 6

collected at va riou s depths.

degrees lon gitu d e as the w estern boundary and the Sum atra Coast along w ith the Andam an and Nicobar

1964

Islands as the eastern boundary. Some cruises were

m ade to south o f the Equator up to 12 degrees south.

K IS T N A p a r tic ip a te d in s ix o c e a n o g r a p h ic cruises.

Sim ilarly, cru ises w ere undertaken to the east coast T e n s u b m a r in e c a n y o n s w e r e lo c a t e d on th e east o f A frica w h ere im portant oceanic currents originate coast o f India.

and w h ich have a bearin g on the coastal circulation on the northw est coast o f India.

1965

T h e In d ia n p ro g ra m m e in c lu d ed o b s e rv a tio n s and c a lc u la tio n s o f en erg y flu x b etw een the ocean K IS T N A p a r t ic ip a t e d in s ix c r u is e s fo r co lle c tin g and the atm osphere. Studies w ere also to be m ade o f h y d rog ra p h ic an d b a th y m e tr ic d a ta . In tw o cruises, sun. sk y and a tm osp h eric rad iations: air pressu re, sh e c o lla b o ra te d w ith th e G e r m a n R e s e a r c h Vessel te m p e r a tu r e a n d h u m id ity a t d eck le v e l: s u r fa c e M E T E O R in s e is m ic r e fr a c t io n e x p e r im e n t s in the tem perature o f the sun: near surface current: waves: Gulfs o f C am bay an d K u tch.

sw ells: tide: rain fall: evaporation profiles o f w et and dry bulbs and w ind above sea surface.

1966

In dia w a s rep resen ted in the exped ition by four vessels:

In 1966. the ocea n og ra p h ic d a ta c o lle c te d du ring the 1965 e x p e d itio n w a s c o m p ile d . T h e d a t a from the

•

I N

S

K

I S

T N

A

.

T h e sh ip w a s fitte d ou t w ith the

seism ic su rveys ca rried o u t b y K IS T N A an d METEOR

requ isite scientific instrum ents and equipm ent to

w as processed.

cope w ith the requ irem en ts o f the va riou s tasks allocated to India.

T h e N a t io n a l I n s t it u t e o f O c e a n o g r a p h y was

•

established in 1966.

R

V

V

A

R

U

N

A

,

a s u r v e y v e s s e l o f th e In d o -

N orw egian Fisheries Project. Kerala.

•

1972

B

a n g a c l a . a fis h e r ie s ve ssel.

•

C

o n c h , a r e s e a rc h v e s s e l o f th e K erala U n ive rs ity.

A c o m m it te e u n d e r t h e S c i e n t i f i c A d v is e r to the A tota l o f 20 sh ip s from the fo llow in g cou n tries D efen c e M in is te r r e c o m m e n d e d th e fo rm a tio n o f a participated in the expedition:

n a tio n a l b o d y fo r o c e a n o g r a p h y . T h e r e a f t e r the D e p a r t m e n t o f S c ie n c e a n d T e c h n o l o g y w a s to A u s t r a li a . F r a n c e . In d ia . In d o n e s ia , Is r a e l, prepare a paper for C a b in et a p p ro v a l. It took several Japan. Norway. Portugal. Pakistan. South Africa.

y ea rs to so rt ou t th e d e ta ils . T h e ir p r o p o s a l for the B rita in . R u s s ia . Z a n z ib a r and W est G erm a n y .

f o r m a t i o n o f a n O c e a n S c ie n c e a n d T e c h n o l o g y T h e U S A a n d R u s s ia b e tw e e n th e m h a d th e A g e n c y e v e n t u a l ly e n d e d u p b e i n g t h e p r e s e n t largest contin gents o f ships.

D epartm ent o f O cean D ev elo p m en t in 1981.

From these cruises, the Navy hoped to obtain:

1973

•

Up to date seasonal sonar charts o f our seas.

M

ONEX 73.

•

Data on sea/sw ell in the open ocean.

In collaboration with Russia, the India

•

B o tto m c o n t o u r c h a r t s o f th e o c e a n fo r M e te o r o lo g ic a l Departm ent organised Monsoon su bm arine navigation.

Experiment 1973.

In the 1962 cru ise, va lu a b le data w as collected Oceanographic Expedition Decem

ber 1973

r e la tin g to th e p r o p a g a tio n o f sou n d th ro u g h sea A major step taken for the exploitation ot the w ater, m e a s u re m e n t o f tides, w a v es and cu rren ts, country’s resources in the continental shelf was t e the m orphology o f the sea bed etc.

commencement

of the

multi

discipH nary

Oceanographic Expedition in D e c 7 3 .

T h e

1963

institutions which took part in the expedition were.

K IS T N A , co m m e n ce d stu d y cru is e s in a c c o rd a n c e

•

N a t io n a l G e o p h y s ic a l R e s e a r c h I n s t it u t e .

w ith th e p r o g r a m m e fo r th e In te r n a tio n a l In d ia n H yderabad.

•

National Institu te o f O cean ogra p h y. Panaji*

3 4 4 / T R A N S IT IO N T O T R IU M P H

Z oological S u r v e y o f India, Calcutta.

G eological S u r v e y o f India. Calcutta.

Oil and N a tu ra l G a s C om m ission, Dehradun.

processed^the^Eml37111116

data C° " ected was

Indian M e te o ro lo g ic a l Departm ent, New Delhi.

F o r e c a S i^ a t 11 Z

t

o

S

S

^

and

A tom ic E n e rg y D ep artm en t, New Delhi.

Dehradun a *

.

^

«

G u jara t F is h e rie s D ep artm en t, Ahmedabad.

Oceanographic Equipment for Survey Ships

Naval Oceanographic Program

m

e

Naval Headquarters proposed to the Government the

Between O ct 73 a n d J u n 74, Su rvey Ship DARSHAK

provision of oceanographic equipment for the two

existing survey ships. This would help them in

u n d e rto o k a n e x t e n s iv e o c e a n o g ra p h ic expedition carrying out bathymetric, geological and geophysical

from Goa to th e G u lf o f Om an, covering a coastal belt surveys, measurement o f ocean currents, the

up to a d i s t a n c e o f 2 0 0 m ile s o ffs h o re . Several compilation of temperature,

salinity and

h u n d r e d b e t h y t h e r m o g r a p h o b s e r v a tio n s were meteorological data, and a limited study of marine

obtained on a 15 m ile grid supported by temperature, biology, all of which had deep operational

salinity a n d d e p th p r o b e s as w ell as reversing water implications.

bottle o b s e r v a tio n s o f th e e n tire w ater column. This enabled c o n s tr u c tio n o f th e sound velocity structure 1975

m o d e l o f t h i s a r e a a n d p r o v id e d b a sic data for Oceanographic Forecasting

p la n n in g f u t u r e t i m e - s e r i e s s tu d ie s o f selected stations e s s e n tia l fo r th e pu rp oses o f predicting the In 1975, Oceanographic forecasting was made the

behaviour p a tte rn o f th erm a l layers.

responsibility of the Meteorological officers in the

In d ia n O c e a n d a t a r e c e iv e d from the National Navy. To begin with, one meteorological officer was

O cea n o g ra p h ic D a ta C en tre, W ashington, as well as trained in th the basic principles of oceanographic

d a ta h e ld b y t h e N I O , s u p p le m e n te d the Naval forecasting and data processing.

TRANSITION lO TRIUMPH/345

2 6

T h e In d ige n isa tio n o f N av al S to re s and Equipment Evolution of DQA (N) and D^A (WP)

D ocks, th e d e cis io n w a s a ls o ta k e n to progressively in d ige n ise ail e q u ip m e n t to b e fitte d in th e frigates.

A t the tim e o f Independence in 1947, all ships o f the T h is ra p id ly in c re a s e d th e in d ig e n is a t io n workload In d ia n N avy w e re o f B ritish origin . A lm o st all the and led to th e c re a tio n o f a s e p a r a t e D irec to ra te for m a c h in e ry , e q u ip m e n t, sp a re s and even com m on user stores w ere im ported from Britain. Meanwhile, th e in d ig e n is a tio n a n d in s p e c tio n o f eq u ip m e n t for a ft e r th e S e c o n d W o rld W ar, th e w o r k lo a d o f th e w a r s h ip p r o d u c t io n . In 1 9 6 8 , t h e D D I(M S ) was bifurcated into:

In d ia n O rd n a n ce F actories had reduced d rastically and they had substantial idle capacity.

•

D ire c to ra te o f P r o d u c tio n a n d In s p e c tio n , Navy In 1953, a sm all cell w as created under the then (DPI(N)) - for ex istin g sh ip s

C aptain Su perin tendent Naval Dockyard (Bombay) to

•

D irectorate o f W a rsh ip P ro d u c tio n (D W P ) - for new id e n tify th e item s w h ich co u ld be prod u ced in the construction ships.

O rdnance Factories or by Indian industiy..

In 1955, to b o o s t th e in d ig e n is a tio n effort, an It s o o n b e c a m e e v i d e n t t h a t t h e s e two in d ep en d en t D irectora te o f Stores Production (DSP) D irectorates w ere h a n d lin g s im ila r item s, resulting in w as created, w ith cells at Bom bay and Calcutta The d u p lic a t io n o f e ffo r t . In 1 9 7 5 , it w a s d e c id e d to D SP fu nction ed u nder NHQ.

reorgan ise the D W P an d D P I(N ) in to th e Engineering In 1959, th e a d m in is tra tiv e co n trol o f the DSP

and E lectrical d is cip lin es . D u rin g th e firs t phase of w a s p a s s e d to th e C o n t r o lle r G e n e ra l o f D efen c e t is reo rg a n isa tio n , o n ly W e s te r n o r ig in equ ipm ent Production (CGDP).

w as taken up and the ro le o f th e tw o directorates was A ft e r C h in a ’s a tta c k in 1962, a Department of redefined as follows:

D efence

Production & Supplies was created in the

D e fe n ce - T h e C G D F s functions were

D W P - To deal w ith M a rin e E n g in e e rin g and Hull e q u ip m e n t , i n c l u d i n g a s s o c i a t e d e le c t r ic a l S

S

th e n ern the p reCt0r General

inspection

(D G I) th e D e fe n c e R e s e a rc h and D e v e l o p m e n t m achinery.

Organ.sati°n (DRDO) and the Ordnance Factories

u;PI (N ) " T ° d e a l w it h E le c t r ic a l/ E le c t r o n ic /

T h e D SP w as placed under the DGI.

c a p o n e q u ip m e n t , t h e i r s p a r e s a n d Naval otores.

o f

19i64’ 016 DSP WaS redesignated as Directorate

o f D e v e lo p m e n t & In s p e c tio n . M a rin e s in r PC

D uring Phase II ol the reo rg a n isa tio n in 1983: (D D I(M S)). In addition to indigenisation, its role was expanded to include:

as

T h e in d ig e n is a tio n o f R u s s ia n o r ig in e q u i p m e n t

•

T h S •* urcat-ed 011 the a b ove lines.

'

S S e f

S “

led

e in s p e c tio n e s t a b lis h m e n t s w e r e s im ila rly

.

^ P o s itio n e d u nder D W P and D PI(N ).

•

Vetting of Annual Review Demands(ARDs) and

w as in ten d ed to p la c e D W P a n d D P I(N ) under

•

Inspection of indigenised stores.

one ead, the A ddl DGI (N avy) an d ration a lise the field units.

Prior to this, the inspection of indigenous sinmc

Com

rf d0I1Q ^ thC S

urvey°r of Stores under the

*10wever he im p lem en ted .

Bombay

6

" » » « ! D o c k y ,

C on trol r j ' !

DGI w a s d e s i g n a t e d as th e Director

The indigenisation of equinment nr,,i .

n w n

Q u allty A ssu ra n ce (D G Q A ). T h e D PI(N ) a n d received a major impetus when, a lo n g w i t i T i f A s«.n rrCre^ edeSignated as D ire c to ra te o f Quality Assu ran ce (Naval) D Q A (N ). an d D irec to ra te of Quality decision to build Leander class frigates in M atgon f e s n ^ r n i e

(W a r s h iP

P r o d u c t i o n )

D Q A (W P ).

!vc. y, u nder the M in istry o f D efen ce.

27

T h e In tern ation al Law of The Sea and

In d ia n Maritime Legislation

Developm ents till 1965

Several other developments were also taking

Over the c e n t u r ie s th e in te r n a tio n a l law o f the sea place. The USA and the Soviet Union were unable to

had c o m e to b e b a s e d o n th e b a s ic p rin c ip le of agree on the width of territorial waters - the Soviet

Union wanted twelve miles whilst the USA wanted

freedom o f t h e s e a s ” . B e y o n d the narrow coastal only three miles. Technological developments in the

strip o f t e r r it o r ia l w a t e r s , th e sea s could be freely industrialised West began to make it possible to

used by a ll n a t io n s fo r fis h in g and for navigation.

extract oil and gas from the seabed. The newly

C oastal s t a t e s u s e d to b e c o n te n t w ith exclusive independent nations of Asia and Africa began to feel

rights in th eir n a r ro w b e lt o f territorial waters.

that the International Law of the Sea would be

The d is c o v e ry o f p e tro le u m and natural gas in the exploited to their disadvantage. To sort out all these shallow w a te rs o f th e co n tin en ta l sh elf led the United matters, the first United Nations Conference on the

States to is s u e t h e T r u m a n P roclam a tio n in 1945, Law of the Sea (UNCLOS-1) was convened in 1958.

which cla im ed s o v e r e ig n rig h ts over the resources of t e con tin en tal s h e lf a d ja c e n t to its coast. Around the UNCLOS 1 -1 9 5 8

same time, co a s ta l s ta te s fou nd that the fishingareas UNCLOS 1 was able to codify the traditional law. It

near th eir c o a s ts w e r e b e in g poached by larger and a d o p te d w h a t cam e to be k n ow n as th e Geneva etter eq u ip p ed fis h in g sh ip s o f distant foreign states.

C o n v e n tio n s on th e Law o f th e Sea. The fo u r

° t h t h e s e d e v e l o p m e n t s , c o m b in e d w ith the Conventions were:

e m e rg e n ce o f n e w ly in d e p e n d e n t sta tes after the

•

the freedom of the seas as long conceived.

^ co lo n isa tio n o f A s ia a n d A frica , led to a spate of

.

the sovereignty o f coastal states in the territorial

ni a te ra l c la im s b y th e c o a s ta l sta te s to extend a ional ju r is d ic tio n o v e r la rge adjacent sea areas to

.

the a n cilla ry physical, custom s, s a n ita ry and Protect their fishery resources,

im m ig ra tio n r ig h ts o f c o a s ta l s t a t e s in a bp

n a ^ a iriing independence in 1947, India had Contiguous Zone.

of th Content to proclaim the traditional territorial sea

•

ree m>les. In view of the above developments.

*a is s u e d fo u r p resid en tial notifications to r

accr „ “

.

^

saleguard its interests:

° n 3 0 A u g u st 1 9 5 5 , India claimed full and g£lSThe UNCLOS 1 participants rem ained divided on E lu siv e sovereign rights over the seabed and several issues: subsoil of the contin ental s h e l f adjoining the u

-IM S o f co alition s o f coastal sta tes, lan d

°a st but b eyon d territorial waters. Neither

e

*

V a Sates and archipelagic states.

locked states a

sted the righ ts o f p a s s a g e

ePth nor the distance from the coastline wa

.

C ertain state

^

international navigation

,

l n d ic a t e d .

through straits

G ib r a U a r , H o r m u z a n d

2 2 M arch 1 9 5 6 , India c l a i m e d Territorial lik e the S tr a its o>

•

aters 0f six miles from appropriate baselines.

2 9 N o v e m b e r 1 9 5 6 , In d ia

MalaCC3' ^ mineral producers tried to carve out

c l a i m e d

a

.

Land based m in e n u ^ as ^ e y could o f the new ly o n ^ u ^ 011 Z o n e fo r fisheries up to a dis; a

^

ter5

U nc* e r e d m ile s fr o m th e o u te r

•

^ m to r ia l w aters

Zone D ecern b er 1956, In dia claimed a C ontiguous

U NCLO S 1 com pletely failed to agree on:

T

h

e S

e a

b

e d

C

o

m

m

i t t e

e

D u rin g th e 1 9 60 s p o litic a l, te c h n o lo g ic a l, econonv

•

T h e p r e c is e w id th o f th e T e r r ito r ia l S ea (th ree a n d n a v a l d e v e l o p m e n t s b e g a n to c h a n g e the m ile s o r t w e lv e m ile s ) a n d t h e e x te n t o f th e s i t u a t io n .

A d v a n c e s in s e a b e d exploitation

Exclusive Fisheries Zone.

t e c h n o lo g y m a d e it p o s s ib l e to e x p lo it the seabed

•

Th e prior authorisation and/or notification o f the

m u ch b eyon d a d e p th o f tw o h u n d re d m etres, thereby p a s s a g e o f fo r e i g n w a r s h ip s t h r o u g h t h e r e n d e r in g th e 1 9 5 8 C o n v e n t io n s o u tm o d e d . The territorial sea o f a coastal state.

dep loym en t o f s u b m a rin e la u n c h e d b a llistic missiles T h e S e c o n d C o n fe r e n c e , U N C L O S 2. w a s a n d w o r ld w id e a p p r e h e n s i o n s o f a com p etitive therefore convened in 1960 to resolve these issues.

s c r a m b le to a c h ie v e p r e d o m in a n t c o n tr o l over the seabed led th e U n ite d N a tio n s to d is c u s s the need to U

N

C

L O

S 2 - 1

9 6

0

evolve m e a n s fo r th e p e a c e fu l u s e o f th e oceans. In U N C L O S -2 a tte m p te d to ex ten d th e ju ris d ic tio n o f 1968, t h e U N G e n e r a l A s s e m b ly c o n s titu te d a 42

coastal states over territorial w aters to six miles, with m em ber “S eab ed C o m m itte e ” o n th e peaceful use of an additional six m iles as an Exclusive Fishing Zone.

the seabed.

T h is failed to gain the required tw o thirds m ajority for In D e c e m b e r 1 9 7 0 , t h e G e n e r a l A ssem bly its acceptance.

adopted th e “ D eclara tio n o f P r in c ip le s ” governing the A fte r U N C L O S 2 failed to a ch ieve a greem en t on S e a b e d , th e o c e a n flo o r a n d t h e s u b s o il thereof, th e w id t h o f th e t e r r it o r ia l s e a , m a n y c o u n tr ie s b e y o n d th e lim it s o f n a t i o n a l j u r i s d i c t i o n . The u n ilaterally extended their offsh ore ju risdiction . Th e D e c la r a t io n s t a t e d t h a t t h e s e a r e a s a n d their S o u th A m e r ic a n c o u n tr ie s r e a ffirm e d th eir ea rlier resou rces a re the co m m o n h e r ita g e o f m an kind and c la im o f t h e i r t e r r i t o r i a l w a t e r s e x t e n d in g tw o s h a ll b e s u b je c t to a n i n t e r n a t i o n a l r e g im e as h u n d re d m ile s fro m th e co ast. A fr ic a n sta te s lik e established by an in tern a tio n a l treaty.

N igeria, C ongo. M a u ritiu s and G hana also extended th e ir t e r r ito r ia l s e a to d is ta n c e s m u c h b e y o n d 12

S

e a

b e d

M

i n

i n

g

miles.

India’s in t e r e s t in the m i n i n g o f p o ly m e ta llic nodu les fr o m the se ab ed d e r i v e d f r o m its lo n g t e r m s tra te g y P

a

s s a

g e o

f W

a

r s h

i p

s T

h

r o u

g

h

t h

e T

e

r r i t o

r i a

l S e a .

fo r m etals like nickel, cobalt, c o p p e r a n d m a n g a n e s e .

A t U N C L O S 1, In dia had proposed that the passage of In th e e a r ly 1 9 7 0 , t h e I n d ia n G o v e r n m e n t had fo r e ig n w a r s h ip s t h r o u g h th e t e r r it o r ia l se a o f a initiated a p rogra m m e o f s c ie n tific in v estig a tio n and c o a s t a l

s t a t e

s h o u ld

b e

s u b je c t to

p r io r

evaluation o f the m an gan ese n o d u le res o u rc es in the a u th o ritis a tio n and n o tifica tio n to th e coastal state.

Indian Ocean.

A s th is re q u ire m e n t w a s n ot accepted and th erefore n o t in c lu d e d in t h e 1 9 5 8 c o n v e n t io n s on th e O

f f s h

o r e O

i l a

n

d

G

a s

T e r r i t o r i a l S e a a n d th e C o n t ig u o u s Z o n e , In d ia By the early 1970’s, In dia had d is co v ered oil and gas d e c lin e d to r a tify a ll fo u r G en eva C o n v en tio n s . In in B o m b a y H ig h a n d p r o m is in g fie ld s w e r e being su b s eq u en t y ea rs, In dia resiled from this position. As fo r e c a s t in th e G o d a v a r i, K r is h n a a n d P a lk Bay a g ro w in g m a ritim e n a tio n in terested in the freedom basins, as also gas in th e A n d a m a n O ffshore.

o f n a v ig a tio n b o th fo r i t s e l f a n d th e in te r n a tio n a l W ith a v ie w to e s t a b l i s h a n e q u i t a b l e c o m m u n ity , In d ia s o u g h t o n ly p rio r n o tific a tio n for in tern a tio n a l re g im e fo r th e e x p lo it a t io n o f s e a b e d th e in n o c e n t p a s s a g e o f fo re ig n w a r s h ip s th ro u g h resou rces, th e UN G en era l A s s e m b ly c o n v e n e d t h e territorial w aters.

third conference. U NC LO S 3 in 1 9 7 3 .

D evelopm ents A fter 1965

U

N

C

L O

S 3 - 1 9 7 3 t o 1 9 8 2

It took UNCLOS 3 n l n e y e a r g 0 f d iscu sslo n s to a d o p t I n

d

i a

’ s E

x

t e

n

s

i o

n

o

f T

e

r r i t o

r i a

l W

a

t e r s

the United Nations C onvention on th e L aw o f the Sea On 12 S e p tem b e r 1967, In dia extended its territorial o n

p r il 198 2. Thereafter t h is c o n v e n t i o n took w aters to tw elve m iles. T h is w a s largely a reaction to t w e lv e y e a r s to f o r m a lly c o m e in t o f o r c e on 1 6

P a k is ta n ’s e x te n s io n o f h e r te r r ito r ia l w a te r s from N ovem ber 1984.

th ree to tw e lve m iles, ra th e r th an an a ct o f m aritim e U NCLO S 3 aim ed to define an agreed set o f rules policy.

to govern the use o f the seas w h ich w ou ld strike a fair balance between:

348/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

those w h o c o n s id e r e d th a t a coastal state should ju ris d ic tio n for certain specified economic

have no rig h t w h a ts o e v e r over the living resources activities.

o f the se a s b e y o n d a territoria l sea o f twelve miles

•

a Continental Shelf extending to the outer edge of

and

the continental margin, to be delimited with

•

o t h e r s w h o m a i n t a i n e d t h a t a c o a s ta l state reference to either three hundred and fifty-miles

sh ou ld h a v e fu ll o r lim ite d sovereign ty over the from the baselines o f territorial waters dr one

s e a a n d i t s r e s o u r c e s o u t to an E x clu sive hundred miles from the 2500 - meter isobath.

E xonom ic Z o n e o f tw o h u ndred nautical miles.

•

regimes for the abatement and control of marine

pollution, for marine scientific research, for the

T h e a c c e p t a n c e o f th is co n ce p t o f the Exclusive international seabed area and for unimpeded

Economic Z o n e (E E Z ) w a s a landm ark contribution of transit passage through straits used for

UNCLOS 3.

international navigation.

A t U N C L O S 3 , I n d i a ’s s ta n d w as th a t as a

•

The 1982 Convention included India as one of the

d e v e lo p in g c o u n t r y c e n t r a lly locatcd in the Indian four states named as “pioneer investor* for seabed

Ocean, w ith a c o a s tlin e o f over 6400 kilometers, its mining. On 17 August 1987. India became the

basic n a tio n al in te re s ts w ere:

first state to be so registered, after having fulfilled the criteria stipulated in the Convention.

•

T o o b t a i n a s s u r a n c e o f sm o o th and free n a v ig a tio n th o u g h tradition ally used waters and There were several areas where India s stand was

straits u sed fo r international navigation.

not accepted. The major ones were.

•

T o a c h ie v e a rc h ip e la g ic status for the Andaman

.

Pa ssa ge o f Warships Through the Territorial

an d N ic o b a r is la n d grou p and the Lakshadweep CgQ(

,

is la n d g r o u p w h ic h b etw een them, comprise There was vehement opposition from the USA and

over 1280 isla n d s and islets.

the Soviet Union to prior notification before

°

T o p r o t e c t e s s e n t i a l s t r a t e g ic and secu ri warships transited through territorial waters on

y

in terests in th e w aters around its coast.

the grounds that it would seriously jeopardise

•

T o se cu re th e free m obility o f naval wars ^

t h e i r strategic and security interests. There is

•

T o p r e s e r v e th e m a rin e environm en in

,

therefore n o provision in the 1982 UN Conven ion

on the Law of the Sea requiring prior notification

areas a d ja cen t to its coast, because

e c r

o f n a viga tion passed near its long coas

nr a u t h o r is a t io n f o r t h e p a s s a g e o f f o r e i g i

•

vnrships through the territorial w aters o f a

•

T o reg u la te w ith in its EEZ. the conduct of manne warship

£ ^

ig ? 7

pa k is ta n.

sc ien tific research by foreign agencies.

B a n gla d esh Sri L a n k a an d Burma (Myanmar) In d ia a d vo ca te d from the b a s e lin e s ^ f . j e s a nd L d a lu n ila t e r a lly prom u lgated th at p rio r fh n risation and n o tific a tio n w a s required for sea o f tw elve m iles, an EEZ o f two un

^e0j0gical

“he passage of foreign warships through their

a con tin en tal s h e lf to the outer edge

specific

c o n t in e n t a l m a r g in .

In d ia fa ®° notification for

[nd^aaritlrne^Zon es^Act 1976 also requires

prop osals on th e requirem ent oi pi te r r ito rial sea.

"reign warships to give prior notification for

w a r s h ip s p a s s in g th r o u g h t c , ffshore oil rigs, through India's territorial waters and

en largem en t o f safety zones ^r01'1

orotection of the

PaSnSins all submarines and other underwater

d e sign a tio n o f sp ecial areas for

pje the coral

vehicles to navigate on the surface and show their

re s o u rc e s lo c a ted th erein (as or^

. ers could run

naa W h ile passing through these waters.

lagoons in the Lakshadweep w er .

A r c h ip e la g i c S t a t u s f o r th e A n d a m a n a n d

aground) and several other propo

■

C

o t w

e n t i o n

'

3

X h T c 'o n v 'e n t i o n g r a n t e d t h e s t a t u s o f a n T

h

e O

u

t c o m

e o

f U

N

C

L O

S

- T h e

archipelago on ly to th ose groups o f is la n d s th a t o n

t h

e h

a w

o

f t h

e S

e a

met moSt

i !_ « T niU 01 ^

w

e r e political e n t i t i e s b y t h e m s e l v e s a s f o r T h e 1982 Convention on t n e w -

example Indonesia, th e P h ilip p in e s a n d th e o f India's interests. It adoptee:

w idthof

M -ildives. T h is w a s b eca u se o f fe a r o f in te rfe re n c e

•

Tw elve m iles as the uniform l>mi

!m h th e freedom of n a v ig a t io n t h r o u g h the territorial sea.

w ithin which t e

a r c h i p e l a g i c waters th a t might b e c r e a t e d i f th e

•

a tw o h u n d r e d m ile s ->

’ rejgn rights ai

off-lying islands o f continental coa sta l sta tes were c o a s ta l s t a te e x e r c is e s so

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/349

to b e gran ted a rch ip ela g ic status. For exam ple, im p o r t a n c e o f in t e r - m in is t e r ia l c o o r d in a tio n while the distance b etw een the A ndam an group and the

se lec tin g C o a s t G u a rd v e s s e ls , r e c ru itin g experienced N ic o b a r g r o u p o f i s la n d s is 76 m ile s .

I f p e r s o n n e l, s e t t i n g u p c o m m u n i c a t i o n networks, a rc h ip e la g ic s ta tu s h a d b e e n g ra n te d to th e s e u sin g n a va l r e p a ir fa c ilitie s , in d ig e n is a tio n etc. Such g r o u p s o f is la n d s , In d ia w o u ld h a v e h a d fu ll in t e g r a t e d N a v y - C o a s t G u a r d d e v e lo p m e n t would

~ ' *

avoid d u p lic a tio n a n d e c o n o m is e effort.

re g u la to ry c o n tro l o v e r th e n a v ig a tio n o f sh ip s p a ssin g th rou gh the T e n D egree Channel, w hich O n 25 A u g u s t 1 9 7 6 , In d ia p a s s e d th e Maritime w ou ld then have been part o f India’s archipelagic

Z o n e s A c t w h ic h c la im e d a 12 m ile te rrito ria l sea, a w a te rs , a n d th e r e fo r e s u b je c t to th e re s tric te d 2 4 m ile C o n t ig u o u s Z o n e , a 2 0 0 m ile E E Z and a regim es o f archipelagic sealanes passage.

con tin en tal s h e lf u p to 2 0 0 m ile s o r th e ou ter edge of

•

E

n

l a

r g

e

d

S

a

f e

t y

Z

o

n

e

s

f o

r

O

f f s

h

o

r e

the co n tin en tal m a rg in , w h ic h e v e r is greater.

I n

s

t a

l l a

t i o

n

s

.

S o o n a fte r t h is A c t , a c o m m it t e e w a s set up to T h e U N C LO S 1 Continental S h elf Convention had c o n sid er th e ty p e o f fo r c e t h a t s h o u ld b e created to provided for a safety zon e o f 500 m eters around

en force com p lian ce w ith its p r o v is io n s . T h re e options a rtific ia l isla n d s, in s ta lla tio n s or stru ctu res on em erged:

th e con tin en tal shelf. In d ia ’s view at U NC LO S 3

w a s th at th is zon e w a s in adequ ate, con sid erin g T o en tru st th is r e s p o n s ib ility to th e m arine wing the tim e th at a huge supertanker takes to com e to

o f th e M in is try o f F in a n c e , w h ic h a lre a d y had a n u m b er o f C e n tra l B o a r d o f R e v e n u e (CBR) anti a stop. In dia th erefore advocated Enlarged Safety

Z ones. T h e su ggestion did n ot receive adequate sm u gglin g vessels. T h is o p tio n w a s n o t pursued su pp ort. A p rovision w a s h ow ever incorporated as the fu n ction s w e r e to o o n e ro u s .

T o set up a sep a rate C o a sta l C o m m a n d , as a part in th e 19 82 C o n v e n tio n th a t i f a u th o r is e d by o f th e N a v y , to o v e r s e e t h e s e fu n c t io n s . This gen era lly accepted international standards or as

o p tio n w a s s e r io u s ly c o n s id e r e d s in c e it would re c o m m e n d e d b y th e c o m p e te n t in te r n a tio n a l avoid the ex p en d itu re o f r a is in g a n d m aintaining o r g a n is a t io n , th en , a c o a s t a l s t a te m a y a separate a rm ed force. T h e M in is t iy o f External prom u lgate safety zon es larger then 500 metres.

A ffa irs h ow ever felt th a t p a tro llin g o f th e EEZ and I n

d

i a

' s

G

a

i n

s A

f t e

r t h

e 1

9

8

2

U

N

C

o n

v

e n

t i o n

o

f

p r o te c tio n o f n a tio n a l a s s e ts w a s a p e a c e time t h

e L a

w

o

f t h

e S

e a

role for w h ich d efen ce a sse ts s h o u ld n o t b e used.

•

T o set up a s e p a r a te a r m e d fo r c e o f th e Union, A p a rt from th e b e n efits o f an agreed Law o f the Sea.

a lo n g th e lin e s o f th e U S C o a s t G u a r d . T h is India gain ed in tw o sign ifican t areas:

option w a s fin a lly ch osen, a s it a v o id e d th e Navy

•

I n d ia ’s E E Z b e c a m e th e t w e lfth la r g e s t in th e b e in g d is t r a c t e d fr o m i t s p r i m a r y r o le of w orld . T h e exten sion o f the E E Z to 350 m iles or preparin g for h ostilities.

100 m iles b eyon d th e 2 5 00 -m etre isobath added In te rim C o a s t G u a rd w a s c o n s t it u t e d on 1

2

m i l l i o n s q u a r e k ilo m e t e r s to I n d i a ’ s February 1977, w hich op erated u n d e r th e a eg is o f the ju ris d ic tio n .

N a v y u n til 18 A u g u s t 1 9 7 8 . A p e r m a n e n t C o a s t

•

P u r s u a n t to th e ‘p io n e e r in v e s t o r ’ s ta tu s , th e u u a r d w a s c o n s t itu t e d a s a n a r m e d fo r c e o f the In tern a tion al S eab ed A u th ority allotted to India a Y o ^ o 11 ° n 19 A u &u s t 1978. T h e C o a s t G u a r d A ct 150,000 sq u a re k ilom eter m ine site in the central 1978 requires the C oast G u ard to-I n d ia n O c e a n f o r t h e s e a b e d m in in g o f p olym eta llic nodu les. T h e rich est area at this site E n s u re th e s a fe ty a n d p r o t e c t io n o f o ffs h o r e h a s a d e n s it y o f 21 k ilo g r a m s o f n o d u le s p e r t e r m i n a l s , i n s t a l l a t i o n s a n d o t h e r s t r u c t u r e s a n d d e v i c e s .

sq u a re m etre.

•

P r o v id e p r o t e c t io n to f i s h e r m e n , in c lu d in g T

h

e G

e n

e s i s o

f t h

e C

o a

s t G

u

a

r d

•

P r n t V ? ^ h em w h en in distress a t sea.

W h ile U N C L O S 3 w a s s t ill in t h e e a r ly p h a s e o f o te c t th e m a rin e e n v ir o n m e n t b y p r e v e n tin g and controllin g m arine pollution.

d iscu ssin g th e E E Z a n d w ell b efore India had enacted A s s is t the cu stom s in a n ti s m u g g lin g a c tiv itie s th e M a r itim e Z o n e s A c t o f 1976, d is c u s s io n s had w h en patrollin g the seas b eyon d In d ia n c u s t o m s com m en ced in In dia on h ow th e E E Z w a s goin g to be w aters.

s a fe g u a r d e d . In 19 7 4 , N a v a l H e a d q u a r t e r s had S n,force the M aritim e Zones A c t o f 1976.

su ggested to th e G o v ern m en t "to have an arm ed force T a k e m easu res for the safety o f life and prop erty on th e lin es o f th e U S C o a st G u ard an d stressed the at sea.

•

C ollect scientific data.

350/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

T h e C o a s t G u a r d t h u s b e c a m e th e p rin cip a l Maritime boundaiy agreements were amicably

agency fo r e n f o r c in g a ll n a t io n a l le g is la tio n in the concluded with:

Maritime Z o n e s o f In d ia , w o r k in g in close liaison with other G o v e rn m e n t a u th o r itie s to avoid duplication of

• Sri Lanka in 1974 and 1976.

• Indonesia in 1974.

effort.

D u rin g h o s t i l i t i e s , I n d i a ’s C o a s t G u ard would

• The Maldives in 1976.

• Thailand and Indonesia, on the trijunction

function u n d e r t h e o v e r a ll o p e ra tio n a l command o f p o i n t ,

the N avy, a s is d o n e b y o t h e r C o a s t G uards o f the i n 1 9 7 7 .

•

Myanmar in 1982.

world.

Maritime boundaiy agreements with the adjacent

M a ritim e Boundaries

states o f Pakistan and Bangladesh have yet to be

concluded. Meetings have been held with Bangladesh

India h a s m a r it im e b o u n d a r ie s w ith five opposite since 1976 and with Pakistan since 1986.

states (Sri L a n k a , th e M a ld ives, Myanmar, Indonesia, T h a ila n d ) a n d t w o a d ja c e n t S ta te s (Pakistan and Bangladesh).

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/351

U n ifie d C ode fo r th e T h re e S e r v ic e s In N o v e m b e r 1955, w h ils t th e N a v y A c t w a s s till provision s o f th e d ra ft U n ifie d C od e, th e m a tter was u n d er co n sid era tio n , th e G overn m en t decid ed th at placed b efore the C h iefs o f S t a f f C o m m itte e . A n ad-a fter th e p a ss in g o f the N avy A ct. the A rm y and A ir hoc A rm ed F orce U n ified C od e C ell w a s established in Force A cts sh ould also be am ended to:

1972 to red ra ft the C ode. T h e re d ra fte d U n ified Code

•

A c h ie v e u n ifo r m ity in p u n is h m en ts fo r s im ila r w as com pleted b y J a n u a ry 1978.

offen ces in the three services.

W h e n th is d r a ft w a s c o n s id e r e d b y t h e th ree

• A c h ie v e

u n ifo r m it y

in

r e s t r ic t io n s

on

S ervice H ea d q u a rters, th e fo llo w in g c r itic is m s were fu ndam en tal rights and

raised:

• C on form to naval court m artial procedure, under

•

T h e C ode w a s n o t r e a lly u n ifie d . It w a s m ore a w hich an acquittal by a court m artial could not be

set aside.

com pendium o f the ex istin g s e rv ic e laws.

T h e C o d e w a s n o t r e a l l y p r o g r e s s i v e . T h e D iffic u ltie s w e re en c o u n te re d in im p le m e n tin g p r o g r e s s i v e f e a t u r e s o f t h e C o d e s o f o th e r u n iform ity o f pu n ish m en ts for sim ilar offences under d e m o c ra tic c o u n tr ie s d id n o t fin d p la c e in the the th ree A cts.

A Special Com m ittee com prising the

draft code.

J o in t S ecretaries o f the M inistries o f D efence and Law A b o u t 13 y e a r s h a d b e e n ta k e n in d r a ft in g the and the J u d g e A dvocates G eneral o f the three services Code and a fu rth er d elay o f o f 8 to 10 y e a rs could w a s s e t up in J u n 1965 w ith the fo llo w in g term s o f be envisaged.

reference:

T h e Code w as m ore co m p lica ted th an the existing rm y, N avy and A ir F o rc e A c t s a n d m a y not be

•

T o stu d y th orou gh ly the historical background o f u n e r s t a n d a b le b y la y s e r v ic e p e r s o n n e l fo r d i s c ip lin a r y c a s e s o f th e t h r e e s e r v ic e s th e w hom it w as really m eant.

d i f f i c u l t i e s e n c o u n t e r e d , th e c o d e s o f o t h e r T h e revision o f the ex istin g S e rv ice A c ts w a s being d e m o c r a t ic

d e v e lo p e d

c o u n t r ie s ,

t h e ir

experien ces, etc.

e ayed on accou n t for the C ode w h ich w a s m eant to replace the Acts.

T o dra ft a U nified C ode in order to rationalise the th ree se rvice A cts, ta k in g into con sid eration the A f t e r c o n s id e r in g t h e s e a s p e c t s , it w a s d e v e lo p m e n ts in c rim in o lo g y and p en ology and recom m ended to the Chiefs o f S t a ff C om m ittee that: a lso th e fa c t th a t m em b ers o f the A rm ed Forces w ou ld , in d u e cou rse, com e from m ore educated T h e th re e s e rv ic e A c t s s h o u ld b e s u it a b ly and p olitically con sciou s classes.

amended so as to make them a s progressive and

uni orm as possible, considering the Government

T o a s s is t in d r a ft in g th e u n ifie d code,, a S u b directive of 1955.

C o m m it t e e w a s s e t u p. c o n s is t in g o f th e J u d g e The decision w h eth e r to p ro g re ss the D raft A d v o c a te s G en era l o f the A rm y , N avy and A ir Force Unified Code or a b an d o n it be con sid ered after T h e S u b C o m m it t e e h e ld 17 8 m e e tin g s a n d th e the work of m odern isin g the three service Acts S p e c ia l C o m m itt e e h e ld 35 m e e tin g s to c o n s id e r had been completed.

v a r io u s s e c tio n s o f th e d ra ft. In F eb ru a ry 1970, a d ra ft U n ified C ode w as fin a lised and sent to the Law T h e C h iefs o f S t a ff a gre ed th a t th e th ree se rvice M in istry for vetting.

c s a n d th e s t a t u t o r y r u le s s h o u ld b e a m e n d e d In v ie w o f th e d iv e rg e n c e o f op in ion betw een the b e fo re a d e c is io n w a s ta k e n on th e D r a ft U n ifie d Code.

t h r e e s e r v ic e s in r e s p e c t o f c e r ta in c o n tr o v e r s ia l

29

The Third Pay Commission

Preamble

O f f i c e r s . The closest comparator, to Defence Services S in c e th e A r m y h a s b e e n th e la rg e st service, the f

reason that they both'wore a uniform. This relativity

r e m u n e r a t io n s t r u c t u r e o f n a v a l p erson n el has had no other logic, especially with regard to job

always b een lin k e d w ith that o f the Army. Army rank content. It continues till today, much to the

stru ctu re a n d c o n d itio n s o f service were taken as the detriment o f the Service officers pay scales. In

datum a n d th e N a v y ’s d iffe re n c e s in structure and establishing this relativity, the PWPC deliberated at

service c o n d itio n s had to be reconciled thereafter.

length as to what should be the linkage points. It was W h en th e T h ird P a y Com m ission was constituted first agreed that the end o f the Lieutenant

in 1 9 7 0 , t h e r e m u n e r a t io n s tr u c tu r e for naval Commanders scale should not exceed the end of the

p e r s o n n e l w a s th e o u tc o m e o f su ccessive reviews Senior Time Scale of the Police in which the SP was

ca rried o u t b y th r e e D ep artm en tal Committees and placed, thereby establishing a linkage between the

the e a rlie r P a y C om m ission s. The framework evolved two. The nexflink in the Police then was the DIG.

by th es e c o m m itte e s , esp ecia lly the earliest, largely The Service representatives sought a linkage of the

re m a in e d in ta c t. S o m e o f the concepts introduced DIG with the naval rank of Commander. However, it

then had a lm o s t b ecom e “fixations" and constrained was finally accepted that the DIG should be placed

between the naval ranks of Commander and Captain.

the a p p ro a ch o f ea rlier Pay Commissions.

One of the factors in establishing this linkage was

that the three pillars of administration, namely the

The Post War Pay Committee of 1946

DIG of a Range, the Commissioner of a Division and

Th e firs t a ttem p t a t rationalisation and simplification the Commander of a Military District (of the rank of

Colonel) had near identical years of service, were of

o f th e rem u n e ra tio n stru ctu re was made by the Post anoroximately the same age and required to socially

W ar C o m m ittee in 1946. It was given the mandate to interact with each other. There should, therefore, be p r o d u c e p a y s c a le s r e la te d ex clu sively to In ian some relativity in their pay scales.

c o n d itio n s , to s im p lify th e pay s y s t e m and ac ie v e On the plea o f ‘all inclusive pay and to achieve

the m a x im u m d eg ree o f harm ony within each en^

cimnlicitv almost all the allowances of officers were an d b e tw e e n th e th r e e Services. The G °vernl'n _

withdrawn.

No such w ithdraw al was effected ,

a ls o t o o k a d e c is io n th a t “ the fu tu re pays o however for the Police and the Civil Services. The

A r m e d F o r c e s s h o u ld be linked with ci’VI P

,

J L V Pay Code resulted in considerable reduction in

r~.i,__ « „ n r f nf the First centra

d e te rm in ed fo llo w in g the report o f the -

on these parameters and

the then existing pay scales of naval officers. Within a P a y C o m m is s io n ." B ased on

r o f i t s implementation, the Government realised gu id ed by th e Post W ar Pay Code o f the BriUs

^

t y n t there were inequities and drawbacks in the New F o r c e s , th e P o s t W a r C o m m it t e e rec° m foJIowing Pnv Code and sanctioned certain benefits in 1948 and

r e m u n e r a t io n s y s t e m b a se d on t e 1950. In practice, the ‘all inclusive* concept o f pay equations:

was found unworkable.

:qual

S a i l o r s . The Navy had initially projected a two

•

S e r v ic e o f fic e r s sh o u ld broa d ly rece'

tfrouD structure for sailors nam ely A rtificers and treatm en t w ith police officers-three years

Mnn-artificers. Amongst the Non-artificers, it was

A fu lly tra in ed in fan try soldier W1^ j j i ecj worker L e n that in some trades like Writers. Elcctrical. Sick s e rv ic e w a s equ ated with a sem1 ^ ^ g eaman of Berth

A s s is t a n t .

S to res

A s s i s t a n t

and

w ho in tu rn w as equated with an

<yrcraftman

Communications. sailors w ere m atricu lates. In

the N avy and the ju niorm ost Lea i

however. a

Vq46 matriculation was a relatively high educational

o f the A ir Force. W hilst fixing

jvjaval and Air

'a lific a tio n . it needed to be recognised in the pay higher differential was given to

popularity of structure and so a separate pay group was created for Force equ ivalents due to the ^

educational

matriculates, below the Artificer Group. The Navy

th e s e tw o S e r v ic e s , th eir 'jig

hardships of

q u a lification on en tiy and in e

life at sea in the Navy.

therefore em erged w ith a three grou p trade and pay

"The Service representatives felt that D

stru c tu re as co m p a re d to th e A r m y ’s e ig h t g ro u p s approximating to the scales prevalent on^SCa,es

an d th e A ir F o r c e ’s fiv e g ro u p s . A n o th e r fe a tu re sid e w e re p r e fe r a b le to th e e x is tin g pav stri, (ClVil recogn ised by th e Post W ar Pay C om m ittee w as the but that a revision would be such a c o m plex J H

All o f a C om pany” concept. T h is w as u niqu e to the lengthy process that it was not practicable a i T

N avy. I t w a s a c c e p te d th a t s in c e s a ilo r s s e r v e d present juncture. In view of these practi a|

on b oa rd sh ip s in clo se p ro x im ity w ith one a n o th er d if f ic u lt , e s . w e d e c i d e d t h a t t h e p re sen t „ !

and w ere all com b atan ts, th ere sh ou ld n ot be w id e structure might be retained until such time as

d is p a rity in th eir pay scales. A cco rd in g ly , th e pay the Government finds it convenient to carry out!

scales o f the non-m atric ‘C’ Group m erged w ith those d eta iled re v ie w ” .

o f the m a tricu late ‘B ” G roup from the ran k o f Petty Officer upwards.

Another Departmental Committee under Shri

In th e c a s e o f s a ilo r s , th e ir u p d a te d p a y w a s Kamath was set up in 1 9 6 7 to examine the adequacy depressed by 33 percent on account o f ‘Hom e Saving

or otherwise of various allowances and concessions.

E le m en t fo r c o n c e s s io n s p ro v id e d in kin d. S in ce The recomm endations m ade by this Committee

certain allow ances w ere adm issible as percen tage o f resulted in an increase in some allowances and p y, this resulted in a double depression. H ow ever concessions, but left the pay structure intact.

an addition o f Rs 5 w as made, w hich worked out to 12

N o t h a v in g h a d th e .b e n e fit o f a r e v ie w o f their t 0 £o m p e n s a t e s a ilo r s fo r th e h a z a r d s an d hardships o f naval life.

c o n d it io n s o f s e r v ic e a n d p a y s c a le s , th e Armed orces em erged in to th e p o s t s e c o n d P a y Commission thP W h ^lef thiS am ou n ted ^ a form al recog n itio n o f scen e w ith a m e re a r ith m e tic a l r e v is io n o f their pay the need for such a com pensation, this rationale was

a n d a llo w a n c e s . A t t h is s t a g e t h e C iv il Services, n o t e x te n d e d to c o v e r a ll r a n k s . T h u s , o ffic e r s especially the IAS and IPS, in itia te d m a jo r changes in t n e ir c a d r e s t r u c t u r e . A S e l e c t i o n G r a d e was in reduced in the IPS, b e tw e e n th e S P a n d DIG. This rxr "■ th

'

gra e w as eq u a ted to th e n a v a l r a n k o f Commander and p re ssu re b u ilt u p fo r r e v is io n on th e D IG 's pay rank^ f n

^ l e D IG h a d o v e r t a k e n th e naval

A dm iral Som an recalls:

th e ° , a P^a *n ’ a n d s ta rte d d r a w in g re la tiv ity with lo w ra n S

C o m m o ^ r e a n d B r ig a d ie r , th ereb y

S ^ rm ^ rJ h e s ta tL ls a n d r e l a t i v i t y o f th e A rm ed Service O fficer v is a v is th e Police.

T

h

e T

h

i r d

P

a

y

C

o m

m

i s s i o n

served In the m adhouse that „ a s NHO '

'

formntir! *

G o v e r n m e n t a n n o u n c e d the

tim e rip 11? |

PaY C o m m i s s i o n a n d , f o r the first a n H o 1 iC1 CC

en ^ru st th e ta s k o f r e v ie w in g the pay

Com m ; ° W a n c e s o f t h e A r m e d F o r c e s to a Pay Howevr' ST,n anC* n o*

a D e p a r tm e n ta l Committee,

r e c o m m e n d in g t h a t th e eountinr, »

gIy

termc; rvf

r Cre Was a m aJo r d iffe r e n c e b e tw e e n the In d ia n C ivil S ervice scales n f m

Wlth the

and \ h

rC erence as a p p lic a b le to th e A rm e d Forces t ic k e d o f f a n d in fo r m e d t h a M w a ^ t h 01^

17

A rm pri°pe a PP*lc a b le to c iv ilia n s . In th e ca s e o f the rep resen t N H Q 's view s not my own

S

' °

m ake r ° r c e s '

C o m m is s io n w a s n o t a s k e d to

a s k e d to b e r e lie v e d o f m y jo b b h y

b u t t a ?COm/Tlenc*a tio ns on th e c o n d itio n s o f service h a p p en e d an d m , d .s s c n tm g i o t e r e L t o e d o S

nrnmin

.

m a s S i v e n .

T h i s d i f f e r e n c e w a s

report

^ ^ ^ h lig h t e d b y th e C o m m is s io n in their the So . Ven on

Q u estion o f th e p re s e n ta tio n of

T

h

e R

a

g

h

u

r a

m

a

i a

h

a

n

d

K

a

m

a

t h

C

o m

m

i t t e e s

Sc

. H'1068 ca se,th e C o m m issio n w a s k een that the C on seq u en t to the Second Pay C om m ission’* p renrpCe p e r s o n n e ^ a ls o s h o u ld h a v e th e lib e r t y to in 1960, a D ep artm en tal Com m ittee, headed by S h ^

emnl SCnt ^ eir ea se d ire ctly b efo re th em lik e civilian R a gh u ram a ia b . exam in ed the p a y and a l l o w a n c e s 0 r D e f t ° yeeS ' H ow ever- th eir re q u e s t to th e M in istry of the A rm e d Forces. It stated that:

2 r n Cn^ G

^ a t e ^ e c t w a s t u r n e d d o w n on th e u n d s t h a t th e r e q u ir e m e n t o f A r m e d F o r c e s 354/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

discipline w o u ld n o t p e r m it su ch an approach. Thus the ExDerf C

n

d

the t h r e e S e r v i c e s c o u ld n o t e x p la in th e ir ca se the Service Members T h e lm Z rt S

?b™ted °n,y 5y

directly to th e P a y C o m m issio n . A s a result, many o f lost and the Third Pav Pnm

u T

r e p ° n W a S

the a n o m a l i e s i n j e c t e d b y e a r l i e r C o m m itte e s I0St

theTh,rd Par Comm.ssion had to seek the

views separately from the Ministry ofDcfence.

rem ained u n c o rre c te d .

A comprehensive

J o b E

v a l u a

t i o n

o

f S a i l o r s .

In th e ir a p p r o a c h to th e fo rm u la tio n o f Arm ed T , . , n

n

,

J o b evaluation was carried out o f the sailors cadre.

Forces pay. th e Th ird P a y C om m ission adopted the The Pay Commission however did not accept their f o llo w in g b r o a d

p r i n c i p l e s fo r d e te rm in in g recommendations on the grounds that the evaluation rem uneration:

had not been done by professional job evaluators.

The sailors job description sheets remained in the

•

Im p le m e n ta tio n o f the Post W ar Pay Committee's archives of Naval Headquarters and were eventually r e c o m m e n d a tio n th at fu tu re pay should be linked used after the Fifth Pay Commission when at short

w ith civ il p a y a n d co m p ara b le to those o f Class I notice, trade rationalisation was required by the C e n t r a l S e r v i c e s a n d In d ia n P o lic e S e rv ice Ministry of Defence.

officers.

The

S

a i l o r s T r a d e S t r u c t u r e .

advent of the Air

A n in fa n try s o ld ie r w ith three years service to be Arm led to the creation of a separate pay group for eq u ated w ith a w ork er classified as between semiaviation sailors on scales identical to their sk illed a n d skilled.

counterparts in the Air Force. When the Submarine R e g a in th e “ a ll in c lu s iv e " ch ara cter o f military' Arm was formed, submarine sailors were also placed p a y a s r e c o m m e n d e d by th e Post War Pay in this group. These measures were ratified by the C om m ittee, w h ich had got diluted over a period of Third Pay Commission and this new “Special Group"

tim e by th e g ra n t by the Government o f a number

was placed between the Artificers Group and the o f a d d itio n a l allowances.

Matric Group.

A n y ele m en t o f S ervice life which was a relatively C

o m

p e n s a t i o n f o

r ‘X

’ F

a c t o r .

In the British

co n stan t fa cto r for the bulk o f the service, should Armed Forces Pay S tru ctu re, the X factor b e c o m p e n s a te d in the pay itself. Allowances compensated for the uniqueness and distinct disadvantages of service

w ere o n ly to be granted in such cases where the life. Service Headquarters

sought the extension of the

co n d itio n s did not have uniform applicability, viz X factor to the Indian

s e rv ic e in field areas, at high altitude or at sea.

Armed Forces. The Third Pay Commission examined the advantages and disadvantages o f Service life,

S p e c ia l a llo w a n c e s w ere also recommen e or

considered that the former outweighed the latter and

the perform an ce o f hazardous duties.

concluded that there was no justification for the X

O

f f i c e r s . T h e m ain thrust o f the s e r v i c e s 'vas to factor. One of the advantages of naval life taken into consideration

seek p a rity in pay scales with the IAS. The Thfr

*y

was the op portu n ity for naval

. that the officcr

C om m ission w as o f the view, however.

of personnel to visit distant foreign countries at Government expense.

cadre o f the A rm ed Forces was an

and job

inH iviH

P

e n

s i o n

.

Th e Th ird Pay C om m ission also

11ci 1c n f v a r v in g d is c ip lin e .

,

in d iv id u a ls o f v a ry in g

certainly be

equated m ilitary pension with the civil pension.

r e s p o n s ib ilitie s . W h ilst

who

ff"

It to 1C1<

Eligibility for pension was related to the civil service s o m e c a te g o rie s , though <

dl *gUthe g o .000 strong

requirement of 33 years service. This was despite the co u ld claim p a rity with the

.

^

com pared

fact that in the Defence Services very few individuals A rm ed Forces of icercadre cou

acj

^

a similar

could achieve so many years o f service. The earlier

w ith th e C lass I officers caar ^

^

^

thcrefore

inbuilt monetary compensation for a truncated career

disparate composition.

re la tiv itie s w ere

was dispensed with and in lieu, a weightage in years

n o t a c c e p t e d an d t ie

of service was introduced. These measures effectively

•

retained.

nf Defence created an

M in is t r y

___ three

neutralised the prevailing edge that military pension

E x p e r t C e l l . The

o f th e th re e

had.

E x p e r t C e ll c o m p r is in g

£ s e c r e t a r y a n d a n

C om m odore RC B hatnagar w ho served in the

S e r v i c e s P a y C c " * ' A d v is er. T h e E x p e rt C eil w a s N avy’s Third Pay Com m ission Cell and interacted A d d i t i o n a l Fin an cial^ A

M e m 0 ra n d u m o f e a c h

m a n d a te d to s c r u t i n y

^

vjew s t0 the p « y

with the Army and Air Force Pay Cells, recalls:

S e r v i c e a n d ^

^

t e

l y

n o a g re e m e n t c o u ld be

“A very im p orta n t rid e r th at th e M in istry o f C o m m i s s i o n . U n fo

c M em b ers 0n th e on e sid e

D efence put dow n b efore a g re ein g to S ervice r e a c h e d b e tw e e n * c

fence on th e other. E ven tu a lly

Headquarters making their projections to the Pay

a n d th e M in is try of

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/355

C om m ission w a s th a t th ere w ou ld be a M in istry sixth year of service not only got what the P0r o f D efen ce Pay Cell. T h is cell w ou ld receive and officer got, but also got 50 rupees more, which e x a m in e th e p r o p o s a ls o f th e t h r e e S e r v ic e s was a part of Special D istu rbance Allowance

H e a d q u a r t e r s , v e t th e m a n d p r o je c t fin a l which the Pay Commission had agreed to extend

co o rd in a te d p ro p o s a ls to th e Pay C om m ission .

to Service officers.

T h u s w e h a d a n o t h e r b o d y to e x a m in e o u r

“W e h a d a n o th e r p e c u lia r situ ation . The rank p r o p o s a ls b e fo r e th e s e w e r e s e n t to t h e P a y o f C a p t a in in t h e N a v y s p a n n e d th e ranks of C om m ission in a consolidated form.

C o lo n e l a n d B r ig a d ie r in t h e A r m y an d Group

“W e w ere form ed as a “Pay C om m ission and

C ap tain a n d A ir C o m m o d o r e in th e A ir Force. The Job Evaluations Cell" and w e took u pon ourselves p r o b le m w a s to d e v is e a p a y s c a le w h ich would to carry ou t a total jo b evalu ation o f every single c o v e r t h e s e t w o A r m y s c a l e s o f C o lo n e l and t r a d e a t e a c h s a ilo r le v e l t h a t is a s a n A b le B r ig a d ie r . A t o n e s t a g e t h is w a s n o t readily Seam an, as a Leading, as a Petty O fficer and as a

accepted b y th e P a y C o m m is s io n n o r b y the other C h ief Petty Officer. For each level, w e carried out tw o S e r v i c e s a n d t h e M i n i s t r y o f D efence.

an e v a lu a t io n o f th e jo b c o n te n t, t h a t is th e H ow ever, w e m a n a g e d to c o n v in c e n o t only the t r a in in g ,

w o r k

c o n t e n t

a n d

e x p e r ie n c e

M in is t r y o f D e f e n c e b u t a ls o t h e M in is tr y of r e q u ire m e n t o f ea ch in d ivid u a l ra te and trade.

F in a n c e ( D e f e n c e ) a n d w e r e a b l e to obtain T h is w as all recorded in a Job Evaluation Report.

approval for a c o m b in e d s c a le fo r C ap ta in s in the S o m e o f th e o ffic e r s o f th e C e ll w e r e s e n t to N avy, c o v e r in g b o th th e r a n k s o f th e oth er two B o m b a y to th e L a b o u r In s titu te to u n d ersta n d Services".

th e civilia n system o f jo b -sk ill corelation and on th a t b a s is w e c a r r ie d o u t jo b e v a lu a tio n . T h e D

e v e l o p

m

e n

t s A

f t e

r 1

9

7

5

A r m y a n d t h e A ir F o r c e a ls o d id th e s a m e T h e p a r a m e t e r s u n d e r w h i c h t h e T h ir d Pay e x e r c is e . T h is h e lp e d u s to p r o je c t to th e P a y C om m ission had stru c tu re d th e ir re c o m m e n d a tio n s C o m m issio n , th e c o re la ted jo b con ten t o f every en visa g ed th a t th e y w o u ld b e v a lid fo r th e n ext ten s in g le r a t e in th e S e r v ic e in c lu d in g a r t ific e r years. T h e oil crisis o f th e m id s e v e n tie s a n d the high sailors.

in fla tio n th e r e a ft e r n e u t r a lis e d t h e s e pa ram eters.

“T h is jo b evalu a tion ex ercise u n d erta k en by T h e G o v e r n m e n t t h e r e f o r e in t r o d u c e d a s e rie s of us w a s s o m e w h a t'o n th e p a tte rn o f an exercise adh oc m ea su res. T h e s e d id n o t a lle v ia t e m atters, d o n e b y th e B r it is h A r m e d F o r c e s ju s t a few e s p e c ia lly fo r o ffic e r s . T h e e c o n o m ic p o s it io n of m on th s earlier. D espite the fact that all the three officers w orsened, a ffe ctin g m o ra le a n d th e quality of B ritis h s e rv ic e s w e r e u sin g q u ite so p h is tic a ted in ta k e. By th e la te s e v e n tie s , r e m e d ia l m ea su res equ ipm en t, th eir fin d in gs w ere th at Naval trades b e c a m e e s s e n t ia l.

In 1 9 8 2 , t h e C h ie f s o f S ta ff

h a d a b r o a d e r j o b c o n t e n t t h a n t h e ir Com m ittee forw a rd ed to G o v e r n m e n t th e ir paper on co u n terp a rts in th e oth er tw o Services. T h u s the Q u ality and M o r a le ” w h o se m a jo r re c o m m e n d a tio n R oyal N a v y ’s sa ilo rs w ere placed in three higher w !is

e x ten s io n o f fre e r a tio n s to p e a c e a re a s for p a y sca les as a ga in s t fou r scales for Royal A rm y o ff ic e r s up to th e naval, r a n k o f C a p t a i n . The a n d R o y a l A i r F o r c e p e r s o n n e l. It w a s N a v a l o v e r n m e n t w a s in c lin e d to g r a n t t h i s in cash-H e a d q u a r t e r ’s v ie w a t t h a t t im e t h a t w e too A dm iral R L Periera, th e C h a irm a n C O SC , w a s able to s h o u ld try to g r o u p o u r tra d e s lik e w is e , as all p e r s u a d e G o v e r n m e n t to s a n c t io n fr e e r a t io n s in s a ilo r s o n b o a r d a r e a c t iv e ly in v o lv e d in th e kind.

actu al fig h tin g o f a sh ip vis-a-vis the m any trades R

e

- m

u

s

t e

r i n

g

o

f S

e

a

m

a

n

a

n

d

E

n

g

i n

e

e

r i n

g

o f th e A rm y and th e A ir Force. T h a t w as the basis e

°

a ™l c s *

1 9 7 7 , t h e M i n i s t r y o f D e fe n c e o f ou r projections.

accepted N aval H ea d q u a rters r e c o m m e n d a tio n that

"A s r e g a r d s o ffic e r s , w e fo u n d th a t th e Pay to keep abreast w ith the g row th o f te c h n o lo g y in the C om m ission w as recom m en d in g a pay scale o f an ervice,

e educational q u a lifica tio n o f S e a m en and

In d ia n P o lic e O ffic e r in h is six th y e a r o f service E n gin eerin g M ech a n ics b e r a is e d to m a tric u la tio n .

w h ic h w o u ld b e h ig h e r th a n w h a t w a s b e in g e G overnm ent not only app roved th is u pgrad ation re c o m m e n d e d fo r a C a p ta in in th e A rm y h a vin g in e d u c a tio n a l q u a lific a tio n , b u t a ls o d ir e c te d th at six y ea rs o f service. A very stron g representation t h e y b e p a id m a t r ic r a t e s o f p a y . S e a m e n a n d w a s m a d e b y N a v a l H e a d q u a r t e r s a n d th e E n gin eering M echanics w ere rem u stered from Group a n o m a ly w a s rectified. A C aptain o f the A rm y and o

roup B . T h is linkage b etw een pay scales and

eq u iva len ts in th e N avy and the A ir F orce in their e d u c a t io n a l q u a lific a t io n e v e n t u a lly b e c a m e th e 356/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

keystone fo r th e r a t io n a lis a t io n o f the sailors trade S l S o f T P 8t" ' C1Ure aftcr the

fay

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/357

3 0

The Navy’s Education Branch

T h e E v o lu t io n o f t h e B r a n e h

N a v a l H e a d q u a r t e r s , a c o m p o s it e n-

Developments Until 196 5

T r a in in g a n d E d u c a tio n w a s c o n stitu ted 'tn . ^ ° f T h e B o y E n t r y c o n s t i t u t e d t h e m a i n i n t a k e i n t o t h e a n d e d u c a t i o n a l a c t i ^ e s , ^ 1

fi!

J

6 ° th e R oyal ln d ‘ an N avy (RIN)

S in r e

m n n in tPH t ' J I e a d m a s t e r C o m m a n d e r Smith was their educational standard w as w ell short o f w hat th e

■ H e a d q u a r te r s in th e Directorate of

N a v y r e q u ir e d , b o y s w e r e im p a r te d J d u S E S l

I * ™ ? 6 ^

E d u C a t io n a s t h e D e p u t y d

™

t r a in in g a ft e r j o i n i n g th e N a v y .

E d u c a t io n a l

w a s r

^ h

^

SamG y e a r ’ an In s tru ctor Branch

s “ i l o r sm teon h WaS a lS ° 3 mandatory P r e r e q u i s i t e fo t r i m S a n J t

br. ° * d e n t h e b a s e o f e d u c a t i o n a l t h e r e f o r e n E d u c a t i o n a l t r a i n i n g w a s t h

e

S

1^

3 l n i n g m e t h o d o l o g y . T h e i n t a k e into v o l u n t a ' hn

l ; f ° r S a i l o r s t ° a v a i l o f o n a ( R l N V R /r ° f ‘ n s t r u c t ° r L i e u t e n a n t C o m m a n d e r f o r n r n m M

P t h e m t0 q u a l i f y e d u c a t i o n a l l y c a n d iH t

KS

L > e u t e n a n t ( R I N V R ) w a s from

p r e s a ib e d Eri?

,

°, ' d u c « ' » n = I t e s t s

h a d a n £

l h' r t y a " d

o f age. wh.

o f all branrhpQ

TeSt 0 n e

w as for bovs

M erh n ■ n ^ ^ ' S d e £ r e e in M a th em a tic s/ P h y s ics or w as fo r sa ilo rs

h ^

^ her Educational T e st (HET)

exnpr- niCa ^

l e c t r ic a l E n g i n e e r i n g a n d w ho had l ° Rbe COmmiss^°ned U s

im p a i:t i n g t r a i n i n g i n a reCOgniSed r e s p o n s ib le fo r nrcj

•

°

r a n c h w a s m a d e

to thp ^ f

n ew Inst-r u c to r B ra n c h w as added on

educauonai training,

an d im P a r tin g a ll th is

T h e s

S

S

S

S

S

r

h

T h e B ra n rh cfor-+

S c h n n i^ o *

5!

c o m b in e d In s tru c to r Branch -

days, w as called the Sch T 1928 a n d ' i n i t s e a r l y C d r as D e

a d r e .in c r e a s e d to o n e Headmaster

t h i s cadre c o n s i s t e d ^ f ^ S e f P

By 1 9 3 5 ^

H ea d m a ster L U S W D i r * C to r ° f E d u c a t i o n ' t 0"?

Petty O fficer fPO)

, e fP e ttY 0 fficer (C P O l/

N H Q

L

( P) a s A s s >stant D e p u ty Director at

co llege degree thf^- °

erS‘ a11 ° f w h om had a

S

h

i f H e a d m a ^ e r L t a t H M I S B A H A D U R in S toker and S i g n a l s B o j i w ^ 3 t the S eam en, C o m m i s s i o n , ^ ^ m a s te r L ie u te n a n ts (RINVR). forty K a r a c h i a n d Rnm K

T ra in in g Establishm ents

h u n d rrd

i

A r r a n t S c h o o l m a s t e r s an d one

L ie u t e n a m S m it h ^ fa s 1 ° 1 9 3 8 ,

H e a d m ^

C P ° S c b o o lm a s t e r s . B y then

S c h o o lm a s t e r C a d r e a L P P ° m te d to h e a d th e e s t a b l i s h m e n t s !

*m e in aU t r a in in g and base

education in the Navy.

6 th e s t a n d a r d o f

going appoin tm en ts

CCntreS ^

^

BrS

anehCt: r

one

£ £ - i hS S S

S c h o o lm a s t e r s

H a H e rS a n d f o u r t e e n C P o / P n

I nst

r

u

c

t

o

r

P h y s i c s ' C h e m is tr y . W arrant

th e n re v is e d th e H C T and^CTl" I ' n t * S m ith h a d £

^

" E j e c t s .

r e q U ir e d t0 bC

l eM M a V e d U C a ti0 n a I sy ] }ahi fo r ya ll naav a f , rhC a S U h e D i r e a o r V " A ? 4 8 ' a t N a v a ] H e a d q u a r t e r s , th e e s ta b lis h m e n ts .

d va I s h ip s a n d

tWQ £ o r a le oi N a v a l T r a in in g a n d E d u c a t io n s p lit into T o a t t r a c t b e t t e r t a le n t , it b e c a m e no D ir e c t o r ^

r t f ' D ir e c t o r a t c o f W e a p o n T r a in in g and r a is e t h e s t a t u s a n d t h e p a y o f th e o i h Ce,s s a ry to n a v a l , a te o f N a v a l E d u c a tio n . T h e la s t o f th e British S c h o o lm a s t e r p a y s c a le s w e r e ra ise d a n r i^ ' i " 1 9 4 3 '

W ith t h f r ^

0 f f i c c r s o n d e p u t a t io n le ft in 1950.

M a t h e m a t i c s o r P h y s i c s w a s m oH

3 deSre e in

R e a i„ r

f o r m a t io n o f t h e N a v a l A i r A n u s 's F le e t q u a lific a t io n fo r e n t r y in to th e S^h

? 3 0 e s s e n t ia l

m a d e ^ m e n t U n it in 1 9 5 1 - E d u c a t io n O ffic e r s w ere try in to th e S c h o o lm a s te r C a d re.

S

: c s

P ° n s i b l e f o r P r ° v « > i n g m e t e o r o l o g i c a l

In 1955. the Instructor Branch was reorganised-

. AH entries into the Branch were made either in and for more

the rank of Com m issioned Instructor Officers

■ Education Officers was inn " ' “f l traiT,in§ of

(CIOs) or as civilians. An Engineering degree was weeks to include Naval n • .

16 t0 36

included as an entry qualification

The

promotion la d d e r w as CIO - Senior

.

a

0n

fe NavaI Sdentfflc Onenta«ona« ů" s« Vigati0n

CIO -

Instructor Lieutenant and upwards

" X

s

z

s

s

s

s

z

r *

*

• Civilian E d u ca tio n In stru cto rs (CEI's) were posted

m a in ly

in

the

basic training

establishments for boy entry sailors.

The restricted nature o f duties constrained the

Many of the d ire ct entry, honours degree promotion prospects of Education Branch officers.

Instructor Officers who were inducted from 1955 This constraint was overcome to some extent by m

wUnderWent specialisation courses in the

deputing them to, and facilitating their secondment A d S n r

to, organisations like Defence Laboratories under h 3* ? ' m R a d a r> R a d i 0 ' T h e rm o d y n a m ics, dvanced M e te o r o lo g y . G u n n ery , Torpedo and Anti DRDO. Sainik Schools, Army Recruitment

P

an ne W arfare,

Organisation, Electronic

N a v ig a t io n and Direction,

Data Processing, etc.

communications and Electronic Warfare. In later

Two Education of icers at ained Flag rank:

n pfaS’ S° me

them achieved em in en ce in the • Rear Admiral KN Ramanarasiah became Director esearch and Development Organisation,

of the Naval Science and Technology Laboratory

rppp-

Branch List entry scheme was not well

in Visakhapatnam where he did pioneering work

Bra

h

y the In stru cto r Branch. In 1963. the

on the development of torpedoes.

numhC

entr^ was abolished and a limited

•

Rear Admiral SR Mohan became the Project

jn .

Civilian Education Instructors (CEIsj were

Of icer for the development of the Navy's

Lie UfC G<^ Entry was restarted in the rank of Sub

indigenous Surface to Air Missile TRISHUL.

I

enant and seniorities of all serving Branch List

which was a segment of DRDO’s Integrated

njctor Officers were readjusted,

Guided Missile Development Programme.

enl VGr ^me’

responsibilities of the Branch were

Education Of icers also

ar&ed *° in clu d e the conduct of

made significant

sailors’

c o n t r i b u t i o n s to the development o f the academic a c?Ui-tlTlent ^es^s *n shore establishments, organising

ivities to enhance general knowledge and

faculties of the Ethiopian Navy’s Naval Academy and Nigeria’s Inter Services Academy.

]e^ an*s*n^ welfare activities at Unit and Com m and Educational Activity

D

e v e l o P

m

e

n

t S B

e t w

e e n

1

9 6

5

a

n d

1 9 7 5

Developm ents U n t i l 1 9 6 5

jfn 1968, in Naval Headquarters, the D irectorate of aval Education w as redesignated as

I n 1 9 4 4 :

D irectora te o

An

aval Education and Meteorology.

0

E x a m i n a t i o n Of ice was established in

In 1971, th e In stru cto r Branch was redesigna e

Bombay to conduct HET and ET1 tests and

assess sailors’ educational attainments before

as

E d u ca tion B ranch.

.

p

In 1 9 7 4 , a s p a r t o f th e c o m p r e h e n s i v e promotion.

Lectures on training techniques were arranged

^ o r g a n is a t io n o f N aval Tra in in g carried out by Na head qu a rters, th e m ajo r changes implemented w

for CPO and PO Schoolmasters.

Reference libraries and unit libraries were set up

To cope with the increasing level of techn0!°f?Jg

in ships and establishments and provided with

w e a p o n s , s e n s o r s and ecluiPrnent1J tl tjon 0f

publications, both local and from Britain.

service, the minimum educational qua

^

The

In te r-U n iv e rs itie s

B oard

(In d ia )

E d u c a tio n O ffic e r s on en try was ra

vsicSi

recommended to all the universities in India that

M a s te r s d e g r e e in M a t h e m a t i c s .

duate

the Navy's HET examination be recognised as

Chemistry or

equivalent to Matriculation.

E

n g l i s h with phy s*cs.

echanicaJ

le v e l a n d d e g r e e in E l e c t r i c a l /

m

The Inter-Universities Board (India) accepted

Naval Headquarters suggestion that Navigation

Engineering.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/359

(iii) Commission W orthy (CW)

and Meteorology be introduced as a degree

Scheme for sailors

~

subject in Indian Universities.

(iv) In-service Hindi Exam inations

In 1954, N a v a l H e a d q u a r te r s in t r o d u c e d th e (Uchh, M adhyam ik and Prarambhik

Pariksha)

^

Educational T e s t One (M odified), ie ET1(M ), for Cook (v) Higher Rank (Technical)

Twice

and Stew ard sailors w hose educational standards on

(c) Command/Professional Managem ent

Once

entry w ere low er than those o f other sailors.

and Staff College Entrance

T o h e lp im p r o v e t h e ir le v e l o f s c ie n t ific a n d (C/PM & SCE) Exam inations

t e c h n ic a l

k n o w le d g e

a n d

in c r e a s e

t h e ir

for officers

com prehension o f professional training, officers and s a ilo r s w e r e im p a r t e d t r a in in g in E le c t r o n ic s , N

a

v

a

l I n

s

t i t u

t e

o

f E

d

u

c

a

t i o

n

a

l a n d Train in g

M a th em a tic s, T h e r m o d y n a m ic s etc. By 1965, th e T

e

c h

n

o

l o

g

y

( N

I E

T

T

)

In stru cto r B ranch w a s resp on sib le fo r all scien tific E d u c a tio n o f f ic e r s u s e d t o b e t r a in e d in “training and m athem atical instruction, in clu d in g instru ction tech n ology" d u r in g th e ir in itia l tra in in g . Later, it was in the theoretical 'aspects o f technical subjects.

co n sid ered n e c e s s a r y t h a t a ll in s tru c to rs in training e s ta b lis h m e n ts s h o u ld b e a c q u a in te d w ith "training D

e v e l o p

m

e n

t s B

e t w

e e n

1 9 6 5 a

n

d

1 9 7 5

m eth o d s” . D is c u s s io n s w e r e h e ld w ith the Technical In 1 9 6 6 , E d u c a tio n O ff ic e r s w e r e g iv e n th e T e a c h e r s T r a in in g I n s t it u t e a t M a d r a s . In 1971, a responsibility o f im parting Russian language training N aval In stitu te o f E d u c a tio n w a s s e t up a t Cochin. In to th e p e r s o n n e l b e in g d e p u te d fo r th e R u s s ia n 1974, th e s c o p e o f t h e I n s t i t u t e w a s expanded to a c q u is it io n s . E d u c a t io n O ffic e r s s t a r t e d b e in g in clu d e ‘T r a in in g T e c h n o lo g y ” a n d it w a s renamed as deputed to the School o f Foreign Languages in Delhi.

t h e N a v a l I n s t it u t e o f E d u c a t i o n a l a n d T ra in in g T e c h n o lo g y (N IE T T ). T h e I n s t it u t e co n d u cted in-T

r a

i n

i n

g

E

s t a

b

l i s h

m

e n

t s

se rv ic e tr a in in g fo r o ffic e r s a n d s a ilo r s in Teaching In the b a sic tra in in g establishm ents, th e Education M eth ods an d T r a in in g T e c h n o lo g y .

D e p a r tm e n t p r e p a r e d in s tr u c t io n a l h a n d o u ts in sim p le E n glis h to h elp sa ilo rs w h ose k n ow led g e o f R

e f e

r e n

c e L

i b

r a

r i e

s

a

n

d

M

a

i n

t e

n

a

n

c e

G

r a n t s

English w as inadequate.

T h e need for books for self-study whilst preparing ft#

W h e n p re p a rin g fo r the E T 1 and E T 1 (M) tests, E T 1 and H E T , and for m agazin es for e n h a n c in g s a ilo r s h a d to d e p e n d on s ta n d a rd te x t b o o k s on general awareness used to be met by libraries in M athem atics and English. Th ese text books could not

shore establishments and ships. Due to linn e

p r o v id e s ta n d a r d is e d s u b je c t m a te r ia l to s a ilo r s servin g in th e va riou s naval establishm ents all over funds, however, they could not be a(^e<^u aieDS

In d ia . T h e p r o b le m w a s o v e r c o m e in 1 9 7 4 by equipped. I n 1 9 6 5 , the Government sancti0^ 000

p r e p a r in g o n e s t a n d a r d p u b lic a t io n e a c h fo r 50,000 to g eth er w ith a r e c u r r in g g r a n t o f Rs M a t h e m a t ic s , E n g lis h la n g u a g e a n d G e n e r a l fo r th e n e x t t h r e e y e a r s fo r s e t t in g u p ^ e^e re ?ue Kn ow ledge for the E T 1 test.

L ib r a r ie s in t h e t r a i n i n g e s t a b lis h m e n t s . In

^

c o u r s e , t h e f o l l o w i n g r e f e r e n c e l i b r a r i e s we E

x

a

m

i n

a

t i o

n

O

f f i c e

established:

Over the years, the Examination Office’s

responsibility expanded to cover the following

•

T h e C en tral R e fe re n c e L ib ra ry in Bom bay-additional tests:

•

C om m and R e fe re n ce Libraries in Visakhapa

and C ochin.

Annual

•

R eferen ce L ib ra ry in G oa.

. .ng

Frequency

•

R e fe r e n c e

L i b r a r i e s

in

m a jo r

t r a lJlT a

(a) R e c r u i t m e n t T e s t s

es ta b lis h m e n ts a t A G R A N I. C IR C A R S , H A M ^ 1

(i)

Direct Entry (Matriculate Entiy MER)

SHIVAJI an d V A LS U R A .

and Artificer Apprentices

Twice

(ii) Direct Entry (Non-Matriculate

T h e C e n tr a l R e fe r e n c e L ib r a r y a t Bom ay Entry NMER)

Twice

established to:

(iii) Direct Entry (MER/NMER)

Sports Entry

Twice

•

m a in ta in r e fe r e n c e lib r a r ie s in s h ip s a n d non (b)

t r a in in g e s t a b lis h m e n t s b y is s u i n g b o o k s E

d

u c a t i o n

a l T e s t s

(i)

HET/ET1/ET1 (M)

tem porary lo a n and

Twice

(ii) Navy Entry Artificer Scheme

Twice

36Q/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

issue on p e rm a n e n t loan, books o f general

In 1990, the Examinations Office shifted from

• t0terest to ships and establishments, to meet the Bombay to Delhi, under the Directorate of Naval

needs of officers and sailors in Bombay.

Education. In 1991, it was decided that.women

officers could join the Navy in the Education Branch

Similarly, the Com m and Reference Libraries at

and the Logistic and Law cadres. The first batch of

Vishakhapatnam and C o ch in and the Reference

nine women Education officers joined the Branch in

Library in Goa m et th e requ irem en ts of training July 1992 on a seven-year short service commission,

establishments in their respective stations who were

extendable to ten years.

not in receipt of reference library grants.

In addition to the three Command Reference

Libraries, there are today thirty eight Naval/Met

Developm ents After 1975

Reference Libraries in the Navy, apart from unit run

libraries.

In 1982, “Meteorology” was made the responsibility of

a separate D ir e c to r a te o f N aval Oceanology & Future o f the Education Branch

Meteorology (DNOM).

With the general rise in the educational standard of

In 1988, the q u a lific a tio n s for entry into the officer and sailor intake, the basic function o f the Education Branch were further broadened to include

Education Branch became diluted. The requirement

a post g ra d u a te d e g re e in Computers/graduate o f the Navy became to train its personnel rather than

u pHt irate them. Additional responsibilities like EDP.

degree in Computer Engineering.

,

anointm ents in NCC and resettlement.

In 1988, NIETT was augmented with a Centre tor

Training Aids Production to produce quality training

aids for the Navy. Since then, the Institute has grown into the Navy’s pioneer organisation for con uc n& courses on T ra in in g Management and provi mg

guidance in the fabrication and effective u^lis^ 0

training aids. It conducts Instructional Tecnniq

""

Courses for ju n io r officer instructors an

r

' “ y

Management Courses for middle leve o IC^ ^ possessed.

officers possess high academic

sinCe E d u c a U o n O ra c e ^ P n g |n eer.ng n

s

also conducts profession al specialist cou

q

qualifications in

nsidered to optimally utilise

education officers, sailor-instructors a

proposals have bee

thinking is to continue

sailors. T h e In s titu te has earnerd 1

ttie

ag the

th eir services. The cu

o n ]y shQ rt s

e

certification for quality training. tt also

lesson

apex body for standardisation o sy

’

anCj

Planning and all aspects of T ra in in g

needs.

Evaluation.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/361

31

/

Naval Meteorology and Oceanology

Preamble

course, meteorological offices were established in the The Second World War highlighted the tactical

second cru iser INS M Y S O R E (1957). the aircraft importance of accurately forecasting the

carrier INS V IK R A N T (1961) th e second Naval Air meteorological conditions on, above and below the Station INS IiANSA (1962) and in Port Blair (1969).

surface of the sea:

At Naval Headquarters, the post of Staff Officer

M eteorolog y w as c re a te d in 1957 to assist the

•

Anomolous propagation conditions affected

Director of Naval E du cation in adm inistering the radars and wireless communications.

M eteorological s e rv ic e . In 1966, th is post was

•

Hydrological conditions affected sonars.

uPgraded to Deputy Director Meteorology in the rank

Humidity, temperature and pressure conditions

o Commander (Education). In 1968, the Directorate

affected the accuracy of naval gunfire and

0 N aval E d u c a tio n w a s re d e s ig n a te d as the

•

Wind conditions affected naval flying operations.

irectorate of Naval Education and Meteorology.

In 1970, the Naval Met offices at Bombay and

Developments Till 1975

ochin were provided with dedicated meteorological

telep rin ter ch an n els. T h is h e lp e d to provide Meteorology

uninterrupted meteorological data o f the region for Meteorological training in the Navy began in 1949

ne ing aircrew and issuing weather warnings.

when an Education officer was deputed to the British n 1973, Automatic Picture Transm ission (APT)

Navy for a course in naval meteorology. He in turn reception fa c ilitie s

w e re

p ro v id e d

to the

™ P" ted meteorological training to four officers of m eteorological offices at C ochin . P ort Blair and the Education Branch and four sailors in 1952. Thev nf^th ard

Y 1KJRANT- APT enabled satellite pictures

were taught to keep a continuous weather-watch tim KPr^Vailing weather to actually be seen in real

and record and dissem inate meteorological

me, by day and by night. In due course APT facilities

observations to air traffic controllers, aircrew and TrainfXrt cfued t0 a11 naval met offices and the Met ships, to code and decode weather messages and to training School.

issue weather warnings.

INsT^APnr^ATraining Ce^ ’ w h ic h had sta rted in the With the advent of the Naval Air Arm, a regular fledged m

g r e w in d u e c o u r s e into a full

meteorological service started in 1952. Naval air arm eventuaiu

^a i? in g S ectio n by 1968 and was

sailors were trained as “meteorological observers”

Training q J

e s i g n a t e d as th e M e t e o r o l o g i c a l They were required to take surface and upper air met 1 raining School in 1974.

observations, do their coding and decoding, receive w e r e ^ n ^ i f^ S cim lle (F A X ) w e a t h e r c h a r t reco rd ers and transmit observations on teleprinter, and chart V i s a k h T m f 0

m

^ a v a * M e t o f f i c e s a t C o c h in ,

and plot the data on met charts. This enabled the b o a r d MYSORR B° mbay' Goa- P o r t B la i r a n d on

“weather forecaster” to analyse the charts and issue e n a b le d m et

V I K R A N T - T h i s e q u ip m e n t

forecasts. A teleprinter circuit with the India Met u p p e r a ir o h n rt r

r e c e i v e a n a l y s e d s u r f a c e a n d Department enabled met observations to be obtained air Charts fr°™ th e India Met D e p a r t m e n t.

from all over India and adjoining countries.

Since Education officers u su ally possessed

Oceanography

sound knowledge of mathematics and physics, they were trained as “weather forecasters" by the India Met Naval eSchoo^7o°f ^

mGt officer was sent to the Royal

Department at Poona.

(RNSOMO) in B ritafnT™ /0®7 3nd Oceanography

Meteorological offices were established in the

On return

h e wa

tra in in g in Oceanography-

Naval Air Station INS GARUDA and onboard the

Hydrographic O f f i J n D e h P° i nted t0 thC Na,V?o flagship INS D ELHI to provide weather and

produce a document

n

WherC hC hClP

r

meteorological inform ation to the fleet. In due range prediction

Sonn th

? graphy

S°r,

n t h e r e a f t e r , a s e c o n d o f f ic e r

w as deputed to the US Naval Oceanographic Office in Washington DC for train in g in oceanography. On fo re ca stin g ‘ the

° cean°graphic

return, he was appointed to INS GARUDA where the Ocean

hy was conducJ

«

£

Seaking anti submarine helicopters were based.

In 1974:

Coch n University. The second Oceanography

capsule course was conducted by JIT Delhi in March

. Oceanography w as introduced as a topic for study in Met s a ilo rs’ specialist courses and in In 1981, sanction was received for three digital Observers and Sub Lieutenant courses.

e le c tr o n ic system s to be installed at Naval Air

► Oceanographic fo recastin g was made the

S tation s GARUDA and HANSA to enhance safety responsibility of met officers.

during landing and take off:

•

The Ceilograph which gave digital printouts of the D evelopm ents After 1975

heights of lowest cloud over an air station.

•

The Skopograph which gave digital printouts of In December 1980. an Oceanographic Forecasting

runway visibility and

Cell (OFC) was established at Cochin under the

•

The Current Weather Instrument System (CWIS) operational control of the FOCINCSOUTH. This

which gave digital printouts o f weather marked the beginning of oceanographic studies and parameters like humidity, temperature, wind

forecasting in the Navy. The OFC was located in the direction and speed.

premises, of the Met School and headed by the officer OFP’k ^ keen trained by the American Navy. The F o rm a tio n o f the D ire cto ra te o f Naval s terms of reference were to liaise with the Oceanology and Meteorology (DNOM)

Physical and Oceanographic Laboratory In 1982. the need was felt for the establishment of a (NPOL) located in Cochin and:

dedicated Directorate of Oceanology. The rationale was:

Provide a general description of the major

oceanographic and acoustic

.

O ceanographic forcasting was vitally important

factors affecting a

specified area of operation for a

for anti submarine warfare.

specified forecast

,

it was n ecessary to safeguard the sec u rity Period, the sea state at the beginning of the

a sp ects

a ris in g out

o f the

in crea sed

forecast period and significant changes expected oceanographic activity in Indian waters.

during the forecast period.

.

The Navy’s existing arrangements to plan, co

Collect and store processed oceanographic da a < ordinate and progress oceanographic tasks were in the form of atlases, charts and reports issue by the NPOL and the Chief Hydrographer.

S S s h o u l d assist in ocean development.

Collect oceanographic information, records an

research outputs from agencies like the Na on

A new D irectora te o f N aval O c e a n o lo g y and

,

,o«= therefore established and the met

Institute of Oceanography, OSTA and ON

•

Meteoro10^

'

0f Naval Education and

Provide forecasts of thermal structure

COmP° n^ w a s transferred to the new Directorate.

salinity profiles based on the available pas

^

Mete07 ' r®Jhis directorate became the single nodal and current oceanographic observations

J e n c y dealing with all aspects o f naval oceanology from fleet ships during exercises.

, fon 0f

Devise 5*r»H of.nHorHicP mdes for transmission

Devise and standardise codes

ands7 n

e‘ ee0 rj't0sgyin c e p t,o n th e d ir e c t o r a t e h as

oceanic data and forecasts.

naravhy to

contributed/undertaken the following:

Undertake selective studies in oce^n, hrljques

update and validate the forecasting

„ „ o rd in a tio n o f the N a vy 's h elp fo r S e c o n d

developed by

*

Indian Scientific Antarctica Expedition in 1982-

N P O L .

. tpraCtion in

Undertake studies on air-sea ir[

cleS.

collaboration with

R en dering co n su lta n cy a b o u t d e s ig n o f p o la r

N P O L and other as

of

*

re s e a rc h v e s s e ls fo r D e p a r tm e n t o f O c e a n A s s i s t the M e t T r a i n i n g S c h o o l in naval personnel in o c e a n o g ra p y- -introductory C ^ n lt o N n g 1 th e p r o g r e s s or o c e a n o g r a p h ic Although met officers studie

advanced

research undertaken by the DRDO and by CSIR s

oceanography" as a topic during

reaiised that

scientific organisations.

Weather Forecaster’s training, it w

TRANSITIO N T O TR IU M PH /363

Participation in UNESCO's Inter Governmental

data collection, its utilisation and annUmf.

Oceanographic Commission at Paris.

Naval activities.

tl0n for

Organisation of the oceanographic course in the

•

Interacted w ith In d ia Met Departm

Centre for Advance Studies in Atmospheric and

Conferences of Forecasting Officers

^ in

Fluid Sciences at 11T. New Delhi.

Functioned as a think-tank for oceanographic

In 1985, the Meteorology Training School in ins Garuda w as renam ed as the School for Naval

Oceanology and Meteorology.

364/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

32

Welfare

Indian Naval Benevolent Association

•

After the 1971 war, an ad-hoc grant was given to

the bereaved families.

The In d ian N a v a l B e n e v o le n t Association was Command Benevolent Funds

established in 1942 as a registered charitable

organ isation . Its o b je c t is to relieve financia The Association places funds at the disposal of the

hardship/distress am ongst serving and ex-naval

three Commands and INS India to meet extreme

personnel an d th e ir d epen den ts. Its sources of emergent requirements.

income are:

Family Assistance Scheme 1969

•

Subscriptions from serving naval personnel.

The Family Assistance Scheme was introduced in

January 1969 to provide regular income in the

•

Donations.

of a monthly allowance to bereaved families.

•

Interest on Investments.

•

Contribution from the Armed Forces ene

’ m e membership o f the

Fund.

for all serving nava1 persw

^

Rs 3Q

•

AUocaUoits*from the IN Amenities F u n d ^ th e

*”dR‘ 6

welfare of ex servicemen and their a

from sailors.

1988-89 onwards.

In January 1963. membership of the f ^ “ onneL

was made compulsory for all seein g navd>Per^ sed.

following

g„ „ t depending

In April 1967, the monthly subsmpUon

t

The scale ranged from Rs 3.50 for the sen

officer to Rs 1.50 for the juniormost sail •

g w

L o a n s . T h e A ss o cia tio n sane j marriages of officers and sailors for house repairs a ^ medical d au g h ter/sister and to sailorsROILfeeri l 96^ ancl expenses and higher education-e

successful reh^bllltaueri

^ slkimg ^^Se

1975, the following changes took p a

f h i r h e v e r was earlier.

P

Retirement. A

Qn Death Within

100/. per month for the

•

Interest was waived on loan?

sailors

•

Monthly allowance of

l i w ^

who had

•

Loans were increased for the ma

hdance of the period o f 5 years to

^

For

sister/daughter.

neXt of kin 0

•

B e n e f i t s w e r e i n c r e a s e d t

others, tne ^

personnel who died in service •

^ouse repaifS-

eliding scale.

•

In 1972. loans were increased disContinued.

2 *nnre Scheme

Loans for sister's marriage we

.

in

..

o n ly 11

Sehem' PT°V,<'“ 1

G r a n t s . G ra n ts are san^ni ej based on the e x c e p t io n a l c a s e s to s e r v in g p er s han dicapp

S i o S g ^ istance:

m e r it s o f e a c h c a s e . S a ilo r s ^ S & 0n a n d s p o g c h ild re n c a n a p p ly fo r g ra n ^

rf

houSe rePa*n fp a id

• r s &

t e

g

&

p

z

s

s

z

e q u ip m e n t. S a ilo r s ca n a p p ly

norm ally P

Su r mtal contribution.

Qf Rs 50/

a fte r a n a t u r a l c a la m it y . G ra n ts a r <

„ , for

° n l y to r e t i r e d n a v a l P e r s ° n " ® ‘ en 1965 and

-

°f

mePending

e c o n o m ic a c t iv it y v e n tu re . Be

' Pe,raf e°o *d m issio n into the scheme.

th e fo llo w in g c h a n g e s to o k place.

Qn death

on oaic

•

G ra n ts w e r e in c re a s e d to the n

w h ils t in s e rv ic e .

O n D e a t h W i t h in 5 Y e a r s o f R e t i r e m e n t /

•

Availing o f c o a c h in g t h r o u g h c o rre sn n , R e le a s e / D is c h a r g e f r o m S e rv ic e . A monthly courses for jo in t E n tra n c e E x a m in a tio n s ih Ce

allow ance o f Rs 50/- per month for the

a u th o r is e d in s t it u t io n s . R e im b u r s e ™

gh

balance of the period of 5 years to those who

m ad e a va ila b le fo r th e c h ild r e n o f

Was

had contributed to the scheme for 15 years or

o f Rs 2000 for a m a x im u m o f tw o c h iW re n Sail° rS

more.

•

E x is t in g S a ilo r s .

Indian Naval A m enities Fund

O n R e t i r e m e n t / R e l e a s e / D is c h a r g e f r o m S e r v ic e . A resettlement grant not less than The IN Amenities Fund was established in 1

the total contribution.

provide welfare and amenities for serving and rPt a O n D e a t h W h ils t in S e r v ic e . Grants as per a personnel and their families.

retired

sliding scale.

The INAF’s sources o f income are:

O n D e a t h W i t h in 5 Y e a r s o f R e l e a s e /

D is c h a r g e f r o m S e r v ic e . Same as for new

•

Armed Forces Reconstruction Fund

entrants.

0 Flag Day Fund.

Naval Group Insurance Scheme 1975

•

Profits from Canteen Stores Department

>

•

fromKIndian Naval Ganteen service

A s s i s t i n g h975' the ° fficers and Sailors Family Monthly subscription from officers & sailors

f n S ,

e u

eS Were changed into the Group

Insurance Scheme. The scheme was initially run

Any income derived or donations received from

other sources for purposes o f amenities.

LiTp lnaeglS

^ ,NBA and in ass°ciation with the

Life Insurance Corporation. From October 1976

onwards. Government accorded approval for Naval

fix e d V t9? ^ , ! he qUartefrly rate

contribution was

a S S PUn 1116 SChem

e ^ParJnSly^“ a officer and 7 .

T

° f Rs 3 6 for th ^ seniormost

ancI 7 5 Paise

the jun iorm ost sailor.

Famnrt^sfaL^^Sme bSCtrhiPUOn °f the

Developments A fte r 1 9 7 5

contributions for Group Insurance were R^°3o f y officers and midshipmen and

s Naval G roup In s u r a n c e S ch em e

R s 10 J

sailors

from ^K w o *nsurance Schem e has been improved

B e n e f a s o f th e G ro u p I n s u r a n c e S c h e m e cover-onw ard s to p ro v id e h ig h e r insurance

h™G d'S^ ility cover was introduced for the first time m 1980.

^in/dependent of

r f° thS n6Xt of

Additional group insurance schemes for Aviation,

15,000 for sailors.

f° r ° ff,cers and Rs

at f ? ariu C and

personnel were introduced

op t e , e^ est of the G overnm ent from 1

Scholarship Scheme 1972

thic u t T 1981 t0 Provide additional cover for

•

T h e n

g h r i S k g r 0U P S -

Wac . ° st J^tirement Death Insurance Scheme

- —

* «

as mtroduced in 1982.

were ™den!vMaWe°;o2r “ “ rs“ d S'> « a r ships

Insurance - ' f k - c u m - s a v i n g schemes, Group s a lo r s a n d th e c h ild r e n „ f nf£

en o f s e r v in g

meanincrf i

cJlemes are intended to provide a

invalid pH amount to bereaved families and to those 197? % 3 C ti0 n or who died whilst?n cnd Saii0rs 1971 the annual scholarship r

Service. In

rehab S S - Ůt ° f Se rvice- To facilitate smooth

° f nVe y e a r s w e r e R s 300 f

f m a x im u m

to give n 10n in CiV** ^ e’

avowed-objective is als0

•

U n n .

7, ° ° f° r b o a r d e r s .

° ° f° r d a y s c h o l a r s

their

t reasonabIe amount to naval personnel on Undertaking Graduation/Posf r ,

impr0vemrpe? ent/discharg e from Service. Major first comn

in .^ e sclleme were effected a^ter^h

salient f

ensive actuarial review in 1988. T

daughters of serving andader aVailable for the

from Jam i Ur<Ts

the revised scheme, in tr o d u c e

number of scholarships

sail°rs. The

m January 1989. were:

tacnpa* lnsu rance cover with a relatively lesser

•

Pamv in ? m° nth]y P^m ium .

qnd

366/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

in war tirneSUI*anCe COver for death in Peace ‘

.

Paym ent o f s a vin g elem ent in addition to the insurance cover for death and invalidment.

fin a n c ia l d is tr e s s and p ro vid e su cco u r to Naval pensioners in distress.

Since over 99.8% o f Naval officers and sailors

fUnd iS giVCn an annuaI a,Iocation from the

retire hale and hearty, the thrust of the schemes has IN A F to augm ent its resources. Existing schem es been to improve the saving element substantially.

have been improved and new schemes introduced:

After the award of the Fifth Pay Commission and

Introduction o f the Octogenarian Grant and its

taking in to c o n s id e r a tio n the erosion in the su bsequ ent enhancem ent from Rs 18000 to Rs

purchasing power o f the rupee:

25000.

•

The insurance cover has been increased to Rs 7

•

T h e en h a n cem en t o f fin a n cia l assista n ce for lacs for officers and Rs 3.5 lacs for sailors with a

specialised medical treatment from Rs 10.000 to

m on th ly c o n trib u tio n o f Rs 500 and Rs 250

Rs 1 lac each for mem ber and spouse towards

respectively.

s u r g e r y and tre a tm e n t fo r C a rd io -V a s c u la r diseases. Cancer. Renal transplant and complete

•

The Post Retirem ent Death Insurance Scheme,

Hip/Knee joint replacement.

which provides insurance cover for death upto 15

•

Enhancement o f the ex-gratia grant on death to

y e a rs a fte r ie tir e m e n t or 70 years of age the next o f kin to Rs 10.000 for officers and Rs whichever is earlier, has been enhanced to Rs 2.5

5000 for sailors.

lacs for officers and Rs 1.5 lacs for sailors with a

•

Introduction o f ex-gratia grant for the marriage o f

one-time term premium of Rs 8000 and Rs 2700

children o f widows o f naval personnel who die in

respectively.

service or as pensioners.

•

E n h a n cem en t in the ann u al sch o la rsh ip for

INBA H ousing-loan-Schem e

h ig h e r e d u c a tio n to the ch ild re n o f Naval To meet the essential requirement of a dwelling unit,

pensioners to Rs 3000 for day scholars and Rs

a Housing loan Scheme, directly financed from NGIF,

6000 for boarders.

was introduced in 1988 after the Government had

expressed its in a b ility to extend the benefit of a In d ia n Naval Am enities fu n d

housing loan o f Rs 2.5 lacs to Service personnel as T h e c o n trib u tio n rates h ave been p ro g ress ively was being given to Civilian Central Government

revised. The present rates o f contribution effective em ployees. In Novem ber 1997, the quantum of

Septem ber 97 are Rs 60 per quarter by officers and

housing loan was increased to Rs 7 lacs for officers Rs 18 per quarter by sailors.

and Rs 3.5 lacs for sailors, subject to repayment Th e m ajor w elfare projects presently hnanccc

capacity.

from INAF are:

.

Augmenlation o f Kindergarten and Naval Public

fN BA ’s S ubsidiary Fund

Schools.

In 1988, a s e p a r a t e INBA S u b s i d i a r y F u n d w a s i n s t i t u t e d f o r t h e w e l f a r e o f ex-Naval personnel and

^ugmenTaUon o f MI Room and Dental Centres tor

t h e ir f a m ilie s . It s t a r t e d w ith a n in itia l c o rp u s o s

av ^prvicemen and their families.

c r o r e f r o m t h e IN A m e n i t i e s F u n d a n d m a r k e d a Promotion of sports and adventure activities.

w a t e r s h e d i n t h e h i s t o r y o f t h e INBA to alleviat o f D i s b u r s . m j n f c f r c ^ ^

S tatistics

IN

Naval Group

A m en ities

Family Assistance

Insurance

Fund

INBA

Scheme

Allowances

Schemes wef 1 •

Year

Loans

Grants

4.83.300

32.500

3.39.720

1964

5.64.150

21.610

45.534

3.10.485

1965

4.85.900

37.060

26.234

5.OS.060

1966

6.23.920

28.864

51.878

6.27.320

1967

12.13.890

77.054

9.88.763

1968

15.52.455

13.250

68.404

10.72.239

1969

18.15.086

40.000

54.934

6.96.259

1970

18.24,760

64,050

16.47.815

78.257

1971

12.79,318

2.08.800

30.80.SS9

8.37.175

1972

22.69.551

2.32.250

30.53.592

3.28.590

1973

34.78.991

2.30.000

42.53.000

2.05.009

fi.83.118.

1974

21.21.074

5.67.326

M2.84.606.

1.87.808

1975

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/367

23.45.285

6 74.720.

9. 00.558,

1976

32.22.210

•

C h ild re n o f th e s t a f f o f K V s and the KV

The major projects financed were.

Organisation, and ch ild ren o f the employees of

.

KG Schools at HAMLA, SHIVAJ1, Cochin and New

IITs for KVs loca ted in th eir cam puses, are Delhi

bracketed with transferable defence personnel.

•

Loans for purchase of buses

•

INCS Complex at Cochin and Improvements in

Naval Public Schools

Canteen Facilities in ships and establishments.

When the children of Central Government employees

•

Furniture and furnishings in messes.

became eligible for admission to Kendriya Vidyalayas.

problems arose for the admission of naval children in Educational Facilities For Children of Naval

stations where the KVs were not sited within the Personnel

campus of naval establishments. To overcome this problem, the Navy opened Naval Public Schools,

Kendriya Vidyalayas in the Navy

funded from the Navy’s N o n -P u b lic Funds and One of the colateral responsibilities of the Education

affiliated to the C en tral B oard of Secondary Branch was to plan and organise the availability of

Education. Initially, these schools were started in ed u cation al fa c ilitie s for the ch ildren of naval stations w hich did not have a major naval

personnel. Naval “Childrens Schools” were started

establishment. Later, Naval Public Schools were also at Bombay, Cochin, Goa, Karanja, Lonavala and

set up at those stations which had KVs located within Visakhapatnam on naval land.

the campus of naval establishments. At present, Concurrently, the Central Government’s Ministry

there are Naval Public Schools at Delhi, Kochi.

of Education established a chain of higher secondary

Mumbai, V isakhapatnam , Goa, Port Blair,

sch ools all over the country under the Kendra

Arrakonam and Lonavala.

Vidyalaya Scheme to prepare students for the All India Higher Secondary Examination of the CBSE.

Navy Education Society

The objective of the KVs was to provide subsidised

The Navy Education Society w as form ed in October educational facilities and hostel accommodation for

1986. Its objective is to promote education, science, children of Armed Forces personnel, civilians paid

c u ltu re and fin e a rts a m o n g s t th e c h ild r e n and from the D efence Services Estim ates and other

families of naval personnel. The Society governs the categories of Central Government employees who

Naval Public Schools and the KG Schools at various were liable to frequent transfers. In due course, the naval stations; including reportedly the biggest KG

naval C hildren’s Schools were taken over by the

School in Asia at Bombay. It is also responsible for Ministry of Education and administered as Kendriya

the formulation of broad policies, standardisation o Vidyalayas.

cu rricu la and a d m in istra tio n /se ttin g up 0

By following common text books and a common

educational institutions at naval stations.

syllabus, KVs ensure continuity when children move

from one KV to another. The medium of instruction is

Military Schools

Hindi/English. The KVs charge no tuition fee upto

Military Schools are located at Ajmer, Bangalore, class VIII and the rates of tuition fees for classes IX, X

Belgaurn, Chail and Dholpur. These are residential and XI are nominal. The priorities for admission to

institutions run on public school lines and prepare KV's, as laid down by the C entral Schools

students for the A ll In d ia H igher Secondary Organisation, are:

Exam inations conducted by the C B S E and the

•

Children of transferable defence personnel.

entrance examination to the NDA. These schools

•

Children o f transferable Central Government

conduct classes from standards V to XI with Englis employees.

as the medium of in stru ctio n . The maximum

•

C h ild ren o f o ffic e rs o f A ll India Services, strength of each school is 300 boarders and 30 day autonomous bodies/projects (fully financed by

scholars except at Ajmer and Dholpur whose boarder

the G overn m en t) and public undertakings/

strengths are 230 and 200 respectively. 60% of the corporations v/hose services may be transferable.

vacancies of boarders in these schools are reserve

•

Children o f non-transferable defence personnel

for serving JCOs and ORs, NCs(E), civilian clerks etc.

and Central Government employees.

50 seats are reserved for sons of JCO § and ORs an

•

Other floatin g population which includes the

their equivalents in the Navy and Air Force, killed in civilian population desirous of joining the pattern

action. The remaining 40% vacancies are earmarke

of studies adopted in the KVs.

for the sons of officers and civilians. For the reserve 3 6 8 / T R A N S IT IO N T O TRIUMPH

vacancies, boys are ad m itted in the V class on the India Higher Secondary Examination of the Central

basis of an all In d ia ad m ission test conducted by Board o f S econdaiy Education, and the Entrance

Army Headquarters. They must have reached the age

Examination of the NDA conducted by the UPSC.

of 9 years and should not be more than iO 1/2 years Admission to Sainik Schools is made in Standard

on 01 Jul of the yea r o f admission. Some boys can be V and is restricted to boys between the ages o f 9 and admitted to h igher classes, subject to availability of 10 years. Boys between the ages of W and 11 are vacancies.

also considered for admission to class VI in the few schools which have vacancies in that class, which

Sainik S ch ools

however is restricted to boys from the state in which These are resid en tia l schools for boys, providing a the school is located.

public school education with a military bias. A chain

67% o f the seats in each school are reserved for

of Sainik Schools has been established in the various

boys belonging to the state in which the school is states in the cou n try, prim arily to serve as feeder situated. A number of vacancies are reserved for the

institutions to tra in boys to enter the NDA. The sons o f defence service personnel and ex-servicemen.

schools are administered by an autonomous board of Boys are admitted to the schools on the basis of an all India entrance examination held at various centres in governors under the chairmanship of the Minister of the countiy in Februaiy each year.

Defence. These schools prepare students for the All

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/369

Changes in Naval H eadquarters Organisation

U p jj aftet! independence in 1947, the staff at Naval abolished and its Directorates redistributerl h*t

OfficerMreO'sT aThrOUPed

®Ve PrinCipaI Staff

umcers (PSO s) These were the Chief of Staff Chief

fnfgsrScNS1

^

BranCheS-

of Person nel, C h ie f o f M aterial, C h ief of M

a l C r , ' a l

Administration and Chief of Naval Aviation.

This functioned s a t i X S ^ u n U l ^ i g ^ ' w , ^ 1^ '

com bined im p a c t b ega n to h

r ln

V

° the

The 1955 Reorganisation

modernisation and self sufficiency.

o f Srowth'

The 1962 Reorganisation

following^tmcTure"183ti0n ° f N H 9 resulted in the

^

^

] ^

] (Rear Admiral)

Chief Hydrographer

Civil Engineering

Training

Education

Supply Branch

Medical Service

Civilian Personnel

Cloth

Judge Advocate General

»ng and Victualling.

c h i e f o f m a t e r i a l

(Commodore)

Fleet Maintenance

Naval Construction

Marine Engineering

Armament Inspection

Electrical Engineering

Stores

Scientific Research

Weapons & Equipme,u

gupp™Snt'

(Captain)

Changes from 1965 to 1968

M

a

t he C h le f o f Personnel and the C hief o f manpower from 2 ° oon ? 4° Crores and increase in T ,

'^e’’e uPgraded in rank to Rear Admiral.

em phasis on s e lf suf°f°

3 l ’ °0 0 . With greater

The D efen ce Plan 1966-71 had accepted in

prod>-'ction of ships W(,‘

cy in th e indigenou s

p rin ciple the N avy's expansion program m e at an " atu re an d scope 0f and ammunition, the

H e a d q u a r t e r s c h a n g e d s u b s t a r ° i r k l ° aCl ^ N a V a l

overload on all of them as a result of the Navy’s

In 1966 the Director of the Submarine Arm was

development.

sanctioned and placed under the Deputy Chief of the

The need for the appointment of Vice Chief of the

Naval Staff to be tenable by a Vice Admiral so as

NaV* n ? 9 6 7 , t h e D e p u t y C h i e f o f N a v a l S t a f f w a s r e to better supervise and coordinate work in Naval d e s i g n a t e d a s V i c e C h i e f o f t h e N a v a l S ta ff, a n d th e Headquarters and to enable Government to have

C h i e f o f N a v a l A v i a t i o n w a s r e d e s ig n a t e d a s A ss is ta n t a choice between two Vice Admirals

(FOCINCWEST and VCNS) when considering a

of the Naval

successor to a retiring CNS.

upgraded in m nk

Adntral. Al.o Ir,1968. » * »

The need for a new Logistics Branch under a

Chief of Logistics in the rank of Rear Admiral to

deal with all matters concerning stores, clothing.

L e a n d e r P r o j e c t , d e a l i n g w i t h t h e c o n s t r u c t i o n o f t h e L e a n d e r c la s s fn g a tc s . w a p the rank of Rear Admiral.

Directorate of

To relieve the overload of he Uir

under the Chief of Material.

need

Personnel Services, by splitting

By mid 1968. it became clea^that

directorates.

to fur’ h e r r a t i o n a l i s e t h e l^ s l o m a ]jes s o u g h t to

a n d t h e w o r k

K lio a d

u . S

o o

u m

n e

« . o f

— t

h

— e

a n o

R e o r g a n is a t io n

b e r e m e d i e d w e r e :

H S E S S S 2 S * « * - *■ ‘“ re,*,ne « « *

Chief Hydrographer

plans

Civil Engineering

Weapon Policy

O perations

& Tactics

Intel igence

S ignals

Meteorology

Medical Service

Judge Advocate

General

S

(ADM)

Leander

M a rin e E n g in e e r in g

Project -

E le c tr ic a l E n g in e e r in g

Scientific

IR&D)

w e a p o n s & E q u ip ™ ™ 1

Fleet ^ ^ g f n i c t i o n

Nava1 Co InspcCtion

A d vis er

Civil

Engineering

Supply Branch

Civilian Personnel

Stores.

c upply.

Armamen

alUng

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/371

Clothing & V1

aircraft.

Changes from 1970 to 1972

The induction of gas turbine propulsion.

In 1970, a deep exam in ation was launched to

o

The acquisition of vessels from Russia with their reorganise Naval Headquarters on functional lines.

new philosophies and practices in the fields of Some of the areas examined were:

maintenance, logistics and training, which were

su b sta n tially d iffe re n t and d istinct and

•

Whether the Staff Branch should be comprised of

irreconcilable with extant practices.

E xecutive officers only or should T ech nical

® The m arch tow ards s e lf su fficie n cy and the officers also participate in taking staff decisions.

indigenous construction programme ranging

•

Should the Air and Submarine Arms be separate

from 200 ton Seaw ard D efence Boats, and

branches.

Landing Craft to 3000 ton LST’s, 2000 ton Survey

•

Should E n gin eerin g and other sp ecialist

Vessels and the Leander class frigates.

d irecto ra tes look after “T ra in in g " in their respective fields or should these branches be

The salient features of the 1972 reorganisation represented in the Directorate of Naval Training.

were:

E xten sive

discu ssion s

follow ed.

The

°

The creation of the Deputy Chief of the Naval Staff

organisational lessons learnt during the conflict with

(DCNS) in the rank of Rear Admiral, responsible Pakistan in December 1971 were incorporated and

for “Operations" and the associated disciplines of the revised organisaUon was implemented in 1972.

intelligence and sig n a ls, leaving VCNS to

concentrate on the policy and planning functions The 1972 Reorganisation

of the Staff’Branch.

•

The upgradation in rank of Chief of Personnel and

The 1972 Reorganisation took numerous factors into

account:

Chief of Material to Vice Admiral.

•

The creation of three A ssistant Principal Staff

•

T he need to stren gth en the policy m aking

Officers (APSOs) in the rank of Rear Admiral viz apparatus to respond quickly to situations and

Assistant Chief of the Naval Staff (Policy and also allow larger initiative to the Commands.

P la n s ) (ACNS P&P) Assistant Chief of P e r s o n n e l

•

The growth and diversification of sea going forces

(ACOP) and Assistant Chief of Material (ACOM).

and the doubling of manpower since 1962.

•

The creation of the new D irectorate of Naval

•

T he

exp an sion

and

m od ern isation

of

Design under COM and renaming the D irector o maintenance facilities.

Stores as Director of Logistic Support.

®

T he u p d a tin g and en largin g of train in g

•

The distribution and organisation of Directorates complexes.

was rationalised eg sep aratin g w h e r e v e r

•

The establishment of the Submarine Arm.

necessary the problems of Russian and W estern

•

The la rge v a rie ty o f w eapons and m issiles, acquisitions.

com p u terised

fire

con trol

system s,

communication and electronic warfare systems.

The resultant structure of Naval Headquarters

•

T he a c q u is itio n o f very sop h isticated naval was as follows:

3 7 2 / T R A N S IT IO N T O T R IU M P H

VICE C H IE F O F THE NAVAL STAFF J (Vice Admiral) AC N S (P&P):

(Hear AdmiraJ)

Combat Policy

Chief Hydrographer

& Tactics.

Staff Duties

Plans

Scientific Research

Works

A cqu isition s

D EPU TY CHIEF OF NAVAL STAFF (Rear Admiral)

A ir S ta ff

i

Operations

Submarines

A ir M aterial

Intelligence

Signals

CHIEF OF PERSONNEL

(Vice Admiral)

A C O P R ea r A d m iral

Personnel

Training

Medical Services

Personal S ervices

Education

Judge Advocate

Civilian Personn el

& Meteorology

General

CHIEF OF MATERIAL (Vice Admiral)

(•ADM) | [a c o m [ (R ear Adm iral)

Leander Project

M arine Engineering

Dockyards &

Naval Design

Fleet Maintenance

Electrical Engineering

W eapons & Equipment

Naval Construction

[CHIEF OF l o g i s t i c s ] (Rear AdmiraJ)

Armament Supply

Supply Branch

Armament Inspection.

Logistic Support

Clothing & Victualling

The post o f C h ie f of Logistics was abolished.

Changes from 1972 to 1975

^

The Directorates of Logistic Support and

Armament Supply were placed under the Chief of

In 1973/74 the

Material for better coordination of all aspects of

D ire cto ra te °£ ^ ^ d e r ACNS IP&PI-

(DOMS) was created and p a ce recj d ir e c t ly u n d e r stores and machineiy under one branch.

In 1974/75 DO MS was p

The Directorates of Clothing and Victualling were

merged Into the Director of Supplies and placed

VCNS.

under the Chief of Personnel as both functions

C h a n g e s A fter 1975

were related to personnel.

non of Naval Headquarters

The Director of Naval Armament Inspection was

The next major reorgan sa

was necessitated by

placed under the Vice Chief of Naval Staff for

took place in January1^

ern of support and

closer supervision of munitions.

substantial " ^ f ^ g e number of new ships,

The Director of Staff Duties was redesignated as

m aintenance o

^ ^ Execu tive and

Director of Administration.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/373

34

Changes in Command and Control Structure

1965 to 1975

Eastern Fleet (FOCEF) after the arrival of the

P etya s and s u b m a rin e s fro m Russia, the In Ja n u a ry 1966, proposals were initiated to C om m odore E a s t C o a s t

(C O M E AST) at

redesignate the nomenclature of the four Naval Visakhapatnam was re-designated as Flag Officer

Operational and Administrative Authorities. In war, Commanding in C hief Eastern Naval Command

these operational authorities would be responsible (FOCINCEAST) in the rank of Rear Admiral.

for the conduct of maritime operations and

•

Commodore in Charge Cochin (COMCHIN) was

operational control of maritime forces in their re -d e s ig n a te d as C o m m o d o re Commanding respective sea areas. After harmonisation with other Southern Naval Area (COMSOUTH).

concurrent proposals for rationalisation and

•

All ships, aircraft, dockyard and logistics support

upgradation, the following major reorganisation came facilities were placed directly under the respective

into effect on 1 March 1968:

a d m in is tra tiv e and o p e r a tio n a l control of

•

The Flag Officer Bombay (FOB) who had hitherto

FOCINCWEST. FOCINCEAST and COMSOUTH.

been ju n io r to the Flag Officer Commanding

•

In 1970. COMSOUTH was upgraded to the rank

Indian Fleet (FOCIF) was re-designated as Flag of Rear Admiral and re-designated as Flag Officer

Officer Commanding in Chief Western Naval

Commanding Southern Naval Area (FO C SO U TH ).

Command (FOCINCWEST) and upgraded in rank

•

In 1971, Eastern Fleet was constituted under

to Vice Admiral.

FOCEF.

•

The Flag Officer Commanding Indian Fleet

(FOCIF) was subordinated to the Flag Officer

Soon After 19 75

Commanding in Chief Western Naval Command

(FOCINCWEST). Instead of "all front line ships,”

In 1977:

including those undergoing refit being under

•

FOCSOUTH was upgraded to the rank of Vice

FOCIF, only “operational ships" as alloted by A d m iral and re -d e s ig n a te d as F lag Officer FOCINCWEST would be under the Flag Officer

Commanding in Chief Southern Naval Com m an

Commanding Western Fleet (FOCWEF). The non-

(FOCINCSOUTH).

operational Fleet ships undergoing refit in

•

Naval O fficer in Charge, Goa (NOIC GOA) waS

Bombay Dockyard would be administered

upgraded to the rank uf Rear Adm iral and re

directly by FOCINCWEST.

designated as Flag Officer Commanding Goa Area

•

In anticipation of the formation of the Eastern (FOGA).

Fleet under the Flag Officer Commanding

35

Visits of Ships and Submarines to F o r e ig n P o r t s : 1965 to 1975

SHDP(S)

PO R T S VISITED

YEAR

REMARKS

A M A R

a)

PO RT LOUIS

MAR-APR 74

On transfer to Mauritius

A M BA

aj

ISTANBUL.CASABLANCA,

MAR-MAY 69

Homeward after Commissioning

MATADI, MAURITIUS

b)

COLOMBO

MAY-JUN 72

Southeast Asia Sailing Regatta

A M IN I

aj

KOBE.MANILA.SINGAPORE

DEC 74-JAN 75 Homeward after Commissioning

A N D A M A N

a)

NAGASAKI, HONGKONG,

JAN 74

Homeward after Commissioning

SINGAPORE

A N JA D IP

a)

G DYNIA. G OTEBORG .ANTWERP

MAY 73

Homeward after Commissioning

LE HAVKt/.LAo muvirto.bnuuo

MATADI, MAURITIUS

FEB - MAR 71

BEAS

a)

PORT SUDAN,MASSAWA,

ADEN

APR - MAY 71

b)

COLOMBO

a)

ABU DHABI.MUSCAT.BAHRAIN.

MAY-JUN 72

BETWA

BASRA. BANDAR SHAHPUR.

KUWAIT. DUBAI. RAS-AL-KHAIMA

FEB 73

b) COLOMBO, MALE

MAR 65

BRAHMAPUTRA a)

MUSCAT. BASRA

MAY-AUG 67

EXPO 67 at Montreal.Canada

DJIBOUTI.TARANTO.MALTA

b)

a l g i e r s .h a l if a x .m o n t r e a l .

POINTE AU PIERE,QUEBEC.

SUMMERSIDE. FREETOWN,

m a u r j t iu s ,

MAR-APR 70

Mauritius Independence Day

cj

^

S

^

t e n h a m .b a n g k o k

APR-MAY 70

DARSHAK

a)

j a k a r t a .s in g a p o r e

MAR 68

JAN 69

DEEPAK

a)

So^.N A GAS/^.M A M LA

b)

MAR-APR 73

MOMBASA. ZANZIBAR.

c)

d a r -e s -s a ia m

OCT 73

PENANG. COLOMBO

d)

MAR-APR 74

Mauritius Independence Day

MAURITIUS

e)

SEP 74

BANDAR ABBAS

n

JAN 75

MALE. COLOMBO

MAR 75

Mauritius Independence Day

g)

MAURITIUS

h)

MAR 68

Mauritius Independence Day

a)

SEP-NOV 69

DELHI

1V^ U^ 1 nTLE, MELBOURNE.

bj

SYDNEY,BRISBANE, AUCKLAND.

WELLING TON. FIJI. LATUKA.

poEr t d a r w i n .s in g a p o r e

FEB 71

a)

FEB 66

Homeward after Commissioning

g a n g a

PORT SAID, DJIBOUTI

MAR 70

GHARIAL

a)

SABANG. b e la w a n

bj

SEP 75

c)

l e S

^

c a s a b l a n c a .d a k a r .

FEB-APR 75

Homeward after Commissioning

a)

g h o r p a d

TAKORADI.POINT NOIRE,

MAURITIUS

HOMEWARD PASSAGE OF SHIPS AND SUBM A R IN ES

FROM THE SOVIET UNION TO INDIA - 1965 to 1975

/

/

/

A R C T I C

O C E A N

w ■

-------i

/ \

/

N.

sw /

\

a n t a r c t i c o c e a n

GODAVARI

a)

COLOMBO, MALE. GAN

FEB 69

b)

COLOMBO

FEB 71

GOMATI

a)

COLOMBO. MALE, GAN

FEB 69

g u l d a r

a)

PO R T SAID

SEP 66

lomeward after Commissioning

b)

SABANG. BELAWAN

MAR 70

c)

TRINCOMALEE

OCT 70

h i m g i r i

a)

BASRA. BAHREIN

NOV 75

KADMATT

a)

NAGASAKI. MANILA.SINGAPORE

JAN 69

Homeward alter Commissioning

KALVARI

a)

LE HAVRE. LAS PALMAS.

APR-JUN 68

Homeward after Commissioning

CONAKRY.MAURITIUS

b )

PO R T SWETTENHAM.HONGKONG

NOV-DEC 74

To Vladivostok for Medium Repairs

o) MANILA. PORT SWETTENHAM

AUG-SEP 76

Homeward after Medium Repairs

KAM ORTA

a)

NAGASAKI.MANILA.SINGAPORE

JAN 69

Homeward after Commissioning

KARANJ

a)

LA PALLICE. LAS PALMAS.

DEC 69-JAN 70 Homeward after Commissioning

LAGOS.DIEGO SUAREZ

KATCILALL

a)

HONGKONG. SINGAPORE

FEB 70

b)

COLOMBO

FEB-MAR 74

KAVARATTI

a)

HONGKONG. SINGAPORE

FEB 70

Homeward after Commissioning

b)

COLOMBO

FEB-MAR 74

Homeward after Commissioning

KESARI

a)

LE HAVRE.TUNIS.ALEXANDRIA.

SEP-OCT 75

ADEN

MAR-MAY 69

Homeward after Commissioning

KHAN.DE RI

a)

ANTWERP. CASABLANCA, MATAD1.

MAURITIUS

MAR 68

KHUKRI

a)

PENANG

FEB 71

b)

ABU DHABI.MUSCAT.SALALAH.

BAHREIN, ADEN

DEC. 69

H om ew ard a fte r C o m m is s ion in g

KILTAN

a)

HONGKONG, SINGAPORE

MAR 68

KIRPAN

a)

PENANG

FEB 71

b)

ADEN

NOV 75

c)

DUBAI. DOHA.

H om ew ard a fte r C o m m is s ion in g

FEB-APR 70

GOTEBORG.LA CORUNNA.

KURSURA

a)

TAKO RA DI. MAU RITI US

MAR 65

KUTHAR

a)

KUWAIT

MAR-APR 67

b)

BAHREIN. KUWAIT

MAR 68

c)

SINGAPORE

FEB 71

d )

ADEN

APR 71

e)

COLOMBO

SEP 74

0

BANDAR ABBAS

AUG 75

COLOMBO

MAY 66

g )

MALE.COLOMBO

M Y SO R E

a)

FEB 68

SIHANOUKVILLE

b)

FEB 69

COLOMBO, M ^ E .G A N

jviaY-JUN 72

c)

d )

: s

s

S

’

E thiopian Navy Day

j AN-FEB 73

SESEffiS3 KS»

JAN 75

Flag

e)

s h o w in g go o d w ill visit

JUN-JUL 73

0

a fter com m iss io n in g

NILGIRI

a)

SINGAPORE,COLOMBO

SEP 74

M auritius in d e p e n d e n c e Day

Homeward after C o m m ission ,n g

BANDAR ABBAS

MAR 75

b )

AUG-OCT71

c)

MAURITIUS

pALMAS,

t u n i s .t a n g i e r .l a

n i s t a r

a)

DAKAR.POINT NOIRE,

MAURITIUS

FEB 68

BANGKOK

APR 67

RAJPUT

a)

jAN-FEB 69

RANA

a)

APR 67

b )

RAN JIT

a)

male

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/377

SOURABAYA.SINGAPORE.

MAR 68

PORT SWETTENHAM

DEC 75

Homeward after Commissioning

SHARDUL

LE HAVRE, TUNIS

MAR 65

TALWAR

MUSCAT. BASRA

MAR-APR 67

ABADAN. BASRA

MAURITIUS,TEMA,TAKORADI,

FEB-APR 68

To Riga to escort Kalvari home

DAKAR.GIBRALTAR.CADIZ.

antvverp.riga

APR-JUL 68

Escorting Kalvari homeward

d)

LE HAVRE.GIBRALTAR.

CASABLANCA.LAS PALMAS.DAKAR.

CONAKRY.TAKORADI. MAURITIUS

JAN-MAR 71

Ethiopian Navy Day

c)

BAHREIN,PORT SUDAN.MASSAWA.

ADEN.ABU DHABI,MUSCAT,

SALALAH

COLOMBO

APR-MAY 71

SEP 74

g)

COLOMBO

TRISHUL

a)

ABADAN. BASPA

MAR-APR 67

b)

KUWAIT, BAHREIN.SHARJAH

JAN-FEB 69

c)

MANILA.TOKYO.KOBE.

APR-MAY 70

EXPO 70 at Tokyo, Japan.

HONGKONG,PENANG

d)

COLOMBO

MAY 71

e)

GAN

mKr 75

BUSHIRE, ABU DHABI

NOV 75

VAGHSHEER

LE HAVRE.DAKAR

MAR 75

Homeward after Commissioning

TAKORAD! MAURITIUS

VAGIR

LE HAVRE. LAS PALMAS.

MAR-APR 74

Homeward after Commissioning

TAKORADI. MAURITIUS

VAGLI

LE HAVRE, POINTE NOIRE,

NOV-DEC 74

Homeward after Commissioning

MAURITIUS

VELA

LE IiAVRE.LAS PALMAS,

NOV-DEC 73

Homeward after Commissioning

TAKORADI, MAURITIUS

VIKRANT

KUWAIT

MAR 65

BAHREIN.KUWAIT

MAR-APR 67

COLOMBO

AUG 75

BANDAR ABBAS, KUWAIT

NOV 75

Visit of Training Ships to Foreign Ports: 1965 to 1975

SHIP

PORTS VISITED

YEAR

R E M A R K S

TIR

a)

MOMBASA. SEYCHELLES

b)

COLOMBO

JAN-FEB 65

c)

S“ 'slS ' WAALEM,D«*-

OCT 65

JAN-MAR 67

d)

MOMBASA,DAR-ES-SALAAM

AUG-SEP 67

e)

“ S T

'bahre™

'

FEB-MAR 68

FEB 69

g)

h) ■SSKSIES;

SEP-OCT 70

Captain Cook Centenary

J)

SEP 74

MAR-APR 75

“ UVERV s

SEYCHELLES

EGO SUAREZ,

SEP-OCT 66

AUG-SEP 68

378/TRANSITION T O T R ,U M P H

c)

PENANG. PORT SWETTENHAM

FEB-MAR 69

SINGAPORE

cl)

DUBAI. KUWAIT. ABU DHABI,

JAN-FEB 70

ADEN. MASSAWA

e)

JAKARTA,FREMANTLE, BUNBURY

SEP-OCT 70

SOURABAYA

Captain Cook Centenary

f)

COLOMBO

MAY-71

g)

MOMBASA, ZANZIBAR. DAR-ES-

MAR-APR 73

SALAAM

h)

PENANG, COLOMBO

OCT 73

j)

SA3ANG, BELAWAN, PENANG

SEP 74

k)

P O R T LOUIS

MAR-APR 74

Tow of AMAR to Mauritius

1)

HODEIDA, ADEN

MAR-APR 75

KRISHNA

a)

DAR-ES-SALAAM,DIEGO SUAREZ,

AUG-SEP 68

SEYCHELLES

b)

BANDAR ABBAS. BAHREIN.

JAN-FEB 70

BASRA. MUSCAT, ADEN, MASSAWA

c)

MOMBASA, ZANZIBAR. DAR-ES-

MAR-APR 73

SALAAM

d)

PENANG. COLOMBO

OCT 73

e)

PO R T LOUIS

MAR-APR 74

Tow of AMAR to Mauritius

DELHI

a)

MOMBASA, ZANZIBAR. DAR-ES-

MAR-APR 73

SALAAM

b)

PENANG, COLOMBO

OCT 73

Handing over AMAR io Mauritius

c)

ADDU ATOLL. PORT LOUIS

MAR-APR 74

d)

SABANG. BELAWAN, PENANG

SEP 74

MAR-APR 75

e)

HODEIDA. ADEN

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/379

36

C o m m i s s i o n i n g s a n d D e c o M f f l i s s i o E i E g s C o m m is s io n in g o f Indian Naval Ships: 1965 to 1975

d a te

shep t y p e

NAME

17 FEB 66

Landing Ship Ta n k (M edium )

GHAR1AL

GULDAR

13 SEP 66

Landing Ship T a n k (M edium )

PAM BAN

18 FEB 67

Patrol Boat

PANVEL

18 FEB 67

Patrol Boat

PANAJI

16 MAR 67

Patrol Boat

PURI

16 MAR 67

Patrol Boat

PULI CAT

16 MAR 67

Patrol Boat

DEEPAK

20 NOV 67

Fleet Tanker

BHATKAL

08 JUN 68

Inshore M inesw eeper

KAMORTA

21 NOV 68

Petya class subm arine ch a ser

KADMATT

23 DEC 68

Petya class subm arine ch a ser

AM BA

28 DEC 68

Submarine D epot Ship

AMAR

11 JUL 69

Seaward Defence Boat M K I

KILTAN

30 OCT 69

Petya Class S ubm arine ch a ser

A JIT

09 DEC 69

Seaward Defence Boat M K I

KATCHALL

23 DEC 69

Petya Class S ubm arine C h a ser

KAVARATTI

23 DEC 69

Petya Class S ubm arine C h a ser

ATUL

11 JUN 70

Seaward Defence Boat M K I

BULSAR

19 JUN 70

Inshore M inesw eeper

VINASH

20 JAN 71

Missile Boat

NIRGHAT

29 JAN 71

Missile Boat

VIDYUT

16 FEB 71

Missile Boat

NIRBHIK

NASHAK

20 ™

71

Missile Boat

19 MAR 71

Missile Boat

VIJETA

NISTAR

Missile Boat

29 MAR 71

VEER

02 ap r 71

Submarine Rescue V essel

NIPAT

26 APR 7 1

« ^ o a t

NILGIRI

03 JUN 72

ARNALA

29 JUN 72

Leander Class Frigate

ANDROTH

30 JUN 72

£etya Class S u bm arine C h a ser

a n j a d i p

23 DEC 72

e^ a ^ ass S u bm arine C h a ser

GAJ

20 SEP 73

Petya Class S u bm arine C h a ser

ANDAMAN

28 DEC 73

pIeet Tu S

HIMGIRI

23 NOV 74

Petya Class Subm arin e C h a ser

AMINI

12 DEC 74

Leander Class Frigate

GHORPAD

16 JAN 75

Petya Class S ubm arine C h a ser

k e s a r i

15 AUG 75

Landing Ship T a n k (M edium )

SHARDUL

24 NOV 75

Landing Ship T a n k (M edium )

SHARABH

27 JAN 76

Landing Ship T a n k (M edium )

Landing Ship T a n k (M edium )

KALVARI

08 d e c 67m m iS S ,0 n ln g o f S^ m a rin e s : 1965 to 1975

k h a n d e r i

k a r a n j

06 DEC 68

04 SEP 69

k u r s u r a

DEC 69

VELA

31 AUG 73

VAGIR

03 NOV 73

VAGLI

10 AUG 74

VAG SH EER

26 DEC 74

Commissioning of Naval Air Squadrons: 1965-1975

SQUADRON

DATE

AIRCRAFT TYPE

ROLE

INAS 321

15 MAR 1969

ALOUETTE

Search & Rescue and Logistic Support

INAS 330

17 APR 1971

SEAKING

Anti Submarine

INAS 561

15 SEP 1971

HUGHES 300

Helicopter Training

SAR ALOUETTE

INAS 331

15 MAY 1972

MATCH Role

Frigate borne Helicopter

INAS 336

20 DEC 1974

SEAKING

Anti Submarine

Soon After 1975

INAS 312

18 NOV 1976

Super Constellation

Maritime Reconnaissance

exIAF

INAS 315

07 OCT 1977

IL 38

Maritime Reconnaissance and Anti

Submarine Warfare (MRASW)

C o m m is s io n in g o f Shore Establishm ents: 1965 to 1975

LOCATION

ROLE

E S TA B LIS H M E N T

DATE

COIMBATORE

Petty Officers Leadership School

INS AGRANI

18 SEP 65

GOA

Naval Hospital

INHS JEEVANTI

18 APR 66

VISAKHAPATNAM

Submarine Headquarters

INS VIRBAHU

19 MAY 71

OKHA

Advance Base

INS DW ARKA

26 NOV 72

BOMBAY (Colaba)

Missile Boat Headquarters

INS AG NIBAH U

09 JAN 73

(Earlier TRATA-2 since 1971)

NICOBARS (Kamorta)

Advance Base

28 SEP 73

INS KARDIP

BOMBAY (Karanja)

Missile Preparation Facility

07 JUN 74

INS TU N IR

Naval Establishment

CALCUTTA

05 JUL 74

INS NETAJI SUBHASH

(Earlier H O OGHLY since 1959)

Naval Hospital

PORT BLAIR

07 OCT 74

Integrated Type Training School

INHS DHANVANTARI

VISAKHAPATNAM

21 DEC 74

for Russian Acquisitions

INS SATAVAHANA

Naval Academy

GOA

05 JAN 76

INS MANDOVI

Of Indian Naval Ships: 1965 to 1975

Decommissioning

SHIP TYPE

d a t e

SHDPS

Tanker

31 d e c 67

Fleet Destroyer

SHAKTI

30 SEP 71

Escort Destroyer Hun C ass

RANA

31 MAY 72

Escort Destroyer (Hunt Classj

GOMATI

31 JUL 72

M in esw eep er/ D ivin g T e n d e r

GANGA

31 JUL 72

Fleet Tug

KONKAN

30 SEP 72

Inshore minesweeper

HATHI

31 DEC 72

Fleet Destroyer

ug patrol Boat

b i m l i p a t n a m

30 JUN 73

Central Board °

Patroi Boat

RAJPUT

15 JUN 74

Central Board of H e " ™ pa(roI Boat

SAVITRI

15 JUN 74

Central B o S d of Revenue Patrol Boat

SARA YU

15 JUN 74

SUVARNA

15 JUN 74

Survey Ship

SUBHADRA

30 SEP 74

Fleet Destroyer

INVESTIGATOR

30 SEP 75

Store Ship

RAN JIT

31 DEC 75

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/381

DHARINI

37

CEREMONIAL

Presidential Reviews o f the F leet

In this tradition inherited from the British Navy, the At sunset, all ships at the anchoragc participate Supreme .Commander of the Armed Forces reviews

in a fireworks display. With the ships covering a wide the Navy as if on parade. Traditionally, the President expanse, the entire harbour appears to be aflame. As of India reviews the Indian Fleet once during his darkness descends, all ships, in unison, switch on tenure in office. There have, however, been two their garland s of lig h ts w h ich accentuate their occasions when reviews were done by other

silhouettes.

personages- by the Shah of Iran in 1956 and by To date, all reviews have been held in Bombay Defence Minister YB Chavan in 1964 on behalf of Harbour.

President Radhakrishnan who was indisposed.

No Fleet Reviews were held for

The Presidential Review is an impressive

ceremony, second only to the Republic Day Parade.

•

President Zakir H ussain during his tenure from Naval ships and ships from maritime organisations 13 May 1967 to 03 May 1969.

like the Coast Guard, the Merchant Navy, the

•

President N Sanjiva Reddy during his tenure from

National Institute of Oceanography, the Oil and 25 July 1977 to 24 J u l 1982.

Natural Gas Commission, Training Ship Rajendra

As a prelude to the Presidents Review

and Naval Yardcraft are anchored precisely in neat in 1969,

lines and dressed overall.

naval aircraft gave an aerial fire power dem onstration The President embarks in a naval ship nominated

and aerobatic display off M arine Drive in Bombay, as the Presidential Yacht which flies the President’s from where th o u s a n d s w atched the aircra Colour. After receiving a 21 gun salute, the President decimating anchored targets.

, g

reviews the Fleet by cruising past each line of ships On the day of the Review in 1969, 20 Seahaw & Each ship s side is manned by her ships company in Alizes, 4 Vampires and 7 Alouette helicopters^ ^

white ceremonial uniform. As the President passes past in two formations - one depicting an anc o by, each ships company, in unison, 'take off their the other depicting the letters “IN"

caps in salutation and give three resounding J a £

Date

Participants

R e v ie w e d By

Ships

Submarines Aircraft &

Coast

Yard

Ships of

Helicopters

Guard

Craft

Mercantile

Ships

Marine &

Other

10 October 1953

25

Agencies

Ar~ prasaC^

President Dr Rajendra

06 March 1956

12

1

20 April 1964

(TS Dufferin)

31

The Shah of Iran

chava‘1

12

D efence Minister

^

10 February 1966

because Pres:ic?eHisposc^

10 at sea

28 December 1969

krishnan was ^

45

President SRadhaK

11 January 1976

43

33 Navy

President W Gin

^

5 Navy

12 February 1984

President Fakhru

45

32 Navy

A hm ed

7„\\

15 February 1989

President G ia n iZ 3'

^

48

5CG

29 Navy

President R V en katara'1’

8C G

10

The Presidents Colour

Since ancient times, in all countries, armies and navies the monarch used to fly his flag to visually As you know, before India became a Republic the

indicate his location to his dispersed forces. In India Naval custom was to Parade the Kings Colours

this flag was called the “dhwaj”. The Romans carried

ashore on special ceremonial occasions. On and

flags called “stan dards” on tall poles topped by after January 26th. 1950. however, this practice

eagles. In battle, those flags served as a central point ceased and the ordinary Indian Naval ensign has

o f re fe re n c e . I f the flag ceased to be visible, it been paraded instead. It would be a privilege of

indicated that the personage had either been defeated

which the service would be extremely proud if the

or had fled. The flag therefore was a rallying point, President would honour the Indian Navy by

presenting to it a special flag which would be

well defended in battle. In peacetime, it was a focus paraded on important occasions in the same

for pageantry because it was a personal symbol of the

manner as the King’s Colours used to be.

monarch.

I

am attaching a drawing which shows the

In the British Navy, when the monarch embarked

Indian Naval White ensign with the Asoka Lion,

in a naval ship, the ‘Royal Standard’ was flown at the the emblem of India, in the centre, and an

highest mast. When admirals were embarked in large

elephant in the lower right quarter. The shape of

sailing fleets, they flew their personal flags at the the elephant is the same as the one which

highest points o f their respective flagships. These

appears in outline in the top right quarter of the

fleets of sailing warships were usually organised in

President’s flag. The elephant symbolises

three segments - the van, the centre and the rear,

“strength and stability" and has been chosen in

with the seniormost admiral in the centre. The Vice

lieu of the vase and lotus flower which appears in

Admiral in the Van (ie front) and the Rear Admiral in the lower right quarter of the President’s flag. I

th e rear. T h e R ear A d m iral’s flag had two red feel that the lotus emblem representing “peace

roundels on a white flag with red strips dividing it and plenty" would not be appropriate if shown in

into four quadrants. The Vice Admiral’s flag had only

a flag belonging to a fighting force.

one red roundel and the Admiral’s flag had just the

“If you agree with the proposal for a

quadrantal red strips and no roundels. In battle at

President’s Colour to be presented to the Indian

sea, these personal flags fulfilled the same function of Navy. I should be grateful if you would submit the

a rallying point, much as a “Standard” did in battles

design to the President, and request him if he

would be gracious enough to present the flag

on land.

In Britain, the monarch used to present colours

when made."

to the 'Navy, Arm y and Airforce, as well as to the Following the British tradition of the Navy being

C om m anders in C hief o f the forces. This Kings the senior of the three armed services, the Indian

C o lo u r” w as paraded ashore on very specia

Navy was the first to be presented with the President s c e rem on ia l occasions. In 1924, King George

Colours on 27 May 1951. in the years that followed,

presented his colours to the British Navy, n

e

as the Navy grew in size and function. Presidents

following years, Kings Colours were presented to tne

Colours were presented to the Naval Commands and

Com m anders in C hief of the main nava por s a

the Fleet.

Portsm outh, Plym outh and Chatham an

0

Commanders in Chief of the British Fleets m ™

P r e s e n t e d t o th e

B y P r e s id e n t

On

and ab road . In 1935, the Kings Colours were

Indian Navy

D r Rajendra Prasad 27 May 1951

26 November

presented to the Royal Indian Navy.

Q[-n

Southern Naval

Giani Zail Singh

1964

India became a republic on 26 January IQ 50.

Command

25 March 1987

One day earlier, on 25 January, all

o

Rovai

Giani Zail Singh

Eastern Naval

C olours w hich had been presented to the Royal

Command

22 pebruaiy

Indian Navy, Royal Indian Army and Ro^

id up»

Shri R

Western Naval

^

(nr, mnn

1990

Force and {heir respective Commands were^ laid up^

V enkataram an

Command

at the Indian Military Academy at Dehr

■

Dr Shankar Dayal

26 Jan uary 1950 onwards, the use of the prei..

Western Fleet

?ir_^!l?[1Kar ^

09 March 1997

Sharma

'R o y a l1 w a s discontinued.

rnmmander in

= A *71 the use of'Personal Standards'

On 27 February 1951, the B£ ^ i £ T Edward

b v f h e ^ r e s i d e n t g o v e r n o r s an d L ie u t e n a n t Chief of the Indian Navy, Vice Adm ira

Parry,

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/383

wrote to the Defence Minis er.

Governors was discontinued. Instead the National flag was to be flown when these standards used to be displayed.

Navy Day

On 21 October 1944, the Indian Navy celebrated Navy In due course and until 1972, Navy Day came to Day for the first time. This met with considerable be celebrated on 15 December and the week in which success and aroused enthusiasm not only in the 15 December fell was observed as the Navy Week.

ports where parades were held but also in inland At the Senior Naval Officers Conference in May centres where public meetings were organised.

72, it was decided th a t:

Seeing its success, it was decided to organise similar functions every year on a larger scale and later in the

•

Navy Day would be celebrated on 4 December to season when the weather was cooler. Accordingly, commemorate the very successful naval actions

Navy Day 1945 was celebrated in Bombay and

in the Arabian Sea and the Bay of Bengal during Karachi on 1 December.

the Indo Pakistan War of December 1971.

•

Navy Week w ould be observed from 1 to 7

December.

384/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

38

D iving Cadre and the Chariot Project

t h e d i v i n g c a d r e

Until 1968. there hart

Preamble

organisation responsible either for the repair ofdMng

equipment or to certify its serviceability. in 1 968 this responsibility was entrusted to The Weapons

Si of

modened entire* 0n Department of the Bombay Dockyard and its staff deep divers and shallow diVers"

^

Categ°neS '

augmented by experienced clearance divers.

Till 1970, the acute shortage o f divers persisted d e m a n d ^ o T n a v if d 5 Witnessed a stead^ rise in the In 1971. w ith the induction o f the Submarine constraint „

^

d iv in g assistance. The main

Resue Vessel NISTAR and its Deep D iving capability,

° f a diviner

a!<

aCUte shortage of divers, the la ck

the Navy's proposal was accepted that the D ivin g g tender and the lack of diving boats.

Cadre be reorganised into five categories:

Developm ents 1966 t o 1975

Monthly Allowance

•

Clearance Diving Officers

Rs. 75

D iv i n J ^ ^ ^ ^Icin accepted the n e e d fo r C le a ra n c e

•

Deep Diving Officers

Rs. 75

In qRmS ^°r

rnaJor P °rts and the Fleet,

• Ship Diving Officers

Rs. 40

the fo

aP P rova^ was accorded in p r in c ip le to

•

Deep Divers

Rs. 60

ad ditirm ation

^ r e e c le a r a n c e d iv in g te a m s w ith

•

Ship Divers

Rs. 35

T h e

0?

Instructors and the necessaiy equipment.

The personnel o f the e rstw h ile Deep Diver and d ip n l ™

! f d e a [ a n C e dlV ers a n d the aI,owances and

shallow uiver « . « * . « . « »

....... ..

........

In 7

pay at)Ie to them was also agreed upon.

convert to Clearance/Deep D ivers and S h ip Divers Se^.

Une ^966, s a n c t i o n w a s a c c o r d e d fo r the respectively or retain their existing qualifications till offi

^ UP

a Clearance D iv in g C a d re c o m p risin g 5

^ retired. It was hoped that the monthly allowance cers and 44 sailors, to form three C le a ra n ce D iv in g ^ ghip divers W0uld encourage volunteers to fill the th 3 P|S‘ ° ne Gach for Bombay- V is a k h a p a tn a m an d J

Diving Cadre which Government was going to

renr? Get’. #^ lese ^am s could be q u ic k ly deployed to san cfj0n.

er d ivin g assistance to th e o r g a n is a t io n w ho j n QCtober 1971. s a n c tio n w as accorded for a sŮght their assistance

revised Diving Cadre of 661 D iving Specialist officers.

rvM.

^

n p a ra n c e D iv e rs a n d S h ip D iv e rs, a s against the n g T e n d e rs

ong inal total sanction o f only 150.

he Defence Plan 1 9 6 6 - 7 1 had p ro v id e d fo r two tugs.

The acute shortage o f divers manifested itself h e s a n c t io n fo r th e fir s t O cea n G oing Tug. GAJ had during the 197J war when ships boi toms a d t o b e P r o v i d e d f o r it to h a v e a l a r g e R c c o m p re s s io n searched repeatedly to counter the threat o f enemy

Chamber^ 3nd 3 Portab,e ° ne' Man RecompreS

1972. only 200 divers were borne. The

c c q u j r e d

i d g e t T

u

Z

^

S

S

^

c a n d e s t i n e u n d e r w a t e r a t t a c k b y f^ °^ m* Jv envisage

__________________ -arbour. Till then °niy

commandos on ships when in harbour

T ra in in g o f 350 divers in Cochin by end 1974.

o

on

nee C

C ller a

r a n c e D iv in g T e a m h

- ad been rais ^ ^

jL/lVIllfc» 1 Cctm lit*'- ~

tO

preponing the commissioning of the Submarine

Bem

o b

m a

b y

a’ . Im m ed ia te ly, the u rg e n c y incr e its E sca p e Training Tower/Naval Diving School at e ^

* p

P a n d th

t r*

he n

D iu

i v m

i n rf

g ' C a d r e and ir^Pr

Vishakapatnam.

e ect,veness and its capability.

Withdrawing experienced divers to act as

d u ties.

*n 1 9 6 8 , to a t t r a c t volunteers fo r v

p

instructors.

th e ra te s o f Sailors R e ta in in g Sea and Diving Pay m o n e y ) w e r e re v is e d u pw ard.

In early 1972, the Submarine Rescue Vessel

Developm ents A fter 1975

NISTAR was positioned in Cochin to train Deep Sea The Naval.Dockyard Bombay delivered four 45 foot divers and other trainees from the Diving School, diving boats. The Diving equipment ordered in 1975

Cochin. Practical training was carried out in the deep started arriving from 1976 onwards.

waters off Kovalam. near Trivandrum.

The biggest difficulty in sustaining the

momentum of the crash programme to increase the number of divers was the lack of a diving tender.

The Chariot Project

KONKAN, who had been doing diving tender duties In September 1972, a team w as sent to Italy to since 1963, had reached the end of its life. On the one finalise the acquisition of midget submarines and hand, the long awaited new ocean going tug, GAJ, chariots from the same Italian firm which had earlier had yet to be delivered. In the absence of GAJ, the supplied midgets and chariots to the Pakistan Navy only other vessel available for diving tender duties in 1967. The team was tasked to evaluate, negotiate was NISTAR. On the other hand, the deployment of and contract for midget submarines and chariots.

NLSTAR to Cochin had resulted in her maintenance The team did not co n sid e r it worthwhile to routines becoming overdue. NISTAR was also due for her guarantee closing refit in March 1972, which, if acquire midget submarines because of :

delayed, would affect the terms of her one year

•

Their unsuitability for long range operations in guarantee. A decision had therefore been taken that tropical waters.

the old destroyer RANJIT was to be converted for

•

The difficult problems of manning these craft.

diving duties during her next refit. However the cost

•

The uncertainty of their continued maintainof Ranjit’s refit was found to be prohibitive. It was ability.

therefore decided to make the maximum possible use

of NISTAR until GAJ commissioned in end 73.

C h a rio ts co u ld h o w e v e r b e u s e d fo r com m ando In 1973, special boards were constituted for the op erations even w ith o u t m id g e t su b m a rin e s .

medical examination of divers.

The team signed a contract.for the acquisition of In end 1973, approval was accorded for revised six chariots along with supporting equipment, spares scales of diving equipment for all ships and diving and explosives.

teams, which would provide for the bottom searches Acceptance trials were carried out in 1974. The of ships against underwater sabotage.

chariots arrived in 1975 and were based in Bombay.

In 1974, one officer and four sailors qualified as The first replacement crew was trained by 1976. On Deep Sea Divers from NISTAR in the first such course 1 May 1980, the newly built chariot complex was conducted by the Navy.

commissioned as INS ABHIMANYU.

In 1975, NISTAR, for the first time, carried out The basic role of the chariot complex was to extensive deep sea diving up to a depth of 100 meters.

determine the defensive measures to be instituted to In 1975, orders were placed for import of the defend Bombay against possible attack by Pakistan’s latest diving equipment. Equipment shortages were

midget submarine’s and chariots. In addition, on an expected to be made good by 1977.

ongoing basis, the chariots were to exercise ships in In end 1975, the borne strength of naval divers harbour in Operation AWKWARD procedures. When

s till rem ain ed

w ell sh ort o f w hat had been

required, the chariots could also be deployed

sanctioned:

operationally.

Category

Sanctioned

Initially, considerable d ifficu ltie s were

Borne

experienced in identifying and earmarking a ship to Clearance Diver

Officer(CDO)

30

(20

embark the chariots, take them well out to sea and

+ 50%

Reserve)

17

Ships Diver Officer

then lower them safely into the water to go in and (SDO)

94

(47+100%

" )

90

carry out dummy attacks on sh ip s in Bombay

Clearance Diver

harbour. Eventually, AMBA, who had by then been 1st Class(CDl)

39

(26 + 50%

M

)

20

re-based in Bombay to support the VELA Class

Clearance Diver

submarines on the West Coast, was found to be most 2nd Class(CD2)

53

(37 + 50%

" )

22

suitable as a chariot launching platform. In tactical Clearance Diver

exercises, both AMBA and the chariots performed 3rd Class(CD3)

103 169 + 50%

" )

48

efficiently and successfully.

Ships Diver (SD)

470 (235 + 100%

M

)

227

386/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

39

T r a n s f e r o f Naval Ships to Foreign Navies

mercantile marine and to render technical assistance

Bangladesh

whenever requested.

After the 1971 Indo

trtuisation o f P a k h tw lJm fcm rtaUP* S ite d

Pakistan b e c a m e an >n d e P ;

assistanceofthe

During th e 1 9 7 1 war

Bangladesh. B a n g la d e s h sought the

Jn

Indian Navy to help start the Bangladesh N

April 1973 and J u ly 1974. Seaward D e ie ^ ^ ^

9326) ^ M A D H U M A T I

” practice, these

INS A K S H A Y a n d A J A Y w e r*r ,

s BNS PADMA

9

As per internation al law a: ? P ^

q{ (he

Bangladesh Navy, who renamed th

vessels were trM te

^

utjIised as folloWs:

and SURMA respectively.

Government

_

'

vvas renamed MV

M au ritiu s

On 17 April 1972,

. by the Shipping

In the early 1970s, th e Gover,n, ^ I r t e r t m a r i U m e in need of a vessel which cou

rescue. rescue

S

a

s

s

-

S

S

?

and fis h in g rig h ts , h elp in air

^ i ing and other

fishermen iri d istress and c

india offeredt0L *

Later m

used for the transport

a &n

illegal traffic. T h e Governm en

a MAR-

e

ADHAR an^ UbSeetvveen the m a i n t o p January

the S e a w a r d D e fe n c e B oa

e p ted the offe ■

and maten ^

ten the naval p

Une for

G o v e r n m e n t o f M a u r itiu

trained in n

g

M auritian o fficers and sallor

by the Train f

S ' ^ ^ R s ar S o P -

S S f o "

A M AR w a s to w e d to M a u ritiu s

^ t beCOme

[ o KADHAR and ^ p e r i o d s . LOK ADHAR

S q u a d ro n a n d h a n d e d over

cG S AM AR

d

MNS AM AR to start with anid

cuard was

comp'etion ^

bv the Navy.

t

f '

a

a Nw AR

In 1989. the Maurlti“ S- hment was set up ({om

« » « « f ° , f o " » » cr l fd "p A s «f « • “ " * «

A m arine trainin g esta 1

,t waS acqu>

B A

j ^

n«tf *

p r D

t H

o “

tS

he I

S U

-

e”d ”

a ld

m

o ™

u ,

n ”

t

. S

L "

ate '

r.

Dornier su rve illan c e air

st Guard

India<

nonv the Mauritius

Boat

In the early 1990 •

f seaward

craft from

expanded. It acquired ano

gt Guard ai

from India and its secon

get up the

Britain.

have helpe majntaJn jt*

In dian Naval O fficers h ^

and ^ aperate th

M a u ritia n C o a s t Ů Guard Pers° npersonnel for vessels, to train Coast ■

u

ritian Pe

Dornier aircraft, to tra

40

A ssistance Rendered by the Navy in Peace Tim e

1965 - 1975

N a v a l A s s is ta n c e to S h ip s In D is t r e s s A t S e a Month

Assistance

Nature o f Assistance

Loca tion

B y IN ships

& Year

Rendered to

Jul 65

SS Avra

Rescue of crew before

Between Bombay

BEAS

ship sank

and Madras

Jul 65

SS Marviki beached

Rescue of crew

Kola Bay

DHARINI,

near Goa

KARWAR

Aug 65

Customs Launch

Rescue

Between Port

SHARDA

in distress

Novo and

Cuddalore

Sep 66

Ceylonese fishing

Rescue of fishermen

Bay of Bengal

DELHI

boat

Sep 66

Fishing Vessel

Search and Rescue.

‘Off Quilon

RAJPUT, RAN A

‘Kerala 15’

Vessel located and

and Naval

brought to Cochin

aircraft

Apr 67

Dhow Digvijaya

Rescue of 13 crew

Off Janjira

SUTLEJ

Sagar on fire

harbour

Feb 68

Fishing Vessels

Rescue of 40 fisher

Off Kakinada

PAM BAN &.

men

PANAJI

Mar 68

Canadian Sail Boat

Location of Canadian

Off Kardip Island

crew

May 68

(A & N Islands)

SS Bharat Ratna

Rescue of entire crew

BEAS

grounded off

Gopinath Port

May 68

INS Sukanya

Salvage

aground

Off Madras

GHARIAL,

Jul 68

SS Vardhini

GULDAR

Assistance for emergency

Off Bombay

DARSHAK

repairs to boilers and

pumping out flooded

engine room

May 69

SS Shujaat

Towing of distressed

ship

From off Canna-

GANGA

May 70

SS Damodar Zuari

nore to Cochin

Towing of ship disabled

320 km NW of

KHUKRI

Jul 70

by leak in engine room

SS Bergehaus

Bombay

Evacuation of stretcher

Off Goa

Naval

Aug 70

patients

SS Ampuria

helicopter

*

grounded

Salvage o fl 5,552 tons

d e e p a k .darshak.

of crude oil

Saurashtra

off Porbander

INVESTIGATOR.

Yard Craft

Nov 70

SS Mahajagmitra

Search for missing ship

d h r u v ak

Jul 71

after cyclone

Off East Bengal

TIR

INS Ajit foundered

Search and rescue of

Coast

Feb 72

Bay of Bengal

c a u v e r y

MV Vishwa Kusum

survivors after sinking

Rescue of crew after

ship hit by drifting

Off Chittagong

c a n n a n o r e *

Apr 72

mine

BULSAR.

Tugs and Barges of

b h a t k a l

Shipping Corpora

Salvage of grounded

tion of India

vessels

Off Great Coco

MAGAR.AJAY

Island

Sep 72

SS Sanjeevani

Towing

From off Mang

GODAVARI

Jun 73

SS Cosmos Pioneer

alore to Goa

Assistance to grounded

grounded off

ship

Saurashtra

BETVVA

Porbandar

Aug 73

MT Sea Song

Medical Assistance

High seas

Sep 73

Fishing Trawler

KIRPAN

Search for missing

Akshi Maru

Between Madras

Naval ships

vessel

and Calcutta

and IAF

aircraft

Dec 73

Fishing Trawler

Search and rescue

200 miles

Naval

Iswaiy

southwest of

aircraft

Cochin .

Dec 73

MV Sonavati

Search and rescue of

OffVisakh-

KAMORTA

survivors after cyclone

apatnam

Sep 74

Fishing Vessel

Search,location and

Off Quilon

Naval

Lady of Snow

provision of food and

helicopter

water for crew

Sep 74

SS Transhuron,

Rescue of crew from

Lakshadweep

GAJ

(American tanker)

grounded tanker,

grounded off

unloading of fuel oil

Kiltan island

and diving assistance

600 miles

TALWAR

1974

SS State of

Medical assistance

southwest of

Haryana

Bombay

Bay of Bengal

Naval ships

Feb -

Two canoes carry

Rescue

Mar 75

ing 45 Nicobarese

bound for Chowra

Off Bombay

NILGIRI

Salvage

Apr 75

Alouette helicopter ditched

o ff Oil Rig

KUTHAR

Sagar Samrat

E vacuation o f sick crew

Apr-75

M TE vit

for hospitalisation

Off Bombay

AMINI

Escorting broken down

Aug 75.

SS Bravery

ship

AMINI

Assistance

Sep 75

SS Gulf

Naval Aid to Civil Authorities

Location

By IN Ships

Nature of Assistance

M onth &

A s sis ta n c e

BEAS

Year

R e n d e re d to

Bombay to

T ow in g o f Passenger

port Blair

AKSHAY

1965

Andaman & Nicobar

Fenv Yamuna

Calcutta to Madras

INVESTIGATOR

Administration

Towing of Tug Balwan

Madras to Bombay

KISTNA

May 65

Garden Reach Work

Bombay to

shops

Towing o f Ferry Ganga

port Blair

KONKAN.

Oct-

Mazagon Docks

SHARDA.

Nov 65

SUKANYA

Apr 66

Shri Mihir Sen’s

2 - s s s s a .

GANGA.SHARDA

Mannar to

swim across the

pamban and

Palk Strait

Talaimanar to

Apr 67

Swimming Federaacross Palk strait

D hanu shkodi

CANNANORE

tion of India

O ffC an n an o re

& GODAVARI

Apprehending^^

MAGAR

Off Bombay

Apr-

C u s t o m s Department,

harbour

Eastern Naval

From Calcutta to

May 67

Calicut

° % : r sr

Command

Sep 67

Bhabha Atonnc

radi0rtofKanhojiAng«

port Blair

Research Centre

&

b il lo n *

Mar 69

E x p lo r e r 's C lu b

of

Port Blair

In d ia . C a lc u tta

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/389

Firefighting assistance

Port Blair

NOIC Port Blair

Mar 70

Andaman & Nicobar

Administration

Conveyance of surgical

Broach

BULSAR

Mar 70

Gujarat Government

team for earthquake victims

Firefighting assistance

Karjat Town

SHIVAJI

Jun 70

Kaijat Civil

Authorities

Salvage and towing

O ff Goa

NOIC GOA

Dec 70

Customs Department

of large abandoned dhow

Goa

Assistance in restoring

Paradip

KAVARATTI

Nov 71

Paradip Port Trust

normalcy after cyclone

Escort of Bangla

Visakhapatnam

KAVARATTI

Sep 72

Government of

to Chittagong

Bangladesh

desh Naval Ship Padma

Andaman &

PAM BAN

Nov 73

Customs Department

Apprehending contra

Nicobar islands

Andaman & Nicobar

band goods

West Coast

Nov 73

Customs Department

Apprehended a dhow

engaged in smuggling

Jan 74

Andaman & Nicobar

Firefighting assistance

Port Blair

NOIC (A&N)

Administration

Market

Jun 74

Andaman & Nicobar

Evacuation of seriously

Narkondam Island

PANVEL

Administration

injured policeman

Jul 74

Bombay Municipal

Supply of food by naval

Railway Hospital

JAM UNA

Corporation

boats to inundated areas

near Bombay

Central

Aug 75

Oil and Natural

Towing drilling platform

To Bombay High

BRAHMAPUTRA

Gas Commission

Haken Magnus

1975

Oil and Natural

Ferry of personnel &

O ff Bombay

Tw o Seakings

Gas Commission

stores to and from

o f I NAS 336

Bombay High oil

drilling rigs

Sep 75

Bombay Port

Firefighting,

Hughes Dock

V IK RANT

Trust

assistance

1975

Andaman & Nicobar

Medical assistance

Car Nicobar

FORTAN

Administration

during epidemic

Sep 75

Andaman & Nicobar

Apprehension of Thai

O ff North Sentinel

GHORPAD

Administration

fishing trawler

Island

1975

Andaman & Nicobar

Providing met data to

Port Blair

NOIC (A&NJ

Administration

Port Blair airport to

airport

enable bi-weekly air service

S e a T r a n s p o r t a t io n

Month &

Organisation

Items/Personnel

T ra n s p o r te d

Year

Assisted

Transported

From

By IN Ships

T o

Apr 66

Military Engineering

Heavy equipment

GHARIAL

Service

Mainland

stores

Car Nicobar

Sep and

Indian Oil Corpo

& Port Blair

Nov 66

HSD Oil for filling

ration

Visakha

SHAKTI

Port Blair

Ocl and

oil installation

Andaman & Nicobar

patnam

Nov 66

Football team

Administration

Port

Visakhag h a r i a l -

Blair

g u l d a R

patnam and

Nov 66

Military Engineering

MES Stores and CPWD

back

Service

Visakhag u l d a R

Port Blair

Apr 67

explosives

NCC

patnam

NCC Cadets

Cochin

d h a r i n i

Jul 67

Amini &

Ministry of Home

back

Affairs

Rescue of 122

Laksha

DELHI

stranded personnel

Mainland

dweep

from Minicoy,

KavaraUi, Aniini,

Klllan.Chcllat and

Androth islands

390/TRANSITIQN TO TRIUMPH

Oct -

NCC

200 NCC Cadets

Mainland

Nov 67

Port Blair

MAGAR

Nov 67

Andaman & Nicobar

Football team

Port

Calcutta

Administration

Blair

Mar 68

Singapore Navy

Sea Training of naval

Singapore

Cochin

DEEPAK

officers and cadets

May 68

Indian Air Force

IAF stores

Calcutta

Port Blair

MAGAR

May 68

Military Engineering

Heavy equipment &

Car

Port Blair

MAGAR

Service

stores

Nicobar

Oct 68

National Defence

10 officers

Visakha

A&N and

MAGAR

College

patnam

back

Oct 68

Indian Army

Personnel and stores

Calcutta

Port Blair

MAGAR

Apr &

Ministry of Rehabi

Heavy machinery and

Bhtpur

Hut Bay

GHARIAL

Nov 68

litation

stores

Nov &

Andaman & Nicobar

Football team

Car

Visakha

MAGAR

Dec 68

Administration

Nicobar

patnam & back

Feb-

Indian Army-

Providing SAR and

Madras

Port Blair

Mar 70

Corps of Engineers

communication cover

to sailing boats and

crew.

Apr 70

NCC

NCC Cadets

Kavaratti

Cochin

GODAVARI.

and back

GANG A AND

GOMATI

1975

Andaman & Nicobar

Two consignments of

Visakha

Campbell

MAGAR

Administration

buffaloes

patnam

Bay

N aval Assistance During Strikes/Bandhs

*

Nature o f Assistance

M onth &

O rganisation Assisted

Year

Piloting and berthing of ships during

Jan 65

Calcutta Port Trust

strike by Assistant Harbour Masters

Maintenance of essential services during

Cochin Port Trust

Apr 66

strike by Harbour craft crew.

Operation of cranes tc unload essential

Apr 66

Kandla Port Trust

Civil A d m in istration

Nov 66

Visakhapatnam

Movement of ships during strike by

Bombay Port Trust

Flotilla crew

Jul 67

Security of vital points in city dunng

Andhra

Civil A d m in istration

disturbances

Jan 73

Minninrf o f power generating stations/

Visakhapatnam

Civil Adm in istration

Sep 73

C o c h in

C a lc u tta P o rt T ru s t

Feb-

Workers strike.

Mar 74

During strike of employees.

C e n tra l an d Western

. Servicing of electric .ocomoUves^kes.

May 74

Railways

traction m°t° ^ intenance of boilers and

' generators

power houses and repairs of

. Watch'keeplng'and maintenance at power

substations

sent|aI seiviccs during

AJMn'dia^crt and Dock Workers strike.

C0afcuTS

a

khapatnam

Jan 75

an d M ad ras

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/391

D ivin g A s s is ta n c e

Nature o f Assistance

Place/O rgan isation

Assistance Rendered

Month &

Year

Diving assistance

State G o v e rn m e n ts

Bhakra Nangal Dam.

1965

Tungabhadra Dam and

D iving assistance

Mettur Dam

Orissa G o v e r n m e n t

D iving assistance

Hirakud Dam

1966

Punjab Government

Diving assistance

Bhakra Nangal Dam

1966

Bombay

Central Excise

1966

Department

Diving assistance

State Governments

Nagaijuna Sagar Dam.

1967

Bhakra Nangal Dam.

Dhakkam and Dhanpur

Dams

U nderwater sealing &

Orissa Government

Jan 68

Hirakud Dam

cleaning w ork

M odification o f trash

Uttar Pradesh State

Dhakrani & Dhalipur

Apr-

racks

Electricity Board

May 68

Power Stations

Salvage o f 30 ton boat

Port Officer

Apr-

Chandbali Port

Jun 68

Dem olition o f underw ater

Calcutta Port Trust

May-

King Georges Dock

culverts

Jun 68

Extension

U nderw ater cutting/w elding

Madhya Pradesh

Jun-

Gandhi Sagar Dam

o f gates & pneum atic removal

Government

Jul 68

o f reinforced concrete

A ssessm ent o f dam age to five

Bulsar (Gujarat)

Aug 69

Western Railway

railway bridges betw een Bulsar

and Atul.

Repair to ship’s hull

Jan 70

SS Eagle

Mazagon Docks

Inspection and clearance of

Mar 70

Rajasthan Atomic

Atomic Energy

Power Project ANUSHAKTI

Commission

underwater debris

Recovery o f crashed helicopter

Apr 70

Cambata Aviation

Bombay

Clearance o f fouled propellers

Apr 70

Tug Relume (British)

Mazagon Docks

Aug 70

SS Tarreen

Mazagon Docks

Repairs to ships hull

Jan and

Oil and Natural Gas

Offshore Project,

Inspection o f legs o f drilling

Sep 70

Commission

Bhavnagar

1973

Burmah Shell Oil

Bombay

Underw ater repair on submarine

Company

oil pipelines

1973

Rihand Dam Hydro

Uttar Pradesh State

Clearing the obstacles in m e

electric Station

Electricity Board

inlets to the turbines

1973

Kidderpore Dock

Calcutta Port Trust

Search for likely sabotage

Extension

1973

Chambal Road Bridge

Rajastan PWD

Survey and establishing

near Agra

and extent o f dam age to b n g •

1973

Indian Air Force

Brahmaputra River

Recovery o f crashed helicop

1973

and crew

MV Robert Wattmiller

Caltex oil Refineries

Inspection o f hull at

(India Ltd)

1974

Vishakhapatnam

Kakinada Port

1974

Port Officer Kakinada

Dem olition o f w reck

MV Agios Antonios

1974

Port Officer. Karwar

Salvaging 300 tons o ffu e*

Kerala Government

NearTrichur

Recovery o f dead bodies

1974

MV Jagdoot & MOT Tug

bus fallen into river

Hindustan Shipyard

Diving assistance

1974

Badarpur Thermal

Visakhapatnam

Power Project

Delhi Electric Supply

Clearance o f underw ater sump

Feb 75

Undertaking

Cochin Port Trust

Cochin

Salvage o f three subm erged

pontoons

392/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Jun 75

Pullar Dam,

pontoons

Tamil Nadu State

Coimbatore

Shifting of sluice gates

Electricity Board

1975

Badarpur Thermal

Delhi Electric Supply

Power Project

Clearance of underwater

Undertaking

1975

Bhavnagar Port

obstructions in the basin

Port Officer,

Clearance of channels for

Bhavnagar

1975

shipping

Mercantile Marine Dept. Cochin

Inspection of SS Amindivi’s

bottom

1975

Ramaswamy Water

Kerala State

Clearance of underwater

Headworks Munnar

Electricity Board

obstructions preventing opening/

closing of shutter

1975

Maini Shipping Co

Survey of

SS Nityanand’s wreck

1975

M/S JM Baxi, Ship

Visakhapatnam

Underwater hull inspection of

Chandlers

the MV AJP Priya

1975

Customs Department

Bombay

Salvage of Custom Craft Shakti

1975

Paradeep Port Trust

Paradeep

Recoveiy of dredger's suction

pump from the sand

1975

Ramganga Project

Kalagarh

Placing of trash rack on the

intake shaft of underground

tunnel

1975

Underwater inspection and

Rana Pratap Sagar Dam

Rajastan

clearance of stilling basin.

VIP Transportation

In Indian Naval Ships

From

To

M onth/Year VIP

1965

MYSORE

Colombo

Male

May

1966 Indian High Commissioner

in Ceylon/Ambassador

to Maldives

VIKRANT

Bombay

Goa

MYSORE. RAJPUT. RANA.

Apr

1967 Defence Minister

Madras

Port Blair

KHUKRI. KUTHAR

Feb

1968 Prime Minister

MYSORE. GODAVARI

Colombo

Male

Feb

1969

GOMATI

In d ia n H igh C o m m is s ion e r

in C e y lo n / A m b a s s a d o r

A&N Islands

GODAVARI. GOMATI

to Maldives

Madras

Apr

1969 Cabinet Secretary

Defence Secretary

LMA Islands

VIKRANT. DEEPAK.

Home Secretary

Goa

TRISHUL. KUTHAR

Oct

1969 Prime Minister

ONGC’s off

DARSHAK and Naval

INS

helicopters

shore Oil

Mar

1970 Prim e Minister

d a r s h a k

platform at

AJiabet

Vivekananda

Naval helicopters

Kanyakumari

Rock

1970

P r e s id e n t.

Memorial

DEEPAK

Vice P res id en t

LMA Islands

DEEPAK. AM BA.

and Prime Minister

Goa

Great

KAMORTA.

Vice P resid en t

Port Blair

Nicobar

Nov

1970

KATCHALL. KILT AN

Vice P resid en t

Jan

1973

DELHI

Kavaratti

Cochin

MYSORE. DEEPAK

Male

1974 Up Raksha Mantri

Cochin

Apr

1975 P rim e M in ister

Jan

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/393

41

Battle Casualties Indo Pakistan War (1971)

SUMMARY

Total

O fficers

S ailo rs

194

18

176

INS KHUKRI

3

2

1

Alize 203

1

1

BANGLADESH OPERATIONS

1

1

INS KILTAN

199

22

177

Total

INS KHUKRI (Sunk by Pakistan Navy Submarine HANGOR on 09 D ec 71) Rank

Nam e

Rank

N a m e

OFFICERS

M u kadavil O m m en O m m en

Ag Capt(X)

Mahendra Nath Mulla

Cdr(E)

Prab h at K u m a r

Lt Cdr(X)

Jogindsr Krishan Suri

Lt Cdr(L)

M a n ba r S in gh

Lt Cdr(S)

Raj at Kumar Sen

Lt (SD TAS)

V in od K u m a r J a in

Lt(X)

Suresh Hiranand Kundanmal

Lt(L)

S u d h a n sh u S e k h a r P a n d a .

Lt

Davinder Kumar Sharma

Surg Lt

S atyed ra P al S in gh K u sh w ah a

Lt

Madabhushi Sampath Kumar

Sub Lt

Sub Lt

Samvel Abraham

Sub Lt

Su shil K u m a r

Sub Lt

Shashi Prakash

Sub Lt

G u ru Q a l S in g h S a n d h u

Sub Lt

Subhash Chander Sapra

Midshipman

A sh ok G u la b R ao Patil

SAILORS

M CP0 2

Bansilal

MCELP II

O P Kohli

MAA

KG Nair

SCPO

A S ingh

CHME

N Singh

CHYS

M A P rosp erian

ERA 2

MK Unnikrishnan

EAP 2

J S H arike

ERA 3

BN Singh

ERA 3

S M ohan

ERA 3

P Balachandran

EAP 3

T R Raju

EAP 3

SK Pathak

SWA 3

S K V erm a

WM 3

KS Mankotia

MECH 3

A P R an a

PO

SN Ram

P

r O

vj

PO

A L a tif

Thottapura Chathunni Sidharthan

PO

PO

CD M an diri

NS Kathait

PO Wtr

PO W tr

HK Singh

R S ingh

SPO

POME

M Singh

R Piara

POME

POME

MRC Nair

C K ach ch ap

POEL(P)

POME

J Raj

R S ingh

PO Tel

KS John

POEL(P)

R Singh

ERA IV

LS Sharma

P O Tel

W P M a n u el

EAP IV

S Singh

ERA IV

G P Singh

EAP IV

PR Krishnan

EAP IV

In d e ijit

EAP IV

B Singh

EAP IV

A Singh

EAP IV

SC Chauhan

EAR IV

KB S ad h ies

PO

Dhiman

AG ERA IV

K M u k h op a d ya

PO Std

HR Sharma

PO Std

K Singh

LS

Sridhar

POCK(S)

Ja b h ard en

LS

M Singh

LS

D eson dh i M ai

LS

MG Pan dey

LS

R Singh

AG LS(TY)

B Sasidharan

AG LS

KR Joshi

LME

SS Malhan

LME

Rameshwar

LME

JB Patil

LME

B Malesappar

LME

YS Bhardwaj

LME

RS Nimon

LME

SBS Chauhan

LMA

P Singh Shekhawat

L Wtr

H Singh

L W tr

K Singh

LTel

RS Parmar

L Tel

Prakash Kulkarni

LTel

A Sebastian

L Tel

BD Manna

LSIG

PR Lokiaah

L S ig

SS Yadav

LMER

Salg Ram

LEMP

KM Kuria

LEMP

S Lai

EAR 5

E John

EAR 5

Karam Chand Nandh

EAR 5

M Sharma

EAR 5

K Chand

ERA 5

P Singh

L STD

TO Verghese

LCK (O)

PK Sen

LCK (S)

S Shinde

LCK

M Chand

LTop

Om Prakash

AKTripathi

Sea I

MS Negi

Seal

AK Sarkar

Sea I

BS Tangniya

Seal

Sea I

N Samanta

Sea I

SK Das

Sea I

SP Dutta

Sea I

R Sankar

Seal

Raj Kumar

Sea I

AK Jha

Seal

Mohinder Pal

Sea I

I Singh

Sea 1

Tilochan Samanta

Sea I

LG Werulkar

Sea I

VK Ramadavan Pillai

Sea I

G Ravindranathan Nair

Sea 1

NS Gopalkrishnan Nair

Sea I

MV Somraj

Sea I

K Gurudas

Sea I

John Thomas

Sea I

Zainuddin

Sea I

RN Sahadevan

Sea I

P Chand

Sea I

EP Verghese

Sea I

SB Sami

Sea 1

CP Kurian

T ell

HK Mehta

Sea I

A Kabilan

Tel I

W Ray

T e ll

Parma Nand

SigI

KK Sud

S Thomas

T e ll

SA 1

KG Daniel

H Singh

SN Pathak

S ig I

ME I

SA I

A Ram

ME I

SK Biswas

V Singh

Hari Lai

ME I

ME I

TR Salunke

KB Singh Guleria

ME 1

ME I

K Kabbur

VN Narayana

ME 1

ME I

B Singh

R Gurumurthy

ME I

ME I

G Venkatesan

PL Sheemar

ME I

EMR I

AK Khanna

STD I

P Ram

EMR I

VR More

BK Mandal

CK I

STD 1

GB Singh

S Dass

CK1

STD 1

TNS Shetty

Top I

A Lai

CK (S) 1

B Singh

M Halim

Sea II

W tr I

RB Singh

P Singh

Sea II

Top I

Raghbir Singh Yadav

V Venugopal

Sea II

Sea II

Om Prakash Tyagi

M Ram

Sea II

Sea II

N Chand

SS Nirwal

Sea II

SN Krishnan

Sea II

R Singh

Emp II

PC Maity

Sea II

PL Devassy

ME II

HR Jat

Sea II

KP Moideen

ME II

JNKNair

ME

Banshi Lai

ME II

KS Thakur

ME II

r S rin iv a s a n

EMP ii

V Deshmukh

ME II

Tel

Ram Anju

B Singh

EMP II

Tel

A P M ahanan

N Balan

EMP II

Tel

AG Rajam ani

p Chand

Tel

KP B haskaran

Sig

Hari Mitter

Tel

EMR II

B Das

Sig

Hiralal Jat

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/395

EMR II

STD II

C K

Jagdish Chand

CKfO)

H Singh

STD II

R Mahto

Top II

P S R a w a t

CK (S)

B Ram

P

Nandu Bhai

CK (O)

a Raju

Alize 203 Shot Down Kw d t •

^ Pandey

N

" Air FOrCC F 104 «

«

«ec 71

u m o ™

HS\° e^ oy

MCPO»

m v i j f y T Sirohi

Bangladesh Operations

U IX> ™

Sam ir Das

IN S K I L T A N

Lt (X)

Suresh Gajanan Samant

396/raANSrnow TO TTO

umph

42

Award Winners 1971 Indo Pakistan War

K e y to A bbreviations

NHQ

Naval Headquarters

CO

Commanding Officer

W NC

Western Naval Command

(X)

x o

Executive Branch

Executive Officer

ENC

Eastern Naval Command

fE)

EO

Engineering Branch

Engineer Officer

SNA

Southern Naval Area

(L)

LO

Electrical Branch

Electrical Officer

W F

Western Fleet

(S)

Supply Branch

SO

Supply Officer

EF

Eastern Fleet

(P)

Pilot

MO

Medical Officer

(O)

BRO

Base Repair Organisation

Observer

SEO

Senior Engineer Officer

(S/M)

BMU

Base Maintenance Unit

Submariner

AEO

Air Engineer Officer

(H)

NARO

Naval Aircraft Repair

Hydrographer

ALO

Air Electrical Officer

Organisation

NO

Navigating Officer

Rank/Nam e

Personal

Appointment/Where Serving

Number

P a d m a Vibhushan

Adm SM Nanda(X), PVSM

00001A

CNS NHQ

P a d m a B hushan

VAdm SN Kohli (X). PVSM

00002B

FOCINC WEST HQWNC

VAdm N Krishnan(X),PVSM DSC

00003B

FOCINC EAST HQENC

P a r am V ish ish t Seva Medal

RAdm BR Singh (L). PVSM

ADMIRAL SUPERINTENDANT. BOMBAY DOCKYARD

RAdm VA Kamath (X)

00007R

FOCSOUTH HQSNA

RAdm EC KuruviIa(X), AVSM

00009W

FOCWEF WESTERN FLEET

RAdm SH Sarma (X)

00016K

FOCEF EASTERN FLEET

Cmde DR Mehta (X)

A CNS NHQ

Cmde JTG Pereira(E), AVSM

4000IK

CSO (TECH) HQ WNC

CHIEF OF STAFF HQ WNC

Cmde BN Thap'*r (X)

00030T

CHIEF OF STAFF H g ENC

Capt MS Grewa. (X), AVSM

00031W

M a h a vir Chakra

00022Z

CO VIKRANT (EF)

Capt S Parkash (X),

CO KHUKRI (WF)

Ag Capt MN Mulla(X) (Posthumous)

00079B

CO KILTAN (WF) KARACHI OPERATION 4/5 DEC

Cdr KP Gopal Rao (X)

00101B

IN COMMAND MISSILE BOATS 4/5 DEC

Cdr BB Yadav (X)

00124F

IN COMMAND KHULNA OPERATION 10 DEC

Cdr MN Sainant (X)

0031 IF

CO SEAHAWK SQUADRON VIKRANT

LCdr SK Gupta (X) (P) NM

00422H

CO PANVEL KHULNA OPERATION 10 DEC

LCdr JPA Noronha (X)

87600

UNDERWATER COMMANDO. KHULNA OPERATION 10 DEC

C Singh. LS CD 2(Diver)

A ti V is h ^ h t Seva Medal

00013B

DIR SUBMARINE ARM NHQ

Cmde Gautam Singh (X)

00023A

NOIC BOMBAY HQWNC

NOIC VISHAKHAPATNAM

Cmde EJ Debu (X)

00027K

Cmde TJ

DIR OF PERSONNEL NHQ

K u n n e n k e r il W

00029R

Cmde GM Shea (X). AVSM

DIR OF NAVAL PLANS NHQ

00033Z

Cmde VEC Barboza(X).AVSM

DIR OF MARINE ENGINEERING NHQ

40004T

DIR OF WEAPONS EQUIPMENT NHQ

Cmde IK M a lh o tra (E)

50004W

DIR OF NAVAL OPERATIONS NHQ

Capt PK Sinha (U

00035B

DIR OF WEAPON POLICY & TACTICS NHQ

Capt OS D a w s o n (X)

00038K

Capt DS Paintal (X)

D IR O F NAVAL IN TE LLIG E N C E N H Q

00040R

Capt M K Roy (X)

000 4IT

DIR O F NAVAL SIG N ALS NH Q

Capt RB M ukheijee (X)

C ONTROLLER O F M E R C H A N T S H IP P IN G H Q W N C

00046B

Capt FL Fraser (ifl (H)

CAPT M ISSILE PREPARATIO N F A C ILIT Y

50008B

Capt BG Mudholkar (L)

DIR O F NAVAL A IR M A TE R IA L N H Q

Capt C Srinivasagopal(AE)

40009B

4001OF

AM E NAVAL DOCKYARD B O M B A Y

Capt N Bhalla (E)

00062R

NOIC CALCUTTA

Capt RP Khanna (X)

AM L NAVAL DOCKYARD B O M B AY

Capt ANP Pillai (L)

50012N

DIR O F FLEET M AIN TE N AN C E N H Q

Capt KR Menon (L), VSM

50014T

CD SUPPLY OFFIC ER H Q W N C

Capt SK Sinha (S)

60009H

DTE O F SIG NAL IN TE LLIG E N C E N H Q

Capt PJ Barron (X)

000 7IK

NAVAL AD VISER PAKISTAN

Capt JP Syal (X)

00078A

PRO NAVY NHQ

Capt JJR Martin (S), VSM

40022H

OI/C BRO VISAKHAPATNAM

Cdr NP Mukundan (E),

60025W

OI/C W IRELESS D E TA C H M E N T B om b ay

LCdr N Geeverghese (X)

00239T

i r C hakra

Capt RKS Ghandhi (X)

000 21Y

CO M YSORE (WF)

Capt MP Awati (X)

00037H

CO KAM ORTA (EF)

Capt PC Andrew s (X)

00045A

CO DEEPAK (WF)

Capt KMV Nair (X)

00051R

CO TRISH U L (WF)

Capt JC Puri (X),

00073R

CO BRAHM APUTRA (EF)

Cdr SS Kum ar (X)

00084R

CO TALW AR (WF)

Cdr BR Chowdhury (E)

40027W

EO VIKRANT (EF)

Cdr Subir Paul (X)

00127N

CO KAVARATTI (EF)

C dr L Ram das (X),

00132Z

CO BEAS (EF)

C dr RS Grewal (X) (P),

00146F

CDR A IR VIKRANT

Cdr KN Zadu (X)

00150R

CO KATCHALL (WF)

C dr R R Sood (X).

00157F

CO KIRPAN (WF)

C dr RJ Millan (X) (S/M)

00168F

CO KHANDERI (ENC)

Cdr MO Om m en (E), (Posthumous)

EO KHUKRI (WF)

C dr V S Shekhaw at (X) (S/M)

00189B

CO KARANJ (WNC)

LCdr A K M ehra (X) (P)

0031 OH

SEAHAW K PILO T V IK R A N T

LC dr RD Dhir (X) (P)

00319Z

CO ALIZE SQUADRON V IK R A N T

LCdr J K Suri (X). (Posthumous)

XO KHUKRI (WF)

LCdr R K Sen (S), (Posthumous)

SO KHUKRI (WF)

LCdr SP G hosh (X) (O)

00370R

ALIZE OBSERVER V IK R A N T

LCdr P Kum ar (L) (Posthumous)

LO KHUKRI (WF)

LC dr S Ram sagar (X) (P)

00379K

SENIOR PILO T ALIZE SQ UAD RO N V IK R A N T

LCdr J K R oy Choudhury(X)

00406Y

OI/C PADMA, KHULNA OPERATION 10 DEC

LC dr Vijai Jerath (X)

00409B

CO VINASH (Missile Boat) KARACHI O PER ATIO N 8/9 DEC

LCdr BN Kavina (X)

00416W

CO NIPAT (Missile Boat) KARACHI O PER ATIO N 4/5 DEC

LC dr In d eijit Sharm a (X)

00435N

CO NIRGHAT (Missile Boat) KARACHI O PE R A TIO N 4/5 DEC

LCdr OP M ehta (X)

00442B

CO V EE R (Missile Boat) KARACHI OPER ATIO N 4/5 DEC

LC dr George C M artis(X),NM(Diver)

00445H

UNDERWATER COM MANDO

LCdr A sh ok Roy (X),(P) NM (Posthumous)

ALIZE PILOT W NC

LCdr (SDB) In der Singh(X)

83151B

CO RAJPUT (EF)

Lt RS Sodhi(X) (P)

00540A

SEAHAW K PILO T VIK RAN T

Lt BB Bhagwat (X) (O)

00566K

ALIZE OBSERVER V IK R A N T

Surg Lt SS Panda (Posthumous)

MO KHUKRI

Lt Arun Prakash (X) (P)

00590R

WITH LAF HUNTER SQUADRON

Lt V P Kapil (X) (Diver)

00667R

U N D E R W A TE R C O M M A N D O & K H U L N A O P E R A T IO N 10

DEC

L t SG Sam ant (X), (Posthumous)

NO KILTAN(WF)

Lt KS Panw ar (X) (O)

00685F

OBSERVER V IK R A N T A LIZE

L t S K M itter (X)

00723T

OI/C PALASH KH U LNA OPERATIO N 10 DEC

L t V K D atta (XMP)

00838B

SEAHAW K PILO T V IK R A N T

Lt Prem Ku m ar (X) (P)

0 0 7 17B

SEAHAW K PILO T V IK R A N T

S Lt A sh o k Ku m ar (X)

01036B

PANVEL KHULNA O PERATION 10 DEC

398/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

MN Sangal, MC (EAP) II, No. 50896

LK Chakarvarty, MECH3, No. 48830

BOat) KARACHI 0PERA™ N 4/5 DEC

MO Thom achan, PO(PRI), No. 46337

MISSILE BOAT KARACHI OPERATION 4/5 DEC

RN Sharm a. POTEL, No. 8830

MISSILE BOAT KARACHI OPERATION 4/5 DEC

KS Raju, LEMP,

MISSILE BOAT KARACHI OPERATION 4/5 DEC

89148

PANVEL. KHULNA OPERATION 10 DEC

S h a u rya C h akra

Lt Cdr Sajjan Kumar (X) (Diver)

004I3N

CCDT Visakhapatnam DIVING ON GHAZI

BC M ahapatra, MCPOII, NM(Diver)

60128

CCDT Visakhapalnam DIVING ON GHAZI

MB Patel, LME

KUTHAR (VVF)

NA Marad, LME

56163

KUTHAR (WF)

AJ Baby, LMA,

80298

GHARIAL (EF)

NAO Sena Medal

Capt VA Dhareshwar (X)

00036F

CO AMBA (SNA)

Cdr RP Bhalla (X)

00070H

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION(EF)

Cdr CG Francis (X) (H)

00074T

CO DESHDEEP (EF)

Cdr Jogendra Khanna (X) (H)

00090B

CO SUTLEJ (WNC)

Cdr HM L Saxena (X)

00093K

XO VIKRANT (EF)

Cdr RR Sood(E), VSM

40026T

EO MYSORE (WF)

Cdr CM Vyas (X)

00097W

FLEET OPERATIONS OFFICER EASTERN FLEET

Cdr T N Singhal (X)

00115M

CO MAGAR (EF)

Surg Cdr GP Christian

75035H

MO VIKRANT (EF)

FLEET OPERATIONS OFFICER WESTERN FLEET

Cdr GM Hiranandani (X)

00123B

CO KADMATT (WF)

Cdr Sukhmal Jain (X)

00130W

FLEET NAVIGATING OFFICER WESTERN FLEET

Cdr TS Khurana (X)

00133A

CO BETWA (WF)

Cdr RK Chaudhury (X), VSM

00134B

CO GODAVARI (SNA)

Cdr Hardev Singh (X)

00143Z

00145B

CO KUTHAR (WF)

Cdr UC Tripathi (X)

00147H

XO MYSORE (WF)

Cdr G T Wadhwani(X)

00153Y

AMPHIBIOUS OPERATION (EF)

Cdr V F Rebello(X)

CO SAGARDEEP (WF)

Cdr SP Kaprawan (X)

00159K

CO RAN JIT (WF)

Cdr RN Singh (X)(P)

CO SEAKING SQUADRON (WNC)

00181K

Cdr M P Wadhawan (X), (P) VSM

EO BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)

40101N

Cdr RS Huja (E)

FLEET NAVIGATING OFFICER EASTERN FLEET

00279H

Cdr PP Iyer Sivamani (X)

SEO VIKRANT (EF)

40069R

LCdr Bharat Bhushan (E)

EO TALWAR (WF)

40070T

LCdr MB Ghosh (E)

XO TRISHUL (WF)

00195T

LCdr NN Anand (X)

AEO VIKRANT

40088H

LCdr YK Satija (AE)

CO GANGA (SNA)

00285Y

LCdr SK Kulsrestha (X)

CO GHARIAL (EF)

00288B

LCdr AK Sharma (X)

XO BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)

00304R

LCdr KASZ Raju(X) (P)

CO GULDAR (EF)

00348R

CO POSHAK (Dockyard Oiler) (WNC)

LCdr Utful Dabir (X)

00394W

XO KATCHALL KARACHI 4/5 DEC(WF)

LCdr JW Daniel (X)

0043IB

SUPPORT OF MUKTI BAI IINI OPERATIONS

LCdr Janardan Deo (X)

50101R

LCdr VK Raizada (L)

EO EASTERN FLEET SHIP

40146R

FLIGHT DECK EO VIKRANT (El4)

LCdr SN Jha (E)

40147T

SIGNALS OFFICER KHUKRI (WF)

LCdr Suresh Soota (E)

00461Y

EO KADMATT (WF)

LCdr M Sharma (X)

40166K

DEPUTY LO MYSORE (WI*)

LCdr JS Cheema (E)

50143K

NO KHUKRI (WF)

u SH Kundanmal (X)

VIKRANT (EF)

(P o s th u m o u s )

83160Z

40181W

SUPPORTOF MUKTI BAHINI OPERAT'ONS

40203W

KHUKRI (WF) IMPROVEMENTS TO SONAR

PCDT BOMBAY

Lt VK Jain (U. (Posthumous,

0062 IK

AEO SEAHAWK SQDN VIKRANT

Lt GAD Duke (XI1 (Diver)

4021 IN

EO VEER (Missile Boat)

Lt Gurnam Smgh (AE)

40229B

Lt PK Puri (E)

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/399

XO NIRGHAT(Missile Boat)

Lt Anthony De Sam Lazaro (X)

00672A

87514W

ASSISTANT LO VIKRANT

Lt (SDR) Kashmira Singh

EO VINASH (Missile Boat)

Lt RK Narad (E)

40244N

XO NIPAT (Missile Boat)

Lt SR Sampath Go pal (X)

00691W

SEO KUTHAR (WF)

Lt Arvind Lochan (E)

40273B

ALO ALIZE SQUADRON V IK R A N T

Lt MV Paul (AL)

50196F

WK EO KIRPAN

Sub Lt KR Girwalkar (E)

40334?

BEACH RECCE AM PH IBIO U S LA N D IN G (E F )

Sub Lt BS Thakur (X)(Diver)

00949F

U N D E R W A TE R C O M M A N D O & K H U L N A O P E R A T IO N 10

Sub Lt A K Bandhopadhyay (X)

00961H

DEC

Sub Lt MS Ahluwalia (X)

0100Z

KHUKRI (WF)

EASTERN FLEET - SALVAGE O F M INI L A B O U R

Sub Lt (SDME) RP Singh

85041Z

Sub Lt Sam irakanti Basu(X)

01054W

KHUKRI (WF)

Shiv Singh. MCPO I.

31804

DEEPAK (WF)

M K V ijayan . MCPO (Posthumous)

44971

ALIZE AIRCREW (WNC)

SL Gupta. MCEAR1.

47023

MISSILE BOATS (WNC)

NB Thapa. MCERAI,

50529

KILTAN KARACHI O PERATION 4/5 DEC

TV R Nambiar. MCPO II (AH).

61284

CAPTAIN FLIGHT D EC K V IK R A N T

Abdul Hameed. MCPO II (TASI),

12402

KIRPAN (WF)

SK Sen. M CERA II .

50831

DEEPAK (WF)

MK Khandpal, MCME II

46958

MYSORE (WF)

KS Salaria, MCPO(AH) II VSM,

35584

HANGAR CONTROL C H IEF V IK R A N T

J Singh. MECH II

64721

BMU BOMBAY

T Singh, MECH(P)II

64843

BMU BOMBAY

CK Tiw ari. CPO (GI).

44510

KATCHALL (WF) KARACHI O PE R ATIO N 4/5 DEC

J Kumar, CPO

45473

NBCD INSTRUCTOR V IK R A N T

BS Sandhu, CHEAP.

50916

MISSILE BOATS (WNC)

T Michael. CHERA,

49796

ATUL (WNC)

Devi Prasad, Mech III,

49411

KAMORTA (EF)

R Singh, Mech III.

64220

AMBA (SNA)

PV Lonappan, Mech 3

67488

PANVEL KHULNA OPERATION

Randhir Singh. Mech 3

66233

VINASH (Missile Boat) KARACHI O PE R A T IO N 8 /9 DEC

RP Singh. Mech 3.

67488

VIKRANT (EF)

KK Goyal. EAR 3.

51198

NIPAT (Missile Boat) KARACHI O PE R A TIO N 4/5 DEC

Ishwar Prakash. ERA 3.

51096

INS HOOGHLY Calcutta

Sukhdarshan Singh ERA 3.

52566

KADMATT (WF)

PK Dhole. PO.

49148

UNDERWATER COM MANDO

A P Ravindran, PO Tel.

49018

TRISHUL (WF)

JN Sharm a. PO PTI,

86186

KHUKRI (WF)

KP Singh. PO Tel.

48729

KHUKRI (WF)

CS Tyagi. PO (GI).

48039

VIKRANT (EF)

S Kumar. ERA 4

69135

TALWAR (WF)

Abbas Ali Khan, SWA 4.

51437

TALWAR (WF)

LS Mishra. LS, Diver

61782

RAN JIT (WF)

Lai Singh, LS, Diver

80352

Mahipal Singh, LS Diver

UNDER WATER COM MANDO

86514

Karan Singh. LS

CCDT Visakhapatnam

86625

Sant Ram. LS.

UNDERWATER COMMANDO

82060

EJ Princhan, LS, Diver

PANVEL KHULNA OPERATION 10 DEC

82811

MS Gupta. LS (CD 1),

UNDERWATER COM MANDO

64915

L Prasad. L CK(O),

UNDERWATER COMMANDO

66441

-DO-

RS Yadav. Sea I.

83406

-DO-

PK Bhattacharya. Sea I,

88900

-DO-

I Singh. Sea I.

92675

-DO-

SC Prabhakar, Sea I,

84388

Capt Inder M ohan Narang(M erchant Navy)

OPERATI° N NOIC KATHIAW AR

_

MASTER MV VISHW A VIJAY, A M PH IB IO U S OPERATION(EF) V is h is h t Seva M edal

Capt RJ Duckw orth (X)

00060K

NOIC MADRAS

Cdr M V A gark ar (X)

00080F

COPO HQ WNC

40Q/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Cdr N Raj ago pal (X)

Cdr J Ram Rao (L)

00075W

DRAFTING CDR, Bombay

50020F

Cdr JA Fernandes (S)

SLO. HQ ENC

60022N

Cdr MS Ratra (X)

SECY VCNS NHQ

00116N

Cdr CS Narayana Raju (AE)

COPO HQ ENC

40040Z

Cdr GC Thadani (E)

OI/C NARO. Cochin

40042B

Cdr SK Moorlhy (L)

SEO HQ ENC

50035R

Cdr Amrik Singh(X)

WECORS NAVAL DOCKYARD Bombay

0014IB

Cdr SD Sinha (X)

CO INS INDIA. New Delhi

00144A

Cdr NR Khambatta (X)

DEPUTY DIR NAVAL SIGNALS NHQ

00154Z

Cdr JS Pantle (X)

NOIC KATHIAWAR

00161R

Cdr Arun Rao (X)

DTE OF ARMAMENT INSPECTION NHQ

00174W

Cdr KC Gairola (X)

DDNAS (AIR ORGN & TRG) NHQ

00183R

DDOP(X) NHQ

Cdr RK Deshpande (X)

00185W

CAVO HQ WNC

Cdr SW Lakkhar (X)

00191H

DDNO WAR ROOM NHQ

Cdr V Ravindranath (X),(P)

00194R

SENIOR PILOT SEAKING SQUADRON

Cdr MP Ballal (X)

SI DIRECTORATE

LCdr (SDME) James Soares

85000F

BRO. Visakhapatnam

LCdr PV Damodaran (E)

40109F

LCdr Mehar Singh (X)

00233F

ADNO TRADE WARFARE NHQ

LCdr Kandaswamy Chelliah (X) INR

98002F

-DO-

Surg LCdr (Mrs) Jagmohan Sood

75084W

ANAESTHETIST. ARMY HOSP Delhi

LCdr LK Sharma (X)

00294T

NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE HQ WNC

LCdr (SDC) PAJ Bento

81853B

COMCEN DELHI NHQ

LCdr Bal Subramaniam (X)

00363Z

DTE OF ARMAMENT INSPECTION NHQ

LCdr GD Mukeiji (X). NM

00388F

PLANNING STAFF. HQ EASTERN ARMY

LCdr NK Mukheijee (X)

00397A

LCdr Suresh Bhandoola (X)

0040IK

SI DIRECTORATE NHQ

LCdr Teck Sharma (X)

00433H

LCdr PP Nandi (X) (H)

00468N

LCdr Pirthi Singh (S)

60092Y

BASE VICTUALLING OFFICER. Bombay

LCdr D Shahane (AE)

40155K

AEO SEAKING SQUADRON. Bombay

LCdr MM Kaila (L)

50133N

MISSILE TECHNICAL POSITION. Bombay

Lt (SDAE) PN Suri

86002H

WIRELESS DETACHMENT. Bombay

Li (SDC) Mark D’Souza

81862Z

MISSILE TECHNICAL POSITION. Bombay

Lt PC Bhasin (L)

50155N

WIRELESS DETACHMENT. Calcutta

Lt (SDC) MN Raghavan

81864B

NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE, Cochin

Lt (SDC) NP Nair

81870T

ENC NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE Visakhapatnam

Lt (SDC) YKP Charles

81874A

Lt (SDME) Madan Lai

85029Y

Surg Lt DK Bose

75131A

UNDERWATER COMMANDO

Lt Samir Das (X), NM. (Posthumous)

WAR ROOM COMCEN NHQ

Lt (SDC) Mohan Singh

81892T

88304R

Sub Lt (SDAR) ER Menon

MYSORE (WF)

KC Vasandan. MCPO(Tel) II

33805

41084

NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE. Visakhapatnam

UP Madhavan. MCPO(Tel) II

46284

INS HANSA. Goa

VB Pathak, MCPO(AOF) II

49640

KUTHAR (WF)

CS Matiyani. MCERA II

64516

INS HOOGHLY. Calcutta

TN Chakravorty. SCPO.

64546

CCDT Bombay

Gurmail Singh. CPO (CD l)(D.ver)

51233

NARO. Cochin

Narinder Singh. AA3.

ALIZE DETACHMENT Bombay

51173

J Mathew. AA3.

ALIZE DETACHMENT Bombay

66083

Om Pa,rkash. POAF

46196

CCDT Bombay

Amin Chand C h au h an PO (CD 1).

WIRELESS DETACHMENT Visakhapatnam

49667

S u k u m a r a n G e o r g e . PO e .

WIRELESS DETACHMENT Calcutta

Harish Chandra Pandey, PO Tel 6537«

NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE. Cochin

49495

NAVAL SIGNAL DETACHMENT. Bombay

RK Dinesan. YS.

48905

Ajit Singh. POAH.

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/401

M ention in Despatches

00083N

CO CAUVERY

Cdr IK Erry (X)

00068B

Cdr KL Chopra (X) (H)

CO CANNANORE M INESW EEPING IN B A N G LA D E SH

00102B

Cdr T K Sachdev (X)

50027Y

LO TRISH U L (WF)

Cdr JN Sukul (L)

CO INVESTIGATOR (WNC)

Cdr Benoy Bhushan (X) (H)

00109Y

CO KISTNA (WNC)

Cdr Raj Anderson (X). VSM

00118T

CO T IR (WNC)

Cdr M Pratap (X)

00135F

CO VIJE TA (Missile Boat) (WNC)

Cdr A R Parti (X)

00164Y

Lt Cdr V Chakraverty (X) (P)

00222B

EO SAGARDEEP (WF)

LI Cdr LV Reddy (E)

Lt Cdr MPS Bhinder (E)

40098F

Lt Cdr RV Kanakrajan (X)

00322F

XO KAVARATTI (EF)

FCO WESTERN FLEET

Lt Cdr In deijit Bedi (X)

00327T

Lt C dr AKS Chitre (X)

00330Z

Lt Cdr BR Ghosh (X)

00336N

Lt Cdr BK Malik (X) (P)

00337R

Lt Cdr SK Parulekar (E)

4 0 1 13R

EO KAVARATTI

Lt Cdr DK Nandi (X). NM

00358N

Lt Cdr Gulab Israni (X) (P)

00364A

SEAHAWK PILOT VIK RAN T

Lt Cdr RB Sun (X)

00375A

CO NASHAK (Missile Boat) (WNC)

Lt Cdr Rajvir Singh(L)

50081W

LO BEAS (EF)

Lt Cdr(SDB) K L Dogra

83152F

Lt Cdr RN Sharm a (X)

00389H

FCO EASTERN FLEET

Lt Cdr A shok Sinha (X) (P)

00392R

SEAHAWK PILOT VIKRANT

Lt Cdr Keki Pestonji (X) (G)

00398B

XO TALW AR (WF)

Lt Cdr Bakshish Singh (X)

00399F

Lt C dr BB Singh (X)

00404T

CO VID YU T (Missile Boat) '(WNC)

Lt Cdr SC Isssacs (X)

0 0 4 14Z

CO NIRBHIK (Missile Boat) (WNC)

Lt Cdr PD Sharm a (X) (P)

00429Z

SEAHAWK PILOT VIKRANT

Lt Cdr SS Chaudhri (X)

00437T

Lt C dr SP Singh (X)

00443F

CO KARWAR M INESWEEPING BAN G LAD E SH

Lt Cdr Y Bhide (X) (P)

00446N

SEAHAWK PILOT VIKRANT

Lt Cdr Daljit Singh (X)

00456N

MYSORE (WF)

Lt Cdr RS Gill (E)

40167N

EO KHANDERI (Submarine) ENC

Lt KN Govindan N air (X)

-00493W

BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)

Lt HS S irohi (X), (O) (Posthumous)

ALIZE OBSERVER (WNC)

Lt BD Vachha(X)

00503T

Lt Ranjit A tlri (X)

00534N

KATCHALL (WF)

Lt PBS Gujral (X)

00539Z

VIKRANT (EF)

Lt SP V yas (X)

00595A

CO BIMLIPATAM M INESW EEPING IN B AN G LAD E SH

Lt (SDB) Charanjit Singh

83163F

Lt C Narayan (X)

00568R

TASO KILTAN (WF)

Lt Raman Puri (X)

00604R

GO KILTAN (WF)

Lt CVS Naidu (X)

00582Y

ALIZE PILOT VIKRANT

Lt A N Karve (X)

00593Y

Lt R Paralikar (E)

4021OK

KILTAN (WF)

Lt V S Shukla (X)

00647W

Lt SC Dua (E)

40238Z

EO NIRGHAT (Missile Boat)

Lt S K Gupta (X)

00665K

Lt Kasho Ram (X)

00669W

Lt SD More (X)

00674F

CO AKSHAY (SDB) (ENC)

Lt SA Bhende (X)

00680W

Lt AM G okhale (X)

00686H

XO VINASH (Missile Boat)

Lt C R Jayaram an (X)

00697H

Lt S hantonu Sen (X)

0 0 7 14Y

Lt SC Suresh Bangara (X)

00726Z

XO VEER (Missile Boat)

Lt SC G hildiyal (X)

00746W

MGO VINASH (Missile Boat)

Lt KB Kh ann a (X)

00756T

402/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

LI KM Rao (X)

Lt Prakash Chandra (X)

MGO

Lt Ratan Singh (X)

007702

NIRGHAT (Missile Boat)

Lt A D Rao (X)

00773F

Lt RPK Pillai (E)

Lt RC Shahdapuri (L)

40280W

f !? mid^ ER (Missi,e Boat)

Lt SR Dhareshwar (X)

50216A

O NIPAT (Missile Boat)

Lt TB Ray (X)

40451H

Lt T I Punnen (E)

00847Z

Lt SS Byce (X)

40268T

Lt A jit Tiw ari (X)

00883F

CO SUBHADRA (SDB)

Lt NP Singh (X)

00904B

Sub Lt Osmond Titus (X)

00849B

CO BULSAR M1NESWEEPING IN BANGLADESH

Sub lt (SDP) Jasbir Singh

00934Y

NO KATCHAL

PA Nair, MCPO I,

868232

MYSORE (WF)

Jagm ail Singh. MC(EAR)I,

35327

VIKRANT (EF)

K T Chami, MC(Mech) I.

50119

VIKRANT (EF)

Tarlok Nath, MC (ERA),

22216

RAJPUT (EF)

86550

David D'Souza MCPOCK I,

KHANDERI (Submarine) (ENC)

13562

PKR Pillai. MCPOTEL II

BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)

23079

RN Pandey. MCPO II (G l).

CHIEF TEL FOCWEF STAFF

44133

BR Sam ptafi Kumar, MCPO II,

KAVARATTI (EF)

50766

SS Shukla, MCPO II

SEAHAWK SQUADRON VIKRANT

35424

K Bhaskaran, MCEAP II

SAGARDEEP (WF)

50821

Ram Singh Kathait, CPO QMI

BETWA (WF)

46444

Nasib Singh. CPO.

BEAS (EF)

43789

MAGAR (EF)

Shrikant Singh. CPO,

64079

DEEPAK (WF)

BB Lai , CH YS

61757

BR Roul, CH YS

CHIEF YEOMAN FOCWEF STAFF

62510

KADMATT (WF)

NL Batra, CPO Tel(WI)

26359

VIKRANT (EF)

C T John, CPO Tel

36004

KHUKRI (WF)

GA Nair, CHELR

47236

KAVARATTI (EF)

Jagm al Singh CHME,

45798

TIR (WNC)

JS Sikarwal, CHME

45953

RANJIT (WF)

Sudam a Tripathi, CHEAP

49858

DEEPAK (WF)

Jo g Raj CHEAP

50847

NIPAT (Missile Boat) KARACHI OPERATION 4/5 DEC

Rup Chand, CPO WTR

62411

HQENC

KL Malhotra, CPO WTR

64957

KHUKRI (WF)

Lekh Raj. MECHfW) 3

67196

TALWAR (WF)

AG Balan. EAR 3

88342

TALWAR (WF)

PS Gaudu, EAR 3

87798

KHUKRI (WF)

MD Mandai ERA 3

52583

BETWA (WF)

Bakhshish Singh. EAR 3

51115

KADMATT (WF)

V P Gopalkrishnan, ERA3

51265

KADMATT (WF)

Rai Singh. Mech (R)3

63930

KATCHALL (WF)

KAVARATTI (EF)

SN Prasad, Mech3

49150

CANNANORE MINESWEEPING IN BANGLADESH

DS Jaswal, Mech3

49405

VINASH (Missile Boat) KARACHI OPERATION 8/9 DEC

Om Prakash Singh EAR3

88809

KILTAN (WF)

Sikandar Tasildar, ERA3

52571

VIKRANT (EF)

HM Sharma, ERA3

88731

VINASH (Missile Boat) KARACHI OPERATION 8/9 DEC

Harbans Singh. EAP (C)3

51305

DEEPAK (WF)

Sarwan Singh, PO Tel

49551

KIRPAN (WF)

RS Pannu, YS

48903

NAVAL SIGNAL CENTRE Bombay

45083

N P Biswas, YS

KHUKRI (WF)

49921

LC Khatri. YS

49609

KHUKRI (WF)

US Yadav, YS

MYSORE (WF)

45482

Papat Lai Chijafiya, PO (QA1J

BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)

86948

GD Goirala, PO (TASI)

KHUKRI (WF)

49373

BR Jaskalyan. PO (UW1)

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/403

BEAS (EF)

PM Subbaiah. PO Tel

48471

KATCHALL (WF)

PS Diwana. PO

86086

BETWA (WF)

Ram Adhar Singh. PO(GI)

46341

HQENC

M VR Murty, PO Tel

46048

BRAHMAPUTRA (EF)

VEB Nambiar, Mech (R)4

87529

RANJIT (WF)

KV Vijayaraghavan, EAR4

90638

MYSORE (WF)

CS Chhetri, SPO

80252

GODAVARI (SNA)

Badrinath, EAR4

52882

BEAS (EF)

Babu Singh, Ag‘. SWA4

90594

RAJPUT (EF)

M R Subram anyam , Mech4

49712

KIRPAN (WF)

P Gangadharan. ERA4

51452

KARANJ (Submarine) (WNC)

PK Bagichi. POELP

69099

KHANDERI (Submarine) (ENC)

ND Katakshyam, POELP

65953

SAGARDEEP (WF)

DP Dash, POELP

87621

JN Dass, POME

66368

MYSORE (WF)

Ivan Lowe, POME

44452

RAJPUT (EF)

RK Nair, PO W tr

92399

FOCWEF STAFF

P T Varghese, LS (UCI)

83170

KAMORTA (EF)

A m a ijit Singh, LS (QA1)

82095

KAVARATTI (EF)

MS Gupta, L S (C D l) (Diver)

64915

UNDERWATER COMMANDO

RS Yadav, LS(CD2) (Diver)

83406

UNDERWATER COM MANDO

SB Singh, LS

83842

MG Prabhu LTel

89797

T Sudhakaran, LEMP

90893

MYSORE (WF)

RVN Gillet, LEM R

91148

PANVEL, KHULNA O PERATION 10 DEC

V Patankar, LME

88306

RANJIT (WF)

P Singh. LME

69501

KHUKRI (WF)

S Shankar, ERA5

51641

GANGA (SNA)

N M athews ERA5

51617

KAMORTA (EF)

RS Sidhu, EAR5

51681

KIRPAN (WF)

S Husain, SIG I

55497

BEAS (EF)

PK Dagar, T E L I

91849

TRISHUL (WF)

VM Singha, T E L I

84649

PANVEL, KHULNA O PERATION 10 DEC

Yogendra Jha, Sea I (GL3)

86268

TRISHUL (WF)

MG Vasupillai, SEAI(RP3)

84343

KILTAN (WF)

RK Dogra, SEA I

82617

INS HANSA, Goa

BN Som an. EM R I

56449

BEAS (EF)

SC Sharm a. SE A I (RP2)

90586

TRISHUL (WF)

KV Bhava Dasan, ME I

68262

INS CIRCARS, Visakhapatnam

GP Haldhar. ME I

99562

Nathu Singh. SEA II

94715

PULI CAT (Patrol Boat) ENC

Dinesh Dubey, EMP2

57636

KATCHALL (WF)

G V Thum bunkel

Master MV HOOGHLY

RD Hajarnavis

Chief Officer VISHW A VIJAY A M P H IB IO U S O PE R A TIO N (EF) A K Bhattachaijee

Chief Engineer M V H O OGHLY

Commendations by the Chief of the Naval Staff

Cdr SC Bindra (S)

60040B

Cdr M M L Saxena (X)

00192K

Lt Cdr CS Menon (X)

00277B

Lt Cdr SJ Contractor (X)

0 0 4 18Z

Lt Cdr K Suresh (X)

NOIC Bombay S taff

004 8IT

Lt Cdr B Nag (X)

Lt Cdr (SDG) KN Divekar

Sqd Leader GPU Nair

7287 IAF

Lt Kulwant Singh Bhasin (E)

40163B

Lt PJ Jacob (X)

VIKRANT (EF)

0051 IK

Lt RS Pujji (X)

0 0 5 13R

DIRECTION OFFICER V IK R A N T (EF)

404/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Lt PS Nelson (X)

Lt HC M edha (X)

00551A

00880Z

Lt SS Kum ar (E)

40207B

Lt K Kam ak (E)

40283A

Lt V K Bhatia (E)

40271Z

Lt P Jaitly (L)

50166N

Lt (SDG) Ravinder Singh

80025Z

Lt (SDG) A vtar Singh

80028F

Lt (SDAE) VS Chitale

86003K

Lt (SDPR) Karnail Singh

SUPPORT OF MUKTI BAHINI OPERATIONS

81559K

Lt (SDR) Kewal Krishan

86014K

Lt (SDR) CP Xavier

87501R

Sub L T RK Sharm a (X)

00920R

Sub L T KM Nair (X)

01081F

Sub L T Guru Raj (X)

011I6K

Sub L T Ranbir Talw ar (X)

01138K

Sub L T CR Kutty (X)

Sub L T EG Govindan (E)

50283B

Sub LT N Subbarao (E)

40400T

Sub L T UP Misra (L)

50264K

Sub L T (SDTAS) Wasi Ahmed Warsi

81269A

Sub L T (SDS) S R Malik

8853IF

Sub L T (SDAE) RK Sur

86013H

De Stephan M CPO II(TAS I)

25774

INS VIRBAHU, Visakhapatnam

Lakhan Lai MC SWA II

50711

INS ANGRE, Bombay

KP M asilam ani MC ER1

50749

INS ANGRE. Bombay

K Ram krishnan MC ERA II

C Arvin daksh an Nair Mech II

64413

HATHI (Tug)

G L Narayan AM II No.

M A rvindakshan CYS

43579

INS INDIA. New Delhi

J u g Lai CPO (G I)

45526

INS TRATA, Bombay

INS HOOGHLY. Calcutta

S K Ch oudhary CPO Wtr

63302

PN Khanna Ch ERA

MYSORE (WF)

LN S harm a CPO CK(S)

60740

JC D u tta CYS

INS VALSURA, Jamnagar

RK Pandey CPO

44523

S K G handhi CH(ME)

45585

INS CIRCARS, Visakhapatnam

48074

S K Bhardwaj CHEL(R)

63922

HATHI (Tug)

VS Nair CH(ME)

VIKRANT (EF)

48841

BM Tiw a ri Ch ELA

NIPAT (Missile Boat)

87168

MPG Pillai Mech III

DARSHAK (Survey Ship) (WNC)

52578

NV Varughese ERA III

NARO Cochin

51209

BK V ashisht EAA III

MYSORE (WF)

51239

P Dass ERA III

ALIZE SQUADRON

88049

GD S ingh AM (W) III

VIKRANT (EF)

49277

HC Chandel A M III

VIKRANT (EF)

51291

V K Sharm a A A III

VIKRANT (EF)

87961

AM Thyagarajan AM (W) III

VIKRANT (EF)

88343

KM N air A A III

VIKRANT (EF)

88451

EV Narayanan EAR III

KATCHALL (WF)

47300

SEAHAWK SQUADRON

P W Rao M ech (R) III

48890

INSJARAWA. Port Blair

M M ahm ood PO EL (A)

66062

INS INDIA. New Delhi

S K Chakraborty Mech (W) III

86113

INSADYAR, Madras

M ohin der Singh PO Tel

86234

VEER (Missile Boat)

SB Th om as PO Tel

66838

TALWAR (WF)

TM Vagnan PO (QM 1)

81296

KUTHAR(WF)

Vasudeb Nag PO W tr

67350

INS HOOGHLY, Calcutta

PV A lexan der PO EL (P)

48257

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/405

P Periera PO

CJ Joseph PO (ME)

VIDYUT (Missile Boat)

82406

KN Venugopalan Nair PO (ME)

GODAVARI (SNA)

67214

BP Shahi A g PO (ME'

GODAVARI (SNA)

87238

S Bandopadhya SWA IV

INS ANGRE. Bombay

51367

KCN Krishnan EAP IV

VIKRANT (EF)

51449

S Reddy L/Tel

INS HOOGHLY. Calcutta

88630

KD Varghese LEM

68931

KUTHAR (\VF)

KL Sebastian LEM

90279

DEEPAK (WF)

B Ram LS

82962

V K Ghatge LS (QM)

86851

INS ANGRE, Bombay

Sulekhan Singh LME

88513

KHAN DERI (Submarine) (ENC)

V P Balakrishnan ME I

57165

TALWAR (WF)

A S Thathola Sea I

83624

DEEPAK (WF)

JKH Varky Sea I

A S Dahiya Sea I

92977

DEEPAK (WF)

K Dam odaran ME I

56060

KATCI-IALL (WF)

Hari Palei Sea I

53148

INS VENDURUTHY, Cochin

Vidhyadhar Singh Sea I

54201

INS CIRCARS, Visakhapatnam

4Q6/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Select Bibliography

Indian Sources

Name o f Book

Author

Under Two Ensigns -

Publisher

Rear Adm Satyindra Singh

The Indian Navy 1945-50

Published by the Indian Navy

Oxford University Press

Blueprint to Bluewater -

Rear Adm Satyinder Singh

New Delhi 1986

The Indian Navy 1951-65

Published by the Indian Navy

A Sailor.Remembers

Admiral RD Katari

Lancer New Delhi 1992

(CNS 1958 to 1962)

Vikas Publishing House

Indian Navy's Submarine

New Delhi 1982

Admiral AK Chatteiji

Arm

Birla Institute of Scientific

(CNS 1966 to 1970)

Naval Aviation - A World

Research 1982

Admiral AK Chatteiji

History

Birla Institute of Scientific

(CNS 1966 to 1970)

We Dared - Maritime

Research. Allied Publishers 1985

Admiral SN Kohli

Lancer International

Operations in the 1971

(FOCINCWEST in 1971

New Delhi 1989

Indo Pak War

CNS 1973 to 1976)

My Years with the IAF

Air Chief Marshal PC Lai

Lancer International Second

(VCAS in 1965, CAS in 1971)

Edition New Delhi 1987

No Way But Surrender -

Vice Adm N Krishnan

Vikas New Delhi 1980

An Account of the Indo

(FOCINCEAST 1971)

Pakistan War in the Bay

o f Bengal 1971

War in the Indian Ocean

Vice Adm MK Roy '

Lancer New Delhi 1995

(Director of Naval

Intelligence 1971)

Manohar New Delhi 1997

Surrender at Dacca

Lt Gen JFR Jacob

(Chief of Staff Eastern

Army Command 1971)

Published by the Publications

A Maritime History of

Rear Adm K Sridharan

Division. Ministry of Informa

India

tion and Broadcasting. Govt of

India 1982 (2nd edition)

Published by the Admiral

Rear Adm K Sridharan

The History o f the Naval

Superintendant Naval Dockyard

Dockyard Bombay

Bombay 1989

Submarine Headquarters

Compiled by

The Indian Navy’s

Visakhapatnam - 530014

Rear Adm RNGanesh

Submarine Arm -

A Pictorial Histoiy-

Silver Jubilee of the

United Sennces Institution of

Submarine Arm 1967-92

Gen JN Chaudhari

India. 1973 National Security

India’s Problem of National

(COAS in 1965)

Lecture, USI 1973

Security in the Seventies

United Services Institution of

PVR Rao

India. 1973 National Security

India’s Defence Policy

(Defence Secretary

Lecture

and Organisation Since

(1962-1967)

United Services InstituUon oi

Independance

Air Chief Marshal PC U1

India. 1975 National Security

Some Problems o f Defence

(VCAS 1965, CAS 197D

Lecture. USI 1977

Vikas Publishing House Delhi 1972

Oxford University Press 1997

Kuldip Nayar

Distant Neighbours

CP Srivastava IAS

Lai Bahadur Shastri

(Secretary to

Orient Longman New Delhi 1999

Minister Shastri 1965)

RD Pradhan IAk

Debacle to Revival

SSTcEKS"8

Lancer International

Stalin to Gorbachov

TN Kaul

(Ambassador to the Soviet Union)

New Delhi 1991

Chanakya Publications

Sailing and Soldiering

Cdr Sureshwar D Sinha

in Defence of India

New Delhi 1990

Brasseys UK 1995

Sea Power and Indian

Rahul Roy Chaudhary

Security

O ffic ia l D o c u m e n ts

Indian Ministry of Defence Annual Reports

Reports of the Standing Committee on Defence, Lok Sabha, New Delhi P a k is ta n i S o u rc e s

Pakistan Naval History Section

The Story o f the Pakistan

Naval Headquarters Islamabad 1991

Navy 1947-1972

National Book Foundation

Pakistan’s Crisis in

Msaj Gen Fazal Muqeem Khan

Leadership

(Defence Secretary 1972)

Islamabad 1973

The First Round (The

Air Marshal Asghar Khan

Vikas New Delhi 1969

Indo Pakistan War 1965)

(CinC Pakistan Air Force

1964-65)

History of the Pakistan

Sy.ed Shabhir Hussain &

PAF Press Masroor

Air Force

Sqdn Ldr M Tariq Qureshi

Karachi 1981

Ayub Khan

Altaf Gauhar

University Press Ltd

(Information Secretary

Bangladesh 1996

1965)

Friends Not Masters

Field Marshal Ayub Khan

Oxford University Press

A Political Autobio

(President of Pakistan

London 1967

graphy

1958 to 1969)

My Version

Gen Mohammad Musa

ABC Publishing House,

(CinC Pakistan Army 1965)

New Delhi 1983

Sentinels of the Sea

Compiled by the Public

Barqsons, Islamabad 1997

The Pakistan Navy

Relations Directorate

(1947-1997)

Pakistan Naval Headquarters

I n t e r n a t io n a l S o u r c e s

Indo Pakistan

Russell Brines

Pall Mall Press London 1968

Conflict 1965

South Asia Crisis - A

Robert Jackson

International Institute for

Political and Historical

Strategic Studies 1975 Chatto

Analysis of the 1971 War

and Windus London

War and Secession -

Richard Sisson and

Vistaar Publications New Delhi

Pakistan India and the

Leo E Rose

1990

Creation of Bangladesh

India’s Ad Hoc Arsenal

Chris Smith

Oxford University Press

New York 1994

No Easy Answers - The

James Goldrick

Lancer Publications New Delhi

Development of the

1997

Navies of India, Pakistan

and Sri Lanka 1945-1996

On Watch

Admiral Elmo R Zumwalt, Jr

Admiral Elmo Zumwalt & Associates

(Chief of Naval Operations

1500 Wilson Boulevard

US Navy 1971)

Arlington. Virginio, 22209, USA 1976

The White House Years

Henry Kissinger

Little Brown, Boston 1979

(National Security Adviser

(Pages 842 to 918 are on

to President Nixon 1971)

In Confidence

Bangladesh)

Anatoly Dobrynin

Random House, New York 1995

(Soviet Ambassador

to the US in 1971)

408/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

Index

•Presence in Persian Gulf 17.18 19

Bangladesh

Admiralty (British) see under Britain

Amnh£enCG n DiCg° Garcia

Aircraft

Amphibious Capability 1971 34 6

•reopening of ports 232,234

.Alizes

(for Army/Navy combined operations!

•minesweeping 233 to 240

•diving Operations 240

.acquisition 263,267

Amphibious Operation Beaver 197

170 to 181

Bharat Electronics (BEL) 83,88,329

.in

the

1965

W ar 37

to

harat Heavy Electricals (BHEL)

39,51.264,265

Reminiscences of

81,88.91.92.100

.in the 1971 War 268,269

•V Adm N Krishnan 170

Blockade

.Loss o f AJize 203 1971

•Adm OS Dawson

171

•in the 1965 War 51

212,269

•Lt Gen JFR Jacob 170,171,172

•Cmde RP Bhalla

172,173,177

■in the 1971 War 124. 125. 131 159

.sonobuoy system 267

160

•Cmde AK Sharma CO GHARJAL

.refurbishment 270

Bombardment

175,177,178,179

.phasing out 276

•of Dwarka 1965 32.33.34

• Cdr U Dabir CO GULDAR

.Dorniers 277

•of Cox’s Bazar 1971 138.182

175.176,177,178

.Islanders 277

Bombay Dockyard see under Naval

.Cdr VF Rebello 170 to 172,175

.Kirans 268,270.277

Dockyard Bombay

to 177

.Seahawks 34 to 37

Britain

.Cdr G Martis 175,176,179

.acquisition 263,265

•and India 3.4.6.13.14.16.57

.Pakistan Navy account 183

.and Pakistan 13,16

.in the 1965 War 37 to 40, 264,

A&N Islands 7.8,9,16,17,47,48,60,61

.Admiralty 6.7.8,68 to 72. 78, 93,

265

.in the 1965 War 24,47

251,253

.material state 1966-70 265,266

.in the 1971 War 123,131

.reluctance to sever naval connection

.in the 1971 War 268

.Kamorta, KARDIP 299.381

17,59.60

.material state 1972-75 270

.Port Blair. JARAWA 9

.response to Defence Delegation

.phasing out 276

Anomalous Propagation

1964

9.17.59

.Sea Harriers 276

.in the North Arabian Sea 35

.withdrawal from East of Suez 1968

.Skyhawks 266,326

.in the 1965 War 37.39

17

Air Force-Navy Interaction

Anti Submarine Operations

BRO Cochin see under NSRY

•in India 1965 War 37,39,51.264.265

.in the 1965 War 38.39.48

BRO Visakhapatnam see under Naval

.in Pakistan 1965 War 38.54

.in the 1971 War

Dockyard Visakhapatnam

.in India 1971 War

196.204,205.207.219

BASSEIN BIMLIPATAM (IMS) 11.381

BULSAR BHATKAL (IMS) 233 to

124.131.156.198.199 to

Arjan Singh, Air Chief Marshal (CAS

238.327.328.380

203.209.219,330

1964-69) 20,23,27 to 30,41

BRAHMAPUTRA BEAS BETWA (AA

•in Pakistan 1971 War

.on the Navy’s non-participation in

Frigates) 11,33,103,110

194.198.202.217.218.224.225

the 1965 War 49,50

BABUR (Pakistan Navy cruiser)

Air Strike radius

Asghar Khan. Air Marshal (CAS PAF

31.33.130

•in the 1965 War 35

1964-65) 23.54

BADR (Pakistan Navy destroyer)

.on Indonesian naval assistance to

-in the 1971 War 125,210.217

31.33.130

Pakistan in 1965 47

Alize (anti submarine aircraft) see under

BAQIR (Pakistan merchant ship 1971)

Ayub Khan. Gen. (President of Pakistan

Aircraft

134,154,241

1965) 20.24.30.54

Alouettes see under Helicopters

BUCKEYE STATE (American merchant

AGRANI (PO Leadership School) 381

America

ship 1971) 160

abhay ajay akshay (SDBs) 11 240

•and India 3,6,14,15.16.22,57.60

AJIT ATUL AMAR (SDBs] 328’387’38°

•and China 13,14,15

AMBA IS/M depot ship) see

•and Pakistan 7.13.14.15.17.18

Submarine Ann h

^DAMAN

Casualties in the 1971 War 394

•in the 1971 War 157 to 160

Ceremonial

•and Russia (USSR) 14.18.158

ARNAANJADIP

AMINI

(Petyas)

.Fleet Reviews 382

•deployment o f Navy to India 1971

243.244.328.380

.

157 to 160

change'of Navy^ay after 1971 384

•geo strategic perceptions o f Asia

jS K K S M S '

14.15.16.17.18

•naval policy in the Indian Ocean

! 7 . 18

Ch Pakistani threat In 1971 124_223

•policy on defence supplies to India

acquisition by Indian Navy 386

and Pakistan 13.14,251

B

Chatter)! AK. Adm (CNS 1966-70) 5. 9.

.non supply o f ‘lethal’ equipment

59,63

to India 8,266

P

. « » “

•suspension/embargoes

34,264

16,20.106

.Henry Kessinger

164 to 166

C h a u d h a ri J N , G en (C O A S 1965)

D

.Adm Gorshkov 169

20.23,25

to 30,40,41,42

.PN Dhar 169

Chavan YB, (Defence Minister 1962-66)

Dawson OS, Adm (DNO 1971, CNS

.LK Jha 169

.1964 Defence Delegations to USA,

1982-84) 171.330

.KB La 11 170

USSR and UK 31,57 to 60,251 to

Defence Delegations in 1964 9,16

.to USA in 1964 57,59,251

.V Adm Krishnan

167,168

253

.Lt Gen Jacob 169

.in the 1965 War 20.23.27,28,29

.to USSR in 1964 57,58,252

ESSO ARK (merchant ship 1971) 235

.on the non involvem ent o f Navy

.to UK in 1964 17,59

1965 30

Defence Reviews

.1971 War 111,113

.1963 and Defence Plan 1964-69 8,

C h eta k s

(A lo u e tte s )

see

u nder

9,57,251

F 104 (PAF fighter aircraft) in 1971

Helicopters

.1973 (APEX 1) 244,327

.attacks on Okha 1971 194,227

Chiefs of Staff Committee 49,50

.1975 (APEX 2) 327

.shooting down AJize 1971 212.227

Chiefs of the Naval Staff

Defence of Bombay 1971 124. 125,213,

Fixed commissions in ships 312

1947-48 R Adm JTS Hall RIN 5

214

Foreign cruises 291,375

1948-51 V Adm E Parry RN 6

Development of the Indian Navy

F rigate P r o je c t see u n d er Leander

1951-56 V Adm M Pizey RN 6

.overview 1947 to 1965 11

Frigate Project

1956-58 V Adm S Carlill RN 7

.overview 1965 to 1975 328

1958-63 V Adm RD Katari IN 7.57

Dhar. DP (Foreign Policy Planning

1963-66 V Adm BS Soman 20

Committee 1971) 111

1966-70 Adm AK Chatterji 5. 9. 59. 63,

Dhar. PN (Sec to PM 1971) 111,168

249

Diego Garcia 17,18

Gan (Addu Atoll) 17

1970-73 Adm SM Nanda 58,71,73.110

Diving Cadre 385

G andhi Indira, (PM o f In dia 1969-

1973-76 Adm SN Kohli 51,52.110

Dwarka see under Bombardment

77.1979-8 4) 81. 82, 95, 111.

1976-79 Adm J Cursetji 273 to 275

Dornier (aircraft) see under Aircraft

113,159 to 162

1979-82 Adm RL Pereira 356

Daphne class submarines see

u nder

Garden Reach Workshops(GRW) 67

1982-84 Adm OS Dawson 171,330

Pakistan Navy

GED, GTD, GKES (of the USSR) 247

1984-87 Adm RH Tahiliani 263. 273.

Dabolim see under Goa

Goa 8,9

330

DELHI (WWII cruiser) 7,11,33

Goa Shipyard(GSL) 68.

1987-90 Adm JG Nadkarni 88

DHARINI (2nd hand store/depot ship)

Gopal Rao KP, Cmde, (on 1st Missile

1990-93 Adm L Ramdas 178

11,381

Attack 1971) 188

1993-96 Adm VS Shekhawat 249. 255.

DARSHAK (survey ship) 11, 235, 264,

Gorshkov SG, Adm o f the Fleet, USSR

330

268

62,63,247

1998-Adm Sushil Kumar vii

DEEPAK (tanker) 96,268,328,380

G ovind N a rain , (D e fe n c e Secretary

China

.acquisition 8,9

1973-75) 111,273

.and India 3. 8 to 10. 15. 16. 24, 57.

.in the 1971 War 199

Grechko. Marshal, USSR 107

.

160. 161

DESHDEEP (requisitioned tanker 1971)

Gwadar see under Makran

.and Pakistan 15.16.19.24

134

GODAVARI class new frigates 84, 87. 98

Chittagong 131 to 139.182.183

DUNAGIRI (4th Leander) 85

to 101

.Oil tanks set on fire 182

DEGA (NAS Visakhapatnam) 279

G H AZI (P a k is ta n N a vy S/M 1971)

Coast Guard 350

DACCA (Pakistan Navy tanker) 31. 33

108.221 to 223

Contraband Control

130.199.201

•in the 1965 War 108

.in the 1965 War 37,51

•in the 1971 W ar 140 to 153

.in the 1971 War 124 to 126,131 to

.Reconstructed T ra c k 1971 (map)

139

Corvette Project/500 ton Patrol craft

Eastern Fleet

148

.Likely Date and Causes of Explosion

61.102

•in 1971 120.123.131 to 139.175 to

C o x s Bazar 131 to 139.170 to 184

Reminiscences

184

Cursetji J (V Adm VCNS 1971. CNS

.Lt Gen Jacob 148

.after 1971 290

1976-79) 273 to 275

.R A dm (N D ) PP S iv a m a m

Education Branch 358

CAUVERY (WW II Frigate).5

147,152

Education Activity 359

C A N N A N O R E C U D D A LO R E 'C M S)

.R Adm (E) GC Thadani 145

Embargoes on defence supplies 1965

11.233 to 239

.C m d e (T A S ) KP Mathew

War 20.106

C H ITR A N G A D A (B S F launch 1971)

145.151

ENTERPRISE Task Force 1971 15 lfi

154.156

.Cmde (SM) KS S u b r a -M a n ia

18.157 to 169

’

CHAKRA (Russian nuclear propelled S/

145,146.150

.n

•reconstructed track (map) 163

M) 255.259.260

.Cmde (ND) CVP S a r a th y ^

COM1LLA (Pakistan Navy gunboat)

.Cmde (Diving) Vimal

■ a! 5 8 T i 6 0 Special Action Groue

K u m a

109.140.182

•Reminiscences

•Cdr (SM) Shall Syed I 46’ 1

•Adm^Zumwalt (CNO 1971) 160

• C d r (D iv in g ) H

D h m gr*

•Anatoly Dobrynin

161 162 lfifi

149.151

•Cdr (TAS) Utful Dabir 152

■Jack Anderson 161,162

410/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

.Lt Cdr (Diving) Sajjan Kumar

146.152

P0:38 51 aU ackin6 merchant ships

.Lt Cdr(SDG) Inder Singh CO

Indigenisation of

RAJPUT 144

Kamath VA, V Adm. (FOCSOUTH 1971

GARUDA (NAS Cochin) 262

•Leander machinery and equipment

VCNS 1974) 111.330

GHARIAL, GULDAR (LST) 170 to 184

see under Leander Frigate Project

Kamov (Russian anti S/M helicopters)

328. 380

•submarine batteries 258

•warship design 96 to 104

see under Helicopters

GHORPAD (LST) 245.328.380

Karachi 33.187

GAJ (Tug) 96.328.380

•warship construction see under

Kashmir

Leander Frigate Project

GODAVARI GANGA GOMATI (WWII

.warship stores and equipment 346

•Pakistan’s intrusions 1965 13.21

destroyers) 11,33.215.381

•yardcraft 95.105

•Russian support of India’s stand 14

GOMANTAK (shore establishment) 9

Indonesia

•in the 1965 War 20.21

GULF STAR (merchant ship 1971) 199

Katari RD. V Adm. (CNS 1958-63) 57

•intrusions 9.16.17.253

201

Kaul TN 57

.acquisition of Russian warships

Keamari Oil Tanks 22

15,25

H

.in 1971 War 227

.perception of A&N Islands prior to

.fire 4/5 Dec 193.194

1965 9,15 to 18,25,48.60

Helicopters 264.267

.fire 8/9 Dec 199

.perceptions during 1965 17,47

Kiran (jet trainer aircraft) see under

.Alouettes/Chetaks 264

.naval assistance to Pakistan 1965

Aircraft

.SAR 268.270

17,47.48

Kirpal Singh. R Adm 56

.MATCH 268.270

IL 38 (MRASW aircraft) Maritime

Kissinger, Dr Henry(Adviser to US

.in smaller ships 277

Reconnaissance

President Nixon 1971)

.Seakings 110.326

Islander (aircraft) Aircraft

.on aid to Pakistan 159 to 166

.acquisitions 267

International Law of the Sea see under

.on the Bangladesh War 164

.preliminary evaluation 267

Maritime Legislation

on despatch of ENTERPRISE Task

.in 1971 war 269

INVESTIGATOR (WWII Survey Ship)

Force 166

.material state 1972-73 270

5,33.381

Kohli SN. Adm. (DCNS 1965.

.in frigates 85,277

FOCINCWEST 1971. CNS 1973-

Simulator (FATS) 279

76) 330

.Helicopter Training School 268

.reaction to bombardment of Dwarka

.Kamovs 244.277

Jacob JFR,- Lt Gen. (Chief of Staff

1965 51.52

Higher Direction of War

Eastern Army 1971)112,114.117

Krishna Menon. (Defence Minister.

1957-62) 16.57.67,248

.in 1962 decision not to use Air Force

.on Mukti Bahini 127,128,129

Krishnan N, V Adm. (FOCINCEAST

29.30

.on GHAZI 147,149

1971) 329

.in 1965 decision to use Air Force

.on Naval Commando Operation

.reactions on 1965 War 53

28.29.30

Khulna 154,157

.on 1971 War 117.118.119.120 to

.in 1965 decision not to use Navy

.on the ENTERPRISE Task Group

122,131 to 140

30.31.34.43.50 to 55

169

Krushchev. Nikita 14.58.59

.on Amphibious Landing

.in the 1965 War 40 to 55

Kuruvila EC. V Adm. (I'OCWEF 19/1.

170,172,174

.in the 1971 War 123.227 to 231

CMD MDL 1973-76)

Jagjivan Ram, (Defence Minister 1971)

Hindustan Shipyard(HSL) 67

73.111,329.330

63,111,114,329

Honours and Awards 1971 War 397

Kutch. Rann of 9.17.21.22.23

Hydrographic Office see under Survey

KHUKRI class new Corvettes 98.102

j£irinather i965 War 37.38.264.265

HATHI (WW II Tug) 215.381

KHUKRI KUTIIAR KIRPAN (A/S frigates)

.in the 1971 War 269

11.110.125.204.209

HANSA (NAS Goa) 263

Jammu and Kashmir see under

.KHUKRI. sinking of 204 lo 211, 227.

HIMGIRI (2nd Leander) 83.328.380

Kashmir

H A N G O R

(P a k ista n

Navy

S/M)

325

Japan 3.14.56

.Adm Kolili's account 204.209.210

108.199.205.207 to 209.220 to

J A R A W A s e e under A& N Islands

.Pakistan Navy account 205.207 lo

223

Jha LK. (P rin c S ec to PM 1905.

209

H ARM ATTAN (m erchant ship 1971)

Ambassador USA 1971)

.post war Inquiries 210.2 ii

199.201

.on the 1965 War 20.23

KISTNA (WW II frigate) 5.33.65

.on the non involvement of Nav>

KONKAN (WW II minesweeper ^ b l

. I

1965 30

k a l v a r i

k h a n d e r i

k u r s u r a

KARANJ (submarines) 62. 63,

Indian Ocean 3.4,17.18

•tears o f vacuum/inilitirisation 1968

k a m orta

31 33 130

80 kadm att

kiltan

'

MVARATTI KATCHALL (Petyas)

17.18

JESSORE (Pakislan Navy gunboat)

63.64.187.188.328.380

as a Zone of Peace 18

109.137.140

Indian Navy

KESARI (LST) 245.328,380

JUMNMWW II frigalcl 5

.responsibilities in the Indian Ocean

SKESB Stfk-

3 4.5.6

.role in the 1965 war 33

t m n s i t i o n t o t i m p i w 1

•operations in 1965 war 25.26.33 to

38.48

KHAIBAR (Pakistan Navy destroyer)

.Indian Fleet in Bay of Bengal 1965

.Chittagong 1971 235 to 240

31.33.130.187.188.191

46

.Reminiscence o f Rear Adm A Tewari

KATTABOMAN (VLF station) 259

.Eastern Theatre 1971 112

1971 233 to 239

KAL1NGA (missile technical position)

.Naval O perations Bay o f Bengal

Missiles see under Weapons

Missile Attacks on Karachi 1971 War

245

1971 132

KARDIP see under A&N Islands

.GHAZI’s movements 1971 148

.first missile attack 4/5 Dec 185 to

.Khulna Operation 1971 155

196

.ENTERPRISE movements 1971 163

.sequence of events 187

.Amphibious Landing 1971 174

Reminiscences

Laccadive/LMA/Lakshadweep Islands

.First Missile Attack 1971 186

.Adm Kohli 185.191

34.257

.Western Fleet movements 1971 195

.Cmde Gopal R a o l8 8 to 191

Lai PC. Air Chief Marshal. fVCAS 1965.

.Missile Attacks on Karachi 1971 197

.Pakistan Navy Account 191 to

CAS 1971) 29.43 to 47

.Second Missile Attack 1971 200

194

.On Objectives in 1971 113

.Sinking of the KHUKRI 1971 206

.cancelled missile attack 6/7 Dec

.on 1971 War 113,170

.Southern Naval Area 1971 216

124.198,223.224

Leandcr Frigate Project 8.9.32.58.67 to

.Minesweeping at Pussur 1971 234

.Pakistan Navy Account of attack

95.326

.Minesweeping at Chittagong 1972

on ZULFIQAR 194

.s c e p tic is m

re g a rd in g

In d ia n

236

.second missile attack 8/9 Dec 196

capability 73.76.78 to 81.89,90

.Naval Air Stations 1999 278

to 199,223

.Vickers of UK 9,69 to 83,88

.Hom eward Passages o f Russian

Reminiscences

.Yarrow of UK 9.69 to 81,88

acquisitions 1965 to 1975 376

.Adm Kohli 196.198

.SIGNAAL o f Holland 83.84,89

Maritime Boundaries 351

.Pakistan Navy Account 199 to

.NEVESBU of Holland

Maritime Legislation

203

83.84.94

.UNCLOS 1 347

Missile Boats 62 to 66,242

.interaction with the Admiralty 93

.UNCLOS 2 348

Mongla 120,121.127,128.154,156,182

.indigenisation 69,79 to 94

.UNCLOS 3 348

Moolgavkar H, Air Chief Marshal (CAS

.Reminiscences of

.1982 Convention on the Law of the

1976-78) 56,274

.Adm SM Nanda 71

Sea 349

Mountbatten. Adm o f the Fleet UK

.Adm JG Nadkarni 88

.p a ssage o f w a rsh ip s throu gh

5,9,12,13.59.248,250 to 254,262

.V

Adm

BA

S am son

territorial waters 349

Mukherjee SK. (Addl Secy Min of Def

74,75,78.81,82.89

.Maritime Zones Act 1976 349

1971) 111,330

.R Adm JJ Baxi 83.84,86,93.329

.sa fe ty

zon es

fo r .

o ffsh o re

M u kti

B a h in i

-

N a v a l

E lem en t

.Cmde KK Lohana 84.91

installations 350

115,127,128,129.232

.Cmde SC Bose 76.80,87.91

.Coast Guard Act 350

Mu 11a MN, Capt (CO KHUKRI 1971)

.Cmde KM Acharya 79,83,90

Maritime Reconnaissance 271

205,209

.Capt S Prabhala 74,83,85,90,92

.Air Force responsibility 4

MANDOVI (Naval Academy) 381

.Capt Mohan Ram 76,77,81,329

.in the 1965 War 38.51,271

MAGAR (WW II LST) 11. 33. 123. 170.

.in the 1971 War 125,210,214

173. 175, 182

M

.evaluations of Beriev, Atlantique and

MYSORE (WW II cruiser) 7, 11. 33, 196.

Nimrod aircraft 243,272

199,203,204

Maldive islands 277

.Transfer of Command and Control

MANGRO (Pakistan Navy S/M) 108.

M a lh otra . In d e r (S e n io r D efe n ce

273 to 276

127,222,223

Journalist) 118.248

Reminiscences of

MUHAFIZ (Pakistan Navy CMS) 129.

Malinovsky, Marshal, USSR 57,58

.G ovind

N arain

(D efen ce

187,189 to 191

Makran Coast 124

Secretary 1973-75) 273

MADHUMATI (Pakistani merchant ship

.MYSORE’S diversionary operation

.Adm Tahiliani 273

1971)

203,241

203

.Air Chief Marshal Moolgavkar

.Gwadar 124

MAQBOOL BAKSH (Pakistani merchant

274

.Jiwani 203

ship 1971) 228

•V Adm Arun Prakash 274

.Pasni 124

•Cmde Shahane 275

M a n ek sh a w S F H J, F ield M arsh al

N

•

Super Constellation MR aircraft

(COAS 1971) 11 1.114.115

271,272,277

Manpower

Nadkarni JG, Adm (CNS 1987-90) 88

.IL 38 MRASW aircraft 244,272 277

.policies 301

■TU 142 LRMP aircraft 277

Nanda SM Adm (D CN S 1964. CMD

.manning plan 302

M D L

1965.

C N S

1970-73)

Mazagon Docks(MDL) 8,9.67 to 90

.controlling costs 317

Meteorology 362

329,330

.NSEC 313

.1964 Delegations to America. Russia

Maps

MWge N a ^ marineS SCe Under Pakistan

and Britain57 to 59.251 to 253

.Jammu and Kashmir 26

Mine Damage 1971 235 239

•on the Leander Project 71.329

.Indian Fleet movements 1965 32

•in the 1971 War 119

.Naval Operations Arabian Sea 1965

Naval Air Arm 4.6.7

36

R1« , E iu rin c c i a 7 i

Naval Assistance in Pcacelime 388

•to ships in distress at sea 388

■ to civil authorities 389

412/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

.for sea transportation 390

.during strikes and bandhs 391

Operation Beaver 19 71 170 to 181

.diving assistance 392

Operation Falcon 1971 209

•welfare 365

.for VIP transportation 393

Operation Python 1971 196 to 199

Pr,rHhnda^ n the 1965 War 30,51

Naval Com m ando Operation Khulna

Operation Trident 1971 185 to 196

Pradhan RD (Sec to DM 1965)

Organisation

154 to 157

0ntohe5q9,64,?cefenCe DeleSati° ‘« l 57

Reminiscences

•changes in NHQ organisation 370

to 5 9 to USA. USSR and UK|

.V Adm Krishnan 154

changes in command and control

p P " ‘ heA 1965 w a r 22.27.2 9.30.31 .54

rrak ash Arun V Adm 269 274 27S

.Lt Gen JFR Jacob 154,156

PASNI^(Pakistan merchant ship 1971)

.Capt MN Samant 154

.Lt Cdr JPA Noronha 156

PADMA, PALASH (BSF launches 1971)

.attacks by IAF aircraft 156.157

Pakistan

127.154.156

Naval Constructor Cadre 96.98

.an d A m erica 7.13,14.15

PANAJI. PULICAT. PAMBAN. PANVEL,

Reminiscences

■and C h in a 15.19.24

PURI (R u ssia n p atro l bo ats)

.Mr Parmanandan 96.99.102.103

62.328.380

.and R u ssia 15.24.106

.Capt K Lohana 96.101

Port Blair see under A&N Islands

P a k is ta n Navy

.Capt Mohan Ram

100

POSHAK (dockyard tanker 1971) 125

.n a v a l

a c q u i s i t i o n s from USA

Naval Dockyard Bombay 1.7.8.64.293

7,15.16.19

to 295.299

.a cco u n t of the 1965 War 22.25.31 to

N a va l

D o ck ya rd

V isakh apatn am

33

Rann of Kutch see under Kutch

62.63.243.244.296 to 298.300

.D a p h n e

c l a s s

s u b m a rin e s

Rao PVR. (Defence Secretary. 1962-66)

Naval Research and Development 337

108.119.124.281

.Defence Delegations 1964 251.253

.NPOL 337.338

.u n d erw ater forces programme 108

.on the 1965 war 20.25,28,31.49

.NCML 337.339

.s u rfa c e sh ip s 109

.on the Higher Direction of War in

.NSTL 339

.in teractio n with R ussia 17.106.107

1965

42.43.53.54

Naval Ship Repair Yards (ex BROs)

.t im in g o f p re e m p tiv e a tta c k in

.on the Russian acquisitions 56

.Cochin 299.300

D ecem b er 1971 130

Retrospects

.Port Blair 299,300

.a c c o u n t o f the 1971 War 217 to 226

.The Navy's Growth 1947 to 1965

Nehru. Jawaharlal. (PM of India 1947-

.re c o n n a issa n ce effort 55.198.220 to

10.11

64)

5.13.14.16.262

222

.The 1965 Indo Pakistan War 52

.in 1952 on equidistance from

.m id g e t s u b m a r in e s & c h a r io ts

.The Leander Frigate Project 95

superpowers 56

108,124,223.228

.Indigenous Warship Design 104

.The ENTERPRISE Incident 1971

.in 1955 on Air Force acquisitions

.a n a l y s i s

o f

P a k is ta n i

Naval

169.170

from Russia 56

op eratio ns 1971 223 to 226

.The Landing Operation 1971 180 to

Nott. Martin SL. Cmde RIN (Chief of

.m ining o f Chittagong 232

182

Staff 1947-48) 5

.policy for attack in g m erchant ships

.O p e ra tio n s in E a ste rn Naval

Nuclear Propulsion 96.259

54

Command 1971 183.184

NILGIRI (1st Leander) 81. 82. 270. 328.

P a rk a sh S . V Adm (CO VIKRANT 1971)

.The First Missile Attack 1971 194

122.138.139.329

380

.After the War (Fleet Raid on Makran)

P arm an an d an . DGND 96. 99. 102. 103,

NISTAR (S/M rescue ship) see under

1971 203.204

Submarine Arm

329

.A fter th e W ar (The S in k in g of

N IPA T NIRBH IK NASHAK NIRGHAT

P ay C o m m ission 353

KHUKRI) 1971 210.211

(m is s ile b o a ts)

110.185 to

R em in iscen ces

Submarine Operations 1971 212

.V Adm Som an 354

204.328.380

.O p era tio n s in W estern Naval

.Cm de B hatnag ar 355

Command 1971 213

P e r c e p t io n s D u rin g W ar

.Naval Operations in the Arabian Sea

.o f CN S So m an on Indonesia in

1971

227

W ar 47.48,49

Naval Operations in the Bay of

Oceanographic Forecasting 345

o f CNS Nanda on m issile attack o

Oceanographic Research 343

•°f Dec 1971 198.227 228

J2K.“SS » —

Oceanography 362

o f C in C K oh li on h u n te r k iller

Oceanology 363

. J

S

,

Officers

5

7

,

^

Ships in Harbour 229

.Intake 302

T a s k

F o r c e

1971

The 1971 War 2 3 i

iM in e s w e e p in g

O p era tion s

.training 302

136,167,168

.promotion 305

Chittagong 1971 240

P erso n n el

61,109,110

.The Russian Acquisition Programme

.morale and discipline 317

.dilution o f expertise

.personal numbers 312

.facial appearance d w

245

The Submarine Arm 259

Ogarkov. Marshall USSR 259

.uniforms 314

.M a in ten a n c e . R ep a ir and R efit

Okha in the 1971 War 125.185.194.214

.accomodation 320

Facilities 300

Operation Desert Hawk 1965 21 to

civilian personnel

.personnel 324

Operation Gibraltar 1965 24,26

.Third Pay ^

^

5° 1975 323

Operation Grand Slam 1965 27

borne strength 1965 19 fo

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/413

Operation Riddle 1965 30,53

S u p er C o n s t e lla tio n s

see

u nd er

.The Navy’s Growth 1965 to 1975

Scientific Research see under Naval R

Maritime Reconnaissance

325 to 328

and D

Survey

.Epilogue 329,330

Sea Harriers see under Aircraft

.ships and craft 331 to 336

Roy Chaudhury, Rahul 6,7,248

Seahawks (fighter aircraft) see

u nder

.activities 331 to 335

R oy MK, V A dm (D N I in

1971)

Aircraft

.Hydrographic Office 331 to 334

111,127.167,259

Seakings (British ASW helicopters)

.training 333,336

Russia

see under Helicopters

Swaran Singh, (Foreign Minister 1971)

.and In dia 3 ,4 ,9 ,1 4 to 18,56 to

Seaward Defences 4,9

20.111.113

58.113

.take over of coast batteries 9

S U B H A D R A

S U V A R N A

S H A R A Y U

.and Pakistan 15,106

.missile coast battery 62,245

SAVITRKCBR craft) 11.381

.and China 15,16

Security of Information 61,109

.deployment of Navy to India 1971

Sen MM (Leander Project) 91.92.329

SHARADA SUKANYA (SDBs) 1 1

18,157

to 169

Seventh Fleet see under ENTERPRISE

SHAKTI (old tanker) 7.11.33.35.381

.minesweeping force in Chittagong

Shastri Lai Bahadur. (PM of India 1964-

S H A R D U L

S H A R A B H

(LS Ts)

1972

18,240

65)

16.20.22 to 29

245,328.380

Russian Acquisitions 9,61,64,242 to

SIGNAAL see under Leander Frigate

SUTLEJ (WW II vintage survey ship)

245,326

Project

5.20.32

.In d ia n h esita n ce to sw itch to

Skyhawks see under Aircraft

SAGARDEEP (requisitioned lighthouse

Russian acquisitions 56. 58, 59.

Soman BS V Adm (CNS 1963-66) 1965

tender 1971) 124.196

60. 253

War 30.47 to 52

SATAVAIIANA (training establishment)

.s e g re g a tio n in V isa k h a p atn a m

Southern Naval Area 1971 War 215

244.258.260.381

109,110

Soviet Union see under Russia

SHAMJEHAN (Pakistan Navy destroyer)

.co n fid en ce in In dian ca p a b ility

Sri Lanka 276

31.33.189.193

60,63.64

S riva sta va PC (Sec to PM 1965)

S H U S H U K

(P a k is ta n

N a v y S/M)

.im provem en ts su ggested by the

20.22.23.26.28

108.222.223

Indian side 61,63,64

Strategic Perceptions 3 to 6.9.14.16 to

S Y L H E T (P a k is ta n N a vy g u n b o a t)

.spares problems 62,65

18

109.140

.RTD problems 62,65

Submarine Arm 8,10.325

S AD A Q A T (P a k ista n N avy gu n boat)

.guarantee specialists 61.246

.acquisitions 58.248 to 261

109.129.193

.repair and refit facilities 64.242 to

.training 249.250,254.255

247

.inductions 62 to 64

T

.Professional Delegation 1975 244

.infrastructure facilities 62.256

.Acquisitions 1965 to 1975 56.242

.improvements 61,65,256,260.327

Tactics

.Acquisitions After 1975 245

.depot ship AMBA 63, 215. 257. 260,

.evaluations 260,290.291

R A J P U T

R A N A

R A N J IT

(WW

II

328, 380

.doctrine 210.211,291

destroyers) 11,33,142,381

.rescue vessel NISTAR 63, 66. 257

Tahiliani RH, Adm, (CNS 1984-87)

RAJALI (NAS Arkonam) 279

,328. 380

.in the 1961 Goa operation 263

R IF A Q A T (P a k ista n N avy gu nboat)

.operations 1971 War 140,211,212

.on the transfer o f MR 273

109,129

.six yearly refits 243,244,258

Torpedoes see under Weapons

RAJSHAHI (Pakistan Navy gunboat)

•VLF communication facility 259

Trade Warfare

109.182

.indigenous batteries 258

.in 1965 War 54

• indigenous construction (SSKs) 258

.in 1971 w ar 183,184,212,215

S

.Kilo class 258,327

Training

.nuclear propelled CHAKRA 258.259

.1974 Reforms 315

Sailors

.Reminiscences

Transfer o f Ships to Foreign Navies 387

.intake 305

.Adm Soman 250

TRJSHUL(AS frigate) 11.33.110.198

.training 306

•Adm Nanda 251,252

.transfers 308

TALWAR (AS frigate) 11. 33, 34, 37, 62,

•Adm Kohli 254

.reorganisation o f structure 309,310

110

.Adm VS Shekhawat 249.255

.introduction o f MCPO 309

•in 1965 War 26,34

.PVR Rao 249.251

.artificer shortage 309

•in 1971 War 198

• RD Pradhan 252,253

.morale and discipline 317

.fitment o f missiles 245

.K Spbrahmanyam 253

.changes in branch responsibilities

TIR (cadet training frigate) 5,65

.V Adm RN Ganesh 255

310

•in 1971 War 124,196,198.225

.R Adm JMS Sodhi 250,255

.topasses 317

TARAGIRI(5th Leander) 87

•R Adm SC Anand 255

.changes in conditions o f service 323

TRATA (seaward defence base) 64

.Cmde KS Subra-Manian 249,

Samson BA V Adm. (FOCIF 1965, CMD

254

T U N IR (m is s ile te c h n ic a l p o s itio n )

M D L

1966-73)

244.381

.Capt MN Samant

249 254

20.25,35,50,73,329

TU 142 (LRMP aircraft)

see

u n d er

Subrahm anyan K (S en ior D efen ce

Sarin HC (Sec D ef Prodn 1965-68)

Analyst)

Maritime Reconnaissance

20,73,77 to 79,88,92,93,329

TIPPU SULTAN (Pakistan Navy frigate)

•on decision for naval acquisitions

S arm a SH R A dm (F O C E F 197 1)

from Russia 60,253

31,33,130

1 1 1,123.232,240,329

IUGHRIL (Pakistan Navy destroyer)

.on delegation to Russia 1965 60

31.130

414/TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH

u

Reminiscences of

.Bom bardm ent 124

.V A d m

S

P a rk a s h

(C O

W eapons

UK see under Britain

VIKRANT 1971) 122,139

.anti ship missiles 280.287.326

.anti aircraft m issiles 280.287

Unified Code 352

.V Adm B B hu shan (S en ior

U n ited

N a tio n

S e c u r it y

C o u n c il

Engineer 1971) 122,139

.anti su bm arine h om in g torp ed o es

13.14.18,55

.R Adm SK Gupta (CO

281.285.287

.1971 War 124.157,158

Seahawk Sqdn 1971) 268

.anti subm arine ro ck e ts 2 8 1 ,287

.C o n f e r e n c e on t h e Law o f t h e Sea

.modernisation refits 103.270.276

.m aintenance 281 to 283,287

347

.decommissioning 276

.depots 283 to 285,287

.Seabed Committee 348

VINDHYAGIRI (6th Leander) 87

.inspection 285 to 287

USA see under America

VIR AA T (aircraft carrier)

276

.acceptance trials 286.288

USSR see under Russia

VISHW A KUSUM (merchant ship 1971)

.work up 287

Ustinov Marshal USSR 259

239

Weapon System s

UDAIGIRI (3rd Leander) 85

V IS H W A V IJ A Y (re q u is itio n e d troop

.im port o f 6

UTKROSH (NAS Port Blair) 277

c a r r ie r

1971)

see

u n d e r

.self sufficiency 6

Am phibious Operation

W estern Fleet O perations 1971 196 to

V

VENUS CHALLENGER (merchant ship

204

1971) 187,189.202

Vickers o f UK

see u n d e r L e a n d e r

VIRBAHU (S/M Headquarters East) 381

Y

Frigate Project

Visakhapatnam 7,8.9,17,61,109

W

Yadav BB Cm de 65,66,18 7,329

Visakhapatnam Dockyard s e e

u n d e r

Y a h y a K h a n ,

G e n .

(P r e s id e n t o f

Naval Dockyard

W ar Plans/Objectives 1971

Pakistan 1971) 128,129

Visakhapatnam Project 61.63

.Indian Arm ed Forces 123

Yard craft 105

VELA VAGIR VAGHSHEER VAGLI

.Pakistan Arm ed Forces 115, 116,

Yarrow o f UK see u n d er Lean der Frigate

(S/Ms) 243,244.328

127, 213

Project

VEER VIDYUT VIJ ETA VINASH (missile

.Indian Navy 118

boats) 110,185 to 203,328,381

.Eastern Naval Com m and 120, 121,

Z

VIKRANT (WW II aircraft carrier) 326

123

.acquisition 7,11,262

.W estern Naval Com m and 123, 124,

Zhukov, M arshal, U S S R 57

.in the Goa Operation 1961 263

125

ZOE (m erchant ship 1971) 199

•in the 1965 W ar 22,33,264

.Southern Naval A rea 126

Z U L F IQ A R (P a k is t a n N a v y f r ig a t e )

.material state 1966-71 265

.W estern Fleet 124,125

130,198,227

• in the 1971 W ar 118' to 122, 139,

.Subm arines 121,124

Zu m w alt E. A dm , (CNO, U S N a vy 1971)

140,184,268,269

.M issile Boats 124,125

160 to 162

.material state 1972-75 270

.Am phibious O peration 121

TRANSITION TO TRIUMPH/415

Table of Contents

Epilogue

Foreword

Lessons Learnt

1. THE GROWTH OF THE NAVY TILL 1965

4. THE RUSSIAN ACQUISITIONS 1965 TO 1971

Pre-Independence Plans for the Navy’s Development 3

The Visakhapatnam Project - 1968

Acquisition of More Petyas and Submarines - 1971 65

Pakistan’s Plan

Operation Grand Slam - September 1965

September

Submarine and Anti Submarine Operations in

Work up for War

The Second Frigate - INS HIMGIRI

The Third Frigate - INS UDAYGIRI

The Operational Plan o f Western Naval

The Fifth Frigate - INS TARAGIRI

The Leander Frigate Project in Retrospect

The Escalation Towards War

Project 25 KHUKRJ Class Corvettes

Indigenous Warship Design in Retrospect

NAVAL COMMANDO OPERATION A T MONGLA -

THE ENTERPRISE INCIDENT - DEPLOYMENT ^

Reconstruction o f Events

™ 'W i S a w s D aJ ' f Sur,aceSh'Ps

Indian Reactions

Operation Beaver

The Landing Operation in R e t r o s p e c t

Assessment of Pakistan Air Force Performance

Pakistan Maritime Reconnaissance

The Pakistan Navy’s Account

Retrospect

WESTERN FLEET OPERATIONS AND THE SECOND

13. RETROSPECT OF THE 1971 WAR

Naval Operations in the Arabian Sea

Naval Operations in the Bay of Bengal

The MYSORE Group’s Raid on the

SINKING OF THE KHUKRI

The Hunter Killer Operation

Afterword

Anti Submarine Operation Falcon

After the War

Reopening the Port of Chittagong

212

Reopening the Pussur River Ports

Trade Warfare

Check Sweeping of the Swept Channel

240

Transfer of Captured Pakistani Merchant ships to

1972 TO 1975

Pakistan Flotilla Operations