UNDER

TWO ENSIGNS

THE IN D IA N N A V Y 1 9 4 5 -1 9 5 0

R ea r A d m i r a l S A T Y I N D R A S I N G H A V S M ( R e t d . ) OXFORD & IBH PUBLISHING CO.

N E W D E L H I

B O M B A Y

C A L C U T T A

© 1986 D ire c to r o f Personnel Services, Indian N avy IS B N 81-204-0094-1

P u b lis h e d by M o h a n P rim la n i f o r O x fo rd & IB H P u b lish in g C o ., 66 J a n p a th , N e w D e lh i 110 001 a n d p rin te d a t G id so n P rin tin g W o rk s, C -130, M a y a p u ri, In d . A re a , N ew D e lh i 110064

Foreword

I n d i a h a s a rich m a ritim e heritag e. T h e In d ia n N av y a n d o u r sister Service, the M erch an t M arine, have m uch to be p ro u d o f in o u r sea-faring traditions.

T he earliest reference to m aritim e activities in In d ia is contained in the R ig Veda. “ D o th o u w hose countenance is tu rn ed to all sides send off our adversaries, as if in a ship to the opposite shores: do th o u convey us in a ship across the sea for o u r w elfare” (R ig Veda 1, 97, 7 an d 8). H in d u m ythology is replete w ith episodes pertain in g to the ocean, the sea an d th e rivers. L ord V ishnu, the preserver in the H indu T rinity, is said to be reclining on Adi Sesha, th e serpent, in th e m idst o f the p rim o rd ial ocean. In th e perennial fight betw een the forces o f good an d evil, sym bolised by the D evas and the A suras respectively, the tw o sides used A di Sesha and the sacred m o u n tain M eru to ch u rn the p rim o rd ial ocean. O ur rivers have alw ays been taken to rep resen t goddesses.

T here is also plenty o f evidence derived fro m In d ia n literatu re and art, including sculpture an d painting, besides the evidence o f archaeology to suggest the an tiq u ity o f the In d ian m aritim e tra d itio n . A rchaeological evidence in the form o f a seal w ith the rep resen tatio n o f a b o a t an d the dockyard at L o th al, dates b ack o u r m aritim e tra d itio n to circa 2500-1700 B .C . The early g ro w th o f In d ia n shipping a n d shipbuilding along w ith the com m ercial acum en o f o u r m erch an t class, the courage and fo rtitu d e o f o u r sailors, helped In d ia to sail the oceans for m any centuries. F ro m a b o u t the 15th century onw ards th ere was a decline in In d ia ’s m aritim e activity till the em ergence o f K h an o ji A ngre a t the beginning o f 18th cen tu ry . H e was a M a ra th a A d m iral w hose nam e is now legend in o u r n aval h isto ry .

T he origins o f the In d ia n N avy lay in a group o f ships belonging to the E a st In d ia C om pany arriving in S u rat on Sept. 5, 1612. H ow ever, they only acquired c o m b a ta n t statu s on M ay 1, 1830 w hen by w a rra n t fro m the Lord H ig h A dm iral, they cam e u n d er th e B ritish C row n an d th e Service was nam ed th e In d ian N avy. T h e n am e In d ian N avy changed to B om bay M arin e, Indian M arin e, R oyal In d ia n M arin e a n d R oyal In d ian N avy fo rm 1863 onw ards till it becam e th e In d ia n N avy once ag a in on Ja n u a ry 26, 1950.

B arrin g a few p u b licatio n s by em inent h isto rian s on th e subject o f our m aritim e p a st th e re is in ad eq u ate aw areness o f o u r n au tical history, although a g re a t deal o f recorded m aterial does exist in o u r country. T his needs to be research ed by scholars. H ow ever, it was felt th a t th e h ap p en in g s in the im

Vi

F O R E W O R D

m ediate p ast, p a rtic u la rly th e period betw een 1945 a n d 1950 should be research ed a n d m ad e a subject o f a boo k im m ediately. A n official history o f th e activities o f th e R oyal In d ia n N avy d u rin g W orld W ar II already exists an d so th e p re se n t volum e picks u p th e th read s fro m this period onw ards.

H ow ever, as a n In tro d u c tio n to this histo ry , the a u th o r has also given an in sig h t to In d ia ’s rich m aritim e past.

A g re a t deal o f m aterial h as been system atically collated to reco rd the im p o r ta n t h isto ric a l h ap p en in g s d u rin g these form ative years o f Independent In d ia ’s N av y . W e w ere fo rtu n a te to have fo u n d R ear A dm iral Satyindra S ingh, A V SM (R etired ) to u n d e rta k e this ta sk u n d e r the guidance o f an E d ito ria l B o ard co m p risin g V ice A d m ira l K .K . N ay y ar, R ear A dm iral O.P.

S h a rm a an d myself.

R e a r A d m ira l S aty in d ra S ingh has d u g o u t a g reat deal o f m aterial and in terview ed vario u s p e rso n alities o f th e co n te m p o ra ry p erio d seeking their views on th e th e n p rev ailin g c o n d itio n s and th e em ergence o f the Indian N avy. In su b seq u en t volum es we in ten d to cover the la te r developm ents in th e Service.

In th e c e n tu ries ah e a d th e oceans a ro u n d us will u n d o u b ted ly have a larg er significance b o th fro m th e p o in t o f view o f In d ia ’s security concerns as well as eco n o m ic d ev elo p m en t. It is a p p ro p ria te , th erefo re, th a t we in cu lcate am o n g st o u r co u n try m en a n aw areness o f th e oceans. T his volum e w ill ho p efu lly c o n trib u te its b it in this direction.

T h is p ro je c t w as s ta rte d in early 1982 u n d e r th e direction o f one o f my predecessors, A d m iral R .L . P ereira. M y im m ediate predecessor A dm iral O.S.

D aw son lent it th e su p p o rt it deserved. It ju s t h ap p en s to be my good fo rtu n e to be in th e driving seat o f o u r N avy to w rite th is forew ord.

I w ould like to place on reco rd o u r deep ap p reciatio n o f the w ork done by R ear A dm iral S aty in d ra Singh an d the assistance o f my colleagues on th e E d ito ria l B oard.

N avy H ouse

R .H . T a h i l i a n i

N ew D elhi

A dm iral

D ecem ber 4, 1985

Preface

I n t h e p r o c e s s o f getting a n official h isto ry o f th e 1971 In d o -P ak W ar p re p ared , I was invited to com pile the Post-W orld W ar I I history o f the Indian N avy com m encing w ith the period 1 9 4 5 - 1 9 5 0 . This period has been chosen because som e publications recording events o f som e o f the earlier periods, already exist and are available.

R egrettably, how ever, there are far too m any, gaps and grey areas even if it w ere possible to locate all th a t has been w ritten ab o u t our Service since the beginning o f this century. T h ere is even less m aterial available on the earlier p erio d — o f the evolution o f o u r Service from the In d ian M arine, B om bay M arine, B om bay M arine C orps, In d ian N avy, B om bay M arine-Bengal M arine, (n o n -co m b atan t), H is M ajesty’s In d ian M arin e (a co m b atan t force w ith two D ivisions a t B om bay and C alcu tta), Royal In d ian M arine (com batant, reversion to a n o n -co m b atan t role and again co m b atan t), an d Royal In d ian N avy.

Very little is know n ab o u t our various regional m aritim e forces w hich fought a m o n g st them selves, k ep t invaders a t bay, and projected o u r m aritim e and com m ercial interests and culture to d ista n t lands. T his paucity o f m aterial only refers to publications in the English language. T h ere are m any publications in various In d ia n and foreign languages and undoubtedly, several docum ents m ust exist in these languages w hich could th ro w m ore light on o u r little-know n an cien t m aritim e past. W e do, how ever, have an official publication covering the organisation an d o p eratio n al role o f the R IN during the 1939-45

W ar.

T h o u g h m y ch a rte r was lim ited to a specific period, I have included a ch ap ter on In d ia ’s m aritim e history. T his, in a prelim inary way, brings out o u r rich m aritim e p a st including shipbuilding in India, a n d o u r exploitation an d subjugation by the W estern Pow ers— the Portuguese, French, D u tch and the B ritish. D u rin g the p erio d we were ruled by foreigners, our m aritim e projection was obviously w hat o u r rulers wished a n d directed. U ndoubtedly, th erefo re, o u r role in th e F irst an d Second W orld W ars was totally linked to the B ritish E m p ire’s role a n d interests in the region.

T h e span o f this study is less th a n six years—fro m V .J. D ay on A ugust 15, 1945 to the end o f the decade, D ecem b er 31, 1950. I t has, however, n o t been possible to strictly ad h ere to these specific dates and in m any o f the chapters, earlier a n d la te r events have h a d to be necessarily recorded to provide som e basic links.

v i i i

P R E FA C E

This p erio d is indeed very significant an d far-reach in g events took place d u rin g this sh o rt span. It saw the end o f the 1939-45 W ar, followed by the co n tractio n o f the R oyal In d ian N avy w ith the a tte n d a n t rushed dem obilisation. C lose on its heels, the R oyal In d ian N avy h ad the trau m atic experience o f the M u tin y in F e b ru a ry 1946. A little over a year later, w ith In d ep en d ence cam e th e division o f the Royal In d ian N avy into the Royal In d ian Navy and R oyal P a k ista n N avy. W e con tin u ed to rely on the Royal N avy for its assistance fo r q u ite a few years in the form o f loan service o f officers to m an ap p o in tm en ts a t vario u s levels including C hiefs o f the N aval Staff. W e were the last o f th e th re e D efence Services to have an In d ian as C h ief o f Staff—

eleven years a fte r o u r In d ependence.

A little-k n o w n fact to d a y is th a t u n til Ja n u a ry 26, 1950, the R oyal Indian N avy w as th e sen io rm o st o f th e th re e D efence Services in In d ia; the last visible evidence o f th is w as the rib b o n o f th e ] 939-45 S tar, com m only know n as th e “ C how ringhee S ta r” , w here th e p rio rity o rd er o f display is d a rk blue (N avy), re d (A rm y) a n d light blue (A ir Force). T h e last naval officer who w ore th is rib b o n o n his chest re tire d in N o v em b er 1984.

In collecting m aterial fo r th is b o o k I h a d the g o o d fo rtu n e o f m eeting m an y sh ip m ates, Service colleagues an d frien d s—b o th In d ian and B ritish—

w ho, like m e, sp en t m any h a p p y decades in th e R oyal In d ian N av y /In d ian N avy; they w ere k in d eno u g h to ren d er testim ony to m any subjects, w hich p ro v ed invaluable. T h ro u g h th eir help an d kindness, I was also able to collect som e v alu ab le m aterial in clu d in g p h o to g ra p h s covering very significant events a n d som e o f th e m find a place in this volum e. I was fo rtu n a te to interview som e em inent perso n alities w ho played a significant role in the n a tio n a l scene at th a t tim e a n d later.

1 w ould have liked to m eet som e fo rm er colleagues w ho served in the undivided R oyal In d ia n N av y an d w ho w ent to the newly created Royal P a k ista n N a v y in A ugust 1947. T h e first (then) In d ia n to be adm itted to the Executive ca d re o f th e R oyal In d ia n M arin e in 1931 was C adet H .M .S .

C h o u d ri w ho la te r ro se to the ra n k o f Vice A dm iral and retired as the C hief o f th e N av al S taff o f the P a k ista n N avy. I t w ould have been useful an d interesting to o b ta in th e testim o n y o f som e o f these colleagues, p articu larly as they w ere p a r t an d parcel o f the sam e Service u n til 1947 and fought shoulder-to -sh o u ld e r in th e p a st fo r a co m m o n foreign re g im e !

S a t y i n d r a S i n g h

R ear A d m iral (R etd .)

A c k n o w le d g e m e n ts

T o A dm iral R .H . T ah ilian i, PVSM , AVSM , goes m y expression o f deep gratitu d e. It w as he, w ho selected m e fo r the privileged task o f w riting this volum e. W ith o u t his g enerous assistance an d encouragem ent th ro u g h o u t, it w ould not have been possible to u n d ertak e this task.

L am m ost grateful to Vice A dm iral K .K . N ayyar, PV SM , A V SM , fo r his guidance and help and valuable suggestions based on deep study. I also wish to express my g ratitu d e to R ear A dm iral O .P. Sharm a, AVSM , VSM , for his u n stin ted assistance th ro u g h o u t the p erio d I was engaged on this project.

In the H istorical Cell, I received valuable assistance from C ap tain G .S. Sen.

L ieu ten an t C om m an d er R.S. N aran g , a t present in-charge o f H istorical Cell, has been o f considerable help in several ways. T h e indefatigable P etty Officer P.V . K u m ar, who was in the H istorical Cell fo r m ost o f the period, was o f invaluable secretarial assistance. I also wish to th a n k M r. R .K . M a lh o tra fo r p atien tly u n d ertak in g the laborious task o f typing.

T o C om m ander D .J. H astings, OBE, R IN V R (R etd.), H o n o ra ry Secretary an d A rchivist o f the R oyal In d ian N avy (1612-1947) A ssociation, w ith w hom I spent som e days in E ngland in O ctober 1984, is due a special w ord o f th an k s. I acknow ledge w ith g ratitu d e the great pains he took to provide me w ith valuable m aterial w hich I could n o t have o b tain ed elsewhere.

S a t y i n d r a S i n g h

R ear A dm iral (R etd.)

C o n t e n t s

F o r e w o r d

• • •

v

P r e f a c e

• • •

v i i

A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s

• • •

i x

D i v i s i o n o f t h e r o y a l i n d i a n n a v a l f l e e t

o n a u g u s t 1 5 , 1 9 4 7

• • •

x i i

E v o l u t i o n

• • •

x i v

A b b r e v i a t i o n s

• • •

x v

1. I n d i a ' s m a r i t i m e h i s t o r y

. . .

1

2 . P L A N S F O R T H E D E VEL OP ME NT OF T H E NA V Y

. . .

31

3 . T h e a n d a m a n s , n i c o b a r s a n d l a c c a d i v e s — t h e

SENTI NELS OF OUR -WATERS

. . .

4 3

4 . T h e r o y a l i n d i a n n a v y m u t i n y , F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 6

. . .

5 3

5 . E v e n t s a t s e a

• • •

9 3

6 . P e r s o n n e l

• • •

1 0 3

7 . T r a i n i n g

• • •

1 1 6

N a v a l a v i a t i o n

• • •

1 2 7

T h e n a v y ’s f e a t h e r e d a i r w i n g

. . .

1 3 2

1 0 . H y d r o g r a p h y

. . .

1 3 6

1 1 . T h e m e d i c o s a t s e a

. . .

1 4 2

1 2 . B u d g e t

• • •

1 4 8

1 3 . L o g i s t i c s

• • •

1 5 3

1 4 . D e v e l o p m e n t o f f a c i l i t i e s f o r n a v a l

s c i e n t i f i c r e s e a r c h

• • •

I 5 7

1 5 . W h e n t h e n a v y b e c a m e n u m b e r

t w o

. . .

161

I n d e x

• • •

1 6 5

Division of th e Royal Indian N av a l

IN D IA

S l o o p s

S u r v e y V e s s e l

H M I S S u tle j

H M I S Investigator

H M I S Jum na

T r a w l e r s

H M I S K istn a .

H M I S N a sik

H M I S Cauvery

H M I S Calcutta

F r i g a t e s

H M I S Cochin

H M I S Tir

H M I S A m ritsar

H M I S K u k ri

M o t o r M i n e s w e e p e r s

C o r v e t t e s

M M S 130

H M I S A ssam

M M S 132

M M S 151

M i n e s w e e p e r s

M M S 154

H M I S Orissa

H M I S D eccan

M o t o r L a u n c h

H M I S Bihar

M L 420

H M I S K um aon

H a r b o u r D e f e n c e M o t o r

H M I S R o h ilkh a n d

L a u n c h e s

H M I S K liyber

H D M L 1110

H M I S C arnatic

H D M L 1112

H M I S R a jp u ta n a

H D M L 1117

H M I S K onkan

H D M L 1118

H M I S B om bay

H M I S B en g a l

A l l E x i s t i n g L a n d i n g C r a f t

H M I S M adras

7 ~ T

»

* * * *

Fleet on A u g u s t 1 5 , 1 9 4 7

PA K IST A N

S l o o p s

H M P S Narbada

H M P S Godavari

F r i g a t e s

H M P S Sham sher

H M P S Dhanusli

M i n e s w e e p e r s

H M P S Kathiawar

H M P S Baluchistan

H M P S Oudh

H M P S M alwa

T r a w l e r s

H M P S Ram pur

H M P S Baro da

M o t o r M i n e s w e e p e r s

M M S 129

M M S 131

H a r b o u r D efence M o to r L aunches

H D M L 1261

H D M L 1262

H D M L 1263

H D M L 1266

Evolution

D ate

Title

D ecem ber 31, 1600

E ast In d ia C om pany founded by R oyal C h arter o f Q ueen E lizab eth I

S eptem ber 5, 1612

In d ia n M a rin e fo rm ed w hen a sq u ad ro n o f ships arriv ed in Sw ally, th e ro a d ste a d off S urat. (Also kn o w n as th e ‘H o n o u ra b le E a st In d ia C o m p an y ’s M a rin e ’)

1686

T he B om bay M arin e

M ay I, 1830

T h e In d ia n N av y (by W a rra n t from the L ord H igh A d m iral, P rin ce W illiam )

1858

H e r M ajesty ’s In d ia n N avy

A p ril 30, 1863

T h e B om bay M arin e (N o n -c o m b a ta n t— o n expiry o f th e H o n o u ra b le E a st In d ia C o m p an y and tra n sfer to th e C row n) 1877

H e r M a je sty ’s In d ia n M arin e

1892

T h e R oyal In d ia n M arin e

1928

T h e R oyal In d ia n M arin e (C o m b a ta n t) O cto b er 2, 1934

T h e R oyal In d ia n N avy

J a n u a ry 26, 1950

T h e In d ia n N avy

A b b reviatio n s

A B C D

A tom ic B acteriological and C hem ical D am age

A D C orps

A rm y D en tal C orps

A F M S

A rm ed Forces M edical Service

A M C

A rm y M edical C orps

B EM

B ritish E m pire M edal

B O R

B ritish O ther R ank

BTE

B oy’s T rain in g E stablishm ent

CB

C o m p an io n o f th e O rd er o f th e B ath

CBE

C om m an d er o f the O rder o f the B ritish E m pire C IE

C om panion o f th e O rder o f th e Indian Em pire C IL Q

C om pensation in Lieu o f Q uarters

C -in-C

C om m ander-in-C hief

C N S

C h ief o f th e N av al Staff

CO

C o m m an d in g Officer

D SC

D istinguished Service Cross

D S M

D istinguished Service M edal

D SO

D istinguished Service O rder

E T I

E d u catio n al T est O ne

FO B

F la g Officer B om bay

F O C R IN

F lag Officer C om m anding R oyal In d ian N avy F R U

F leet R eq u irem en t U n it

‘G ’

G u n n er

G H Q

G eneral H ea d q u a rte rs

G O C -in-C

G eneral Officer C om m anding-in-C hief

H D M L

H a rb o u r D efence M o to r L aunch

H E T

H ig h er E d u catio n al T est

H M

H is/H e r M ajesty

H M IS

H is/H e r M ajesty ’s In d ia n Ship

H M S

H is/H e r M ajesty’s Ship

H O

H o stilities O nly

IA F

In d ia n A ir F o rce

IA M C

In d ia n A rm y M edical C orps

ID S S

In d ia n D efence Science Service

ID S M

In d ia n D istin g u ish ed Service M edal

IM D -B C

In d ia n M edical D e p a rtm e n t— B ritish C adre

Evolution

D ate

Title

D ecem ber 31, 1600

E a st In d ia C om p an y founded by R oyal C h arter o f Q ueen E lizab eth I

S eptem ber 5, 1612

In d ia n M a rin e fo rm ed when a sq u ad ro n o f ships arriv ed in Sw ally, the ro a d ste a d off S urat. (Also kn o w n as th e ‘H o n o u ra b le E ast In d ia C o m p an y ’s M a rin e ’)

1686

T h e B om bay M arin e

M ay 1, 1830

T h e In d ia n N avy (by W a rra n t from the L o rd H igh A d m iral, P rince W illiam )

1858

H e r M ajesty ’s In d ia n N avy

A p ril 30, 1863

T h e B o m b ay M arin e (N o n -c o m b a ta n t— on expiry o f th e H o n o u ra b le E a st In d ia C o m p an y an d tra n sfer to th e C row n) 1877

H e r M ajesty ’s In d ia n M arine

1892

T h e R oyal In d ian M arin e

1928

T h e R o y al In d ia n M arin e (C o m b a ta n t) O cto b er 2, 1934

T h e R oyal In d ia n N avy

J a n u a ry 26, 1950

T h e In d ia n N avy

A b b reviatio n s

A B C D

A tom ic B acteriological and C hem ical D am age

A D C orps

A rm y D en tal C orps

A F M S

A rm ed Forces M edical Service

A M C

A rm y M edical C orps

BEM

B ritish E m pire M edal

B O R

B ritish O ther R an k

BTE

Boy’s T rain in g E stablishm ent

CB

C om panion o f th e O rd er o f th e B ath

CBE

C o m m an d er o f the O rd er o f th e B ritish E m pire C IE

C om panion o f th e O rder o f the In d ian Em pire C IL Q

C om pensation in Lieu o f Q uarters

C -in-C

C om m ander-in-C hief

C N S

C h ief o f th e N av al Staff

CO

C o m m anding Officer

D SC

D istinguished Service Cross

D S M

D istinguished Service M edal

D SO

D istinguished Service O rder

E T I

E d u catio n al T est One

FO B

F la g Officer B om bay

F O C R IN

F lag Officer C om m anding R oyal In d ian N avy

F R U

F leet R eq u irem en t U n it

‘G ’

G u n n er

G H Q

G eneral H ea d q u a rte rs

G O C -in-C

G en eral Officer C om m anding-in-C hief

H D M L

H a rb o u r D efence M o to r L aunch

H E T

H ig h er E d u catio n al T est

H M

H is/H e r M ajesty

H M IS

H is/H e r M ajesty ’s In d ia n Ship

H M S

H is/H e r M ajesty 's Ship

H O

H ostilities O nly

IA F

In d ia n A ir F o rc e

IA M C

In d ia n A rm y M edical C orps

ID S S

In d ia n D efence Science Service

ID S M

In d ia n D istin g u ish ed Service M edal

IM D -B C

In d ia n M edical D e p a rtm e n t— B ritish C adre

XVi

A BB R EV IA TIO N S

IMS

Indian M edical Service

IN

Indian N avy

IN A

Indian N a tio n a l A rm y

IN S

Indian N aval Ship

IO R

In d ian O th e r R ank

IO M

In d ian O rd er o f M erit

ISD PS

Inter-Service D em obilisation P lanning S taff

JSW

Jo in t Services W ing

K t

K night

K C B

K n ig h t C o m m a n d e r o f th e O rd e r o f the B ath K C B E

K night C o m m a n d e r o f the O rd er o f th e B ritish E m pire K C S I

K night C o m m a n d e r o f th e O rder o f the S tar o f India K D F

K a th ia w a r D efence F orce

L C T

L anding C ra ft T a n k

LC W

L an d in g C ra ft W ing

L N D

L ocal N aval D efence

LST

L an d in g Ships T an k

M A

M edical A ssistant

M B E

M em ber o f the O rd e r o f th e British E m pire M L

M o to r L au n ch

M L R

M o n ey in L ieu o f R ations

M T B

M o to r T o rp e d o B oat

M U R A F

M ain ten an ce U n it o f the R oyal A ir F orce

N A A F I

N av y A rm y A ir F o rc e In stitu te

N H Q

N aval H e a d q u a rte rs

N O P IN

N av al O p e ra tio n Indian N avy

O B E

Officer o f th e O rd e r o f th e B ritish E m pire O B I

Officer o f th e O rd e r o f B ritish In d ia

O R ’s

O th er R an k s

R A C IN S

R ear A d m iral C o m m an d in g In d ian N aval S quadron R A F

Royal A ir F o rc e

R IA F

Royal In d ian A ir F o rc e

R IM

R oyal In d ian M arin e

R IN

R oyal In d ian N avy

R IN R

R oyal Indian N aval R eserve

R1N V R

R oyal In d ian N av al V olunteer Reserve

R N

R oyal N avy

R N A S

R o y al N av al A ir Station

R N R

R oyal N aval R eserve

R N V R

R oyal N av al V olunteer Reserve

SBA

Sick B erth A tte n d a n t

S D M L

S eaw ard D efence M o to r L aunch

S N L R

Service N o L onger R equired

T A S

T o rp e d o A nti-S ubm arine

W R IN S

W om en R oyal In d ian N aval Service

1.

In dia's M a r itim e History

T h e I n d i a n o c e a n , is n am ed a fte r p e n in su la r In d ia w hich ju ts into its centre and occupies a unique p o sitio n . These vast w aters w ash th e shores o f the entire E ast C oast o f A frica, th e S o u th C o ast o f A rab ia, th e S o u th ern shores o f Ira n an d B aluchistan, th e M alaysian P eninsula and In d o nesia’s S u m atra. T he ingress an d egress o f th e ocean a re th ro u g h the eastern and w estern w aterw ays a t th e S traits o f M alacca a n d Bab-el-M andeb. T he fo rm er lead to the In donesian A rchipelago, th e S outh C hina Sea, th e F a r E ast an d th e vast expanse o f th e Pacific O cean w hile the latter co n tro l th e entrance to th e R ed Sea. C om m anding th e gatew ay to the la n d locked P ersian G u lf in th e no rth w est is H o rm u z form erly know n as O rm uz.

F o r ages, A den, a t the S outhern tip o f A rab ia, w as th e hom e an d main base o f th e A rab corsairs. Tw o off-shoots o f th is O cean are the A rab ian Sea and the Bay o f Bengal w hich w ash th e 5600-kilom etre-long shores o f the Indian peninsula, P ak istan , B angladesh, B u rm a and the island o f Sri L anka w hich is se p arated fro m In d ia by th e P alk S trait.

Because o f its u n iq u e features, the In d ian O cean has alw ays been reg ard ed as a n are a o f great g eopolitical significance a n d In d ia has been regarded as its centre o f gravity. S ard ar K .M . P an ik k ar, has said: In spite o f the vastness o f its surface an d the oceanic ch a ra c ter o f its c u rre n t and winds, the In d ian O cean has som e o f th e features o f a land-locked sea. T he A rctic and th e A n tarctic, circling the P oles have b u t little connection w ith in h ab ited land. T h e Pacific a n d th e A tlan tic lie from th e n o rth to th e so u th like gigantic highw ays. They have no land ro o f, no vast lan d a re a ju ttin g out into th e ir expanse. T he In d ian O cean is w alled off on th ree sides by land, w ith the so u th ern side o f A sia fo rm in g a ro o f over it. T he co n tin en t o f A frica co n stitu tes th e w estern wall a n d B urm a, M alay a an d the insular co n tin u atio n s p ro te c t th e eastern side. B ut th e vital featu re w hich differentiates th e In d ia n O cean fro m th e Pacific o r th e A tlan tic is n o t the tw o sides b u t th e su b co n tin en t o f In d ia w hich ju ts o u t fa r into th e sea for a th o u sa n d m iles to its tap e rin g end a t K an y a K u m ari. I t is the geographical p o sitio n o f In d ia th a t changes th e ch a ra c ter o f th e In d ia n O c e a n .1

T h e islands in th e In d ia n O cean a re a a re n e ith e r as num erous nor as evenly spread o u t as those in th e Pacific. T he m a jo r islands2 in th e region are Sri L an k a a n d M alagasy w hile th e m in o r ones a re S o co tra n e a r th e A rab C oast, Z an z ib a r an d Seychelles off th e A frican C o ast, M au ritiu s and R eunion

2

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

on th e T rp p ic o f C ap rico rn , L akshadw eep an d th e M aldives n ear th e W est C o a st o f India, th e B ahrain g ro u p n ear th e Persian G ulf, th e A n d am an s a n d th e N icobars in the Bay o f Bengal and th e D iego G arcia g ro u p in the C h ag o s A rchipelago.

C onsiderable geopolitical significance is also atta c h e d to th e bays, gulfs a n d bights o f th e O cean. T h e P ersian G u lf w hich is virtually a land-locked sea w ith its choke p o in t a t H o rm u z, th e A rab ian Sea w hich sep arates th e In d ia n a n d A ra b ia n peninsulas, th e G u lf o f A den entry to w hich is c o n tro lled by th e island o f S o co tra, th e R ed Sea w hose g ate-p o st is a t Bab-el-M an d eb , the Bay o f Bengal se p a ra tin g th e In d ian and M alaysian peninsulas a n d th e G u lf o f M alacca w ith S in g ap o re co m m anding entry in to it, have all p layed a significant ro le in th e m aritim e h isto ry o f th e region.

B ecause o f th e u n iq u e fea tu re o f th e m onso o n s a n d th e d ev elo p m en t o f th e nucleus o f civ ilisatio n a ro u n d th is O cean, oceanic activity and tra d itio n s developed in th is region b efo re an y o th e r place. C enturies before th e d ev e lo p m en t o f seafarin g activ ities in th e A egean Sea, th e litto ra l states o f p e n in su la r In d ia h ad a lread y b u ilt u p th e ir oceanic tra d itio n s.

T h e strateg ic, n av al a n d g eo p o litical im p o rtan ce o f land-locked co u n tries e stab lish in g lin k s w ith th e seas by ac q u irin g sovereignty over w aterw ays o r even la n d c o rrid o rs h as been a p p re c ia ted by po litico -m ilitary th in k ers for c en tu ries. F o r instance, th e p o te n tia l o f th e ir presence in th e In d ia n O cean o r even in its seas, bays a n d stra its p ro m p te d som e super pow ers o f to d ay to m a k e a tte m p ts to gain access to th is ocean over lan d even in the last cen tu ry . T h e B ritish a p p re c ia tio n o f th e balan ce o f pow er in a n d aro u n d A sia a fte r W o rld W a r I I a n d its fu tu re p lan s m ade d u rin g th e fo rties also ca te re d to these contingencies.

W h a t is m ost strik in g a n d little kn o w n is th e fact th a t M a h a ra ja R a n jit S ingh, th e g reat ru le r o f th e P u n jab , h a d also realised th e im p o rtan ce o f estab lish in g a link w ith th e sea a fte r his victory o v e r th e P a th a n s an d A fg h an s d u rin g th e th ird decade o f th e la st century. T o q u o te a h isto rian ,

“ I f th e P u n jab i em p ire3 w as to expand any fu rth er, it could only be across th e S indh d esert to th e sea o r acro ss th e Sutlej to In d ia .” (T h e p o rtio n o f In d ia th en held by th e B ritish.) T he B ritish w ere clever eno u g h to p ersu ad e th e M a h a ra ja to sign a com m ercial tre a ty in D ecem ber 1832 a n d ab an d o n his p lan s to extend his em pire to th e sea. T hese facts a n d to d a y ’s rivalry betw een th e super pow ers over th eir presence in th e In d ia n O cean confirm th e w isdom o f th e o bservation m ade by K h aired d in B arb aro sa;4 th e E gyptian A d m iral centuries ago, “ H e w ho rules on th e sea will sh o rtly rule on th e la n d also.”

A n o th e r fact th a t em erges fro m a careful analysis o f th e sequence o f events in In d ia ’s m aritim e p a st is th a t d u rin g th e la st five m illennia, th o se w ho cam e over land from o th e r p a rts o f the w orld, m ain ly u sing th e m o u n ta in passes in the n orthw est, did ru le som e p a rts o f t h e In d ia n su bcontinent fo r a w hile b u t were eventually ab so rb ed in th e m ain stream o f In d ia n cu ltu re a n d tra d itio n s an d , over th e centuries, becam e a n in teg ral p a r t o f th e In d ian

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO R Y

3

m ilieu. Som e o f these w ere the A ryans, P ath an s, M oghuls, A fghans, Sakas a n d even the H uns. B ut those w ho cam e by sea d u rin g th e last two* m illennia, the P o rtu g u ese, D u tch , F ren ch , B ritish, G erm ans, D anes, Flem ish, A rm enians a n d th e Jews, did n o t lose th eir identity an d cam e to stay for hundreds o f years, som e o f th em holding sway over larger areas and fo r longer periods.

In d ia ’s m aritim e h isto ry can be broadly divided into five d istin ct periods—

th e H in d u period extending fro m the h o ary p a st to the m iddle o f th e 15th cen tu ry a .d ., the Portuguese p erio d fro m the closing years o f the 15th centu ry to th e end o f th e 16th century; tw o B ritish p erio d s—from 1612 to 1830

a n d from 1830 to 1947; a n d the In d ian period w hich com m enced on A ugust 15, 1947. T h e B ritish period is divided into tw o p a rts because in 1830, the E ast In d ia C o m p an y ’s N avy in In d ia underw ent tw o m ajo r changes; it was c o n stitu ted as a c o m b a ta n t service a n d given the nam e Indian N avy an d the first sh ip o f th e Service to sail u n d e r steam , th e 411-ton Hugh Lindsay, covered th e distance from B om bay to Suez in 21 days th u s ushering in the conversion from sail to steam .

T h e V edas, B u d d h ist Jatak as, Sanskrit, Pali a n d Persian literature, Indian fo lk lo re an d m ythology an d even the O ld T estam en t b ear testim ony to the fact th a t as fa r back as th e days o f M o h en -jo -D aro , L othal an d H a ra p p a (3,000 to 2,000 B .C .) , i.e., th e In d u s Valley C ivilisation, th ere was considerable m aritim e activ ity betw een In d ia an d the countries in A frica, S outhern E u ro p e, W estern A sia and the F a r E ast. Seals an d p o tsh erd portraying a n ch o rs an d tools an d kitchen im plem ents m ade o f coral and mussel-shell have been found a t these places a n d Jav a, S um atra, Indo-C hina, Sri L anka a n d E gypt. A recently u n earth ed huge drydock a t L othal in G u ja ra t further confirm s the existence o f In d ia ’s seaborne tra d e w ith these countries, especially Sum er, E gypt, C rete a n d countries in C en tral A sia and P ersia a t th a t tim e.

L ate P ro fesso r B uhler, th e w ell-know n G erm an o rien talist, expressed the view th a t “ th ere a re passages in an cien t In d ian w orks w hich prove th e early existence o f n avigation o f th e In d ia n O cean an d th e som ew hat la te r occurrences o f tra d in g voyages u n d ertak en by H in d u m erchants to th e shores o f th e P ersian G u lf a n d its rivers.”

T his fa c t is fu rth e r b o rn e o u t by av ailab le w orks in th e languages o f the litto ra l states o f th e region; such as Sindhi, G u ja ra ti, M a ra th i, K onkani, K a n n a d a , M alayalam , T am il, Telugu, O riya an d B engali; th e w ritings o f foreign travellers a n d h isto ria n s— C hinese, A rab ic a n d P ersian —w hich conta in observations on In d ia n subjects; th e evidence available from a rch aeo logy— epigraphic, m o n u m en tal a n d num ism atic; an d In d ian a n d foreign a rt an d foreign lite ra tu re —English, G reek , P ortuguese, F ren ch , D u tch , Persian, C hinese, Japanese, A rabic, M alay, T h a i, B urm ese a n d Sinhalese.

Some o f th e little-know n facts a b o u t th e extent o f com m ercial an d cultural influence o f In d ia an d sea-borne tra d e using ships b u ilt in In d ia during the H in d u p erio d (p re-C h ristian e ra to the m iddle o f th e 15th C entury a . d . ) are:

—

T he M atsy a Y a n tra 5 (the fish m achine), a n iro n fish floating on oil p o in tin g to th e n o rth serving as a p rim itiv e com pass used by In d ian sea-

2

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

o n th e T rp p ie o f C ap rico rn , L akshadw eep and th e M aldives n e a r th e W est C o ast o f India, th e B ahrain g ro u p n ear th e Persian G ulf, th e A n d am an s a n d th e N icobars in the Bay o f Bengal and th e D iego G arcia g ro u p in the C hag o s A rchipelago.

C onsiderable geopolitical significance is also atta c h e d to th e bays, gulfs a n d bights o f th e O cean. T h e P ersian G u lf w hich is virtually a land-locked sea w ith its choke p o in t a t H o rm u z, th e A rab ian Sea w hich se p arates th e In d ia n a n d A rab ian p eninsulas, th e G u lf o f A den entry to w hich is c o n tro lled by th e island o f S ocotra, th e R ed Sea w hose g ate-p o st is a t Bab-el-M a n d e b , th e Bay o f Bengal se p a ra tin g th e In d ian an d M alaysian peninsulas a n d th e G u lf o f M alacca w ith S in g ap o re com m anding entry in to it, have all play ed a significant ro le in th e m aritim e h isto ry o f th e region.

B ecause o f th e u n iq u e featu re o f th e m o n so o n s an d the d ev elo p m en t o f th e nucleus o f civilisation a ro u n d th is O cean, oceanic activity an d tra d itio n s developed in th is region before an y o th e r place. C enturies before th e d e v e lo p m e n t o f seafarin g activ ities in th e A egean Sea, th e litto ra l states o f p e n in su la r In d ia h a d a lread y b u ilt u p th e ir oceanic trad itio n s.

T h e strateg ic, n a v a l a n d g eo p o litical im p o rta n c e o f land-locked co u n tries e stab lish in g lin k s w ith th e seas by a c q u irin g sovereignty over w aterw ays o r even la n d c o rrid o rs h as been a p p re c ia ted by politico -m ilitary th in k ers for cen tu ries. F o r instance, th e p o te n tia l o f th e ir presence in th e In d ia n O cean o r even in its seas, bays a n d stra its p ro m p te d som e super pow ers o f today to m a k e a tte m p ts to gain access to th is ocean over lan d even in th e last cen tu ry . T h e B ritish a p p re c ia tio n o f th e balan ce o f p o w er in a n d aro u n d A sia a fte r W o rld W a r I I a n d its fu tu re plans m ad e d u rin g th e fo rties also ca te re d to these contingencies.

W h a t is m o st strik in g a n d little kn o w n is th e fact th a t M a h a ra ja R a n jit Singh, th e g reat ru le r o f th e P u n jab , h a d also realised the im p o rtan ce o f estab lish in g a link w ith th e sea a fte r his victory o v e r the P a th a n s and A fg h an s d u rin g th e th ird d ecad e o f th e la st century. T o q u o te a h isto rian ,

“ I f th e P u n jab i em p ire3 w as to exp an d an y fu rth er, it could only be across th e S indh d esert to th e sea o r acro ss th e Sutlej to In d ia .” (T h e p o rtio n o f In d ia th e n held by th e B ritish .) T h e B ritish w ere clever en ough to p ersu ad e th e M a h a ra ja to sign a com m ercial tre a ty in D ecem ber 1832 a n d ab an d o n his p lan s to extend his em p ire to th e sea. T hese facts a n d to d a y ’s rivalry betw een th e super pow ers over th e ir presence in th e In d ia n O cean confirm th e w isdom o f th e o b serv atio n m ade by K h a ire d d in B arb aro sa;4 th e E g y p tian A d m ira l centuries ago, “ H e w ho ru les on th e sea will sh o rtly rule on th e la n d also .”

A n o th e r fact th a t em erges fro m a careful analysis o f th e sequence o f events in In d ia ’s m aritim e p a st is th a t d u rin g th e la st five m illennia, th o se w ho cam e over lan d from o th e r p a rts o f the w orld, m ain ly u sing th e m o u n ta in p asses in th e n orthw est, did ru le som e p a rts o f the In d ia n su b co n tin en t fo r a w hile b u t w ere eventually ab so rb ed in th e m ain stream o f In d ia n cu ltu re a n d tra d itio n s a n d , o v er th e centuries, becam e a n in teg ral p a r t o f th e In d ia n

I N D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO R Y

3

m ilieu. Som e o f these were th e A ryans, P ath an s, M oghuls, A fghans, Sakas a n d even the H uns. B ut those w ho cam e by sea d u rin g th e last two' m illennia, th e P ortuguese, D u tch , F ren ch , B ritish, G erm ans, D anes, Flem ish, A rm enians a n d th e Jews, did n o t lose th eir identity an d cam e to stay for hundreds o f years, som e o f th em holding sway over larger areas and fo r longer periods.

In d ia ’s m aritim e h isto ry can be bro ad ly divided into five distinct periods—

the H in d u p erio d extending fro m the h o ary p ast to the m iddle o f th e 15th cen tu ry a.d ., th e P ortuguese p erio d fro m the closing years o f th e 15th centu ry to th e end o f th e 16th century; tw o B ritish p erio d s—from 1612 to 1830

a n d from 1830 to 1947; a n d th e In d ian period w hich com m enced on A ugust 15, 1947. T h e B ritish p erio d is divided into tw o p arts because in 1830, th e E a st In d ia C o m p an y ’s N avy in In d ia underw ent tw o m ajor changes; it was co n stitu ted as a c o m b a ta n t service an d given the nam e In d ian N avy an d the first ship o f th e Service to sail u n d er steam , th e 411-ton Hugh Lindsay, covered th e distance from B om bay to Suez in 21 days th u s ushering in the conversion fro m sail to steam .

T h e Vedas, B u d d h ist Jatak as, S anskrit, Pali a n d Persian literature, In d ian fo lk lo re a n d m ythology an d even the O ld T estam en t b e a r testim o n y to the fact th a t as fa r back as th e days o f M o h en -jo -D aro , L othal an d H a ra p p a (3,000 to 2,000 B .C .) , i.e., th e Indus Valley C ivilisation, th ere was considerable m aritim e activ ity betw een In d ia a n d th e countries in A frica, Southern E u ro p e, W estern A sia an d the F a r E ast. Seals a n d p o tsh erd portraying a n ch o rs a n d tools an d kitchen im plem ents m ade o f coral an d mussel-shell have been found at these places a n d Jav a, S um atra, Indo-C hina, Sri L an k a an d Egypt. A recently u n earth ed huge drydock a t L o th al in G u ja ra t fu rth er confirm s th e existence o f In d ia ’s seaborne tra d e w ith these countries, especially Sum er, E gypt, C rete a n d countries in C entral A sia an d P ersia a t th a t tim e.

L a te P rofessor B uhler, th e w ell-know n G erm an o rien talist, expressed the view th a t “ th e re a re passages in an cien t In d ian w orks w hich prove th e early existence o f n avigation o f th e In d ia n O cean a n d th e som ew hat la te r occurrences o f tra d in g voyages u n d ertak en by H in d u m erchants to th e shores o f th e P ersian G u lf a n d its riv ers.”

This fa c t is fu rth e r b o rn e o u t by available w orks in th e languages o f the litto ra l states o f th e region; such as Sindhi, G u ja ra ti, M a ra th i, K onkani, K a n n a d a , M alay alam , T am il, Telugu, O riya and B engali; the w ritings o f foreign travellers a n d h isto ria n s—C hinese, A rabic a n d P ersian —w hich co n ta in observations on In d ia n subjects; th e evidence available fro m a rch aeo logy— epigraphic, m onu m en tal an d num ism atic; an d In d ia n a n d foreign a rt an d foreign lite ra tu re —E nglish, G reek, Portuguese, F ren ch , D u tc h , Persian, C hinese, Japanese, A rab ic, M alay, T h a i, B urm ese a n d Sinhalese.

Som e o f th e little-k n o w n facts a b o u t th e extent o f com m ercial an d cultural influence o f In d ia an d sea-borne tra d e using ships b u ilt in In d ia during the H in d u period (p re-C h ristian e ra to th e m iddle o f th e 15th C entury a . d . ) are:

— T h e M atsy a Y a n tra 5 (th e fish m achine), a n iro n fish floating on oil p o in tin g to th e n o rth serving as a p rim itiv e com pass used by In d ian sea

4

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

farers for several m illennia (as per H indu m ythology, M a tsy a w a s th e first in carn atio n o f L ord V ishnu).

— T he names o f som e o f th e places in Southern and so u th east A sia such a s Socotra w hich is a derivative o f S uk h ad h ara (co n tain er o r island o f happiness); Sri L an k a w hich originally was Sw arna A lan k ar (gold o rnam ent), N ico b ar w hich was derived from N ak-D w eep (the island o f th e naked) and C alicu t w hich originally was K allik o te (in K a n n a d a a sto n e-fo rt);

— R eference to In d ian s as K lings in T hailand and Telangs in som e p a rts o f B urm a because o f th e conquests o f these countries by th e K alin g as and A n d h ra s several m illennia ag o ;

— T h e sim ilarity betw een th e T hai and O riya scripts due to th e long K a lin g a rule over T h ailan d ;

— T he scriptures in a B uddhist tem ple in Ja p a n w hich a re recitcd by th e m o n k s every m o rn in g even to d a y being in the 6th C entury a .p . Bengali scrip t; an d

— T h e tra n s fe r by sea o f th e w eary, tired and dem oralised arm y o f A lex an d er th e G re a t fro m th e m o u th o f th e In d u s to th e shores o f the P e rs ia n G u lf in 323 B.C. in a b o u t 800 In d ian -b u ilt sailing vessels.

D u rin g this p e rio d , w hile th e A rab ian Sea a n d the In d ian O cean w ere used m ain ly fo r p u rp o se s o f m aritim e tra d e , th e Bay o f Bengal p ro v id ed a h ig h w ay f o r th e c o u n tries on th e E astern seab o ard to em b ark on proselytising, c u ltu ra l a n d co lo n isin g m issions to Sri L a n k a an d countries as fa r as the E a s t In d ies a n d Ja p a n .

D u rin g th e H in d u p e rio d , considerable m aritim e activ ity to o k place in the w a te rs a ro u n d In d ia . A s described by M eg asth en es,6 th e ro y al sh ip y ard s o f th e M a u rv a s b u ilt seagoing ships o f vario u s classes. T h e W ar Office o f E m p e ro r C h a n d ra g u p ta h a d , as one o f its six b o ard s, a N av P arish ad (B oard o f A d m iralty ) w h ich co n tro lle d n atio n al sh ip p in g . D u rin g the days o f E m p e ro r A sh o k a in th e 3rd cen tu ry B.C ., his sister, Princess S an g h am itra7

sailed from T a m ra lip ta in Bengal to Sri L a n k a on h er historic m ission o f spreading B uddhism there. A sh o k a also h a d a stro n g seagoing fleet an d reg u lar com m ercial in te rc o u rse w ith Syria, E g y p t, C yrene, M aced o n ia an d E p iru s. Between 2 0 0 B .C . a n d a . d . 2 5 0 , th e A n d h ra s carried o u t m aritim e tra d e w ith W estern A sia, G reece, R om e, E gypt, C h in a an d som e o th e r E a stern countries a n d h a d even set u p em bassies in som e o f these countries.

R o m an coins discovered in In d ia , especially in th e S o u th , estab lish th e existence o f tra d e betw een th e se c o u n tries even before the C h ristian era.

Persecution a t th e h an d s o f th e R o m a n s forced som e Jew s to flee R om e and ta k e refuge in M a la b a r in a . d . 68. L arg er sailin g vessels b u ilt by th e C h o la s, P an d y as an d the K eralas o f S o u th In d ia a n d th e K alingas o f O rissa were used fo r trad e, passenger traffic a n d naval w arfare. T hese ships were co n sidered excellent for n av ig atio n acro ss th e oceans as th e ir low er p a rts were reinforced w ith trip le p la n k s in o rd e r to en ab le th e m to w ith stan d th e force o f tem pests. Som e o f th e leading com m unities in o rg an isin g sea-borne com m erce were th e M an ig ram m an C hetties, N am d asis, V alan g ais a n d E langais

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO RY

5

o f S outh India. It is a fact o f h isto ry th a t d u rin g the first decade o f the seventh century, a ru ler o f G u ja ra t w ho was faced w ith d efeat at th e hands o f his enem y, sent his son w ith th o u san d s o f follow ers com prising cultivato rs, artisan s, w arriors, physicians an d w riters in over 100 vessels to Java w here they laid th e fo u n d atio n o f a new civilisation w hose co n trib u tio n to the w orld is th e tem ple and sculptures o f B o ro b u d u r.8

T he C holas ( a . d . 985-1054) m aintained a strong naval fleet on th e C o ro -, m andel C oast. T he C h o la em p ero rs9 R a ja ra ja I an d R ajen d ra I h ad strong a rm ad as w hich were used to cap tu re Sri L an k a an d in a . d . 1007 the C holas \ launched a n expedition ag ain st the Sri Vijayas, who a t th a t tim e ruled the M alayan P eninsula, Jav a, S u m a tra an d som e neighbouring islands and the sea areas co n tin g u o u s to them , and defeated them to establish C h o la pow er in th e M alayan P eninsula.

E vidence from various sources confirm s the existence o f tra d e in various com m odities between In d ia an d E u ro p e fo r a t least three m illennia. India m aintained tra d e relations w ith the Phoenicians, Jews, A ssyrians, G reeks, E gyptians an d R om ans d u rin g th e earlier centuries and with the T urks, V enetians, P ortuguese, D u tc h and English d u rin g the later p a rt o f the period.

W hile In d ia im p o rted few item s such as tin, lead, glass, am ber, steel fo r arm s, coral an d m edicinal d rugs from E u ro p e and W est Asia, A rab ia supplied frankincense to In d ia fo r use in h e r tem ples. T h e items exported to Europe, N o rth A frica and W est A sia included wool from the fleeces o f sheep bred on th e northw estern m o u n tain ranges, arm o u r, onyx, chalcedony, lapis lazuli, jasp er, resinous gum , furs, asafoetida, m usk, balm , m yrrh, em b ro id ered woollen fabrics, coloured carpets, silk (considered m ost valuable a n d exchanged by w eight w ith gold), various types o f c o tto n clo th ran g in g from coarse canvas an d calicoes to m uslins o f the finest texture, peacocks, apes, oils, brassw are, ivory, ebony, pearls, sugar cane extracts, salt, indigo, drugs, dyes, rice, sand alw o o d , tim b e r fo r building ships, arom atics, pepper, cinnam on an d edible spices w hich were, d u rin g th e later years, m ainly traded for precious m etals, especially gold.

In terre la tio n is fu rth e r confirm ed by th e fact th a t the w ord for peacock is

“ tu k i” in H ebrew an d “ to k e i” in T am il a n d by the ad o p tio n o f T am il w ords by th e G reeks a n d vice-versa. T h ere was consid erab le sea-borne com m ercial intercourse betw een G reece a n d S o u th In d ia d u rin g th e H in d u period affirm ed by th e fact th a t the w ords fo r rice, ginger, cin n am o n an d foreign m erch an ts in G reek an d T am il respectively a re cryza an d arisi, zingibar and inchivar, k a rp io n an d k a ra v a an d Iao n es a n d Y avana. In A pril a . d . 800, as described in th e 199th C h a p te r o f th e Jap an ese d o cu m en t R u iju k o k u sh i,10

an In d ia n was cast u p on th e shores o f J a p a n a n d som e seeds o f the co tto n -

p lan t, so fa r un k n o w n to th a t co u n try , w ere fo u n d on his ship a n d sown in th e provinces o f K ii, A w aji, Sanuki, Jyo, T o sa an d K yushu. T h u s cotton was in tro d u ced into Jap an .

T h ere is evidence o f H e ro d o tu s (450 B .C .) w ho w rote a b o u t th e (cotton) garm en ts w orn by th e In d ia n c o n tin g en t o f X erxes A rm y w hich h ad been

6

U NDER TW O ENSIGNS

woven from “ the wool w hich certain m ild trees in In d ia b ear instead o f fru it th a t in beauty an d q u ality exccls th a t o f sheep.” T hus, it was In d ia th a t in tro d u ced th e use o f co tto n to E urope, W est A sia an d the F a r E ast.

O ne o f th e m ost sensational discoveries th a t helped m ain tain tra d e between In d ia a n d the W est was th a t o f the regularity o f the seasonal w inds o f th e southw est m onsoon by a G reek nam ed H ip p a lu s11 in a . d . 45. H is discovery helped him in finding a d irect ro u te to M a la b a r w hich was fa r sh o rter th a n the old er coast-hugging route. T o w ard th e end o f the sum m er m onths,

“ ships used to d e p a rt from th e m o u th o f th e A rab ian G u lf o r K ane on the c o ast o f A ra b ia Felix a n d sail straight, in 40 days to M uziris (m odern K o d u n g a llu r) on the W est C o ast o f In d ia. They b egan th e ir hom ew ard voyage in D ecem ber by sailing w ith th e N o rth -E ast W ind, en ter the A rabian G ulf, m eet w ith a S o u th o r S outh-W est W ind a n d th u s com plete th e voyage by using th e tra d e w inds th ro u g h o u t the p e rio d .” T h e discovery o f the d irectio n s a n d reg u larity o f th e m o n so o n a ir cu rre n t was a m ajo r c o n trib u ting fa c to r to w ard s th e c o n tin u an ce o f m aritim e tra d e betw een In d ia and the W estern co u n tries over th e centuries.

T h a t o cean ic n av ig atio n w as well advanced d u rin g th e e a rlie r cen tu ries o f th e C h ris tia n e ra is fu rth e r b o rn e o u t by the w ritings o f th e celebrated C h in ese m o n k , F a H ie n 12 w ho cam e to In d ia o v erlan d to study B uddhism a t B o d h g ay a, S a rn a th an d V aran asi in a .d . 413. On his w ay back to his h om e la n d h e sa ile d fro m T a m ra lip ta in B engal an d 14 day s la te r reached Sri L a n k a w h e re h e em b ark ed fo r Ja v a an d called a t th e N ic o b a rs b efo re p a ssing th r o u g h th e S traits o f M a la c c a to reach th e Pacific.

H in d u su p rem acy over th e E a ste rn w aters reached its z e n ith d u rin g th e p e rio d o f 5 th to 12th c e n tu ries w hen th e Sri V ijay a13 E m p ire ruled th e en tire sea a r e a b etw een I n d ia ’s eastern seab o ard an d th e F a r E ast. T he Sri V ijayas’

c u ltu ra l a n d c o lo n isin g ex p ed itio n to o k th em to such far-flung a re a s as S u m a tra , B u rm a , th e M ala y a n P e n in su la, Jav a, T h ailan d an d In d o -C h in a.

B esides sp re a d in g H in d u cu ltu re, th ey m a in tain ed reg u lar political an d com m e rc ia l in te rc o u rse w ith th e C h o las, P andyas a n d K eralas. A s a result o f je a lo u sy betw een th e C h o las, th e T am il K in g s, a n d th e Sri V ijayas, how ever, a series o f sea b a ttle s w ere fo u g h t betw een th e ir navies to w ard th e end o f th e 10th c e n tu ry a . d . resu ltin g in th e w eakening o f th ese em pires a n d o pening th e w ay fo r A ra b su prem acy in th e region. A b o u t th e sam e tim e, th e ru le rs o f G u ja ra t a n d C a lic u t also m a in tain ed large fleets o f sailing vessels fo r co m m ercial p u rp o ses w hich sailed w ith cargoes o f silk c a rp ets, precious sto n es, p e a rls, ivory, spices a n d o th e r v alu ab le goods to E u ro p e an d W e s t^

A sia. W ith th e w eakening o f th e In d ian ru lers, th e ir sea-b o rn e tra d e ro u tes [

p assed in to th e h an d s o f th e A rabs w ho becam e g re a t interm ediaries o f 1

m a ritim e com m ercial in terco u rse betw een th e tw o regions.

^

D u rin g this p erio d th e A rab s acted as a link betw een th e E a st a n d E u ro p e a n d used to pass th e In d ian m erch an d ise to th e V enetians w ho supplied the In d ia n goods to th e E u ro p ean m a rk e ts w here they w ere in g reat dem and.

T h e V enetians soon becam e im m ensely p ro sp e ro u s w hich aro u sed the jea-

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO R Y

7

lousy an d cupidity o f th e seafarers o f th e Ib erian nations, i.e., Spain, P o rtu g a l a n d o th e r M e d iterran ean countries, an d the quest fo r a direct passage to In d ia began.

F o r several m illennia ships had been trav ersin g the Indian O cean carrying v aluable m erchandise an d cu ltu ral em issaries betw een In d ia an d th e W est.

C ities th a t directly engaged in th e m aritim e trad e o r stood on the ancient tra d e routes continued to grow in im portance a n d prosperity. Some o f these centres o f com m erce were ancient C haldea, Babylon, N ineveh, O phir, T ad-m ore an d th e p o rts in the M ed iterran ean , P ersian G u lf an d the R ed Sea.

T he P hoenicians h a d fo r som e years arro g a te d to them selves a m ajo r share in the M ed iterran ean tra d e b u t were later driven o u t o f it by the A ssyrians, G reeks a n d R om ans b u t the A rabs continued to hold away over the R ed Sea, P ersian G ulf, In d ian O cean a n d the A ra b ia n Sea.

Egypt, d u rin g th e days o f the P tolem ies,14 developed A lexandria into the m ost im p o rtan t p o rt in th e w orld. O ne o f the Ptolem ies, Ptolem y Philadel-phus was p lan n in g to co n stru ct a canal between the R ed Sea an d the N ile, a h u n d red cubits wide an d thirty cubits in d e p th , in o rd er to tra n sp o rt Indian goods to A lexandria w holly by w ater but, fo r reasons n o t know n, this p ro ject was never u n d ertak en a n d hence a new p o rt called Berenike w as developed on the W estern shore o f the Red Sea. Ships fro m In d ia carried m erchandise, sailing fro m T a tta a t th e h ead o f the lower delta o f the Indus o r o th e r p o rts on the W est C oast to the coast o f P ersia an d a fter follow ing the A rab ian shore to Berenike. F ro m Berenike, the goods were carried overlan d to the city o f K o p to s, w hich was very close to the Nile, w here they were loaded into ships w hich navigated along a canal to A lexandria. C arthe-gian m erchants carried In d ian goods to all M ed iterran ean ports. D u rin g the p erio d o f E gyptian suprem acy, th e n o rth e rn countries o f E u ro p e received In d ia n goods w hich were carried o verland from In d ia to Oxus fro m where they w ent to the regions bord erin g th e C asp ian Sea an d the B lack Sea.

A fter its conquest o f C arth ag e, E g y p t an d Syria, the R o m a n E m pire m onopolised tra d e w ith In d ia fo r m any years a n d A lexandria con tin u ed to be th e p rin cip al p o rt fo r In d ia n m erchandise. T he conquest o f P ersia an d E gypt by the M o h am m ed an s later, how ever, deprived the E u ro p ean countries o f the use o f A lex an d ria fo r tra d e and access to In d ia n m erchandise.

B asra was fo u n d ed a t th e head o f the P ersian G u lf and becam e as im p o rtan t a tra d in g centre as A lexandria, co n tro llin g the m ovem ent o f m erchandise in b o th the easterly a n d westerly directions.

T he A rab s later gained co n tro l o f th e tra d e routes a n d sto p p ed supplying In d ia n goods to th e sea p o rts o f th e M ed iterran ean b u t th e o v erlan d route to C o n stan tin o p le p rovided the altern ativ e fo r carry in g In d ia n p ro d u c ts to th e E u ro p ean tra d e centres. In fa c t, C o n stan tin o p le becam e th e focal point fo r th e m ovem ent o f m erch an d ise betw een E u ro p e a n d In d ia.

T he rise a n d fall o f th e V enetians, G en o an s a n d Pisans, the b itter struggle/j betw een Venice an d G e n o a over the eastern tra d e an d the V enetian suprem acy over th is tra d e fo r som e tim e fo rm b u t a sm all c h a p te r in term s o f

6

U N D E R T W O E N S IG N S

w o v en fro m “ th e w o o l w h ich c e rta in m ild trees in In d ia b ear instead o f fru it t h a t in b e a u ty a n d q u a lity excels th a t o f sheep.” T hus, it was In d ia th a t in tro d u c e d th e u se o f c o tto n to E u ro p e, W est A sia an d th e F a r East.

O n e o f th e m o st se n satio n al discoveries th a t helped m ain tain tra d e betw een In d ia a n d th e W e st w as th a t o f th e reg u larity o f the seasonal w inds o f th e so u th w e st m o n so o n by a G reek n am ed H ip p a lu s 11 in a . d . 45. H is disco v ery h elp ed h im in finding a d ire c t ro u te to M ala b a r w hich w as fa r sh o rte r th a n th e o ld e r c o a st-h u g g in g ro u te . T o w a rd th e end o f th e sum m er m onths,

“ sh ip s u sed to d e p a rt fro m th e m o u th o f th e A rab ian G u lf o r K an e on the c o a s t o f A ra b ia F elix a n d sail s tra ig h t in 40 days to M u ziris (m odern K o d u n g a llu r) o n th e W est C o a st o f In d ia . They b egan th e ir hom ew ard v o y a g e in D e c e m b e r by sailin g w ith th e N o rth -E a st W ind, en ter the A rabian G u lf, m eet w ith a S o u th o r S o u th -W est W ind a n d th u s com plete the voyage b y u sin g th e tra d e w inds th ro u g h o u t th e p e rio d .” T he discovery o f the d ire c tio n s a n d re g u la rity o f th e m o n so o n a ir c u rre n t was a m a jo r c o n trib u tin g fa c to r to w a rd s th e co n tin u a n c e o f m aritim e tra d e betw een In d ia and the W estern co u n trie s over the centuries.

T h a t o cean ic n a v ig atio n w as well advanced d u rin g th e e a rlie r centuries o f th e C h ris tia n e ra is fu rth e r b o rn e o u t by the w ritings o f th e celebrated C hinese m o n k , F a H ie n 12 w ho cam e to In d ia o v erlan d to study B uddhism a t B o d h g ay a, S a rn a th a n d V aran asi in a . d . 413. On his w ay back to his hom e la n d h e sailed fro m T a m ra lip ta in B engal an d 14 d ay s la te r reached Sri L a n k a w h ere h e em b ark ed fo r Ja v a an d called a t th e N ico b ars b efo re p a ssing th ro u g h th e S traits o f M alacca to reach th e Pacific.

H in d u suprem acy over th e E astern w aters reached its z e n ith d u rin g th e p e rio d o f 5th to 12th cen tu ries w hen th e Sri V ijay a13 E m p ire ruled th e entire sea a re a betw een In d ia ’s eastern seaboard an d th e F a r E ast. T h e Sri V ijayas’

c u ltu ra l a n d co lo n isin g expedition to o k th em to such far-flung areas as S u m atra, B u rm a, th e M alay an P en in su la, Jav a, T h a ila n d an d In d o -C h in a.

Besides sp read in g H in d u culture, th ey m ain tain ed reg u lar p o litical a n d com m ercial intercourse w ith th e C holas, P andyas a n d K eralas. As a resu lt o f jealousy betw een th e C holas, th e T am il K ings, a n d th e Sri V ijayas, how ever, a series o f sea b attles w ere fo u g h t betw een th eir navies to w a rd th e end o f th e 10th cen tu ry a . d . resulting in th e w eakening o f th ese em pires an d o pening the way fo r A rab suprem acy in th e region. A b o u t th e sam e tim e, the rulers o f G u ja ra t an d C alicu t also m ain tain ed large fleets o f sailing vessels fo r com m ercial purposes w hich sailed w ith cargoes o f silk c a rp ets, precious stones, pearls, ivory, spices a n d o th er v aluable goods to E u ro p e an d W est A sia. W ith the w eakening o f th e In d ian ru lers, th eir sea-b o rn e tra d e ro u tes ’

passed into th e h ands o f th e A rabs w ho becam e g reat interm ediaries o f '

m aritim e com m ercial intercourse betw een th e tw o regions.

D u rin g this p erio d the A rabs acted as a link betw een th e E a st a n d E u ro p e a n d used to pass th e In d ian m erch an d ise to th e V enetians w ho supplied th e In d ia n goods to the E u ro p ean m a rk e ts w here they were in great dem and.

T h e V enetians soon becam e im m ensely p ro sp e ro u s w hich aro u sed th e jea-

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO R Y

7

lousy an d cupidity o f th e seafarers o f th e Ib erian n ations, i.e., Spain, P o rtu g a l an d o th e r M e d iterran ean countries, an d the quest fo r a direct passage to In d ia began.

F o r several m illennia ships had been trav ersin g the Indian O cean carrying v alu ab le m erchandise an d cu ltu ral em issaries between In d ia and th e W est.

C ities th a t directly engaged in th e m aritim e trad e o r stood on the ancient trad e routes continued to grow in im portance a n d prosperity. Some o f these centres o f com m erce were ancient C haldea, Babylon, N ineveh, O p h ir, T ad-m ore an d the p o rts in the M ed iterran ean , P ersian G u lf an d th e R ed Sea.

T he P hoenicians h a d fo r som e years a rro g ated to them selves a m ajor share in the M ed iterran ean trad e b u t w ere later driven o u t o f it by the A ssyrians, G reeks an d R o m an s b u t the A rabs continued to hold away over the R ed Sea, Persian G ulf, In d ian O cean an d the A ra b ia n Sea.

Egypt, d u rin g th e days o f th e P tolem ies,14 developed A lexandria into the m ost im p o rta n t p o rt in the w orld. O ne o f th e Ptolem ies, Ptolem y Philadel-phus was p lan n in g to construct a canal between the Red Sea an d the N ile, a h u n d red cubits wide an d thirty cubits in d e p th , in o rd er to tra n sp o rt Indian goods to A lex an d ria w holly by w ater but, fo r reasons n o t know n, th is p ro ject w as never u n d ertak en a n d hence a new p o rt called Berenike w as developed on the W estern shore o f th e R ed Sea. Ships from In d ia carried m erchandise, sailing from T a tta a t the h ead o f th e lower d elta o f th e Indus o r o th e r p o rts on the W est C oast to the coast o f P ersia a n d a fte r follow ing the A rab ian shore to Berenike. F ro m Berenike, the goods were carried overlan d to th e city o f K o p to s, w hich was very close to the Nile, w here they were loaded into ships w hich navigated along a canal to A lexandria. C arthe-gian m erchants carried In d ian goods to all M ed iterran ean ports. D u rin g the period o f E gyptian suprem acy, the n o rth e rn countries o f E urope received In d ia n goods w hich were carried overland from In d ia to Oxus fro m where they w ent to th e regions bord erin g th e C asp ian Sea an d the B lack Sea.

A fter its conquest o f C arth ag e, E g y p t an d Syria, the R o m an E m p ire m onopolised tra d e w ith In d ia fo r m any years a n d A lexandria continued to be th e p rin cip al p o rt fo r In d ia n m erchandise. T he conquest o f P ersia and E gypt by the M o h am m ed an s later, how ever, deprived the E u ro p ean co u n tries o f th e use o f A lexandria fo r tra d e and access to In d ia n m erchandise.

B asra was founded a t th e head o f the P ersian G u lf and becam e as im p o rta n t a tra d in g centre as A lexandria, co n tro llin g th e m ovem ent o f m erchandise in b o th the easterly a n d westerly directions.

T he A rab s la te r gained co n tro l o f th e tra d e routes an d sto p p ed supplying In d ia n goods to th e sea p o rts o f the M ed iterran ean b u t th e o v erlan d ro u te to C o n stan tin o p le p rovided th e altern ativ e fo r carry in g In d ia n p ro d u c ts to th e E u ro p e a n tra d e centres. In fa c t, C o n stan tin o p le becam e the focal po in t fo r th e m ovem ent o f m erch an d ise betw een E u ro p e a n d In d ia .

T he rise a n d fall o f th e V enetians, G en o an s a n d Pisans, the b itter stru g g le^

betw een Venice an d G en o a over th e eastern tra d e an d th e V enetian su p rem acy over th is tra d e fo r som e tim e fo rm b u t a sm all c h a p te r in term s o f

8

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

tim e in o u r m aritim e history. W ith the annexation o f C onstantinople and tra d in g routes to In d ia by th e T urks tow ards the end o f the 15th century a n d w ith th e co n tin u ed p iracy on th e A lexandrian tra d e ro u te by the E gyptian s, a new p a tte rn o f rivalry involving S outh E u ro p ean , N o rth A frican and W est A sian co u n tries over tra d e w ith th e E ast em erged. Since m astery over th ese tra d e routes h ad a d irect bearing on the pow er an d p ro sp erity o f these n a tio n s, a n a lte rn ativ e ro u te to In d ia was so u g h t to be established by som e o f these co u n tries w hich alread y h ad centuries o f seafarin g experience and expertise.

T h e q u est fo r a n altern ativ e ro u te hugging th e co asts o f A frica an d A sia led to th e sailing dow n the W est C oast o f A frica by the P o rtu g u ese N avig a to r, B arth o lem y D ia z in 1487 an d the discovery o f the C ap e o f T em p ests,15

la te r to be ren am ed the C ap e o f G ood H ope. V asco d a G a m a w as deputed by K in g M an o el o f P o rtu g a l in July 1497, five years a fte r the discovery o f th e W est Indies by C o lu m b u s, to co m p lete th e w o rk do n e by D iaz. The K in g ’s astro lo g er, A b rah am Ben Z a k u t,16 h av in g studied his h o ro sco p e and h a v in g fo u n d it fav o u rab le fo r th e discovery o f the sea ro u te to In d ia , there w ere h ig h hopes o f success in th e venture. F o u r ships, th e Sao Gabriel (120

to n s) co m m an d ed by V asco d a G a m a , th e Sao R aphael (100 tons) co m m an d ed by his b ro th e r P a u lo d a G am a, the Berrio (50 tons) u n d er the co m m a n d o f N ico las C oelho a n d a 200-ton sto re sh ip set sail fro m Belem on M a rc h 25, 1497. A violent sto rm was en co u n tered while ro u n d in g th e C ape a n d th e crew , w h ich w anted to go back, p lo tted a m u tin y b u t V asco d a G a m a succeeded in suppressing the m utiny by arrestin g the ring-leaders a n d th re a te n in g to th ro w th em o v e rb o ard . In M a rc h 1498, Sao Gabriel and Sao R aphael reached M o zam b iq u e, th e sto re ship having retu rn e d to P ortugal a fte r tra n sfe rrin g h e r stores a n d the Berrio having been found n o t seaw orthy a n d b ro k e n u p to re p a ir th e o th e r sh ip s. V asco d a G a m a now needed a pilot to ta k e him acro ss the In d ia n O cean a n d A rab ian Sea to In d ia and found o n e in th e M o o rish B ro k er, D av an e, fro m G u ja ra t w ho w as a n experienced p ilo t a n d knew th e seas co n tig u o u s to A frica, W est A sia a n d In d ia very well.

H is ex p ert p ilotage not only p rovided security fro m th e je a lo u s A rab s b u t a lso h elp ed V asco d a G a m a to proceed to M elinde fro m w here the ships sailed on A u g u st 26, 1498. H a d D av an e n o t assisted V asco d a G am a, the P o rtu g u ese w ould n o t have reached In d ia fo r som e m ore decades w hich p r o b ably w ould hav e ch anged th e co u rse o f In d ia ’s m aritim e histo ry .

W h ile th e discovery o f the sea ro u te 17 to In d ia by d a G a m a was o f no g reat significance, especially w hen co m p ared to th e feats o f C o lu m b u s an d M a g e lla n , th e im p o rta n c e o f his ach iev em en t lies in th e fa c t th a t w hile the seas w ere regarded by th e A rab s as a p athw ay fo r carry in g o u t m aritim e tra d e , th e P o rtu g u ese w ere th e first to lay claim to sovereignty over these w aters a n d using th em as an instrum ent fo r th e pro jectio n o f th e ir n atio n al policy. T h is claim w as fu rth e r sanctified by the Bull o f P o p e C alixtus III w hich co n sid ered the seas they sailed to be th eir possession. T h e Portuguese th u s b eg an considering them selves to be lo rd s o f th e seas a n d th o u g h t they

L ie u te n a n t H.R. Bow ers of th e Royal Indian Marine, w ho a cco m p a n ie d the A n ta r c t ic e xplore r Capta in S c o tt in his expedition to the S o uth Pole in 1910 and perished, a long w ith h im , on his way back. B o w e rs was the firs t

representative o f th e Indian s u b c o n tin e n t to set fo o t on th e South Pole. Ph otog ra p h: co urtesy of C o m m a n d e r R.S. B orner R N VR (retd.).

L ie u te n a n t Ram C h a ra n , who

w as a m e te o r o lo g is t in the

Indian Navy, w as th e f i r s t Indian

to v is it A n t a r c t ic a w he n he

a c c o m p a n ie d an A u s t r a l i a n polar

e x p e d itio n in 1960. He died in

a road a c c id e n t in 1961.

E n g in e e r S u b - L ie u t e n a n t D.N. M ukerji, the fir s t* In d ia n to jo i n th e Royal In d ia n M arine s. He w as c o m m is s io n e d on J a n u a ry 6, 1928.

L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r B.K. Shroff, R IN V R (retd.) better kn o w n as “ Pigeon S h r o ff " .

T h e C o m m a n d a n t o f th e Ja p a n e s e

fo r c e s in th e A n d a m a n s arrives

on b o a rd H M IS Narbada to

s u r r e n d e r ( A u g u s t 1945).

T h e barge of the J a p a n e s e

C o m m a n d a n t a lo n g s id e

H M IS Narbada.

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E HISTORY

9

were justified in confiscating the m erchandise o f all ships th a t sailed w ithout th eir a u th o rity . K .M . P a n ik k a r is fully justified in saying, “ It may truly be said th a t In d ia never lost h er independence till she lost co m m an d o f the sea in th e first decade o f the 16th cen tu ry .”

The P ortuguese claim to sovereignty o f the seas an d da G a m a ’s strong a ttitu d e at the C o u rt o f the Z am o rin o f C alicut displeased the latter and the challenge to the ru ler’s lim ited sea pow er led to a series o f indecisive skirm ishes an d sea battles off the co ast o f M a la b a r in the years th a t followed.

T he P ortuguese intruders were detested by the A rab trad ers w ho joined h ands w ith the Z am o rin and in 1500 when A dm iral P edro C ab ral b o m b ard ed C alicut, 80 ships o f the Z am o rin , m anned by 1500 intrepid sailors and reinforced by the ships o f a rich A rab trad er, K h o ja A m ber, drove him away to C ochin. Tw o indecisive b a ttle s18 were fo u g h t off C ochin in 1503 an d off C haul in 1508. In 1509 the next battle o f im portance was fo u g h t off D iu when ships o f the Z am o rin , u n d er the com m and o f the courageous K assim and reinforced by an Egyptian fleet u n d er A dm iral M ir H ussain, fo u g h t against a stro n g P ortuguese force led by D en Francesco d ’A lm eida. This battle also produced no decisive result because o f the treachery o f the Sultan o f G u ja ra t w hich led to the E g y p tian fleet sailing aw ay in disgust. T he In d ian O cean was th ereafter d o m in ated by the Portuguese, a n d A lbuquerque, the great com m ercial em pire-builder a n d statesm an, helped in firmly establishing P o rtu guese suprem acy over the area.

M ention m ust be m ade here o f the ou tstan d in g role played by the Z a m o rin ’s fleet which, u n d er the leadership o f the Ali M a ra k k a rs, gave valiant b attle to th e P ortuguese fo r well over 90 years. T he M a ra k k a rs 19 who had th e ir h ea d q u a rte rs a t P o n n an i, a n atu ra l h a rb o u r S o u th o f C alicut, held sway over the w aters a ro u n d C alicut. T he m ost illustrious nam e in the family o f the A li M a ra k k a rs was th a t o f K u n jali M a ra k k a r II w ho sank a num ber o f P o rtu g u ese ships (the tally in a p artic u la r y ear being 50) an d struck terro r in the h e arts o f the P ortuguese forces. F o r som e reasons, how ever, K unjali I I I (M o h am m ed K unjali M a ra k k a r) w ho was the last o f th e K unjali A dm irals an d h a d w on m any a b attle ag ain st th e Portuguese, fell o u t w ith th e Z am o rin . This led to th e w eakening o f the Z a m o rin ’s fleet an d its ca p itu la tio n to th e Portuguese. T he m ain co n trib u tio n o f th e K u n jalis d u rin g the 16th cen tu ry was th a t fo r over 90 years they k ep t th e Portuguese a t bay and h ara sse d th e ir fleet th u s preventing them from carrying o u t incursions into th e land areas o f th e subcontinent.

H av in g failed to d efeat th e Z am o rin , A lb u q u erq u e20 seized G o a an d its su rro u n d in g areas in 1510. O p eratin g fro m G o a w hich occupied a com m anding p o sitio n in the prevailing scenario, A lbuquerque h o u n d ed the A rab tr a d ers o u t o f th eir fav o u rite h a u n t, subdued th e S ultan o f O rm uz and relegated him to the level o f a vassal o f th e P ortuguese ruler, developed S o co tra into a pow erful naval base w ith a w ell-defended fo rt, established a stro n g governm en t in C ochin a fte r bypassing th e Z a m o rin and b ro u g h t im m ense pow er an d w ealth to his co u n try by exercising m astery over th e A rab ian Sea. In

1 0

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

1513, h e m u stered a stro n g naval force a n d seized a n d fortified th e S traits o f M alacca. H e also established am icable relations w ith th e ru ler o f Pegu, w ho co n tro lle d th e A ra k a n C o a st, a fte r prolonged n egotiations w ith him.

P o rtu g u ese su prem acy over th e w aters a ro u n d In d ia was th u s established a n d reach ed its z e n ith d u rin g th e days o f A lbuquerque. B ut in 1580, w hen P o rtu g a l jo in ed h an d s w ith Spain a n d th e Spanish A rm a d a suffered a cru sh in g d efeat, it changed the course o f events a ro u n d the globe, one o f its offsh o o ts b eing th e decline o f P o rtu g u ese suprem acy in the In d ia n region. I t is a m o o t p o in t th a t if th e S p an ish A rm a d a h a d triu m p h e d , th e U n ited States co u ld in all p ro b a b ility have becom e a L a tin A m erican c o u n try an d In d ia a P o rtu g u ese dom inion!

T h e su d d en ch an g e in th e p o w e r e q u a tio n w as first exploited by the D u tc h 21 a n d th e D u tc h E a st In d ia C o m p a n y w as fo rm ed a t A m sterd am in 1592. T h e first m e rc h a n t fleet o f th e D u tc h reach ed In d ia in 1595 b u t they d id n o t challenge th e P o rtu g u e se suprem acy. In ste a d , th ey occupied Jav a a n d estab lish ed a n av al b ase a t B atav ia. M eanw hile, th e B ritish an d the F re n c h also decided to benefit fro m fishing in o u r tro u b le d w aters an d cam e to In d ia d u rin g th e earlier years o f th e 17th C en tu ry . It is th u s a p p a re n t th a t w hile th e H in d u s co n tro lle d th e tra d e ro u te s u n til th e beginning o f the 1 5th C e n tu ry , th e A rab s to o k over th e m ain b u lk o f it fro m them fo r a w hile w ith a sh o rt p e rio d o f overlap. B u t suprem acy over these ro u tes passed in to P o rtu g u ese h an d s to w a rd s th e end o f th e 15th C e n tu ry . T he Portuguese th e n reig n ed unchallenged fo r n early a cen tu ry till the d efeat o f the S p an ish A rm a d a a n d th e n th e sun o f th e B ritish m aritim e p o w er rose over In d ia n h o riz o n s a n d th e In d ian O cean d u rin g th e first decade o f th e 17th C en tu ry .

T h e M u g h al ruler, A k b a r22 h a d a fairly stro n g N avy b u t its m ain c o m p o n e n t w as a fleet o f ships a n d c ra ft b ased a t D a c c a w hich w ere used fo r o p e ra tio n s in rivers a n d creeks fo r th e p ro te c tio n o f d eltaic S o u th B engal fro m th e M agh (B urm ese) a n d Feringhee (half-caste) p irates w ho h ad the s u p p o rt o f th e A ra k a n rulers. H e h a d a n A d m iralty w hich lo o k ed a fte r th e supply o f ships a n d sm aller c ra ft, re c ru itm e n t o f suitable personnel fo r the ships and c ra ft, security o f rivers a n d w aterw ays a n d collection o f p o rt revenue. The M u g h als, how ever, did n o t ap p reciate th e im p o rtan ce o f bu ild in g up a blue-w ater navy a n d developing sea-borne tra d e a n d com m erce. S h ip p in g a n d shipbuilding, ocean-going a n d riverine, how ever, flo u rish ed d u rin g the M u g h al days in vario u s p a rts o f In d ia such as B engal, K a sh m ir, L a h o re an d S u ra t a n d th ere is evidence available to estab lish th e h ig h s ta n d a rd o f te c h no lo g y m ain ta in e d in th e co n stru c tio n o f these ships a n d craft.

A u ra n g z e b ’s navy w as su p e rio r in size a n d efficiency to th a t o f A k b a r.

Besides naval ships, h e h a d fo u r ships a t S u ra t fo r carry in g H a j pilgrim s free o f c o st to M ecca b u t th e lack o f ad eq u ate sea-g o in g n a v a l ships caused th e loss o f som e o f his bigger ships to B ritish p irates.

By a R o y al C h a rte r o f Q ueen E lizab eth I, the H o n o u ra b le C om p an y o f th e M e rc h a n ts T ra d in g to th e E a st Indies, b e tte r k n o w n as th e E a st In d ia

IN D IA ’S M A R ITIM E H IS T O R Y

11

C om pany,23 was fo u n d ed b y th e B ritish on D ecem ber 31, 1600 a n d a ship o f the C om pany, th e H ector, w ith C a p tain H aw kins as th e C om m anding Officer, arriv ed in S u ra t bringing a letter to E m p e ro r Jeh an g ir requesting fo r p erm ission to tra d e w ith In d ia. H aw kins reached A g ra on A p ril 16, 1610

an d perm ission w as duly g ran ted an d tra d in g facilities prom ised by the E m p e ro r but th e P o rtu g u ese did n o t ap p reciate the B ritish en cro ach m en t on th e ir tra d e preserves. The B ritish sensed th is a n d sent a sq u a d ro n o f w arships, th e D ragon, O siender, Ja m es an d Solom on, u n d e r th e overall com m and o f C a p tain T h o m as Best, w hich reached Swally, th e ro a d ste a d o f S u rat, on Septem ber 5, 1612. T his d a te is reg ard ed by the B ritish as th e fo u n d atio n day o f the R oyal In d ia n N avy, as th e first arriv a l o f th e ir w arsh ip s in India an d th e fo rm a tio n o f th e In d ia n M arin e to o k place on th is d ay .

A very interesting fact “ d iscovered” by the late C o m m an d er (special) G .E .

W alker, w ho was th e Judge A dvocate G eneral o f th e R IN im m ediately b efore Independence, is th a t th e Ja c k flown by the In d ian M arin e in 1612 was the flag w o rn by ships on the A m erican side d u rin g th e W ar o f Independence w hen they rejected the U n io n Jack . T he Jack o f the In d ian M arin e w as thus the first flag o f th e U .S.A . w hich over th e years developed in to th e stars and stripes. T he In d ian M a rin e Ja c k h ad seven red a n d six w hite strip es an d in the p o sitio n occupied by th e stars to d ay , w as displayed th e St. G eorge’s C ross. This flag form s a p a rt o f th e insignia o f th e existing R IN A ssociation in th e U .K .

T h e ir m o n o p o ly over tra d e in the region having been challenged by the B ritish, th e P ortuguese attack ed th e ships o f th e In d ian M arine on O ctober 29, 1612 w ith fo u r galleons an d fo rty o th e r c ra ft b u t h a d to a d m it defeat a fte r a p ro tra c te d b attle. They th e n w ithdrew leaving th e B ritish as m asters o f th e lan d a n d sea a re a a ro u n d S u ra t w ho set u p factories an d form ed a fleet o f In d ia n sm all c raft kn o w n as G h u rab s (the B ritish called th em G rabs) an d G alivats fo r the p ro tectio n o f th eir sea-borne com m erce23 from the P o rtu g u ese. T he sobriquet “ T he G ra b Service” by w hich the B ritish Indian N avy was know n fo r m any years does n o t necessarily brack et it w ith the p irates o f v ario u s natio n alities w ho infested the In d ian w aters a t th a t time.

T h e nucleus o f th e In d ian M arin e consisted a t th a t tim e m ainly o f some w arships b u ilt in E ngland an d a larg er num ber o f vessels b u ilt in India. The G h u ra b s24 were heavy beam y vessels (a b o u t 300 to n s) o f shallow d ra ft and w ere arm ed w ith six 9 to 12-pounder guns while the G alivats were sm aller c ra ft (a b o u t 70 to n s) m ounting half-a-dozen 2 to 4-pounders. T he crews o f these c ra ft consisted m ainly o f H in d u fisherm en from th e K o n k an C oast.

T h e second m a jo r b attle w ith th e Portuguese to o k place in 1614 in which th e In d ian M arine em erged victorious an d th e E ast In d ia C om pany was g ran ted fu rth e r tra d in g rights by Jehangir. In th e follow ing year, Sir Thom as R oe w as ap p o in ted A m b assad o r fro m K ing Jam es I to the M oghul C ourts.

M erchandise m an u factu red a t the S u rat factories started m oving by sea to th e W est fo r tra d e w ith the P ersian G u lf p o rts in 1618. H aving h a d the m o n o p o ly o f tra d e in these p o rts fo r nearly a century, th e P ortuguese tried

1 2

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

to block the passage o f these ships across the A rab ian Sea b u t were successfully th w arted fro m d o in g so by the B ritish w ho annexed O rm uz from the P o rtu g u ese in 1622 a n d th u s began th eir u n in te rru p te d trad e w ith Persia.

T his, how ever, did n o t d eter the P ortuguese from seeking a n o th e r battle a t Sw ally in 1630 w here they were defeated once ag ain an d a tru ce was declared lead in g to th e o p ening o f som e o f th e P o rtu g u ese p o rts to the E ast In d ia C o m p a n y ’s ships.

T h e D u tc h h ad been keeping a n eye on the balance o f pow er in this region a n d in th e ir efforts to co n so lid ate th e ir base a t B atavia (now know n as J a k a r ta ) , they cap tu red th e S tra its o f M alacca in 1641 an d d rove the P o rtu guese aw ay fro m the E a ste rn gatew ay to the In d ian O cean. R ealising the strateg ic im p o rtan ce o f C o lo m b o as a naval base for o p e ra tio n fo r th e a n nex atio n o f the In d ia n m ain lan d , th e D u tc h th e n befriended the ru ler o f Sri L a n k a w hich h elp ed in d riv in g th e P o rtu g u ese aw ay from C olom bo also in 1654. Soon th e re a fter, th ey m ad e in ro a d s in to th e P o rtu g u ese bastions on th e M a la b a r C o ast. T h is w as ren d ered even m ore effective by th e m ain base o f th e D u tc h a t B atavia, th e ir c o n tro l o f th e S traits o f M alacca a n d the a d vanced o p e ra tio n a l base a t C o lo m b o . C o ch in w as c a p tu re d in 1663. This w as fu rth e r m ade possible by th e B ritish p re o c c u p a tio n w ith o th e r problem s b u t th e ir friendly re la tio n s w ith E m p e ro r S h a h jah an prevented the D u tch fro m m ak in g any fo ray s in to th e w aters a ro u n d S u ra t w here th e B ritish facto ries w ere situ ated . A y e a r later, how ever, Shivaji, the M a ra th a ruler, a tta c k e d S u ra t by lan d b u t th e B ritish ers rep u lsed his atta c k .

M eanw hile, K in g C h arles I I 25 o f E n g lan d h ad m a rrie d In fa n ta C ath e rin a o f B rag an za, the P o rtu g u ese princess, in 1662 a n d B om bay was ceded to him as a p a r t o f his dow ry. T h e official version o f the tra n sfe r docum ent describ ed the gift as “ th e P o rt a n d Isla n d o f B om bay in th e E a st Indies, to g e th e r w ith all th e rights, profit, territo rie s a n d a p p u rte n a n c es th e re o f w h a tso v e r.” Since, how ever, it w as virtu ally im possible fo r K ing C harles II to a d m in iste r B om bay successfully fro m E n g lan d , he tra n sferred it to the E a s t In d ia C o m p a n y a t a n a n n u a l ren tal o f f 10 in 1668— one o f the m o st significant events in th e h isto ry o f B om bay.

D esp ite th e advice o f his counsellors to the c o n trary , Sir Jo h n C hild26 who w as a p p o in te d th e A d m ira l o f the E a st In d ia C o m p a n y ’s lan d an d sea forces betw een th e P ersian G u lf a n d K a n y a K u m ari in 1685, decided to a d o p t an aggressive policy to w ard s the M oghuls. H av in g ta k e n o n a f a r su p erio r force, C h ild suffered an ignom inious d efeat a t th e h an d s o f th e M oghuls w ho, w ith th e su p p o rt o f th e Sidis’ fleet, ca p tu re d m o st o f B om bay island and besieged C h ild in th e B om bay C astle w hich is now know n as the N aval B arracks.

P eacc was, how ever, restored by redeem ing B om bay o n th e p ay m en t o f

£ 15,000 in 1690 and som e kind o f a reconciliation having been effected betw een A u ran g zeb and th e C om pany. M eanw hile, in 1685 th e In d ian M arin e H e a d q u a rte rs w ere shifted to B om bay and a year later th e Service was rech risten ed the B om bay M arine.

In 1698, th e D an es ap p eared on the scene and set u p th eir trad e after

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO RY

13

o b tain in g the perm ission o f Prince A zim us-shan, grandson o f E m peror A urangzeb. By 1755, they h ad set u p a facto ry an d had hoisted the D anish flag a t S eram pore. In 1801, the B ritish au th o rities forcibly seized Seram pore b u t restored it im m ediately. In 1808, however, a detachm ent o f British tro o p s from B a rrack p o re occupied S eram pore. T he D an ish E ast Jndia C o m pany recovered it later but in 1844 tran sferred all its assets to the British G o v ern m en t an d left the country.

T he beginning o f the 18th century saw the em ergence o f an A dm iral o f S hivaji’s M a ra th a F leet, K an h o ji A ngre,27 w hose nam e becam e a legend d u rin g these years a n d w hose exploits a re w ritten in letters o f gold in the an n als o f the navies o f India. Shivaji w as a firm believer in the doctrine28

“ Jalain i Jasya, V alaim T a sy a ” (he w ho rules the sea is all-pow erful) and T ukoji A ngre, his A dm iral and son, K an h o ji A ngre and his descendents, put it to practice. In 1706 the fleet o f K anhoji, m enaced and considerably reduced B ritish tra d e between B om bay and th e lower M ala b a r C oast an d c a p tu red C o la b a from the Sidis. A year later, m aritim e tra d e in the In d ian O cean was threatened by A rab pirates o p eratin g from M uscat w ho plundered a large num ber o f ships. E quipped w ith a fleet o f 10 G h u rab s a n d 50 G alivats, the M a ra th a F leet, u n d er th e co m m an d o f K an h o ji A ngre, challenged the A rab fleet a n d drove it aw ay fro m the In d ian O cean. T hereafter, K anhoji began establishing m astery over th e K o n k a n C oast by fortifying his base at G h e ria (V ijaydurg). This fortress was m anned by a specially train ed garrison w hich had been arm ed a n d provisioned to w ithstand severe a ttack s from land an d sea a n d prolonged perio d s o f blockade. T his was fu rth e r reinforced by a d o ck y ard b u ilt on a river fro n t behind th e fortress w hich was equipped to build bigger, stronger an d b etter sea-going vessels fo r his navy.

T he Portuguese by this tim e having been reduced to a n insignificant sea pow er, along w ith the Sidis a n d the B ritish faced a strong challenge fro m the M a ra th a Fleet. T he size, m anouvreability and fire-pow er o f the M a ra th a Fleet continued to grow an d hence the B ritish Council decided to build co rvettes fo r the B om bay M arine w hich w ould escort the m erchant ships o f the C om p an y a n d p ro tect th em from A n g re’s w rath. This went on fo r som e tim e an d the G o v ern o r o f B om bay, C harles Boone,29 decided to a ttack G h eria in 1717 w ith a strong fleet under the com m and o f C ap tain Barleu. A bitter engagem ent follow ed a n d the M a rath as forced the C o m p an y ’s ships to beat a hasty retreat a fte r inflicting severe dam age on th eir ships an d killing a large num ber o f th e C o m p an y ’s soldiers a n d sailors. U ndeterred by the n e a rcatastro p h e, C harles Boone carried o u t an o th er attack , this tim e a surprise one, on G h eria on N ovem ber 5, 1718 an d succeeded in silencing m any M arath a guns after a sh ip -sh o re artillery engagem ent. The next day, however, when his forces landed, th e M a ra th a guns w hich h ad been strategically positioned to cover the entire b eachhead, mowed them down. T he B ritish fleet, with the han d fu l o f survivors hastily withdrew .

O n receiving a petition fro m the G o v ern o r o f Bom bay fo r naval reinforcem ent, the K ing o f E ngland sent fo u r w arships under C om m odore

14 UNDER T W O ENSIGNS

M athew s to pro v id e s u p p o rt to th e fleet o f the B om bay M arine. B ritish and P o rtu g u ese ships carried o u t an a tta c k on C olaba, five miles from G h eria, in O cto b er 1722 b u t even this a tte m p t w as successfully repulsed by the M a ra t has a n d th e a tta c k in g forces w ithdrew a fte r having suffered severe losses o f m en, guns a n d am m u n itio n .

A ngered by the c ap tu re o f som e o f th e ir ships by th e M a ra th a F le e t, the D u tc h atta c k e d G h e ria 30 in 1724 w ith a pow erful sq u ad ro n o f seven m en-of-w ar, e ach m o u n tin g 30 to 50 guns, b u t they suffered heavy losses and w ere b eaten back.

T h e success o f th e M a ra th a F leet ag ain st bigger a n d b e tte r equipped sh ip s o f E n g lan d , P o rtu g a l a n d H o lla n d a n d those o f th e M oghuls an d the A ra b s stretching over several d ecades w as m ainly d u e to K a n h o ji’s tactics o f u sin g a large n u m b er o f light, stro n g a n d fa st cra ft, ad eq u ately equipped, w h ich su rro u n d e d th e h e a v ie r vessels o f th e enem y a n d sim ultaneously a tta c k e d th em fro m all sides th u s overw helm ing the crews o f th e enemy sh ip s a n d th en b o a rd in g th em a n d p u ttin g th em o u t o f actio n by scuttling th e m o r settin g th em on fire.

H a v in g h a d th e u n iq u e d istin ctio n o f m ain tain in g naval suprem acy over th e sea a re a off th e K o n k a n C o a st fo r m any years, K an h o ji suddenly passed aw ay in 1729, survived by his sons, Sekhoji A ngre a n d S am bhaji A ngre.

T h e B ritish tre a ty o f a llian ce w ith th e Sidi’s to fight th e A ngres in 1733

w as follow ed by S a m b h a ji’s c a p tu re o f som e B ritish m erch an t ships on D ecem b er 16, 1735 w h ich w as a heavy blow o n B ritish trad e. T he Peshw as o f P o o n a w ho w ere n o t q u ite frien d ly w ith the A ngres, w ere th e n w ooed by th e B ritish an d a tre a ty w as signed in 1739. By th is tim e, M a ra th a control o f th e seas h ad extended fro m K u tc h to C o ch in a n d h a d severely h am p ered B ritish tra d e . M eanw hile, in o rd e r to bu ild ships a t a site closer to the scene o f actio n , th e B ritish h ad set u p a naval d o c k y a rd 31 a t B om bay in 1735.

A co m b in ed o p e ra tio n 32 by th e B ritish a n d th e Peshw as by lan d a n d sea, led by A d m ira l W a tso n w ith his ships an d 1400 sailors an d C olonel R o b e rt C live w ith his a rm y contingent, besieged G h e ria a n d w ere successful in c a p tu rin g it a n d reducing M a ra th a sea pow er to nou g h t. It m ay n o t be o u t o f p lace to m en tio n here th a t A d m iral W atso n a n d 50 sailors o f th e M arin e a ssisted Clive in th e B attle o f P lassey in 1757.

S om e m erch an ts fro m O stend, A n tw erp a n d o th e r F lem ish to w n s33 a rriv e d in B engal o n b o a rd a sh ip laden w ith m erchandise d u rin g th e second decad e o f th e 18th C entury. T h e O sten d C o m p an y was set u p in 1722 w ith th e blessings o f N a w a b M urshid K uli K h a n and a fa c to ry was set u p in B an k i B azar, so u th o f C h an d ern ag o re. They, how ever, faced considerable o p p o sitio n fro m th e o th e r E u ro p ean trad in g com m unities a n d th e N a w a b ’s C h a rte r w as w ith d raw n in 1727 as a result. Soon th e re a fter, a naval engagem e n t to o k place betw een the F lem ish a n d N a w a b ’s forces a n d th e Flem ish m e rc h a n ts, hav in g been defeated, w ithdrew fro m In d ia .

E n te rin g th e scene to challenge B ritish sea p o w er in th e reg io n in 1740

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w ere th e F re n c h 34 a n d th ey b egan th e ir o perations by c a p tu rin g M auritius a n d co n v ertin g it into a stro n g naval base an d then sending a strong fleet into the Bay o f B engal to in te rc e p t a n d cap tu re B ritish m erchant ships. The w ar o f A u stria n succession in E u ro p e in 1744 saw the B ritish and the F rench in o p p o sin g cam ps a n d D upleix, the F ren ch G o v ern o r o f P ondicherry, decided to act. H av in g alread y decided to c ap tu re the entire S outh In d ian region, he used th e F re n c h F leet, w hich was u n d er th e com m and o f L a B ourdon-nais, to lau n ch a n a tta c k o n the B ritish F leet w hich w as led by C a p tain Peyton. T h e F re n c h F leet succeeded in driving the B ritish F leet u p the H ooghly and then, a fte r a b rie f resistance, c a p tu re d M adras.

D u p leix , how ever, d id not ap p reciate th e im p o rtan ce o f sea pow er as a n essential fa c to r in m ain tain in g su p rem acy over lan d areas continguous to the sea. L a B o u rd o n n ais w as th u s allow ed to re tu rn to F ran ce in 1747 and the B ritish regained th e com m an d o f th e seas aro u n d In d ia once again.

T hey also b ro u g h t six pow erful ships an d several sm all c raft o f B oscaw an’s F leet to th e Bay o f Bengal in 1748 an d beseiged P ondicherry.35 T his siege, how ever, w as n o t successful b u t the B ritish continued to m ake th e ir presence felt by an n ex in g strategic a n d im p o rta n t regions. O ne o f these w as C hander-nagore, a F re n c h possession, w hich was cap tu red by A dm iral W atson, assisted by Clive, in 1756. W a tso n died in 1757 a n d the B ritish Fleet, u n d er the c o m m an d o f A d m iral P ocock, a tta c k e d M ad ras. D espite som e reverses suffered a t the h an d s o f th e F ren ch , th e B ritish land forces to o k the offensive a n d defeated th e m in the C arn atic W ar while A dm iral Pocock defeated the F re n c h F leet u n d er D ’A c he w hich was driven aw ay fro m the sea leaving th e B ritish as the m asters o f the entire sea a re a a ro u n d India.

P eace was, how ever, short-lived fo r a fte r a few years o f th e B ritish a n nexation o f P ondicherry, A dm iral Suffren, a red o u b tab le naval tactician, ap p eared on th e scene w ith a reinforced F ren ch F leet an d attacked the B ritish F leet w hich was u n d er the com m and o f A dm iral Sir E dw ard H ughes.

A series o f encounters ensued but follow ing a treaty betw een E ngland and F ran ce, A dm iral Suffren an d his F leet left the a rea, converting the Indian O cean into a B ritish lake. T he laU r h a lf o f the 18th century saw th e extinction o f P ortuguese pow er in India, th e B ritish seizure o f the island o f Sal-se tta an d o th e r Portuguese holdings in In d ia an d the B ritish victory over H a id e r A li’s navy a t H o n a v a r a n d M angalore.

B o th H yder Ali a n d T ip u Sultan h ad m aintained a fleet m ainly to sup p o rt th e ir o perations on land and p ro tect their trad e interests ab ro ad . They were form idable adversaries who inflicted a severe defeat on th e B ritish an d cam e n e a r to b reaking the pow er o f the E ast In d ia C om pany.36 But they were confined to the south an d did n o t directly affect th e fortunes o f In d ia as a whole.

H a id e r A li was a rem arkable m an an d one o f the n o tab le figures in In d ian history. H e h ad som e kind o f a n atio n al ideal an d possessed the qualities o f a leader w ith vision. C ontinually suffering from a p ain fu l disease, his self-discipline an d capacity fo r h a rd w ork were astonishing. H e realised, long before others did the im portance o f sea pow er an d the growing menace

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U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

o f the B ritish based on naval strength. H e tried to organise a jo in t effort to d rive them o u t an d , for this p urpose, sent envoys to the M a ra th a s, th e N izam , a n d S h u ja-u d -D o w la o f O udh. But n o th in g c a m e o f this. H e started b uilding his ow n navy a n d , cap tu rin g the M aldive Islands, m ade them his h e a d q u a rters, for sh ip b u ild in g a n d naval activities. H e died by the w ayside as he was m arch in g w ith his arm y. H is son T ip u continued to strengthen his navy. T ip u also sen t m essages to N ap o leo n and to the S u ltan in C o n stan tin o p le. H aid er A li h a d , how ever, lam ented th a t he could b eat the E nglish on land, b u t he could n o t dry up the sea.

O n e o f th e o th e r little-k n o w n facts o f o u r m aritim e34 h isto ry is th a t, o v er tw o centuries ago, th e G erm an s too m ade an a tte m p t to establish a fo o tin g in Bengal. In 1753, som e m erchants fro m E m pden, a to w n in G e rm any, founded a com pany, p o p u la rly know n a t th a t tim e as the Bengal C o m p a n y o f E m pden o r the R oyal P russian Bengal C om pany. T h e B ritish, the F re n c h , th e D u tch a n d th e D anes, w ho had alread y set u p facto ries on th e b an k s o f the H ooghly, com b in ed ag ain st th e new com ers an d orders w ere issued fo rb id d in g th e ir p ilo ts, m asters a n d m ates to ren d er any assistance to th e G erm an s. T h e M o g h u l N a w a b also issued o rd ers to these foreig n ers a sk in g th e m to p rev en t th e settin g u p o f a G e rm a n estab lish m ent.

T h e G e rm a n ships, th e largest o f them being th e P rince H enry o f Prussia, how ever, arriv ed a n d set u p a fa c to ry n e a r C h a n d ern ag o re a n d succeeded in getting th e N a w a b ’s a p p ro v a l fo r carry in g on th e ir tra d e a fte r paying a

“ n a z ra n a ” (gift) on R s. 5,000 to him .

F aced w ith b itte r hostility from the o th e r E u ro p ean co m p etito rs, the G erm an s failed to exp an d th e ir tra d e an d could n o t m ake an y headw ay to w ard co n stru ctin g buildings a n d w arehouses fo r th e p u rp o se. T hey decided, th e re fo re , to w ind up th e ir tra d e a n d , by 1760, re tu rn e d to G erm any.

L o rd N elso n , w hen he was o n ly 16, visited B om bay an d C a lc u tta while on b o a rd th e S eahorse, a tw enty-gun ship, d u rin g its voyage to th e ‘E ast In d ies’ in 1775. T he ship reached B om bay on the m o rn in g o f A u g u st 17, 1775 a n d la te r visited C alcutta w hen N elson c o n tra c te d som e “ distressing illness a n d fevers.” He was sent hom e on b o a rd th e frigate, D olphin an d com pletely recovered before reach in g E ngland. T he details o f his jo u rn ey from the H o o g h ly to P o rtsm o u th a re recorded in th e book Nelson w ritten by C a ro la O m an.

T he shipbuilding yard a t S u rat h a d been s e tu p in 1635 d u rin g w hich y ear th e E a st In d ia C om p an y b u ilt fo u r p innaces a n d o th e r larg er vessels, this being th e first record o f any o f th e ir shipbuilding38 activities in In d ia . T he sh ift to B om bay in 1735 w as necessitated by its being safer a n d closer to the scenes o f action. It was Low jee N usserw anjee W a d ia , an cesto r o f a lo n g line o f fam o u s P arsi m aster-builders o f ships, n av al a n d co m m ercial, w ho selected th e site fo r the N aval D o ck y ard w hich d u rin g th e course o f the next 100 years, proceeded to build n o t less th a n 115 w ar vessels a n d 144 m e rc h a n t ships including 84 gun-ships o f a to ta l to n n a g e o f over 2,000 fo r the

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO R Y

17

R oyal N avy. T he quality o f construction o f these ships was o f such a high o rd e r th a t they were acclaim ed by shipbuilding nations aro u n d the globe. It was th e W adias w ho proved to th e w orld th a t In d ian -b u ilt M alab ar teak ships were fa r su p erio r in seaw orthiness an d w ithstanding the detrim ental effects o f the elem ents th a n B ritish -b u ilt o aken ships. H M S Trincomalee, w hich was built by the B om bay N av al D ock y ard in 1817 for the R oyal Navy an d w hich saw m any battles during the p erio d o f her com m ission, is still in use a t P o rtsm o u th as T S Foudroyant fo r train in g school and college students in seam anship an d navigation an d is the oldest sail-driven w arship afloat today. H e r M a la b a r teak hull a n d sup erstru ctu re, despite several m ajor m odifications, dam ages suffered d u rin g battles a n d storm s a n d continuous use fo r train in g purposes, is still as good as new a n d to quote a well-known shipbuilder, “ good for an o th e r 300 y ears” .

T he earlier decades o f the 19th century saw the a rriv al in the In d ian waters o f pirates belonging to an A rab trib e called the Joasm is.39 T hey operated fro m the A rab side o f the P ersian G u lf covering the co ast fro m B ahrain to C ape M ussendon an d , w ith th e ir h ead q u arters at R as-el-K haim a, they held sway over the entire P ersian G ulf. O riginally m erchants an d pearl-fishers, they now to o k to piracy. F o r m any years they left the ships o f the East In d ia C o m p an y alone an d attack ed only sm all c ra ft but since th e C om pany ships to o k no actio n ag ain st the A rab pirates p lundering ships and craft belonging to the others, th is was in terpreted by the Joasm is as a sign o f w eakness an d la te r they stopped sp a rin g the C om pany ships.

A fleet o f 12 ships o f the B om bay M arine, carrying 4,000 men a n d under the c o m m an d o f C ap tain Seaton, attack ed R as-el-K h aim a40 in 1809 and b o m b ard ed this focal po in t o f the Jo asm is’ o p eratio n s b u t were beaten back by the w ell-entrenched Joasm i forces. T he sq u ad ro n o f ships h ad , therefore, to re tu rn to B om bay a n d the A ra b p irates con tin u ed to seize an d plunder th e C o m p an y ’s ships. U n d er the com m and o f C a p ta in C ollier, the C om pany la te r despatched a n o th e r fleet o f 11 ships w ith 6,000 m en u nder M ajor G en eral Sir W illiam G ra n t K eir. T hey blockaded the tow n o f R as-el-K haim a fo r fo u r days as a result o f w hich S a rd a r H a sa n Bin R eh m an , th e Joasm i Chief, gave him self up a n d ad m itted defeat. T he A rab s g u aranteed safe p assage to B ritish ships in a tre a ty 41 in 1820 a n d the E ast In d ia C om pany was n o t subjected to h a rassm en t by the A rab s any fu rth er.

A n interesting fa c t recorded is th a t the P u n jab R egim ent o f the Indian A rm y is p ro b ab ly the only exam ple in the w o rld o f a land-based force, having a naval c raft as its cap-badge w ith th e m o tto “ S thal-w a-Jal” (earlier

“ K h u sh k i-w a-T ari” ).42 T h is regim ent was p erm itted to a d o p t the galley as an em blem because it to o k p a rt in m any m ilitary expeditions overseas betw een 1796 a n d 1824.

Tw o im p o rta n t events to o k place in 1829. T h e B om bay M arin e was assigned the new nom enclature, th e B om bay M arine C o rp s, an d Hugh Lindsay, a ship o f the E ast In d ia C o m p an y , w as the first to be fitted w ith a steam engine.

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U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

H ugh L indsay

a 4 1 1-ton ship o f the B om bay M arine C orps, steam ed o u t o f B om bay on M a rc h 20, 1830 a n d reached the Suez a fte r 21 days o f ac tu a l steam ing averag in g a trifle u n d e r six knots. T hus began the gradual conversion o f the C o m p a n y 's ships fro m sail to steam w hich was com pleted d u rin g the next 15 years. T he year 1830 also saw an o th e r change in the nam e o f the Service— this tim e to th e In d ian N avy.

A ll w ent well fo r seven years th e re a fter w hen in 1837 a pilgrim sh ip 43 o f th e E a st In d ia C om pany, w hilst on passage to M ecca, w ith a n u m b er o f rich pilgrim s on b o a rd , w as seized an d plundered near A den. A sq u ad ro n o f the In d ia n N av y ’s m en -o f-w ar, led by C o m m an d er H aines, w as th en sent to a tta c k A den b u t since th e Sultan o f A den was in a rep en tan t m ood an d ready to p ay an indem nity o f R s. 3 lakhs, the ships sp ared A den and returned to B o m b ay in 1838. T h e indem nity p ro m ised was, however, never p aid by the S ultan an d hence th e ships retu rn ed to A den in the sam e year an d captured it.

In 1848, d u rin g th e A nglo-S ikh W ar, the In d ia n N avy provided a c o n tin gent o f 100 ratin g s an d seven officers w ith th e ir guns to p articip ate in the siege o f M ultan. T h is w ould a p p e a r to be the second occasion w hen the N av y w as actively em ployed fo r land o p eratio n s.

In 1852 a stro n g fleet o f th e In d ia n N av y ,44 u n d e r the c o m m an d o f C aptain L ynch, atta c k e d a n d c a p tu re d R a n g o o n . T he R a ja o f B urm a h a d refused to be cow ed dow n by the naval m ig h t o f L o rd D alh o u sie w ho w as Viceroy o f In d ia an d his defiance o f the a u th o rity o f the B ritish resulted in his loss o f the strateg ic city o f R an g o o n . M eanw hile, Persian an d R ussian seafarers in th e P ersian G u lf began h a rassin g the C o m p a n y ’s ships w hile they were o n passag e fo r m aritim e tra d e . A stro n g fleet o f the Indian N avy u nder Sir H en ry Leeke45 w as sen t to deal w ith the p irates a n d c a p tu re d B ushire (B asra) a fte r defeatin g th e P ersian F leet in 1853. Ships o f the In d ian N avy a lso assisted those o f th e R oyal N avy in su p p ressin g p iracy d u rin g th e w ar in th e C hinese w aters in 1860.

T h e tw o highest d e c o ra tio n s46 ever to be aw ard ed to the personnel o f the In d ia n N av y b efo re Ind ep en d en ce were earn ed d u rin g the 1857 u p risin g and on sh o re. A n In d ia n N aval B rigade com prising 78 officers a n d 1740 m en w ere assigned sh o re service d u rin g the u p risin g . M ister M id sh ip m an M ayo o f the 4 th D e ta c h m e n t w as aw ard ed the V ictoria C ross fo r his bravery at D acca. T his V C w as la te r presen ted to the Service a n d w as on display w ith a p h o to g ra p h o f th e y o u n g officer in the R IM (la te r R IN ) Officers M ess at B om bay. T h e o th e r recip ien t o f th e VC w as M ister A cting M aste r G B

C hicken o f th e 3 rd D e ta c h m e n t in recognition o f his desp erate single-handed defence a g a in st an a tta c k by a p a rty o f 20 a rm ed m en, five o f w hom were killed by him .

In 1863, a M a rin e Survey D e p artm en t, m anned com pletely by naval officers, w as sta rte d in In d ia w hich d u rin g the next 120 years h as developed in to a full-fledged H y d ro g ra p h ic Survey D e p a rtm e n t u n d e r free In d ia ’s N avy.

B efore the fo rm a tio n o f th e M arin e Survey D e p a rtm e n t,47 h y d ro g ra p h ic

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO R Y

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survey was being carried o u t by the B om bay M arin e/In d ian N avy itself. In fact, survey w ork was started in 1772 a n d officers o f th e Service surveyed the coastal w aters o f not only In d ia an d th e neighbouring countries and islands but also the P ersian G ulf, the Red Sea, the E ast A frican C oast, the E ast Indies, the P hilippines, the Pelew Islands in the Pacific, the C husan A rchipelago in th e E ast C hina Sea and T asm an ia in the F a r South East.

C onsidering the prim itive instrum ents, the lim itations o f the ships used by these officers and the dangers o f venturing into the unknow n, the feats o f em inent h y d ro g ra p h e rs48 like C ap tain s M cC luer, R oss and B lair w ould be c o m p arab le to the great A rctic explorers.

In 1863 the In d ian N avy was reorganised as a n o n -co m b atan t force w ith tw o b ranches49 a t B om bay an d C alcu tta w hich were renam ed the Bom bay M arin e an d th e Bengal M arine, naval p ro tectio n o f In d ian w aters having been taken over by the A dm iralty. T heir new role was tra n sp o rt o f tro o p s an d G overnm ent stores; m aintenance o f ‘S tation S hip’ duties a t A den, the A n d am an Islands (P o rt B lair), B urm a and Persian G ulf; the m aintenance o f gun boats on the Ira w a d d y a n d Tigris; m aintenance o f all G overnm ent light c ra ft em ployed fo r m ilitary duties an d in th e m aintenance o f light-ships and lighthouses a ro u n d th e C oasts o f In d ia and B urm a and in the S outhern p o rtio n o f the Red Sea an d the M arin e Survey o f India. T he nom enclature was to change again in 1871 when an Indian D efence F orce w ith tw o ships was co nstituted and yet again in 1877 when the G overnm ent restored the c o m b a ta n t status to the Service a n d called it H is M ajesty’s Indian M arine w ith tw o divisions a t B om bay an d C alcu tta. T he Service underw ent yet a n o th e r change in nam e in 1892 when it was rechristened the R oyal Indian M arine.

F ro m 1892 to the o u tb re a k o f W orld W a r I, the R IM did n o t m ake any significant c o n trib u tio n to th e m aritim e history o f th e country. B efore the W ar, the m ain tasks assigned to th e R IM were m arine survey, m aintenance o f lighthouses an d tra n s p o rta tio n o f tro o p s. D u rin g th e W ar, however, th ere were no tab le exploits o f th e R IM in various th eatres o f naval operations.

Its ships tra n sp o rte d tro o p s, arm s, am m u n itio n an d stores to Egypt, Ira q an d E ast A frica. W hile on p a tro l in th e Suez C anal, R IM sh ip 50 Hardinge fo u g h t ag ain st the T u rk s a n d th w a rte d th eir efforts to block the canal. She suffered severe dam age a n d lost one o f h er funnels b u t succeeded in preventing th e blocking o f the canal. R IM ships landed tro o p s in M esopotam ia and its sm aller ships, designed fo r o p eratio n s in inland w aters, rendered excellent service in th e E u p h ra te s an d T igris rivers. T h ree o th e r ships, th e Northbrooke, M into a n d D ujferin, carried o u t p atro llin g duties in th e Red Sea. W hile carrying out these duties, the M into called a t Je d d a h an d tra n sp o rte d some H a j pilgrim s safely back to In d ia . T he R IM w as once again reverted to its n o n -c o m b a ta n t role w hen th e W a r ended in 1918.

T h e in tern atio n al situ atio n a t th e end o f W orld W ar I, sh o rtag e o f funds an d extensive re tre n c h m en t adversely affected the R IM . W ith the task o f naval defence o f In d ia once again en tru sted to the R oyal N avy, the com bat-

1 8

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

H ugh L in d sa y* 2 a 4 1 1-ton ship o f the B om bay M arine C orps, steam ed o u t o f B om bay on M a rc h 20, 1830 an d reached the Suez a fte r 21 days o f ac tu a l steam ing averag in g a trifle u n d e r six knots. T hus began the gradual conversion o f th e C o m p a n y 's ships fro m sail to steam w hich was com pleted d u rin g the next 15 years. T he year 1830 also saw an o th er change in the nam e o f the Service— this tim e to the In d ian N avy.

All w ent well fo r seven years th e re a fter w hen in 1837 a pilgrim ship43 o f the E a st In d ia C om p an y , w hilst on passage to M ecca, w ith a n u m b er o f rich pilgrim s on b o a rd , w as seized an d plundered near A den. A sq u ad ro n o f the In d ia n N a v y ’s m en-of-w ar, led by C o m m an d er H aines, was then sent to a tta c k A den b u t since th e S ultan o f A den w as in a rep en tan t m ood and ready to p ay an indem nity o f Rs. 3 lakhs, the ships sp ared A den an d returned to B om bay in 1838. T h e indem nity prom ised was, however, never p aid by the Sultan an d hence th e ships retu rn ed to A den in the sam e year and captured it.

In 1848, d u rin g the A nglo-S ikh W ar, the In d ian N avy provided a c o n tin gent o f 100 ratin g s a n d seven officers w ith th e ir guns to p articip ate in the siege o f M u ltan . T h is w ould a p p e a r to be the second occasion w hen the N av y was actively em ployed fo r land o p e ra tio n s.

In 1852 a stro n g fleet o f the In d ian N av y ,44 u n d er the com m an d o f C aptain Lynch, atta c k e d a n d ca p tu re d R a n g o o n . T h e R aja o f B u rm a h a d refused to be cow ed dow n by th e naval m ight o f L o rd D alhousie w ho w as Viceroy o f In d ia a n d his defiance o f the a u th o rity o f the B ritish resulted in his loss o f th e strateg ic city o f R an g o o n . M eanw hile, P ersian an d R ussian seafarers in th e P ersian G u lf b egan h a rassin g th e C o m p a n y ’s ships while they were on p assag e fo r m aritim e tra d e . A stro n g fleet o f the Indian N avy u n d er Sir H en ry Leeke45 was sen t to deal w ith the p irates a n d cap tu re d B ushire (B asra) a fte r d efeatin g th e P ersian Fleet in 1853. Ships o f th e In d ian N avy also assisted those o f th e R oyal N avy in su p p ressin g p iracy d u rin g the w ar in th e C hinese w aters in 1860.

T h e tw o highest d e c o ra tio n s46 ever to be aw ard ed to the personnel o f the In d ia n N a v y b efo re In d ependence were earn ed d u rin g the 1857 u p risin g and on sh o re. A n In d ia n N av al B rigade com prising 78 officers a n d 1740 m en w ere assigned sh o re service d u rin g the u p risin g . M ister M id sh ip m an M ayo o f th e 4 th D e tach m en t w as aw ard ed the V ictoria C ross fo r his bravery at D acca. T his VC was la te r presen ted to the Service a n d was on display w ith a p h o to g ra p h o f th e young officer in the R IM (later R IN ) Officers M ess at B om bay. T h e o th e r recip ien t o f the VC w as M ister A cting M aste r G B

C hicken o f th e 3 rd D e tach m en t in recognition o f his desp erate single-handed defence a g a in st an a tta c k by a p a rty o f 20 a rm ed m en, five o f w hom were killed by him .

In 1863, a M a rin e Survey D e p artm en t, m anned com pletely by naval officers, was sta rte d in In d ia w hich d u rin g the next 120 years has developed in to a full-fledged H y d ro g ra p h ic Survey D ep artm en t u n d e r free In d ia ’s N avy.

B efore the fo rm a tio n o f th e M arin e Survey D e p a rtm e n t,47 h y d ro g ra p h ic

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO R Y

1 9

survey was being carried out by the Bom bay M arin e/In d ian N avy itself. In fact, survey w ork was started in 1772 a n d officers o f the Service surveyed the coastal w aters o f not only In d ia an d th e neighbouring countries and islands but also th e P ersian G ulf, the Red Sea, the E ast A frican C oast, the E ast Indies, the Philippines, the Pelew Islands in the Pacific, the C husan A rchipelago in the E ast C hina Sea and T asm an ia in the F a r South East.

C onsidering the prim itive instrum ents, the lim itations o f the ships used by these officers an d the dangers o f venturing into the unknow n, the feats o f em inent h y d ro g rap h ers48 like C aptains M cC luer, Ross an d B lair w ould be co m p arab le to the great A rctic explorers.

In 1863 th e Indian N avy was reorganised as a n o n -co m b atan t force w ith tw o branches49 a t B om bay an d C alcu tta w hich were renam ed the Bom bay M arin e an d th e Bengal M arine, naval p ro tectio n o f Indian w aters having been tak en over by the A dm iralty. T h eir new role was tra n sp o rt o f tro o p s and G overnm ent stores; m aintenance o f ‘S tation S hip’ duties a t A den, the A n d am an Islan d s (P o rt B lair), B urm a and Persian G ulf; the m aintenance o f gun boats on the Iraw ad d y an d Tigris; m aintenance o f all G overnm ent light c ra ft em ployed fo r m ilitary duties a n d in th e m aintenance o f light-ships and lighthouses a ro u n d th e C o asts o f In d ia an d B urm a and in the S outhern p o rtio n o f the Red Sea and th e M arin e Survey o f India. T he nom enclature was to change again in 1871 when an Indian D efence F orce w ith tw o ships was constituted and yet again in 1877 when the G overnm ent restored the c o m b a ta n t status to the Service an d called it H is M ajesty’s In d ian M arine w ith tw o divisions a t B om bay an d C alcutta. T he Service underw ent yet a n o th e r change in nam e in 1892 when it was rechristened the R oyal Indian M arine.

F ro m 1892 to the o u tb re a k o f W o rld W a r I, the R IM did n o t m ake any significant c o n trib u tio n to the m aritim e history o f th e country. B efore the W ar, the m ain tasks assigned to th e R IM were m arine survey, m aintenance o f lighthouses a n d tra n s p o rta tio n o f tro o p s. D u rin g th e W ar, however, th ere were notable exploits o f th e R IM in various th eatres o f naval operations.

Its ships tra n sp o rte d tro o p s, arm s, am m u n itio n and stores to Egypt, Ira q an d E ast A frica. W hile on p a tro l in the Suez C anal, R IM sh ip 50 Hardinge fo u g h t ag ain st the T u rk s a n d th w arted th eir efforts to block the canal. She suffered severe dam age an d lost one o f her funnels but succeeded in prev en ting th e blocking o f the canal. R IM ships landed tro o p s in M eso p o tam ia and its sm aller ships, designed fo r o p eratio n s in inland w aters, rendered excellent service in the E u p h rates an d T igris rivers. T hree o th e r ships, the Northbrooke, M into a n d Dufferin, carried o u t p atro llin g duties in the Red Sea. W hile c arry in g out these duties, th e M into called a t Je d d a h an d tra n sp o rte d som e H aj pilgrim s safely back to In d ia . T h e R IM w as once again reverted to its n o n -c o m b a ta n t role w hen th e W a r ended in 1918.

T h e in te rn a tio n a l situ atio n a t th e end o f W orld W ar I, shortage o f funds and extensive re tre n c h m en t adversely affected the R IM . W ith th e task o f naval defence o f In d ia once again en tru sted to the R oyal N avy, the co m b at

2 0

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

a n t statu s o f the R IM w as lost. F o r th e services rendered by th e Royal N avy, th e G o v ern m en t o f In d ia h ad to pay a staggering sum o f £ 100,000

an n u ally to th e B ritish G overnm ent. T he R IM had, therefore, to be reduced to a sm all force e n tru sted w ith m in o r coastal d u ties. M o st o f W orld W a r I veterans w ere dem obilised an d no reservists were left fo r calling u p d u rin g em ergencies. T his led to th e m obilisation o f In d ian public opin io n against the w ilful erad icatio n o f the c o u n try ’s naval a n d m aritim e tra d itio n s an d a nu m b er o f com m ittees were ap p o in te d to exam ine the fu tu re role o f the Service a n d to m ake reco m m en d atio n s fo r suitable changes o r expansion to be im plem ented. T h e R aw linson C om m ittee, the last such com m ittee to be ap p o in te d , reco m m en d ed the fo rm atio n o f a sm all c o m b a ta n t fo rce51 to suit th e needs o f th e co u n try w hich was to be controlled by an adm inistrative a u th o rity o p e ra tin g fro m th e m a jo r p o rt.

Very few In d ia n s jo in ed the R o y al In d ian M arin e a t th a t tim e th o u g h re cru itm en t w as open b o th to th e In d ia n s a n d the B ritish. T h e first In d ian to jo in th e R IM as an officer w as E ngineer S ub-L ieutenant D .N . M ukerji who was com m issioned on Ja n u a ry 6, 1928. H e rose to the ra n k o f C ap tain and to o k p re m a tu re retirem en t fro m service in 1950 and em igrated to England w here he is still living.

T h e frozen co n tin en t o f A n ta rc tic a w hich straddles the S outh Pole and w here th e en v iro n m en t is, literally a n d m etaphorically, as clean an d p u re as driven snow , h a d alw ays a ttra c te d ad v en tu rers a n d explorers fro m all p arts o f th e globe. O ne o f th em was L ieu ten an t H .R . B ow ers52 o f the R oyal Indian M a rin e w ho in 1910 h a d the d istin ctio n o f being chosen to acco m p an y the g reat ex p lo rer, C a p ta in S cott, on his expedition to the A n tarctic. Even th o u g h he w as n o t a n In d ia n , he w as th e first rep resentative o f this sub co n tin e n t to e m b a rk on an expedition to th e S outh Pole. In th e w ords o f C o m m a n d e r G .E . W alk er, R 1N V R , a u th o r o f The H istorical B ackground o f the R o y a l Indian Navy, L ieu ten an t Bow ers h ad th e h ig h h o n o u r o f being selected as one o f th e p a rty w hich m ade th e last great jo u rn ey to th e S outh Pole itself. S co tt w rote o f him , “ I believe he is th e h a rd e st traveller th a t ever un d e rto o k a P o la r jo u rn e y , as well as one o f th e m ost u n d a u n te d . N ever was su ch a stu rd y , active, u n d efeatab le little m a n .”

W h en o n ly eleven m iles fro m safety, th e th ree survivors o f th a t jo u rn ey were com pelled by a w eek-long b lizzard a n d the ex haustion o f th eir supplies to give u p th e ir m arch . S co tt (one o f th e last acts o f his life) w rote to B ow ers’

m o th er, “ I w rite w hen we a re very n e a r the end o f o u r jo u rn ey , a n d I am finishing it in co m p an y w ith tw o g allan t, noble gentlem en. O ne o f th em is y o u r son. H e h a d com e to be one o f m y closest a n d soundest frien d s, a n d I a p p re c ia te his w onderful u p rig h t n atu re, his ability a n d energy. As th e tro u bles hav e th ick en ed , his d au n tless sp irit ever shone b rig h ter, a n d he h ad re m ain ed cheerful, hop efu l a n d in d o m itab le to th e e n d .”

S c o tt th e n w rote to his bro th er-in -law , “ T here is a piece o f th e U n io n Jack I p u t up a t th e S o u th P ole in m y p riv ate k it b a g .. . send a sm all piece to the K in g a n d a sm all piece to Q ueen A lexandra. . . . A th ird piece is in th e R IN

In d i a ’s m a r i t i m e h i s t o r y

2 1

O fficers’ M ess in B om bay, w ith the cups an d spoons w hich Bowers carried w ith him on his journey, a n d w hich were found by his dead body in his last c a m p .”

T he cups and spoons o f L ieutenant Bowers along w ith the piece o f the U nion Ja c k a rc now on disp lay a t the N aval M useum a t Bombay.

By sheer coincidence, the first Indian to set fo o t on A n tarctica was also a naval officer, L ieutenant R am C h aran , an officer o f the N avy’s E ducation b ran ch an d a specialist in m eteorology, w ho accom panied an A ustralian expedition to the S outh Pole in 1960. U n fo rtu n ately , he died in a ro ad accident in New D elhi in 1961.

T h e bulk o f the personnel w ho to o k p a rt in the first In d ian expedition to A n tarctica, E xpedition G a n g o tri, in 1981 were also from the Indian N avy.

Indian N avy also p articip ated in th e subsequent expeditions launched in 1982, 1983 a n d 1984.

T h e in d o m itab le sp irit o f a d v en tu re o f personnel o f the Indian N avy has taken the N aval Ensign n o t only to the frozen continent o f A n tarctica but also to th e to p o f the w o rld ’s tallest m ountain, the Everest. T he intrepid and renow ned m oun tain eer o f the Indian N avy, In stru cto r L ieutenant C om m ander M an m o h an Singh K ohli (la te r rose to the ra n k o f C ap tain , In d ian N avy) has h ad the distinction o f not only clim bing to the highest altitu d e w ithout oxygen but also o f p u ttin g nine men a to p the peak and hoisting the N aval Ensign on it fo r the first tim e in its history.

W ith the reco n stitu tio n o f the R IM 53 as a c o m b atan t force in 1928, the W hite Ensign was hoisted for the first tim e in its history on N ovem ber 11, 1928. T he In d ia n N avy D iscipline Bill, based on the recom m endations o f the R aw linson C om m ittee, w as also taken up by the Legislative Assem bly in the sam e year an d , a fter six years o f deliberations, the bill was passed by the A ssem bly a n d th e C ouncil o f States on Septem ber 5, 1934.

W hen the In d ian N avy D iscipline B ill54 was presented to the In d ian Legislative A ssem bly on F e b ru ary 21, 1928, it was presented as a non-contentious m easure, o f w hich barely a fo rtn ig h t’s notice w as given, as no m ore was th o u g h t necessary.

M r. M a c k w o rth Y oung, the A rm y Secretary, introducing the Bill, gave a b rie f history o f th e Service a n d p o in ted o u t th a t the intention was “ to enable In d ia to en ter upo n the first stage o f h e r n av al developm ent a n d ultim ately to u n d e rta k e her ow n naval defence.” H e p o in ted o u t th a t Indians had alw ays been eligible as officers o f th e R IM , b u t no qualified candidates had ever ap p lied . O n e-th ird o f th e vacancies w ould be reserved fo r In d ian s in future, p ro v id ed th a t suitable candidates offered. (H e w as asked w hether ‘one-th ird ’ m eant only one p e rso n — w hich in fa c t it did, as th ere w ere only three vacancies a y e a r—an d he replied, “ T here will be m ore th a n one.” It is difficu lt to u n d erstan d why h e said this.) Sir S hunm ugham C h etty (la te r becam e finance m inister in independent In d ia ) opened the o p p o sitio n w ith brillian t speech saying:

“ M y reason fo r op p o sin g th e present m otion is th a t, w ith o u t th e consent

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U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

o f this H ouse, the G o v ern m en t o f In d ia have decided to create an Indian N avy; necessary legislation was passed by P arliam ent, an d w hat we are asked to do to d ay is sim ply to legislate fo r th e discipline o f this Indian N avy, w hich has been created w ith o u t o u r consent an d w ithout o u r a p p ro v a l.

“ T he principles underlying the creatio n o f a N avy a re these: firstly, who will p ay ; secondly, w ho will officer the N avy; an d th ird ly w hat will be the c o n tro l o f th e L egislature over the N avy. . . . T he question, who will pay is very easily answ ered: the tax p ay er in In d ia will p a y .”

H e th en p o in ted o u t th a t the “ o n e-th ird o f the v acancies” am o u n ted to one officer p er year, a n d a fte r co n sid erin g this in detail, w ent on, “ We will th e re fo re have a N avy w hich fo r decades to g e th e r will be officered entirely by B ritish officers; an d I a sk the H o u se to consider w hether they will be willing p arties to the creatio n o f In d ia n N avy, w hich, th o u g h In d ian s m ay not be technically and legally excluded, will ta k e several years to be officered by In d ia n s .”

A s re g a rd s co n tro l over the R IN , he said, “ I w ould ask w hether the p eo ple o f In d ia desire to create a n In d ia n N avy over w hich th eir co n tro l will be exactly identical with the c o n tro l w hich th is H ouse h as over the Indian A rm y .” A t this p o in t M r. J in n a h (la te r the first G o v ern o r-G en eral o f indep e n d e n t P a k ista n ) com m en ted , “ W h ich m eans n il” . “ In tim e o f em ergency the In d ia n N avy can be taken over by th e B ritish A d m iralty w ith the consent o f th e G o v e rn o r-G e n e ra l in C ouncil, n o t w ith the consent o f th e Indian Legislatu re, n o t w ith th e con sen t o f the In d ia n people; a n d th e G o v ern o r-G en eral in C o u n cil is a su b o rd in ate b ran ch o f the B ritish G o v ern m en t.”

Sir S h u n m u g h am then d ealt w ith th e question o f co n tro l in an extrem ely ab le m an n er, an d finished up: “ F o rtu n a te ly fo r us, we a re placed in this situ atio n now: th a t w ith o u t the passing by th e In d ian Legislature o f the m easure th a t is now introduced, the In d ian N avy c an n o t com e into existence

. . . . I am so rry to use stro n g w ords, b u t I w ould conclude by saying th a t I w ould n o t to u c h the presen t m easure w ith a p a ir o f to n g s.”

M a n y la te r speakers elab o rated and restated the p o in ts m ade by Sir S h u n m u g h am C hetty w ith o u t ad d in g an y th in g to them ; his speech, however, d e te rm in e d the course o f the debate.

M u n sh i Isw ar S aran opposed the sad d lin g o f In d ia w ith the cost o f a N avy w hose expan sio n they could n o t control, an d ridiculed the a rg u m en t th a t a t p re se n t the N avy “ was only a little o n e ,” w hich he said, was like the nursem a id ’s excuse fo r h er b a sta rd , in M r. M idshipm an Easy.

Sir H en ry G idney ridiculed the o n e-th ird reservation fo r In d ian s, pointing o u t ironically th a t the next step w ould obviously be to ap p ly the com m unal r o ta to th e one officer a year to be recruited.

In rep ly in g fo r G o v ern m en t, M r. M a c k w o rth Y oung said th a t if In d ian c a n d id a te s w ere fo rth co m in g in sufficient num bers, th e p ro p o rtio n o f the in ta k e w ould be increased. H e po in ted o u t th a t even th e old R IM could be ta k e n o v er by the A d m iralty in tim es o f w ar— w ith o u t even the consent o f th e G o v e rn o r-G en eral in C ouncil. H e said th a t it was a b su rd to suppose th a t

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO RY

2 3

H .M . G ov ern m en t would w ant to ap p ro p ria te ships from the R IN in w artim e and use them in the A tlantic (how oddly th a t reads, twenty-two years—

an d one w orld w ar— after it was said!)

W hen the Bill cam e up again in 1934 Sir Shunm ugham C hetty was the P resident (“ Speaker” ) o f the H ouse; and alth o u g h the question o f Indianisa-tion was again b rought up, the Bill was passed w ithout a division, everyone giving it his blessing a t the “ co n sid eratio n ” stage.

T he R oyal Indian N avy th e reafter cam e into being on O ctober 2, 1934

w ith its separate N aval H ead q u arters a t Bom bay u nder the F lag Officer C om m anding Royal Indian N avy (F O C R IN ).

T he Scindia Steam N avigation C om pany was form ed in the early twenties but its m aritim e activities were virtually limited to coastal tra d e as overseas co n tracts granted to the C om pany were very few. T he train in g ship for cadets, S S Dufferin, was acquired by the Indian M ercantile M arin e D e p a rtm ent in 1926 and started training cadets fo r the M erch an t N avy. A num ber o f sm all shipping com panies cam e into being during the early thirties which m anaged to cap tu re a sizable chunk o f coastal trad e fro m foreign shipping com panies but com p ared to the volum e o f exports and im ports, the tonnage u n d er the Indian shipping com panies was virtually negligible.

Between 1934 and 1939, the R oyal Indian N avy was developed into a small an d efficient naval force a n d by the tim e W orld W a r II b roke out, the R IN

fleet com prised five sloops, a survey vessel, a p atro l ship, a d ep o t ship and a large num ber o f sm all craft. R ecom m endations were m ade in 1939 for a ssigning g re a te r responsibility fo r th e naval defence o f In d ia to th e R IN by the Chatfield C o m m ittee. In o rd e r to enable th e R IN to carry o u t these duties, m o d ern isatio n o f the Service was also recom m ended.

T he C hatfield C om m ittee reco m m en d atio n s m ade in 1939 were based m ainly on the p ro p o sals p u t fo rw ard by the R IN for th e expansion o f the Service w hich w as to be com pleted in five years. T h e m ain featu res55 o f the C o m m itte e ’s reco m m en d atio n s w ere the co n stru ctio n o f fo u r B ittern class escort m inesw eepers, developm ent o f d ep o ts and train in g establishm ents and a cq u isitio n o f local naval defence equipm ent. Even th o u g h the recom m end atio n s were to be im plem ented over a p erio d o f five years, the o u tb reak o f the W ar in 1939, greatly h astened the process o f expansion. T he annual subv en tio n 56 o f £100,000 to be p aid to the B ritish G o v ern m en t along w ith m iscellaneous o th e r charges ranging between £15,000 an d £20,000 was also d iscon tin u ed on the condition th a t it w ould be u tilised to w ard s expanding the R IN fleet a n d m ain tain in g a sq u ad ro n o f six escort vessels w hich w ould, besides assisting the R oyal N avy, carry o u t local naval defence duties.

F o rm a tio n o f reserves fo r th e R IN was also resorted to before the W ar.

T he R oyal In d ia n N av al R eserve (R IN R ) com prised serving officers o f the In d ia n M ercantile M arin e an d h a d tw o branches, E xecutive a n d A ccountant, to w hich the E ngineering b ra n c h w as also added a t the o u tb re a k o f the W ar.

T he R oyal In d ia n N av y V olunteer R eserve (R IN V R ) w as constituted by in d u ctin g qualified m em bers o f the general public as com m issioned officers

2 4

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

a n d giving th em six m onths intensive train in g a t B om bay. This was also done fo r sailors, called ratin g s a t th a t tim e. In a d d itio n to th e regular service ratin g s, special service ratin g s were recru ited w ho served fo r five years before being tra n sfe rre d to the F leet R eserve fo r 10 years. These ratings belonged to th e ca d re o f R o y al In d ia n F leet R eserve (R 1 F R ). Personnel from the m e rc h a n t m a rin e w ere also recru ited as “ H ostilities O nly” ratings fo r service d u rin g th e W ar.

T h e perso n n el stre n g th o f th e R IN on O c to b e r 1, 1939 was 114 officers a n d 1,732 ratin g s w ith only 16 officers m an n in g the N aval H ead q u arters w hich w as located inside th e N av al D o c k y a rd a t B om bay.

W hen W o rld W a r II b ro k e o u t, th e R oyal N avy u n d e rto o k the task o f b u ild in g , com m issioning a n d w o rk in g u p fast sea-going m o to rb o a ts for co astal p a tro l a n d corvettes an d m inesw eepers w hich w ere suitably arm ed a n d equipped fo r carry in g o u t a n ti-su b m a rin e an d escort d u ties in th e w aters a ro u n d In d ia . M ag n etic m ines posed a m a jo r th re a t to the m erch an t m arine a t th a t tim e a n d hence 263 m e rc h a n t a n d naval ships were fitted w ith degaussing cables m ade in In d ia by Ju n e 1941. T h e first B asset class traw ler, H M IS

Travancore, w as b u ilt a t C a lc u tta an d com m issioned into th e R IN in July 1941 a n d w as follow ed by five m ore w ith in a y e a r an d a n o th e r six soon t h e re a fte r.[T h e fir st B an g o r class m inesw eeper b u ilt in In d ia joined the R IN

in 1943. Six sloops b u ilt in G re a t B ritain an d nam ed a fte r In d ian rivers, Ju m n a , Sutlej, C auvery, K istn a, G o d a v a ri an d N a rb a d a , also jo in ed the R IN

to re in fo rce its fleet..5?JJ

I n o rd e r to m ain tain effective control over the o p e ra tio n a l a n d o rg an isatio n a l asp ects o f th e R IN a t B om bay, th e F O C R IN could pay only occasional visits to N ew D elh i, the focal p o in t o f c o m m an d an d c o n tro l. T h is led to co n sid erab le delay in o b tain in g N ew D e lh i’s clearan ce on im p o rta n t m atters as th e bulk o f th e exchanges betw een th e cap ital a n d B om bay h ad to be by co rresp o n d en ce o r by signal. A N av al L iaison Officer was positioned a t New D elh i in O cto b er 1939 to reduce th e tim e taken in processing im p o rta n t p ap ers b u t even th is pro v ed u n satisfacto ry a n d hence th e N aval H e a d q u a rte rs was tran sfe rre d fro m B om bay to N ew D elhi in M a rc h 1941.

A t th e tim e o f the o u tb reak o f th e W ar, all tra in in g establishm ents o f th e R IN were co n cen trated inside the R IN D o ck y ard , B om bay. T hese were th e S eam anship School, the Signal School, th e G u n n ery School, the M echanical T ra in in g E stablishm ent, the Boys’ T ra in in g E stab lish m en t and th e A n tisubm arine School. T here were no schools fo r tra in in g in to rp e d o , ra d a r an d electrical disciplines.V There were also no facilities fo r tra in in g officers w ho w ere perforce d e p u t e a t o the R oyal N av al E stab lish m en ts in th e U n ited K in g d o m fo r basic an d advanced train in g in all disciplines. > A s th e size o f the R IN fleet increased an d the tasks assigned to it m ultiplied, several new naval establishm ents cam e up a t Ja m n a g a r, C ochin, M an d ap am , M a d ra s, C o co n ad a (K ak in ad a), V ish ak h ap atn am a n d C alcutta. T o cope w ith th e increased intake o f sailors a n d requirem ents o f equ ip p in g th e fleet, the existing naval bases a t K a rach i an d B om bay were expanded an d m odernised.

IN D IA ’S M A R ITIM E H ISTO R Y

2 5

T he extrem ely rap id grow th o f the R IN in term s o f th e strength o f the fleet an d personnel posed grave problem s o f train in g personnel in the specialist a n d general tasks. F o r exam ple, by June 1940 when Italy ju m p ed into the fray, the R IN had doubled its strength and by 1942 it h ad expanded to nearly six tim es its pre-w ar strength.

T he naval establishm ents58 also m ultiplied fast. T o au gm ent train in g o f boys a t H M IS Dal/iousie a t B om bay, H M I S Bahadur was com m issioned at K arach i. In ad d itio n , fo r train in g officers and ratings, tw o m ore establishm ents, H M I S H im alaya, th e gunnery train in g establishm ent, an d H M IS

C ham ak, th e ra d a r train in g establishm ent, where com m issioned a t K arachi.

T he o th er naval bases th a t cam e up ab o u t this tim e were H M I S Shivaji, the m echanical train in g establishm ent a t L onavla, H M IS Akbar, ratin g s’ training establishm ent at T hane, H M I S Tahvar, the Signal School a t Bom bay, an d a m cchanical train in g establishm ent a t Pilani. M erch an t ships were arm ed for defence a t K arach i, B om bay an d C alcu tta an d inspection org an isatio n s were set up a t V ish ak h ap atn am , M ad ras an d C ochin.

In o rd e r to m ake up fo r the w artim e losses o f the m erch an t m arine, the need was felt fo r a m ajo r m erchant shipbuilding y ard and accordingly a site w as located a t V ish ak h ap atn am by the Scindia Steam N avigation C om pany59

but the first m ajo r sh ip , a freighter, could only be launched well after the W a r in 1948. T he problem created by th e in adequate su p p ly o f stores and supplies to th e A llied forces ow ing to the U nited K in g d o m ’s inability to send supplies in sufficient quantities was solved by the In d ia n m ercantile m arine w ho shouldered th e responsibility o f delivering stores to places as fa r as M a lta a n d H ongkong.

U n d er the overall co m m an d o f the C o m m ander-in-C hief, E ast Indies, sloops o f the R oyal In d ian N avy to o k p a rt in the o p eratio n s60 in the Red Sea, G u lf o f A den a n d the P ersian G u lf in 1940. H M I S Jum na a n d H M IS

S u tlej to o k p a r t in th e B attle o f the A tlantic in 1941. In th e sam e year, reoccupation o f B erbera in th e G u lf o f A den was m ade possible by th e first com bined o p eratio n s, i.e. am p h ib io u s o p eratio n s, by the In d ian A rm y and the R oyal In d ia n N avy. T h e R IN also played a vital role during th e advance o f the A llied Forces in Sudan. W hile H M IS Clive softened up th e area betw een P o rt Sudan an d M assaw a w ith h er arm a m e n t a n d H M I S Hindustan, Indus, Parvati a n d R atnagiri led the a ttack , th e m inesw eepers entered M assaw a an d annexed the p o rt fro m the Italians.

H M I S Lawrence a n d L ila va ti earned d istinction in th e o p eratio n s in th e P ersian G u lf a n d tw o officers o f th e R IN were aw arded th e distinguished Service C ross. T hese were L ieu ten an t N . K rish n an fo r his a ct o f gallantry w hile b o a rd in g a n d overpow ering th e crew o f a n arm ed Axis d u rin g O peratio n C o u n ten an ce fo r th e ca p tu re o f Aty E ngineer L ieu ten an t D . S h a n k a r (later rose to the r a n k ^ ^ M le a r A dm iral ^

a n d becam e the C o n tro ller G en eral o f D efence P rodi b o a rd in g an Ita lia n vessel, C abote, d u rin g th e Persian G |

sam e y ear, w ent th ro u g h the blazing bridge-deck a t con!

life a n d c a p tu re d th e crew.

2 6

U N D ER T W O EN SIG N S

O ne o f the ships built by A u stralia d u rin g the W ar fo r the R IN was H M I S Bengal (733 tons), a B a th u rst Class m inesweeper. O n N ovem ber 5, 1942, she sailed from F rem an tle as escort to M .V . Ondina, a D u tch tan k er on passage to D iego G arcia. A t 1145 hours on N ovem ber 11, 1942, she sighted a vessel, ab o u t eight miles off, com ing straig h t tow ards her. T he new com er could n o t be identified but, in any case, to a d o p t the safer course, Bengal sounded her action a larm , an d the sh ip ’s com pany closed up a t

“ A ction S ta tio n s” . Bengal altered course to sta rb o a rd , an d instructed the ta n k e r to tak e statio n on her sta rb o a rd beam . A t this tim e, an o th e r ship a p p e a re d over th e h o rizo n , com ing up a t B engal's p o rt bow. B oth ships w ere la rg e r th a n B engal, w hose arm am en t com prised one 12-pounder gun a n d a few close-range, a n ti-a irc raft guns. By this tim e b o th the ships had been identified as Jap an ese. T he Ondina was, therefore, instructed to act in dependently a n d to rendezvous a t a certain p o sition the follow ing day.

Bengal th en in creased to full speed, an d tu rn ed to engage the first raider.

She h o p ed , in th is way, to allow the ta n k e r tim e eno u g h to get away, but the M a ste r o f Ondina w ould n o t leave h e r to face the tw o raid ers alone. Instead, w ith his fo u r-in c h gunm o u n ted a ft, he returned th e fire. T he a c tio n 61 th a t follow ed is b est described in th e w ords o f the C o m m an d in g Officer Lieuten a n t C o m m a n d e r W .J. W ilson, R IN R :

“ T he ra id e r cam e u p very fast and Bengal steam ed straig h t ahead a t her.

T h e ra id e r also increased speed, an d op en ed fire a t a b o u t 3500 yards w ith h e r fo rw ard guns. W e retaliated , an d h it first. A t 3000 yards we m ust have h it th e ra id e r in the m agazine because a g reat sheet o f flam e sh o t u p astern, a lm o st m ast high. W e then closed th e range, an d fo u g h t the actio n a t ab o u t 2500 yards. T h e second Jap an ese ra id e r never cam e closer th a n 8000 yards.

B o th fired a t us continuously. T he first ship we engaged carried on firing u ntil, in a g reat sheet o f flam e, she blew u p a n d sank. I estim ate she fired o v er 200 ro u n d s a t us. A t 1246 h o u rs o u r am m u n itio n w as ru n n in g short.

W e had very few ro u n d s left, an d o u r vessel was dam aged fore and aft. T he sh ip th a t we san k w as a large ed itio n o f th e K u n ik aw a M a ru class and was o f a p p ro x im a te ly 10,000 to n s. T h e second ra id e r was slightly sm aller, her to n n ag e being 8000. T h ey were b o th firing 4-inch gun broadsides, and these a p p e a re d to be fro m 5.5 inch guns. W e drew the enem y’s fire, an d acted as a screen, as long as possible, to allow the ta n k e r to escape.

“ T h e e n co u n ter lasted fo r o v er tw o hours, b u t really th e first three m inutes decided th e issue. W hile shells were b u rstin g all ro u n d th em , the crew o f B engal k e p t on firing one salvo a fte r an o th e r. T he sixth salvo m ade a direct h it on th e first ra id e r for, follow ing a terrific explosion, flames leap t high in the a ir fro m her. T h is greatly enthused th e R IN crew, we k e p t on firing steadily. By th a t tim e, the second ra id e r h ad com e w ithin range, a n d opened fire. W ith in a q u a rte r o f an h o u r o f actio n , a fire b ro k e o u t in B engal's officers baggage room . She h a d also been d am ag ed fore a n d a ft, an d had o n ly five ro u n d s o f high explosives rem aining. T h e C o m m an d in g Officer a cco rd in g ly decided to b re a k off th e engagem ent, a n d sta rte d to m ake sm oke

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO RY

2 7

— b u t n o t before the first raid er h ad gone d ow n by the stern an d sunk.

“ The Ondina had then opened th e range at ab o u t seven miles, but the second ra id e r began to chase h er and fire repeatedly. The ta n k e r’s a m m u n itio n was soon expended, and h e r M aster, C a p tain H . H o rsm an was killed on the bridge. (H e was p osthum ously aw ard ed the M ilitair W illem s O rd er—

D u tch V .C .— by Q ueen W ilhelm ina o f the N e th erlan d s.) T he Ondina was then ab a n d o n e d , w hereupon the ra id e r to rp ed o ed her twice. T he ra id er also m achine-gunned the boat, killing the ch ief engineer an d som e o f the Chinese crew. W hen the raid er left the scene, volunteers b o arded th e vessel an d , with som e difficulty, got her u nder way. She eventually reached F rem antle, where she had been given up for lost.

“ It w as a m atter o f su rp rise, even to the sh ip ’s com pany, th a t the Bengal em erged from this actio n w ith o u t serious dam age. They had never been in actio n before, b u t when ‘A ction S tatio n s’ w here sounded, everyone was perfectly calm , firm and disciplined, an d all hands were, in fact, anxious to have a sh o t a t the raider. T he C a p ta in ’s exam ple was highly inspiring, and the trib u te he p aid to his men was fully deserved. H e said, ‘N o praise is g reat enough fo r th eir m agnificent co n d u ct in face o f the greatest d a n g e r.’

T he F O C R IN V ice-A dm iral Sir H e rb ert F itzh erb ert spoke m uch in th e sam e strain when in his m essage he said, ‘We are all p ro u d o f y o u .’

“ W hen B engal reached C olom bo, every sh ip in h a rb o u r gave her an official an d spontaneous reception. A band played on the jetty, and as the sh ip ’s com pany descended the gangw ay o f th eir ship, they were greeted w ith loud cheers. T he acm e o f the crew ’s jo y however, was when they steam ed into B om bay. W hile still outside the h a rb o u r, R IN ships w hich happened to be in the vicinity, saluted them . T he 75 officers and men received a public reception, an d were honoured a t a lunch in the Sir Cow asji Jeh an g ir H all.

“ Besides the C o m m anding Officer o f the ship, L ieutenant C om m ander W .J. W ilson, R IN R , w ho was aw arded the D istinguished Service O rder, two Indian- ratings were also decorated. L eading Seam an Ism ail M oham m ed, one o f the 12-pounder g u n ’s crew, was aw arded the Indian D istinguished Service M edal fo r gallantry an d devotion to du ty . P etty Officer M oham m ed Ib rah im , cap tain o f the 12-pounder gun, was aw arded the In d ian O rd er o f M erit Second Class fo r setting an excellent exam ple o f steadiness an d resolutio n an d using his w eapon to the very best advan tag e even a fter the Bengal h a d been hit by enem y gun fire.”

T he w riter well rem em bers decyphering the signals fro m Bengal in the N avy Office in C alcu tta th a t night an d passing the news to the then N aval Officer-in-C harge, C alcu tta, C ap tain L. S anderson, C .I.E ., R IN .

O p eratin g from C h ittag o n g a n d K o ro n g e Island, ships o f the R IN carried o u t sustained attack s on the A ra k a n C o ast o f B urm a. They also provided close s u p p o rt to tro o p s th a t h a d been landed by the R IN lan d in g c ra ft for d riv in g the Jap an ese aw ay from the area. D espite its success in o p eratio n s in v ario u s theatres o f w ar aro u n d the globe, the losses suffered by the R IN were

2 8

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

negligible an d w hen V J D a y arrived, ships o f the R IN and th eir m en were still ra rin g to go.

Six ships o f th e R IN w ere lost d u rin g th e W ar: H M I S Pathan (E scort P a tro l S hip) 23 rd Ju n e, 1940 off B om bay by explosion; H M IS Parvati (A uxiliary) 30th A pril, 1941 m ined off M assaw a; H M I S Parbhavati (A uxiliary) 8 th D ecem ber, 1941 off G o a ; H M I S Sophie M arie (A uxiliary) 1st M arch, 1942 m ined in M acp h erso n S tra it; H M I S Indus (S lo o p ) 6th A pril, 1942 air a tta c k a t A kyab; a n d H M I S L a d y C raddock (A uxiliary) 16th O ctober, 1942

C yclone in river H ooghly.

T he end to W o rld W a r II w as hastened by the nu clear h o lo cau st62 p e rp e tra te d on th e in n o cen t residents o f H iro sh im a a n d N a g asak i in Jap a n an d on A u g u st 15, 1945, E m p e ro r H iro h ito su rren d ered . A t the tim e o f cessatio n o f hostilities, th e R IN fleet com prised seven sloops, four frigates, four corvettes, 14 m inesw eepers, 16 traw lers, tw o d ep o t ships, 30 auxiliary vessels, 150 lan d in g c ra ft o f v ario u s types, 200 h a rb o u r craft, several m o to r launches a n d h a rb o u r defence m o to r launches an d over 25,000 officers an d men.

A s th e guns fell silent on A ugust 15, 1945, exactly tw o years before we w ere to gain In d ep en d en ce, th e stage w as set fo r carry in g o u t the p o st-w ar task s, su ch as sanitising— sw eeping large areas fo r m ines an d o th e r sunken h a z a rd s in a n d a ro u n d In d ia n w aters; preventing any fu rth e r repetition o f th e tra u m a tic experience; decom m issioning o r assigning peace-tim e roles to a larg e n u m b er o f ships a n d c ra ft w ith th e R IN w hich h ad been rendered re d u n d a n t a n d refu rb ish in g the N avy to m eet th e p o st-W o rld W a r II re q u irem ents.

T h e 1939-45 g lo b al conflict also b ro u g h t in th e grow ing realisation o f the after-effects o f m a n ’s m erciless a n d persistent assau lt on ecology w hich began w ith th e In d u stria l R evolution a n d w hich h as assum ed m onstrous p ro p o rtions to d ay , the ra p id ly dw in d lin g energy, fo o d a n d m in eral resources o f the e a rth a n d th e v ast p o ten tial o f th e living a n d m ineral w ealth in th e oceans, on th e o cean bed a n d below th e ocean bed. In te rn a tio n a l riv alry over sh arin g th e m a rin e resources co n sid erab ly delayed th e a d o p tio n an d com ing into fo rc e o f th e L aw o f Sea C on v en tio n . T his is likely to inexorably sh ift the th e a tre s o f fu tu re tensions fro m lan d to sea. T h e clouds o f p o rte n t a re already d iscernible o v er th e d ista n t h o rizo n a n d how f a r m an will succeed in striking a h a p p y b alan ce betw een his increasing needs an d available resources w ithout affecting ecology, only th e fu tu re can tell.

REFERENCES

1. P a n ik k a r, K .M ., In d ia a n d the In d ian O cean, G eo rg e Allen & Unw in L td ., L o n d o n , 1962, p . 19.

2. Ib id ., p. 20.

3. S ingh, K h u sh w an t, R a n jit Singh M a h a ra ja h o f th e P a n ja b 1780-1839, O x fo rd U niversity Press, D elh i, 1962, p. 153.

IN D IA ’S M A RITIM E H ISTO RY

2 9

4. P a n ik k a r, K .M ., op. cit., p. 7.

5. Ibid., p . 26.

.

6. M ookerji, R a d h a K u m u d , A H isto ry o f In d ian Shipping, K itab M ahal P rivate L td ., A llah ab ad , 1962, p p . 72-73.

7. S rid h aran , K ., A M aritim e H istory o f India, M inistry o f Inform ation & B roadcasting, G overnm ent o f In d ia, 1982, p. 23.

8. M ookerji, R a d h a K u m u d , op. cit., p. 105.

9. Ibid., pp. 57-58, 64, 85 an d 123-25.

10. Ibid., pp. 122-23.

11. P a n ik k ar, K .M ., op. cit., p p . 21-22, 24-26.

12. M ookerji, R a d h a K u m u d , op. cit., p. 112.

13. P a n ik k a r, K .M ., op. cit., pp. 33-36.

14. M ookerji, R a d h a K u m u d , op. cit., pp. 84-85.

15. P a n ik k ar, K .M ., op. cit., p. 37.

16. N a m b iar, O .K ., T he K unjalis, Asia Publishing H ouse, B om bay, 196.3, p p. 11-13.

17. P an ik k ar, K .M ., op. cit., pp. 37-40.

18. Ib id ., p p . 41-42.

19. Ib id ., pp. 44-48.

20. Ib id ., p . 52.

21. Ib id ., p p . 55-56.

22. M ookerji, R a d h a K um ud, op. cit., pp. 147-48.

23. W alker, G .E ., H isto rical B ackground o f the R .I.N ., G overnm ent o f India Press, N ew D elhi, 1945, p. 1.

24. Ibid., pp. 1-2.

25. Ibid., p. 4.

26. Ib id ., p . 5.

27. P a n ik k ar, K .M ., op. cit., p. 59.

28. M o o k erji, R a d h a K u m u d , op. cit., p. 170.

29. P a n ik k a r, K .M . op. cit., p. 60.

30. Ib id ., p. 62.

31. M ookerji, R a d h a K u m u d , op. cit., p. 173.

32. P an ik k ar, K .M . op. cit., p. 63.

33. B asu, B .D ., R ise o f th e C hristian Pow er in India, R .S . Publishing H ouse, A llah ab ad , 1981, p. 39.

34. P a n ik k a r, K .M ., op. cit., p. 65.

36. N e h ru f Ja w a h a r L ai, T h e D iscovery o f In d ia , O xford U niversity Press, N ew D elhi, 1981, p. 275.

37. Basu, B .D ., op. cit., p p . 31-38.

38. W alker, G .E ., o p . cit., p. 3.

40. Low,* C .R ., H isto ry o f th e In d ian N avy, V olum e I, 1612-1830, A.

Schulse, 13, P o la n d Street, L o n d o n , 1877, pp. 310-63.

41. S ainik S am ach ar, V olum e X X IX N o . 30, D ire c to r o f Public R elations,

3 0

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

M inistry o f Defence, In d ia, A ugust 1982, p. 5.

42. W alker, G .E ., op. cit., p. 18.

43. Ib id ., p. 20.

44. Ib id ., p. 21.

45. Ib id ., p. 22.

46. Ib id ., p. 23.

47. Ib id ., p. 24.

48. Ib id ., p. 33.

49. Ib id ., p p . 24-25.

50. Ib id ., pp. 27-29.

51. Ib id ., p. 29.

52. Ib id ., p. 26.

53. S rid h a ra n , K ., op. cit., p p . 268-73.

54. R o y al In d ian N avy (1612-1947) C lub R e p o rt, T h e N o rth H a n ts P rin ting C o m p a n y L td ., H a n ts, 1950, E xcerpts fro m Political U ps and D ow ns by G .E . W alker, p p . 24-26, an d reco rd o f C en tral Legislative Assem bly P roceedings.

55. S rid h a ra n , K ., op. cit., p . 275.

56. R IN M u tin y C om m ission o f E n q u iry R e p o rt, P a rt I, G overnm ent ol In d ia , 1946, p . 3.

57. S rid h a ra n , K ., op. cit., p. 279.

58. Ib id ., p . 280.

59. Ib id ., p. 371.

60. Ib id ., p p . 281-83.

61. R oyal In d ian N avy (1612-1947) A sso ciatio n — Jo u rn al 1983, Excerpts fro m H M IS B engal’s E p i c B attle by C om m an d er(s) T.E . R olf, R IN V R , p p . 32-34.

62. S rid h a ra n , K ., op. cit., p. 310.

2.

Plans fo r th e D ev e lo p m e n t

o f th e N avy

Plans for the RIN made during the ‘forties’

T ow ards the end o f W orld W ar II, it was decided to ap p o in t a C om m ittee fo r p lan n in g the requirem ents o f In d ia ’s A rm ed F orces a fte r the cessation o f hostilities. T he C o m m ittee’s p rim ary ro le 1 was to assess the size an d com position o f the P o st-W ar A rm ed Forces in In d ia , w hich included the future R oyal In d ian N avy and the tasks it was going to share w ith the A rm y and the A ir F o rce. T his C om m ittee’s proceedings were to be based on the ‘R eport on th e Size a n d C om position o f the P o st-W ar Forces in In d ia ’ p rep ared by the C hiefs o f Staff C om m ittee.

This re p o rt m akes significant reading; it was, o f course, based on the assu m p tio n th a t by the end o f the W ar, Ja p a n w ould have been com pletely subdued, the principal foreign pow ers in the E ast would be the U .S .S .R ., the U .S .A . an d C h in a an d th a t In d ia w ould be responsible fo r m aintaining sufficient forces to overcom e a m inor pow er an d to hold o u t ag ain st a m ajor pow er until Im p erial F o rces could arrive. It d id n ’t tak e into account an independent In d ia a fte r th e W ar.

In the course o f discussing the p aram eters on w hich the fram ew ork fo r the re p o rt w ould be based, th e re p o rt states, “ T he B ritish C om m onw ealth o f N atio n s com prises m any countries an d com m unities linked together by the sea a n d air. N o one p a rt o f th e C om m onw ealth can, in peace o r w ar, be self-sufficient o r indep en d en t o f supplies fro m o th e r parts. T he econom y and defence o f each nation an d com m unity o f the C om m onw ealth m ust, th erefore, largely depend on the use o f the sea a n d a ir routes and ports. W hile the m ain responsibility fo r keeping open these sea an d a ir com m unications m ust rest w ith the R oyal N avy an d R oyal A ir F orce u n d er the o rd ers o f the B ritish G overnm ent, e ach co m ponent p a r t o f the C om m onw ealth should be p re p a re d to b ear its share. In d ia, in com m on w ith o th er countries o f the E m pire, should, therefore, m ain tain su ch naval a n d a ir forces as a re necessary to ensure th e defence o f h er bases a n d th e security o f shipping w ithin h er co astal w aters fro m su bm arine, m ining a n d a ir a tta c k an d to assist in the p ro te c tio n o f tra d e in th e o cean sh ip p in g routes.

“ In d ia ’s cen tral p osition in th e Indian O cean is likely to m ake h er p a rticularly sensitive to the need fo r a n increased naval fo rce a n d especially fo r

VNT*FR TWO ENSIGNS

'.arsxr w arships th a n she a t present possesses. Such ships, unlike the present s 'v*~ units o f the Royal In d ian N avy, w ould be capable o f adequately represc:‘::'.\g In d ia in o th e r p arts o f the C om m onw ealth and m ight do m uch to foster b e tte r u n d erstan d in g o f In d ia an d thus im prove relations w ithin the E m pire.” 1

The C om m ittee described the p rincipal task o f the N avy thus: “ T he princip al responsibility o f In d ia ’s N avy a fter the w ar will be th e safety o f Indian ar.c E m p ire shipping in the p o rts o f In d ia an d th eir app ro ach es; India will also w ish to tak e her sh are in the p ro tectio n o f this sh ip p in g on the trade routes w ithin the In d ian O cean. It will be an im p o rta n t task o f In d ia ’s Navy to p ro v id e facilities fo r the com bined o p eratio n al training o f the A rm y fo rm ations m ain tain ed in the cou n try an d to provide a share o f the escorts, assault sh ip p in g an d c raft required to land these form ations on a hostile shore, should this p rove necessary. This implies the m aintenance in peace of a nucleus force o f assau lt sh ip p in g an d c raft a n d the a p p ro p ria te training organisations, as well as personnel possessing an expert know ledge o f this subject. In ad d itio n , the N avy, in co njunction w ith the A ir F orce, must be p re p a re d to tak e its sh are in intercepting a n d a ttack in g any foreign invading force w hich m ay a ttem p t a landing on the shores o f In d ia .”

T he re p o rt considered the A rm y responsible fo r co astal defence and the A ir F orce fo r “ seaw ard reconnaissance, sh ip p in g p ro tectio n and co-operation w ith the R IN .” 1 It was also considered essential th a t “ naval units may be required to proceed a t sh o rt notice to p o rts in occupied countries should disturbances arise an d to p a tro l the river ap p ro ach es to such p o rts .” Concern was expressed for superpow er aggression on A fg h an istan , “ W e m ust also ensure sufficient a irc ra ft being available to prev en t th e A fghans fro m being overaw ed by th e R ussian air stren g th o n th eir b o rd e r” — an appreciation w hich is o f interest even today!

O n the state o f peacetim e p rep ared n ess a n d inter-Service cooperation:

“ It is necessary to b e a r in m ind th a t n av al forces, to co u n ter these threats, c a n n o t be quickly im provised in time§>of w ar. T he m ain task o f the N avy in peace, in com m on w ith the o th er Services, is to p rep are fo r w ar but since the full stren g th o f th e naval force m ay be needed im m ediately on th e o u tbreak o f w ar a n d a long period is required b o th fo r the construction o f w arships an d the train in g o f n aval personnel, it follow s th a t the naval forces and air forces to co -o p erate w ith th em m ust be m ain tain ed in peace a t a high stan d ard o f preparedness.

“ W hile f o r purposes o f local defence a n u m b e r o f sm all ships m ust be m aintained, we consider th a t a p ro p o rtio n o f large ships will also be necessary.

T he provision o f such ships will p ro d u ce a b alan ced naval force, fo rm an added incentive to recru itm en t an d increased p rid e in the Service, besides assisting considerably in th e tra in in g o f th e perso n n el w hich c a n n o t be a d equately carried o u t in sm all ships. In a d d itio n , we a tta c h g reat im portance to the fo rm atio n o f an ad eq u ate air co m p o n e n t fo r seaw ard reconnaissance and a strik in g force and also to th e m aintenance o f m o d ern co ast defences and

Secretary of the A d m ira lty , C om m ander-in-C hief of the Nore, the Indian High C om m issioner, Second Sea Lord, C om m ander-in-C hief[R IN , and C om m anding O fficer on board H M IS Delhi.

!

|

I

R ear A d m ir a l L o rd M o u n tb a tte n o f B urm a in s p e c tin g s h ip 's c o m p an y, H M IS D elhi.

I / j !

r r

V

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, a

i

- 4

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Prime M in ister Jaw ahariai Nehru inspecting a guard of honour on the quarterdeck of H M IS Delhi, form erly H M IS Achilles, on her arrival at Ballard Pier, Bombay on September 16 1948 On his rig ht are Sardar Baldev Singh, the Defence M inister and Lieutenant K irpal Singh (who later rose to the rank of Rear A d m iral), the guard officer.

Finding th e ir sea legs on the quarterdeck of INS Delhi during her cruise to Indonesia in June 1950 are Prim e M inister Jawaharlal Nehru, S hrim ati Indira Gandhi and her sons, Rajiv and Sanjay.

P LA N S F O R TH E D EV ELO PM EN T OF T H E NA V Y

3 3

m aterial fo r local seaw ard defences such as boom s, mines, nets and indicator lo o p s.” 1

As regards possible aggression from m ajor pow ers, the re p o rt states:

“ A p a rt fro m a possible long term th re a t from C hina, R ussia is the only m ajo r pow er from w hom a serious th re a t m ight be likely. So long as India is connected w ith G re a t B ritain, either as a D om in io n o r by a treaty g u a ranteeing assistance, hostilities between R ussia and In d ia could only be either the cause o f or the result o f a w ar between G reat B ritain and the USSR.

Such a w ar w ould, inevitably, sooner o r later, develop into an o th e r w orld conflict. W hile In d ia ’s co n trib u tio n to a w ar o f this n a tu re will depend very largely on the defence policy o f the B ritish E m pire as a whole, she is likely to b ear the first b ru n t o f such an a tta c k an d m ust, therefore, be p rep ared at all tim es to defend h er fro n tiers u n til Im perial reinforcem ents a rriv e .”

T he a p p re c ia tio n o f possible th re a t is evident: “ R ussia is th e only m ajor pow er w hich a p p ears likely to be in a position seriously to th reaten India fo r som e years a fte r the present w ar. F o r this reason, aggression by Russia has been taken as the basis fo r estim ating the forces w hich In d ia w ould require fo r her defence ag ain st a m ajo r pow er. It is n o t possible to forecast w ith any degree o f accuracy the stren g th o f th e forces w hich R ussia, by the tim e she is likely to becom e an enem y, m ay be able to b ring to b ear ag ain st India.

T he scale o f a tta c k w ould depend on th e conditions w hich obtain a t present o r those w hich a p p e a r likely if n o rm al p re p aratio n s were m ade, and on the a ssu m p tio n th a t R ussia will evacuate N o rth P ersia a t th e end o f the W ar.

As these co nditions change, so m ust the scale o f enem y atta c k be reviewed an d o u r defensive m easures b ro u g h t u p -to -d ate; a t the sam e tim e, it will be necessary to consider the possibility o f a th re a t by any o th e r m ajo r pow er.” 1

On July 13, 1946, a d esp atch fro m L o rd W avell, the th en Viceroy to Lord P ath ick L aw rence, the th en Secretary o f State fo r India, inter alia said,

“ . . . . the greatest dan g er is th a t an independent In d ia m ay com e u n d e r the d o m in atio n o f R ussia. I t is very difficult to estim ate how likely this is to h appen. A n independent In d ian G overnm ent could h ard ly be unconscious o f the length o f its seab o ard o r o f th e fa c t th a t 90 p er cent o f its trad e is seaborne. T he defences o f the c o u n try a re so m u ch stronger by land th a n by sea th a t In d ia w ould n atu rally lo o k first fo r a naval alliance, especially a t a tim e w hen a steady flow o f im p o rts is so vital to the developm ent o f the c ountry. A nd it m ust surely be m any years before R ussia can becom e a fo rm idable naval pow er in th e In d ian O cean. A gain com m unications by land w ith R u ssia are so bad th a t R ussian help w ould be no substitute fo r B ritish o r A m erican help in developing the country. It seems, th erefo re, th a t the fu tu re G o v ern m en t o f In d ia will n o t o f its own choice go fo r R ussian p ro tection.

“ R u ssia m ight how ever try to em ploy her usual tactics o f giving su p p o rt to a re v o lu tio n ary p arty . C o n d itio n s in In d ia a re n o t u n fa v o u rab le. A few cap italists a n d princes have e n o rm o u s fo rtu n es, while la b o u r is still exploited, h as genuine grievances, an d h as begun to feel its pow er. M a la d m in istra tio n

3 4

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

can easily cause local scarcity and fam ine. The nucleus o f a C om m unist o rg an isatio n a lre a d y exists an d is m aking itself felt. It w ould n o t be difficult fo r R u ssia to gain a fo o th o ld in the co u n try by its usual m ethods if the G o v ern m en t is w eak an d if the gatew ay o f A fghanistan is not effectively b a rre d .” 2

T h e N a v y ’s case was effectively p u t in the follow ing w ords: “ T he establishm en t o f in d u stries w ithin In d ia will ten d to m ake h e r econom y and p ro sp erity m ore d ep en d en t on th e security o f her e x p o rt tra d e and so m aintain, and possibly increase, th e im p o rtan ce o f her p o rts and overseas com m unications.

It follow s, th erefo re, th a t In d ia m ust m aintain ad eq u ate naval forces and th a t th e p o rts on w hich she is depen d en t m ust be k ep t u p -to -d a te in a c c o rd an ce w ith m o d ern req u irem en ts. T h e co astal tra d e o f India is not only an essential p a r t o f h e r peace a n d w ar econom y b u t is also an im p o rta n t facto r in h e r tra n s p o rta tio n system . T h e requisitioning o f the m ajority o f her co asta l steam ers a t th e beginning o f th e p resen t w ar fo r naval p urposes has g reatly increased th e congestion on th e railw ay w hich m ight have been im possible h a d In d ia been th re aten ed fro m th e outset. It is, th erefo re, im p o rta n t th a t en co u rag em en t should be given to the developm ent o f th e coastal tra d e an d th e ship b u ild in g in d u stry , th a t sufficient naval forces should be m ain ta in e d to av o id being obliged to requisition m ercantile shipping im m ediately on the o u tb re a k o f w a r.” 1

Even th e naval a ir elem ent was th o u g h t o f as is evident: “ P rovision m ust be m ad e fo r n av al defence b o th as reg ard s the d evelopm ent o f the R oyal In d ia n N av y a n d th e fo rm atio n o f an a ir c o m p o n en t to w ork in co -o p eratio n w ith it.” 1

I t is obvious, th erefo re, th a t th e B ritish strateg y for an allied o r co m m o n w ealth fu tu re did co n sid er in d ep en d en t In d ia as a vital link between th e E ast an d the W est. T o sustain th eir interests in the In d ian O cean A rea, In d ian m aritim e stren g th was given an im p o rta n t place.

“ D iscussion on th e fu tu re R oyal In d ian N av y ” in th e re p o rt was b ased on th e prem ise th a t the N aval forces a fte r the w ar w ould be lim ited to those needed only fo r local naval defence an d to assist in the p ro te c tio n o f tra d e in th e In d ian O cean. I t also included m aintenance o f sufficient assa u lt c raft fo r tra in in g the In d ian A rm y in am phibious w arfare d u rin g peace. It was based on th e assu m p tio n th a t th e R oyal In d ian N avy was alread y capable o f lim ited co astal defence a n d h ad ad eq u ate seagoing stren g th . It, th erefo re, required p ro v isio n an d d evelopm ent o f a b alanced naval force w hich could be fu rth er developed in case o f a fu tu re w ar. T he C o m m ittee, therefore, recom m ended th e generation o f a com plete force consisting o f one sq u ad ro n o f th ree cruisers, a destroyer leader w ith a flotilla o f eight destroyers, one eight-ship training flotilla o f sloops, one eight-ship flotilla o f frigates fo r m iscellaneous duties, eight B an g o r/B ath u rst class m inesw eepers an d eight m o to r minesweepers. As reg ard s sm aller, am phibious an d au x iliary craft, a to ta l stren g th o f eight m o to r to rp e d o b o ats (M T B ), eight m o to r launches (M L), eight h a rb o u r defence m o to r launches (H D M L ), tw o m arine survey

PLA N S F O R TH E D EV ELO PM EN T OF T H E NA V Y

35

vessels w ith auxiliaries a n d traw lers, a ‘nucleus’ o f assault ships and c raft and one rep air ship was recom m ended.

! These recom m en d atio n s m ade in 1944 envisaged a tw o-stage developm ent o f the R oyal Indian N avy. Stage I had a tim e fram e o f tw o years from 1945

to 1947 fo r rep lacin g “ existing inefficient sh ip s” by frigates and m odern sloops, acquisition o f eight destroyers and training o f personnel for cruisers.

T he tim e-fram e for Stage II was a four-year period a fter the w ar with Ja p a n ended d u rin g w hich the rest o f the recom m ended force levels h ad to be provided. I t w as perceived th a t the R oyal Indian N avy w ould require ab o u t 1,500 reg u lar officers an d 15,000 ratings w ho w ould gradually be trained to m an the R IN ships to replace the R oyal N aval personnel then serving in th e R IN . It was also stated th a t “ H is M ajesty’s G overn m en t” w ould lend these ships to In d ia, w hich w ould subsequently be m aintained an d repaired in E ngland a t the cost o f the Indian exchequer. F u rth er, it recom m ended th a t

“ H is M ajesty ’s In d ian D o c k y a rd ” a t B om bay continue an d th ere should be base establishm ents and re p a ir facilities on b o th the west an d the east coasts.

On A pril 12, 1944, Vice A dm iral G odfrey, the F la g Officer C o m m anding the Royal Indian N avy, subm itted a detailed p a p e r1 to the R eorganisation C om m ittee on the ‘F u tu re o f the Royal In d ian N av y ’3 m uch on sim ilar lines an d also keeping in view w h at th e R oyal N avy could possibly provide o r spare. H is p lan also was divided into tw o stages, each com prising several phases. H is recom m endations elab o rated on larger ships th a n those th a t existed w ith th e R IN a t th a t tim e an d included a irc ra ft carriers a n d subm arines in the final stages o f developm ent. H is p lan also em phasised the o rg an isation o f the R IN to generate an in-house capability for m aintenance and train in g (such as ad eq u ate requirem ent o f bases, dockyards, depots, train in g a n d a d d itio n a l shore establishm ents).

In the p re p a ra tio n o f various rep o rts a n d papers p rio r to an d a fter the W ar, evidently th e R oyal In d ian N avy was envisaged to develop into a full-fledged D om inion N aval F o rce to w ard s the late ‘fo rties’ a n d be deployed as a v a n g u ard o f C o m m o n w ealth interests. It a p p e a rs th a t even a fter Independence o u r p lan n ers continued to rem ain influenced by w hat was said e arlier. T h a t the In d ian N avy did n o t quite develop on these lines could possibly be attrib u te d to the “ la n d -fro n tie r-th re a t o n ly ” concept th a t continued to occupy In d ian m inds a t the highest levels fo r decades th a t follow ed. This resulted in the in ad eq u ate funds m ade available fo r developing the m aritim e fo rce in the years th a t follow ed.

T he guns finally fell silent on A ugust 15, 1945 a n d the tim e had com e to assess the req u irem en t o f fu tu re w eapons a n d p latfo rm s in the light o f the p o st-W ar environm ent. B efore, how ever, this could be done, the R IN had to und ertak e large-scale dem obilisation o f personnel (no longer required for w ar) as well as decom m issioning o f m any old ships an d c ra ft w hich had m u sh ro o m ed d u rin g th e w ar. T h e Service had also to handle a m utiny in F e b ru a ry 1946 a n d to tra n sfe r a sizeable p a rt o f its assets to P ak istan in A ugust 1947.

3 6

UNDER TW O ENSIGNS

In as early as October 1944, the then Viceroy o f India, V iscount W avell, in

_ _a_secret telegram to the then Secretary o f State for India Mr. Amery, susgested a num ber o f measures w hich would help “ to change the atm o sphere in India” at th at time. One o f the m ajor suggestions was a declaration by the British Prime M inister him self th a t it is the definite intention o f the British G overnm ent to give India self-governm ent as early as possible and it was suggested th a t the declaration should also say th a t “ the greater m easure o f cooperation that political parties in India give, the earlier the change-over is likely to be.” A significant suggestion in the sam e telegram m entioned th at in the sam e declaration a “ prom ise o f m odern ships fo r the Indian N avy a t the end o f the w ar” should also be made.

At a meeting o f India and B urm a Com m ittee held on M ay 28, 1947, the then Viceroy Viscount M ountbatten is recorded to have said, “ The Interim G overnment was very anxious to obtain a B ritish cruiser fo r service w ith the Indian N avy. It was, in his view, essential to the efficiency o f the Indian N avy th a t this request should be met; this would have the fu rth e r advantage th a t the Indian Navy would for years be dependent on the British N avy for active help in m aintaining in service a naval unit o f this size. H e th o u g h t th a t it m ight be possible for a British cruiser to be loaned to the Indian N avy u nder arrangem ents sim ilar to those recently m ade with the N orw egian G o v ern m ent.” 1

\ l n the first Plans P aper brought out a fter Independence on A ugust 25, 1947, the role and the force requirem ents o f the N avy o f free In d ia fo r the next ten years were given a concrete shape fo r the first tim e. To quote from C hapter V o f the Plans Paper, “ The eventual role o f the N avy o f In d ia is to safeguard her shipping on the high seas from interference in w ar; to ensure that supplies can b o th reach and leave In d ia by sea in all circum stances; to keep open her ports and coastal shipping routes; to prevent any enemy la n d ing on her shores; and to support the A rm y in any operations w hich m ay be required in the furtherance o f the national policy.” 4

It was stated, “ So long as India rem ains w ithin th e B ritish C o m m o n wealth o f N ations, her task will be very m uch lightened by the assistance she will receive from the Royal and other D om inion Navies. B ut even in these circumstances, she will be expected, and indeed she will w ish to, contribute to the general Naval Defence o f the C om m onw ealth in accordance w ith her status as the principal sovereign state in the Indian O cean .”

( T h e Plans P aper preceived the building in the shortest possible tim e a Completely Indian-m anned balanced task force5 consisting o f tw o light fleet carriers, three cruisers, eight destroyers, fo u r subm arines a n d “ such sm aller n h r i ? f | Were,hneCCS,Sa^ f° r tra i" ing and auxiliary Purposes.” T he plan em-2 t h T n a - r i h r n ° n

f T * SUbmarin£ e' emCntS in the Indian

gested 10 years!}The P,»P T & W

” Wlthin a dcflnite Period o f ^

^

Chief o f Staff, Commodore M H St^L n T * ^ ^ R° ya' Ind‘an NaVy’S

H a r t e r , His

P LA N S FO R TH E D EV ELO PM EN T OF THE NA V Y

3 7

the N avy even a fter Independence. H e u n fo rtu n ately died in an a ircrash in Italy in M arch 1948. T hose w ho w orked w ith him speak highly o f his know ledge an d foresight.

Acquisition o f ships

Based on the recom m endations o f the first P lans Paper, negotiations were initiated w ith the B ritish G overn m en t for acquiring the first cru iser1 fo r India, H M S A chilles (o f the filmed B attle o f the River P late o f W orld W ar II), w hich was to be com m issioned on h an d in g over as H M I S Delhi. A rgum ents fav o u ring the acquisition o f th ree such cruisers (L ean d er class) were p u t u p as P lans P a p e r 2/47 w hich d eliberated on th e b u ild -u p o f th e R IN as a balanced naval force, getting o u t o f the sloop stage a n d fo r contributing tow ards In d ia ’s im age in the region. Based on these considerations, N aval H ead q u arters recom m ended to the G overnm ent th a t the acquisition o f the first cruiser be given overriding priority.

HM IS D e l h i

This cruiser, costing £ 736,500,6 w hich was inclusive o f the cost o f norm al outfits o f a rm a m e n t an d naval stores a n d any m odifications required to be m ade fo r h abitability in tro p ical conditions, w as to be m anned by 24 Indian C om m issioned Officers, fo u r B ritish C om m issioned Officers, two In d ian W a rra n t Officers and 16 B ritish W a rra n t Officers besides 756 ratings o f various specialisations and branches. Twelve officers were to be deputed to the U .K .

fo r train in g and specialisation in N avigation an d D irection and a ttach m en t to various ships an d establishm ents. Several ratin g s were also to be sent to the U .K . fo r train in g an d specialisation in various disciplines including P a rt II Q ualifications’ in gunnery, ra d a r, to rp ed o an d anti-su b m arin e w arfare, com m u n icatio n s, engineering an d electrical technology a n d store-keeping.

T he first C o m m an d in g O fficer1 o r th e cruiser w as C a p tain H .N .S . Brown o f th e R oyal N avy w ith C o m m an d er R .D . K a ta ri as his Executive Officer.

(C o m m an d er K a ta ri rose to th e ra n k o f A dm iral an d to o k over as In d ia ’s first In d ian C h ie f o f th e N av al Staff.) A b o u t this tim e, it was decided not to acquire the o th e r tw o cruisers, the A jax an d the L eander.

T he plans to o k m ore concrete shape when P lans P a p e r 10/1948, wherein the details o f th e co m p o sitio n o f the N avy o f the ‘fifties’, as envisaged a t th a t tim e, were given.7 As it w as ap p re c ia ted th a t it m ay be im practical to accord G ov ern m en t ap p ro v a l to the com plete developm ent p rogram m e a t th a t stage, it was p ro p o sed th a t sanction be initially acco rd ed fo r the first six years o f the developm ent p ro g ra m m e only. T h e ships a n d a irc ra ft to be acquired d u rin g the period 1949-54 were, one light fleet carrier, three cruisers, seven destroyers, six subm arines, one survey vessel, one lan d in g ship ta n k and som e o th e r su p p o rtin g craft.

W hile negotiations were going on fo r the finalisation o f plans for th e other ships, actio n h a d a lread y been initiated to finalise th e m anning, equipm ent an d tra in in g plans fo r H M I S D elhi. T he m ain bulk o f the crew fo r the

3 8

U NDER T W O EN SIG N S

cruiser had to be carrie d on b o a rd naval ships to the U .K . well in tim e fo r w orking up the various d ep artm en ts o f the cruiser before its com m issioning.

H M I S K istna a n d H M I S Cauvery were assigned this task . T he officers, ra tings and essential stores an d equipm ent were em b ark ed 6 on these tw o ships w hich were p re p a re d fo r a cruise to th e U .K . C alling a t A den, P o rt Said, M alta an d G ib ra lta r, these ships headed tow ards th eir respective d estinations — Cauvery to P lym outh an d K istna to P o rtsm o u th .

D u rin g passage, C o m m an d er K a ta ri,6 th e C o m m an d in g Officer o f Kistna, received orders ap p o in tin g h im th e C o m m an d er (officially designated ‘E xecutive Officer’ , i.e., the second-in-com m and) o f the Delhi. O n arriv al in the U .K ., C o m m a n d e r K a ta ri underw ent a few pre-com m issioning courses at D av en p o rt an d P o rtsm o u th . H e then jo in ed the Delhi w hich w as undergoing refit a t th e tim e a t C h ath am . H is first lieu ten an t was L ieutenant C om m ander S.M . N an d a, his n a v ig ato r L ieutenant K .L . K u lk arn i, a n d his gunnery officers L ieutenant C o m m an d er V. A. K a m a th an d L ieutenant K irp al Singh. All these officers5 later rose to flag ran k .

^ July 5, 1948 w as a red -letter day fo r In d ia when the In d ian N av y ’s first cruiser H M I S D elh i 6 was han d ed over by the C o m m an d er-in -C h ief o f N ore to Shri V .K . K ris h n a M enon, the then In d ian H ig h C om m issioner in the U .K . N o ta b le a m o n g the guests present on the occasion were A dm iral Sir H a ro ld B u rro u g h , u n d e r w hose guidance th e ship h a d been refitted, and Vice A d m iral W .E . P arry , C o m m an d er-in -C h ief designate o f the R oyal Indian N avy. T he ‘w o rk -u p ’ p ro g ram m e fo r the In d ian crew began im m ediately.

A few days before H M I S D elhi sailed fo r In d ia , L o rd M o u n tb atten w ho had by then relin q u ish ed his ap p o in tm e n t o f In d ia ’s G o v ern o r-G en eral a n d retu rn ed hom e, visited the ship. H e w as highly im pressed by th e w ay the ship was being h a n d led by its fresh com plem ent o f officers a n d ratings. T he ship sailed fro m Sheerness on July 6, 1948 a n d , on her way to In d ia, called at P o rtsm o u th 8 P o rtla n d , G ib ra lta r an d M a lta fo r a few weeks fo r a fu rth e r spell o f ‘w o rk -u p ’ w hich was facilitated by th e presence o f the M e d ite rra nean F leet a t G ib ra lta r. A t M alta, th e ship w as visited by A dm iral Sir A rth u r Pow er, C o m m an d er-in -C h ief o f th e M e d iterran ean Fleet.

T he D elhi h a d a sta n d a rd displacem ent o f 7030 to n s while the full load displacem ent w as 9740 tons. H e r length w as 554.5 feet, an d h er beam , a little over 55 feet, h er d ra u g h t, 16 feet fo rw ard and 20 feet aft. She was pow ered by P a rso n s’ geared turbines delivering a specified horse-pow er o f 72,000 on fo u r shafts. H er m axim um speed was 32 knots. H e r a rm a m ent p ack ag e com prised six six-inch guns fo r surface o p e ra tio n s a n d eight fo u r-in c h guns, fifteen 40 m m guns a n d fo u r th ree-p o u n d ers fo r a n ti-a irc ra ft defence. T h e sh ip h ad eig h t 21-inch to rp ed o tubes. T h e oil fuel capacity was 1800 to n s w hile th e bunked acco m m o d a tio n w as f o r a com plem ent o f 680.

T h e D elh i's crest w as a ca p a riso n e d elep h an t carrying a cerem onial u m b rella w ith th e logo “ S arv ato Ja y a m ic h c h h a m i” (m ay you be a victor every

PLA N S F O R TH E D EV ELO PM EN T O F TH E NA V Y

3 9

w here) an d the ship was to be the first in the series o f cruisers th a t were to be acquired fo r the N avy an d nam ed a fter m ajor In d ian cities. As Achilles, her p entagonal crest p o rtray ed the head o f a knight-in-arm our.

On the s h ip ’s arrival in In d ia6 on Septem ber 16, 1948, the officers and ratings w ere accorded a tum ultuous welcome. Shri Jaw aharlal N ehru, and m any o th e r civilian dignitaries visited th e ship im m ediately on her com ing along side. T he Prim e M inister addressed the officers and ratings and expressed his pride in the floating fortress an d the men 0 11 b o a rd w ho would, if the occasion arose, effectively defend the cou n try ’s shores w ith all th eir m ight.

L ieutenant C o m m an d er V .A . K a m a th (later to becom e a Vice A dm iral), IN S D elh i’s first gunnery officer, rem inisces “ M y direct association with D elhi p erh ap s goes back lo n g er th a n any o th er officer past or present in our Service, as I w as sent to the W hale Island G unnery School a t P o rtsm o u th in as early as M a rc h 1947 to train Indian ratin g s in the G u n n ery System o f the cruiser. A t th a t tim e, it was still the p re-p artitio n N avy an d the idea was th a t we w ould eventually com m ission all three L eander class cruisers then rem aining w ith the R N , o f w hich H M S Achilles (later D elhi) was to be the first. W hile a t P o rtsm o u th I h ad frequently to visit A chilles, then refittin g in C h a th a m , to progress th e gunnery aspects o f the refit, as th e R N

com plem ent on b o ard did n o t have a specialist ‘G ’ Officer.” 5

“ P a rtitio n cam e in A ugust 1947, an d the only G u n n er I had w ith me at W h ale Island, S h arif K h an , an d all the M uslim ratings w ho opted for P ak istan , were retu rn ed to K arach i. U nfo rtu n ately , th o se who opted for P ak istan form ed the bulk o f the gunnery ratin g s and we h ad to w ait a few m ore m o n th s before fresh batches o f ratings w ho had o pted fo r In d ia were sent to E ngland to s ta rt all over again the train in g th a t h ad been going extrem ely well until A ugust 1947. This obviously p u t b ack th e com m issioning d ate o f the sh ip , w hich eventually to o k place a t C h ath am on July 5, 1948.

“ A t the recep tio n held on b o a rd alongside B allard Pier on th e sh ip ’s a rrival a t B om bay, I rem em b er we were hon o u red by the presence o f o u r then Prim e M inister, P a n d it N e h ru . H e w as, u n fo rtu n ately , com pletely lost in this large d rin k in g gath erin g o f u n ifo rm ed officers a n d men a n d the sm art set o f B om bay. H e sp en t m ost o f the tim e standing m orose by him self in a co rn er o f the q u a rte rd e ck h a rd ly talk in g to anyone. It w as then th a t L ieuten a n t Percy Sim m ons, w ho was th e Senior W atch k eep er on b o a rd , w ho, I vaguely rem em ber, tried to m ake conversation w ith P an d it N eh ru . It ap p ears th a t w hen he w as to ld by the P.M . th a t he w as p lan n in g a visit to Indonesia on b o a rd D elhi, Percy Sim m ons to o k u p o n him self to give th e P rim e M inister som e sound financial advice on how best to go a b o u t the exchange o f Indian R upees into In donesian R u p ia h s. T his incident m ay well explain w hy P andit N e h ru left the ship in a h u ff e arlier th a n expected.”

M agar joins the fleet

A b o u t th is tim e, th ere were fo u r L anding Ships T anks (LSTs), Class 3

H M S S m ite r, Thrasher, Bruiser a n d Avenger, in various In d ia n p o rts. These

4 0

U N D ER T W O EN SIG N S

ships had been borrow ed fro m the B ritish G o v ern m en t by the Q u arterm aster G eneral o f the In d ian A rm y on b eh alf o fth e G o v ern m en t o f In d ia fo r d u m p ing surplus am m u n itio n into th e sea. D u e to lack o f train ed personnel, however, only one ship had been in co n tin u o u s use an d this was m anned by the R oyal In d ian N avy.

E ach lan d in g ship h ad a cruising speed o f 12 knots an d bunked accom m odation fo r 18 officers a n d 150 m en in ad d itio n to the n o rm al sh ip ’s co m pany. It could also c a rry 2,000 tons o f stores or, alternatively, a varied com b in atio n o f lorries, lan d in g c ra ft an d tanks. These ships were essentially ocean-going ta n k -la n d in g ships cap ab le o f landing tan k s, vehicles an d men directly on beaches d u rin g am p h ib io u s o p eratio n s o r fo r d isaster rescue purposes.

C o m m u n icatio n links betw een B om bay an d C ochin were very p o o r an d a train jo u rn e y to o k m ore th a n th ree days. C ochin w as a t th a t tim e being developed as the N a v y ’s p rem ier train in g establishm ent while the N aval D o ck y ard w as lo cated in B om bay a n d th u s th ere was an im m ediate need to tra n s p o rt large qu an tities o f stores an d equipm ent fro m B om bay to C ochin.

T he L S T s w ere co n sid ered best-suited fo r th is p u rp o se. These ships could also be used to tra n s p o rt steel fro m C alc u tta an d cem ent fro m B om bay to V ish a k h a p a tn a m a n d C ochin fo r co n stru ctio n purposes.

H ow ever, th e p lan s h ad to be revised ow ing to m any reaso n s and it was la te r decided to acq u ire only one L ST an d thus H M S Avenger5 was acquired fo r th e R IN fro m th e B ritish G overnm ent. The ship w as renam ed H M IS

M a g a r a n d w as com m issioned in to the R IN on A pril 11, 1949.

Three destroyers join the R IN

N aval P lans P a p e r 1/47 h a d envisaged, besides building u p a cruiser sq u ad ro n o f th ree ships, th e d ev elo p m en t o f a d estro y er flotilla o f eight ships co n cu rren tly w ith the acq u isitio n o f a F leet A ir A rm an d a subm arine flotilla. In P lans P a p e r 5/48, how ever, th e n u m b er o f destroyers required was reduced to five, o u t o f w hich th ree were to be acquired by the end o f 1948

a n d tw o early in 1950-51. P lans P a p e r 7/48 d ated Ju n e 4, 1948 stated th a t as a result o f n eg o tiatio n s w ith the B ritish G overnm ent, th e A d m iralty h ad agreed to tra n sfe r th ree d estro y ers,5 H M S R otherham , R edoubt, a n d Raider to the G o v ern m en t o f In d ia . It w as an tic ip a te d a t th a t tim e th a t these ships, w hich were u n d erg o in g refit a t various R oyal N av al D o ck y ard s, w ould be read y fo r h a n d in g over to th e R oyal In d ian N a v y by Ja n u a ry 1949.

A t th a t tim e th e re was an acute sh o rtag e o f ratings w ith P a rt II qualifications, i.e. pro fessio n al specialist qualifications in different disciplines. It was, th erefo re, co nsidered necessary to firstly, tra in these ratings in th e ir respective qualifications before ap p o in tin g th em to the destroyers, an d secondly, depute a certain n u m b er o f key officers a n d ratin g s fo r tra in in g in sea-going destroyers o f the R o y al N av y before th ey becam e proficient to carry out their specialist task s on b o a rd these destroyers. It w as also h o p e d to com plete the tra in in g schedule o f these officers an d ratin g s well in tim e fo r th eir being

Lady W illis , w ife o f C om m ander-in-C hief, Portsm outh, Unveiling sh ip 's name.

Indian High C om m issioner V.K. Krishna Menon being piped aboard H M IS "ana.

The C om m anding Officer, Officers and S hip's Company of H M IS Ranjit.

A squadron of am phibious Sealand a ircraft of the Navy’s Fleet A ir A rm on a reconnaissance m ission.

These were among the firs t lot of a ircraft acquired fo r the N a v y jfo r which the n egotiations were heldjj in 1949-50.

P L A N S FO R T H E DEVELO PM EN T OF T H E NAVY

41

available fo r com m issioning1 the destroyers in M arch 1949. All three destroyers were planned to be com m issioned together as they w ould then be able to ‘w o rk -u p ’ as a team an d it w as considered th a t tw o m o n th s’ w orking up w ith R oyal N avy’s H om e o r M editerranean Fleet, w ould be sufficient before the ships sailed fo r In d ia. T he ships were expected to arrive in In d ia by Ju n e 1949.

In case an ad eq u ate num ber o f billets could n o t be m ade available on b oard the R oyal N a v y ’s destroyers, it w as alternatively planned to depute officers an d key ratings only fo r the first destroyer fo r sea train in g w ith the R oyal N avy, besides a few engine-room personnel fo r th e second an d th ird destroyers; the bulk o f officers a n d ratin g s were to be train ed on the first d estro y er a fter it w as m anned by R IN personnel. T o give these officers and ratings sufficient sea tra in in g to com m ission a new type o f ship on w hich the m ajority had n o experience, it w as considered necessary to com m ission the ships a t intervals o f tw o m onths so th a t the three destroyers w ould be com m issioned in a period o f fo u r m onths an d be ready a fter a fu rth e r period o f tw o m onths to allow fo r the w orking up o f the th ird destroyer. All d e stro yers were to be ready to sail fo r In d ia in com pany. T he com plem ent o f th ree ships varied as the R otherham , being the senior ship o f the squadron, w as to be com m anded by a C ap tain an d he w ould carry his staff in a ddition to the n o rm al com plem ent o f th e ship. T h e R aider an d the Redoubt were to be com m anded by a C o m m an d er and a L ieutenant C o m m an d er respectively so th a t a definite o rd e r o f seniority w ithin the sq u ad ro n could be m aintained.

In clu d in g the specialists in gunnery, to rp ed o , anti-subm arine, com m unications a n d navigation an d direction, the officer com plem ent o f the th ree ships was to be 17, 14 an d 13 while the com plem ent o f ratings, 229, 208 and 205

respectively.

T he to ta l n o n -recu rrin g 1 expenditure involved in th e acquisition o f these destroyers w as R s. 1.548 crores an d th e an n u al recurring expenditure was estim ated a t R s. 75.39 lakhs. T his expenditure was to be m et by debiting it to th e unreleased p o rtio n o f th e sterling balance. T hese destroyers were expected to hav e a life-span o f 15 to 18 years when they were to be replaced fo r w hich it was also p ro p o sed to m ake an a n n u a l co n trib u tio n o f R s. 10

lakhs fo r each destroyer, besides building u p a reserve stock o f am m unition to be kept ash o re. T he n o n -recu rrin g an n u al expenditure o f R s. 25.13 lakhs p er destroyer included Rs. 1.74 lakhs fo r pay an d allow ances o f officers, R s. 3.39 lakhs fo r pay a n d allow ances o f ratings, Rs. 10 lak h s fo r stores an d the sinking fu n d o f R s. 10 lakhs to w ard s replacem ent a fte r 20 years.

T he fo rm al request fo r th e tra n sfe r o f th e th ree d estroyers8 w as m ade when Shri H .M . P atel, the then D efence Secretary, add ressed a letter to M r. Jo h n L an g , Secretary to th e A d m iralty , on N o v em b er 15, 1947. T his w as followed by a fo rm al letter add ressed to th e Secretary, M ilitary D e p a rtm e n t (Defence Staff), C o m m o n w ealth R elatio n s Office, L o n d o n , w hich also sought facilities fo r the tra in in g 'o f the sh ip ’s crew s, p rio r to th eir com m issioning in the Royal N a v a l destroyers an d tra in in g establishm ents.

4 2

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

T h e fo rm a l sanction fo r th e acquisition o f the th ree ‘R ’ Class destroyers was o btained in July 1949. It was also decided th a t the ships, H M S R otherham , Redoubt a n d R aider were to be respectively renam ed Rajput (F lo tilla Leader), Rana a n d R a n jit. T he ac tu a l cost o f th e th ree d estroyers, p aid on M arch 25, 1949, was £ 700,800 while the cost o f reco n d itio n in g these ships w orked o u t to £ 344,200. H M I S R a jp u t, w ith C ap tain A. C h ak rav erti (becam e a R ear A d m iral before retiring) as its C o m m an d in g Officer an d Senior Officer o f the 11th D estro y er S q u ad ro n , the Indian N a v y ’s first destroyer sq u a d ro n w as com m issioned w ith p o m p an d eclat a t P o rtsm o u th on July 28, 1949. H M I S R anjit w ith C o m m an d er G .S . K a p o o r as its C o m m an d in g Officer h a d alread y been com m issioned a t C h ath am on July 4. T he th ird destroyer, H M I S Rana, w hose C o m m an d in g Officer was C o m m an d er S.N . K o h li (later an A d m ira l a n d C h ie f o f th e N aval Staff) was com m issioned a t D e v o n p o rt on S ep tem b er 9, 1949.

T h e sta n d a rd displacem ent o f H M I S R a jp u t was 1,750 to n s w hile th a t o f the o th e r tw o ships w as 1,705 tons; th e fu ll load d isp lacem en t o f Rajput was 2,510 to n s w ith th e o th e r sh ip s’ full lo ad displacing 2,425 tons. T he overall len g th o f this class o f ships w as 358.25 feet w ith a beam o f 35 feet eig h t inches, th e m axim um d isp lacem en t being 16 fe e t. T he arm a m e n t c o n sisted o f fo u r 4 .7-inch guns w hich could be u sed a g a in st surface a n d serial ta rg e ts a n d fo u r tw o -p o u n d e r p o m p o m s. Besides, Rajput h a d six 20 mm a n ti-a irc ra ft guns w hile th e o th e r tw o ships h a d fo u r 40 m m a n ti-a irc raft guns each. E a c h ship w as fitted w ith eig h t 21-inch to rp ed o tubes on q u a d ru p le m o u n tin g s an d fo u r d ep th -c h a rg e th ro w ers. T he p ro p u lsio n m achinery o f e ach sh ip co m p rised P a rs o n ’s geared turbines delivering a specified horsep o w er o f 40,000 on tw o sh a fts giving it a m axim um speed o f 32 knots.

T h e crests were sh ap ed a fte r tra d itio n a l shields a n d d epicted different types o f m ediaeval R a jp u t w eapons; th e R ajput crest displayed a R a jp u t h elm et an d tw o crossed sp ears, R a n a 's c re st h a d a b ro ad -b ased knife w ith a petagonal b lade a n d a cross-grip, a n d R a n jit’s crest carried tw o crossed curved daggers enclosed in a ring.

REFERENCES

1. N av al H e a d q u a rte rs (In d ia ) R eco rd s.

2. T h e T ra n sfe r o f P ow er, 1942-47, V olum e V III, E dito r-in -C h ief, N ich o las M an serg h , H e r M ajesty ’s S ta tio n e ry Office, L o n d o n , 1979, p. 52.

3. T h e T ra n s fe r o f P ow er, 1942-47, op. cit., V olum e V, 1974, p. 140.

4. Ib id ., V olum e X , 1981, p . 1022.

5. R e p o rt on th e R o y al In d ia n N avy, A u g u st 1947-A u g u st 1948, N aval H e a d q u a rte rs (In d ia ), 1948, p. 2.

6. D ia ry o f E v en ts— IN S D e lh i— 1948-78, W estern N a v a l C om m and, B om bay.

7. R e p o rt o n th e R o y a l In d ia n N avy, op. cit., pp. 3-4.

8. R e p o rt on th e R o y a l In d ia n N av y , 1948-49, op. cit., 1949, p. 1.

3.

Th e A n d a m a n s , Nicobars and

Laccadives— The Sentinels of

Our W a te rs

M a n y In d i a n s still refer to C ap e C o m o rin as th e S o u th e rn m o st tip o f In d ia. In fact the S o u th ern m o st tip is th e P ygam alion P o in t w hich in tu rn is th e S o u th ern tip o f the G re a t N ico b ar Island. It is obvious th a t we have yet to acco rd due im p o rtan ce to o u r sentinels a t sea— o u r islands in the Bay o f Bengal and the A rab ian Sea.

v-The B ritish were fully conscious o f th e m ilitary im p o rtan ce o f these islands 1

i n d records reveal the B ritish A d m iralty ’s plans to install certain defences '

a t N ancow ry fo r naval use.

The utility o f these Islands fo r the Jap an ese a n d th eir view point has been highlighted by W o o d b u rn K irb y in his H isto ry o f the Second W orldW ar. “ As early as the 7th F eb ru ary (1942) th e Im perial G eneral H ea d q u a rte rs (Japan) h ad issued orders fo r th e ir c a p tu re ” he w rites.

I

T he entire stre n g th 1 o f th e arm y statio n ed a t P o rt B lair d u rin g th e earlier , years o f W o rld W ar II consisted o f a B ritish co m p an y w hich was replaced by a b a tta lio n o f G u rk h a s o n Ja n u ary 1, 1942. W hen th e fall o f R an g o o n j seem ed im m inent these b attalio n s were w ithdraw n on M a rc h 12, 1942 u n d er ^

G eneral W avell’s orders. T h e islands were th u s left to th eir ow n fate. Sim ultaneously, the Bay o f Bengal h a d been a centre o f naval activ ity ; H M I S Sophie M arie h a d sunk a fte r h ittin g a m ine, fo u r m e rch an t ships w ere lost, H M IS

R am das was d am aged while th e rest o f th e In d ia n ships rem ained deployed , ag ain st Jap an ese subm arines a n d fo r convoy defence. T he last ship to sail fro m th e C h a th a m Jetty a t P o rt B lair left on M a rc h 13, 1942.

\yThe Jap an ese naval sh ip s2 sw ooped on th e R oss a n d C h ath am Islands a t P o rt B lair on the n ig h t o f M a rc h 23, 1942 a n d a t 4 a.m . th ey fired th eir first s h o t blow ing up P o rt B lair’s wireless sta tio n a n d th e te leg rap h office. A t 6 a .m . the Jap an ese sta rte d landing.

N a rra tio n s o f Iq b al Singh as well as those o f H u g h Toye in th e la tte r’s b o o k The Springing T iger a re ad m ira b le a n d explicit p ointers to w ard s the Jap a n e se strateg ic a n d po litical aim s. N etaji S ubhash C h a n d ra B ose’s visit to th e A n d am an s, his d ream o f establishing a n Indian N a tio n a l A rm y B a tta lion an d the fo rm a tio n o f th e P rovisional In d ia n G ov ern m en t have been high-

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U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

lighted a t som e length w ith a convincing conclusion th a t “ th e Japanese had no in ten tio n o f h an d in g over an y effective p o w e r.”

It w ould a p p e a r th a t N etaji h a d been convinced th a t the Jap an ese were genuinely interested in establishing a “ co -p ro sp erity sp h ere” . T he p ro p o sal o f sta tio n in g the In d ia n N a tio n a l A rm y 3 co n tin g en t in the A n d am an s had, how ever, been vetoed by the N ip p o n G overn m en t even before N e ta ji's arrival, i H e arriv ed alone a n d was received by A d m iral Ish ik av a, the C om m ander-in-C h ie f o f th e Jap an ese A rm y, in a cerem onial w elcom e. Toye states, “ The A d m iral, in agreeing to th e a p p o in tm en t o f an In d ian C h ie f C om m issioner, to ld N etaji th a t fo r cogcnt strategic reasons, th ere w ould be no com plete h a n d o v e r d u rin g th e w ar, b u t th a t if the C om m issioner w as p rep ared to c o o p e ra te , som e d ep a rtm e n ts o f civil a d m in istra tio n could be tran sferred . . . on th e second a n d last d ay o f N e ta ji’s visit, th ere w as a public m eeting in his h o n o u r . . . . N etaji talked a b o u t th e fo rm a tio n o f th e P ro v isio n al In d ian G o v ern m en t a n d dw elt on his aim to seek the help o f the Jap an ese G o v ern m en t in th e lig h t f o r In d ia ’s freedom . T h erefo re, he said , it w as incum bent u p o n th e In d ia n s to c o o p e ra te w ith th e Ja p a n e se . . . . ” 4

T h e re w as a co m p lete lack o f en th u siasm a m o n g th e local people ab o u t N e ta ji’s visit, possibly on a c c o u n t o f th e h o rrify in g experiences an d to rtu re .

E ven th e local liaison officers a tte n d in g on N etaji could n o t have a w ord with h im on a c c o u n t o f fe ar. T h is visit w as also his last.

T h e re is no evidence to estab lish o r ascertain w hether N etaji raised any o b je c tio n to th e Jap a n e se A d m ira l’s a d m in istra tiv e a rran g em en ts o r fo r having ta k e n u p th e m a tte r w ith th e Jap a n e se P rim e M inister. T here are, how ever, I reco rd s to show th a t L ieu ten an t C olonel L o g a n a th a n , th e C h ie f C om m is-

| sio n er designate, d id a rriv e a t P o rt B lair on F e b ru a ry 22, 1944 b u t never in j effect to o k over th a t p o st. T he Islan d s, th erefo re, rem ain ed u n d e r Japanese I c o n tro l until th e ir e v a cu atio n d u rin g A u g u st 1945.

•^ J a p a n e se o c c u p a tio n o f th e Islan d s once again em phasised th e im p o rtan ce o f o u r eastern sentinels5 a n d in A ugust 1943, In d ian C o m m a n d ’s Jo in t P la n n in g S taff discussed th e “ c ap tu re a n d re te n tio n ” o f these islands. T he m ain ad v an tag es reflected in th e ir p a p e r d a te d O cto b er 20, 1943 were: denying the Ja p an ese o f a n ad v an ced base an d using the sam e fo r allied intelligence and an ti-sh ip p in g p u rp o ses. C onsequently, the Jo in t P lanning S taff P a p e r dated A u g u st 15, 1945 reco m m en d ed th a t th e C -in-C In d ia should be invited to accep t responsibility fo r th e reo ccu p atio n .

In th e in terim p e rio d , how ever, it was felt th a t th ere was a sp u rt in J a p a n ese naval activ ity 6 in th e A n d am an Seas a n d a series o f an ti-sh ip p in g strikes w ere carrie d o u t by allied destroyers d u rin g F e b ru a ry a n d M a rc h o f 1945.

R ein fo rcem en t p ro v id e d in th e follow ing m o n th b o m b ard ed the airfield and o th e r targ ets a t N ic o b a r Islan d s as well as airfields, b atteries a n d sh ip p in g off P o rt B lair.

In th e f a r E astern th e a tre th e tide had tu rn ed m uch ag ain st the Japanese.

T h e first n u clear b o m b w as d ro p p e d on H iro sh im a on A ugust 6, 1945; tw o d ay s la te r th e U .S .S .R . d eclared w ar on Ja p a n a n d on A u g u st 9, th e Allies

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4 5

d ro p p e d the second nuclear b om b on N ag asak i. T he rem aining few days o f the W a r witnessed the R ussian invasion o f M an ch u ria and th eir entry into N o rth K o rea. T he Japanese surrendered unconditionally on A ugust 14, 1945.

T he w ar a t sea, a co m p ilatio n o f the B ritish A d m iralty ’s H istorical Section, gives an acco u n t o f ^Operation P o p c o rn —the op eratio n to reoccupy the A nd am an and N ico b ar islands. Bandra,7 a ‘m ercy s h ip ’ carrying supplies for prisoners-of-w ar an d those living in P o rt B lair, escorted by the In d ian N avy sloop Narbada, left C alcu tta on S eptem ber 22, arrived a t P o rt B lair fo u r days later an d rem ained th ere as a g u ard ship. T he convoy fo r the A n d am an an d N ico b ar Islands sailed fro m C alcu tta on O ctober 3 an d th e 116th Brigade landed a t P o rt B lair on O ctober 7, 1945 w here th e brig ad e com m ander, B rigadier A. J. S olom on, accepted the fo rm al su rren d er8 o f the Japanese.

A trocities on the locals in th e Islands during Japanese occupation are too w ell-know n and th eir p o st-w ar plight has also been vividly described by Iqbal Singh in The Andam an Story. The account o f naval o p eratio n has been com piled m ainly fro m the recollections o f those who p articip ated in these and the w ritings o f Sir C o m p to n M ackenzie, w ho arrived in P o rt B lair on b oard N arbada on F e b ru ary 23, 1947.

W hen the convoy9 bringing th e allied tro o p s and supplies arrived to occupy the A ndam ans in O ctober 1945, they found Narbada, the flagship o f the R oyal In d ian N avy, alread y an ch o red in th e deep sea h a rb o u r o f P o rt Blair. P rio r to th e arriv al o f the main force, she h ad p erfo rm ed a num ber o f im p o rta n t task s to facilitate reo ccu p atio n . T he Japanese authorities, led by Vice A dm iral Teize H a ra h ad been interrogated in detail reg ard in g minefields an d an chorages to establish safe an ch o rag e fo r the allied incom ing ships.

Narbada had also organised landings on the outlying island to search fo r people. T hose found on H avelock, N ancow ry a n d L ong Islands had grim tales o f hard sh ip s to tell. D ue care an d treatm en t w as p ro v id ed on b oard the Narbada. W ith L ieutenant C o m m an d er J.E . Baylies, R IN , in com m an d she k ep t a vigilant w atch offshore d u rin g allied lan d in g fo r re o c c u p a tio n .

On arriv al, larg er ships o f th e convoy an ch o red a t th e eastern end o f the h a rb o u r an d the N avy com m enced landing o f tro o p s. L an d in g c raft sped p ast the flagship carrying th e contingent o f 8/5 R a jp u ta n a Rifles. T he tro o p s landed in assau lt order, fully a rm ed a n d w ith o u t an y resistance o r incident.

P ositions were secured an d a h ea d q u a rte rs established soon thereafter.

L ieutenant K .R . N a ir (w ho later rose to th e ra n k o f R e a r A dm iral a n d was the F la g Officer C om m anding-in-C hief, E astern N av al C o m m an d ), n arrates,

“ H M I S N arbada a n d Jum na were p a r t o f a B ritish T ask F o rc e 1 th a t b o m b ard ed Jap an ese p ositions a t Sabang on P ulo Ve Islan d a t th e entrance to the Straits o f M alacca, in m id 1945. O u r ships were com m ended on th eir good gunnery.” 10

Im m ediately a fter th e Jap an ese su rren d er in A ugust 1945, th e Narbada was o rd ered to the A n d am an w aters a n d th e su rren d er o f the Japanese garrison a t C a r N ico b ar to o k place on b o a rd th e ship, C ap tain M .H . St.L. N o tt, R IN

accepting th e su rren d er fro m th e Jap an ese B rigadier. T h e sam urai sw ord an d

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U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

the Japanese flag surrendered on th a t occasion graced N arbada's w ardroom (officers’ mess).

Japanese minefields in the A ndam ans an d N ico b ars were sw ept by the 37th M inesw eeping F lo tilla 11 o f the R IN consisting o f ten B ath u rst and B angor class m inesw eepers. T he F lo tilla was co m m an d ed by L ieutenant C om m an d er R .D . K a ta ri. M inesw eeping was com pleted in a b o u t six m onths tim e.

R eg ard in g the Japanese strength and naval activity, R ear A dm iral N air recollects, tlNarbada proceeded to P o rt B lair fro m C a r N ico b ar. Japanese forces w ere in fa ir strength, say a t least tw o o r th ree b attalio n s in P o rt Blair.

A large p o rtio n o f them ap p eared to be pioneers em ployed in reconstruction an d o th er w orks. N o Jap an ese vessel was in h a rb o u r w hile we were th ere in A ugust 1945. L ater on when Narbada visited P o rt B lair again in D ecem ber o f th e sam e year, th ere were th ree Jap a n e se destroyers em ployed in ta k in g the Jap an ese tro o p s aw ay. T hey used to load so m an y tro o p s th a t the w hole u p p e r decks seem ed to be packed w ith m en in khaki. W here they were being taken, w h eth er to p riso n cam ps in S in g ap o re o r b ack hom e to Ja p a n , I do n o t know .

“ I rem em ber clearly w alking a ro u n d P o rt B lair an d n oticing th a t the J a p a n ese h ad installed guns o f vario u s m akes a n d calibres co v erin g all th e a p p r o aches to th e h a rb o u r. T h ey h a d installed six-inch gun m ountings a t the South an d A tla n ta P o in ts o v erlo o k in g th e h a rb o u r. T hese were o f English m ake and obviously b ro u g h t from S ingapore. It m u st have been quite a feat getting these a sh o re a n d uphill there.

“ T here w ere also several w ell-sited lo o k o u t posts p rovided w ith the largest b in o cu lars th a t I have ev er seen. O ne such p a ir o f b inoculars m ounted on a trip o d w as ta k e n on b o a rd th e N arbada. It used to be k ep t on one wing o f th e bridge w hile a t sea a n d on th e q u a rte rd e ck w hile in h arb o u r. L ater when N a rb a d a w as a t th e N a v a l A n ch o rag e a t B om bay, it was fun w atching the goings on on th e first floor o f th e T a j !”

Transfer o f Islands to independent India

T he m ilitary a d m in istra tio n 12 a fte r th e Japanese su rre n d e r w as supposed to last fo r six m onths b u t in actu al fact th e a d m in istra tio n w as han d ed over to civilian a u th o rities on F eb ru ary 7, 1946 w ith N .K . P a tterso n tak in g over as th e C h ie f C om m issioner. In F e b ru ary 1947 he handed over charge to In am u l-M ajid o f the In d ian Civil Service, th e first In d ia n fo r th a t post.

D u rin g the po st-W ar days, when independence an d division o f In d ia was being discussed in In d ia a n d B ritain, th e geostrategic im portance an d utility o f A n d a m a n a n d N ico b ar Islands continued to occupy the B ritish m ind. F ro m the records it is ab u n d a n tly clear th a t th e B ritish w ere m o st relu ctan t to lose th e ir h o ld o v er these Islands and th erefo re tried to disassociate this territo ry w hile n e g o tia tin g th e In d ian a n d P ak istan b o u n d aries. In an a p p re c ia tio n 13

“ T he strateg ic im plications a t inclusion o f P ak istan in th e B ritish C o m m o n w e a lth ,” F ield M arshal Sir C laude A uchinleck, th e th e n C om m ander-in-C hief, ela b o ra te d the vital C o m m o n w ealth in terest14 in th e In d ian ocean;

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(oil supplies, co n tro l o f eastern and w estern app ro ach es, a ir com m unications to Ira q , C eylon, B u rm a an d M alaya, an d th e co n tro l o f the seas an d island territo rie s fo r C o m m o n w ealth use). In this ap p reciatio n Sir C laude stated:

“ Should In d ia be u n frien d ly o r liable to be influenced by a pow er, such as R ussia, C h in a o r J a p a n , hostile to the B ritish C om m onw ealth, o u r strategic position in th e In d ian O cean w ould becom e untenable an d o u r co m m u n ications w ith N ew Z ealand an d A u stralia m ost insecure.”

In M arch 1947, In d ia Office had asked fo r the com m ents o f the Chiefs o f Staff on the inclusion o r otherw ise o f the A nd am an and N ico b ar Islands in the p ro p o sed tran sfer o f pow er to In d ia, w herein it was stated th a t “ these islands have no racial connection w ith In d ia .” Sim ultaneously in a letter to Field M arsh al V iscount W avell Lord P ath ick Law rence said: “ . . . atten tio n has been focussed here on th e A n d am an a n d N icobar Islands. T he Chiefs o f S taff have been giving co n sid eratio n . . . an d have represented th a t from the strategic p o in t o f view it is m ost desirable th a t we should retain B ritish Sovereignty over the Islands, an d th a t if th a t is n o t possible, we should a t least conclude a special agreem ent w ith In d ia allow ing us full freedom to tak e w h at defensive m easures we consider n ec e ssa ry . . . . ” 15

W hile the B ritish con tin u ed to deliberate the issue an d the possibilities o f retain in g sm all u n its o f th e R oyal A ir F orce a t certain a irp o rts in the A n d a m an a n d N ic o b a r Islan d s an d using them as staging p o rts, Field M arshal W avell in In d ia expressed his fears a b o u t m ain tain in g B ritish Sovereignty on the islands as he th o u g h t it w ould only stir up a h o rn e t’s nest. In his reply d a te d M a rc h 19, 1947 he w rote to L ord P ath ick Law rence: “ . . .y o u will appreciate, o f course, th a t the islands a re a p a rt o f India, an d w ould n o t easily be given up by the In d ian G ov ern m en t except in retu rn fo r som e very special co n sid eratio n . T he only chance o f securing the use o f these Islands as a defensive o u tp o st w ould presum ably be to get th e m atter covered in a general defence a g re e m e n t. . . . ” 16

T he H o m e Secretary to the G ov ern m en t o f In d ia had also prepared a p a p e r on th e A n d am an a n d N ico b ar Islands w hich was discussed a t the V iceroy’s staff m ettin g held on A pril 10, 1947. In the context o f defence and quite co n tra ry to the B ritish view point it w as stated: “ T he strategic value o f the Islands was assessed by In d ia ’s D efence D ep artm en t an d the three Service H ead q u arters were o f th e considered opinion th a t the Islands were n o t required fo r th e d evelopm ent o f a N aval Base o r fo r positioning a m ilitary g a rrison b u t a sm all m eteorological statio n w ould be located in the Islands for the benefit o f th e A ir F o rc e .” 17

^ C o n tin u e d insistence fo r th e reten tio n o f A n d am an a n d N ico b ar Islands by th e B ritish M inistry o f D efence set in m otion lengthy debates and d ia lo gues a t the political an d a d m in istrativ e levels n o t only in B ritain a n d In d ia b u t also between B urm a, A u stralia a n d the representatives o f P akistan. T he issue also engulfed th e L accadive Islan d s w hich were also pro p o sed to be re tain ed by th e B ritish as a stag in g p o st for a ir com m unication between M asira a n d C eylon o r a link in th e overall C om m onw ealth com m unication netw ork.

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U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

A ccounts o f various Bills o f L egislatures, Proceedings o f th e C om m ittees, C onferences, m eetings and d o cu m en ts have been succinctly projected in Transfer o f Pow er 1942-47. In the co n tex t o f N aval H isto ry it w ould suffice to give view points o f vario u s governm ents an d agencies.

v ^ J ff p u rsu an ce o f th eir objective, the B ritish G o v ern m en t decided th a t n o th in g sh o u ld be d one in legislation18 o r said to the In d ian leaders to suggest th a t H is M ajesty’s G o v ern m en t accepted the view th a t the A n d am an and N ic o b a r Islan d s could be regarded as an organic p a rt o f B ritish In d ia. In th e ir view, th e ir status w as co m p a ra b le to th a t o f th e Settlem ent o f A den, a d m in istra tiv e responsibility o f w hich w as in 1936, by O rder-in-C ouncil under th e G o v erm en t o f In d ia A ct 1935. T h e B ritish felt th a t it was n o t desirable th a t th e V iceroy should ta k e th e initiative in raising th e issue w ith the Indian leaders. T h e B ritish were obviously aw are th a t the In d ian leaders w ould o b je c t vehem ently w hen th e Bill o f Legislation reg ard in g the independence o f S tates w as published. C o n sid eratio n was also given fo r introducing an a m e n d m ent while th e Bill w as in passage, if necessary, to m eet the In d ian reaction a fte r its p u b licatio n . A fter m uch discussions o f files the m atter w as left to th e V iceroy in D elhi to handle if th e situation arose.

T h e B ritish G o v ern m en t a n d th e V iceroy h ad a difficult ta sk to justify the retention o f th e A n d a m a n a n d N ic o b a r islan d s u n d er B ritish sovereignty as e arlier th e In d ia a n d B u rm a C om m ittee h a d not m ade any specific p r o vision in th e d ra ft Bill on th is ac c o u n t. Besides, S a rd a r P atel h ad already ta k e n a stan d w ith V iscount M o u n tb a tte n th a t “ the C ongress P arty certainly reg ard ed th e islands as p a r t o f B ritish In d ia an d th a t these were a C hief

/^ C o m m issio n e r’s p rovince u n d e r the G o v ern m en t o f In d ia A ct 1935.” It was obviously difficult fo r the V iceroy to go a lo n g w ith the directives fro m L ondon.

^ M o u n t b a t t e n w rote b ack fro m In d ia: “ It is, how ever, becom ing increasingly clear to me th a t an y a tte m p t by H is M ajesty ’s G o v ern m en t to claim the A n d a m a n Islan d s as colonies will cause an ab so lu te flare u p th ro u g h o u t th e length an d b re a d th o f In d ia . . . . M y own p osition will be p erm an en tly u n derm in ed if I were to a c t on b e h a lf o f H is M ajesty ’s G o v ern m en t in th is m a tter; it will, therefo re, have to be left to the H ig h C o m m issio n er o r som e o th e r au th o rity . B ut I believe th e only reasonable so lution w ould be to suggest som e fo rm o f jo in t co n tro l o r a leasing o f the naval an d a ir bases t r e a t y . . . . T h e one th in g I am quite certain a b o u t is th a t an y h ig h -h an d ed ac tio n by H is M ajesty ’s G o v ern m en t a b o u t these islands a t this m om ent will destro y all th e good feelings w h ich now exist betw een th e tw o c o u n trie s ... .” 19

R eiteratin g th e B ritish stan d , the Secretary o f S tate in his teleg ram to M o u n tb atten replied: “ It is clear, th erefo re, th a t we have to m ake definite choice betw een (a) se p a ra tin g A n d am an s an d N ic o b a rs fro m In d ia by B ritish L egislation (b) including islands in territo ry tra n sfe rre d to one o f th e new In d ia n D om inions (presum ably In d ia as distinct fro m P a k istan ) a n d relying solely on subsequent n e g o tia tio n s .. . . D ra ft bill w hich is in tra n s it to you deals w ith m atters, on lines a t (a). .. . W e desire to have yo u r advice u rg e n tly ... .” 20

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O n Ju n e 12, 1947, M o u n tb atten in his re p o rt to E arl o f Listowel (Secretary o f S tate fo r In d ia an d B urm a) expressed his views on the reaction o f the B ritish p ro p o sa l in the In d ian Press an d proposed negotiations w ith the political representatives o f the tw o dom inions to w ork out an acceptable solution. H e said: “ A statem en t ap p eared in th e Tim es o f India on June 9

saying th a t it is reliably u n d ersto o d th a t A nd am an and N ico b ar Islands are to be ceded to the B ritish . . . . This has b ro u g h t a sh a rp rejoinder in the Hindustan T im es on June 11 to the effect th a t B ritish G overnm ent have not raised the question o f the future o f these Islands w ith the Interim G overnm ent an d th a t if any suggestion o f the type is m entioned hereafter, it will be sum m arily rejected. In m y opinion th ere can no question o f raising this controversial subject a t the p resen t delicate stage . . . .” 21

T h e V iceroy’s22 fears ab o u t a violent reaction in the In d ian subcontinent evoked an im m ediate response fro m th e Secretary o f State w ho w ithin hours co m m unicated to M o u n tb atten th a t the B ritish C abinet C om m ittee were now o f the view th a t “ C lause 16 o f the Bill in its existing form w ould have to be om itted b u t if no o th e r pro v isio n is inserted, Islands will autom atically becom e a p a r t o f free In d ia by virtue o f clause 2(1) o f the Bill.”

It w ould a p p e a r th a t in spite o f the crisis in L ondon, British diplom acy was quick on the up tak e. C o n tin u ed the Secretary o f State to M ountbatten:

“ W e note th a t M uslim League claim th a t they are entitled to a share in the A n d am an s as an A ll-In d ia asset. . . . an d we should avoid, if possible, including th e A n d am an s in eith er In d ian D o m in io n p ending discussions ab o u t th e m .” 23 T he telegram also covered the fu tu re o f th e L accadives on strategic g rounds a n d discussed “ th eir tran sfer o r otherw ise to In d ia o r P a k ista n .” It culm inated in the expression o f the B ritish G overn m en t’s decision to retain th eir sovereignty over the A n dam ans, N ico b ars and the Laccadives.

On June 15, 1947, M o u n tb a tte n discussed the issue a t his 45th Staff M eeting. T he Viceroy having sensed the intensity o f In d ian sentim ents was cautious an d circum spect in regard to raising the to p ic d u rin g discussion on the Independence Bill. H e even considered suggesting reten tio n o f N ancow ry an d C a r N ico b ar by the B ritish a n d h an d in g over the A ndam ans to India.

M inutes o f this m eeting are quite interesting a n d state th a t “ H is Excellency was am azed to find in the d ra ft Bill provision th a t the A n d am an a n d N icobar Islan d s sh o u ld cease to be p a rt o f In d ia a fte r A ugust 15. B ut it was n o t for him to a tte m p t to disguise the in ten tio n s an d desires o f H is M ajesty’ G o vernm ent in this resp ect.” 24 H e considered th a t it w ould be b etter to allow this p a ra g ra p h to be circulated to th e leaders; to com e out into the open an d then to try to n eg o tiate a n agreem ent w ith them .

L o n d o n continued to feel th a t the Islands should n o t be handed over to In d ia o r P ak istan a n d suggested th a t in stead o f asking for the separation o f the Islands they sh o u ld seek perm ission fo r their continued use an d to p ro p o se th a t it w ould be b e tte r if these islands were to be adm inistered25 by a C om m issioner u n d er th e G o v ern o r G eneral o f India. Based on the Viceroy s reco m m en d atio n , it w as u n d ersto o d th a t th ere was no question o f raising the controversial issue a t th a t juncture.

5 0

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

W hile the In d ia n leaders were n o t aw are o f B ritish intentions, they were a p p a re n tly q u ite p re p a re d to consider extending staging facilities on these islands to a irc ra ft o f the R oyal A ir F orce a fte r independence. H ow ever, c o n s ta n t exchange o f ideas continued d u rin g June a n d L ondon yielded in deleting C lause 16 o f the Bill an d revising it w ith am en d ed C lause 15 (A p pendix ‘B’) w hich gave little m ore leverage to th e Viceroy in favouring Indian sentim ents.

By Ju ly 5, L o rd Listow el had conveyed the decision o f the B ritish C abinet C o m m ittee to M o u n tb a tte n in a telegram w hich read: “ G eo g rap h ical positio n o f these Islan d s m akes it im possible to assign them to P ak istan , n o r did any fo rm o f jo in t co n tro l by b o th In d ia an d P ak istan seem to us practicable.

W e felt th a t to exclude Islan d s alto g e th e r from eith er In d ia o r P akistan w ould n o t be acc e p tab le .” 26

M r. M o h a m m a d Ali J in n a h 27 reacted sh arp ly an d met the Viceroy the sam e day a n d h an d e d o v er a telegram addressed to the P rim e M inister and the L ead er o f the O p p o sitio n p ro te stin g ag ain st the exclusion o f the A n d a m ans from the Bill. F u rth e r, th a t th ere w as n o m achinery to ensure th a t the assets w ere fairly divided a n d th e ir tra n sfe r w as c o rrectly im plem ented. M r.

J in n a h ’s teleg ram continued: “ C lause 2 o f In d ian Independence Bill28 allots A n d a m a n a n d N ic o b a r Islan d s to D o m in io n o f In d ia . These islands have never fo rm e d subject to discussion o r agreem ent betw een p arties a t any tim e.

T h e ir sudden inclusion in In d ia raises very grave issue. T hey are n o t p a rt o f In d ia h isto rically o r geographically. T hey were B ritish possessions adm inistered by G o v e rn m e n t o f In d ia an d a re n o t in sam e ca te g o ry as o th e r C hief C o m m issio n ers’ P ro v in ces being reserved to G o v e rn o r G eneral u n d er C o n stitu tio n A ct 1935. M a jo rity o f p o p u la tio n consists o f tribes w ho are n o t connected w ith peoples o f In d ia by ethnical, religious o r cu ltu ral ties. P a k ista n ’s claim to these islands is very stro n g since only channcl o f co m m u n icatio n betw een E astern a n d W estern P a k ista n is by sea a n d these islands occupy im p o rta n t strateg ic p o sitio n on sea ro u te an d p ro v id e refuelling bases.

D o m in io n o f In d ia have n o claim . T h e y sh o u ld fo rm p a r t o f P a k is ta n .”

W hile M r. J in n a h ’s p ro te st raked th e issue a t L o n d o n again a n d gave fresh fuel fo r th e B ritish C hiefs o f Staff, w ho once again p re p a re d a fresh p a p e r em phasising the im p o rtan ce o f the In d ian Islands fo r C o m m o n w ealth D efence C o m m itm en ts in the F a r E a st a n d once again w ith the p ro p o sa l th a t these should be retain ed by the B ritish, a p p a re n tly L o n d o n decided ag ain st fu rth e r discussion on th e sensitive subject. I t w as felt p ru d e n t to go alo n g th e decision o f th e 35th m eeting o f In d ia a n d B u rm a C o m m ittee o f Ju n e 25, 1947 w herein it was stated in re g a rd to C lause 16 o f the Bill th a t a tte m p t sh o u ld be m ade to convince In d ian leaders th a t if th e p ro p o sa l to ad m in ister these islands by a C h ie f C om m issioner was n o t acceptable, the best solution to th e v irtu al impasse w as jo in t ow nership o f the Islan d s by th e tw o D o m in io n s a t th e tim e o f th e ir fo rm a tio n to be follow ed by neg o tiatio n s fo r extending c ertain facilities to the B ritish A ir F o rc e an d the N avy. T h e C om m ittee n oted: “ T h e V iceroy had com e to th e firm conclusion th a t n o p ro v isio n

TH E A N D A M A N S, N ICO BA RS A N D LA CCA D IV ES

51

should be included in the Bill ab o u t the A n d am an an d N ico b ar Islands. In his view, we should have to seek to obtain such strategic facilities as we m ight require, by negotiations th ro u g h the H igh C om m issioner for In d ia in due co u rse.” 29 T he C om m ittee thought, however, th a t “ the Viceroy should be asked to put to the In d ian leaders the clause to the effect th a t these islands w ould belong to the tw o Indian D om inions jo in tly p ending agreem ent u n less he was convinced th a t this w ould have definitely u n fo rtu n a te repurcussions. It could be p u t to them on the basis th a t H is M ajesty’s G overnm ent th o u g h t th a t this w ould be convenient arran g em en t between the tw o D om inions. T he Viceroy should, how ever, be inform ed th a t, if the Indian leaders could n o t agree to it, we should be p rep ared to om it any reference to these Islands from the Bill and to leave our interests to be d ealt w ith by negotiations w ith the new D om inion o f In d ia alo n e.”

REFERENCES

1. Singh, N. Iq b al, T he A nd am an Story, Vikas P ublishing H ouse P v t. L td ., New D elhi, 1978, p p . 134-35.

2. Ibid., p. 237.

3. Ibid., p . 248.

4. Ib id ., pp. 249-50.

5. Ib id ., p. 260.

6. Ibid., p. 264.

7. R ep o rt on the R oyal Indian N avy, July-D ee. 1945, N aval H ead q u arters (In d ia), 1946, p. 1.

8. Singh, N. Iqbal, op. cit., p. 265.

9. C ollins, D .J.E ., T he R oyal In d ian N avy, 1939-45, C om bined Inter-Services H isto rical Section, In d ia and P ak istan , 1964, pp. 320-21, and R e p o rt on the R oyal In d ian N avy, op. cit., p. 1.

10. N a ir (R e a r A dm iral), K .R ., R etd ., personal m aterial received.

11. R e p o rt on th e R oyal In d ian N avy, July-D ee. 1946, op. cit., 1947, p. 1, and m aterial received fro m N a ir (R e a r A d m iral) K .R ., R etd.

12. Singh, N . Iqbal, op. cit., p. 275.

13. T he T ran sfer o f Pow er, 1942-47, V olum e V III, E ditor-in-C hief, N icholas M ansergh, H er M ajesty ’s S tatio n ery Office, L o n d o n , 1979, p p . 56-57.

14. Ibid., V olum e X II, 1983, p. 801.

15. Ibid., V olum e IX , 1980, p p . 891-92.

16. Ibid., p. 992.

17. V iceroy’s Official C onference files, V .C .P. N o. 19 dated 8 A pril, 1947, In d ia Office L ib rary a n d R ecords, L o n d o n , p. 2.

18. T h e T ra n sfe r o f Pow er, 1942-47, op. cit., V olum e X, 1981, p . 1017.

19. Ib id ., V olum e X I, 1982, p. 306.

20. Ib id ., p . 313.

21. Ibid., p. 320.

5 2

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

22. Ibid., pp. 482-83, 602.

23. Ib id ., p. 502.

24. Ib id ., pp. 465-66.

25. Ib id ., p p . 482-83.

26. Ib id ., p. 907.

27. Ib id ., p . 936.

28. Ib id ., p p . 938-39.

29. Ib id ., p. 640.

4.

Th e Royal Indian N avy M u tin y ,

February 1 9 4 6

“ D u r i n g t h e w i n t e r o f 1945-46, the w orld p ictu re was one o f u n rest an d u p h eav al— in te rn a tio n a l, n atio n al and dom estic. T he Indian scene, in a d d itio n to the w orld-w ide econom ic an d dom estic upset, show ed high political tension an d w idespread cam paign fo r freedom fro m B ritish co n tro l. T he IN A trials had also taken place in late 1945. A nd w ithin the Indian scenc was th a t o f the R oyal In d ian N av y —a young over-expanded Service rapidly d isin teg ratin g in the ru sh to dem obilise, w ith the inspiration and binding incentive o f a com m on w ar u n ity an d w ar effort gone, living in a su p erch arged political a tm o sp h ere w ith its ow n ad d itio n al feelings o f disappointm ent, ap p reh en sio n , u n certain ty a n d unredressed grievances.” 1 This is how the p o st-W o rld W ar II scenario h as been described ju s t p rio r to the trau m atic experience the R oyal In d ia n N avy h a d o f the m utiny in F eb ru ary 1946.

By the tim e the W ar ended in 1945, th e Service2 had grow n very rap id ly .

F ro m a glorified flotilla w ith eig h t ships, som e sm all c ra ft a n d m inim al shore facilities w ith a stren g th o f a b o u t 1500 personnel p rio r to the W a r in 1939 in to a Service v irtu ally b ursting a t its seam s w ith nearly 300 ships an d c raft, som e designed an d b u ilt as naval vessels a n d the rest com m andeered fro m all possible sources a n d con v erted an d suitably arm ed fo r the purpose, a large n u m b er o f shore establishm ents a n d over 25,000 officers an d men.

T he m ain ta sk facing the naval a u th o rities a t th a t tim e w as tw o-fold— decom m issioning a n d assigning peacetim e roles to a large n um ber o f ships an d c ra ft an d , w h a t was m ore im p o rta n t, the d em obilisation, resettlem ent and reh ab ilitatio n o f several officers a n d ratin g s belonging to a wide variety o f ethnic, c u ltu ra l, religious, ed u catio n al, professional, linguistic and social b ack g ro u n d . T he la tte r assu m ed grim an d strid en t overtones w ith th e w inding up o f the num erous o rganisations w hich h a d m ushroom ed in a m ost ad hoc m an n er all o v er the co u n try d u rin g th e W ar. T his was fu rth e r ag g ravated by the decision tak en to reduce th e Servicc to a m uch sm aller force, based on the assessm ent o f the tim e th a t the p o ten tial enem ies o f the A llied F o rces in the region h a d alread y been totally a n n ih ila te d !

Salient features o f the mutiny

Som e o f th e b ro a d features o f the m utiny3 were: B om bay—processions

5 4

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

ta k e n o u t by th e N av al ratin g s; th e shouting o f slogans; burning o f the A m erican F la g in th e U .S . In fo rm a tio n Office; hoisting the C ongress, M uslim L eague a n d ‘J a i H in d ’ flags; low ering o f the N aval Ensign; and som e acts o f violence a n d exchange o f lire in the C astle B arracks between the m utineers a n d m ilitary p erso n n el w ho h ad been called in to quell the m utiny. K a ra c h i—

acts o f violence on H M I S Bahadur a n d H M I S H im alaya and a procession fro m th ere to H M I S C ham ak (R a d a r S chool); an d an exchange o f fire between th e m ilitary a n d th e m utineers o f I I M I S Hindustan, a sloop. A t other places, g en erally n o n -v io len t m easures such as refusal to w ork and hunger strik e w ere re so rte d to . W ith rare exceptions, th e behaviour o f the m utineers to w a rd s th e ir officers w as c o u rteo u s w ith th e usual m arks o f respect.

T he c asu alties3 suffered by th e m utineers an d th e others included one r a ting killed a n d six w o u n d ed , one R IN officer killed a n d one w ounded, two B ritish O th e r R a n k s w ounded in B om bay, a n d eight ratin g s killed an d 33

w o u n d ed (in clu d in g B ritish soldiers) in K arach i.

In resp o n se to a p p eals m ade by political leaders o f em inence such as S hri J a w a h a rla l N e h ru a n d S a rd a r V allab h b h ai P atel, the m utineers later su rren d ered . T he m utiny, how ever, h a d wide repurcussions all over the c o u n try a n d the C e n tra l Legislative A ssem bly discussed it on F eb ru ary 22

a n d 23, 1946. W hen it was ta k e n u p a t the D efence C onsultative C om m ittee M eeting held on M a rc h 8, 1946, Field M arsh al Sir C laude A uchinleck, the th en C o m m a n d e r-in -C h ie f o f the th ree Services, recom m ended a C om m ission o f E n q u iry a t the conclusion o f the discussions. T h e C om m ission, as p ro p o sed by him , was to en q u ire in to a n d re p o rt on “ the causes a n d origin o f the recent m u tin y in th e R oyal In d ia n N av y .”

T he fo rm al a n n o u n c e m e n t on th e a p p o in tm e n t o f a C om m ission o f E n quiry was subsequently m ade by th e W a r D e p a rtm e n t in A pril 1946. The C om m ission4 w as to consist of: C h a irm a n —T h e H o n o u rab le Sir Saiyed F azi Ali, C hief Justice o f P a tn a H ig h C o u rt; Judicial M e m b e rs—M r. Justice K .S. K rish n asw am y Iyengar, C hief Justice o f the th en C ochin S tate and M r. Justice M .C . M a h ajan , Judge o f the L ah o re H ig h C o u rt; Service M em bers—Vice A dm iral W .R . P a tte rso n , F lag Officer C o m m an d in g the C ruiser S quadron in the E a st Indies F leet a n d M ajo r G eneral T .W . R ees, C o m m an d er o f the F o u rth In d ian D ivision.

THE M U TINY

T he M utiny5 originated on F eb ru ary 18, 1946 on th e th en H M IS Talwar, the N av y ’s W ireless C o m m unication E stab lish m en t in B om bay (even shore establishm ents are referred to as ships in naval parlance) an d th en sp read to various naval ships6 an d establishm ents all over the co u n try a n d even beyond In d ian shores. O nly a few rem ained unaffected. Ten estab lish m en ts a n d 45

ships, besides 11 m iscellaneous ships an d fo u r flotillas, joined th e m utiny. T he m ajo r shore establishm ents and ships involved were: B om bay

The R oyal Indian Navy D ep o t: T his com prised th e C astle B arrack s (now

T H E ROY AL IN D IA N NA V Y M U TIN Y

5 5

N aval B arracks) w hich housed ab o u t 900 ratings belonging to the ships in the N aval D ock y ard and those aw aiting ap p o in tm en t to oth er ships o r to the release centres, the F o rt B arracks w hich housed the H .O . (H ostilities O nly) ratings, the C en tral C om m unication Office w hich handled all signal traffic fo r naval au th o rities in B om bay, the C o lab a Receiving Station w hich was a wireless receiving statio n m anned by a b o u t 80 ratings, the M ahul W ireless Station in T ro m b ay Island, 14 miles aw ay fro m Bom bay, w hich housed the naval wireless tran sm itters an d was staffed by ab o u t 50 ratings a n d the R IN H ospital a t Sevvri w hich h ad a bed stren g th o f 300 an d a 220

stro n g staff including nursing staff know n as Sick B erth A ttendants.

O ther Establishments'. H M I S Talwar w hich tra in e d all visual and wireless com m unication ratings; H M I S M achlim ar a t V ersova, 12 miles aw ay from B om bay, w hich was m anned by 300 ratings a n d w hich im parted training in an ti-su b m arin e o p era tio n s; H M I S H am la a t M arve, 20 miles aw ay from B om bay, w hich housed the L anding C ra ft W ing o f the R IN w ith ab o u t 600

ratin g s; H M IS K akauri, th e dem obilisation centre h ousing over 1400 ratings; H M IS C heetah, the second d em obilisation centre situ ated on T rom bay Islan d ; H M IS A kb a r situ ated a t K olsett, 28 miles aw ay from B om bay, an d com prising a cookery school, a physical train in g centre, a few units to co n d u ct som e m iscellaneous courses an d a train in g school w hich u n d erto o k the basic train in g o f 3000 recruits a t a tim e for Special Service ratings (500 were th ere a t the tim e o f the m utiny); a n d H M I S Feroze, situated on M alabar H ill, B om bay w hich initially u n d e rto o k train in g o f Reserve Officers and later becam e the d em obilisation centre for officers (it h ad 120 ratings a t the tim e o f the m utiny).

Ships: S lo o p s— H M I S Narbada an d Jum na; F rig ate— H M IS Dhanush; C o rv ettes — H M I S Gondwana, A ssa m , M aharatta an d S in d ; F leet M inesw eepers— H M I S K um aon, K athiaw ar, Khyber, Punjab, Bom bay, M adras, Orissa, a n d Oudh; O ld S loops— H M IS Clive a n d Law rence; T raw lers—

H M I S Agra, C u tta ck, K arachi, Lahore, M adura, N autilus, N asik, Patna, Poona, Ram pur, Berar, Am ritsar a n d Cochin; E x-Persian G u n b o ats H M IS

N il am , M o ti, L a i an d Heera; A uxiliary Vessels— H M I S Kalavati, Ramdas, D ipavati an d Bhadravali; th ere were also a few M o to r M inesweepers.

K a r a c h i

Shore E stablishm ents: H M I S Bahadur, B oy’s T rain in g E stablishm ent, Cham ak, the R a d a r School a n d H im a la ya th e G u n n ery School.

Ships: H M I S H industan an d Travancore; M o to r L au n ch 1262.

M a d r a s

S hore E stablishm ent: H M I S Adyar.

C a l c u t t a

S hore E stab lish m en t: H M I S H ooghly (now I N S N etaji Subhasli).

Ship: H M I S Rajputana.

5 6

U N D E R T W O ENSIGNS

C o c h i n

Shore Establishm ent: H M I S Venduruthy.

Ships: H M I S Baroda a n d som e launches, etc.

L o n a v l a

Shore E stablishm ent: H M IS Shivaji, th e N av y ’s M echanical T raining E stablishm ent, w hich train ed artificers an d stokers. It could accom m odate 800 ratings.

J a m n a g a r

S hore E stablishm ent: H M I S Valsura, the E lectrical an d T o rp ed o T ra in ing School, w hich acco m m o d ated a b o u t 300 ratings.

V l S H A K H A P A T N A M

S hore E stab lish m en t: H M I S Circars.

Ships: H M I S Sonavati, A hm edabad an d Shillong', a n d certain flotillas.

M a n d a p a m

S hore E stab lish m en t: H M I S Tengra.

A d e n

S hore E stab lish m en t: W /T S tatio n .

B a h r a i n

S hore E stab lish m en t: W /T Station.

A n d a m a n & N i c o b a r I s l a n d s

Ships: H M I S R oliilkhand, H ongkong, Deccan, Bengal, Bihar, Baluchistan a n d K istna.

N e w D e l h i

S h o re E stab lish m en t: H M I S India.

T h e follow ing ships a n d establishm ents, how ever, did n o t m utiny: H M I S Sham sher, a frig a te — th e so lita ry exception a t B om bay; H M IS

Dilawar, a B oys’ T ra in in g E stab lish m en t, a n d M o to r L a u n ch 1261 a t K arach i; a slo o p , a t M a d ra s; H M I S Barracuda, a d e p o t ship, a t C alcu tta; M o to r M inesw eeper 154, a launch a t C ochin; H M I S Tir, a frigate a t V ish ak h ap atn am ; H M I S Investigator, a survey sh ip a n d Llanstephen Castle, a d e p o t ship a t T rin co m alee; H M I S Cauvery a n d H M I S S u tle j, b o th sloops in the Pacific a n d H M I S C alcutta, w hich w as a t sea.

S u b -L ieu ten an t R .K .S . G h a n d h i (later Vice A d m iral a n d F la g Officer C o m m an d in g -in -C h ief o f the W estern N av al C o m m an d ) has the follow ing to say w ith reg ard to H M I S Sham sher, th e only ship w hich d id n o t p articip ate in th e M u tin y a t B om bay7:

“ A fter co m pleting m y S u b -L ieu ten an t C ourses in E ngland, I arriv ed back

T H E RO Y A L IN D IA N N A V Y M U TINY

5 7

in In d ia in O cto b er 1945 an d jo in ed H M I S Sham sher. Sham sher w as a river class frigate w hich we had recently acquired from the Royal N avy an d I was p a rt o f its first com m ission. T he officers a t th a t tim e were, C om m anding Officer L ieu ten an t K rish n an , Executive Officer L ieutenant G a u tam Singh, Engineer Officer L ieutenant C om m an d er B hushan, Senior Engineer Lieutena n t Z ah id H assain, Surgeon L ieutenant M o h in d er Singh, Supply Officer L ieu ten an t E.L . P in to , C o m m u n icatio n Officer L ieutenant A m eer A slam and S ub-L ieutenant A n th o n y Pillai. T here were a couple o f B ritishers also; one was L ieutenant H am m o n d an d the o th e r was a S ub-L ieutenant w hose nam e I forgot. W hen I jo in ed , I w as th e N av ig atin g Officer, G u n n e ry Officer and incharge o f th e mess an d wines.

“ A t th a t tim e Sham sher w as a test ship a n d p ro b ab ly the B ritishers were trying it as an experim ent, in th a t it was p ractically, in toto, a ship m anned by In d ian officers. T his p erio d was one o f g reat confusion a n d speculation am o n g st the reserve officers o f the In d ian N avy. T he B ritish G overnm ent h ad decided th a t the p o st-W a r stre n g th o f the In d ian N avy w as to be a n induction o f only 100 reserve officers to the p erm an en t cad re o f which 66

w ould be In d ian s an d 34 w ould be B ritish. T herefore, a g reat deal o f tim e and energy was spent by reserve officers sitting a t th e Coffee H ouse discussing th e ir future em ploym ent. I well rem em ber a t th a t tim e th a t I was shocked to see officers spending so m uch o f their w orking h o u rs aw ay fro m th eir ships and in th e evening also th ere w ould h ard ly be an y officer on b o a rd to look a fter the men.

“ By a n d large, Sham sher was a h a p p y ship, an efficient ship, and as wc d id a g reat deal o f sea tim e, we w ere aw ay from th e flesh p o ts o f Bom bay, w hich all helped. K rish n an was a great leader an d even those days he alw ays called him self C a p ta in .

“ In F e b ru ary 1946 (th e exact d ate I do n o t rem em ber), we were a t sea on passage N o rth w ard s to B om bay. D u rin g the dog w atches, (evening duty ho u rs), we received a m essage fro m B om bay W /T th a t th e R oyal Indian N avy sailors m utinied a n d th a t the leader h ad requested all ships to do likewise. O n th e heels o f the first signal, we received an o th e r signal giving the list o f the ships th a t h ad m utinied. A m eer A slam w as th e C om m unication Officer w ho dashed up to th e bridge a n d show ed me this signal, having in fo rm ed me th a t he h ad given a co p y to th e C a p ta in . A s so o n as I saw this signal, I ru sh ed d o w n stairs a n d to ld th e C ap tain th a t it was o u r d u ty —and I p ro p o sed to h im — th a t we en ter B om bay H a rb o u r an d b o m b ard the R oyal B om bay Y ach t C lub. I t m u st be rem em bered th a t before Independence the R oyal B om bay Y ach t C lub did n o t a d m it an y In d ian s a n d this was a very so re p o in t w ith me. W hen I to ld L ieu ten an t K rish n an th a t we should b o m b a rd the Y ach t C lub he w as qu ite shocked a n d taken aback an d tu rn ed ro u n d to m e a n d said ‘th a n k y o u . Please go up to th e bridge a n d keep w atch o r w ords to this effect a n d he m ade m e feel th a t th is was n o t a very m ature th in g to do. I p lead ed w ith him a n d to ld h im once again th a t we m ust open fire on the Y acht C lub a t B om bay. H e once again to ld m e to go u p to the b rid g e w hich I d id .

5 8

U N D ER T W O ENSIGNS

“ W hilst I was on the bridge, A m eer A slam an d I were discussing the news a n d he having com e up th ro u g h the lower deck, a com m unication sailor, knew som e o f the m en whose nam es were being m entioned as leaders o f the m utiny. A slam sh o rtly th e re a fter w ent dow nstairs, cam e back again to tell m e th a t there was a conference going on in the C o m m an d in g Officer’s cabin w ith all the senior officers, including L ieu ten an t H am m ond.

“ By this tim e, the low er deck (sailors q u arters) h ad alre a d y got the info rm a tio n th a t a m utiny h a d tak en place an d fro m the bridge I could see sm all k n o ts o f sailors talk in g a n d gossiping.

“ A t a b o u t 8.00 p .m . we received a m essage fro m the F lag Officer, B om bay, in fo rm in g us th a t a n a irc ra ft h ad ditched a b o u t 200 miles west o f B o m b ay a n d th a t we w ere to p ro ceed there a n d carry o u t a search. T he C a p ta in cam e up to the bridge a n d asked m e to lay out the course to the d itch ed a irc ra ft a n d th e re a fte r we altered course n o rth -w estw ard fo r this p o sitio n . T he sailors o f c o u rse knew a t once th a t instead o f entering Bom bay h a rb o u r a n d jo in in g th eir sh ip m ates in m utiny, we h ad altered the course o f th e ship a n d feelings began to get h o t on the low er deck.

“ A fter n ig h t ro u n d s, G a u ta m Singh in fo rm ed the C ap tain th a t the men were im p a tie n t a n d th a t we should clear low er deck a n d explain the situation to them . L ieu ten an t K rish n an , know ing my views an d presum ing quite rightly th a t I w as a h o t head, directed th a t I go up to th e bridge a n d keep w atch w hile he ad d ressed th e low er deck a n d the officers. T herefore, I was n o t a ctu ally p re se n t to h e a r K ris h n a n ’s fam ous speech b u t A slam cam e up im m ed iately a fte r a n d to ld m e o f the very goo d th e a tric a l p erfo rm an ce o f the C o m m an d in g Officer. H e explained to the m en w h at m utiny was. H e fu rth er explained to th em th a t he w as as m uch an In d ian as a n y one else. H e tore open his sh irt a n d exclaim ed th a t if his b o d y w as cu t, black In d ian blood w ould flow o u t o f it. He m anaged to calm dow n the sailors a n d to ld them th a t we w ere on a ta sk o f m ercy to search fo r a ditched aircraft.

“ A b o u t 48 hours la te r we en tered B om bay h a rb o u r to find th e entire In d ian N avy a t a n c h o r w ith black flags flying fro m the m astheads. O f course before th a t we h ad h eard on the All In d ia R ad io th a t G o rk h a soldiers had b o ard ed o u r rin g lead ers’ ship a t K arach i an d th a t fo r all in ten ts a n d p u rp o se the m utiny was over a n d the ring leaders behind b ars. As we entered B om bay h a rb o u r, it was such a sad sight to see soldiers in K h a k i u n ifo rm w ith guns on th e u p p e r deck o f o u r ships. W e w ere also asked to h o ist the b lack flag b u t this th e C a p ta in refused to d o as all o f us h ad to ld him th a t we w ould n o t d o it w hen we a re th e only ship w hich never m utinied.

“ As so o n as we en tered a n d the gangw ay w as low ered, a b o a t cam e a lo n g side a n d a fa ir-h a ired officer o f th e ra n k o f L ie u ten an t step p ed on b oard a n d I o v erh eard him telling L ie u ten an t K rish n an th a t he w an ted th e firing p in m echanism s fro m my guns, rifles a n d revolvers. I to ld th e C a p tain th a t I refuse to give the firing pins to th is B ritisher w h ereupon b o th officers laughed an d L ie u ten an t K rish n an in tro d u ced me to L ie u te n a n t M u k a t K aul w hom I have know n ever since. A t th a t tim e K au l h a d a b so lu te b lo n d e h air,

THE R O Y A L IN D IA N NA V Y M U TIN Y

5 9

a n d looked like an E nglishm an ! T hus ended the saga o f In d ian M utiny as seen fro m Sham sher the only ship w hich did n o t m utiny.

“ M any years a fter the event, K rish n an told me th a t he had engineered w ith A slam the diversionary signal fo r the ditched a irc ra ft!”

L ieutenant K rish n an , w ho won the D istinguished Service Cross in action in the P ersian G u lf in 1941, rose to the ra n k o f Vice A dm iral a n d was the F lag Officer C o m m an d in g -in -C h ief o f the E astern N aval C om m and before retirem en t. H e was present a t the tim e o f P ak istan i G eneral N iazi’s su rren d er to o u r forces in D ecem ber 1971 a t D h a k a a fte r the In d o -P ak conflict.

H e died in 1981.

Discipline during the war

D u rin g W orld W a r II, the discipline8 in the R IN ap p eared to have been satisfacto ry on the w hole. M any senior officers an d o th ers even described it as excellent! T h e C om m ission, how ever, stated: “ one c a n n o t overlook the num ero u s mutinies^which have occurred in N av y ’s ships an d Establishm ents d u rin g the W a r.” \T h e re were nine m utinies9 betw een 1942 a n d 1945 an d th e C om m ission recorded th a t “ the m an n er in w hich the m utinies originated show th a t m any o f the ratings were p ro n e to indiscipline a n d had exaggerated n o tio n s a b o u t th eir rights w hich reacted u n favourably on th eir sense o f d u ty a n d loyalty to the Service. T he investigation w hich follow ed som e o f the m utinies has fu rth e r disclosed th a t th ere were faults in the a d m in istratio n a n d th a t th ere was considerable ro o m fo r im provem ent in the conditions o f Service.” A fter the m utiny in M arch 1942 in th e M echanical T raining E stab lish m en t a t B om bay, the then F la g Officer C o m m an d in g R oyal Indian N avy, Vice A dm iral Sir H erb ert F itz h e rb e rt cam e to the co n clu sio n 10 th a t

“ H a d the officers m aintained p ro p e r co n ta c t w ith the apprentices an d had th e general discipline o f th e E stablishm ent been in a satisfactory state, the o u tb re a k o f indiscipline could n o t have occu rred .” In Ja n u ary 1943 A dm iral F itz h e rb e rt w as so alarm ed a t the state o f indiscipline in th e N avy th a t he fo u n d it necessary to circulate the follow ing n o te to th e C om m anding Officers o f all the ships a n d E stablishm ents:

“ I am d istu rb ed over the num b er o f cases o f in su b o rd in atio n w hich have occurred recently in H is M ajesty ’s In d ian Ships. The frequency w ith w hich th ese cases have o ccurred points to the fa c t th a t th ere is som ething in h erently w ro n g w ith th e way Ships’ C om panies have been handled by th eir officers.

“ I have given the fullest co n sid eratio n to the recent causes an d am convinced th a t in nearly all cases, th e ro o t cause was th e m ishandling o f the situ atio n by th e officers, usually a t a very early stage.

“ N ap o leo n said ‘T here a re n o t bad m en, there a re only b ad officers.’ The tru th o f this statem en t is am ply b o rn e o u t by recent happenings. It is necessary fo r m e to en u n ciate certain tru th s concerning th e h andling o f the men w hich sh o u ld be know n b u t a re a p p a re n tly n o t ap p reciated by all officers.

“ T he first a n d m o st im p o rta n t o f all activities indulged in by any officer

5 8

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

“ W hilst I w as on the bridge, A m eer A sla m a n d I were discussing the news a n d he h av in g com e up th ro u g h the low er deck, a com m unication sailor, knew som e o f th e m en w hose nam es w ere being m entioned as leaders o f the m u tiny. A slam sh o rtly th e re a fter w ent d o w n stairs, cam e back again to tell m e th a t there w as a conference going on in the C o m m an d in g Officer’s cabin w ith all the sen io r officers, including L ieu ten an t H am m o n d .

“ By th is tim e, th e low er deck (sailors q u arters) h a d a lre a d y got the in fo rm a tio n th a t a m u tin y h a d tak en place an d fro m the bridge I could see sm all k n o ts o f sailo rs talk in g a n d gossiping.

“ A t a b o u t 8.00 p .m . we received a m essage fro m the F lag Officer, B om bay, in fo rm in g us th a t a n a irc ra ft h a d ditch ed a b o u t 200 miles w est o f B o m b ay a n d th a t we w ere to proceed th ere a n d carry o u t a search. T he C a p ta in cam e u p to th e bridge a n d asked m e to lay o u t the course to the d itc h e d a irc ra ft a n d th e re a fte r we altered course n o rth -w estw ard fo r this p o sitio n . T h e sailo rs o f c o u rse knew a t once th a t instead o f entering B om bay h a rb o u r a n d jo in in g th e ir sh ip m ates in m u tiny, we h ad alte re d the course o f th e ship a n d feelings b egan to get h o t on th e low er deck.

“ A fte r n ig h t ro u n d s, G a u ta m Singh inform ed the C a p tain th a t the men w ere im p a tie n t a n d th a t we should clear low er deck a n d explain the situation to them . L ie u te n a n t K rish n a n , k now ing my views an d p resum ing quite rightly th a t I w as a h o t h e a d , d irected th a t I go up to the bridge a n d keep w atch w hile he ad d re sse d th e low er deck a n d the officers. T h erefo re, I was n o t a c tu a lly p re se n t to h e a r K ris h n a n ’s fam o u s speech b u t A slam cam e up im m ed iately a fte r a n d to ld m e o f the very goo d th e atrical p erfo rm an ce o f the C o m m a n d in g Officer. H e explained to the m en w h a t m utiny w as. H e fu rth er ex p lain ed to th em th a t he w as as m uch a n In d ia n as a n y one else. H e tore o p en his sh irt a n d exclaim ed th a t if his b o d y w as c u t, black In d ian blood w ould flow o u t o f it. H e m an ag ed to calm d ow n th e sailors a n d told them th a t we w ere on a ta sk o f m ercy to search fo r a d itch ed a ircraft.

“ A b o u t 48 h o u rs la te r we e n te re d B om bay h a rb o u r to find the entire In d ia n N av y a t a n c h o r w ith black flags flying fro m the m asth ead s. O f course b e fo re th a t we h a d h e a rd on the All In d ia R ad io th a t G o rk h a soldiers had b o a rd e d o u r rin g le a d e rs’ ship a t K a rach i a n d th a t fo r all in ten ts a n d p u rp o se the m utiny w as o v er a n d th e rin g lead ers b eh in d b ars. As we entered B o m b ay h a rb o u r, it w as such a sad sight to see soldiers in K h a k i u niform w ith guns o n th e u p p e r deck o f o u r ships. W e w ere also ask ed to h o ist the b lack flag b u t th is th e C a p ta in refused to d o as all o f us h a d to ld him th a t we w ould n o t d o it w hen we a re th e only ship w hich n ever m utinied.

“ A s so o n as we e n te re d a n d th e gangw ay w as low ered, a b o a t cam e a lo n g side a n d a fa ir-h a ired officer o f th e ra n k o f L ie u te n a n t ste p p ed on b o ard a n d I o v erh eard him telling L ie u ten an t K rish n a n th a t he w a n te d th e firing p in m echanism s fro m m y guns, rifles a n d revolvers. I to ld th e C a p ta in th a t I refuse to give the firing pins to th is B ritisher w h ereu p o n b o th officers laughed a n d L ie u te n a n t K rish n a n in tro d u ced m e to L ie u te n a n t M u k a t K au l w hom I have know n ever since. A t th a t tim e K a u l h ad ab so lu te b lo n d e hair,

TH E R O Y A L IN D IA N N A V Y M U TIN Y

5 9

an d looked like an E nglishm an ! T hus ended the saga o f In d ia n M u tin y as seen from Sham sher the only ship w hich did n o t m utiny.

“ M any years a fte r the event, K rish n an told m e th a t he h ad engineered with A slam the div ersio n ary signal fo r the ditch ed a ir c r a f t! ”

L ieutenant K rish n a n , w ho w on the D istinguished Service C ross in actio n in the P ersian G u lf in 1941, rose to the ra n k o f Vice A d m iral a n d w as the F lag Officer C o m m an d in g -in -C h ief o f the E a stern N av al C o m m a n d before retirem en t. H e was p resen t a t the tim e o f P a k istan i G en eral N ia z i’s su rre n d e r to o u r forces in D ecem ber 1971 a t D h a k a a fte r the In d o -P a k conflict.

H e died in 1981.

Discipline during the war

D u rin g W orld W a r II, the discipline8 in the R I N a p p e a re d to have been sa tisfa c to ry on the w hole. M an y senior officers a n d o th ers even described it as excellent! T h e C om m ission, how ever, stated: “ one c a n n o t o verlook the num erous m utinies w hich have occurred in N a v y ’s ships a n d E stab lish m en ts d u rin g th e W a r.” T h ere were nine m utinies9 betw een 1942 a n d 1945 a n d .

the C om m ission recorded th a t “ the m an n er in w hich th e m utinies o rig in ated show th a t m any o f the ratings were p ro n e to indiscipline a n d h a d exaggerated n o tio n s a b o u t th eir rights w hich reacted u n fav o u rab ly on th eir sense o f d u ty a n d loyalty to the Service. T h e investigation w hich follow ed som e o f th e m utinies has fu rth e r disclosed th a t th ere were fau lts in the a d m in istra tio n a n d th a t th ere w as c o n sid erab le ro o m fo r im p ro v em en t in th e co nditions o f Service.” A fter the m u tin y in M arch 1942 in th e M echanical T ra in in g E stab lish m en t a t B om bay, th e then F la g Officer C o m m an d in g R oyal In d ia n N avy, Vice A dm iral Sir H e rb ert F itz h e rb e rt cam e to th e co n c lu sio n 10 th a t

“ H a d the officers m ain tain ed p ro p e r co n ta c t w ith th e ap p ren tices a n d h ad the general discipline o f th e E stab lish m en t been in a satisfacto ry sta te , the o u tb re a k o f indiscipline could n o t have o ccu rred .” In Ja n u a ry 1943 A d m iral F itz h e rb e rt was so a larm ed a t the sta te o f indiscipline in th e N avy th a t he fo u n d it necessary to circulate the follow ing n o te to th e C o m m an d in g Officers o f all th e ships a n d E stablishm ents:

“ I am d istu rb ed o v er th e num b er o f cases o f in su b o rd in atio n w hich have o ccu rred recently in H is M a je sty ’s In d ia n Ships. T h e frequency w ith w hich th ese cases have o ccu rred points to the fa c t th a t th e re is so m eth in g in h e ren tly w ro n g w ith th e w ay Ships’ C o m p an ies have been h an d led by th eir officers.

“ I have given th e fu llest co n sid eratio n to th e re cen t causes a n d a m co n v in ced th a t in n early a ll cases, th e ro o t cause was th e m ish an d lin g o f th e situ atio n by th e officers, u su ally a t a very early stage.

“ N a p o le o n said ‘T h e re a re n o t b ad m en, th ere a re only b ad officers.’ T he tr u th o f this sta te m e n t is a m p ly b o rn e o u t by recen t h appenings. It is necessa ry fo r m e to e n u n ciate certain tru th s co n cern in g th e h an d lin g o f th e m en w hich sh o u ld be k n o w n b u t a re a p p a re n tly n o t a p p reciated by all officers.

“ T h e first a n d m o st im p o r ta n t o f all activities indulged in by an y officer

5 8

U N D ER T W O ENSIGNS

“ W hilst I was on the bridge, A m eer A slam an d I were discussing the news and he having com e up th ro u g h the low er deck, a com m unication sailor, knew som e o f th e m en w hose nam es were being m entioned as leaders o f the m utiny. A slam sh o rtly th e reafter w ent d o w n stairs, cam e back again to tell m e th a t there was a conference going on in the C o m m an d in g Officer’s cabin w ith all th e senior officers, including L ieu ten an t H am m o n d .

“ By th is tim e, the low er deck (sailors q u arters) h a d a lre a d y g o t the info rm atio n th a t a m utiny h a d tak en place an d fro m th e bridge I could see sm all k n o ts o f sailors talk in g a n d gossiping.

“ A t a b o u t 8.00 p .m . we received a m essage fro m the F lag Officer, B om bay, in fo rm in g us th a t a n a irc ra ft h a d ditched a b o u t 200 miles w est o f B om bay a n d th a t we w ere to proceed there a n d carry o u t a search. The C a p tain cam e u p to th e bridge a n d asked m e to lay o u t the course to the ditched a irc ra ft a n d th e re a fte r we altered course n o rth -w estw ard fo r this position. T h e sailors o f course knew a t once th a t instead o f entering B om bay h a rb o u r a n d jo in in g th e ir sh ip m ates in m utiny, we h ad a lte re d the course o f the ship a n d feelings began to get h o t o n the low er deck.

“ A fter n ig h t ro u n d s, G a u ta m Singh inform ed the C ap tain th a t the men w ere im p a tie n t a n d th a t we should clear low er deck a n d explain the situ atio n to them . L ie u te n a n t K rish n a n , k now ing my views and presum ing quite rightly th a t I w as a h o t h ead , directed th a t I go up to th e bridge a n d keep w atch w hile he ad d re sse d th e low er deck a n d th e officers. T herefore, I was n o t actually p re se n t to h e a r K ris h n a n ’s fam o u s speech b u t A slam cam e up im m ediately a fte r a n d to ld me o f the very goo d th e a tric a l p erfo rm an ce o f the C o m m an d in g Officer. H e explained to th e men w h at m utiny was. H e fu rth e r explained to th e m th a t he w as as m u ch a n In d ia n as an y one else. H e tore o pen his sh irt a n d exclaim ed th a t if his b o d y w as cu t, b lack In d ian blood w ould flow o u t o f it. H e m an ag ed to calm d ow n th e sailors a n d to ld them th a t we w ere on a ta sk o f m ercy to search fo r a d itched a ircraft.

“ A b o u t 48 h o u rs la te r we e n tered B om bay h a rb o u r to find the entire In d ian N avy a t a n c h o r w ith black flags flying fro m the m asth ead s. O f course b efo re th a t we h a d h eard on the A ll In d ia R ad io th a t G o rk h a soldiers h ad b o ard ed o u r rin g lead ers’ ship a t K arach i a n d th a t fo r all in te n ts a n d p u rp o se the m u tin y w as over a n d the rin g leaders b eh in d b ars. As we entered B om bay h a rb o u r, it w as such a sad sig h t to see soldiers in K h a k i u niform w ith guns on th e u p p e r deck o f o u r ships. W e w ere also ask ed to h o ist the black flag b u t th is th e C a p ta in refu sed to d o as all o f us h a d to ld him th a t we w ould n o t do it w hen we a re th e only ship w hich never m utinied.

“ As so o n as we en tered a n d the gangw ay w as low ered, a b o a t cam e a lo n g side a n d a fa ir-h a ired officer o f th e ra n k o f L ie u te n a n t step p ed on b o ard a n d I o v erh eard him telling L ie u te n a n t K rish n a n th a t he w a n te d th e firing pin m echanism s fro m m y guns, rifles a n d revolvers. I to ld th e C a p tain th a t I refuse to give th e firing pins to th is B ritisher w h ereu p o n b o th officers laughed a n d L ie u te n a n t K rish n a n in tro d u ced m e to L ie u te n a n t M u k a t K au l w hom I have know n ever since. A t th a t tim e K aul h a d a b so lu te b lo n d e h air,

THE ROY AL IN D IA N NAVY MUTINY

5 9

an d looked like an E nglishm an ! Thus ended the saga o f Indian M utiny as seen fro m Sham sher the only ship which did n o t mutiny.

“ M any years a fter the event, K rishnan told me th at he had engineered w ith A slam the diversionary signal for the ditched a irc ra ft!”

L ieutenant K rish n an , w ho won the D istinguished Service Cross in action in the Persian G u lf in 1941, rose to the ran k o f Vice A dm iral and was the F lag Officer C o m m anding-in-C hief o f the E astern N aval C om m and before retirem ent. He was present a t the tim e o f P ak istan i G eneral N iazi’s surre n d e r to o u r forces in D ecem ber 1971 a t D h a k a a fter the Indo-P ak conflict.

1-Ie died in 1981.

Discipline during the war

D u rin g W orld W a r II, the discipline8 in the R IN ap p eared to have been satisfacto ry on the w hole. M any senior officers an d others even described it as excellent! T h e C om m ission, how ever, stated: “ one c a n n o t overlook the num erous m utinies w hich have occurred in N avy’s ships an d Establishm ents d u rin g the W ar.’A T here were nine m utinies9 between 1942 a n d 1945 an d th e C om m ission recorded th a t “ the m an n er in w hich the m utinies originated show th a t m any o f the ratings were p ro n e to indiscipline an d had exaggerated n o tions a b o u t th eir rights w hich reacted unfavourably on their sense of d u ty a n d loyalty to the Service. T he investigation w hich follow ed some o f the m utinies has fu rth e r disclosed th a t th ere were faults in the ad m in istratio n a n d th a t th ere was considerable ro o m for im provem ent in the conditions o f Service.” A fter the m utiny in M arch 1942 in th e M echanical T raining E stab lish m en t a t B om bay, the then F lag Officer C o m m anding R oyal Indian N avy, Vice A dm iral Sir H erb ert F itz h e rb e rt cam e to the conclusion10 th a t

“ H a d the officers m aintained p ro p er c o n tact w ith the apprentices an d had th e general discipline o f th e E stablishm ent been in a satisfactory state, the o u tb re a k o f indiscipline could n o t have occurred.” In Jan u ary 1943 A dm iral F itz h e rb e rt was so alarm ed a t the state o f indiscipline in the N avy th a t he fo u n d it necessary to circulate the follow ing note to th e C om m anding Officers o f all th e ships a n d E stablishm ents:

“ I am d istu rb ed over the num ber o f cases o f insubordination w hich have o ccu rred recently in H is M ajesty ’s In d ia n Ships. T he frequency w ith w hich th ese cases have o ccurred points to the fa c t th a t th ere is som ething in h eren tly w ro n g w ith th e way Ships’ C om panies have been handled by th eir officers.

“ I have given the fullest consideration to th e recent causes an d am convinced th a t in nearly all cases, th e ro o t cause was th e m ishandling o f the situatio n by th e officers, u su ally a t a very early stage.

“ N ap o leo n said ‘T here a re n o t b ad m en, th ere a re only bad officers. T he tru th o f this statem en t is am p ly b o rn e o u t by recent happenings. It is necessary fo r m e to en u n ciate certain tru th s concerning the handling o f the men w hich sh o u ld be know n b u t a re a p p a ren tly n o t ap p reciated by all officers.

“ T h e first a n d m o st im p o rta n t o f all activities indulged in by any officer

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sh o u ld be the achievem ent o f com plete tru st between the men an d th eir officers. This can only be achieved by close an d intim ate co n ta c t an d the exercise o f ta c t coupled w ith firm ness when this is called for.

“ I t m u st be rem em bered th a t no tw o men a re alike. All have different p erso n alities a n d ch aracteristics and the sam e tre a tm e n t fo r the sam e o ffence is rarely justified. Tn this co nnection, I w ould once again stress the im p o rtan ce o f the D ivisional Officer n o t only know ing the nam e o f every m an in his division but also th e details o f his fam ily.

“ I t is a truism to say th a t all men will resp o n d to decent treatm en t. O f course, they will. T he fa c t th a t all men a re hum an seems to be fo rg o tten freq u en tly .

“ T h e fa c t th a t a case should be d e a lt w ith com pletely a t the very beginn in g is an im p o rta n t one. Several cases have o ccu rred recently in w hich, it is obvious, th a t tro u b le was allow ed to boil up th ro u g h inadequate steps being taken a t th e outset.

“ N o req u est should ever be p u t to o n e side b u t should be fully enquired in to a n d if th e req u est c a n n o t be ap p ro v ed , the fullest possible explanation should be given as to the reaso n fo r th e req u est n o t being approved.

“ I t will be evident to all w ho study o u r m en th a t a definite ‘fear com plex’

exists w hich p u ts y o u n g er an d w eaker ratin g s a t th e m ercy o f a n u n sc ru p u lous ra tin g w ith a stro n g e r ch a ra c ter. T he possibility o f this difficulty o ccurring m ust be c o n sta n tly b o rn e in m ind an d im m ediate steps m u st be taken to deal w ith it.

“ T h e object w hich all officers sh o u ld e n d e av o u r to achieve is the full realisation by every m an in the S h ip ’s C o m p a n y th a t the officers have the w elfare o f th e m en a t h e a rt. T his can only be achieved by p erso n al exam ple, close and u n d e rsta n d in g c o n ta c t a n d intelligent p ro p a g a n d a .

“ I w ish to im press on all officers th e vital necessity fo r intelligent and tactful h a n d lin g o f th e ir m en a t all tim es. F irm ness is essential in m any cases b u t th is sh o u ld n o t be m istaken fo r bullying even by th e m o st critical.

“ T h e p ractice o f officers alw ays taking the first o p p o rtu n ity o f leaving their ships on a rriv a l in h a rb o u r is to cease. A ny officer is only en titled to leave his ship w hen he is fully satisfied th a t th ere is n o t th e slig h test need fo r his presence on b o a rd an d th a t no m an in his division has an y need o f his advice o r assistance.

“ I f officers d o th eir w ork p ro p erly , th e re sh o u ld n o t be slightest reason w hy the S h ip ’s C om panies o f o u r little ships sh o u ld n o t be very h ap p y fam ilies.

“ T his le tte r is to be b ro u g h t to the n otice o f all officers a n d C o m m an d in g Officers a re to discuss it w ith all officers u n d er th eir c o m m a n d .” 11

T h e C om m ission records th a t n o tw ith stan d in g A d m iral F itz h e rb e rt’s w arn in g a n d directive, the relatio n s betw een th e officers a n d m en re m ain ed u n h a p p y a n d th e diagnosis m ade nearly th ree years earlier th a t m u c h o f the d isc o n te n t a m o n g th e m en was d u e to th e indifference an d u n sy m p ath etic a ttitu d e o f a large n u m b er o f officers still holds good. T he p rev io u s m u tin ies,12

TH E RO Y A L IN D IA N NAVY M UTINY

61

in the C o m m issio n ’s opinion, u n d o u b ted ly had a bearing on the m utiny o f F eb ru ary 1946 in so far as they show ed th a t th ere was discontent and dissatisfaction in the Service an d som e o f the grievances required im m ediate redressal. T hey should have served as w arnings to the naval au th o rities and com pelled them to exam ine the conditions in the Service as a w hole and also those in the Ships an d E stablishm ents w hich were n o t involved in them with a view to finding o u t w hether th ere was any danger lurking aro u n d the corner.

T he C om m ission ad d s th a t a n o th e r aspect o f these m utinies th a t required to be stressed was th a t while those w ho to o k p a rt in the m utinies had received their justifiable p unishm ent, the m an n er in w hich som e o f them h ad been dealt w ith seem ed to have co n trib u ted , to som e extent, to the prevalent discontent in the Service.

L ieu ten an t C o m m an d er B.S. Som an (later A dm iral an d C hief o f the N aval Staff, 1962-66) ap p earin g before the C om m ission as a witness, while setting forth the causes13 o f the M utiny, m entioned “ th a t the higher au th o rities to o k no notice o f the w arn in g given as early as Septem ber 1942.” Evidently, he was referring to the m utiny w hich to o k place on H M I S Orissa in S eptem ber 1942, w hich was found on investigation to be due to bad discipline an d to the fact th a t there w as little co n tact an d no sym pathy betw een th e officers an d men.

Racial discrimination and ill-treatment of personnel T h ere w ere m any cases o f injustice an d ill-treatm en t in the R IN a n d these w ere believed by th e ratin g s to be th e outw ard m anifestation o f racial a rro gance on the p a rt o f the E u ro p ean personnel (D u tch , F ren ch , N orw egian, R ussian, Swede, A ustralian, C an ad ian , New Z ealan d er a n d even S outh A frican) in the Service. T he ratin g s a n d even m any o f the In d ian officers genuinely felt th a t c o lo u r b a r 14 in all its grim nakedness was presen t a n d influenced the c o n d u c t o f the E u ro p ean s tow ards the Indians.

W hen the W a r began, m any In d ian s en listed ,15 firstly because they were ta k e n in by p a trio tic appeals o f the B ritish G o v ern m en t to fight ag ain st the N azi c u lt o f race su p erio rity a n d secondly, fo r the liberty o f sm aller nations, fo r the equal rights o f all people a n d fo r the p e rm an en t establishm ent on earth o f the m u ch-advertised fo u r freedom s o f the A m erican President! D iscrim in a to ry tre a tm e n t, th erefo re, m eted o u t to th em n atu rally led to deep resentm en t w hich began to ra n k le in th eir m inds. T he differentiation could n o t even be justified as based on any so-called superiority o f m erit in the E uro p ean .

W henever in p rofessional, official o r business co n tacts the In d ian a n d the E u ro p e a n were th ro w n together, th e In d ian fo u n d o r a t any ra te believed th a t his cap a c ity a n d p erfo rm a n c e were by n o m eans inferior. In fact, d u rin g the W ar, w hen in several th eatres o f o p eratio n the In d ia n , R N a n d th e o th e r r a tings fo u g h t to g e th e r side by side, it was proved th a t the In d ian s could hold th e ir ow n. In m inesw eeping o p eratio n s in M alay a, in the co astal a tta c k s in A ra k a n , im p a rtia l o p in io n testified to th e fa c t th a t the achievem ents o f th e R I N w ere in every resp ect equal to those o f the R N . F o r d o in g th e sam e k in d o f w ork, one g o t p a id h a lf th a t o f th e o th er, th e ratin g s in th e R IN felt

6 0

U N D ER T W O EN SIG N S

should be the achievem ent o f com plete tru st between the men an d th eir officers. This can only be achieved by close and in tim ate co n tact a n d the exercise o f ta c t coupled w ith firm ness when this is called for.

“ I t m ust be rem em bered th a t no tw o men are alike. All have different perso n alities a n d ch aracteristics an d the sam e tre a tm e n t fo r the sam e o ffence is rarely justified. In this co nnection, I w ould once again stress the im p o rtan ce o f the D ivisional Officer n o t only k now ing the nam e o f every m an in his division but also th e d etails o f his fam ily.

“ It is a truism to say th a t all m en will resp o n d to decent treatm en t. O f course, they will. T he fa c t th a t all m en a re hum an seems to be fo rg o tten freq u en tly .

“ T h e fact th a t a case sh o u ld be d e a lt w ith com pletely a t the very beginn in g is an im p o rta n t one. Several cases have o ccurred recently in w hich, it is o bvious, th a t tro u b le was allow ed to boil up th ro u g h in ad eq u ate steps being taken a t the outset.

“ N o re q u e st sh o u ld ever be p u t to one side b u t should be fully enquired in to a n d if the req u est c a n n o t be ap p ro v ed , the fu llest possible explanation should b e given as to th e reaso n fo r th e re q u e st n o t being app ro v ed .

“ I t will be evident to all w ho stu d y o u r m en th a t a definite ‘fear com plex’

exists w hich p u ts y o u n g er a n d w eaker ratin g s a t th e m ercy o f an u n sc ru p u lous ra tin g w ith a stro n g e r c h a ra c ter. T h e possibility o f this difficulty occurrin g m u st be c o n sta n tly b o rn e in m ind an d im m ediate steps m u st be tak en to deal w ith it.

“ T h e o bject w hich all officers should e n d e a v o u r to achieve is the full realisatio n by every m an in the S h ip ’s C o m p a n y th a t the officers have the welfare o f the m en a t h eart. This can only be achieved by p erso n al exam ple, close and u n d e rsta n d in g c o n ta c t a n d intelligent p ro p a g a n d a .

“ I w ish to im press on all officers th e v ital necessity fo r intelligent and tactfu l h an d lin g o f th eir m en a t all tim es. F irm ness is essential in m any cases b ut th is should n o t be m istaken fo r bullying even by th e m o st critical.

“ T h e p ractice o f officers alw ays taking th e first o p p o rtu n ity o f leaving their ships on a rriv a l in h a rb o u r is to cease. A ny officer is only en titled to leave his ship w hen he is fully satisfied th a t th e re is n o t th e slig h test need fo r his presence on b o a rd an d th a t n o m an in his division has an y need o f his advice o r assistance.

“ I f officers do th eir w ork p ro p erly , th ere sh o u ld n o t be slightest reason w hy the S h ip ’s C om panies o f o u r little ships sh o u ld n o t be very h ap p y families.

“ T his le tte r is to be b ro u g h t to th e notice o f all officers a n d C o m m an d in g Officers a re to discuss it w ith all officers u n d e r th e ir c o m m a n d .” 11

T he C om m ission reco rd s th a t n o tw ith sta n d in g A d m iral F itz h e rb e rt’s w a rn ing a n d directive, the relations betw een the officers a n d m en re m ain ed un-happy a n d the diagnosis m ade nearly th ree years earlier th a t m u c h o f the d isco n ten t a m o n g the men w as d u e to th e indifference a n d u n sy m p ath etic a ttitu d e o f a large n um b er o f officers still holds good. T he p revious m u tin ies,12

TH E RO Y A L IN D IA N NAVY M UTINY

61

in the C om m issio n ’s opinion, u n d o u b ted ly had a bearing on the m utiny o f F eb ru ary 1946 in so far as they show ed th a t th ere was discontent an d dissatisfaction in the Service an d som e o f the grievances required im m ediate redressal. T hey should have served as w arnings to the naval au th o rities and com pelled them to exam ine the conditions in the Service as a w hole and also those in the Ships an d E stablishm ents w hich were n o t involved in them with a view to finding o u t w hether th ere was any danger lurking a ro u n d the corner.

The C om m ission ad d s th a t a n o th e r aspect o f these m utinies th a t required to be stressed was th a t while those w ho took p a rt in the m utinies h ad received their justifiable p unishm ent, th e m an n er in w hich som e o f them had been dealt w ith seem ed to have co n trib u ted , to som e extent, to the prevalent discontent in the Service.

L ieutenant C o m m an d er B.S. Som an (later A dm iral an d C h ief o f the N aval Staff, 1962-66) ap p earin g before the C om m ission as a witness, while setting fo rth the causes13 o f the M utiny, m entioned “ th a t the higher au th o rities took no notice o f the w a rn in g g iv e n a s e a rly a s Septem ber 1942.” Evidently, he was referring to the m utiny w hich to o k place on H M I S Orissa in Septem ber 1942, w hich was found on investigation to be due to bad discipline a n d to the fact th a t there w as little co n tact and no sym pathy betw een th e officers an d men.

Racial discrimination and ill-treatment o f personnel T h ere w ere m any cases o f injustice an d ill-treatm en t in the R IN an d these were believed by the ratin g s to be the outw ard m anifestation o f racial a rro gance on the p a rt o f the E u ro p ean personnel (D u tch , F ren ch , N orw egian, R ussian, Swede, A ustralian, C an ad ian , N ew Z ealan d er a n d even S outh A frican) in the Service. T he ratin g s an d even m any o f the In d ian officers genuinely felt th a t c o lo u r b a r 14 in all its grim nakedness was p resen t a n d influenced the c o n d u c t o f the E u ro p ean s tow ards the Indians.

W hen the W a r began, m any In d ian s en listed ,15 firstly because they were tak en in by p a trio tic appeals o f th e B ritish G o v ern m en t to fight ag ain st the N azi c u lt o f race su p erio rity a n d secondly, fo r the liberty o f sm aller nations, fo r th e equal rights o f all people a n d fo r the p e rm an en t establishm ent on earth o f th e m u ch -ad v ertised fo u r freedom s o f th e A m erican President! D iscrim in a to ry tre a tm e n t, th erefo re, m eted o u t to th em n a tu ra lly led to deep resentm en t w hich b egan to ran k le in th eir m inds. T he differentiation could n o t even be justified as based on an y so-called su p erio rity o f m erit in the E uropean.

W henever in pro fessio n al, official o r business co n tacts the In d ian a n d the E u ro p e a n w ere th ro w n together, th e In d ian fo u n d o r a t an y ra te believed th a t his cap acity a n d p erfo rm a n c e were by n o m eans inferior. In fact, d u rin g the W ar, w hen in several th e a tre s o f o p eratio n the In d ia n , R N a n d th e o th er r a tings fo u g h t to g e th e r side by side, it was proved th a t th e In d ian s could hold th eir ow n. In m inesw eeping o p eratio n s in M alay a, in the co astal atta c k s in A ra k a n , im p a rtia l o p in io n testified to th e fa c t th a t the achievem ents o f th e R I N w ere in every resp ect equal to those o f the R N . F o r d oing th e sam e k in d o f w ork, one g o t p a id h a lf th a t o f th e o th er, th e ratings in the R IN felt

6 2

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

th a t the officers an d men in the R N got b e tte r food, special h o t-w eath er a llow ance, an d could buy articles in the N A A F I (N avy A rm y A ir F o rce In s titu te — concessional rate canteens) cheaper an d m ore easily. I f the R IN ratings claim ed these privileges an d tried to en ter N A A F I canteens fo r instance, they were, on several occasions, insulted a n d even assaulted. T here were in n u m erable instances o f such tre a tm e n t w hich obviously aro u sed em bitterm ent. In fact, such d iscrim in atio n 16 was intolerable a n d w as b itterly resented. T he class o f ra tin g recruited during the W a r was b etter ed u cated an d hence m ore aw are a n d sensitive. H e th erefo re could n o t u n d e rsta n d , n o r ju stify why he should be subjected to such tre a tm e n t fro m w hich ratin g s in o th er navies do n o t suffer.

T he R IN , fo rm ed in 1934, in h erited the old R IM officers a n d ratings w ho h a d very little naval train in g o r experience. T he new B ritish a n d Indian officer en try was tra in e d w ith the R N . U n fo rtu n a te ly , m any o f the B ritish w ere those w ho failed to o b tain a com petitive vacancy in th e R N . Ow ing to the po litical h o stility to w ard s th e B ritish rule, th e y o u n g B ritish officers did n o t feel a to ta l c o m m itm en t to w ard s the Service. In this they were influenced by th e a ttitu d e o f the ex-R IM seniors, w ho qu ite often set a p o o r exam ple a n d laid dow n th eir ow n norm s o f behaviour.

W ritin g in his b o o k Very Special A dm iral, a biog rap h y o f the late Vice A d m iral G o d frey , P a tric k Beesly, an in d u lg en t a d m irer o f G odfrey, states:

“ T h e tro u b le was th a t th ere w as little u n d e rsta n d in g o f In d ia ’s p ro b lem or n eed s in the A d m iralty . L aw rence (th e a u th o r was his S taff Officer in M arch 1947), G o d fre y ’s fu tu re C h ie f o f Staff, has recalled how , in 1937, when a L ie u te n a n t C o m m an d er, he a tte n d e d a m eeting o f the A d m iralty presided o v er by A dm iral F o rb es to pick young officers fo r th e executive and en g in eerin g b ranches o f th e R IN a n d th e In d ian an d D o m in io n navies. It was suggested th a t a c a n d id a te , rejected as u n su itab le fo r th e R N , m ight d o for th e R IN . L aw rence, despite his ju n io r ra n k , p ro te ste d th a t, as In d ia was try in g to create a new Service o u t o f n o th in g , they needed th e pick o f the recru its, n o t the cast-offs. T his p o in t o f view h a d n o t o ccu rred to A dm iral F o rb e s b u t he w as so im pressed by it th a t he asked L aw rence to lu n ch an d listened w ith g reat in terest to w h a t he h a d to say a b o u t In d ia ’s N avy. U n fo rtu n a te ly the lack o f u n d e rsta n d in g p ersisted a n d when, fro m tim e to tim e, R N o r R N V R officers could be ex tracted fro m th e A d m iralty , to o m any o f th e m w ere n o t really suitable, by age, h e a lth o r te m p e ra m e n t fo r the testing a n d try in g duties fo r w hich they w ere re q u ire d .”

F ro m 1939 o n w ard s cam e th e large w artim e influx o f B ritish a n d In d ian officers. T h e B ritish com prised m o stly residents in In d ia , o f every class and o c c u p a tio n — ‘b o x -w allas’, office m anagers, technicians, p lan ters a n d m erc h a n t service officers; m an y retired senior ratin g s a n d W a rra n t Officers o f the R N w ere sen t o u t as officers to In d ia . T he a ttitu d e o f th e resid en t B ritish, w h o in civil life rem ain ed a lo o f fro m In d ian s a n d were now im p o rte d into th e Service a n d th e ir tre a tm e n t o f the ratin g s w as n o different to the tr e a tm en t m eted o u t by th em to th e ir previous In d ia n em ployees.

TH E RO Y A L IN D IA N NA V Y M U TINY

6 3

In his m o rale re p o rt o f D ecem ber 17, 1945, L ieutenant C olonel M . H aq N aw az, the G H Q M o rale a n d Security Officer, observed: “ P ractically all Indian officers w ho talked to me com plained th a t there is a m arked discrim ination on the p a rt o f the senior B ritish officers a g a in st th e In d ian officers in reg ard to p ro m o tio n s a n d a p p o in tm e n ts. A n inefficient and inexperienced B ritish officer is often p referred to an In d ia n officer w ho is fully qualified to do th e j o b .” T he sam e officer in his re p o rt d ated Ja n u a ry 22, 1946 m entioned, am o n g o th e r things, the co m p lain t th a t: “ In v ariab ly the p ro m o tio n s to W arra n t ranks in the Seam an b ran ch were being given to the B ritish ratings seconded from th e R N , in spite o f the fact th a t a num ber o f In d ian ratings were fully qualified fo r these p ro m o tio n s. A t the sam e tim e a n um ber o f W a rra n t Officer a p p o in tm en ts were being filled by R IN V R officers. As far as I could see, the senior an d prom ising ratings were very m uch disgruntled a b o u t this system . T hey seem to have given u p all hopes o f p ro m o tio n to the W a rra n t ra n k an d if the presen t system is continued, it is bound to affect the m orale o f the senior ratin g s.” 17

C olonel A .A . R u d ra from G eneral H ead q u arters a t th a t tim e stated th a t he noticed tw o defects18 a m o n g th e In d ian officers, w ho were alw ays in a m inority to B ritish officers, firstly, th e fear th a t to o m uch m ixing w ith r a tings, P etty Officers an d C h ief P etty Officers, m ay give the im pression o f p lo ttin g ag ain st B ritish officers in th e m atter o f p o p u larity ,-an d secondly, the inability to stand up fo r any o f the ratin g s’ dem ands against a m ajo rity of B ritish officers on a n im p o rta n t issue.

T he tendency o f B ritish officers to en tertain E u ro p ean Petty Officers and ratings in the W ard ro o m s (Officers’ M esses) o f R IN ships was also greatly resented by In d ia n officers and ratings. Som e o f these P etty Officers and ratin g s o btained com m issions in the R IN Reserve during the W ar but later went b ack to the R N to serve as ratings again. Quite a few o f the Indian officers saw th a t these R N personnel, w ho h a d served in In d ia as officers, were b ack in the R N in th eir p ro p e r ratin g s’ billets.

U n doubtedly, th ere were good E u ro p ean officers also w ho were b o th efficient a n d p o p u la r. B ut looking a t the num ber a n d bitterness o f th e com plaints, the percentage o f bad officers was a p p a ren tly h ig h enough to a n ta gonise a very large num ber o f ratin g s a n d sow in their m inds feelings o f acu te resentm ent tow ards the E u ro p ean officers. As regards the Indian officers, a lth o u g h th eir num ber was com paratively small, som e o f them were also guilty o f giving ro u g h tre a tm e n t a n d using foul language tow ards the ratin g s; to them , it w as partly, a m anifestation o f an expression o f ‘forceful’

pow er o f co m m an d an d p artly , to ‘im press’ an d ape the E u ro p ean m asters.

L ieu ten an t T o m S h e p p a rd ,19 a B ritish officer o f the R IN w ho was a Staff Officer to Vice A dm iral G odfrey, the F lag Officer C om m anding-in-C hief, R IN , a t th e tim e o f the m utiny an d was respected by officers an d ratings both f o r his efficiency an d integrity, in a n o te presented to the R IN E nquiry C om m ission, stated: “ O ur ratin g s have d o n e extrem ely well in this w ar. They q u ite n a tu ra lly consider them selves professionally superior to the R oyal N avy

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w hom they see o u t here, be it in coastal forces, co m m unications, landing craft o r m inesw eepers. T hey also see the slovenly B ritish sailo rs—badly dressed, n o t saluting, slouching a b o u t B om bay an d o th e r p o rts, w hilst they them selves a re kept u p to m ark. In low er deck language, th eir reactio n m u st be— why the h ell?”

T o m S hep p ard w ho is now in his late sixties a n d lives in E ire, reminisces:

“ I h a d m y own ideas a b o u t the causes (o f the m utiny), w hich I set dow n in a p riv ate m em o to A dm iral G o d frey , w ho in tu rn used th e m in his re p o rt to th e C om m ission o f E nquiry, w ho in tu rn questioned me on m y views. As I hav e n ever seen th e re p o rt o f the C om m ission, I a m n o t really an f a i t w ith w h at th a t p a rtic u la r B rains T ru st cam e o u t w ith. W h a t I do know, as you y o u rse lf know , is th a t th e w hole scenario o f 1945-1947 was d o m in ated by the political u p heaval o f th a t period, a n d th e findings o f th e C om m ission were inev itab ly influenced to som e degree by the perceived need to please the new m asters— very u n d erstan d ab ly .

“ T here was a lo t o f ten sio n — the IN A tria ls, the m utinies— o r strikes as th e y w ere euphem istically te rm e d — in th e R A F a n d R TA F, th e com m unal bitterness an d o f course, th e u n certain ties follow ing th e end o f th e W ar.

“ A s reg ard s m y view o f th e actu al events, I believe th e decision by A dm iral G o d fre y to use th e te rm ‘m u tin y ’ ra th e r th a n ‘strik e ’ a n d to tre a t it as such, was a h a rd one b u t I am sure, in th e longer term , m u st be seen to be correct.

It was vital th a t the Service sh o u ld n o t d isin teg rate on the tra n sfe r o f pow er an d th e secession o f P ak istan . It w as w onderful th a t the In d ian N avy developed so stro n g ly in the ensuing years a n d I feel th a t if in 1946 th ere h ad not been evidence o f firm h a n d lin g o f th e m utineers, th e y o u n g Service w ould h av e g o t o ff to a bad s ta rt a fte r A u g u st 1947. T h e show o f fo rce by th e R A F , the th r e a t o f actio n by the R o y al N avy, th e d ep lo y m en t o f tro o p s ro u n d C astle B a rrack s, were all very sad a n d h u m ilia tin g fo r us in th e R IN . N evertheless th in g s g o t so rted o u t q u ite d ra m a tic a lly an d the m u tin y collapsed.

“ U n d o u b te d ly th e C o m m u n ic a tio n ratin g s m u st have been a t the centre o f d isaffectio n . T hey w ere o f a h ig h er s ta n d a rd o f ed u c a tio n , m ore q uestioning o f th e o ld style o f relatio n sh ip s betw een officers an d ratin g s a n d very critical, u n d e rsta n d a b ly , o f p o o r officers. T hey needed very sy m p ath etic h an d lin g an d th is w as n o t alw ays fo rth co m in g .

“ A fte r 35 years I still lo o k b ack on my tim e in In d ia w ith lots o f h a p p iness a n d n o sta lg ia . I loved y o u r c o u n try a n d its p eo p le a n d I alw ays h a d as m y a m b itio n to serve th e m to th e b est o f m y a b ility .” 20

C o m m a n d e r S treatfield-Jam es,21 w ho held vario u s sen io r a p p o in tm e n ts in th e R o y a l In d ia n N avy, is over 80 years old now . H e h as expressed th e view th a t th e situ a tio n a t th a t tim e co u ld n o t be a ttrib u te d to an y p a rtic u la r asp ect o f th e a d m in is tra tio n . It w as b ro u g h t a b o u t en tirely by o u tg ro w in g th e d iscip lin a ry s tre n g th o f the sp irit o f loyalty. M u ch h a d been achieved, he says, b u t a t a very g re a t risk due to the lack o f the p ro p e r b ack g ro u n d in th e h urriedly re c ru ite d officer cadre. W ith reg ard to overall c o n tro l o f th e Service a t th a t p e rio d o f tim e, h e states “ each one o f us m u st sh are som e m easure o f b lam e.”

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Shri R .N . V asudeva o f th e In d ian A dm inistrative Service, w ho retired as C h ief Secretary o f the G o v ern m en t o f K a rn a ta k a in 1970 and was a Supply Officer in the R oyal In d ian N aval V olunteer Reserve, says w ith regard to his last afloat posting in the N avy, “ Before I o pted fo r reversion to civilian career I w orked as Supply Officer on b o ard H M I S So n a vat i, u nder the com m and o f C ap tain Hill, an old seasoned sailor with nearly 40 years’ experience o f men.

Like several o th er B ritish officers, he had been d rafted or o pted h im self to serve in the Indian N avy fo r the d u ratio n o f war. Sonavati a n old sloop, was on coastal p atro l duty, when it retu rn ed from C alc u tta to V ishakhapatnam in F eb ru ary 1946. O n F eb ru ary 20, 1946, while the ship was berthed in the h a rb o u r, the sh ip ’s com pany suddenly struck, shouted slogans a n d w alked off the sh ip ’s q u arterd eck . C ap tain H ill w ho, like o th er officers on b o ard , had little p rem o n itio n o f this sudden ‘eru p tio n ’, was taken back an d sobbed like a child in his cabin, saying th a t he had n o t know n m utiny in his long naval career a n d he w o u ld n ’t be able to live dow n this slur on his h o n o u r in his last years. I rem em ber it to o k us som e tim e to console him an d explain him th a t the ‘rev o lt’ o f ratin g s was n o t directed ag ain st his ‘c o m m a n d ’ p erso n ally, b u t an incidental en d -p ro d u ct o f forces beyond the purview o f the ship o r its officers.” 22 Shri V asudeva recalls th a t H ill was one o f those dedicated B ritish com m anders whose p rofessional ability, h u m an ity , loyalty, a n d c a p a bility fo r leadership was unquestioned an d , therefore, it w ould n o t be p ro p er to o p t for a sim plistic diagnosis a n d p u t the blam e for the m utiny w rongly on this category o f officers as a class.

T he in o rd in ate d rinking h a b it an d behav io u r u n d e r the influence o f alcohol on b o a rd ships an d ash o re was also a subject o f acute resentm ent an d criticism by th e ratin g s.23 I t was n o t a p le a sa n t sight for the ratin g s to see their officers d ru n k an d disorderly in the W ard ro o m . M any o f them th o u g h t th a t if th e officers could do w hat they liked in th eir spare tim e, th en they th em selves were entitled to do w h at they liked in th eir ow n spare tim e, but could n o t. D ance p arties on b o ard ships a n d establishm ents cam e in fo r co n tem p tu o u s rem arks o f the ratings as “ w hat the officers had d o n e the n ight before.”

O ne D ivisional Officer, w ho w ent to plead the case o f one o f his ratings for p ro ceed in g on leave as he h a d a wife, was brushed aside by the officer w ith th e rem ark : “ H as he n o t g o t a n o th e r b ro th e r to h u sb an d th e wife?”

C a p tain Percy L earm o n t w ho died recently a t the age o f 91 years an d who h a d been held in considerable respect an d aw e in th e R IN a t the tim e, reco rd ed his views as follows: “ Y o u n g , p artia lly tra in e d officers have been called to p o sitio n s o f a u th o rity in co m m an d o f sm all ships o r as Executive Officers o f large ships. T h eir ideas o f m ain tain in g discipline a n d h an d lin g m en have freq u en tly been p o o r in the extrem e. U n fo rtu n a te ly o f course, they have n o t had the benefit o f the advice a n d assistance o f tra in e d a n d experienced Petty Officers. T o q u o te one m atter w hich has com e to m y notice fro m my in fo rm al talk s w ith ratin g s— th e a w ard o f p u n ish m en t. In m any cases th ere is no d o u b t ju stice has n o t been d o n e a n d severe p u n ish m en ts have a t tim es been a w ard ed . A n o tio n prevails th a t if an officer charges a m an w ith a n offence,

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the officer must n o t be let down irrespective o f the justice attach ed to the case.

“ Secondly, w ithout doubt there has been a great deal o f unnecessary sh o u ting if n o t bullying. One young officer in com m and o f an auxiliary vessel in C alcutta once said to me that he had got his men com pletely u n d e r his th u m b , and illustrated his rem ark by pressing his thum b on the table. I im m ediately inform ed him th a t I was n o t impressed in the slightest an d th e so o n er he re leased the pressure and got his men in the p ro p er place, th a t is w h o leh eartedly behind him , the b etter for him self a n d the Service.

“ One cannot altogether blam e the officers as they had no basic train in g or experience o f m ore senior regular officer to fall back upo n to guide them .

The same rem arks apply to C hief an d P etty Officers. H ere you fran k ly have boys o f about tw enty rated up, totally unfitted and un train ed fo r such im p o rta n t responsibilities. It m ust be m ade clear o f course th a t this was inevitable but it also has had an equally inevitable result disadvantageous to the w hole Service.” 24

Lieutenant C om m ander E. M ichael Shaw, a B ritish officer o f th e R oyal Indian N avy who is nearly 70 years old now and lives in C ornw all, has taken great pains to record his reminiscences o f the period w ith interesting su p p o rting docum ents which were n o t available elsewhere.

Shaw was in com m and o f H M IS Talwar fro m Jan u ary 28, 1945 to Septem ber 29, 1945, when he was transferred as the Staff C om m unication Officer.

He says th a t the ap p o in tm en t25 o f C o m m an d er F.W . K ing as C om m anding Officer o f H M IS Tcihvar was “ a great surprise an d d isap p o in tm en t to m any o f us” because K ing was n o t a C om m unication Officer. W h at Shaw d id not fu rth er like was th a t he was later asked to go back to Talwar as the E xecutive Officer and this appeared to him to be a dem otion!

Shaw was b o th efficient and p o p u lar an d held in high regard by m any o f his Indian contem poraries. H is com m ents on the subject o f secondm ent o f officers from the Royal N avy w hich he recorded in a confidential Staff M inute Sheet to the C om m anding Officer, H M IS Talwar, m ake interesting reading.

He refers to A dm iral G odfrey’s address to all regular officers an d C o m m an d ing Officers during which G odfrey m entioned: “ In o rd er to officer these cru isers (future acquisitions fo r the R oyal In d ian N avy), it will be necessary to get ab o u t 400 officers on loan from the R N . As the R N is sh o rt o f regular officers, these 400 will probably be R N R an d R N V R officers w ho will be granted perm anent com m issions in the R IN .” 26 Shaw ’s reaction to G o d frey ’s intention o f inducting these large num bers o f B ritish officers was: if ex-R N R

and R N V R officers were to be taken, why could n o t the n um ber o f p erm an en t com m issions given to the ex-R IN R an d R IN V R officers be increased as m any o f them had had six years w ar experience? I t was considered unlikely th a t the A dm iralty would either perm it really good officers to com e to In d ia o r w hether really good officers would volunteer for service in an o th e r N avy as it w ould be regarded as backw ard and d etrim ental to p ro m o tio n (they w ould have to

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be v olunteers as a pressed m an w ould n o t do the service an y good); they w ould n o t b e able to know th e men (or have the inclination to do so); they w ould n o t be able to get on w ith the m en because they did n o t know U rd u w hich was still co nsidered im p o rta n t for R egular officers to know ; to get officers o f the R N R /R N V R to volunteer, they w ould have to be given som e in d u cem en t such as special allow ance o r actin g ra n k w hich w ould be h ard on the existing reg u lar officers; if six years’ w ar experience was equivalent to 12

years peacetim e experience, it should be possible, as a rew ard for good services a n d as co m p en satio n fo r the com paratively slow p ro m o tio n they received d u rin g th e w ar, to give o n e-th ird o f th eir w ar service as ad d itio n al seniority to all R egular officers; the im p o rt o f 400 B ritish officers on loan did n o t m ake the in ten tio n o f n a tio n a lisa tio n seem sincere; the problem o f gettin g officers on loan fro m the R N fo r the R IN was very different to th a t o f the R oyal C a n ad ian N avy, R oyal A ustralian N avy an d R oyal N ew Zealand N avy. Shaw recorded th a t these w ere n o t his p ersonal views b u t were only the general views o f the officers so th a t should th e C o m m an d in g Officer, H M I S Talwar, th in k it fit, he could inform th e higher au th o rities o f the existing th o u g h ts a n d opinions on the in d u ctio n o f officers on loan from the R N .

It is n o t difficult to im agine w h at reaction this Staff M in u te Sheet w ould have h ad fro m his C o m m an d in g Officer an d the higher a u th o rities a t th a t time!

W ith reg ard to tre a tm e n t o f ratin g s an d redressal o f their com plaints, the lack o f confidence w hich existed in the Service w ith regard to dealing w ith these co m p lain ts p ro m p tly an d in th e no rm al Service m anner, is m anifest a n d exem plified in the confidential letter w hich Shaw addressed to the C o m m an d in g Officer, H M I S Talwar on M ay 10, 1946. T he letter reads, “ . . . on S atu rd ay , 9 th F eb ru ary a n d Sunday, 10th F eb ru ary , I, in m y capacity as S taff C o m m u n icatio n Officer saw 14 ratin g s w ho stated th a t they w ished to state a com plaint.

“ I t has been my experience in this Service th a t ratin g s very rarely p u t in, in the p ro p e r service m anner, to state a co m p lain t. So I was determ ined th a t since these ratin g s h ad done so, I w ould do my best as an officer to help them an d to prove th a t th e Service system did w ork.

“ I com m u n icated the fact by Im p o rta n t C onfidential L etter to C om m an d er K ing, th en C o m m an d in g Officer, H M I S Talwar, th a t 14 ratings had requested to see him to state a co m p lain t.27 T he le tte r was despatched on Sunday, the 10th F eb ru ary .

“ T hese ratin g s w ere seen by C o m m an d er K in g on S atu rd ay , 16th F e b ru a ry a n d inform ed th a t if th ey so desired, th ey could state th eir co m p lain t in w ritin g an d it w ould be fo rw ard ed to H ig h er A u th o rity .

“ O n M o n d ay , 18th F e b ru ary , I acco m p an ied the F lag Officer, B om bay to H M I S Talwar in the d o g w atches. T h e m u tin y w as by then in progress. O ne o f th e cries o f the ratin g s w as th a t no a c tio n h ad been taken on these ratin g s’

req u ests.

“ T h e F la g Officer B om bay th e n a n d th ere p ro m ised the ratings th a t an

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immediate, full and im partial enquiry w ould be held to deal w ith this case.

“ Several weeks later, I was asked by som e o f the ratings concerned if a n y thing had been done ab o u t their request. I inform ed them th a t it had been forw arded to H igher A uthority. A t the sam e tim e I m entioned the m atter to my C om m anding Officer who w rote a letter to the F lag Officer, Bom bay.

The reply stated th a t ‘the result w ould be com m unicated in due co u rse .’

“ It is now three m onths since the alleged incident occurred an d these 14

requestm en have been given no answ er. I am rem inded o f the rem ark m ade to me by a Signalm an a t the D ockyard Signal Station ten m inutes before they m utinied.28 H e said, ‘Sir, If I call y o u a w hite b astard , I shall be arrested an d locked up w ithin an h o u r b u t if an officer calls me a black b a stard , noth in g is d o n e .’

“ I have the tem erity to suggest th a t th e situ atio n has been aggravated by the delay in dealing w ith this case. T he 14 ratings to w hom I m ade prom ises o f seeing th a t th eir co m p lain t w ould be d ealt w ith p roperly have no d o u b t lost all confidence in me and have now classed m e w ith the m any others who say they will do a lo t a n d do nothing.

“ I now feel th a t I can n o t exhort a ra tin g to ad h ere to the co rrect service procedure fo r stating a com plaint, and I consider th a t the delay in dealing w ith this m uch-publicised case has k n ocked the b o tto m o u t o f the service trad itio n al m ethod o f dealing w ith com plaints.

“ I am bringing this to y o u r notice in a confidential letter in the hope th a t it m ay be forw ard ed th ro u g h the p ro p e r channels as I do n o t wish to bring it o u t before the E n quiry C om m ission because o f the dam age th a t could be d one to an already dam aged Service by an unscrupulous p re ss.”

Ex-Leading T elegraphist B.C. D u tt, who joined the R IN in the C o m m u n ication B ranch in 1941 a n d was discharged in M arch 1946, was a ‘p ro m in e n t’

rating on the scene before the m utiny an d indeed earlier to o . A fter leaving the N avy, he w ent into journalism and jo in ed the Free Press Journal in B om bay fo r som e years before getting into th e g lam orous profession o f a d vertising. W hen the a u th o r interview ed him 37 years later, he was M anager, G eneral A dm inistration o f a leading advertising concern in B om bay. H e ap p eared to epitom ise the tra n sfo rm a tio n from a ‘rad ical o f radicals’ to a fashionable idealist wishing to plunge into som e ‘constructive activ ity ’ fo r society on his im pending retirem ent fro m his p resen t profession! U n d o u b tedly a p a trio t, he was no longer cast in the fiery a n d fervent m ould o f F ebruary 1946 and, indeed, now ap p eared to be an urb an e, practical in d ividual n o t wishing to let th e good things o f life slip by.

H e p ain ted slogans29 like ‘ Jai H in d ’ a n d ‘Q uit In d ia ’, on the p latfo rm from w hich the C om m ander-in-C hief, In d ia was to tak e the salute in H M IS

Talwar on F eb ru ary 2, 1946, was found o u t an d tak en in to custody. H e was in custody a t th e tim e o f th e o u tb re a k o f th e m utiny an d felt th a t he was a hero even when u n d e r detention. It is m entioned in the re p o rt of the B oard o f Enquiry, w hich was called u p o n to investigate in to this incident in w hich D u tt was involved, th a t when D u tt’s p ap ers were exam ined, his records

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were fo u n d to be excellent. Indeed, C om m an d er K ing, his C om m anding Officer, has sta te d th a t, “ H e (D u tt) was a m isguided, h o n est a n d good m an w ho h ad been led a stray by som e rev o lu tio n ary o rg an isatio n an d if officers had been able to give him m ore o f th eir tim e an d to ld him the o ther side o f the story, he w ould have proved an excellent ratin g and a credit to any N av y .”

D u tt has w ritten a book entitled M u tin y o f the Innocents— a w ell-brought -

o u t boo k in the p re p a ra tio n a n d bringing b u t o f w hich considerable w ork has been p u t in by him an d p erh ap s som e o f his friends in the civvy street o f the sam e hue, it presents his p o in t o f view— in som e respects, however, n o t in an unconvincing way. T h ere is a liberal dose o f rh eto ric to justify his aim s and w h at he did, a n d how th e m utiny was th e p en u ltim ate/u ltim ate nail in the coffin o f the foreign rulers an d the final ‘let d ow n’ o f th e m utineers by the ageing political leaders from w hom they had sought advice and guidance—

hence the title— the m utineers w ho, he th o u g h t, were politically in n o c e n t!

In this b ook, exam ples a re legion o f the discrim ination suffered by Indian ratin g s a t th e h an d s o f the E u ro p ean s a n d also the ill-treatm en t w hich was inflicted on them . H e says, “ W e fo u n d ourselves w orking alongside w hite servicem en from the A rm y. In the In d ian A rm y, B ritish servicem en received p re fe re n tial tre a tm e n t. W h eth er a t base o r in a co m b at zone, they had b etter acco m m o d atio n , b etter am enities. T hey were paid five to ten tim es m ore fo r the sam e jobs th a t In d ian servicem en d id . They travelled m ore co m fo rtably. T hey could, if they w ished, use In d ian servicem en’s canteens, mess ro o m s an d b ath s, but the In d ian s had no access to theirs. T he B ritish servicem en w ere n o t req u ired to salute V iceroy’s C om m issioned Officers.

T he d iscrim ination was cru d e a n d w as calcu lated to m ake th e In d ian s feel in ferio r to the B ritish. W e, fro m th e R IN did n o t suffer from a n inferiority com plex because, ra n k fo r ran k , o u r p erfo rm an ce was as good as, if n o t b e tte r th a n , th a t o f th e B ritish ratin g . Officially to o , in th e R IN , unlike in the In d ia n A rm y, we w ere su p p o sed to get equal tre a tm e n t w ith th e m en o f th e R oyal N av y . T he B ritish ratings received b e tte r p a y a n d enjoyed m ore am enities b u t th a t did n o t tro u b le us m uch as we seldom served to g eth er on board th e sam e ship o r establishm ent. I t w as w hen we h a d to w ork w ith the A rm y p erso n n el th a t we felt hum iliated a t every tu rn .” .

D u tt refers to a B each Signal U n it o u tsid e G re a te r B om bay w here a vast train in g cam p was lo cated u n d e r A rm y a d m in istra tio n a t th a t tim e. T here w ere facilities fo r tra in in g o v er 10,000 m en in th a t cam p. H e says, “ T he caste system p ractised in th e cam p was m erely a n extension o f th e system long established by th e R aj in its ad m in istrativ e set-up a n d its w hole existence in In d ia . Besides the g ra d a tio n o f r a n k s i n t o officers a n d O th e r R anks, th e cam p was b ro a d ly divided in to tw o p airs; the B ritish a n d o th e r white personnel called the B .O .R ., the p r i v i l e g e d section, the Brahmins; the In d ian A rm y p erso n n el a n d R IN ratin g s k n o w n as I.O .R . (In d ia n O th e r R anks), the under-privileged, th e u n to u c h a b le s.” 30

H e refers to this division being a n op en one a n d says th a t no effort was

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m ade to conceal this fact. A ccording to him , “ J.O .R . b arracks in the cam p com pared well w ith the pigsties k e p t by the villagers outside the cam p area.

T he I.O .R . canteen did n o t c ater even to o u r basic m inim um needs.” A sh e says, th e life o f the B ritish perso n n el ap p eared “ as an affro n t to o u r dig n ities.” A t a n o th e r p o in t he says, “ W e received the sam e train in g fo r the sam e task. W e ju st could n o t u n d erstan d the reason fo r this kind o f discrim in atio n . W e resented the su p erio r airs o f the B .O .R s. W e despised the foul language they used while sp eak in g to Indians. B ut we could do n o th ing a b o u t it. It was a system , w ell-established a n d accepted by the m en o f the In d ian A rm y. They did n o t com plain. By a n d large they were an u n com p lain in g lo t, anyw ay. . . . A lso, they h ad inherited m ore th a n a century-old tra d itio n o f loyalty a n d obedience an d they were a p a rt o f it.”

D u tt relates a n incident o f m eeting C olonel C a ria p p a (later the first In d ian C o m m an d er-in -C h ief o f the In d ian A rm y). H e was staying in the Officers’Mess a couple o f m iles aw ay fro m the b arrack s w here the R IN ratings w ere billeted.

W hen it w as conveyed to C olonel C a ria p p a th a t D u tt a n d his com panions did n o t u n d e rsta n d th e reason fo r the discrim in atio n betw een the I.O .R s. and B .O .R s. o r fo r th a t m a tte r, these different n o m en clatu res, his message to th em w as very significant. C olonel C ariap p a, told them “ we were the chosen few c o m m u n ic a tio n ratings fro m the w hole o f the R IN a n d th a t we could ta lk to th e B .O .R . in his ow n language. In stead o f being fru stra te d an d bitter, we m u st try to m atch him w ith o u r p erfo rm an ce. I t w ould do us good and, w h at w as m o re im p o rta n t, it w ould do th e c o u n try a g re a t service a t the end o f hostilities. H e assu red us th a t it w ould be a different w orld a t the en d o f h o stilities.”

D u tt also refers to tw o B ritish officers w ho w ere given the responsibility o f raisin g th e B each Signal U n it fro m th e R IN . T his w ould fo rm p a rt o f th e in v asio n a rm y w hich w as being tra in e d in different p a rts o f In d ia in 1943-44. T h e se n io r o f th e tw o B ritish officers w as L ie u te n a n t F .M . Y arker.

D u tt says, “ W e developed a g re a t resp ect fo r his (Y a rk e r) h u m an qualities.

H e w as to u g h , generous, k in d -h e a rte d a n d w ithout a trace o f co lo u r p re judice. H e p u t us th ro u g h the train in g , sh arin g h ard sh ip s equally w ith us.

H e m arc h e d in step w ith us, mile a fte r rugged m ile, in th e hills o f coastal M a h a ra sh tra , w ith full eq u ip m en t on his back. H e never u sed the jeep a llo tted to him d u rin g the o p e ra tio n a l exercises if he c ould n o t p ro v id e tra n sp o rt also f o r us (a n d never p u t us th ro u g h any stren u o u s exercise in w hich he did n o t b e a r the h ard sh ip s him self). H e w ent o u t o f his w ay to provide us w ith a few o f th e am enities the B .O .R s. enjoyed.

“ A t the en d o f o u r train in g , we w ere tra n sfe rre d to a R o y al N avy cam p situated a t B an d ra, a su b u rb o f B om bay, to aw ait th e invasion date. W e expected equal tre a tm e n t in living q u arters a n d o th e r am enities as the estab lishm ent was ru n by the R oyal N avy. B u t to o u r surprise, we were given the sam e old treatm en t. L ieu ten an t Y a rk e r sh ared o u r resentm ent. H e to ld the C o m m an d in g Officer o f the cam p, C o m m a n d e r S eym our-H eydon, th a t his signal u n it was as g o o d as any B ritish u n it. H e h ad E nglish-speaking

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men u n d e r him. A lso, they were fro m the N avy w here there were no double stan d ard s. L ieu ten an t Y a rk e r m anaged to get us the sam e living quarters as th e R oyal N avy. H e p aid fo r it in the end . . . . We stayed in th a t cam p fo r nearly tw o m onths. Y a rk e r m ade it possible fo r us to m eet the B ritish signal sections o n th eir ow n g ro u n d . W e b eat th em in ro u te m arch from Band ra to K aly an . W e b eat th em in boxing. W e b eat th eir individual team s as well as th eir com b in ed team in hockey. A n d we did as well as they did in establishing wireless co m m unications in lan d in g exercises carried o u t along the co ast lines a t the height o f the B om bay m on so o n . Y ark er was p ro u d o f us.

“ T h en the blow struck. We were p u t on a le rt fo r m ovem ent. T h a t m eant th a t n o one w as allow ed to leave the cam p. Y arker was ab sen t when we left the cam p. We did n o t know w hat h ad hap p en ed to him . H e ju st d isappeared. W e m ight have been w rong b u t the only inference th a t we could draw was th a t he was rem oved as he was suspected to be too p ro -In d ian . In fact som e o f us h ad h eard the B ritish Servicem en refer to Y ark er as ‘Pat-theW og-L over’.

“ W e w ent to the fro n t led by tw o young inexperienced officers, an A rm enian fro m C alcu tta, Ivan A ra to o n , a n d an In d ian C h ristian fro m M adras, Jesudasan. W e cam e to like th em eventually b u t they could never stan d up to th e B ritish officers.” D u tt gives num ero u s o th e r instances o f his experience an d know ledge o f the racial d iscrim in atio n a n d ill-treatm en t o f Indian personnel. This m ade him a n d m any others m ore an d m ore em bittered.

A fter the m utiny h a d sta rte d , the ratin g s h ad fo rm ed a “ N aval C entral Strike C om m ittee to co -o rd in a te a n d d ire c t the activities o f the various units outside H M I S T a l w a r L eading S ignalm an M .S. K h an , a M uslim from U p p e r Punjab, now in P ak istan , a n d P etty Officer T elegraphist M ad an Singh, a tall, lean Sikh, w ere u n anim ously elected P re sid en t a n d V ice-President respectively. B o th w ere u n d e r 25 a n d spoke English, H in d u stan i an d Punjabi fluently. A nd, as D u tt says, b o th w ere free o f the com m unal virus th a t had in fected Indian public life a t the tim e.

It has n o t been possible to locate M .S. K h an a n d it has been said by some th a t he w as a b so rb ed in the R P N after.its. fo rm a tio n in A ugust 1947. D u tt is unable to c o rro b o ra te this a n d it is n o t possible to verify a t this stage.

M ad an Singh, lives in E ire a n d he visited N ew D elhi recently. H e is about 60 years o ld a n d a n engineer. W hen c o n tacted to reco rd his rem iniscences o f th e p erio d , he co m m en ted on the re la tio n sh ip betw een In d ian an d B ritish personnel: “ R elatio n sh ip betw een the In d ia n a n d B ritish officers was g u a rd e d except in a few instances. T h ere w ere, indeed, som e good B ritish officers a n d , I w ould say, C o m m o d o re R a ttra y h im self w as one am ongst them . T he finest o f o u r In d ia n officers, I rem em ber, was the th en L ieutenant S .N . K o h li— brave to sta te his m ind clearly a n d w ith o u t fa v o u r o r fear and efficient in his w ork. T h ere w ere indeed som e o th e r In d ian officers like L ie u te n a n t K u m a ria , R IN R , L ieu ten an ts R .P . N ay y ar, R IN V R an d D h u -

rin d e r, R IN R m eeting the sam e qualities th o u g h n o t on exact m atch with

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K ohli. N o o n e could stan d u p to a B ritish officer in a dignified m anner as K ohli. R e latio n s betw een B ritish officers an d In d ian ratings were very p o o r except in a few instances. R elatio n s betw een Indian officers and B ritish r a tings on the su rface lo o k ed co rd ial, th e In d ian officers, especially those from R IN V R , b eing m ostly on the serving en d to please the B ritish ratings. R elations betw een the In d ia n officers a n d Indian ratings were b etter by a m arked degree th a n betw een th e B ritish officers a n d In d ian ratings, but Indian officers to o often seem ed to be u n ab le to redress a grievance if one was voiced to them , because in m ost cases it m eant a decision fro m a B ritish officer.

“ S alary d iscrim in atio n betw een the B ritish a n d In d ian ratings was wide.

B ritish ratin g s enjoyed fa r b e tte r salaries an d am enities th a n the In d ian ra tings did. Service co n d itio n s, a lth o u g h the sam e on p ap er, differed in th eir a p plicability. I t w ould be difficult fo r m e to provide a clear p ictu re for B ritish ratin g s o n th e ir sea-shore service b u t, fro m w h at was le a rn t from hearsay, the B ritish ra tin g did get a fa ire r deal th a n the In d ian . F o r the In d ian ratin g , my ow n experience an d o b serv atio n o f others points to a o n e way traffic, nam ely — once on active service alw ays on active service, a n d once on shore jo b alw ays on sh o re job.

“ T h e A n g lo -In d ia n s did enjoy an u n w ritte n special privilege. They could get tim e off fro m a ship o v er a n evening if m o th e r o r fa th e r phoned fo r it.

In m atters o f p u n ish m e n t, th e y were d ealt w ith fa r m ore leniently th a n the In d ia n s.” 31

It w as M a d a n Singh’s co n sid ered o p in io n th a t the causes o f the m utiny were b ad service c o n d itio n s, in w hich b ad fo o d to o k the first place. In to le rable a n d insulting language used by som e B ritish officers w ho seem ed to get m ore b razen by the d ay was a n o th e r im p o rta n t fa c to r. H e states, “ W hereas everything seem ed to go reaso n ab ly well a t H M I S Talwar a t the tim e o f its in cep tio n , racial d iscrim in atio n becam e ev id en t in th e years follow ing. . . .

A n g lo -In d ian s g o t th e m o st o f everything a n d to a sm all degree, even the C h ristian s seem ed to be fav o u red . I o v erh eard a M uslim in stru c to r (a know n M u slim L eaguer) talk in g to a n o th e r M uslim ra tin g a n d saying th a t as fa r as he w as co n cern ed , he w ould confine p ro m o tio n s to M uslim s. I w ould, how ever, reg ard this as an iso lated case because it w ould insult the m em ory o f o th ers w ho w ere n o t infected by the co m m u n al virus.” 32 M a d a n Singh says th a t the B ritish officers’ c o n ta c t w ith m en rem ain ed largely confined to the A nglo-In d ian co m m u n ity . C a p ta in N o tt w as, in M a d a n Singh’s estim ation, the m ost fair a n d yet the h a rd e st task m a ste r a n d he used to issue his o rd ers in variably in w ritin g —th e only B ritish officer w ho to o k the p unishm ent upo n h im self if o rd e rs w ere w ro n g . O th e r officers fa r to o often m ade scapegoats o f th e In d ia n s, w hen o rd e rs w ere verbally given. W h ereas In d ian officers were m o re responsive a n d sy m p ath etic, because they did n o t com m and, th e y w ere helpless.

M .S .I. Sw am y33 w as en ro lle d in th e R IN in M a rc h 1941 as an A cting W rite r a n d ro se to th e ra n k o f C o m m a n d e r b efo re his retirem en t. H e re m inisces a b o u t his experience o n arriv al in E n g lan d in N o v em b er 1942 as a

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m em ber o f th e ad v an ce p a rty fo r m anning the sloop H M IS Narbada. “ We arriv ed in E n g lan d in N ovem ber 1942 an d w ere sent to Stam shaw C am p, P o rtsm o u th . E n route, in L o n d o n there was an ugly incident. T he c o m p a rtm ent reserved fo r us was m ark ed in c h a lk ‘B lackies’. O u r O fficer-in-Cbarge, L ieu ten an t C o m m an d er B eeton disap p ro v ed o f such an a ttitu d e and the w riting w as erased before we en train ed .”

C .

N a ray an an who joined as a p ro b a tio n a ry S tore A ssistant d u rin g the early p a r t o f the W ar an d rose to th e ra n k o f C o m m an d er before retirem en t an d was serving in H M I S Feroze (t he Officers’ T rain in g E stablishm ent) during the m utiny says o f the establishm ent in w hich he was serving: “H M IS Feroze had the a p p earan ce an d atm o sp h ere o f an exclusive club o r g y m khana. It was officered m ainly by su p e ra n n u a te d a rth ritic E nglishm en in N aval u n iform w ho, in th e w artim e upsurge o f p atrio tism , w ere washed ash o re in this p o r t city on the A rab ian sea. T hey w ere ably assisted by few indigenous box-w allahs, w ho h a d been rew arded fo r th eir u n m istak ab le loyalty to the C row n by ‘lim iting’ their p ro m o tio n to th e high ra n k o f L ie u ten an t C o m m an d er.

These officers w ere on th e ‘sta ff’; they lo rd ed it over th e young native re cipients o f the K in g ’s C om m ission while p u ttin g th em th ro u g h th eir paces during training to becom e good m odel Sahibs. B o th th e ‘S taff’ a n d trainee officers detested each o th er; they united only in keeping us, th e flunkies, in o u r places befitting the low est o f th e low. H M I S Feroze m ust have th e n h a d ap p ro x im ately tw o h u n d red o f these im p o rted a n d indigenous Sahibs, flitting in a n d o u t, m ak in g th eir im pact on M a la b a r H ill.” 34

Ja c k G ibson, a B ritish n a tio n a l a n d a renow ned ed u catio n ist w ho served in such a u g u st academ ic a n d m ilitary train in g in stitu tio n s as th e D o o n School, M ayo C ollege a n d the N a tio n a l D efence A cadem y fo r th ree d ecad es a n d h as now settled d ow n in In d ia, also did a s h o rt stin t in th e R o y al In d ian N avy as an R IN V R officer d u rin g W o rld W a r II. In his rem iniscences reco rd ed in ‘A s I Saw I t ’, o n O cto b er 26, 1944, h e do es n o t m ince w ords in describing the state o f affairs th a t prevailed in H M I S Feroze, th e R IN

train in g esta b lish m e n t fo r officers d u rin g th e W a r.35 “ I hav e left Feroze fo r w hich I am th an k fu l. A lth o u g h I liked the C .O ., th e m o rale o f the place was all w ro n g . T h e C h ie f S tew ard a n d th e M ess S ecretary, an English officer, were b o th m ak in g a lo t o f m oney. I trie d to p ersu a d e the Executive Officer th a t th in g s w ere w rong, b u t he w as eith er in it, too stu p id to see it, o r too lazy to care. I p u t in aji official req u est to the C .O ., fo r an en q u iry in to the c o n d u c t o f th e mess. F o r v ario u s reaso n s, loyalty to his N u m b e r O ne (his d ep u ty ), etc., h e d id ’n t w an t this. E ventually I ask e d him to fo rw a rd m y re q u e st to th e F la g Officer, B om bay. I t w as all m o st u n p leasan t as m o st o f th e sen io r officers w an ted it hushed u p . A ny arg u m e n t w as go o d enough: W h a t can y o u p ro v e ? Y o u a re n o t going to kill a n y Jap an ese by this. It h a p p e n s all o v er th e E ast, a n d y o u c a n ’t sto p it. Y o u ’ve a grudge a n d are an in te rferin g b., a n d so o n . U n fo rtu n a te ly the F la g Officer, B om bay was on leave w hen m y re q u e st w ent in a n d it was n o t tak en up, b u t I feel th a t a n e n q u iry co u ld only have d o n e g ood. I t w ould have p u t a n end to the

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general dissatisfaction th a t did so m uch harm to m orale. C o rru p tio n an d n ep o tism is to o prevalent in In d ia, an d it seems to me essential th a t B ritish officers should n o t be involved, an d if they are, should be disgraced. The M ess S ecretary and C h ief Stew ard were transferred, b u t only to practise elsew here as o p p o rtu n ity offers.”

G ib so n ’s rem iniscences confirm the calibre o f m any B ritish perso n n el th a t were inducted into the R IN an d held p ositions o f a u th o rity w hich quite obviously they did n o t deserve b u t m ade full use of.

R acial d iscrim in atio n w ith the a tte n d a n t ill-treatm en t o f In d ia n N aval p erso n n el was m anifested in vario u s ways a n d to vario u s degrees in m ost ships a n d estab lish m en ts. T he ‘b rightest jewel o f the B ritish C ro w n ’ was infested w ith these m aladies b o th in the civil an d m ilitary a d m in istratio n at all levels. I t could be term ed as a ‘n a tu ra l’ facet o f the ruler-ruled re la tio n ship. T h e C o m m issio n o f E n q u iry , u n h esitatin g ly concludes: “ T he feeling o f racial b ittern ess th u s a ro u sed a m o n g the In d ian ratin g s and officers is one o f th e d e a d lie st p o iso n s w hich has c o rru p te d the Service an d its volum e is so g re a t th a t th a t alo n e m ig h t h ave caused a m utiny. It certainly co n trib u ted very largely to giving an a n ti-B ritish tre n d to th e m u tin y .” 36

D efects in administration and its bearing on the mutiny C o m m e n tin g on the state o f a d m in istra tio n a t th e tim e, the R IN C o m m ission o f E n q u iry reco rd s “ it c a n n o t be gainsaid th a t if those w ho are a t th e h elm o f th e affairs o f any D e p a rtm e n t o f S tate, p a rtic u la rly o n e dealing w ith a n A rm ed F o rce, do n o t a d m in iste r it in a n efficient m an n er an d allow g rievances o f th e p erso n n el o f the Service to accum ulate w ith o u t giving red ress o r d evising m eans o f rem ed y in g th em fo r a consid erab le tim e a n d as a resu lt, d isc o n te n t grow s in th e Service a n d eventually results in an o u tb reak , th e n th e resp o n sib ility fo r th e resu lt m u st be sh ared by th o se who w ere e n tru ste d w ith th e a d m in istra tio n o f th a t D e p a rtm e n t o f S ta te .” 37

In a d d itio n , a S enior O fficer o f th e R I N nearly forty years ago said th a t o n e o f th e fu n d a m e n ta l reaso n s fo r the prevailing d isc o n ten t th ro u g h o u t th e Service was: “ C o m p lete lack o f confidence existing generally th ro u g h o u t th e Service in N av al H e a d q u a rte rs a n d R IN Office, B om bay.”

T h e officer developed on this fu rth e r in his M e m o ra n d u m to the C o m m ission o f E n q u iry “ W ith reg ard to N aval H e a d q u a rte rs, it w ould seem th a t a colossus has been b u ilt u p w hich h as g o t com pletely o u t o f co n tro l. In fa c t, th e m achine has ta k e n charge. I am sure I am speaking fo r the m ajo rity o f th e Service w hen I state th a t we a re filled w ith a sense o f fru stra tio n , dejectio n , d esp o n d en cy , if n o t disgust. T he sim plest m a tte r literally takes m o n th s b efo re a reply can be o b tain ed , w hile staff w ork a p p ears a t a p re m iu m .” 38

O th e r officers have sta te d th a t n eith er th eir m en n o r th ey them selves h a d an y confidence in N aval H e a d q u a rte rs an d the general o p in io n was th a t the H e a d q u a rte rs w ere o u t o f to u c h w ith the co n d itio n s in ships an d estab lish m en ts. In answ ering letters, even on im m ediate a n d u rg e n t m atters,

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there were e n o rm o u s delays. G enerally, letters w ent unansw ered o r a t best acknow ledged w ith a mere assurance th a t “ the m atter was u n d er consideratio n ” . O rd ers w ere issued which, to the person on the spot, however loyal, bore no in d icatio n th a t th e tru e co nditions were appreciated. T he rapid gro w th o f th e staff at D elhi an d th e rapidity w ith w hich its members received p ro m o tio n w ith no co rresp o n d in g quickening in the announcem ent o f the decisions on the im m ediate questions raised, also provoked serious criticism .

A n o th e r officer has stated th a t a fter carefully considering the w hole situ atio n ,39 it was his firm conviction th a t the ad m in istratio n fell far sh o rt o f the high sta n d a rd o f ability req u ired for the co n tro l o f a young an d greatly ex panding service an d it h ad n o t show n itself a t all capable o f rising to the tasks expected.

T h e th en F lag Officer, B om bay, R ear A dm iral A .R . R a ttra y and a n u m ber o f officers connected w ith the B om bay E stablishm ents also blam ed N H Q

in m any ways. N aval H ead q u arters, on the o th e r h an d , blam ed the M ilitary F inance D e p a rtm e n t w hich retaliated by blam ing N H Q . R ear A dm iral R a ttray , while referring to the lack o f confidence in N H Q , th e d o m in atio n o f the W a r D e p a rtm e n t and the com plete co n tro l exercised by th e M ilitary F inance D e p a rtm e n t, has recorded:

“ T h e resu lt o f the system is th a t officers a t N aval H ead q u arters have often despaired o f ever getting a case accepted alm o st before it is started . As one officer has very tru ly said, ‘I have spent m ore tim e in this w ar in fighting the M ilitary F inance B ran ch th a n I have the Japanese o r the G erm an s. In nearly every case, th e p ro p o sa l has been finally accepted but a t w h at co st o f tim e a n d e ffo rt.’ ”

M any officers refrain ed from p u ttin g up p ro p o sals being certain th a t there w as no possibility o f th eir accep tan ce w ithin a reaso n ab le tim e. A ‘co u ld n ’t ca re less’ a ttitu d e a p p e a re d to p erm eate th ro u g h o u t th e a d m in istratio n and this feeling even extended to th e ratings. T he m en, in the first place, th o u g h t th a t th eir officers did n o t agree w ith them . N ext they believed th a t they were pow erless, a n d finally, th a t the officers did n o t care. T his led to a feeling th a t refo rm s could seldom be achieved by n o rm al service m ethods !

T h e C om m ission o f E n q u iry has clearly re c o rd e d th a t “ th ere is no gainsaying th e fa c t th a t th e system o f a d m in istra tio n o f Service has been a m ajo r c o n trib u to ry fa c to r to th e p re se n t sta te o f discipline in th e Service—a state w hich has u n fo rtu n ately cu lm inated in th e m u tiny.” T he gravest lapse o f th e a d m in istratio n , as b ro u g h t o u t by th e C om m ission o f E nquiry, how ever, w as th a t it rem ain ed ig n o ra n t o f th e serious d isco n ten t w hich h ad been p re vailing fo r several years. I t h a d failed to gauge the d e p th o f disco n ten t and did n o t allow its a ttitu d e o f com placency, w hich was q u ite a p p a re n t in the m orale re p o rts, to be d istu rb ed by th e feeling th a t anything w as w rong w ith the N avy.

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Recruitment promises and discontent

Vice A d m iral G odfrey, in his re p o rt on the causes o f the M utiny, said, “ T h e average ratin g firm ly believed th a t he was going to be fo u n d a p o st-W a r jo b by th e Service. G o v ern m en t and the N avy can n o t be held blam eless f o r this. M u ch o f the re c ru itm e n t advertising was literally on the lines o f ‘Jo in th e N avy an d ensure y o u rse lf a p o st-W ar jo b .’ A dm ittedly, in th e texts o f th e ad v ertisem en t, no specific prom ise was m ade b u t the cap tio n definitely im plied th a t this w ould be the case. W e stopped it later in the w ar b u t th e dam age was d o n e .” 40

R e a r A d m iral R a ttra y , in his re p o rt on the sam e subject, said, “ To m any ra tin g s th e end o f th e W a r b ro u g h t alluring pro sp ects o f re tu rn to civil life o n a high scale o f p ay . This state o f m in d has been largely engendered by w ar-tim e recru itin g p ro p a g a n d a o n th e them e o f ‘Jo in the N avy and learn a jo b fo r a fte r th e w a r.’ ” 41

C o m m o d o re J o h n L aw rence, w ho was S taff Officer O p eratio n s a t N aval H e a d q u a rte rs fro m 1939 to th e end o f 1941 an d later ro se to be th e C hief o f S taff to the C o m m an d er-in -C h ief, R o y al In d ian N avy, said th a t re c ru iting p o ste rs, p a m p h le ts an d b ooklets c o n tain ed p rom ises and tried to en co u rag e p eo p le b u t th ey w ere n o t qu ite as th ey sh o u ld have been. C om m o d o re Jefford, w ho la te r becam e C o m m ander-in-C hief, R oyal P akistan N avy in A u g u st 1947, re fe rred to th e m isrep resen tatio n by recru itin g officers and said, “ F ro m m y ow n experience I sh o u ld say th a t th ro u g h ignorance in m any cases re cru its have been recru ited w ith false pro m ises; som etim es, it is th e ig n o ran ce o f rec ru its, som etim es o f th e re c ru ite r an d som etim es the re c ru it does n o t u n d e sta n d w h at he has been to ld .”

C o m m a n d e r S.S. G ill o f th e R o y al In d ia n N aval R eserve, a t th a t tim e the C o m m an d in g Officer o f H M I S C heetah, said , “ T h e ra tin g was strongly o f th e opin io n th a t he h ad been le t dow n by th e R ecru itin g Officer who re c ru ited him . H e w as a ssu red a t th e tim e o f re c ru itm e n t th a t he w ould get rapid p ro m o tio n in th e R o y al In d ia n N av y , th a t on release he w ould be g u aran teed a jo b o r, failing th a t, a d e q u a te subsistence allow ance, w hereas he now saw , fro m th e experience o f th o se released already, th a t no such facility is being p ro v id e d by G o v e rn m e n t a n d th a t th ey a re being ju s t left in the s tre e ts .” 41

I n th e M o ra le R e p o rt issued by N aval H e a d q u a rte rs fo r the q u a rte r en d ing D ecem b er 31, 1945, th e fo llo w in g passag e occu rs: “ C om plaints by m en w ho sta te th a t th e y h ad been re c ru ite d by false prom ises a re still prevalent.

T h ey arg u e th a t th e y w ere ta k e n in to th e N avy w ith all so rts o f tem pting p ro m ises a n d now th e y a re sen t o u t o f th e Service w ith o u t any ad eq u ate p ro v isio n fo r e m p lo y m en t in civil life.” C o m p lain ts a b o u t false prom ises a r e also re fe rre d to in the M o ra le R e p o rts o f C o m m an d in g Officers o f various sh ip s a n d e stab lish m en ts fo r e arlier q u a rte rs.

L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r E. M icheal Shaw , R oyal In d ian N avy, w ho was th e C o m m a n d in g Officer o f H M I S Talwar fro m Ja n u a ry 28, 1945 to Septe m b e r 29, 1945 h as o b serv ed : “ By all a c co u n ts, recru its w ere to ld glow ing

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tales o f life in the N avy by recruiting officers and the service life has consequently been a g reat shock. T his has led to th ere being m en in the Service who have been discontended fro m the day they joined. To m y personal know ledge, in 1945, several gentlem en applied for com m issions who a t the tim e o f th eir ap p licatio n w ere draw ing a salary o f Rs. 70 p er m onth. It is considered reasonable to assum e th a t the pay fo r a S ub-L ieutenant o f Rs.

450 pro v ed an a ttra c tio n .” 42 H e fu rth e r adds th a t “ the unfulfilled prom ises m ade by R ecruiting Officers a b o u t em ploym ent an d release” were am ong the m any things w hich caused dissatisfaction.

In the opinion o f L ie u ten an t S.N . K ohli, “ in spite o f the fact th a t m any prom ises were m ade by the recruiting au th o rities a b o u t th e po st-W ar settlem ent o f ratings when they jo in e d , the actual n u m b er o f jo b s w hich the ratings can be offered o r will get was extrem ely few w ith the result th a t the ra tin g is sadly disillusioned an d bears m alice and bitterness tow ards the Service.” 43

L ieutenant C o m m an d er A .K . C hatterji (la te r A dm iral an d C h ie f o f the N aval Staff, 1966-70) said th a t “ the ratings had th ree genuine grievances. T he first was th a t they w ere recruited as C o m m unication ratings an d were expected to w ork as Seam en on deck. C om m unication ratings a re usually o f the m a tricu lation sta n d a rd a n d sta rt on p ay o f Rs. 60 p er m o n th as o p p o sed to R s.

40 p er m o n th fo r the Seam en ratings w ho are n atu rally o f a low er educational s ta n d a rd .”

C o m m an d er P .M . V erghese w ho had jo in ed the R I N as a Boy in 1940, relates his experience in the service,44 “ I jo in ed the N avy on 29th N o v em ber, 1940 in the ‘low est form o f h u m a n ity ’ (a w rong p h rase to use, but yo u know w hat I m ean —a Boy). T he Boys o f ‘D ’ batch recruited a t v arious centres in S outh In d ia early in N ovem ber 1940 were asked to m uster at Pune from w here onw ards we h ad a guided jo u rn ey . A t railw ay stations, we w ere fed in typical naval alum inium p lates like refugees in the m iddle o f p latfo rm s fo r the am usem ent o f the train passengers a n d railw ay staff.

Big crow ds su rro u n d e d us fo r a free show . This w as th e first tim e a recru iting p arty to u re d S outh India. T he O fficer-in-C harge was L ieutenant Som an, later to becom e th e C h ie f o f the N aval Staff.

“ A t K arach i we w ere given fo o d we were never accustom ed to, dry b read w ith d ry dal in the m orning, rice w ith one curry a t noo n an d chapati w ith one cu rry a t night. T here w as a free supply o f milk fo r the Boys. O u r batch o f Boys was supposed to be th e ‘ed u cated a n d civilised’ batch.

“ E arly in 1941, English a n d In d ian ratio n s w ere introduced. There was no vegetarian rations. E xcept fo r a few Punjabi recruits, all others opted for

‘E nglish’ rations. B ut we regretted this o p tio n o n ships w here English rations w ere lim ited to w hite p olished rice an d b eef curry cooked in the officer s galley (kitchen). W e w ere n o t entitled to the pleasure o f eating Indian curry, ch ap ati, etc. T he In d ia n ratio n cooks refused to supply som e curry because we ‘G oreka bachcha ban gaya

“ F o o d in general w as o f low quality. W e were n o t entitled to good qua ity

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vegetables, like to m ato , cabbage an d c a rro ts. C hicken and eggs ap p eared on officers’ m enus only. R atin g s never h a d a m en u o r any variety in food.

O nly p o o rest quality rice, garnished w ith stone chips an d m ud pieces, was supplied.

“ T h e ra tin g ’s uniform was m ade o f ch eap and coarse m aterial. T h e w inter garm ents were rough w oollen stuff, w hich we w ere asham ed o f w earing b ecause they appeared to have been m ade o u t o f blankets. It was nick-nam ed

‘P e re ira ’ because the Supply Officer in charge o f clothing was a C om m issioned Stores Officer by th a t nam e.

“ N o facilities existed fo r m arried ratings. T hey w ere n o t supposed to bring th eir fam ilies to the d u ty statio n . I f th ey did, it was th eir ow n business.

N o n ig h t leave, no M L R (m oney in lieu o f ratio n s), no m arried acco m m o d atio n , no C IL Q (cash in lieu o f q u arters), no ed ucational allow ance, no m edical assistance to the fam ily m em bers and no w eek-ends— b o th long and sh o rt. T h e p resen t facilities cam e m uch, m uch later.

“ W e never h eard o f ‘w elfare’ o r ‘W elfare F u n d ’ in the g oo d old days.

“ As Boys u n d e r training, o u r pay w as a princely sum o fR s . 15 p er m o n th ; Seagoing Boy received R s. 25.”

A b o o k le t entitled The N a vy and its Job45 begins by saying, “ The R oyal In d ian N av y is m oulded on th e lines o f the R oyal N av y because, w ith o u t excep tio n , th e R oyal N avy is th e o ld est, the m o st efficient and th e finest fighting service in th e w o rld .” T his passage occurs in m any o th e r booklets an d it is no m a tte r fo r su rp rise th a t ratin g s generally relied on it fo r their d em an d s fo r b e tte r pay, p ro m o tio n , tre a tm e n t and am enities. It proceeds to say, “ In d ia ’s N avy is g row ing fast. It needs to grow faster if security is to be en su red . T h e N avy n eeds m en o f intelligence an d singleness o f p urpose w ho, u n ite d , will m an In d ia ’s w arships an d p ro te c t In d ia’s seaborne tra d e a g a in st th e a tta c k s o f a g g resso rs.”

O n A p ril 28, 1945, th e F la g Officer, B om bay sen t a detailed re p o rt to the F la g O fficer C o m m a n d in g , R o y a lln d ia n N avy, covering the m isleading sta te m en ts in all re c ru itin g p a m p h le ts reg a rd in g prospects o f a d v an cem en t an d sa id t h a t it w as ev id en t th a t fa r to o m any ratin g s h ad been m isin fo rm ed on re c ru itm e n t reg a rd in g term s a n d c o n d itio n s o f service p articu larly as to statu s a n d ch a n c e o f p ro m o tio n .

In try in g to u n d e rs ta n d th e feelings o f d isc o n te n t a n d fru stra te d hopes in th e m in d s o f th e ra tin g s in th e R IN , th e C om m ission draw s a tte n tio n to a few fa c ts o f p u b lic know ledge a t th a t tim e. S o o n a fte r th e W a r began an d d u rin g its d u ra tio n , th e G o v e rn m e n t e n c o u n tered th e o p p o sitio n o r a p a th y o f certa in lead in g po litical p a rtie s in th e c o u n try a n d large sections o f people w ho sy m p ath ised w ith them . T h e G o v e rn m e n t,46 therefore, fo u n d it necessary to o rg a n ise intensive p ro p a g a n d a fo r w ar effort o f w hich recru itm en t was an o u ts ta n d in g success a n d h a d b ro u g h t large n u m b ers into the fighting service.

B u t th is success was largely due to th e p ro p a g a n d a carried on by officers o f all ra n k s a n d by non-officials o f influence. In th e course o f such p ro p a g a n d a , p eople w ere u n d o u b te d ly given to believe th a t the m en th u s recruited w ould

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p a rta k e o f the fru its o f victory an d the G overn m en t w ould take care o f them , th eir fam ilies an d th eir future. T h erefo re, it was n o t on the prom ises o f recru itin g officers alo n e th a t the hopes o f the enlisted men were built. It is im p o rta n t to rem em ber this fa c t, as som e naval officers a p p e a r to dismiss the claim s o f ratings as d u e to the m istakes o r carelessness o f certain ill-inform ed recru itin g officers. P o st-W a r schem es fo r th e em ploym ent an d settlem en t o f dem obilised soldiers a n d ratin g s w ere also given g reat publicity. It is a d m itted by naval a u th o rities th a t these schem es had n o t m aterialised in any a p preciable m easure.

T he C om m ission clearly records: “ It establishes beyond d o u b t the validity o f the co m p lain ts o f ratings th a t a t th e tim e o f recru itm en t they were misled on various m atters vitally affecting th eir life a n d career. They enlisted on the faith n o t m erely o f vague an d general w ords o f p raise o f the R oyal Indian N avy b u t o f specific rep resen tatio n s a b o u t pay, p ro sp ects o f p ro m o tio n a n d a fine career in an ex panding N avy w ith a b rig h t fu tu re, leave, am enities, etc.

Soon a fte r th eir en try in to the N aval Service, som e ratings were disillusioned an d d isap p o in ted in certain m atters su ch as cleanship duties, m essing a n d food arran g em en ts. B ut these d isap p o in tm en ts were confined to p artic u la r sections o f ratin g s o r localities. T hey were, how ever, so keenly felt th a t they resulted in m utinies in certain establishm ents. B ut dissatisfaction on m atters such as pay, p ro m o tio n a n d p ro sp ects was m ore general an d w idespread. All the sam e, the C o m m an d in g Officers o f Ships a n d E stablishm ents usually rep o rte d till th e m iddle o f 1945 th a t the m orale o f the ratin g s was high. I t was only a fter the tu rn o f th e second h a lf o f 1945 th a t we get disquieting rep o rts a b o u t the tem p er an d state o f m ind o f th e ratin g s generally. T here is a p ro gressive decline o f m orale d u rin g th e second h a lf o f 1945 a n d beginning o f 1946.

“ S uch a decline is to be expected in an y service when a w ar is over b u t in the case o f th e R oyal In d ia n N avy th ere was am o n g st o th er reasons the grievan ce over recru itin g prom ises. T h e dem obilisation o f large num bers o f men a n d officers a fte r th e w ar coupled w ith the failure o f resettlem en t schemes to provide them w ith p o st-w ar jo b s an d em ploym ent w hich they had been led to expect a p p e a r to have a d d e d considerably to the feeling o f d isappointm ent a n d fru stra tio n due to unfulfilled prom ises a b o u t pay, prospects an d conditio n s o f service in the R o y al In d ia n N avy. T h a t this state o f disco n ten t in the R oyal In d ian N avy was one o f the m ain causes o f the m utiny has been generally ad m itted an d is beyond d o u b t.”

Viceroy’s appreciation

In a d esp atch d ated M arch 22, 1946 to K ing G eorge VI, L ord W avell then V iceroy o f In d ia , h ad th e follow ing to say: “ T he last th ree m onths have been anxious a n d depressing. They have been m arked by continuous and unb rid led abuse o f th e G o v ern m en t, o f the B ritish, o f officials and police, in po litical speeches, in practically th e w hole o f the Press, and in the Assembly, by serious rio tin g in B om bay; by a m utiny in th e R IN , m uch indiscipline in

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the R IA F , som e u n rest in the Indian A rm y; by an u n p reced en ted d ro u g h t and fam ine co n d itio n s over m any p a rts o f In d ia; by th re a te n e d strikes o n th e R ailways, a n d in the P ost an d T elegraphs; by a general sense o f insecurity and lawlessness. It is a so rry tale o f m isfo rtu n e an d o f folly. P erh ap s th e best way to look a t it is th a t In d ia is in the b irth -p an g s o f a new o rd er; th a t b irth -p an g s are never p leasan t and often dangerous; an d th a t the crude m ethods o f Indian m idwives are n o to rio u s b u t n o t alw ays f a t a l . . . .

“ T he R I N m utinies cam e on us w ith practically no w arning. H ow fa r the m en had any real grievances will be show n by a C om m ission o f E n q u iry .

T he R IN has expanded so rap id ly d u rin g the w ar th a t it is very sh o rt o f experienced officers an d p etty officers; and it has n o t th e b ack g ro u n d an d tra d itio n s o f the In d ian A rm y. B u t th a t th e expression o f any grievances there w ere to o k the fo rm it did w as u n d o u b ted ly d u e to instigation by political a g ita to rs, C o m m u n ist a n d L eft-W ing C ongress. T he rio ts in B om bay w hich a cco m p an ied the m u tin y w ere sim ply due to the d an g ero u s m obs w hich are alw ays ready in an y In d ian city to seize th e o p p o rtu n ity fo r b u rn in g a n d lo o ting; th ey have o f course been e n co u rag ed by th e v io len t speaking o f the last six m o n th s. A very ugly situ a tio n was extrem ely well h andled by the police an d m ilitary .

“ T h e exam ple o f th e R A F a n d th eir so -called ‘strik e ’ had u n d o u b ted ly som e responsibility b o th fo r th e R I N m u tin y a n d fo r th e p resen t state o f the R IA F, w ho can o n ly be described as sullen an d u nstable fo r th e m ost p a rt. H ere again is a lack o f b a c k g ro u n d d u e to ra p id ex pansion, an d also som e p o litical a g ita tio n .

“ T h e m o st d istu rb in g fea tu re o f all is th a t u n re st is beginning to a p p e a r in so m e u n its o f th e In d ia n A rm y ; so f a r a lm o st entirely in the technical arm s.

A u ch in leck th in k s th a t th e g reat m ass o f th e In d ia n A rm y is still so u n d , and I believe th a t th is is so. It m ay n o t ta k e long, how ever, to shake th eir steadiness if the C ongress a n d M u slim L eague determ in e to use th e w hole pow er o f p ro p a g a n d a a t th e ir c o m m a n d to do so .” 47

P o litica l fallout

M rs. A ru n a A s a f A li w as a y o u n g C ongress S ocialist in the fo rties an d was very activ e o n th e n a tio n a l scene in 1946 a t the tim e o f th e R I N m utiny. W hen asked th irty -six years la te r a b o u t her reactio n to the M u tin y a n d w hether she h ad a n y e a rlie r in fo rm a tio n a b o u t d isc o n te n t o f any k in d in the N avy, A rm y o r A ir F o rc e a n d also w h eth er she w as a p p ro a c h e d by N aval personnel fo r a n y advice, she sa id : “ F irstly , I w ould like to say th a t we did n o t agree w ith th e B ritish a u th o ritie s th a t th e u p risin g w as a ‘m u tin y ’ in th e strict sense o f th e te rm . T h e R IN ra tin g s’ strik e w as a ‘strik e ’ in as m uch as it was a p ro te st a g a in st th e ir u n satisfacto ry c o n d itio n s o f w ork, th e o u trag eo u s racial disc rim in a tio n p ra c tise d by th e B ritish officers ag ain st In d ian s a n d h u m iliation h ea p e d u p o n th e m . A ctually, th e R IA F a irm e n ’s strike m erely accelerated th e R I N re a c tio n because d isc o n te n t was sim m ering in all w ings o f th e A rm ed F o rces. T h e 1942 ‘O pen reb ellio n ’ a g a in st B ritish rule h ad , by a n d large,

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a ro u sed , as never before, the sense o f p atrio tism o f In d ian s serving in the B ritish A rm y, N avy an d A ir F o rce. Till then, they felt they were no m ore than m ercenaries. N ow , they felt like p atrio ts. M y personal ‘re a c tio n ’ was n a tu ra lly o n e o f elatio n because I felt th a t if the B ritish offer o f freedom proved to be a hoax, th e R IA F an d R IN p ro te st actio n s were an indication th a t if n eg o tiatio n s w ith the C ab in et M ission w ould end in failure, the next phase o f In d ia ’s struggle fo r freedom w ould be final, an d colonial rule w ould be b u ried once an d fo r all.

“ W e were all p a rt o f the C ongress. Every segm ent o f th e In d ia n N a tio n a l C ongress, ran g in g fro m the conservative to the m ost radical, accepted, generally speaking, the co n cep t o f egalitarianism . B ut the socialist elem ents w ithin the C ongress in th a t p erio d w ere co m m itted to organising active resistance by the w orkers, p easan ts a n d o th e r exploited classes in o u r society.

W e were less p ro n e to accep t w h at wo perceived as com prom ises th a t u ltim ately led to su rren d er. T h e re fo re, we believed in calling up o n the w orking people to form trad e u n io n s a n d p e a sa n t unions all over the country. T h ro u g h o u t the n atio n al struggle fro m 1932 to 1948 a n d later, we used to often meet individuals fro m am o n g th e class con scio u s elem ents in the Service a n d encouraged th em to fight ag a in st d iscrim in atio n w herever and w henever possible.

“ W hen the op en rebellion w hich b ro k e o u t so o n a fte r th e a rre st o f our n a tio n a l leaders on A ugust 9, 1942 subsided on the surface, u nits o f our u n d erg ro u n d o rg an isatio n in several p a rts o f the cou n try were co n tacted by individuals in the B ritish A rm ed F o rces— secretly o f co u rse— u n d er assum ed nam es. A gain I re p e a t here it was n o t ju s t a question o f ‘d iscrim in atio n ’

ag ain st service rules, etc., b u t they w ere an g ry m en, w ho felt th a t B rita in ’s co lonial rulers had d a re d to sw oop d ow n on th e ir n a tio n a l leaders a t every level, arrested th em a n d h ad unleashed violence (in G a n d h iji’s w ords ‘leonine violence’) on m asses o f u n arm ed m en a n d w om en for the ‘sin’ o f d em an d in g freedom a n d independence o f th eir m o th erlan d . They cam e to us for advice a b o u t th eir desire to tak e p a r t in p a trio tic activities.

“ O u r advice to th em w as to organise, to begin w ith, such elem ents o f their u n its as a re truly p a trio tic a n d p rep ared to ‘do o r d ie’ acco rd in g to G a n d h iji’s m an d ate. W e in terp reted this, now co n tro v ersial, co m m an d to m ean th a t w herever y o u are, y o u ‘d o ’ y o u r best to ham p er th e B ritish w ar m achine w ith o u t causing individual injury unless forced to do so. W e w arned them th a t if th e ir activities w ere detected by the B ritish au th o rities, they should be p rep a re d to pay the highest price— physical to rtu re an d even th e gallow s. We asked th em to be careful a n d act only when they were sure th a t it w ould have th e c h a racter o f a ‘collective’ actio n . W e cau tio n ed th em th a t they could be b etray ed by th eir ow n cow ardly colleagues and th a t they should be p rep ared fo r such treach ero u s actio n s, etc. We did advise th em to avoid killing o f individual B ritish officers as th a t m ight give th em a n alibi fo r inflicting furious reprisals. In any case, they w ere told to spread the m essage o f the ‘Q uit In d ia ’

reso lu tio n fro m u n it to u n it and th en ‘strik e’ on specific dem ands.

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“ All the leaders were alm o st u n an im o u sly o f th e view th a t th e R I N strike should n o t have provoked the B ritish com m anders to behave as they did.

G o d frey ’s nam e becam e n o to rio u s because he had the au d a c ity to th reaten the d estru ctio n o f th e en tire N avy. B ut by a n d large, all o f th em cautioned us ag ain st en co u rag in g the strik ers to tak e any extrem e steps. S a rd a r V allabh B hai P atel, in p articu lar, believed th a t the B ritish ‘offer’ o f In d ep en d en ce was sincere a b o u t tra n sfe rrin g p o w er to India.

“ Y o u r questions persist in using the term ‘m u tin y ’ w hereas th ro u g h o u t this period we defined it as strike actio n . T h e ratin g s w ere in fu riated by th e in h u m an w o rk in g c o n d itio n s a n d , to a d d insult to injury, they w ere abused. To be called In d ia n dogs w ho sh o u ld be treated as m ad dogs h u rt th e ir p atrio tic sentim ents. H ow ever, m o st political leaders including the tallest o f th em all, nam ely G a n d h iji, called u p o n th em to en d th eir resistance. A nd S a rd a r Patel ap p ealed to them to leave it to th e n atio n al leaders to settle m atters. T o begin with, th e ‘Q u it In d ia ’ leaders a p p e a le d to Ja w ah arlal N e h ru an d o th e rs to brin g a b o u t an h o n o u ra b le settlem en t an d n o t insist th a t th e strik ers should su rre n d e r u n co n d itio n ally . H ow ever, o n its ow n, we finally did advise the strik ers to follow th e C ongress le a d e rs’ advice because the fact th a t we were n o t absolutely confident th a t u ltim ately , in th e event o f a d ead lo ck o f the C a b in et M issio n ’s n eg o tiatio n s, w h eth er the 1942 lead ersh ip could co ntinue the freed o m struggle.

“ I am n o t su re if I m et a n y officers o f the In d ia n N avy, b u t leaders o f the strike m o v em en t, w hose nam es I c a n n o t rem em b er now , did com e to see me to seek m y advice.

“ T h e strik ers h ad no o th e r o p tio n . As fo r violence, it w as th e provocative a ctio n o f th e B ritish a u th o ritie s w hich sp ark ed it a n d they h ad to resist it.

T h e violence th a t y o u ta lk a b o u t o ccu rred w hen th e B ritish P olice an d the A rm y re so rte d to firing on th o u sa n d s o f p eo p le w ho d em o n stra te d in su p p o rt o f th e strike.

“ T h e strik ers, m o re o r less, knew a b o u t th e consequences o f th eir action o r th e n a tu re o f p u n ish m e n t th a t w o u ld be heap ed u p o n them . B ut, because th ey knew th a t som e fo rm o f N a tio n a l G o v e rn m e n t w as com in g to existence, th e y n a tu ra lly w an ted to get th e s u p p o rt o f som e p ro m in e n t political leaders.

I do n o t th in k th a t th ey sh o u ld have been dism issed fro m service. In m y view th e y sh o u ld have been rein sta te d by th e N a tio n a l G o v ern m en t. A t the m ost, som e severe w arn in g s sh o u ld have been sufficient to m eet the requirem ents o f u p h o ld in g ad m in istra tiv e discipline.

“ T hey fully deserve to get pensions fo r w hich o th e r freedom fighters are eligible. As a m a tte r o f fact, q u ite a few o f th em did n o t even receive the re g u la r p en sio n th ey w ere en titled to .

“ It w as a p r o o f th a t th e re w as w idespread u n rest in the A rm ed Services u n d e r B ritish ru le. T his p ro te s t a c tio n , th erefo re, could have influenced the m em b ers o f th e C a b in et M ission’s th in k in g a b o u t the tra n sfe r o f p o w er th a t to o k p lace in A u g u st 1947.

“ M o st n a tio n a lists o f o u r tim es w elcom ed th e In d ian soldiers’ refusal to

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fire on unarm ed ag ita to rs. T he G arhw ali soldiers’ refusal to do so in 1930

was a unique event w hich m u st have h ad its repurcussions on som e oth er sections o f the A rm ed Forces. B ut the G u rk h a soldiers’ action in 1919 and, m ore so, the M a ra th a soldiers’ behaviour was u n p a trio tic and gave a n ind icatio n th a t they h ad been to tally dem oralised.

“ In d ian A rm y m en, serving the B ritish rule, w ere looked upon as m ercenaries by the average Indian. To the people o f m y w ay o f thinking, it was b o th illegal a n d im m oral to call u p o n them to sh o o t dow n Indian p atrio ts.

“ Obviously th ere is a w orld o f difference betw een a N atio n al G overnm ent elected by the people a n d one th a t was im posed by force o f arm s an d o th er m eans by the foreigners as the B ritish G o v ern m en t was.

“ I belive th a t in o u r presen t situ atio n , political parties who have taken the o a th o f allegiance to the In d ian C o n stitu tio n should n o t tam p er with the loyalty and discipline o f the A rm ed Forces.

“ M y views on this subject (violence as a m eans to achieve political aim s) a re no longer relevant. B ut in 1942 I certainly did th in k th a t since n o n violence p ractised by m ost C ongressm en since 1930, w ith h ard ly any im pact on the B ritish c o lo n ialists’ a ttitu d e tow ards the d em an d fo r Sw araj; I, rightly o r w rongly, cam e to the conclusion th a t non-violent action was n o t enough an d , therefo re, h ad to be supplem ented by m o re effective actions w hich could be described as violent. Y es, I was aw are o f G a n d h iji’s disapproval o f my en co u rag em en t to th e R IN boys and a t th a t p o in t o f tim e I openly disagreed w ith him.

“ D espite this long span o f tim e, th a t is 1946-1984, I have no reason to revise my views.

“ P erhaps, the IN A soldiers’ a c q u ittal, a fte r th eir trial, m ight have influenced th e R IN strikers. B ut they certainly expected a n d , rightly so, th a t they should have been tre a te d as p a trio ts an d n o t as rebels. I personally th in k it is difficult to isolate th e events w hich to o k place a t th a t tim e a n d com e to an y conclusion a b o u t cause a n d effect o f incidents, su ch as the N aval u prising o r th e IN A ’s role. Finally, m any o f th e grievances o f the R IN

ratings w ere n o t a tte n d e d to satisfactorily by the N a tio n a l G overnm ent.

T h erefo re, som e o f th em th in k th a t I a n d my colleagues b etrayed th em in as fa r as we failed to get th e grievances red ressed .” 48

M a h a tm a G an d h i had issued a statem en t on F eb ru ary 26 in reply to M rs.

A ru n a A saf A li’s criticism o f his a ttitu d e to the R IN m utiny. A m ongst o th er things he said th a t “ it is a m a tte r o f g reat relief th a t th e ratings have listened to S a rd a r P a te l’s advice to su rren d er. T hey have n o t su rren d ered th e ir h o n o u r. So fa r as I can see, in reso rtin g to m u tin y they were badly advised.

I f it w as grievance, fancied o r real, they sh o u ld have w aited for the guidance an d in terv en tio n o f po litical leaders o f th eir choice.

“ I f they m utinied fo r the freedom o f In d ia , they w ere doubly wrong. They could n o t do so w ith o u t a call fro m a p re p a re d revolutionary party. They w ere th o u g h tless an d ig n o ra n t if they believed th a t by th eir m ight they w ould deliver In d ia fro m foreign d o m in atio n .

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“ A ru n a was rig h t w hen she says th a t th e fighters this tim e show ed grit as never before. B ut grit becom es fo o lh ard in ess w hen it is untim ely an d suicidal as this was. She is entitled to say th a t th e people ‘a re n o t in terested in the ethics o f violence o r n o n -v io len ce,’ b u t the people a re very m u ch interested in k now ing the w ay w hich will brin g freedom to the m asses— violence o r non-violence. T he people have, how ever im perfectly, h ith erto gone the way o f n o n -violence. A ru n a a n d h er co m rad es have to ask them selves everytim e w hether non-violence has o r has n o t raised In d ia from h er slum ber o f ages an d created in th em a y earn in g , very vague p erh ap s, fo r Sw araj. T here is, in m y o p in io n , only o n e a n sw e r.” 49

M r. M .R . M asan i, a n o th e r y o u n g C ongress Socialist o f the forties who w as a m em ber o f th e C en tral Legislative A ssem bly, has reco rd ed the follow ing on th e R I N M u tin y in his b o o k B liss W as It in That D aw n:

“ A n exciting d eb ate w hich to o k place on F e b ru a ry 22, 1946, w as th a t on •

an a d jo u rn m e n t m o tio n to discuss th e m utiny o f the ratin g s o f the Royal In d ian N avy in B om bay. O u r D ep u ty L eader, A s a f A li, h a d tab led an a d jo u rn m e n t m o tio n to discuss ‘the grave situ atio n th a t h as arisen w ith respect to th e In d ian N avy, affecting practically the w hole o f it, as a resu lt o f m ish an d lin g by th e im m ediate a u th o ritie s c o n c e rn e d .’

“ In a speech on th e o ccasion, I ap p ealed to the B ritish to leave the country while th e re was ‘still a n arm y, navy and air fo rce left in th e c o u n try .’ We are to ld th a t the situ a tio n is in c o n tro l an d th a t prestige has been preserved no d o u b t w ith the c o -o p e ra tio n o f m en like S a rd a r Patel in B om bay and G a z d a r in K a ra c h i. I t has been preserved because o u r n a tio n a l leaders o f all p a rtie s a re p re p a re d in th e interest o f this c o u n try to en d o rse the call o f th e a u th o ritie s. I w o n d er w h eth er this k in d o f victory is w o rth having. T he ratin g s w ho su rre n d e re d in the in terest o f th eir c o u n try a re the m oral victors o f the struggle.

“ Surely, I co n tin u e d , th e B ritish G o v e rn m e n t did n o t have to w ait for a n o th e r m utiny. T h ey co u ld go w hile th e re w as still som e social stability a n d law an d o rd e r left. T h ey n e e d n ’t pull dow n th e pillars o f society.

“ T h e D efence S ecretary , P h ilip M aso n , w hom I was to com e to know la te r as th e w riter P h ilip W o odruff, to ld me in th e lobby in a typically sp o rting m an n er. ‘T h a t w as a w icked speech, M asani, b u t I enjoyed it’.” 50

T h irty -six years la te r, M r. M asan i was interview ed o n the sam e subject a n d h e said:

“ N o w to see if th e re is a n y th in g I can say to su p p lem en t w h at I have alre a d y w ritten . I im agine th a t th e ratin g s w ere m otivated p a rtly by their ow n grievances like fo o d , p a rtly by p o o r lead ersh ip a n d p artly by n a tio n alistic m otives.

“ O n the la rg e r q u estio n on w h e th e r m em bers o f th e arm ed forces have a rig h t to rebel I w as in a g reem en t w ith m y frien d M r. Ja y a p ra k a sh N aray an w hen h e called u p o n th e a rm ed forces to disobey ‘illegal’ o rd ers o f the G o v e rn m e n t, even th o u g h I p erso n ally w arned h im n o t to re p eat th e statem e n t as it w as difficult to say w h at o rd e rs w ere legal a n d w h at w ere illegal

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a n d he was liable to be m isquoted, w hich he was.

“ M y ow n th in k in g w ould be th a t the Polish A rm y w ould be perfectly en titled to m utiny and resto re so lid arity in P o lan d unless o f course there again it w ould only result in inviting Soviet aggression. It is, th erefo re, a difficult and com plicated q uestion to answ er.

“ Y ou refer to the then B ritish G o v ern m en t as ‘a foreign regim e lawfully estab lish ed ’. W hen was it lawfully established? C an any foreign regim e claim to be lawfully established except when its m ilitary pow er is ad equate to en-foice its will? W hen I was a young rebel u n d er G an d h iji d u rin g Independence days I used to question the w ords ‘G o v ern m en t by law established’. It does n o t m ean th a t even th en I was fo r violent action and I did say in my speech in the Indian Legislative A ssem bly th a t th o u g h the m otives o f the ratings m ay be p artio tic I could n o t s u p p o rt their m ethod o f reso rtin g to a m utiny.

Sim ilarly I do n o t th in k the police force have any right to strike o r riot.

“ I do n o t th in k th a t ex p lo itatio n by political parties o f d iscontent in the m ilitary an d p ara-m ilitary forces fo r political benefit is justified. I entirely agree th a t such exploitation in the long run underm ines discipline in these forces. I am ag ain st m em bers o f the police o r the arm ed forces being allowed to jo in tra d e u n io n s, e tc .” 51

M r. Philip M aso n o f the In d ian Civil Service and a u th o r o f A M atter o f H onour, concerning the In d ian A rm y a n d m any o th e r books, who was the D efence (W ar) Secretary a t th a t tim e an d is m entioned by M r. M asani, was requested to reco rd his rem iniscences o f the p erio d , particu larly relating to the R I N M utiny; he has the follow ing to say:

“ N o netheless I do m o st vividly rem em ber as a very d ram atic m om ent the m utiny in F eb ru ary 1946 in the R oyal In d ia n N av y w hen I was the representativ e o f the D efence D ep artm en t in th e C en tral Assem bly. Y o u ask me in the first place th ree qu estio n s—do I co n sid er th a t the R IN and R IA F m utinies w ere caused by n atio n alistic reasons, o r som e lo n g o u tstan d in g u n redressed grievances, o r a m ixture o f both.

“ T he s h o rt answ er m ust be a m ixture o f b o th b u t I th in k th e general feeling o f u n rest w as the m ost im p o rta n t. T he k in d o f m en recruited in the R IN , as in the In d ian A rm y, were m ostly fro m the P u n jab o r fro m the o ther classes w ho were recruited in the In d ian A rm y a n d I th in k ju s t the sam e kind o f m aterial. 1 have suggested in by b o o k A M a tte r o f H onour th a t w henever there w as a m utiny in the In d ia n A rm y one could say there were th ree causes—a general feeling o f unease o r d isquiet o f political origin, som e m ilitary grievance a b o u t fo o d o r dress or pay a n d finally strange, u n k now n, o r bad officers.

In th e years leading up to the p a rtitio n a n d independence th ere w as w idespread u n certain ty a b o u t the political fu tu re, anxiety a b o u t affairs a t hom e a n d the c o n tra st betw een the prevailing m ood in the village a n d w hat the men h e a rd w ith th e ir regim ent. In the In d ian A rm y th ere was a stro n g feeling o f regim ental prid e an d the tra d itio n o f th e u n it and so they w ere able to overcom e these difficulties an d th e In d ia n A rm y as a w hole rem ained faithful to th eir m ilitary allegiance u n til p a rtitio n . I t was a very surprising thing th a t the

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Indian A rm y was k ep t o u t o f political involvem ent in those years and a g reat trium ph, I th in k fo r th e officers a n d the regim ental spirit.

“ T he R o y al In d ian N avy h ad e x p an d ed fa r m o re rap id ly th an the A rm y and in th e n a tu re o f things h a d n o th in g like th e sam e regim ental spirit. I do n o t need to em phasise the p o in t to you, b u t, in any N avy, m en a re m ade up into com plem ents fo r each ship th ey jo in a n d the p rid e in th e N avy as a whole m ust obviously be a m a tte r o f m uch slow er g ro w th th a n p rid e in a regim ent.

C ertainly the officers o f th e R IN w hom I knew an d w hom I th in k best q u alified to express a n o p in io n believed th a t to o rapid expansion was a t the b o tto m o f the tro u b le. 1 d o n ’t th in k th e local grievances w ere in this case really im p o rta n t; they could have been d e a lt w ith quickly eno u g h w ith officers who really knew th e m en p ersonally.

“ Y o u r second q uestion is w h e th e r I consider it the in h eren t rig h t o f a m em ber o f th e defence fo rces o f a subject n a tio n to rebel o r m utiny. M y answ er to th a t is t h a t it d ep en d s entirely o n w h eth er th ey have been conscripted o r volunteered. I f they have been conscripted (as in R u ssia in 1917) I suppose th ey have such a right, b u t th e In d ian A rm y a n d the Indian Navy in W orld W ar I I h a d vo lu n teered a n d th e m en h a d ta k e n an o a th o f allegiance. In th a t case I m o st em phatically do n o t th in k they have such a right and I em phasised this stro n g ly in th e speeches I m ade in the A ssem bly a b o u t the In d ian N a tio n a l A rm y. I said th a t I th o u g h t it w as essential for th e fu tu re o f In d ia as an in d ep en d en t n a tio n th a t every one should clearly u n derstand th a t a m ilitary o a th by a v o lu n teer was inviolable. T h e only exception to th a t is o f co u rse, as y o u will know , the general legal pro v iso th a t no one should o bey an illegal o rd e r, such as to m u rd e r som eone in cold b lood w ith o u t trial.

“ Y o u r th ird q u estio n is as to w h a t is m y c o n cep tio n o f a legal and illegal o rd e r in re latio n to th e defence fo rces. I am n o t o f c o u rse a law yer an d I am su re y o u will find a g re a t deal o f legal w riting on this subject. It seems to me th a t in a v o lu n teer a rm y th e situ a tio n is usually, in p ra c tic e , perfectly clear.

A so ld ier o r sailo r has ta k e n an o a th o f allegiance an d he is b o u n d to obey th e o rd e rs o f his s u p e rio r officer. I t is u n d e rs to o d th a t these o rd e rs a re all given w ithin a m ilitary fra m e w o rk . T h a t is to say, a m an will legally be o rd e red to do certa in things w hich fall w ithin his m ilitary duty. H is com m anding officer will n o t o rd e r h im to ta k e o ff all his clo th es in public; to rem ove his tu rb a n in public if h e is a S ikh o r to m u rd e r a co m rad e. H e w ould be ju stified in refu sin g su ch a n o rd e r— o n th e o th e r h a n d such an o rd e r svould n o t usu ally be given! So th a t in p ra c tic e , I do n o t th in k th e re is usually any real difficulty.

“ T h e q u e stio n o f a c o n sc rip t arm y, o f w hich th e m a jo rity believe th a t the G o v e rn m e n t w hich c o n sc rip te d th e m is ty ra n n o u s, is a m u ch b ro a d e r and b igger q u estio n a n d I do n o t su p p o se y o u will really w an t to go in to th a t; it d o e s n o t seem re le v a n t to y o u r p o in t because these m en were all volunteers.

“ I do n o t k n o w if y o u will be in sy m p ath y w ith my p o in t o f view b u t l e a n ex p lain it fu rth e r. W hile I w as in th e A ssem bly in the b e g i n n i n g o f 1946 there w as on the C o n g ress benches a lady fro m B om bay, w hose n am e I am sorry

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to say, in old age, has alto g eth er escaped me, whose d au g h ter had com m anded a b attalio n o f Indian w om en in M alaya w ho volunteered to jo in the Japanese and fight on th eir side against the B ritish in India. A t the end o f the W a r this young lady was held as a p riso n er-o f-w ar in a cam p in B urm a. I rem em ber telling my colleague in the Assem bly, this young lad y ’s m other, th a t I th o u g h t she should be released a t once and I w ould e n d e av o u r to arran g e this an d I successfully did. She had a genuine belief th a t she was doing the rig h t thing and had volunteered to fight against us an d I can see no reason why she should be held indefinitely in prison. H e r m o th e r, m y colleague in the Assembly, expressed h er g ratitu d e for w hat I had d one an d asked m e to com e and meet h er fo r tea. I said I w ould be pleased to m eet her and was looking forw ard to the occasion when she m entioned th a t one o f the IN A officers w ould be there. I then said th a t I was a fra id I could n o t m eet him an d so the m eeting never to o k p lace. T he p o in t was th a t the IN A m an had held a com m ission in the In d ian A rm y, he had volunteered fo r this, he had been to the In d ian M ilitary A cadem y a t D eh ra D un and he had held a com m ission fro m the K ing. H e had ch anged sides in w ar when it w as g reatly to his advantage to do so. T o m e this is m orally quite a different category fro m th a t o f som eone w ho h ad never taken any o a th o f allegiance.” 52

C o m m an d er S .G . K a rm a rk a r (later a R ear A dm iral) w ho received orders to tak e over the com m an d o f H M I S Talwar the evening before the M utiny says: “ A s a result o f th e m utiny the C om m unist P a rty o f In d ia in B om bay w ent com pletely berserk, sto p p ed th e textile mills fro m w orking and they sta rte d actively particip atin g in arson a n d d estru ctio n in B om bay especially in the w orking class areas startin g from Bhendi B azar to D a d a r.” 53

H e fu rth e r says, “ A fter the m utiny a delegation o f politicians was b ro u g h t to my house in Reveira by my d e a r friend M r. V enkatrao O gale o f O gale G la s s W o rk s . T h e delegation consisted o f fam ous political personalities like R ao Saheb P a tw a rd h a n , his b ro th e r Ja n a rd h a n P atw ard h an an d they w ere acco m p an ied by M r. A p p a P a n t who was also well know n to me.

“ T hey desired to know a b o u t the m utiny. T hey w ere com pletely briefed giving a co rrect picture. They w ere appreciative o f actio n taken by me an d my attitu d es a n d enquired w hether I w ould be p re p a re d to m eet M r. Jaw aharlal N eh ru . W hen inform ed I d o n ’t see any reaso n ‘why n o t’, they fixed an a p p o in tm e n t fo r m e w ith th e fu tu re P rim e M in ister o f In d ia a t C arm ichael R oad a t his sister’s residence (M rs. K rish n a H ath ee Singh). A tth is tim e I was closely associated w ith a highly p laced B ritish Intelligence Officer from the centre.

H e requested if he could acco m p an y me, I said m o st certainly. I also to o k w ith m e L ieu ten an t S.N . K ohli w ho was re lu c ta n t a t first b u t eventually he agreed.

“ It was a n in terestin g m eeting. Salient features reg ard in g the M utiny were co m m u n icated to M r. N ehru.

“ As usual M r. N e h ru w ent off th e track a n d sta rte d talking ab o u t youth, e n th u siasm , a sp iratio n s etc. M y colleague asked M r. N eh ru , w ould he su p p o rt th e y o u th if they go com pletely hayw ire in d oing things like ruining a very fine,

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extrem ely w ell-regulated service. T his u p set the old m an a n d he got angry. I did n o t subdue him b u t I p o u re d m o re oil in the fire! A fte r a n o th e r ten to fifteen m inutes we had a nice cup o f te a an d d e p a rte d .”

L ieu ten an t S.N . K ohli who w as serving in H M I S Tahvor a t the tim e o f the R IN M u tin y says “ the m utiny sta rte d in Talwar firstly because the com m unication ratings w ere m ore ed ucated an d intelligent a n d secondly because the m utiny could sp read th ro u g h o u t the N avy very ra p id ly as they could control all wireless a n d o th e r m eans o f co m m u n icatio n a n d pass o rd e rs an d in fo rm ation to all th e N aval ships in all p o rts o f In d ia.

“ It is m y view th a t the N aval M utiny co m in g as the cu lm in atio n o f a n um b er o f sim ilar incidents in the In d ian D efence Services was largely instrum ental in convincing the B ritish th a t holding In d ia was no longer feasible w ithout th e use o f large-scale B ritish force a n d was, inter alia, responsible fo r ushering in freedom .

“ I am rem in d ed o f an in cid en t in w hich I was perso n ally involved. Firstly, L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e rs K a ta ri a n d K a rm a rk a r w ere eith er sum m oned o r were going to see P a n d it N e h ru on his visit to B om bay then. T hey asked me to a c c o m p a n y them .

“ A fter arriv al a t M rs. H ath ee Singh’s house, we w aited fo r o u r tu rn . W hen we w ent P a n d itji said, ‘W h a t can I do fo r you?’ I was taken aback because I th o u g h t he h ad sen t fo r us. W hen m y tw o co m p an io n s did n o t say anything, I p ip ed u p ‘A t n o tim e h as th e C o n g ress given the A rm ed F orces clear guidelines o r a c lear directive how to c o n d u ct them selves in th e p resen t politically d istu rb e d c o n d itio n s o f the c o u n try .’ P an d itji w ent red in th e face a n d reto rte d , ‘th a n k y o u fo r teach in g m e m y jo b .’ H e was th en , I th in k , Congress P resident. T h e A d m irals th e n discussed the genesis o f th e m u tin y .” 54

Shri M o ra rji D esai, a fo rm e r P rim e M in iste r o f In d ia , was a well-know n lead er on th e n a tio n a l scene a t th a t tim e a n d to o k over as the H om e M in iste r o f B o m b ay a co u p le o f m o n th s a fte r the R IN M utiny in F eb ru ary 1946. H e w as interview ed w ith reg ard to his views o n this subject. H e was q u ite c a te g o rical a n d said 55 th a t w h atev er m ay have been th e grievances th e y (th e ratin g s) h a d n o rig h t to re v o lt irrespective o f w hether they were serv in g u n d e r a fo reig n p o w er, as th ey w ere v o lu n teers a n d n o t conscripts.

H e said th a t th e m u tin y sh o u ld n o t hav e taken place a n d it was all w rong; th e ratin g s sh o u ld h av e resig n ed a n d ta k e n reco u rse to all co n stitu tio n al m easures. T h ey c a n n o t do w h a t they did in the defence forces a n d police forces. N o A rm y o r c o u n try can fu n ctio n like this a n d in fact it w ould be d isa stro u s. In th e case o f c o n sc rip tio n , how ever, it is a to tally different thing.

Shri D e sa i sa id th a t h e ag reed w ith S a rd a r P a te l’s advice to th e ratings to lay d o w n th e ir a rm s a n d th e n he w ould help th em to have th e ir grievances red ressed .

W ith re g a rd to his views re g a rd in g freed o m fighters’ p ensions, fo r ratings w h o to o k p a r t in the m utiny, he w as em p h atic th a t they are n o t entitled to a n y su ch p e n sio n a n d th a t h e was ag a in st all these things. H e said he was a g a in st th e ra tin g s being ta k e n back in to the service a fter they h a d m utinied.

TH E RO Y A L IN D IA N NA V Y M U TINY

8 9

H e did n o t agree w ith the claim o f the ratings th a t th eir actio n hastened the freedom o f th e country. H e em phasised th a t he did n o t believe in any pension being given to all freedom fighters an d specifically raised the questio n “ does one fight fo r freedom to get p en sio n ?” H e was also ag ain st the ex p lo itatio n by political parties o f an y d isc o n ten t in m ilitary a n d p a ra m ilitary forces fo r deriving an y political benefits. H e was also o f the view th a t the In d ian N a tio n a l A rm y were n o t the h arbingers o f independence and it was M a h atm a G an d h i w ho b ro u g h t independence fo r the country. H e was o f th e view th a t the L a b o u r P arty, being in pow er in G re a t B ritain a t th a t tim e, helped and they had also realised th a t it was n o t possible fo r the B ritish to hold on to In d ia an y longer.

R eferring back to B.C. D u tt, he has a n interesting piece in his boo k M utiny o f the Innocents. H e says, “ If th ere ever was a rev o lu tio n ary situation in In d ia it was th ere in the m id-forties. T he m ushroom cloud o f sm oke o ver the tw o Jap an ese citics had buried u n d er its fall-o u t m uch th a t m an had cherished.

A long w ith it w ent the p rev alen t no tio n s o f im perial glory. In In d ia a new g eneration h ad grow n by w earing the so ld ier’s uniform an d exulting in the sound o f gunfire. M o st o f them w anted the to ta l overthrow o f the R a j. T he m eans did n o t m uch m atter. N o r were they, a t th a t p o in t in In d ian history, the only ones to feel the way they did. O th e r segm ents o f society were also sim ilarly inclined. T he leadership w ould n o t have it. They nipped w hat the young th o u g h t was the revolution in th e bud.

“ T here were reasons fo r such an attitu d e . T he M ah atm a, o f course, was d ead -set ag ain st violence, w hatever the cause. B ut his follow ers were a tired lo t in a h u rry fo r freedom d u rin g th eir life-tim e a t an y price. It is true th a t the M a h a tm a w anted to give th e B ritish a n o th e r chance to prove th eir b o n a fides. If they failed, the M a h a tm a in tended to rally th e co u n try for a n o th e r battle. H e did n o t get th a t chance. He had to accep t the p artitio n o f the co u n try , because his lieutenants did not give h im any o th e r choice.

F o r once, an d a t the m o st crucial a n d h eart-b reak in g o f tim es, everything w ent ag ain st him . T he leaders were a tired lot, veterans o f m any battles, now tu rn e d old a n d im p atien t. It w as n a tu ra l; they were only being hum an; above all, ch aracteristically In d ian . T heir actio n s were in to ta l acco rd w ith the n atio n al c h a ra c ter.” 56

Strike or mutiny

M em ber o f R IN M utiny C om m ission o f E n quiry consisting o f three In d ian C h ief Justices, a Vice A dm iral o f the R oyal N avy C om m anding the C ruiser S q u ad ro n in th e E ast Indies a n d a B ritish M a jo r G eneral o f the Indian A rm y w ho h ad com m anded the fam ous 4 th In d ian Division have unam biguously recorded in th eir concluding p a rag rap h s o f th e re p o rt on July 10, 1946, “ W e feel strongly th a t it m ust be b ro u g h t h o m e to the m en o f the R o y al In d ian N avy a n d indeed to all A rm ed Forces, th a t there is n o t and n e v e r can be, such a th in g as a ‘strik e ’ in an y A rm ed F o rc e ; it can only be m u tin y w ith o r w ith o u t violence.

9 0

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

“ D iscipline is essential a n d discipline calls fo r a spirit o f loyalty, unselfishness a n d d evotion to d u ty on th e p a rt o f b o th officers an d m en, each having his responsibilities, to each o th e r a n d to th e S e rv ic e /’57

Recognition o f freedom fighters

In 1972, the G o v ern m en t o f In d ia ad d ressed the C h ie f S ecretaries o f State G o v ern m en ts a n d U nion T errito ries statin g th a t ex-personnel o f the Royal In d ian N avy w ho h ad p a rtic ip a te d in th e R I N m u tin y w ould also be considered fo r the g ra n t o f freed o m fighters p en sio n . T h e co n d itio n s stipulated fo r the g ra n t o f freed o m fighters p en sio n was th a t “ only those w ho lost th eir jo b s o r m eans o f livelihood due to p a rtic ip a tio n in the n atio n al m ovem en t w ould be b ro u g h t u n d e r this schem e.” A list o f 457 sailors o f the R IN

w ho w ere discharged/dism issed/released from service as a resu lt o f the R IN

M u tin y was p re p a re d a n d subsequently 19 m ore sailors w ere ad d ed to this list m ak in g a to ta l o f 476. It w as decided th a t o n ly those sailors w ho were either “ dism issed fro m th e service” o r “ discharged S N L R ” (Service no longer req u ired ) sh o u ld be eligible fo r the g ra n t o f freedom fighters pension. This decision w as based on th e ap p re c ia tio n th a t these categories o f ex-sailors o f R I N lo st th e ir jo b s/liv elih o o d as a resu lt o f th eir p a rtic ip a tio n in the R IN

M u tin y . T his w as a p p ro v ed by th e G o v e rn m e n t fo r im plem entation on June 19, 1973.

R E F E R E N C E S

1. R e p o rt o f the R oyal Indian N avy M u tin y C om m ission o f Enquiry, G o v e rn m e n t o f In d ia , 1946, P a rt I, p. 40.

2. Ib id ., p p . 7-15.

3. Ib id ., p . 47.

4. Ib id ., p. 7.

5. Ib id ., p . 41.

6. Ib id ., p p . 41-45.

7. G h a n d h i (Vice A d m iral) R .K .S ., R e td .— E xcerpts fro m p ersonal m aterial received, 1982.

8. R e p o rt o f th e R o y al In d ian N avy M u tin y C om m ission o f E nquiry, op.

cit., p . 16.

9. Ib id ., p p . 20-27.

10. Ib id ., p p . 28-29.

11. Ib id ., p. 30.

12. Ib id ., p . 31.

13. Ib id ., p . 27.

14. Ib id ., P a r t II, p p . 295-96.

15. Ib id ., p . 296.

16. Ib id ., p . 297.

17. Ib id ., p . 320.

T H E R O Y A L IN D IA N N A V Y M U TIN Y

91

18. Ib id ., p. 322.

19. Ibid., p p . 297-98.

20. S h ep p ard , L ieu ten an t C o m m an d er T ., R IN , R etd .— Excerpts from m aterial received, 1982.

21. Streatfield Jam es (C o m m an d er) E .C ., O .B .E ., R .I.N ., R e td .— Excerp fro m m aterial received, 1982.

.

2? V asudeva, R .N ., I.A .S ., R e td .-E x c e rp ts from material received, 1983.

23. R e p o rt o f the R oyal In d ian N avy M utiny C om m ission o f E nquiry, op.

cit., P a rt II, pp. 300-304.

24. L carm o n t (C ap tain ) P .H ., C .I.E ., R .I.N ., R e td .- E x c e r p ts from m aterial received.

25. R e p o rt o f the R oyal In d ian N avy M utiny C om m ission o f Enquiry, P a rt II, p. 477.

26. Ib id ., p, 378.

28. Shaw (L ieu ten an t C o m m an d er) E .M ., R .I.N ., R e td .—E xtracts from P erso n al D iary , 1946.

.

.

T ,

29. D u tt, B .C ., M utiny o f the Innocents, S in d h u P ublications P rivate L td., Bom bay, 1971, p . 86, a n d R e p o rt on the R oyal In d ian N avy M utiny Com m ission o f E nquiry, P a rt I, op. cit., p. 50.

30. Ibid., p p . 63-69.

.

,

1QS0

31. Singh, M ad an , M aterial received an d discussion w ith the A u th o r, 1982, pp. 7-9.

33.' Sw ainy (C o m m an d er) M .S .I., I.N ., R e td .- E x c e r p ts fro m m aterial 34. N arayan ian (C o m m an d er) C „ I.N ., R e td .- E x c e r p ts fro m m aterial recei-35. G ib so n 83Jack , As I Saw It, M ukul P rak ash an , New D elhi, 1976, p.

178

36. R e p o rt o f the R oyal In d ian N avy M utiny C om m ission o f E nquiry, P a rt II, op. c it., pp. 329-45.

37. Ibid., p. 463.

38. Ib id ., p. 464.

39. Ibid., p. 469.

40. Ibid., P a rt I, p . 121.

41. Ibid., p. 122.

42. Ib id ., p. 125.

2 . ' V efghese1 (C o m m an d er) P .M ., I.N ., R e td .- E x c e r p ts fro m m aterial 45. R e 'p o r f o f T e ' R oyal In d ian N avy M utiny C om m ission o f Enquiry, P a r t I, op. cit., p p . 130-131.

« :

,942-47. Volume V,. B d i» r i* C h * . Nicbota

9 2

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

M ansergh, H e r M ajesty’s S tationery Office, L o n d o n , 1976, pp. 1232-37.

48. A li (M rs) A ru n a A saf, E xcerpts fro m m aterial received, 1982.

49. D u tt, B .C ., op. cit., p p 210-213.

50. M asani, M .R ., Bliss W as I t in T h a t D aw n, A rn o ld -H ein em an P ublishers (India) Pvt. L td ., N ew D elhi, p p . 196-197.

51. M asani, M .R .— E xcerpts fro m m aterial received, 1982.

52. M ason, Philip, I.C .S ., R e td .— E xcerpts fro m m aterial received, 1982.

53. K a rm a rk a r (R e a r A d m iral), S .G ., R e td .— M aterial received, 1982, p. 8.

54. K ohli (A d m iral), S.N ., R e td .— M aterial received, 1984.

55. D esai, M o ra rji R .—M a te ria l received, 1982.

56. D u tt, B .C., op. cit., pp. 235-36.

57. R e p o rt on the R oyal In d ian N avy M u tin y C om m ission o f E nquiry, op.

cit., p. 526.

5.

Events a t Sea

M A J O R O P E R A T IO N S A N D E X E R C IS E S (1945-1950) E a r l y i n 1 9 4 5 , G e rm a n y hav in g fallen a n d th e en d o f th e W a r alm o st in sig h , the m ain th ru s t o f allied m aritim e activity was in th e eastern theatre.

In A pril 1945, the R I N ’s B angor and B ath u rst class m inesw eepers were fo rm ed into the 37th M inesw eeping F lo tilla a n d were deployed a t M an d ap am an d th e re a fter a t K y au k Pyu. T he F lo tilla included B asset class traw lers fo r d an b u o y laying. O n M ay 2, 1945, th e F lo tilla to o k p a r t in the sea-borne assau lt on R a n g o o n . H M IS Cauvery an d S u tlej also to o k p a rt in the o p e ra tio n leading to the cap tu re o f R a n g o o n . H M I ships, ranging from h a rb o u r defence m o to r launches to sloops, m ade h azard o u s jo u rn ey s up to B u rm a’s to rtu o u s w aterw ays and n arro w chaungs, m any o f w hich were u n ch arted ; the R IN ably assisted th e lan d forces w henever called up o n to do so. T he B ritish A d m iralty has described the o p eratio n as “ u n p recedented in the an n als o f naval h isto ry .” 1

Since the o ccu p atio n o f R an g o o n , R I N sloops m aintained an ti-sh ip p in g p atro ls o ff th e T enasserim C o ast a n d in the T avoy area. H M I S Assam and S in d rem ained engaged in convoying tro o p tran sp o rters. T he particip atio n o f Hindustan and Assam in the V ictory P a ra d e a t R an g o o n , therefore, gave recognition to the p a r t played by th e R IN in the liberation o f B urm a.

The R oyal Indian N av y ’s salvage o rg a n isa tio n 1 tow ed S .S . E lhind off the M an d ap am b reak w ater (w here she lay p a rtly sunk) an d subsequently sank h er a t sea. Sim ilarly, the Foremost w hich h ad been sunk a t the entrance to M azagon D ocks a t B om bay, a n d the V ish ak h ap atn am P o rt T ru st tug Ranger, w hich h a d been sunk in its ap p ro ach es, w ere salvaged.

T he second h a lf o f 1945 con tin u ed to witness naval activity in su p p o rt o f the o ccupation forces. H M I S Narbada, Godavari an d K istna m aintained searching p atro ls in th e M ergui A rchipelago,2 the F o rest S traits an d off Tavoy and T enasserim coasts. L an d in g p arties used to be sent for in terro gating in h ab itan ts an d fo r collection o f intelligence. T h e danbuoy layers, H M I S Punjab an d Deccan w hich were deployed off Phuket Island a t the n o rth e rn end o f M alacca S traits, assisted in fighting the fire on b oard H M S

Vestal after a suicide b o m b er h a d crash ed o n h e r deck.

Narbada, Godavari an d K istna, th e 37th M inesw eeping F lotilla a n d a few o th e r R IN units th ereafter proceeded eastw ards to M alaya and D u tch E ast

9 4

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

Indies. K istna arrived a t Penang on Septem ber 1, 1945 rendering assistance to the occupation forces. F u rth e r to th e east, H M I S Punjab, Bihar, Bengal and som e o th e r R IN units did som e excellent w ork in o p eratio n s ofF B atavia (Jak arta) an d the Jav a C o ast as well as in the S unda S traits.

H M IS Narbada arrived at P o rt Blair on S eptem ber 26, 1945, escorting the m ercy ship Bandra and rem ained a t th a t p o rt till N ovem ber 5. D u rin g this period she did valuable w ork sending search p arties to various islands to look for survivors, in terro g atin g local inhabitants, collecting intelligence and providing vital com m unication links fo r the A rm y, the civil au th o rities and the Press, to India (m ainland) an d C eylon. She was la te r relieved by H M IS

Kistna.

H M IS Godavari and Caiwery h ad m oved fu rth er eastw ard to jo in the British Pacific F leet an d were deployed on escort duties on the C hina coast.

T ho u g h th e w ar w ith Ja p a n had ended in as early as A u g u st 1945, the R IN units rem ain ed busy in a variety o f p o st-w a r o p eratio n s. This m ainly consisted o f m o p p in g u p o p eratio n s, tra n sp o rta tio n o f tro o p s and prisoners and cleaning B ritish an d Jap a n e se m inefields in the eastern th e a tre . Sim ultaneously, this p e rio d w itnessed a considerable am o u n t o f reo rg an isatio n o f ships a n d sm aller u n its o f th e R IN . A large num b er o f ships were either placed in th e reserve fleet, disposed of, re tu rn e d to the ow ner, o r converted b ack fo r trad e.

T hese activities a n d re o rg an isatio n co n tin u ed till In d ia becam e independ e n t.3 H M I S K istna was deployed o n anti-sm uggling p atro ls in the P alk S trait a t the re q u e st o f th e M a d ra s G o v ern m en t. She was subsequently relieved by H M I S Calcutta.

T he 37th M inesw eeping F lo tilla w hich had been decom m issioned and placed on the R eserve F le e t was again com m issioned fo r m inesw eeping o p eratio n s in the A n d a m a n Isla n d s from O cto b er to D ecem ber 1946. Jum na acted in su p p o rt, serving as th e victualling a n d stores issuing ship.

F o u r lan d in g ships, w hich h a d been ta k e n over fro m th e R oyal N avy, were com m issioned a t V ish a k h a p a tn a m an d w ere used fo r dum ping am m unition a t sea off V ish ak h ap atn am an d P o rt Blair.

H M I S D hanush was co n v erted in to a B oys’ T rain in g Ship in Ju n e 1946

a n d u n d e rto o k a cru ise off the E a st A frican C o a st term in atin g a t B om bay in S eptem ber. H e r second train in g cruise com m enced fro m K arach i on O c to b e r 25, 1946 a n d she called a t M a d ra s, P o rt B lair, C hittagong, V ishak h a p a tn a m a n d T rin co m alee. She w as replaced by H M I S Tir.

T h e eve o f independence w itnessed m a jo r ch anges.4 O n Ju n e 3, 1947, neg o tiatio n s betw een th e B ritish G o v ern m en t an d the In d ian leaders w ere successfully co m p leted a n d on A u g u st 15, 1947, the tw o new self-governing d o m in io n s o f In d ia an d P ak istan cam e into being. T hese events n atu rally affected th e co m p o sitio n o f the R oyal In d ia n N avy an d on July 1, 1947, a naval S ub-C om m ittee w as fo rm ed to m ake reco m m en d atio n s regarding the division o f assets an d liabilities o f th e undivided service. O n th e recom m end a tio n s o f th e C o m m ittee, th e P a rtitio n C ouncil did the allo catio n o f ships

EVENTS AT SEA

9 5

to In d ia and P ak istan respectively thus: Sloops 4, 2; frigates 2, 2; corvettes 1, nil; m inesw eepers 12, 4; m arine survey vessel 1, nil; and traw lers 4, 2.

Sm aller c raft too w ere sim ilarly shared with all the landing craft being allocated to India.

S oon a fte r In d ep en d en ce, neg o tiatio n s were started with the B ritish G o v ern m en t fo r the acquisition o f one cruiser, th ree destroyers an d oth er c raft for the R IN . T he num b er o f ships w hich could be kept in com m ission in the reco n stitu ted Royal In d ian N avy was restricted by the shortage o f perso n n el. T he qualified people available were inadequate fo r the m any and varied duties they could be called up o n to perform . An easy solution to this p roblem could n o t be fo u n d as the training o f personnel was handicapped by the lack o f experienced in stru cto rs, an d as a num ber o f the w ell-equipped training establishm ents w hich were lo cated in K arach i, were no longer available.

B efore an y co ncrete steps could be tak en fo r th e R I N ’s expansion, the Service had to u n d ertak e am p h ib io u s o p e ra tio n s, to land the In d ian A rm y fo r the Jun ag ad h o p e ra tio n s5— Exercise Peace as it was called. T h e o p e ra tion rem ains one o f the early hig h w ater m arks in the history o f in d ep en d en t In d ia ’s N avy.

The genesis o f the Ju n a g a d h o p eratio n s lay in certain provocative actions by the N aw ab o f the princely sta te . W ith In d ia ’s independence, m o st o f the princely states acceded to eith er In d ia o r P ak istan depending on th eir geog raphical contiguity. T he state o f Ju n a g a d h 5 h a d no contiguity by land with P ak istan but yet its N aw ab show ed positive indication to accede to th a t c o u n try . This was n eith er acceptable to the people o f Ju n ag ad h n o r to its neighbouring princely states. Besides, w ithin the m ain b o u n d ary o f Ju n ag ad h lay a num ber o f enclaves o f o th er K a th iaw ar states, all o f w hich had acceded to In d ia. This group o f states fo rm ed o n e co m pact geographic an d socioeconom ic u n it whose princely rulers a n d people, b o th inside an d outside Ju n a g a d h , were agitated over the N aw ab ’s inclinations.

A gainst this background, the N aw ab o f Ju n ag ad h , Sir M ah ab atk h an R asu lk h an ji5 and his D ew an (Sir S h ah N aw az B h u tto —fa th e r o f M r. Z.A .

B hutto who later becam e Prim e M inister o f P akistan), thro u g h various m oves kep t b o th th e subjects an d the G o v ern m en t o f In d ia guessing regarding their tru e intentions on the issue o f accession. W hile telling his subjects a n d the o th e r rulers o f K ath iaw ar th a t he intended to accede to India, on A u g u st 15, 1947, the N aw ab signed an in stru m en t o f accession to P akistan. A ccording to V.P. M enon,* th e first intim ation th a t the G overn m en t o f In d ia h ad a b o u t Ju n a g a d h ’s accession to Pakistan cam e from rep o rts in the new spapers dated A ugust 17, 1947.

T he situation as it evolved was th a t w ith the lapse o f B ritish p aram o u n tcy over the princely states, the Sheikh o f M angrol (a state between P o rb a n d a r

* R ao B a h a d u r V.P. M en o n , R efo rm s C o m m issio n e r to th e G o v e rn m en t o f In d ia fro m 1944 a n d S ecretary to th e G o v e rn o r G e n era l (P u b lic) fro m 1945 to 1946 an d la te r Secretary , S tates D e p artm en t/M in istry o f S ta te s fro m 1947.

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UND ER T W O EN SIG N S

an d Ju n ag ad h ) a n d the M ulgarasias o f B ab ariaw ad (a g ro u p o f fifty-one villages) autom atically becam e in d e p en d en t o f th e N a w a b o f Ju n ag ad h whose vassals they h ad been during the p erio d o f B ritish p a ra m o u n tcy . O n becom ing indep en d en t, th ey executed instrum ents o f accession w ith the G o v ern m en t o f India. T he N aw ab o f Ju n a g a d h 5 w ho w as still living in the illusory w orld o f his overlo rd sh ip over these territo ries, u n d e r instigation from P akistan , sent his tro o p s into B abariaw ad. S im ultaneously, the C om m anders-in-C hicf were asked to p re p a re ap p reciatio n s o f a n o p eratio n designed to occupy B abariaw ad, including p re p a ra tio n s to go to the assistance o f M angrol an d if (but only if) Ju n a g a d h to o k o th e r offensive actio n , to be p re p a re d to occupy Ju n ag ad h itself.

O n Septem ber 21, 1947, a telegram w as received by the G o v ern m en t o f In d ia from the D ew an o f Ju n a g a d h in w hich he asserted th a t B abariaw ad a n d M angrol were in teg ral p a rts o f Ju n a g a d h te rrito ry an d th a t th eir accession to the Indian U n io n was invalid. T he D ew an refused to w ithdraw the Ju n a g a d h forces fro m B abariaw ad.

T he co m m u n iq u e5 issued by the G o v ern m en t o f In d ia on S eptem ber 25, a n d O cto b er 5, 1947 said , “ they have m ade clear th eir a ttitu d e in regard to th e accession o f Ju n a g a d h to P a k ista n . T hey have also m ade it clear th a t th e m ilitary an d p olice fo rces sta tio n e d by Ju n a g a d h in B abariaw ad and M an g ro l should be w ithdraw n a t once since th ese states have acceded to the D o m in io n o f In d ia. T hese forces have n o t been w ithdraw n. T he G o v ern m en t o f In d ia has received re p o rts th a t Ju n a g a d h au th o ritie s a re tak in g o p pressive a c tio n ag a in st the p eo p le o f B ab ariaw ad . T hey a re com m andeering c ro p s, issuing exacting o rd ers in resp ect o f o th e r p ro p erty , reaping harvest, b re a k in g into h o u ses a n d lo o tin g p ro p erty , ra tio n s an d o th e r necessities o f life h av e been sto p p e d ; a n d an a tte m p t is being m ade to force th e C hiefs o f B ab ariaw ad to re n o u n ce accession to the D o m in io n o f In d ia an d substitute it by accession to P a k ista n .

O n O cto b er 21, th e P rim e M in ister, In d ia , in fo rm ed P rim e M inister, P a k ista n ,5 th a t it was im possible for th e G o v ern m en t o f In d ia to to lerate th is sta te o f affairs an y longer. T h e G o v e rn m e n t o f In d ia was h o n o u r bound to ta k e m easures fo r the p ro te c tio n o f territo ries w hich h ad acceded to India a n d h a d been p ro m ised p ro te c tio n fro m o u tsid e in terferen ce. In fulfilm ent o f th ese co m m itm en ts, th e In d ia n G o v e rn m e n t w ould have to send to M an g ro l a n d B ab ariaw ad d e tach m en ts o f its m ilitary forces an d to tak e over the a d m in istra tio n o f th ese are a s. T h e P rim e M in ister indicated th a t, instructions h a d been issued to th e m ilitary a u th o rities th a t they should go to these te rrito rie s u n d e r a flag o f tru ce w ith loud hailers over w hich it w ould be m ade c le a r to the p eo p le th a t they h a d no in te n tio n o f o p ening fire except in selfp ro te c tio n .

T h e G o v e rn m e n t o f In d ia , in acco rd an ce w ith the decision an n o u n ced in th e p ress co m m u n iq u e o f O cto b er 5, scrupulously a d h ered to the a rra n g e m e n t by w hich it u n d e rto o k n o t to e n ter into o r cross Ju n a g a d h territo ry on th e u n d e rsta n d in g th a t th e Ju n a g a d h forces also agreed n o t to cross In d ian

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te rrito ry . Instances o ccu rred w here Ju n a g a d h forces crossed In d ian territo ry m o re th a n once. In view o f this, th e G o v ern m en t o f In d ia considered th a t it was no longer bound by the p revious u n d ertak in g th a t In d ian forces w ould n o t cross o r e n te r into Ju n a g a d h territo ry .

T he G o v ern m en t o f India w ished to m ake it clear th a t in ta k in g this step it h ad no in te n tio n 5 o f tak in g final possession o f the territo ries; the only desire was to p ro te c t the people ag ain st oppressive m easures till the question o f accession was settled by plebiscite. P ending h o ld in g o f plebiscite, the Indian G o v ern m en t p ro p o sed to invite the local officials to stay on if they so desire, as observers.

M eanw hile the d isposition o f tro o p s5 in K ath iaw ar was going apace.

B rigadier G u rd ial Singh was in co m m an d o f the force w hich was know n as K ath iaw ar D efence F o rc e (o r K.DF). T he states o f N avanagar, B havnag ar an d P o rb a n d a r w hich had acceded to India, h ad agreed a t the request o f the G overn m en t o f In d ia to place th eir state forces u n d er the com m and o f the B rigadier. All these forces were suitably deployed, th eir m ovem ents and m anoeuvres creating a steadying effect all over K a th iaw ar w hich was agitated a t having pockets o f P akistan in its m idst as a consequence o f Junag ad h ’s intransigence, hostile acts an d accession to P ak istan . T he A rm y C o m m an d er h ad strict orders n o t to violate Ju n ag ad h territo ry in any way.

O n Septem ber 24, it was decided th a t an ad eq u ate force should be sent to M an g ro l an d B abariaw ad.

O n O ctober 10, 1947, while a m eeting o f the Jo in t Defence C ouncil o f India an d P akistan, atten d ed by N ehru an d L iaq u at Ali K han, was going on, a telegram was received by the G o v ern m en t o f India th a t Ju n ag ad h tro o p s had entered M angrol as well.

A week earlier on O ctober 4, 1947, th e G ov ern m en t o f India had already considered the Ju n ag ad h situ atio n 5 an d directed the Chiefs o f Staff to instruct the C om m ander o f the K ath iaw ar D efence F orce to prepare a plan for the occupation o f B abariaw ad an d M angrol in case this should be ordered, with the object o f reducing to a m inim um any exchange o f shots w ith Jun ag ad h forces in these territories. In the m eantim e, efforts were continued to resolve the issue o f Junag ad h , M angrol and B abariaw ad w ith Pakistan th rough discussions. As no progress was m ade a n d it becam e obvious th a t Pakistan was sim ply m arking tim e, th e G o v ern m en t o f In d ia decided on O ctober 21, 1947, th a t M angrol and B abariaw ad w ould have to be occupied. Two days later, a plan was draw n up w hich was finally approved on O ctober 25. Lord M o u n tb a tte n was anxious th a t the occupation should be entrusted to the C entral Reserve Police, b u t S ard ar Patel m aintained th a t this w ould be ta k ing unnecessary risks an d he was firm th a t the operation should be handled by the A rm ed Forces.

E arlier a com m unique5 issued on O ctober 16, 1947 said, “ In pursuance o f th eir policy o f locating units o f the Indian Defence Services in K athiaw ar, a com pany o f D ogras o f the 25th K u m ao n R egim ent w ith detachm ents o f th e R oyal In d ian Engineers, Indian C orps o f Signals and Indian A rm y

9 8

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

M edical C orps, u n d e r th e com m and o f M ajo r Shyam R a tta n is being landed a t Jaffarab ad fro m ships o f th e R oyal In d ian N avy on O ctober 17,1947. T he ships tak in g p a rt are the sloops H M I S Kistna (C om m ander R .D . K atari, R IN , S enior Officer) an d H M I S Jum na, th e fleet m inesw eeper H M IS K onkan and T a n k L an d in g C raft N os. 1358 and 1360.

“ A fter the tro o p s have been landed, courtesy visit will be p a id by H M IS

Kistna to M ul D w ark a n e a r K o d in a r (B aroda territory) and B havnagar.

Visits by ships o f the R o y al In d ian N avy to o th e r K a th ia w a r p o rts a re also being a rran g ed .

“ T h e G o v e rn m e n t o f In d ia have also decided to locate a B rigade g ro u p a t R a jk o t. This fo rm a tio n will co n sist o f units o f the Indian A rm y and tro o p s o f B aro d a, B h av n ag ar, N a v a n a g a r and P o rb a n d a r states, the w hole being co m m an d ed by B rigadier G u rd ial Singh.

“ A s previously an n o u n ced N o . 8 S q uadron, R oyal In d ian A ir F orce, co m p o sed o f T em p est a irc ra ft u n d e r the com m and o f S q u ad ro n L ead er P.S. G ill, R IA F , is now lo cated in K a th ia w a r.”

T h e N avy was resp o n sib le fo r the landing o f tro o p s and e quipm ent on the K a th ia w a r C o ast and the p lan n in g an d c o n tro l o f the L anding o p e ra tio n 6 was en tru ste d to C o m m o d o re M .H . St. L. N o tt, D SO , C BE, R N (Special List) who w as fo rm erly w ith th e R oyal In d ian N avy an d w ho was serving as the C hief o f S taff a t N av al H e a d q u a rte rs , N ew D elhi. T h e naval force, com prising th re e frigates {Kistna, Cauvery an d Jum na), th ree fleet m inesw eepers (Konkan, M ad ra s and R ohilkhand), th ree landing c ra ft (tan k s) (L C T s 1310, 1358 and 1360) a n d one m o to r lau n ch (M L 420) was placed u n d e r the co m m an d o f C o m m a n d e r R .D . K a ta ri (la te r C h ie f o f the N av al Staff), w ho was also the C o m m an d in g Officer o f H M I S K istna. T h e o th e r tw o frigates, H M IS

C auvery an d H M I S Ju m n a , w ere respectively u n d e r th e com m an d o f L ieute n a n t C o m m a n d e r R . Saw hny an d L ieu ten an t C o m m an d er B.A . Sam son (later F la g Officer C o m m an d in g , In d ian F leet). A sm all m obile co m m u n ica tio n link, w hich w as estab lish ed ash o re to pro v id e a com m unication link betw een th e naval fo rc e a n d th e overall co m m an d er a t R a jk o t was u nder L ie u te n a n t N . K rish n a n (la te r F la g Officer C om m anding-in-C hief, E astern N a v a l C o m m an d ).

T h e naval fo rce7 was to land th ree colum ns o f tro o p s d esignated ‘N a m e d ’

(afte r M a jo r N am b iar, th e C o m m a n d e r o f th e tro o p s) ‘R a tc o l’ (afte r M ajo r R a ta n ) an d ‘Jaffco l’ (a fte r Jaffarab ad ). In o rd e r to strad d le Ju n a g a d h geog rap h ically , it was decided to land th e colum ns w ith arm s, equipm ent and a rm o u r a t P o rb a n d a r, Ja ffa ra b ad and M an g ro l on the K a th iaw ar C oast. T he navel force was also req u ired to p ro v id e necessary logistic su p p o rt to the tro o p s fro m seaw ard. A n air force u n it also sto o d by b u t was n o t called u p o n to p lay an y role.

B efore, how ever, th e lan d in g could be effected, it was essential to carry o u t th e h y d ro g rap h ic survey o f th e b each an d choose a b each -h ead w ith an a p p ro p ria te g rad ien t fo r facilitatin g lan d in g o p eratio n . T h e jo b was e n tru sted to H M I S Jum na (N O P IN O N E ); L ieu ten an t K .L . K u lk a rn i (later F lag

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Officer C om m anding-in-C hief, E astern N aval C om m and), Executive Officer o f the ship along w ith tw o o th e r officers and som e sailors carried o u t beach g rad ien t (using sextant and tide pole) in the area; they laid tran sits to facilitate the entry an d beaching o f LCTs.

T he m ain p h ase8 ‘Exercise P eace’ was launched w ith N O P IN T W O which involved the landing o f 14 A rm y officers, 251 In d ian O th er R anks, three tanks and 13 vehicles at P o rb an d ar. This was successfully accom plished on O ctober 5, 1947. T h e naval force fo r the o p eratio n consisted o f tw o frigates— H M I S K istna and Cauvery, tw o m inesw eepers H M IS Konkan and M adras, th ree L anding C ra ft (T an k s)— LCTs 1310, 1358 and 1360 an d one m o to r lau n ch M L 420.

T he second p hase was the landing o f a m ilitary force consisting o f six officers, 93 O th er R an k s an d fo u r vehicles a t Jaffarabad and this was accom plished on O cto b er 17, 1947, w ith H M I S K istna, Jum na an d Konkan and L C T s 1358 an d 1360 tak in g p art.

T he th ird phase o f N O P IN T W O necessitated the landing o f a m ilitary force consisting o f eight officers, 152 O th e r R an k s, th ree tanks and eight vehicles a t M angrol a n d this was successfully accom plished on N ovem ber 1, 1947. T h e ships th a t p a rticip ated w ere H M I S K istna, Cauvery, Konkan an d Ro/iilk/iand a n d m o to r launch M L 420.

T he naval personnel stayed on u n til a civil ad m in istratio n was set up in the S tate. This coincided w ith a n o th e r significant event, the resto ratio n o f the original gates o f the fam ous S o m n ath tem ple a t P rabhas P atan , Veraval by S a rd a r V allabhbhai P atel. T he officers an d m en o f the R IN were guests o f h o n o u r a t the re sto ra tio n cerem ony a t w hich a decision to reconstruct the tem ple an d to resto re it to its original sp lendour, was tak en . I t was indeed an a ct o f historic justice!

T he Ju n ag ad h o p eratio n also led to the first c o u rt m artial in independent In d ia ’s N avy. P etrie G eorge M ungavin, a tem p o rary L ieutenant o f the R oyal In d ian N avy V olunteer R eserve w as in com m an d o f the m o to r lau n ch M L

420, w hich was to p a rticip ate in the landing o p e ratio n s a t P o rb a n d e r and M an g ro l. H e, how ever, g o t co ld feet a n d refused to sail a n d m ade excuses w hich w ere tra n sp a re n tly u n ten ab le. T he au th o rities had to p erforce rem ove him fro m com m an d a n d a p p o in t a n o th e r C o m m an d in g Officer.

L ieu ten an t M ungavin9 was tried by c o u rt m artial o n b o ard H M I S A kbar a t B om bay on D ecem ber 1, 1947. T he th ree charges th a t he faced were:

“ did p resum e to delay the p erfo rm an ce o f m o to r lau n ch M L 420 in which he was co m m an d ed to sail fo r tak in g p a r t in an o p e ra tio n ,” “ wilful disobedience” an d “ c o n d u c t unbecom ing o f the c h a ra c te r o f an officer,” in th a t, w ith a view to av o id in g service in H is M ajesty ’s In d ian M o to r L aunch M L

420, he had m ade a false rep resen tatio n . L ie u ten an t M ungavin was fo u n d guilty a n d convicted. C o m m o d o re N o tt, w ho conducted the p rosecution, asked fo r th e sentence o f d e a th to be p ro n o u n ced ag ain st the accused.

M ungavin, how ever, was let off w ith a dism issal fro m service.

Exercise P eace w as the first m a jo r naval o p eratio n u n d ertak en by inde

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U N D ER T W O EN SIG N S

p e n d e n t In d ia ’s N avy. It was th e first tim e in centuries th a t the R oyal Indian N avy did n o t function as an ad ju n c t o f the R oyal N avy o r a t the dictates o f W hitehall but as a newly in d ep en d en t c o u n try ’s nascent sea arm a t the orders o f the representatives o f the people o f the co u n try .

M a jo r N a m b iar, C o m m an d er o f the N A M C O L colum n o f tro o p s (later rose to the ra n k o f B rigadier) w hen recently interview ed said: “ K D F was th e A rm y ’s first p o st-in d ep en d en t v enture. P erh ap s for goo d reaso n s the o p e ra tio n conducted a t an a re a level was n o t brilliant. T h ere was little o v erall c o o rd in a tio n an d d irectio n fro m the to p . C o m m u n icatio n from K D F to the N avy o r me was non-existent. N avy on the o th e r han d had everything b u tto n e d up to a fine edge and one g o t the im pression th a t th eir officers w ere an efficient, well tem pered an d honed b u n ch .” 10

D elhi jo in ed the fleet on S eptem ber 16, 1948 an d carried o u t tw o very successful cru ises,11 one ro u n d the co ast o f In d ia an d the o th e r to M auritius, Seychelles a n d to a num b er o f p o rts on th e E ast A frican C o ast. D u rin g the cruise ro u n d the In d ian C oast, H M I S Cauvery, K is/na an d S u tle j were in co m p an y . H M I S Tir jo in ed th e D elhi a t Z an z ib a r fo r the cruise ro u n d the E a st C o a st o f A frica. D u rin g this p erio d , H M I S D elhi, w ith the o th e r ships o f th e sq u a d ro n , also carrie d o u t a n u m b er o f exercises a t T rincom alee with th e E a s t Indies sq u a d ro n o f the R oyal N avy.

D elhi th e re a fte r rem ained the centre o f a ttra c tio n and the flagship o f the In d ian N avy fo r decades to com e until she was decom m issioned in 1978.

B esides, c o m m an d in g h er rightful statu s as one o f th e cap ital ships o f o u r N avy, she held a place o f sen tim en t in th e h e a rt o f every naval officer o r sailo r because alm o st all naval perso n n el had served ab o ard h er decks at o n e tim e o r th e o th e r in th e course o f th eir career.

D elhi ce rta in ly fulfilled h er role in p ro jectin g In d ia ’s m aritim e image b o th a t h o m e a n d a b ro a d . F o r th e first tim e on J a n u a ry 4, .1950 she carried the c a d e ts 12 o f th e N a tio n a l D efence A cadem y o n a 10-day cruise fro m B om bay to K arvvar, C o ch in a n d M inicoy a n d back. T he experience gained by the im p ressio n ab le m inds o f y o u n g cad ets was valuable a n d the event was th e re a fte r m ad e a re g u la r an n u al feature.

Sim ultaneously, Tir, a t the re q u e st o f th e G o v ern m en t o f B urm a carried th e sacred relics o f A ra h a n s S a rip u tta a n d M o g allan a to B urm a. These relics were received in C alc u tta by th e P rim e M inister o f B urm a from the M a h a b o d h i Society a n d placed on b o ard th e Tir on F e b ru a ry 3, 1950. These w ere again received by him from th e ship on F e b ru a ry 8 a t R a n g o o n .

R a jp u t, R a n jit and R ana, ships o f th e D estro y er F lotilla, c o n trib u ted co n sid erab ly in p u ttin g th e N avy on its rightful pedestal. T hese ships carried th e stu d e n ts a n d th e directing S taff o f th e D efence Services S taff C ollege on a w eek-long inter-service c o o rd in a tio n exercise an d com bined operations.

T h e R o y al N aval u n its a t T rin co m alee also p a rticip ated . T he F lo tilla sailed fro m C o ch in o n F e b ru a ry 27, 1950 an d retu rn e d on M arch 4 a fte r calling a t T rin co m alee. V ery soon th ereafter, the F lo tilla called a t C olom bo.

D u rin g M ay 1950 S a rd a r V allabhbhai P a te l, w ho was In d ia ’s first D ep u ty

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Prim e M inister, to o k passage on I N S Delhi from B om bay on a visit to C ochin.

An im p o rta n t la n d m ark in In d ia’s naval and m aritim e history was P an d it Jaw ah arlal N e h ru 's visit to In d o n esia13 on b oard the flagship D elhi in 1950.

T h e cruiser was escorted by the th ree destroyers and a t tim es by the 12th F rig a te S quadron w hich visited Penang and the A ndam an an d N icobar ports.

T he Prim e M inister em barked D elhi along with his d au g h ter, Shrim ati Indira G an d h i an d gran d so n s R ajiv (age 5) and Sanjay (age 3) on June 2, 1950 and arrived at Ja k a rta on Ju n e 7. A fter the P rim e M inister had disem barked, the ship visited S urabaya and Bali. D uring th eir stay in Indonesia, the officers and men o f the N avy received trem endous hospitality an d courtesy. The D elhi was com m anded by C ap tain A .K . C h atterji (later A dm iral and C hief o f the N aval Staff). T he Delhi also flew the flag o f R ear A dm iral B arnard, the first R ear A dm iral C o m m anding the Indian N aval S qu ad ro n (R A C IN S).

R e a r A dm iral B a rn a rd ’s r e p o rt14 on the Indonesian cruise gives an in teresting acco u n t o f the crossing-the-line (eq u ato r) cerem ony with Prim e M inister N e h ru on board. It states, “ ships were o u t o f ro u tin e fo r the cro ssing-the-line cerem ony. In D elhi, N e p tu n e ’s co u rt assem bled on the q u a rte rdeck and in th e course o f the usual speeches, N ep tu n e was w arned th a t, in accordance w ith the C o n stitu tio n o f India, he should change his nam e to V aruna. . . . N e p tu n e ’s c o u rt then proceeded from the q u arter-d eck to the to p o f ‘A ’ tu rre t, accom pained by the Prim e M inister an d his p arty. In due course the Prim e M inister was b ro u g h t before the c o u rt an d charged as fo llows: firstly, he w orked to o hard , secondly, he had too m any telephones on his desks, and thirdly, he delivered too m any long speeches.”

Said A dm iral B arn ard a b o u t P an d it N eh ru in his r e p o r t,14 “ Shortly a fter his arriv al, I asked him to go w herever he w anted in the ship an d talk to ratings a t th eir w ork, an d said, I h o p ed he w ould do so w ith o u t being surro u n d ed by a crow d o f gold lace and senior officers. A fter his first good n ig h t’s rest, his inquiring m ind was interested in all aspects o f the ship’s activities. I th in k the th in g th a t struck him m ost, a p a rt fro m the overcrow ding o f ship-life, was the fa c t th a t in the various messes th ere is a wide diversity o f b ack g ro u n d , religion a n d language w hich is, in effect, a m inute cross-section o f In d ia; yet we som ehow , because o f o u r naval training, m anage to get along to g eth er a n d smile in confined q u arters. I th in k he saw in the ships, a m icroscopic exam ple o f the g reat w ork fo r the unity o f India to w hich he h ad devoted his life.”

REFERENCES

1. R e p o rt on the R oyal In d ian N avy, Ja n .-Ju n e 1945, N aval H ead q u arters, (India), 1945, p. 1.

2. Ibid., July-D ee. 1945, 1946, p. 1.

3. Ib id ., Jan.-D ee. 1946, 1947, p. 1.

1 0 2

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

4. Ibid., Aug. 1947-Aug. 1948, 1948, pp. 1 an d 2.

5. C ab in et S ecretariat (India) R ecords.

6. R e p o rt o n the R oyal In d ian N avy, op. c it., July-D ee. 1945, 1946, p. 2.

7. K u lk arn i (Vice A dm iral) K .L ., R e td ., p erso n al m aterial received, 1983, p p. 1 and 2.

8. R e p o rt on the R oyal Indian N avy, op. cit., A ug. 1947-Aug. 1948, pp. 2

and 3.

9. N aval H e a d q u a rte rs (In d ia) R e c o rd s— R e tu rn o f C o u rt M artial.

10. N am b iar (B rigadier) A .M .M ., R etd ., p e rso n a l m aterial received, 1983, p. 4.

11. R e p o rt on th e R oyal In d ian N avy, 1948-49, op. cit., p. 3.

12. R e p o rt on the In d ian N avy, A ug. 1949-Dec. 1950, op. cit., pp. 3 and 4.

13. Ib id ., p . 4, an d N aval H e a d q u a rte rs (In d ia) R ecords.

14. N aval H e a d q u a rte rs (India) R eco rd s—P rim e M inister Jaw ah arlal N e h ru ’s In donesian cruise.

6 .

Personnel

R e c o r d i n g t h e o r i g i n s o f th e In d ian N avy, th e R e p o rt o f th e R o y al In d ian N avy M u tin y C om m ission o f E nquiry, 1946, says th a t “ F ro m the creation o f the H o n o u rab le T he E ast India C o m p an y ’s N avy in 1612 to the m odern tim es, the Indian N avy has had a h isto ry o f a lte rn a te expansion in the face o f em ergency, the successful accom plishm ent o f its task an d subsequent retren ch m en t, som etim es alm o st to vanishing p oint. It has h ad little trad itio n as a fighting force and has been b u ilt u p when required on the R oyal N aval p a tte rn .” 1 D u rin g W orld W ar I, 1914-18, the six ships o f the R oyal In d ian M arine (R IM ), the predecessor o f the R IN , served as auxiliary cruisers an d the officers o f the service served a t sea w ith th e R oyal N avy in m any th eatres o f w ar. T he to ta l m anning stren g th o f the R IM a t th a t tim e was 240 officers, 60 w a rra n t officers an d 2000 ratings.

A fter the W ar, the m anpow er o f the R IN was drastically reduced by dem obilisation in acco rd an ce w ith the recom m endations o f various com m ittees including the Inchcape C om m ittee. T he Service had been red u ced to a mere d o ck y ard w ith a sm all h y d ro g rap h ic survey unit. T he fa r-reach in g effects o f these d rastic m easures were felt when th ere was an acute shortage o f officers a n d ratings a t the tim e o f the o u tb reak o f W orld W ar II in 1939. S toppage o f recru itm en t an d red u ctio n o f the size o f the Service d u rin g th e period betw een the tw o W ars was so u g h t to be justified by the fact th a t the security o f th e In d ian C o a st h a d been en tru sted to the R oyal N avy on paym ent o f an n u al subvention o f £ 100,000 by the G o v ern m en t o f In d ia to the B ritish G overnm ent.

In 1925, a com m ittee head ed by L o rd R aw linson,2 the th e n M inister o f D efence an d C o m m an d er-in -C h ief o f th e In d ian A rm ed F o rces, reco m m ended th e conversion o f the R IM into a navy w ith full c o m b a ta n t status on th e lines o f the R oyal N avy w ith a fleet w hich w ould initially com prise fo u r a rm ed sloops o r esco rt vessels, tw o p a tro l vessels, fo u r m inesw eeping tra w lers, tw o survey ships a n d a d e p o t ship. T h e Service w as to be initially com m an d ed by a R e a r A d m iral o f the R oyal N avy. T h e recom m endations o f the com m ittee were accepted by the G o v ern m en t an d on O ctober 2, 1934, the R oyal In d ian N avy cam e into being a fter the In d ia n N avy D iscipline A ct h a d been passed by the Legislative A ssem bly a n d the C ouncil o f S tates in F e b ru a ry 1934. C onsequently, a five-year p lan fo r the expansion o f th e N avy was p u t fo rw a rd in Ju n e 1937. T his p la n 3 m ainly com prised

1 0 4

U NDER T W O EN SIG N S

the setting up o f a B oys’ T raining E stab lish m en t a t M a n o ra (K arachi) and increasing the m anpow er fro m 121 officers, 48 w a rra n t officers and 1064

ratings to 146 officers, 60 w a rra n t officers, 1313 ratings an d 250 boys. W ith this expansion in the Service, p ay m en t o f the an n u al subvention o f f 100,000

an d the m iscellaneous charges o f £ 15,000 to £ 2 0 ,0 0 0 w ould be discontinued on condition th a t a sea-going sq u ad ro n o f n o t less th an six escort vessels w ould be m aintained an d this w ould be req u ired to u n d e rta k e local naval defence o f In d ian p o rts an d to c o o p erate w ith the R oyal N avy in the defence o f India.

This five-year plan was follow ed a b o u t a year later by a nine-year plan com prising recom m en d atio n s fro m the F lag Officer C om m anding, R oyal In d ian N avy (F O C R IN ) fo r the expansion o f the Service. T he m ain fe a tu res4 o f this plan were: a fu rth e r increase in the active service stren g th o f personnel to 169 officers, 104 w a rra n t officers a n d 2562 ratings (including boys); increase in th e stren g th o f reserve personnel to 252 R oyal Indian N aval R eserve Officers, 71 R oyal In d ia n N aval V o lu n teer R eserve Officers, 912 R oyal In d ian R eserve ratin g s, 593 R oyal In d ian F leet R eserve ratings an d 286 C o m m u n icatio n R eserve ratin g s; setting u p o f ad eq u a te training cad res o f boys an d a p p ren tices; stren g th en in g th e fleet by rearm in g the slo o p s H industan a n d Indus, rep lacin g th e sloops Cornwallis, Lawrence and Clive a n d building one m ore escort vessel, acq u irin g six sm all m inesw eepers a n d eight m o to r to rp e d o b o ats fo r local naval defence; providing fo r 48

au x iliary vessels w hich could be ta k e n up in the event o f the o u tb re a k o f a w ar— 25 as m inesw eepers a n d the rest as a n ti-su b m arin e vessels; pro v id in g tra in in g establishm ents w ith a d e q u a te tra in in g aids a n d o th e r facilities at B om bay, C o ch in a n d V ish a k h a p a tn a m w ith sub-depots for subsidiary tra in in g o f R eserve officers a t C alcu tta, M a d ra s an d K a ra c h i; and replacing old sh ip s by m ean s o f a sin k in g fund.

T h e n in e-y ear p lan was carefully exam ined by th e D efence a u th o rities in In d ia a n d in th e A d m iralty an d , b ased on its p ro p o sa ls, a special com m ittee, th e C hatfield C o m m ittee, w as a p p o in te d fo r scrutinising the p ro p o sals. This C o m m ittee recom m ended th e a c q u isitio n 5 o f fo u r B ittern Class 19 -k n o t escort vessels; re-arm in g o f the Indus a n d th e H industan an d scrap p in g o f the Clive, th e Cornw allis a n d th e L aw rence; co n stru c tio n o f fo u r M astiff Class m inesw eeping traw lers; lo an in g o f fo u r H alcyon Class m inesw eepers fro m the R o y al N avy; a n d th e settin g up o f th e tra in in g estab lish m en ts p ro p o se d by th e F O C R IN .

P re p a ra tio n s w ere being m ad e to im p lem en t these re co m m en d atio n s but th ese efforts w ere th w a rte d by the sudden o u tb re a k o f W o rld W a r I I when th e R I N p erso n n el co m p rised a m ere 109 officers, 63 w a rra n t officers and 1443 ratin g s in active service an d a R oyal In d ian N aval V olu n teer Reserve stre n g th o f 21 E xecutive B ran ch a n d 16 A c c o u n ta n ts ’ B ran ch officers and tw o p a rt-tim e m edical officers o f th e R oyal A rm y M edical C orps.

D u rin g th e p erio d im m ediately follow ing th e o u tb re a k o f hostilities, 31

auxiliary vessels w ere co n v erted in to m inesw eepers o r p a tro l vessels an d by

PER SO N N EL

1 0 5

the end o f 1939, th e strength o f personnel in the R IN had nearly doubled.

Officers w ere recruited to the various cadres from th e m erch an t navy and a w ide variety o f trad es an d professions in civil life. R atings cam e from th e m erch an t navy and also from the civvy street but for reasons o f pay and allow ances th e resp o n se from m erch an t navy sailors was ra th e r poor.

T h e increase in the strength o f p erso n n el6 between the o u tb reak o f W orld W ar II in 1939 and the cessation o f hostilities in 1945 is as given in T able 1: T A B L E 1

O fficers

R IN

R IN R

RINVR

Total

S e p tem b e r 1939

114

9

29

152

D ecem b er 1939

117

65

52

234

D ecem b er 1940

132

108

163

403

D ecem b er

1941

161

155

387

703

D ecem b er

1942

170

261

880

1311

D ecem b er

1943

220

301

1671

2192

D ecem b er

1944

241

335

2104

2680

D ecem b er

1945

269

250

1919

2438

W arra n t O fficers

R IN

On loan from R N

Total

S e p tem b e r 1939

35

11

46

D e ce m b er 1939

125

12

137

D ecem b er

1940

141

9

150

D ecem b er

1941

151

21

172

D ecem b er

1942

180

23

203

D ecem b er 1943

181

25

206

D ecem b er 1944

187

34

221

D e ce m b er 1945

198

16

214

R atings

Continuous

Hostilities

Transferred

Total

Service/Non-

Only

from the

con tinuous

Army

Service /Special

Service

S e p tem b e r 1939

1313

162

—

1475

D ecem b er 1939

1449

1400

—

2849

D e ce m b er 1940

2253

1463

—

3716

D ecem b er 1941

4396

2056

—

6452

D ecem b er

1942

9258

3506

—

12764

D ecem b er

1943

14679

4783

2089

21551

D e ce m b er

1944

18668

4698

1779

25145

D e ce m b er

1945

18610

1678

905

21193

Note: By the end o f th e W ar o n A u g u st 15, 1945. th e stren g th o f ratings had actually ris e n to 27,651 w hich fell to 21,193 by D ecem b er 1945 d u e to l a r g e - s c a l e d em obilisation.

106

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

Besides the trem en d o u s increase in th e size o f the N avy an d its strength o f personnel, the percentage o f ratin g s from different eth n ic,7 religious and regional backgrounds u n d erw en t a m a jo r change d u rin g the W ar years.

W hile the percentages o f M uslim s an d H in d u ratin g s in 1939 w ere 75 and 9.25 respectively, by th e end o f th e W ar, the percentage o f M uslim s fell to 35 a n d th a t o f the H in d u s sh o t up to 42.5. Sim ilarly, th e percentages o f ratin g s fro m the P u n jab an d B om bay in 1939 w ere 44.25 an d 38, b u t by 1945, P u n ja b ’s rep resen tatio n h ad fallen to 21.25 p e r c e n t w hile th a t o f B om bay crash ed to a lowly 8.25 p e r cent. T ables 2 and 3 provide an in te resting p ictu re o f th e response o f the vario u s com m unities a n d regions to the glib sales ta lk o f th e recru itin g officers.

T A B L E 2

R e lig io u s/E th n ic re p re se n tatio n (% )

1939

1945

H in d u

9.2 5

42.5

M u s lim

75

35

C h ristia n

13

19.5

S ik h

0.25

1.5

A n g lo -In d ia n

2

1.25

M isc e lla n e o u s

0.5

0.25

T A B L E 3

R egional rep re se n tatio n (% )

(T h e s e p e rc e n ta g e s d o n o t a d d u p to 100% as th ey a re o n ly sh o w n to th e n e a re s t 0 .2 5 % )

1939

1945

K a s h m ir

0.5

1.25

N .W .F .P .

3.25

3

D e lh i

0.25

0.5

P u n ja b

44.75

21.25

S ind

0.25

0.25

R a jp u ta n a & C e n tra l In d ia

0.25

3.25

U t t a r P ra d e s h

3.25

7.25

B o m b ay

38

8.25

M a d ra s

4.25

25.25

T ra v a n c o re

0.25

9

C o c h in

■)

H y d e ra b a d

Y

0.25

1.5

M y s o re

J

B ih a r & O ris s a

_

1.75

B engal

0.5

11.5

A ssam

0.25

1

O th e rs

3

G o a & P o rtu g u e s e In d ia

2.25

0.75

PER SO N N EL

1 0 7

Officers recru ited to the various cadres o f the R IN were m ainly British, In d ian and A n g lo -In d ian but a sm all num b er belonged to several oth er countries. T hus, th eir ethnic, religious, linguistic an d cultural backgrounds varied w hich is an indication o f th e urgency th a t p ro m p ted th eir induction into a Service th a t was basically In d ian th o u g h u n d e r foreign rule, Table 4

shows the details o f officers8 o f each n atio n ality th a t joined the R IN during th e W ar.

T A B L E 4

British

Indian

Anglo-

Other

Total

Indian

Nationalities

1939

57

29

4

1

91

1940

165

42

4

1

212

1941

240

77

17

10

344

1942

309

168

45

26

548

1943

430

233

99

21

783

1944

140

280

48

8

476

1945

36

120

39

3

198

T o ta l

1377

949

256

70

2652

T h e officers o f ‘o th er n atio n alities’ n u m bering 70 show n in the table were recruited when Ja p a n en tered the W a r in 1942 a n d it was felt necessary to ex p an d the R IN to a m uch g reater degree. T he m obilisation n et h ad to be cast fa r a n d wide and the frontiers o f the B ritish E m pire had to be crossed m ainly because o f th e acute shortage o f officers w ith a know ledge o f the sea.

T he ‘foreig n ers’9 recruited included one A m erican, n in e D u tch , one F ren ch , one T u rk , one G o an , live Iraq is, th ree Jews, eleven N orw egians, two R ussians, tw o Swedes, one Y ugoslav, evacuees fro m Singapore, M alay a and B u rm a as well as m en fro m A u stralia, C a n a d a , New Z ealan d an d South A frica. I t was because o f this unbelievable a n d kaleidoscopic mix o f n atio n al a n d in te rn a tio n a l rep resen tatio n in th e R IN th a t th e Service those days was som etim es referred to as th e ‘R eally Incredible N av y ’ (R IN ). In fact, a t th a t tim e it was a n e a r m anifestation o f a m in iatu re League o f N atio n s !

T he officers8 o f the R IN cam e fro m a wide variety o f professions w hich is a n o th e r ind icatio n o f th e urgency th a t necessitated th eir recruitm ent.

Som e o f these professions w ere: sh areb ro k er, m erch an t navy service, clerk, electrical tra d e , ac c o u n ta n t, telegraphist, m anager, B urm a Civil Service, broadcasting, B engal P ilot Service, school-m aster, lecturer, forem an, stores officer, overseer, law yer, lan d lo rd , engineer, insurance agent, agricultural adviser, a rt d irector, railw ay driver, a u d ito r, sugar process o p e rato r, private businessm an, railw ay em ployee, ju te tra d e r, m eteorologist, chem ist, m ercan tile assistan t, jo u rn a list, b an k em ployee, p o rt officer, shipping assistant, B u rm a p ilo t, p la n te r an d ed u catio n ist fro m B ahrain.

1 0 8

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

Before W o rld W a r II, o rd in a ry seam en in th e R IN an d in the m erchant navy drew th e sam e sa la ry 10 o f Rs. 20 p er m o n th an d som e allow ances.

W hen th e W ar broke out, the m erch an t navy g ran ted a b o n u s o f 25 p e rc e n t to its o rd in a ry seam en w hich was follow ed by a sim ilar increase in the pay o f ‘H ostilities O n ly ’ o rd in a ry seam en o f the R I N but the A ctive Scrvice seam en o f the R IN c o n tin u ed to be p aid Rs. 20 per m o n th . On D ecem ber 31, 1939, the basic pay o f the m e rc h a n t navy seam en was once again raised to Rs. 30 w hich was p erh ap s the reason why a large n um ber o f m erchant navy sailors d id n o t vo lu n teer to jo in th e R IN d u rin g the W ar. T he main bulk o f ‘H ostilities O n ly ’ seam en w ho d rifted into th e Service w ere presu m ably th o se w ho co u ld n o t o b tain jo b s elsew here.

T h e sudden increase in the size o f the R IN a fter the o u tb re a k o f the W ar necessitated a large in tak e o f A ctive Service ratings w ithin a sh o rt period, especially betw een 1942 an d 1944. In o rd e r to a ttra c t suitable young m en to the Service, th erefo re, the scales o f pay o f all ratin g s o f this cadre, in the seam en, sto k er, w riter an d co m m u n icatio n b ran ch es a n d later, the dom estic an d in stru c to r bran ch es, h a d to be revised several tim es betw een 1942 and 1944, th e co m m u n icatio n s b ra n c h having been given an edge over the others because o f h ig h er e d u catio n al qualifications a t entry. T ab le 5 gives an indic atio n o f th e d eg ree to w hich th e im p ro v em en ts w ere effected in tw o o f the b ra n c h e s.11

T A B L E 5

P a y received by ratin g s

Seaman Branch

Communication Branch

1942

1944

1942

1944

B o y (first 12 m o n th s )

15

15

15

15

B oy (re m a in in g 6 m o n th s )

15

20

15

20

B o y (s e a g o in g )

—

30

—

30

O rd in a ry ra te

20

40

26

60

A b le ra te

25

45

34

65

L e a d in g r a te

34

60

44

70

P e tty O fficer

50

85

55

95

C h ie f P e tty O fficer

70

110

80

115

Vice A d m iral G o d frey , justified th e increase in th e in tak e o f the ratings thus: “ F ro m 1940 o nw ards energetic steps w ere tak en to p ersu ad e the G o v e rn m e n t o f In d ia to em b ark on a p la n n e d expansion o f the Service co u p led w ith a ship b u ild in g program m e. D ilato rin ess in arriv in g a t a decision stran g led th e g ro w th o f th e Service a n d w hen th e decision w as finally taken, it presen ted th e N avy w ith a n alm o st im possible p roblem as reg ard s recru itm en t a n d tra in in g o f th e n u m b ers required.

“ W ith the co m p arativ ely slow expansion o f th e S e r v i c e betw een 1938 a n d

PERSO N N EL

109

1941 th ere is n o d o u b t th a t the A rm y had a clear field for recruitm ent and secured the cream o f the p o p u la tio n ; this was p articu larly the case in n o rth ern In d ia. T o o b tain th e num bers required in later years it becam e necessary to open up recru itm en t on an India-w ide scale, large num bers o f ratings from Bengal and so u th ern In d ia were enrolled together w ith a com paratively large n um ber from th e cities as o pposed to the villages in In d ia .”

O ne o f the fall-outs o f the large intake in train in g was th a t the training establishm ents were overcrow ded, the train in g staff was in adequate an d hence the q u a lity 12 o f train in g suffered. F o r exam ple, the R a d a r School was designed for 120 ratings but it was m ade to handle 308 ratings a t a tim e. As a consequence, m ore tim e was devoted to technical a n d professional training a t the expense o f disciplinary train in g w hich directly affected the quality o f the ratin g s th a t these establishm ents tu rn ed o u t in such large num bers.

In 1943 the process o f planned expansion o f the R IN ceased but fo r v arious reasons the a u th o rities h ad n o t reached th e targ et figures. F o r exam ple, the num b er o f officers and ratin g s b o rn e in M ay 1943 w ere 1959 and 13,873 while th e target figures were 2,447 an d 18,838 respectively. D espite th e optim ism o f the planners, th ere was a considerably large shortfall in the personnel stren g th o f the R IN w hich, on hindsight, can be ascribed to: (1) n e a r to tal ignorance o f the career prospects in th e N avy in areas aw ay from the co astal region due to the failure o f the recruiting organisation to spread know ledge a b o u t the Service; (2) the deleterious effect o f the news from the fro n t on the reverse suffered by the A llied N aval Forces during the earlier years o f the W ar; an d (3) the adverse effect o f the rep o rts on the service co nditions sent h o m e by ratings d u rin g th eir first few weeks in the Service.

A n o th er facto r th a t co n trib u ted to the shortfall was desertion by a large num ber o f recruits. In som e m onths, w astage13 due to desertion an d various o th e r causes actually exceeded the intake. In fact, by the end o f the W ar, 43,000 m en h ad been recruited to p roduce a b orne stren g th o f 27,651. T he w astage due to desertion and o th e r reasons being an incredible figure o f 15,349— over 55 per cent o f the b orne strength!

T here h a d been com plaints am ong recruits o f h arsh discipline, bad food, unsym pathetic tre a tm e n t and o th er teething troubles. A lso, while the Indian A rm y an d the R IA F w ould send the recruits hom e on leave on com pletion o f th eir training, th ere was no such system in the N avy. B ut the biggest single disillusioning facto r was the totally incorrect and rosy picture th a t som e unscrupulous recruiting officers a n d th eir agents drew ab o u t the conditions o f service an d th e prospects o f advancem ent so as to m eet th eir recruitm ent targets. F alse hopes an d assurances, w hich were soon to be belied, on such im p o rta n t m atters as pay, p ro m o tio n , fu tu re prospects, post-w ar resettlem ent, fo o d , accom m odation an d treatm en t directly led to the lowering o f m o rale im m ediately a fter recru itm en t a n d consequent desertion by several recruits. T he ratings also resented w orking as m essm en, serving food to senior ratings, p erform ing certain duties o f “ disagreeable ch aracter” as

110 UNDER TW O ENSIGNS

cleaning ships an d lavatories an d sharing fo o d cooked in a com m on galley (kitchen) w ith persons from different castes an d religions. In one o f his rep o rts, Vice A dm iral G odfrey said, “ T he average ra tin g firm ly believed th a t he was going to be found a p o st-w ar jo b by th e Service. G o v ern m en t an d the N avy can n o t be held blam eless fo r th is. M u ch o f the recruiting a d vertising was literally on the lines o f ‘Join the N avy an d secure y o u rself a p o st-w ar jo b .’ A dm ittedly in the text o f th e ad v ertisem en t no specific p r o mise was m ade b u t the caption definitely im plied th a t this w ould be d o n e.” 14

In one o f the recru itm en t posters, th e copy read , “ P erm an en t careers in the R IN . E a rn while y o u learn. P ro m o tio n to W a rra n t Officers an d C o m m issioned R a n k .” This was a piece o f b la ta n t u n tru th as th e short-service ratings could never h o p e to rise even to the ran k o f w a rra n t officers, let alone com m issioned ran k s.

W h atev er the d raw b ack s in th e quality o f train in g and service conditions, the p erfo rm an ce o f th e R IN perso n n el d u rin g the entire p erio d o f th e W a r was com m endable. T h e d e c o ra tio n s15 aw ard ed to officers an d ratings o f th e Service included one K n ig h t C o m m an d er o f the O rd er o f th e B ritish E m pire, two D istinguished Service O rders, one Officer o f the O rd er o f the B ritish Em pire, one K n ig h th o o d , one C o m p an io n o f the O rd er o f the B ath, 10 C om p an io n s o f the O rd e r o f the In d ian E m pire, one C o m p an io n o f the O rd e r o f the British E m pire, 18 M em bers o f th e O rd e r o f the B ritish E m pire, 15 D istinguished Service C rosses, eight Officers o f th e O rd e r o f the B ritish India, tw o Indian O rd ers o f M erit, 28 D istin g u ish ed Service M edals, 10 In d ian D efence Service M edals, 16 B ritish E m pire M edals, one R o y al H u m an e Society M edal, 105

M entions in D esp atch es a n d 118 C o m m en d atio n s from v ario u s au th o ritie s—

an im pressive tally indeed.

T h e casu a ltie s15 suffered by R I N perso n n el d u rin g th e W ar included 27

officers, tw o w a rra n t officers a n d 105 ratin g s killed in ac tio n ; 14 officers, tw o w a rra n t officers a n d 123 ratin g s w ounded; a n d tw o ratings missing.

Im m ed iately on th e cessation o f hostilities on A ugust 15,1945, operations fo r th e p o st-w a r planning, d em o b ilisatio n an d resettlem ent o f personnel were in itiated . N av al H e a d q u a rte rs set up a D em o b ilisatio n an d R esettlem ent S ection u n d e r th e C h ie f o f P ersonnel a n d also a P o st-W ar P lanning D irecto rate w hich w as responsible fo r p lan n in g th e peacetim e stren g th o f p ersonnel in th e R IN . T his d ire c to ra te w as la te r m erged w ith the Plans D irecto rate.

T h e P o st-W a r P lan n in g D ire c to ra te w o rk ed o u t th ree different lim its16 o f personnel stre n g th — the u p p e r lim it being th e stren g th req u ired during the o c cu p atio n al p erio d o f 18 to 24 m o n th s im m ediately follow ing th e W ar, the low er lim it w hich w as th e m inim um p erso n n el stre n g th req u ired fo r en su ring th e security o f sea-lanes a n d sea-fro n tiers a n d th e low est lim it w hich was to be a d o p te d in case financial c o n sid eratio n s did n o t p erm it the m ain ten a n ce o f th e low er lim it.

T h e C o m m an d er-in -C h ief o f th e th re e Services set u p a n Inter-Service D em obilisation P lan n in g S taff17 (1SD PS), w hich included a representative o f th e F O C R 1 N , a n d th e R IN R elease R egulations w ere p u t into effect from

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M ay 8, 1945. T he release system was uniform ly applied to all three Services an d w as w orked o u t on th e basis o f age an d length o f service, to p priority being given to personnel w ho had com pleted 50 years o f age. O ther personnel to be dem obilised were divided into three categories: Class A fo r those w hose release w ould be based on age and length o f service; Class B for th o se w ho had to be released “ for w ork o f n ational im p o rtan ce” irrespective o f age an d length o f service, and Class C fo r those who sought release on co m p assio n ate grounds.

F ro m S eptem ber 1945 to A pril 1946 no ratings w ere recruited th o u g h the en try o f boys co n tin u ed . This w as m ainly because peacetim e physical and ed u catio n al sta n d a rd s fo r en try into the R IN h ad to be finalised. T he N aval W ings18 o f the R ecru it R eception C am ps a t B angalore and M eeru t were disbanded on O cto b er 1, 1946 an d recru itm en t taken over by the naval train in g establishm ents based on a provisional cadre strength o f 5,000 r a tings o f the R oyal In d ian F leet R eserve. T he ex-A rm y ratings were d rafted back to th eir p a re n t units, th eir num ber till the end o f O ctober 1946 being 695.

T he p o st-w ar dem obilisation p la n s19 envisaged the release o f 940 reserve officers a n d 9,000 ratings w hich was begun in S eptem ber 1945 and co m p leted in A pril 1946. T he reserve officers released included 630 officers o f the executive b ranch, 174 officers o f th e special b ra n c h an d som e officers o f the A rm y w ho had been tra n sferred to the N avy d u rin g the W ar. These officers were dem obilised th ro u g h the release centre a t H M I S Feroze, Bom bay.

H M I S H am la I I was recom m issioned as H M I S K akauri in Septem ber 1945

an d functioned as the dem obilisation centre fo r ratings. In the first phase, 5464 ratings were released w hich included 1566 ex-A rm y personnel tra n sferred back to their p a re n t units a n d 1 3 8 5 ‘H ostilities O nly’ ratings w ho were in the m erchant navy before enlisting in the R IN .

T he recruitm ent20 policy also underw ent som e revision and eligibility was restricted to Indians w ho were subjects o f B ritish o r In d ian states o r d o m iciled in them , A nglo-Indians dom iciled in B ritish India o r Indian states, G o an s whose n atu ralisatio n p ap ers co nform ed to th e requirem ents o f the British N atio n ality a n d S tatus o f Aliens A ct o f 1914 a n d recruits from B urm a, Sri L anka an d A frica. T he language policy was also revised an d it was decided to accept recruits w ho could speak an d u n d erstan d either English o r U rd u a n d were able to write English, R o m an U rdu, A rabic o r D evnagari.

In ord er to im prove the educational stan d ard s o f recruits, the d u ratio n o f the train in g courses was increased and th e percentage o f qualifying m arks in the passing o u t exam inations in H M I S A kb a r raised.

T h e cadre o f ratings21 for the R oyal In d ian F leet Reserve was p ro v isionally fixed a t 5000 a n d com posed o f 1915 seam en, 347 signalm en, 452

telegraphists, 95 rad io m echanics (S), 84 rad io m echanics (W ), 192 ra d a r m echanics, 370 engine ro o m artificers, 158 electrical artificers, 125 sh ip w right artificers, 67 ord n an ce artificers, 722 stokers, 136 sick berth a tte n d a n ts, 175 w riters, 85 store assistants, 41 regulating b ran ch ratings an d 36

school-m asters.

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U N D ER T W O E N SIG N S

Based on the decision to set up a p e rm an en t cad re22 o f officers for the R oyal In d ian N avy an d to in tro d u ce new m eth o d s o f selection, a qualifying exam ination to be co n d u cted by the F ed eral P ublic Service C om m ission w hich w ould co n fo rm to the Civil Service C om m ission exam ination held in th e U n ited K in g d o m fo r c a n d id ates fo r the R oyal N avy, was in tro d u ced in 1945. By the end o f th a t year, how ever, only 20 cadets could be recruited ag ain st the p ro jected re q u irem en t o f 44 cadets fo r 1944 an d 1945.

I t was also decided in 1945 to offer 106 p e rm a n e n t reg u lar com m issions to the officers belonging to th e p e rm a n e n t an d tem p o rary R IN R and R IN V R , o u t o f w hich 66 w ere to be In d ian and 40 B ritish officers. Som e of the te m p o ra ry officers o f th e R IN R an d R IN V R were p erm itted to be reta in ed on th e ir su b stan tiv e ra n k b ased on certain con sid eratio n s o f W ar service sen io rity in th eir p a re n t ca d re an d age a n d in m any cases, based on c o n sid eratio n o f age only. T his resu lted in m a jo r seniority changes with fa r-reach in g effects; o ld er R IN R a n d R IN V R officers w ho had en tered the Service la te r becam e sen io r to y o u n g er reg u lar a n d reserve officers w ho had jo in e d Service m uch earlier. T his g ra n t o f seniority, th en know n as “ fictitio u s” sen io rity , w as d isco n tin u ed later b u t by th a t tim e the R IN list had u n d e rg o n e a m a jo r a n d p e rm a n e n t m etam o rp h o sis affecting ap p o in tm en ts a t th e hig h est level in the future.

In 1946, th e cad re o f officers w as divided into tw o lists: I— A ctive List, an d I I — officers p erm an en tly tran sfe rre d fo r service u n d e r the D e p a rtm e n t o f C o m m erce in M ercan tile M arin e ap p o in tm en ts. T he num b er o f p erm an e n t reg u lar com m issions23 to be offered to officers o f the R IN Reserves was increased fro m 106 to 156 and th e B ritish co m p o n e n t reduced from 40 to 11.

A schem e fo r short-service com m issions w ith a co n tra c tu a l p erio d o f th re e to five years w as also in tro d u ced . P ro p o sals fo r the creatio n o f three new bran ch es, viz., th e Supply a n d S ecretariat b ran ch , the E lectrical branch an d the E d u catio n b ran ch , were p u t up to the G o v ern m en t for ap p ro v al.

A p p ro v al was also acco rd ed for th e creation o f the ra n k o f R ear A dm iral in the peace estab lish m en t o f th e Service. Six cadets w ere recruited during th e y ear a n d 11 officers w ere d ep u ted to the U n ited K in g d o m fo r specialist courses in ra d io an d ra d a r, gunnery, to rp e d o and an ti-su b m arin e, navigation an d direction, electrical conversion an d d ockyard courses. Five officers co m p leted th e Staff C ourse, fo u r a t the N aval S taff C ollege at G reenw ich a n d o n e a t th e S taff C ollege, Q u etta.

C o n seq u en t to the p a rtitio n in 1947, In d ia n officers were given the option to elect24 service w ith either o f the tw o navies on the basis o f the following: a) M uslim s residing in In d ia a n d non-M uslim s fro m P akistan areas could ch o o se service w ith e ith e r N avy.

b) M uslim s fro m P ak istan could o p t for service o n ly w ith th e Pakistan N avy a n d non-M uslim s fro m In d ia could o p t fo r service only w ith the R IN .

c) Officers w ho did n o t w ish to serve eith er N avy had the option to retire w ith o u t an y c o m p en sato ry benefits.

PER SO N N EL

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W ith the d e p a rtu re o f B ritish officers, a serious shortage in the officer cadre, p articu larly in the senior ranks, was created and hencc a n u m b er o f British officers, w ho volunteered to serve on the basis o f extended service, were selected fo r a period o f three years w ith effect from Jan u ary 1, 1948.

T he num b er o f cadets to be recruited was raised to 46 and 47 per year fo r 1949 an d 1950 respectively, som e officers o f th e R IN R eserve were offered short-service com m ission an d direct recru itm en t o f officers was resorted to as well. The Special B ran ch o f the R IN V R was abolished in Septem ber 1948 b u t the officers o f this B ranch, who w ore distinctive green stripes on th eir epaulettes, were allow ed to co n tin u e in the R IN .

By the end o f 1950, the B ritish rep resen tatio n 25 in the R IN was 61 R N

an d eight R N Special List officers w ith an o u tstan d in g dem and for the loan o f 19 m ore officers. T h irty -th ree Special E n try cadets were recruited during the year an d sent to the U .K . fo r train in g with the R oyal N avy an d 30

naval cadets were recruited into the Jo in t Services W ing (JSW ) o f the N a tio n a l D efence A cadem y, D eh ra D un. T he first batch o f 21 naval cadets passed o u t o f the JS W in D ecem ber 1950 and proceeded to th e U .K . for fu rth e r naval train in g w ith the Royal N avy. F o rty -eig h t candidates were recruited direct from civil life as C om m issioned Officers. O u t o f these, 33

joined the Executive b ran ch , seven jo in ed the Engineering branch an d eight jo in ed the Supply an d S ecretariat b ran ch . T he to ta l num b er o f direct entry officers recruited since In d ependence was 122. F ifteen candidates were recruited in to the p erm an en t cadre o f the E du catio n b ran ch as C om m issioned In stru c to r Officers. Besides, six released officers a n d 10 Reserve Officers were g ra n te d sh o rt service com m ission in th e N avy. T hirty-three officers w ere d eputed to undergo v arious courses a n d atta c h m e n t w ith the R oyal N avy. R evised rules fo r officers’ leave, p ro m o tio n , ages o f co m p u lso ry re tire m e n t an d ten u re o f a p p o in tm e n t were also in tro d u ced .

A t the o u tb re a k o f the W ar, a n u m b er o f officers’ wives an d o th er ladies started w ork as civilians in the cypher offices th ro u g h o u t the country, w o rk ing fo r the A rm y, the R oyal In d ia n N avy and the R oyal In d ian A ir Force.

O n A pril 9, 1942, they fo rm e d the W om en’s A uxiliary C orps (India).26 Its o bject was to assign som e o f th e jo b s p ertain in g to the m ilitary service to w om en an d thereb y release m en fo r service in the field.

T he creatio n 27 o f this new w om en’s service pro d u ced a feeling o f esprit-de-corps w ithin th e naval establishm ents w here they w ere em ployed, but, m ore im p o rtan tly , a fte r the loss o f S ingapore a heavy burden was th ro w n on the R IN signal o rg an isatio n so th a t it was beneficial to recru it a n um ber o f intelligent E nglish-speaking girls to ta k e o ver these duties where possible.

T he personnel em ployed w ith th e R IN were fo rm ed in to a sep arate wing called the N aval W ing in F e b ru a ry 1944. T hey were called the W R IN S

(W om en’s R oyal In d ian N aval Service).

In ad d itio n to cypher duties, the girls were tra in e d a n d em ployed as telep rin te rs a n d dom e teach er o p e ra to rs; typists; telephonists; loggers; filers; m essage checkers an d d u ty d istrib u tio n officers; a n d clerks. In the clerical

1 1 4

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

field, they helped in ships offices; w orked in w ar in fo rm atio n room s a n d on w ar m aps; also , m any w ere em ployed in d eta c h m e n t a n d u n it offices, k eep ing a c c o u n t o f p ay a n d allow ances; a n d in F leet M ail Offices. T here were W R IN S a t th e N aval G u n n e ry E stab lish m en t, H M I S H im alaya, K arach i w here they w orked on rad io telephones, on the p ro jecto rs as qualified cinem a-o p e ra to rs, on precision m achines a n d on o rd n an ce duties.

C h ief officer Peggy C o o p er (now M rs. M .I. S kipw ith) has rec o rd e d in the R I N A ssociation Jo u rn a l (1984) th a t “ in 1943 th e W R IN S num bered 41

officers a n d 204 ratin g s b u t, tw o years later, th e re w ere 242 officers and 746 ratin g s, by w hich tim e 43 p er cen t o f the officers a n d 77 p er cen t o f the ra tin g s were In d ia n . D u rin g th e th ree-d ay M u tin y in F e b ru ary 1946 it was significant th a t th e W R IN S in all th e p o rts sto o d fast a n d show ed no signs o f d isaffectio n .”

R ec ru itm e n t to this c a d re w as suspended an d H M I S Jahanara a t A hm ed-n a g a r a n d a t H M I S N a lin i a t C a lc u tta , th e tw o W R IN S R ecruiting C entres, w ere closed dow n. T h e m esses a t A d m ira l’s H o u se, C h a te a u W indsor and M a rb le H all, B om bay were given u p and all officers a n d W R IN S tran sferred to V a sa n t S agar in A ugust 1946. T h eir services28 d u rin g th e w ar were re cognised by th e ir c o n tin g en ts being included in th e V ictory P arad e w hich w as held in D elhi on M arch 7, 1946 a n d also in the N avy D a y P arad e in B om bay. A ll W R IN S w ere later released by F e b ru a ry 1947.

R E F E R E N C E S

1. R e p o rt o f th e R oyal In d ia n N avy M u tin y C om m ission o f E nquiry, G o v e rn m e n t o f In d ia , 1946, P a rt I, p. 1.

2. Ib id ., p . 2.

3. Ib id ., p . 3.

4. Ib id ., p p . 3-4.

5. Ib id ., p p . 4-5.

6. Ib id ., p . 7.

7. Ib id ., p. 8.

8. Ib id ., p . 9.

9. Ib id ., p . 248.

10. Ib id ., p . 10.

11. Ib id ., p . 11.

12. Ib id ., p . 12.

13. Ib id ., p . 13.

14. Ib id ., p . 121.

15. Ib id ., p . 15.

16. R e p o rt on th e R o y al In d ia n N avy, July-D ee. 1945, N av al H ead q u arters (In d ia), 1946, p . 26.

17. Ib id ., p p . 20-21.

18. Ib id ., p p . 6-8.

PER SO N N EL

1 1 5

19. Collins (In stru c to r L ieu ten an t), D .J.E ., I.N ., T h e R oyal In d ian N avy 1939-45, C om bined Inter-Services H isto rical Section, India and P akistan, 1964, p. 328.

20. R e p o rt on the R oyal Indian N avy, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

21. Ib id ., pp. 7-8.

22. Ib id ., p p . 5-6.

23. Ibid., Jan .-D ee. 1946, 1947, p p . 8-9.

24. Ibid., Aug. 1947-48, 1948, pp. 9-10.

25. R e p o rt on the In d ian N avy, Aug. 1949-Dec. 1950, 1951, op. cit., p p. 5-6.

26. Collins (In stru c to r L ieu ten an t), D .J.E ., op. cit., p . 160.

27. R oyal In d ian N avy (1612-1947) A sso ciatio n -Jo u rn al 1984—Excerpts from W o m en ’s R oyal In d ian N aval Service by C h ief Officer Peggy C ooper, C .B .E ., W .R .I.N .S ., pp. 35-37.

28. R e p o rt on th e R oyal Indian Navy, Jan .-D ec. 1946, 1947, op. cit., p. 13.

7.

Training

T h a t t h e m a n b e h in d th e m ach in e is m o re im p o rta n t th a n th e m ach in e p er se has p e rh ap s been reduced to a cliche due to overuse but, nevertheless, it is a tim e-h o n o u red cliche w hich will rem ain valid as long as m an fights m an, a sh o re o r aflo at, w ith w eapons o f w ar w hose level o f so p h isticatio n an d lethality is grow ing m enacingly.

T he h isto ry o f tra in in g activities in the R IN covering the p erio d fro m 1939

to th e early fifties is rep lete w ith a n u m b er o f ‘se am ark s’ an d achievem ents w hich were catalysed by n u m ero u s im p o rta n t events in the p rev ailin g politico-m ilitary scenario including d ev elopm ents d u rin g W o rld W a r II, dem obilisatio n a fte r th e W a r, p a rtitio n o f th e c o u n try resulting in th e sh arin g o f assets a n d train in g facilities by th e tw o tru n c a te d navies, an d the need fo r creating a new com plex o f basic, ad v an ced a n d technical train in g in fra stru ctu re in a p h ased m a n n e r based on th e changed security en v iro n m en t, new th re a t p e rcep tio n s a n d th e em erging post-W ra r ro le o f th e m aritim e fo rces.

In S ep tem b er 1939, th e R I N h a d a h a n d fu l o f train in g establishm ents to c a te r to th e n eeds o f its sm all flotilla an d th ese train in g establishm ents were all lo cated inside th e N aval D o c k y a rd a t B om bay. T hese e stab lish m en ts1 were used fo r tra in in g ratin g s o n ly a n d com prised a S eam anship School, a Signal School, a G u n n e ry School, a M echanical T ra in in g E stab lish m en t, a B oys’

T ra in in g E stab lish m en t a n d an A n ti-S u b m arin e S ch o o l. T h ey w ere m anned by a sm all n u m b e r o f officers, w a rra n t officers an d ratin g s w ho carrie d o u t necessary a d m in istra tiv e as well as in stru ctio n al duties. T h e re w ere n o facilities a t th a t tim e fo r tra in in g in th e to rp e d o , ra d a r a n d electrical disciplines n o r w as th e re a n y estab lish m en t fo r train in g officers w ho u sed to be sent to th e U .K . fo r tra in in g in th e R o y al N aval E stab lish m en ts. T he ratio n ale beh in d th e c o n c e n tra tio n o f naval establishm ents here a p p ears to have been th e fa c t th a t B om bay w as th e only p o rt used fo r naval o p eratio n s before the W ar.

I

j^For p u rp o se o f train in g 2 boys, the floating h u lk o f H M I S D alhousie, w hich used to be m o o re d alo n g sid e the b re a k w a te r in th e B om bay D o c k y ard , was used. D alhousie also fu n ctio n ed as the p a re n t estab lish m en t fo r all officers serving in B o m b a y ^

By the tim e, how ever, W o rld W a r II ended several train in g establishm ents3

h a d sp ru n g up all o v er th e country. T hese w ere H M I S H im alaya, th e G u n nery School, H M I S Bahadur, th e B oys’ T rain in g E stablishm ent, H M I S Dila-

T R A IN IN G

1 1 7

w ar, an d H M I S Cham ak, th e R a d a r T raining School, an d the Physical an d R ecreatio n al T raining School at K arach i; H M IS Valsura, the T o rp ed o School a t Jam n ag ar; H M I S A kbar w hich housed the N ew E ntry R atings T raining School, Officers’ T raining School and the C ookery School, H M IS Feroze, the R eserve Officers an d W R IN S Officers T raining E stab lish m en t; H M IS Talwar\ th e Signal T rain in g E stablishm ent; H M I S Khanjar, th e N ew E ntry R atings T raining E stab lish m en t; H M I S H amalawar, th e R IN C o m p o n en t N o. 1

C oastal T raining C en tre ;^ //M IS M achlim ar, the A nti-Subm arine School, and the F o rt B arracks Supply and S ecretarial T raining School a t B o m b ay / H M IS

Shivaji, the M echanical T rain in g E stablishm ent, and the R IN School o f P h o to g ra p h y a t L onavla; the C ivilian/N aval T raining E stablishm ent a t Pilani; H M I S C heetah, the M o to r T ra n sp o rt/B o a t T raining Base atTrombay,J//A/YS'

H a m la , the L anding C ra ft W ing T raining School a t M an d ap am ; H M IS Jahanara at A h m ed n ag ar an d H M I S N a lin i a t C alcutta, b o th train in g establishm ents for the W o m e n ’s R oyal Indian N aval Service; and H M IS Jahangir, the R IN C o m p o n en t N o. 2 C o astal T rain in g C en tre a t K ak in ad a (know n as C o-co n ad a th o se days).

T h e R a d a r T rain in g School, H M I S Cham ak, was established a t K arach i du rin g the W a r and was fo u n d extrem ely useful in im p artin g training on the use o f ra d a r, the recently in tro d u ced long-range all-w eather sensor.

T he M echanical T raining E stablishm ent, H M I S Shivaji, was com m issioned 4 a t L onavla on J a n u a ry 8, 1945 th o u g h the fo rm al opening cerem ony was p e rfo rm ed by the G o v e rn o r o f B om bay o v er a m o n th later on F e b ru a ry 15, 1945. T his estab lish m en t was p lan n ed to u n d ertak e the train in g o f 720 r a t ings an d h ad an ad m in istrativ e a n d train in g sta ff com prising 50 officers an d 329 ratings.

Ow ing to the rap id expan sio n o f the R IN a n d the g reat dem and fo r engineer officers d u rin g this p erio d , it becam e necessary to a p p o in t new ly-com m issioned engineer officers to billets afloat as early as possible, i.e., a fte r a b rief exposure to train in g in basic a n d divisional duties. H ow ever, d u rin g the year 1945, the m anpow er p o sitio n eased to som e extent an d th e engineering syllabi fo r officers w ere revised to include ad d itio n a l topics such as discipline, anti-gas w arfare, dam ag e c o n tro l, fire-fighting a n d electrical, o rd n a n c e an d naval engineering as a p a r t o f the 24-week engineering course. E ngineer officers who h ad jo in ed the Service p rio r to 1944, were also d eputed to u n d e rgo this course.

In F eb ru ary 1943, th e C ivilian an d M ilitary T rain in g C entre at Pilani co m m enced th e train in g o f civilian p erso n n el a n d p re p a re d them fo r recru itm en t to the m echanical train in g estab lish m en t o f th e R IN as d irect-entry artificers.

As this arran g em en t did n o t p ro v e satisfacto ry , it was decided in early 1944

to ap p o in t a L ieu ten an t o f the engineering b ra n c h as the officer-in-charge o f this establishm ent a n d redesignate this estab lish m en t as a C ivilian-N aval C en tre. T h e C entre was placed u n d e r the ad m in istrativ e co n tro l o f the L ab o u r D e p a rtm e n t o f th e G o v e rn m e n t o f I n d ia . T he trainees were now enrolled in th e service p rio r to th eir jo in in g the C en tre. This establishm ent w as ru n like

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any o th e r naval establishm ent by p ro v id in g th e p ro v o st staff an d o th e r facilities. This change also led to th e a d d itio n o f a n im petus in the recru itm en t o f engineering personnel a n d subsequently th e sta ff o f the C en tre was increased to th re e engineer officers, th ree executive b ra n c h officers, o n e supply officer an d requisite p ro v o st staff an d o th e r ratin g s. T he train in g capacity o f the C en tre w as increased to ta k e o n th e train in g o f 280 trainees an d the d u ra tio n o f th e course was extended to six m o n th s.

T he F ire -F ig h tin g a n d D am age C o n tro l school was established a t C olaba, B om bay a n d u n d e rto o k tra in in g o f all categ o ries o f perso n n el in the vital technique o f c o u n terin g em ergencies a t sea caused by fire an d enem y action.

O n th e lines o f th e A n ti-S u b m arin e E stab lish m en t o f th e R oyal N avy at L iverpool, a n A n ti-S u b m arin e T actical T each er was set up a t B om bay to train to rp e d o an d an ti-su b m a rin e (T A S) p erso n n el in th e ever-changing ta c tics ag a in st subm arines. D u rin g p erio d s w hen th e ships aw aited clearance for the d e p a rtu re o f convoys fro m B om bay to o th e r p o rts o r areas o f action across enem y-infested w aters, th e TA S personnel a b o a rd w ere given a heavy dose o f tra in in g in th e la te st tech n iq u es o f u n d e rw a te r w arfare.

In o rd e r to e n su re b e tte r q u ality o f officers a n d sailo rs, su itab le personnel selection tests a n d o th e r m eth o d s h ad also been devised and ad o p te d . U p d a te d syllabi fo r v ario u s courses h ad been d raw n up and several new m ethods o f tra in in g in tro d u c e d . T h e tra in in g flotilla5 co m p rised H M I S Cornwallis, Clive, D ipavati, H eera, L a i an d N ilam fo r new e n try officers from H M I S Akbar a n d the c o n v erted survey ship, H M I S Investigator w hich h ad becom e a B oys’

T ra in in g Ship. T hese m easures co n sid erab ly im proved the q u ality o f training a n d show ed p ositive resu lts w ithin a s h o rt p erio d .

T o en su re th a t th e rig h t ty p e o f officers an d ratings jo in ed the R oyal Indian N avy, a close liaison w as m a in ta in e d betw een N av al H e a d q u a rte rs an d the A rm y ’s D ire c to ra te o f R ecru itin g a n d Selection o f P ersonnel. F u rth erm o re, th e re w as a d istin ct im p ro v e m e n t in the q u ality o f recru its on a c c o u n t o f the in tro d u c tio n o f S ta n d a rd L iteracy T ests w hich ensured u n iform ity in the s ta n d a rd o f q u e stio n p a p e rs a n d assessm ent norm s. T he syllabi were also co n s ta n tly review ed w ith a view to im proving a n d m odernising the training m e th o d o lo g y a n d q u a lity o f train in g .

T ra in in g film strip s a n d p ro je c to rs w ere p ro cu red from the U .K . an d the U .S .A . in o rd e r to re n d e r in stru c tio n m o re interesting, in fo rm ativ e a n d effective. Som e o f th ese film strips w ere also d u b b ed in th e In d ian languages. A film “ N a v a l U n ifo rm ” d ep ictin g th e u niform o f different ratin g s was also p ro d u c e d . T w o o th e r film s, “ P a rts o f a S h ip ” a n d “ A n ch o rs a n d C ab les” , w ere also p ro d u c e d in 1945. Stress w as laid on the need to acq u ire a good k n o w le d g e o f U r d u as sev eral ratin g s w ere U rd u -sp eak in g .

D u rin g th is p e rio d , 11 ratin g s w ere g ran ted com m issions in th e R oyal In d ia n N av al V o lu n te e r R eserve. O f these, seven w ere com m issioned in the E xecutive b ra n c h , tw o in the Supply a n d S ecretariat b ra n c h a n d o n e each in th e E lectrical a n d E n g in e e rin g bran ch es. T hese were the first com m issions ev er g ra n te d to th e p erso n n e l fro m the low er d e c k —ratin g s, a n d m ark ed an

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im p o rta n t m ilestone in the h isto ry o f the R oyal In d ian N avy. T h eir initial com bined train in g o f one m o n th ’s d u ra tio n was conducted a t H M I S A kbar d u rin g w hich period they were also tau g h t general seam anship and o th er disciplines. O n co m p letio n o f this com bined training, the executive bran ch p e rsonnel stayed back a t H M I S A kbar fo r a fu rth e r 11-week tra in in g course while the o th ers proceeded to their respective schools fo r professional tra in ing.

Som e aspects o f train in g had to be im p arted in the U .K . as facilities fo r such train in g did n o t exist in In d ia a t th a t tim e. A n Engineer Officer, for instance, was ap p o in te d to the G u n n ery School a t H M I S H im alaya a n d the qualitative req u irem en t o f his duties necessitated his being qualified in o rd n ance duties. As no R IN officer a t th a t tim e was qualified in this discipline, tw o officers w ere d ep u ted to u n d erg o ord n an ce train in g in the U .K . in July 1944. On th eir re tu rn to In d ia in Ja n u a ry 1945, they were ap p o in ted to H M I S

H im alaya a n d H M I S Shivaji.

D u rin g W orld W ar II and even later, a large n u m b er o f the vessels d e pended w holly on the resources o f the D o ck y ard a t B om bay a n d hence it was felt necessary to continuously in d u ct latest technology an d h ard w are in to the D ockyard. It was, therefore, decided in A ugust 1944 to depute tw o officers to the U .K . to study d o c k y ard o rg an isatio n a n d o th er related aspects.

W ith a view to im proving the train in g m ethodology a t H M I S Shivaji, an Engineer Officer was d eputed to the U .K . in Septem ber 1944 to study m odern train in g m ethods w ith p artic u la r em phasis on the train in g o f engine ro o m an d artificer apprentices.

D u rin g the ‘fo rtie s’, the G o v ern m en t o f In d ia had p lanned to in d u ct cru isers an d destroyers into th e R IN a n d hence tw o officers fro m the Engineering b ran ch were d ep u ted for a six-m onth atta c h m e n t w ith the E a st Indies F leet in late 1944 so th a t they could, on th eir re tu rn , fo rm a nucleus o f engineer officers train ed in the o p eratio n an d m aintenance o f m achinery an d boilers o f cruisers an d destroyers. F o u r electrical artificers were also d eputed to the U .K .

fo r technical train in g in electrical e q u ip m e n tfo r w hich facilities d id n o t exist in th e R IN .

To b ro a d e n the base o f ed u catio n al tra in in g a n d m eth o d o lo g y o f training, an In stru c to r b ran ch was co n stitu ted in A ugust 1944. A n E x am in atio n Office was established in B om bay to c o n d u c t th e H igher E d u catio n al T est (H E T ) an d E d u catio n al T est 1 (E T 1) to assess the ed u catio n al a tta in m e n ts o f r a t ings fo r p urposes o f p ro m o tio n to h ig h er ra n k s. A series o f lectures on train in g techniques w ere arran g ed fo r the low er-deck cad re o f school-m astcrs. R eference, u n it a n d circulating libraries w ere also set up in the R IN train in g esta blishm ents by p ro c u rin g pu b licatio n s locally an d fro m the U .K . A degree in M athem atics o r Physics h a d alre a d y been prescribed as an essen tial qualification for entry into the in stru c to r b ra n c h and the pay scales o f school-m asters were suitably revised in O cto b er 1943. T he ra n k s o f H ead m aster C o m m an d er, H e a d m a ste r L ie u ten an t C o m m an d er a n d H ead m aster L ieutenant w ere in tro duced in th e R IN . T he Inter-U niversities B oard (In d ia) fu rth e r recom m ended

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to all the universities in In d ia th a t the H E T exam in atio n be recognised as equivalent to th e m atricu latio n ex am in atio n . T h e suggestion m ade by the T rain in g and E ducation D ire c to ra te th a t n avigation an d m eteorology should be in tro d u ced as a degree subject in In d ian U niversities was also accepted by the In ter-U n iv ersity B oard. W a r in fo rm atio n ro o m s becam e the responsibility o f the In stru c to r B ranch an d p h o to g ra p h s o f R IN ships an d naval activities o f the C o m m o n w ealth c o u n tries w ere circu lated to th em for display.

T h e responsibility fo r b ro ad castin g th e F o rc e s ’ P ro g ra m m e o v er All India R ad io also devolved on the C o m p o site T rain in g an d E du catio n D irecto rate.

F o r p lanning a n d c o o rd in a tio n o f all train in g activities, the D ire c to ra te o f T rain in g a n d E d u catio n was co n stitu te d on July 26, 1943 a n d com prised a C o m m o d o re o f the R oyal N avy as the D ire c to r o f T ra in in g and E ducation an d In sp e c to r o f T rain in g E stablishm ents, a C o m m an d er o f the R oyal Indian N aval R eserve as th e D e p u ty D ire c to r o f T raining, a H ead m aster-C o m m an -

d er o f the R oyal N avy as th e D e p u ty D ire c to r o f E d u catio n a n d five L ie u ten an t C o m m an d ers o r L ieu ten an ts o f vario u s b ra n c h e s—executive, engineering, a c c o u n ta n t an d in stru cto r. T his D ire c to ra te was fu rth e r reo rg anised in O cto b er 1944 a n d its com p o sitio n was revised to a C ap tain o f the R o y a l N avy as the D ire c to r o f T ra in in g an d E d u catio n a n d In sp ecto r o f T ra in in g E stab lish m en ts, a C o m m an d er o f the R oyal N avy as the D eputy D ire c to r o f T rain in g , an In stru c to r-C o m m a n d e r o f th e R oyal N avy as the D e p u ty D ire c to r o f E d u catio n , a L ie u ten an t o f the R oyal In d ia n N aval V o lu n teer R eserve as S taff Officer (T raining) a n d an In stru c to r-L ie u ten a n t C o m m a n d e r o f th e R o y al In d ia n N aval V o lu n teer R eserve as S taff Officer (E d u catio n ). T h e T ra in in g a n d E d u c a tio n D ire c to ra te , in o rd e r to optim ise the q u ality o f the train ees, w o rk ed in close liaison w ith all branches o f the Service on all tra in in g m atte rs. A little before In d ep en d en ce, i.e., on July 1, 1947, a N av al S u b -C o m m ittee6 was c o n stitu te d to m ake recom m endations reg ard in g th e division o f assets a n d liabilities o f th e undiv id ed Service b etw een In d ia a n d P a k ista n . B ased on th e reco m m en d atio n s o f this C om m ittee, th e P a rtitio n C o u n cil a llo cated ships to th e tw o co u n tries. A s a result o f this allo c a tio n , tw o slo o p s K istna a n d Cauvery, as also the frigate H M I S T ir, cam e to th e R I N to be used la te r as tra in in g ships.

A n id ea fo r jo in t tra in in g 7 by th e tw o navies a fte r p a rtitio n was p ro p o u n d ed b y A d m ira l Sir G eoffrey M iles, the th en D e p u ty S uprem e C o m m an d er (N avy) a n d e a rlie r F la g Officer C o m m an d in g , R o y al In d ia n N avy o f undiv id ed India, to M r. J in n a h th re e days b efo re p a rtitio n . A d m iral M iles reco rd s to say,

“ M r. J in n a h h a d a rriv e d th e re (K a ra c h i) th e sam e day as G o v e rn o r G eneral D e sig n a te o f P a k ista n a n d he bid m e to com e to stay w ith him a t G o v ern m e n t H o u se. T h a t n ig h t a t d in n e r w ith only h im self a n d his sister F a tim a I w as p ro p o u n d in g m y id ea th a t a fte r p a rtitio n the tw o new navies should share th e v ario u s tra in in g estab lish m en ts, fo r exam ple, all th e boys w ould be trained in Bahadur (K a ra c h i) a n d o n co m p letio n , all th e In d ia n boys w ould be sent d o w n to B om bay. C onversely, all engine ro o m staff w ould be train ed in Shivaji (L o n av la).

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“ ‘Y o u c a n ’t do it A d m ira l’ said M r. Jin n ah . I said ‘T alking as an Englishm an I c a n ’t see . . . ’ w hen M r. Jin n a h in terru p ted by thum ping the table and saying ‘T h a t’s y o u r tro u b le, y o u talk as an E nglishm an.’ I said ‘allright, talk ing as an A dm iral I c a n ’t see why it c a n ’t be done. W e’ve had them mixed in ships fo r som e y ears.’ ‘I ’ll tell you why you c a n ’t, said M r. Jinnah, ‘they w orship the cow, we e a t it!’ A very succinct way o f sum m ing up the situ atio n ,” records A dm iral M iles.

O n Ja n u a ry 1, 1948, the old D ire c to ra te o f T rain in g an d E d u c a tio n 8 was split into tw o sep arate directo rates, nam ely, the D irecto rate o f W eapons and T rain in g and th e D ire c to ra te o f N aval E d u catio n . P artitio n o f the cou n try also led to the com m encem ent o f a search fo r suitable location fo r a B oys’

T ra in in g E stab lish m en t (B TE) in In d ia. P rio r to Independence, the Boy’s T rain in g C en tre fo r the N avy used to be a t the tw o establishm ents, H M IS

Bahadur an d H M I S Dilawar, in K arach i. Im m ediately a fte r Independence, a te m p o ra ry train in g centre was set up a t B om bay w hich was shifted to I N S

Circars in D ecem ber 1947. T he initial training o f S toker boys was u n dertaken a t the new B T E in V ishakhapatnam in 1948 an d th e boys then proceeded to H M I S Shivaji for technical training. T h e train in g schools established9 at C ochin during the early forties were the Supply an d S ecretariat School, the C ookery School, th e C o m m unication School an d the A nti-S ubm arine School w here an ti-su b m arin e w arfare courses for officers were started in M arch 1948.

In N ovem ber 1947, a delegation visited the U .K . and m ade arrangem ents fo r 47 officers an d 366 ratin g s to u n d erg o various courses in the R oyal N avy’s train in g establishm ents. A ttach m en ts to ships o f the R oyal N avy and M edite rra n e a n F leets for p ractical sea train in g w ere also a rran g ed .

T he p ro p o sed p o st-In d ep en d en ce expansion o f the R oyal In d ian N avy n ecessitated au g m en tatio n o f m anpow er resources a n d initiation o f im m edia te actio n to step up recru itm en t. T h e officers an d m en so in d u cted in to the N avy h a d to be given ad eq u ate train in g to enable them to discharge th eir duties an d responsibilities, b o th afloat an d ash o re. This called fo r a d hoc arran g em en ts as well as expansion o f train in g facilities to m eet the enhanced requirem ents. In the initial stages, the R oyal In d ia n N avy h ad to depend considerably on th e R oyal N avy fo r specialised training o f ratin g s as well as general a n d specialised train in g o f officers.

W hilst in th e p re -p a rtitio n days th e n u m b er o f cadets to be en tered every y ear was 24, th e in p u t o f cadets d u rin g 1948 was increased to 46; it was accepted in principle th a t the in p u t fo r the years 1949 a n d 1950 w ould be 46 a n d 4 7 respectively.

T he p lan n ed cad et en try schem e catered o n ly fo r offsetting n o rm al w astages on a c co u n t o f retirem en t. T o build u p th e officer cad re o f the N avy fo r h er expansion, recourse to d irect re c ru itm e n t was th e only plausible solution a n d hence this was accepted for all b ranches o f the R IN for an initial p erio d o f tw o years. T o m ake up the sh o rtag e o f officers in different branches o f the R IN , a schem e o f short-service co m m issio n 10 o f seven years’ d u ra tio n was in tro d u ced a n d 67 officers w ere g ran ted com m issions d u rin g the p erio d fro m

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A ugust 1949. O u t o f these, 55 jo in ed th e executive b ra n c h , 7 jo in ed the engineering b ran ch a n d five were sen t to the electrical b ran ch . In a d d itio n , 15 released officers were recalled a n d g ran ted special five-year sh o rt service co m m ission in th e R oyal In d ian N avy. In o rd e r to fu rth er indigenise train in g o f officers, an Inter-S ervice tra in in g in stitu tio n , th e N a tio n a l D efence A cadem y, cam e into being in Ja n u a ry 1949. T h irty -eig h t R oyal In d ian N aval C adets joined the N aval W ing o f the A cadem y a n d com pleted th eir train in g in 1951.

O n passing o u t fro m the A cadem y, they were sent to the U .K ., like o th er R IN cadets before th e m , fo r fu rth e r train in g .

T o m eet sh o rtag es in m anpow er, b o th in tra in in g a n d ad m inistrative spheres, 88 com m issioned officers a n d 61 w a rra n t officers fro m all branches o f the R N were lo an ed to the R I N as a stop-gap a rran g em en t.

Several new courses w ere in tro d u ced . In o rd e r to im plem ent basic, a d v a n ced a n d o p e ra tio n a l tra in in g , th ree new courses, viz., se n io r officers’ refresher course, ju n io r officer’s re fre sh e r co u rse a n d sm all ships g u n n ery officers’

courses w ere in stitu ted a t C ochin d u rin g 1951-52. In F e b ru a ry 1953, the first lo n g physical tra in in g co u rse fo r naval officers was u n d ertak en in In d ia a t the A rm y School o f Physical T rain in g , Pune.

A n ad d e d c o m m itm en t fo r th e tra in in g o f N a tio n a l C ad et C o rp s officers o f th e N aval W in g o f b o th sen io r a n d ju n io r divisions was also u n d e rta k e n by the N avy in 1951. T h e A tom ic, B acteriological a n d C hem ical D am age C o n tro l S chool (A B C D School) was set up a t I N S Shivaji an d tra in in g in te c h n iques o f A B C w a rfare was in tro d u c e d .

T ra in in g activities f o r ratin g s w ere also step p ed up, syllabi revised and several new cou rses in tro d u c e d . F ive h u n d re d a n d eight ratin g s were deputed to th e U .K . betw een D ecem b er 1947 a n d M ay 1948 to u n d erg o various courses a n d a tta c h m e n ts in th e R N . T h e m ajo rity o f ratin g s o f this g ro u p were e a rm ark ed fo r th e first cru iser b eing acq u ired fo r th e R IN , H M I S D elhi an d , after c o m p le tio n o f th e ir co u rses, they w ere ‘d ra fte d ’ to th e ship.

T h e D o c k y a rd A p p re n tic e sh ip S chem e11 w as in tro d u c e d fo r th e train in g o f civ ilian tra d e a p p re n tic e s in o rd e r to pro v id e th e N aval D o ck y ard an d Base R e p a ir O rg a n isa tio n s w ith technicians fo r th e h ig h ly specialised a n d skilled jo b s.

In A p ril 1952, it w as decided th a t th e B oatsw ains tra in in g course sh o u ld also be c o n d u c te d in In d ia . T h e first co u rse co m m en ced a t C ochin in F e b ru ary 1953.

Several co u rses fo r p ro fessio n al tra in in g o f ratin g s o f different disciplines w ere also co m p leted . I t w as expected a t t h a t tim e th a t m o re specialist courses fo r th e ra tin g s ’ first a n d second rates co u ld be u n d e rta k e n in In d ia once the n ecessary e q u ip m e n t fro m the U .K . h a d been installed in v ario u s train in g sch o o ls.

O n th e basis o f th e re co m m en d atio n s m ade by the T ra in in g F in an ce C o m m ittee, c o n s tru c tio n o f b u ild in g s12 fo r a n u m b er o f tra in in g schools f o r the N av y w as a p p ro v e d by th e G o v ern m en t o f In d ia . T hese w ere the T o rp ed o , A n ti-S u b m a rin e S ch o o l a n d N av ig atio n School a t C o ch in a n d th e E lectrical

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School a t Ja m n a g a r to be built a t a co st o f Rs. 95 lakhs an d the G unnery School at C ochin to be built a t a cost o f Rs. 80 lakhs. P lans fo r fu tu re developm ent o f the tra in in g schools— basic, advanced and technical—were also fo rm u lated an d finalised. C o n stru ctio n o f a sw im m ing p o o l a t B om bay for train in g in sw im m ing a n d life-saving was also approved. H M I S Tir was converted into a train in g frigate for the sea tra in in g o f cadets an d m idshipm en.

On Ja n u a ry 15, 1949, N aval H e a d q u a rte rs was reorganised into five main b ra n c h e s13, each headed by a Principal S taff Officer: S taff B ranch, Personnel B ranch, A d m in istratio n B ranch, M aterial B ranch an d N aval A viation Branch.

T h e D ire c to ra te o f T ra in in g form ed p a rt o f th e P ersonnel B ranch.

F ro m N ovem ber 1, 1952, the a p p o in tm e n t o f the C o m m o d o re Superinten d en t, In d ian N aval T ra in in g E stablishm ents, w ho supervised all training activities in the N avy’s tra in in g schools, was abolished and a full-fledged D irecto r o f N av al T rain in g was a p p o in ted to carry out, inter alia, all functions h ith e rto assigned to the C o m m o d o re S uperintendent.

T he th ree m a jo r naval statio n s in the country, Bom bay, C ochin a n d Visa-k h a p a tn a m , have played a significant role in the developm ent a n d evolution o f naval training.

U ntil th e o u tb re a k o f W orld W a r U, m ost o f the train in g establishm ents o f th e R IN were located in Bom bay.

T h e a d m in istra tio n o f the N aval B arracks, v arious schools, wireless stations a n d tra in in g establishm ents was a t th a t tim e the responsibility o f the C om m an d in g Officer, R IN D ep o t w hile the N aval D ock y ard was co n tro lled by the C a p ta in S u p erin ten d en t o f the D ockyard.

The role played by the naval establishm ents in C ochin, b o th in o p eratio n s an d train in g , was equally significant. T he defence req u irem en t o f In d ia as a w hole h ad been reviewed by the C hatfield C om m ittee by a b o u t 1935 a n d this C om m ittee h a d recom m ended the a d o p tio n o f a nine-year p lan fo r th e develo p m en t o f depots, train in g establishm ents an d local naval defence equipm ent. C o n seq u en t to the recom m en d atio n s o f this C om m ittee, it was decided to develop C ochin into a N av al Base. Im plem entation o f this decision was fu rth e r h asten ed on the eve o f W o rld W a r II and on A ugust 31, 1939, a few days before the o u tb re a k o f the W ar, a sm all naval base was established in Cochin u n d er C ap tain L . W adeson o f th e R oyal In d ia n N avy as th e N av al Officer-in-C harge, C ochin.

O riginally this establishm ent was called a L ocal N aval D efence (L N D ) Base a n d was m ade responsible fo r the o p eratio n a n d m an n in g o f th e local P o rt W ireless Signal Station. T here were ab o u t 20 officers an d 50 ratin g s for wireless co m m u n icatio n a n d the E x am in atio n Service C om m ittee. T h e r a tings were acco m m o d ated in a b a rra c k s in V en d u ru th y w hich was earlier used as a p o st office while m o st o f the officers were acco m m o d ated in C ochin C lub a t F o rt C ochin.

By the end o f 1940, 50 acres o f lan d extending fro m the M a la b a r G ate to th e O ld C inem a G ate on W illingdon Island w as acquired from the P o rt A u th o rity . C o n stru ctio n o f buildings an d a jetty an d the in stallatio n o f a

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crane w ere taken up. M eanw hile, w o rk on th e p ro ject o f establishing a large R oyal N aval L an d in g C ra ft Base a t C ochin also com m enced by 1942. Owing to paucity o f office acco m m o d atio n , th e g ro u n d floor o f M a la b a r H o te l’s E astern W ing was requisitioned fo r use as n aval offices aro u n d the m iddle o f 1941. D u rin g the sam e year, a Sea T ra n sp o rt O rganisation and E m b ark atio n H e a d q u a rte rs w ere also established a t C ochin. T he p e rm an en t naval base u n d e r c o n stru ctio n had been n am ed ‘V e n d u ru th y ’ an d th e b arrack s occupied by ratin g s a t F o r t C o ch in christen ed V en d u ru th y II. T his establishm ent was finally com m issioned as H M I S Venduruthy on Ju n e 24, 1943. A ll the naval offices, u nits an d ratin g s in V en d u ru th y I I m oved to this new establishm ent.

T he naval base by th e n h a d becom e a large establishm ent w ith app ro x im ately 5,000 ratings. A n a irp o rt w as co n stru cted in 1943 to m eet the op eratio n al req u irem en ts o f the 312 M U R A F (M ain ten an ce U n it o f the R oyal A ir Force), as also the req u irem en ts o f civil defence.

In Ju n e 1946, the req u irem en ts o f W o rld W ar I I having alread y been met, a decision w as tak en to decom m ission the R oyal N aval A ir Station C h in k ara (R N A S C h in k a ra ) a n d also to reduce H M I S Venduruthy to a considerable extent. T h e R o y al N aval E stab lish m en t com pleted the w inding u p process by a b o u t A u g u st 1946. T h e R oyal In d ia n N avy also sta rte d th e red u ctio n p r o cess by d isch arg in g civilian em ployees w ho h ad been engaged on a tem p o rary basis a n d w ith d raw in g p erso n n el from C o ch in to the h om e base a t Bom bay.

W ith In d ep en d en ce in A u g u st 1947, it w as decided to once again expand th e n av al base a t C ochin. As som e o f th e tra in in g schools had gone to P a k istan , c o rre sp o n d in g tra in in g facilities h ad to be created in India. C ochin was chosen as the a p p ro p ria te site fo r the p u rp o se. T he buildings vacated by R N A S

C hinkara w ere e a rm a rk e d fo r h o u sin g th e train in g schools as a tem p o rary m easu re. A new Signal S chool was set up a t C o ch in to w ard s the end o f 1946

in view o f H M I S T a lw a r 14 h av in g p aid off in A ugust 1946 in B om bay. In J a n u a ry 1947, C a p ta in M .H . St. L. N o tt, R IN , to o k over as N aval Officer-in -C h arg e, C o ch in . A fte r a d etailed review o f the facilities available a t C ochin a n d its p o te n tia l fo r play in g th e role o f a p rem ier tra in in g e stab lish m en t for th e In d ia n N avy, C a p ta in N o tt stro n g ly u rged th e G o v e rn m e n t to initiate m easu res fo r th e d e v elo p m en t a n d ex p an sio n o f th e n aval base. In ad d itio n to th ese schools, th e N av ig atio n an d D ire c tio n School, th e new N av al Seam a n sh ip S chool a n d a new G u n n e ry S chool w ere also set up.

Since th e m a jo rity o f In d ia n naval tra in in g schools w ere n o w located in H M I S Venduruthy, C o ch in , it w as decided to u p g ra d e the sta tu s o f th e naval a u th o rity a t C o ch in to th a t o f a S u p e rin ten d en t o f In d ia n N av al T rain in g E stab lish m en ts. In A u g u st 1948, th e C o m m o d o re-in -C h arg e, C ochin also bec a m e th e C o m m o d o re S u p e rin ten d en t o f T rain in g , R o y al In d ia n N avy.

U n d e r th e co m m a n d o f C o m m o d o re H .B . E llison, D .S .O ., R N , w ho assum ed c o m m a n d 15 o n A u g u st 1, 1948, th e C ochin base developed rapidly.

In 1951, a decision w as taken to b uild p e rm a n e n t buildings fo r all train in g sch o o ls a n d offices in th e N av al B ase. T his w o rk w as to be com pleted in fo u r o r five phases.

T R A IN IN G

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A naval base was first opened at V ishakhapatnam during W orld W a r II on D ecem ber 12, 1939. The office o f the Senior N aval Officer, V ishakhapatnam was then located in a sm all building next to the old H arb o u r D ispensary. The a re a u n d e r the adm inistrative co n tro j o f N aval O fficer-in-Charge, V ishakhap a tn a m th en extended fro m P o rt B aruve in th e N o rth to P o rt V adreva in the S outh.

T he necessity to have naval co n tro l on m erch an t shipping and to have an o p e ra tio n a l an d re p a ir naval base o n the E ast C o ast o f In d ia was the prim ary co n sid eratio n in com m issioning the naval base. As a result, H M IS Circars cam e into being as a refitting an d o p eratio n al establishm ent in A pril 1942.

Incidentally, it was in this year th a t the naval base a n d V ishakhapatnam h a rb o u r w ere bom bed by Jap an ese a irc ra ft b u t the dam age suffered was negligible.

T he en o rm o u s im petus o f the w ar effort necessitated the developm ent o f V ish ak h ap atn am as an advance base and accordingly the facilities a t this p o rt were extended to m eet th e entire needs o f the 14th A rm y in B urm a by the establishm ent o f a v ast a re a for sto rin g am m u n itio n . T his was know n in those days as the O rdnance E x p o rt T ra n sit D ep o t. T he sam e place is now know n as the N aval A rm am en t D ep o t an d is situated ab o u t six miles fro m the h a rbo u r. T here used to be a R oyal N aval Base as R oyal N aval E stablishm ent A m zari from 1943 to 1945 in the a re a n ow called the C .M .H . A rea. This was closed dow n d u rin g the first q u a rte r o f 1946. To m eet the needs o f naval and m e rc h a n t ships, an oil je tty was erected n ear the n o rth w estern arm o f the h arb o u r.

It w as in 1943 th a t the Suprem e C o m m an d established th is p o rt as an a d vance base for C oastal F orces. Sm all c ra ft belonging to th e allied navies used to assem ble a t V ish ak h ap atn am an d w o rk u p d u rin g th e m onsoon season w ith the ultim ate object o f proceeding to B urm a a ro u n d O ctober every year.

T his state o f affairs existed fro m early 1943 to the end o f th e W ar. T he N aval O fficer-in-C harge had an overall co n tro l o f all shipping o p e ra te d from this p o rt b u t the C oastal F orces h ad th eir ow n o p e ra tio n a l co m m ander who was know n as the C ap tain , C o astal Forces.

By the end o f 1945, th e need fo r C oastal F orces no longer existed an d the sm all c raft w hich h a d alread y assem bled alongside the naval je tty in H M IS

Circars were engaged fo r duties in the N avy, an d th e rest w ere disposed of.

H M I S Circars th e n becam e a sm all o p eratio n al an d m aintenance base c atering to the needs o f naval ships w hich visited the E ast C oast. T he establishm en t was extrem ely sm all a n d consisted o f ab o u t a dozen officers a n d 200

m en. Circars, how ever, was a sep arate entity u n d e r the ju risd ictio n o f the N av al O fficer-in-C harge, V ish ak h ap atn am . T his officer, w ho was o f the ra n k o f C ap tain , held the o p e ra tio n a l com m and o f all th e w aters betw een th e E ast C o ast o f India a n d the W est C oast o f B urm a. H is jurisdiction extended right fro m K an y ak u m ari alo n g th e E astern seab o ard to the tip o f Sum atra.

In d ia h a d to establish a B oys’ T rain in g E stablishm ent o f its ow n, the one existing before p a rtitio n a t K a rach i having been assigned to P akistan. Initially

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com m issioned as H M I S A kb a r a t B om bay, the B oys’ T ra in in g E stablishm ent w as subsequently m oved to H M I S Circars in V ish a k h a p a tn a m in D ecem ber 1947. It w as, how ever, agreed th a t th e site w as n o t suitable to house the Boys’

T ra in in g E stab lish m en t p erm an en tly fo r several reasons including proposals fo r utilisatio n o f th e area fo r fu tu re expan sio n o f the Scindia Shipyard (now H in d u sta n S hipyard) an d b asin g o f th e h e a d q u a rte rs o f a naval com m and on the E a st C o ast.

REFERENCES

1. C ollins (In stru c to r L ieutenant) D .J.E ., In d ian N avy, T he R oyal Indian N avy 1939-45, C om bined Inter-Services H istorical Section, India and P a k istan , 1964, p. 14.

2. Ib id ., p. 15.

3. R e p o rt on th e R oyal In d ia n N avy 1943-44, N aval H e a d q u a rte rs, India, p. 11, a n d N av al H e a d q u a rte rs (In d ia ) R ecords.

4. Ib id ., p . 13.

5. Ib id ., p . 12.

6. Ib id ., A ug. 1947-A ug. 1948, 1948, p. 1.

7. R o y al In d ia n N avy (1612-1947) A sso ciatio n — Jo u rn a l 1965-66, Excerpts fro m a d d ress by A d m iral Sir G eoffrey M iles, K .C .B ., K .C .S .I., 1966, pp.

20- 21.

8. R e p o rt on th e R o y al In d ia n N avy, A ug. 1947-A ug. 1948, op. cit., p. 7.

9. Ib id ., p p . 8-10.

10. Ib id ., A ug. 1948-A ug. 1949, 1949, p. 4.

11. Ib id ., p p . 15-16.

12. Ib id ., A u g . 1947-A ug. 1948, p. 21

13. Ib id ., A ug. 1948-A ug. 1949, p . 2.

14. Ib id ., 1946, 1947, p. 7.

15. Ib id ., A u g . 1948-A ug. 1949, p . 1.

8.

N aval A viation

I n N o v e m b e r 1910, the first ever a irc ra ft1 to tak e off from a ship’s deck was launched in C hesapeake Bay from th e sco u t cruiser U S S Birm ingham . The first ever lan d in g a t sea to o k place on an im provised flight deck built over a tu rre t on b o ard the a rm o u red cruiser U S S Pennsylvania on Ja n u a ry 18, 1911. In 1912, the navies o f the U nited States and th e U nited K in g d o m acq u ired th eir first a irc ra ft an d thus was ad d ed the th ird dim ension to o p e ra tions a t sea by the navies o f the w orld. This also signified the tra n sfe r o f the role o f reconnaissance picket a t sea fro m th e scout frigates a n d scout cruisers to the a ir-b o rn e ‘eyes o f the fleet’.

D u rin g the earlier years o f the 1914-18 W ar, w arships carrying seaplanes could only launch them from the deck an d recover th em by using cranes after they h a d lan d ed on the sea-surface. T hese were am p h ib ian a irc ra ft capable o f landing on w ater o r a runw ay. W ithin a sh o rt period o f th eir in tro d u ctio n , these a irc ra ft assum ed a n offensive role an d started carrying torpedoes a n d bom bs fo r use ag a in st enem y subm arines, ships a n d shore targets.

The first ship designed to launch an d lan d a irc ra ft a t sea, i.e., the first carrier, as this class o f ships is now know n, was the B ritish passenger liner, H M S Argus, w hich was converted fo r th e p urpose a n d equipped w ith the w o rld ’s first flush-deck, a flat deck w ith o u t an y su p erstru ctu re. T his in n o v atio n , in its w ake, b ro u g h t in the developm ent o f high-velocity, rapid-fire, high-angle a n ti-a irc raft n av al guns a n d som e new classes o f sm aller ships designed fo r the a n ti-a irc ra ft role, in a d d itio n to o th er roles such as destroyers a n d to rp e d o boats.

T he first W o rld W a r saw fairly extensive use o f ship-borne aircraft. These planes were used fo r a ir reconnaissance, carrying o u t a tta c k s on ships, su b m arines a n d shore bases a n d fo r p ro te c tio n o f fleets fro m air attack s.

T he intervening years betw een the tw o W orld W ars helped in realising the p o ten tial2 o f th e ‘floating airfields’ a n d provided a sp u rt in building a irc ra ft carriers by m any countries. T h e first such ship, designed a n d b u ilt as an a irc ra ft carrier, w as H M S H erm es w hich was launched in 1919. I t w as d u ring th e th ird decade o f this century, however, th a t the Japanese, B ritish and the A m ericans developed th e techniques o f all-w eath er lan d in g an d take-off o f c arrier-b o rn e a irc ra ft. T he ‘isla n d ’, i.e., th e su p erstru ctu re housing the bridge fo r n avigation an d com m and, was added. B attleships a n d cruisers also carried a irc ra ft w hich w ere used fo r scouting an d sp o ttin g — providing

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visual guidance to friendly sh ip s’ a rm a m e n t in b ringing th e ir fire to b ear on the enem y’s ships o r shore installations.

D u rin g the Second W orld W ar, a irc ra ft carriers played a significant role in th e o p e ratio n s a t sea aro u n d the globe. T he n e a r an n ih ilatio n o f the U .S.

naval ships, carriers a n d shore establishm ents in P earl H a rb o u r by the Japanese carrier-based ta sk force, the B attle o f th e C o ral Sea in w hich the o p p o sin g fleets fo u g h t w ith o u t sighting each o th e r on the surface, the first ever such o p eratio n a t sea, the B a ttle o f M idw ay, th e A llied carrier o p eratio n s ag ain st the Jap an ese h o m elan d a n d the B ritish o p eratio n s in the M ed iterran ean , as the E ncyclopaedia B ritannica p u t it, “ rein fo rced a convictio n alread y c le a r ... th a t m od ern sea pow er is a trid e n t o f air, surface and u n d ersea fo rc e s.”

F u rth e r d evelopm ent o f all-w eath er ta k e-o ff an d lan d in g facilities on a irc raft carriers c o n tin u ed a fte r W orld W a r I I a n d soon B ritish designers intro d u ced the angled deck an d th e steam c a ta p u lt and carriers built the w orld over h ad longer a n d stro n g e r flight-decks a n d consid erab ly larger num b er o f aircraft, fa ste r an d b e tte r-a rm ed , carried on b o ard .

T he grow ing realisatio n o f the p o te n tia l o f the a ir elem ent a t sea led the au th o rities in In d ia to d ep u te a R o y al In d ian N avy Officer, L t. Y .N . Singh—

In d ia ’s first naval p ilo t— to the U n ited K in g d o m in 1941 fo r basic train in g a n d la te r to C a n a d a w here he o b ta in e d his ‘w ings’ in 1944 before serving in escort c a rrie rs o f th e R oyal N avy u n til th e en d o f th e w ar.

B etw een V .J. D ay an d o u r In d ep en d en ce, how ever, th ere w as no a ir elem ent in th e R oyal In d ia n N avy. W ith the p a rtitio n 3 o f the su b co n tin en t an d the co n se q u e n t division o f th e R oyal In d ia n N avy, ro ughly a th ird o f its fleet alo n g w ith m an y sh o re estab lish m en ts in K a ra c h i w ent to P akistan.

L o rd L ouis M o u n tb a tte n , w ho h ad played a significant ro le in the B urm a O p eratio n s d u rin g W o rld W a r II a n d w ho w as th e first G o v ern o r-G en eral o f in d e p e n d e n t In d ia , su p p o rte d th e view4 o f th e G o v e rn m e n t o f In d ia th a t in o rd e r to en su re full freed o m o f th e seas fo r In d ian shipping in the w aters a ro u n d this co u n try , its n av al stre n g th sh o u ld be sufficiently built up and sh ip s m o d ern ised on th e basis o f th e em erging concepts o f th e w ar a t sea. In a c c o rd a n c e w ith an official directive received fo r th e p u rp o se fro m the G o v e rn m e n t a n d u n d e r th e d ire c tio n o f Vice A d m iral Sir E d w ard P arry , the th e n C o m m a n d e r-in -C h ie f o f th e R o y al In d ian N avy, N aval H ea d q u a rte rs d re w u p to a I O-year n av al ex p an sio n p lan late on 1947.

W hile p re p a rin g th e p la n , a d e q u a te w eightage was given to th e perception o f possible th re a ts fro m th e sea d u rin g th e n ex t tw o o r th ree decades. T he p la n p ro p o se d th e g rad u al ex p an sio n o f th e In d ia n N avy an d the developm e n t o f su itab le ta sk fo rces to b e fo rm e d a ro u n d tw o lig h t fleet carriers w ith sufficiently larg e s u p p o rt fleets co m p risin g light cruisers, destroyers and a n c illa ry s u p p o rt vessels. In deference to th e n a tio n a l policy, th e N avy was assig n ed a defensive ro le w ith a d e q u a te p ro v isio n fo r ra p id expansion an sw itch in g o v er to a n offensive role if called u p o n to w ear such a m an t e.

In M a rc h 1949, th e w artim e roles o f th e N avy w ere defined a s p ro tectio n o f

N A V A L A V IA TIO N

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o u r sea lanes an d denial o f th e sam e to the enem y, p ro tectio n o f m erchant convoys, provision o f assistance and facilities to the In d ian A rm y fo r com bined (am phibious) o p e ra tio n s an d offensive o p e ratio n s against the enem y’s ships, subm arines, ports, h a rb o u rs and installations.

W ith C ap tain H .C . R analds, O .B .E. o f the R N on loan service to the R IN a t its head, a D ire c to ra te o f N aval A v iatio n 5 was set up a t N aval H ead q u arters, New D elhi in 1948. Since the R N did n o t spare any naval a irc ra ft for tran sfer to the R IN at th a t tim e an d since no a ircraft c arrier was available, it was decided to look elsew here for the a irc ra ft and, when these were acquired, to set up a sh o re-b ased nucleus o f a naval aviation u n it with p rovision for fu tu re expansion. This was provided fo r in the Defence Budget fo r 1949-50. A t th a t tim e it was also decided th a t the first aircraft carrier w ould be acquired by 1955 w ith an o th er follow ing w ithin the next tw o years.

T he inventory o f naval a irc ra ft to be acquired by the N avy was expected to grow to 300 fighter, strike an d anti-su b m arin e aircraft by 1957. O ut o f these, 54 were to be c a rrier-b o rn e an d the rest used ashore as trainers, reserves and for shore-based o p eratio n s. T he p rim ary shore-based strike aircraft was going to be the Seafury FB 11 an d 40 a ircraft o f this type were to be a c q u ired by 1950.

B efore, how ever, an a tte m p t could be m ade to convert th e plans into reality, certain extraneous factors such as the Berlin blockade and the prolonged w ar in K orea p u t p aid to th e asp iratio n s o f the pioneers o f o u r flying branch.

T he changed in tern atio n al situ atio n also altered the o rd e r o f priorities o f the m ajor naval pow ers an d an elem ent o f u n certain ty was introduced to the availability o f ships an d a irc ra ft fo r the N avy’s A ir A rm .

D u rin g 1948, how ever, 13 officers were selected for prelim inary flying a p titu d e screening and rep o rted to th e IA F S tatio n a t Jo d h p u r in Jan u ary 1949 fo r training. O ut o f the 13 officers w ho u n d erto o k train in g a t Jo d h p u r, 10 were selected for train in g w ith the R N in the U .K . These were: L ieuten ants H .K . M u k h e rji, A .S. B athena, K . C o ckburn, M .M . B akshi, R .S. Sokhi, P .N . P a ra sh a r, T. C h ak rav erti, P.C . R ajkhow n, G .C . D ’C ruz an d B.D . Law.

T h e ten young fliers left fo r th e U .K . am id m uch fan fare a n d w ith great expectations. T hey began th e ir p relim in ary flying train in g a t R oyal N aval A ir Station, D o n ib ristle in S cotland an d seven o f them then proceeded to R A F S ta tio n Syerston fo r fu rth er train in g . Only five were, how ever, aw arded

‘w ings’ an d sent to R oyal N aval A ir S tatio n , L ossiem outh fo r o p eratio n al train in g — B akshi, C h ak rav erti an d Sokhi for specialising in anti-subm arine o p e ratio n s an d Law an d P a ra sh a r in fighter o p erations. A t Jo d h p u r these officers h ad flown Tiger M o th s, P rentices an d H arv ard s a t Syerston a n d a t L ossiem outh they were flying Fireflies a n d Seafires.

It was a t this stage th a t the N avy lost its first p ilo t. Bakshi died in a Firefly crash w hile on a low-level sortie.

By this tim e, only fo u r pilots were left— Sokhi, P a rash ar, C h a k ra v e rti and Law . O u t o f these, P a ra sh a r a n d Law were sent to th e 781 C om m unication S q u ad ro n an d Sokhi an d C h ak rav erti to th e 771 F leet R equirem ent S quadron at L ee-on-Solent fo r fu rth e r train in g .

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U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

T h e G o v ern m en t was aw are o f th e need fo r developing a stro n g Fleet A ir A rm a t th is tim e. A nd in th e m eeting o f th e D efence M in iste r’s C om m ittee (N avy) held on O ctober 26, 1949, th e need for a F leet A ir A rm was accepted an d th e p ro p o sal fo r its fo rm atio n was passed by the S tanding C om m ittee fo r P a rliam en t on N ovem ber 13, 1950. T h e p ro p o sa l envisaged train in g o f p ilots fo r th e F leet R equirem ent U n it initially in In d ia an d then in the U .K ., train in g o f N aval A v iatio n O bservers, A ir Traffic C o n tro l Officers and A ircraft E ngineering Officers a t th e R oyal N av y ’s aviation and technical institu tio n s, conversion o f su itab le ratings in to N aval A irm en (A ircraft H a n d lers), N aval A irm en (Safety E quipm ent), N aval A irm en (P h o to g rap h ers), A ircraft A rtificers, Electrical A rtificers, R a d io E lectrical A rtificers, A ircraft m ain ten an ce personnel and A irc ra ft stores personnel, a n d th e setting u p o f a School fo r A ircraft H an d lin g an d F ire F ighting a t C ochin.

A t this stage, how ever, th ere was a reap p raisal o f the n a tio n ’s finances leading to the im p o sitio n o f extrem e budg etary stringency w hich im m ediately affected th e N av y ’s p lan fo r acq u irin g an Air A rm . T he entire naval exp an sio n p ro g ram m e was slashed dow n to a m inim al rate o f developm ent. It w as decided to reduce the p ro p o sed fleet stren g th to a sm all ca rrie r force w ith th e p rim ary ta sk o f a n ti-su b m arin e w arfare to be developed aro u n d o nly one a irc ra ft crrrie r. F u rth e r red u ctio n in th e plans was im posed in S ep tem b er 1950 w hen the G o v ern m en t decided on th e d ev elo p m en t o f only a F leet R eq u irem en t U n it6 w ith 12 a ircraft. T hese were to be o f tw o types in stead o f fo u r as originally p lan n ed an d w ould consist o f th ree H aw ker F ury FB M a rk X I single-seater fighter a irc ra ft (capable o f tow ing sleeve targets) a n d th re e S h o rt S ealand A m p h ib ian s to g eth er w ith 100 p e r cent reserve a irc ra ft o f each type. T h e p la n also included the pro v isio n o f A ir Sea R escue facilities. T h e existing airfield a t C ochin was also to be resuscitated on an a u ste rity basis.

A t th e h eig h t o f th e F le e t A ir A rm ’s d ev elo p m en t enthusiasm , the a u th o rities, in th e ir efforts to en su re its ra p id expansion, h ad p re p a re d them selves to re c ru it civilian p ilo ts an d req u est th e A ir F o rc e to tran sfer som e volunteer p ilo ts to th e N avy. Tw o engineers from the R oyal In d ian A ir F o rc e h a d been sen t to th e U .K . fo r co n v ersio n a n d one w as atte n d in g a n advanced air en g in eerin g co u rse . L ie u te n a n t C o m m an d er G . D ouglas, w ho h ad distinguish ed h im se lf a n d w as d e c o ra te d d u rin g W o rld W a r II w ith the R oyal N a v y ’s F le e t A ir A rm , w as g ra n te d a p e rm a n e n t com m ission in th e Indian N av y . T h e stage w as th u s set fo r a n “ O v e rtu re ” in th e d evelopm ental p ro cess o f o u r n av al a v iatio n to develop into th e strid en t n o tes o f a crescendo w hen th e so u n d in g o f a p re m a tu re finale cau g h t th e naval p lanners unaw ares a n d th e N av y h a d to satisfy itself w ith a m ere F leet R eq u irem en t U nit.

T w enty-five E ngine R oom A rtificers7 w ere d ep u ted to the U n ited K ingdom in 1949 fo r th e A irc ra ft A rtificers’ C onversion C ourse and 24 successfully co m p leted th e first p a r t o f th e ir train in g a t th e R oyal N aval A ir S tatio n , A rb ro a th an d th en u n d erw en t a series o f p o s tg ra d u a te specialist courses and m anufactu re rs ’ co u rses on the types o f a irc ra ft th a t th e In d ian N avy w as to acquire.

N A V A L A V IA TIO N

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The p ro p o sa l fo r establishing a School o f A ircraft M aintenance a t Cochin was suspended in Septem ber 1950 as the A dm iralty had agreed to train o u r a irc ra ft m aintenance personnel a t the R N a ircraft m aintenance training establishm ent in the U nited K ingdom .

T h e sailors deputed to the U nited K ingdom in 1950 fo r a course in A ir Stores successfully com pleted th eir training an d retu rn ed to India by the end o f 1950 an d were em ployed a t C ochin fo r tak in g over surplus IA F

eq u ip m en t from the 312 M aintenance U n it, C ochin.

Flying over th e sea has alw ays been an exacting a n d d em anding task .

T h ere are no bridges, rail and ro a d crossings, n o r an y o th er landm arks to determ ine the a irc ra ft’s exact position. In bad visibility, the sea an d the sky merge to form a light grey bowl w ith no dividing lines o r references.

T rain in g for such flying requires dedication an d co n sta n t application and ca n n o t be taken for g ran ted . Every a ircraft arre st on the deck o f a carrier o r a helicopter touch-dow n on a sm all frigate in heavy seas is a con tro lled crash-landing executed w ith precision an d co n cen tratio n . H overing 40 feet above the w a te r w hilst searching for a subm arine on a d a rk night is equally d em anding.

W hile viewing these developm ents in the p ro p e r perspective a fte r the lapse o f over th ree decades, one ca n n o t help reco rd in g th a t the sudden c u rtailm en t o f th e naval budget in 1950 an d th e consequent delay in developing the th ird dim ension for the N avy was caused n o t so m uch by financial co n strain ts as the lack o f p ro p e r ap p reciatio n o f its p o ten tial fo r n atio n al defence.

T he co n trib u tio n it could have m ade to w ard s supplem enting the o perations th a t to o k place d u rin g th e succeeding decades, can be b etter ap p reciated today.

R E F E R E N C E S

1. E ncyclopaedia B ritannica, Volum e I, E ncylopaedia B ritannica L td., G re a t B ritain, 1768, pp. 448-449.

2. Ibid., pp. 449-450.

3. R e p o rt on the R oyal Indian N avy 1947-1948, N aval H ead q u arters, India, 1948, p. 1.

4. N aval H ea d q u a rte rs (India) R ecords.

5. R e p o rt on th e R oyal In d ian N avy 1948-49, op. cit., p. 1.

6. R e p o rt on th e Indian N avy, 1949-50, op. cit., p. 29.

7. Ibid., p. 28.

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Th e N av y's Feathered A ir W in g

U n d o u b t e d l y , efficient c o m m u n ic a tio n d irectly c o n trib u te s to success o f c o m b a t a t sea. G iven here is a b rie f historical b ack g ro u n d to an interesting aspect o f this line o f co m m u n icatio n .

T h e y o u th o f to d a y ’s tech n ically -o rien ted w orld m ight find it interesting to k n o w th a t d u rin g W orld W a r II, the R I N m ade extensive use o f pigeons fo r conveying m essages fro m ships to shore.

A lth o u g h the a rt o f tra in in g pigeons as m essage carriers h a d been developed cen tu ries ago, t he R I N actu ally in h erited it fro m th e R N where^pjgeons jia d _ been in use sj n ce the last decade o f the 19th century, T h e first ever m essage1 c a rrie d by the birds in the R N was in reference to a shell w hich h ad been accid en tally fired th ro u g h the stern o f a ship, N ettle.

T h e reafter, pigeons were being co n tin u o u sly u sed fo r c arry in g messages from ships in th e English C h an n el. By 1896, th e B ritish A d m iralty h a d decided to m ak e pigeon m ail a re g u la r fea tu re o f n av al co m m u n icatio n s an d intelligence.

On th e In d ia n scene, y o u n g B om an K a ik a sh ro o Shroff,2 a pigeon fancier o f B om bay, jo in e d the R IN on M a rc h 24, 1938 in th e R oyal In d ian N aval V o lu n teer R eserve (R IN V R ). Even before he jo in e d , well before th e o u tb reak o f th e W ar, Vice A d m ira l Sir H e rb e rt F itz h e rb e rt, th e th en F lag Officer C om m a n d in g th e R oyal In d ia n N avy, w as exam ining the po ssibility o f establishing a p ig eo n m ail service a t B o m b ay .3 L ie u te n a n t S h ro ff was ap p o in te d Officer-in -C h arg e, N av al C a rrie r P igeons, an d in d u e course started o p eratin g his pigeon m ail fro m an office lo cated n e a r L ion G ate, B om bay.

In th e b eginning, S h ro ff h a d o n ly 20 to 30 o f his ow n birds, w hich he pre- .

sen ted to th e N avy. H e used to tra in th e bird s by ta k in g them outside the h a r b o u r in a N av al lau n ch th ro u g h a m inesw ept channel an d release them fo r ex p e rim e n ta l p u rp o ses. O nce th e bird s p ro v ed useful in B om bay, the pigeon m ail service w as also established in V ish a k h a p a tn a m , C alcu tta, M adras, K a ra c h i a n d C ochin.

C a d e t D .R . M e h ta (w ho becam e A ssistan t C h ie f o f the N aval Staff, incharge o f N av al A v ia tio n b efo re h is re tire m e n t in D ecem b er 1972) rem inisces, ‘Visito rs to th e im p o sin g R I N O fficers’ M ess on A p o llo Street in B om bay during th e late su m m e r o f 1939 w o n d ered w hy a tall pigeon c o o p , o f all things, stood a d ja c e n t to th e flag staff on th e fro n t law n. TH eTeathered occu p an ts o f these c o o p s w ere in fact the F leet A ir A rm o f th e R IN , u n d e r the co m m an d o f Sub-

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L ieu ten an t B .K . S hroff o f the R IN V R , an expert on carrier-pigeons better know n th o se days as Pigeon Shroff.

‘O n the m orning o f Tuesday, Septem ber 5, 1939, IIM IS P a th a n (later sunk), w hich w as com m anded by L ieutenant H .J.D . H am ilton, R IN , cast off from the N aval Jetty a t the B om bay D o ck y ard an d sailed on her first w ar p atro l.

She was the fastest ship in the N avy, having been built during W orld W ar I as a ship, i.e., a naval vessel disguised as a m erchant ship to deceive an d destroy enemy subm arines. A m ong h er com plem ent o f officers was Sub-L ieuten a n t Shroff, w ith a precious crate co n tain in g the S hip’s ‘C arrier A ir G ro u p ’.

To assist him was N aval C adet D .R . M ehta, then aw aiting passage to England for train in g an d ab o u t to get his sea-legs on this, his first voyage. On clearing h a rb o u r, the single four-inch quick-firing gun was m anned and the little asdic set (subm arine detection eq uipm ent) com m enced pinging. T he idea o f carrying pigeons in patrol vessels an d local naval defence vessels, to avoid the breaking o f wireless silence a t sea, was being given its first trial in the R IN .

“ On clearing B om bay F lo atin g Light, Pathan launched her first flight o f tw o pigeons, each carrying a message capsule lovingly an d tenderly strapped to one leg by S ub-L ieutenant Shroff. They rose an d circled the ship an d then flew off hap p ily an d unerringly in the direction o f B om bay. Tw o hours later, cam e a wireless message from N aval H ea d q u a rte rs (then in B om bay an d h o u sed in a sm all tw o-storeyed building w hich stood w here Lion G ate now stands) th a t the flight h ad lan d ed safely. A second flight was launched, with equally successful results. W ith this, the com plem ent o f pigeons a b o a rd was exhausted. Pathan retu rn e d fro m h er p a tro l on Septem ber 10 a n d a debriefing o f the flight was h e ld .” 4

As reg ard s B om bay, the radius o f local naval defence vessels, d u rin g the w ar, used to be 40 to 50 miles, a distance very co m fo rtab ly an d swiftly negotiated by the birds. O ccasionally, the bird s even flew up to 100 m iles. Shroff m aintained th a t th e distance could be increased to th o u san d s o f miles, the only lim itation being the inability o f pigeons to fly by night.

S hroff o r his m en used to carry the pigeons in baskets a n d release them fro m the sh ip ’s deck. T o ensure th e safe arrival o f the m essage, tw o birds were released a t th e sam e tim e c arry in g the sam e m essage. The n u m b er o f messages lost was negligible b u t th e num b er o f birds lost w as h ig h er as they becam e p rey to haw ks an d o th er p re d a to ry birds.

S hroff was released fro m the service a t his ow n req u est w hen hostilities ended in A ugust 1945 a n d was m ade an h o n o ra ry L ieutenant C om m ander.

In 1941 he published a 66-page boo k ap tly titled India's O ther A ir Force. H e recalls th a t a t the height o f the R I N ’s pigeon activity, the to ta l num ber o f birds a t various n av al statio n s was a ro u n d 2,000. B irds h ad to be b red locally because if they w ere tak en from B om bay, they w ould, when released, fly back to B om bay an d n o t to the statio n to w hich they were assigned.

L ie u te n a n t C o m m an d er Shroff, w ho is now in his late seventies, resides a t P u n e. H e still waxes eloquence on his “ feathered frie n d s” . A n article,

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U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

“ P ostal D elivery System by P igeons— N ovel Schem e in A id o f Navy W ar F u n d ” ,5 published in th e T im es o f India on A pril 8, 1941, accorded due recognition to the services ren d e re d by o u r feath ered co m m u n icato rs. In a cerem ony, 250 carrier pigeons o f the R oyal In d ia n N avy were flown from K aly an to B om bay w ith copies o f a m essage fro m the G o v e rn o r o f B om bay (L ord B rab o u rn e) to the F lag Officer C o m m an d in g R oyal In d ian Navy. The am o u n t realised fro m the sale o f the m essages (R s. 4,000) was d o n ated to the

“ R oyal In d ian N avy W ar P u rp o ses F u n d ” . C om m em orative envelopes b earing specially designed postag e stam ps, duly ap p ro v ed by the D ire c to r G eneral o f P o sts a n d T elegraphs, were offered fo r sale to th e p u b lic fo r R s. 2 each.

The secret b eh in d th e hom in g techniques used by birds is still n o t u n d e rstood. W h eth er th ere is som e k in d o f co m p u terised m em ory, as is used in cruise missiles o r w h eth er th eir nav ig atio n al tech n iq u e is m agnetic, stellar, g rav itatio n al, inertial o r lu n a r is yet to be figured o u t by scientists. But S h ro ff feels th a t pig eo n s h o m e on to th eir perches by using la n d m a rk s and th a t is why, w hile they a re tra in e d as c arrier pigeons, the h o m in g range is increased in stages so th a t the details o f th e lan d m ark s are effectively recorded in th eir m em ory. A s he says, “ I f pigeons are flying fro m P u n e to Bom bay, they w o u ld n ’t m ak e a bee-line fo r B om bay because they c a n ’t see a place w hich is 120 m iles aw ay. B u t if im p o rta n t la n d m ark s such as bill ranges, tall trees, lakes, tow ers, buildings, etc., are alread y registered in th eir m inds, they w ould co v er th e d istan ce by flying fro m la n d m a rk to lan d m ark . Besides, if the la n d m a rk s a re registered in th e ir m em ory well, they w o u ld m ake good speed to o .”

In this co n te x t, a press release in th e Telegraph o f C alcu tta dated Septem ber 8, 1983 is o f interest. It states, “ T he c arrier pigeon is still h o ld in g its ow n in O rissa in th is age o f satellite c o m m u n icatio n . F o r 37 years these birds have p ro v id e d tro u b le -fre e service in a state fra g m e n te d by stream s, hills a n d p rim eval fo re sts.” 6 It is stated th a t o v e r a 1,000 pigeons have p ro v id ed ‘th e m ost re liab le’ service in all 13 d istric ts o f th e state. T h e service was first introduced o n a n e x p erim en tal basis in K o ra p u t d istric t. T h e success o f the O rissa pigeons h as a ttra c te d a tte n tio n to th is m ode o f c o m m u n icatio n in o th er p arts o f the c o u n try a n d th e G o v e rn m e n t o f G u ja ra t is p la n n in g to establish a service in th e S a u ra sh tra reg io n a fte r th e recen t floods w hich d isru p ted teleco m m u n icatio n links. I t is also sta te d th a t the M ad h y a P ra d e sh Police deployed pigeons d u rin g a n ti-d a c o it c a m p aig n s in th e C h am b al valley.

T o d a y ’s c o m m u n ic a to rs ensconced as they a re in th e ir signal centres m ain tain in g w ireless c o n ta c t w ith all c o rn ers o f th e globe w ith th e help o f high p o w er tra n sm itte rs, satellites, lasers a n d o th e r m o d ern facilities, m ight scoff a t th e use o f pigeons fo r c o m m u n icatio n a t barely ov er-th e-h o rizo n ranges a n d dism iss it as so m eth in g a n cien t, re d u n d a n t, o r obsolete b u t the zeal an d a p p lic a tio n w ith w h ich L ie u te n a n t S h ro ff an d o th e r pigeon o p erato rs h andled th eir w inged m essengers needs to be a p p re c ia te d in th e co n tex t o f the absence o f an y o th e r effective a n d reliab le sh ip -sh o re co m m u n icatio n facility d u rin g the th irties a n d th e early forties.

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R E F E R E N C E S

1. D ickson (C ap tain ), C h a tte rta n , W .W .F ., R oyal N avy, H M S M ercury, U .K .

2. N aval H ea d q u a rte rs (In d ia) R ecords.

3. S hroff (L ieutenant C om m ander) B .K ., R IN V R , R etd., m aterial from interview .

4. M eh ta (C om m odore) D .R ., I.N ., R etd ., p erso n al m aterial received.

5. Shroff (L ieu ten an t C om m ander) B .K ., R IN V R , R etd., In d ia ’s O ther A ir F orce, T hacker & C om pany L td ., B om bay, 1941; C lipping from the Times o f India d ated 8 A pril 1941.

6. The T elegraph, C alcu tta, Septem ber 8, 1983.

1 0 .

H ydrography

T h e p e o p l e o f the p re-A ry an e ra in India* used to n avigate the sea an d had tra d e relatio n s w ith ad ja c e n t co u n tries, had c h a rts acco rd in g to b o th the P a u ra n ic system a n d th e astro n o m ers. T he n avigators needed c h a rts for sailing the sh o rtest a n d best possible way in th e sh o rtest tim e.

P ro b in g 2 un k n o w n d ep th s has been the m ission o f h y d ro g ra p h e rs fo r centuries, so th a t every h id d e n d an g er beneath the surface o f the sea, could be revealed a n d n av ig atio n m ade safer fo r m arin ers o f th e w orld. A ll the in fo rm atio n so lab o rio u sly an d system atically collected by th e surveyor is co n tin u o u sly pu b lish ed in th e form o f n av ig atio n al c h a rts a n d n au tical p u b licatio n s th a t a re av ailab le fo r m arin ers to use, so th a t they m ay sail the seas w ith confidence an d tru st.

M a ritim e c h a rts a re useful n o t only fo r n av ig atio n b u t also fo r exploration o f m arin e reso u rces a n d to study o cean o g rap h ic p ro p erties. T h e early exp lo re rs 3 e m b ark ed on a c h a rtin g p ro g ra m m e extending from the R ed Sea to th e P e rsia n G ulf, a lo n g the A rab ian coast, th e In d ian su b co n tin en t, right u p to the C h in a Sea. D u rin g th e 17th, 18th a n d 19th centuries, th ese a c tivities w ere u n d e rta k e n by th e E a st In d ia C om pany. T h e sea cap tain s o f the c o m p a n y w ith th e ir carefu l o b serv atio n s p ro v id ed v aluable in fo rm atio n for th e c o n s tru c tio n o f th e early c h a rts. T hese c h a rts to g eth er w ith Sailing D irectio n s w ere co n d en sed in to “ R u les o f o u r E a s t In d ia C o m p a n y ” by Jo h n D avis, th e fam o u s e x p lo re r a n d n a v ig a to r. H o w ev er, C ap tain Jo h n R itchie was the first H e a d o f th e M a rin e Survey D e p a rtm e n t. H e was ap p o in ted H y d ro g ra-p h e r to th e E a st In d ia C o m p a n y in 1770. H e surveyed the m o u th o f H ooghly R iv er, e x p lo re d th e C o a s t o f B engal a n d B u rm a a n d m ade som e investigatio n s in th e A n d a m a n a n d N ic o b a r Islands. H ow ever, cred it fo r the first system a tic surveys o f th e A n d a m a n Isla n d s in th e B ay o f Bengal goes to L ieu ten an t A rc h ib a ld B lair. I t is in reco g n itio n o f his excellent w o rk th a t the principal p o r t o f th e Islan d s is n a m e d a fte r him .

T h e E a st In d ia C o m p a n y to o k an active in terest in c h artin g the ocean from th e early 17th cen tu ry a n d e n su re d a q u ality c o n tro l in the p re p a ra tio n o f n a u tic a l c h a rts. T h e in te re st ta k e n by the C o m p an y is evident fro m th e instru c tio n s issued to C a p ta in J o h n M cC lu er, one o f th e pioneers, w hen he, in 1787, com m en ced system atic surveys o f th e w est c o a st o f In d ia. It said

“ L et w h at is d o n e be d o n e com pletely an d n o th in g left u n d eterm in ed in this space; if an y d o u b t arises, let o b serv atio n s be rep eated in such p a rts , th a t an

H Y D R O G R A PH Y

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im plicit confidence m ay be placed in th e w o rk when finished.” 4 The surveys were started a t B om bay an d o p eratio n s extended southw ard as far as C ape C o m o rin ; n o rth w a rd , these were extended to the G u lf o f C am bay. M cC luer also m ade o n e o f the earliest plans o f B om bay H a rb o u r. The accuracy w ith w hich he surveyed the co ast o f In d ia, entitled his w ork to be regarded as am o n g st th e best ch a rtin g o p eratio n s u n d e rta k e n in these w aters.

C a p ta in D an iel R oss know n as th e F a th e r o f Indian Surveys was indeed responsible fo r in tro d u cin g scientific m ethods o f surveying. He based his survey w o rk on trig o n o m etric c o n tro l. H is tria n g u la tio n was often verified by astro n o m ical o bservation. T hese surveys, th o u g h m ade m ore th an a century a n d a h a lf ago, w ith inferior and prim itive instrum ents, using tiny ships an d a t a tim e w hen the science o f h y d ro g rap h y was in its infancy, show great accuracy an d a tte n tio n to details.

H ow ever, from 1862 onw ards, the Surveying Service and the D ep artm en t w ent th ro u g h a p erio d o f inactivity u n til 1 874, when C ap tain D un d as T aylor assum ed the p o st o f S u p erin ten d en t o f Indian M arin e Survey D e p artm en t.

U n d er T a y lo r’s charge, a carto g rap h ic office was established a t C alcu tta w here co m p ilatio n o f ch arts, Sailing D irections a n d L ight Lists w as u n d ertak en .

This form ed th e com m encem ent o f organised c h a rt p ro d u ctio n . T he D e p a rtm ent, during the course o f the last c entury, ch arted the w aters o f the A rabian Sea a n d the Bay o f Bengal extending fro m th e R ed Sea to the Straits o f M alacca.

In the early centuries sailing vessels w ere used fo r co n d u ctin g surveys. T he change from sail to steam an d fro m w ood to steel m ade an im m ense difference in the speed and capabilities o f survey ships. The m ost fam ous nam e in the an n als o f In d ian h y d ro g rap h ic survey is th a t o f the sh ip 5 Investigator, the first 450-ton sailing vessel. Investigator was com m anded by C ap tain D aniel R oss a n d was em ployed in the C h in a Sea u n til she was p aid off in 1828. T he second Investigator was a w ooden p ad d le steam er w ith a 581-to n displacem ent, b u ilt in the B om bay D o ck y ard in 1881. T h e th ird ship to b ear the nam e was a steel single-screw ship com m issioned in 1907. She w as em ployed co n tin u o u sly as a survey vessel until 1932 w hen she w as replaced by a fo u rth ship o f th e sam e nam e, a con v erted cable-laving vessel, th e P atrick Stewart.

O n S eptem ber 3, 1939 w hen w ar was d eclared a g ain t G erm any, one 12-p o u n d er gun, th ree d e p th ch arg e shoots, one P N 123 A sdic D om e an d a com pass were fitted on b o a rd th e Investigator a t the B om bay D ockyard. In reco rd tim e, the ship was p a in te d d a rk grey, co m p leted h er gun, engine an d asdic trials, a n d proceeded to C alcu tta in th e th ird degree o f readiness. O n arriv al in C alc u tta o n S eptem ber 17, 1939, the ship was placed u n d e r the o rd ers o f th e N aval O fficer-in-C harge, C alcu tta as an an ti-su b m arin e vessel an d was actively engaged in th e W ar thereafter.

T he h isto ry o f n au tical c a rto g rap h y , w hose develo p m en t kept pace w ith th a t o f h y d ro g rap h ic survey technology, can be b ro ad ly divided into fo u r stages:6 the first covered the d ep ictio n o f em erging coastlines including earlier m aps, ch arts a n d p lan s by th e A rab s, P ortuguese, D u tc h an d the B ritish

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U N D ER T W O EN SIG N S

E ast In d ia C om pany follow ed by a c h a rtin g o f th e o ceans by the B ritish East In d ia C o m p an y an d its h y d ro g ra p h ic o rg an isatio n betw een 1742 an d 1861.

T he M a rin e Survey o f In d ia co n tin u e d th e c h a rtin g activities fro m 1874 to 1947; survey com m itm ents7 o f K h o r A b d u lla a n d D iego G a rc ia w ere u n d e rtaken in 1941-42 a n d surveys o f Salaya H a rb o u r, P ath fin d er Inlet, Rozi, Sikka, K a ri C reek, C o x ’s B azar, V ersova C reek, M a n o ri C reek an d M anda-pam A n chorage were com pleted in 1943. T h e reafter, an d until the end o f the W ar, m arine survey progressively reduced u n til it v irtually faded out.

T he p o st-In d ep en d en ce p erio d saw the co n so lid atio n o f h y d ro g rap h ic activities an d the M arin e Survey D e p a rtm e n t faced the im p o rta n t task o f co m plete re o rien tatio n , reo rg an isatio n a n d reco n stru c tio n . T h o u g h it consisted o f a sm all fleet an d lim ited facilities an d m anpow er, it com pleted the survey o f O rm a ra E a st Bay, B om bay N aval A n chorage, S acram ento S hoal a n d the C ochin N aval Jetty d u rin g 1947-48. I t w as a t this stage th a t the req u irem en t fo r a n in d ep en d en t Survey O rg an isatio n was co nsidered im perative to ch art th e v ast In d ian P eninsula an d hence a full-fledged H y d ro g ra p h ic D e p a rtm e n t fo r the In d ian N avy w as envisaged in 1948 alo n g w ith the expansion and re o rg an isatio n o f th e N avy.

T h e case fo r f u rth e r e x p a n sio n 8 o f M arin e S urv ey in g w as tak en up in 1949

w hich b ro u g h t o u t th e follow ing facts: “ A t presen t, In d ia has only one very o ld survey vessel w hich will be replaced in the n e a r fu tu re by a frig ate c o n v erted fo r the p u rp o se . She is assisted in h e r surveying d u ties by one Seaw ard D efen ce M o to r L au n ch (S D M L ). T hese vessels a re to tally in ad eq u ate to co p e w ith th e ra p id ly in creasin g d em an d s n o w being received largely due to the d ev e lo p m e n t o f th e v ario u s p o rts on the C o a st o f In d ia .” F u rth e rm o re , it w as p ro p o se d th a t In d ia sh o u ld have h e r ow n h y d ro g ra p h ic office th a t w o u ld eventually b e c a p ab le o f p ro d u c in g all the c h a rts o f th e In d ian C oast a n d ce rta in special c h a rts such as L a ttic C h arts, B o m b ard m en t B ases, F leet A n c h o rag es, In s tru c tio n a l C h a rts f o r tra in in g a n d v ario u s d ia g ram m atic c h a rts d esigned to fa c ilita te th e so lu tio n o f n a v ig atio n al an d surveying p r o blem s.

In A p ril 1949, C o m m a n d e r J. C ursetji (later A dm iral and C h ief o f the N a v a l Staff, 1976-1979) w as d ep u ted to th e U n ited K in g d o m to p lan an d rep o r t9 u p o n th e e sta b lish m e n t o f a H y d ro g ra p h ic Office in In d ia . H e xeturned to In d ia in early 1950 w ith th e necessary d a ta , a n d a fte r visiting som e estab lishm ents in In d ia , su b m itted his re p o rt in A u g u st 1950 to N aval H e a d q u a rte rs on th e p la n n in g o f th e H y d ro g ra p h ic Office. H e was the first In d ian S u rv ey o r la te r to becom e S u rv ey o r-in -C h arg e, M arin e Survey o f In d ia from 1951 to 1953. H e w as also th e first to h o ld th e a p p o in tm e n t o f C h ie f H y d ro -

g ra p h e r to th e G o v e rn m e n t o f In d ia fro m 1955-1957.

M eanw hile, the surveys9 o f B h atk al, M alp e, M an g a lo re an d K a n d la Bar w ere co m p leted in 1949. H ow ever, a d e ta ile d survey o f K a n d la an d its a p p ro a c h e s co m m en ced o n O cto b er 5, 1949. T h e H y d ro g ra p h ic Survey o f K a n d la a n d its a p p ro a c h e s w as c a rrie d o u t sim u ltan eo u sly w ith a n u m b er o f surveys a n d investigation in th e sam e are a as p a r t o f th e p ro je c t o f develop

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m en t o f K a n d la as a m ajo r p o rt. F ro m the h y d ro g rap h ic p o in t o f view the m ost im p o rta n t o f these o th er surveys were G eodetic a n d T opographic su rvey carried o u t by different b ranches o f the Survey o f In d ia.

T he M arin e Survey o f In d ia office a tD u n m o re H ouse, C oonoor, Nilgiris, w here on com pletion o f survey season, p relim in ary w ork relating to ch art p ro d u c tio n is generally u n d ertak en , was also re a c tiv ated 10 in A pril 1950 and the w ork on the draw ing o f th ree fair sheets o f K an d la A rea was com pleted by S eptem ber 1950. T he com pleted F a ir Sheets an d the d a ta file were sent to to the Survey o f In d ia P rin tin g Office at D e h ra D un where they were p h o to g rap h ed an d p rin ted . T he K a n d la P o rt A u th o rities and N aval ships were p r o vided w ith these ch arts. T he F a ir Sheets and the T rian g u latio n D a ta File were despatched to the B ritish A d m iralty w here w ork had already com m enced on the p ro d u ctio n o f a new c h a rt b ased upo n the surveys carried o u t by the M arin e Survey o f India. In ad d itio n , survey w ork on O rm ara E ast Bay (in cluding H a rm o n ic Tidal Analysis), B om bay N aval A nchorage along w ith the re p o rt on survey, S acram ento Shoal, C ochin N aval Jetty, B hatkal, M alpe and M an g alo re were also com pleted at C o o n o o r and despatched to the B ritish A d m iralty d u rin g 1945-50; d u rin g this period the B ritish A dm iralty published c h a rts o f P alk S trait and the G u lf o f M a n n a r, P alk Bay, K arn ap h u li R iver an d its ap p ro ach es, R iver H ooghly an d S agar R o a d s to C alcu tta, D h a m ra R iv er, K o ro n g e Island to W hite P o in t, G u lf o f M a rta b a n , K yaukpyu h a rb o u r to C h ed u b a S trait, C heduba S trait to R am ree h a rb o u r, S trait B anka and G a sp e r S trait an d P o in t P e d ro to D elft Islan d . India at this stage was com pletely d ependent upon the B ritish A d m iralty fo r her c h a rt p ro d u ctio n .

K eeping in view the task th a t lay ah ead fo r revision o f surveys o f the e n tire In d ian coastline, m easuring app ro x im ately 6000 nautical miles, several m ajo r a n d m inor p o rts an d to m eet the u rg en t requirem ent o f shipping, G o v ern m en t approved in principle, the setting up o f a H y d ro g rap h ic Office at D eh ra D u n in 1949. The selection o f this site was m ade w ith the view, th a t it rem ain in close proxim ity to the M arin e Survey o f In d ia. T h o u g h statio n ed aw ay fro m N ew D elhi, the C h ie f H y d ro g ra p h e r was placed u n d e r th e then D eputy C h ief o f the N av al Staff in N aval H ea d q u a rte rs to ensure b etter co o rd in atio n w ith the M inistries o f D efence, T ra n sp o rt a n d the P lan n in g Com m ission for catering to defence and civil requirem ents. H ow ever, w hen a Senior Surveyor, C a p tain H ennessey, w ho w as loaned fro m the R oyal N avy, arrived in India, he set up his office at N aval H e a d q u a rte rs. Sim ultaneously, H M I S K u k r i,11 a R iver Class frigate was con v erted into a m ajor survey ship a n d was com m issioned on O cto b er 3 1 ,1 9 5 0 as I N S Investigator. T his w as the fifth successive Investigator in the M arine Survey o f In d ia since 1828. S u tlej an d Jum na, tw o B ittern class sloops were also con v erted into survey ships after W orld W ar II.

T he survey o f H a n sth a l C reek a n d N av lak h i w hich com m enced in N ovem b er 1950 w as also com pleted alo n g w ith the a re a eastw ard u p to N avlakhi p o rt. T he survey o f the G u lf o f K u tch n o rth -eastw ard o f L at 2 2 ' 4 7 ' N L ong 70' 01" E including th e p o rts o f K a n d la a n d N av lak h i was th u s com pleted by D ecem ber 1950.

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U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

As the num ber o f personnel fell well sh o rt o f req u irem en ts in 1947, it becam e necessary to obtain on loan fro m th e U n ited K ingdom som e surveying officers w ith h y d ro g rap h ic experience to enable th e In d ian N avy to establish its h y d ro g rap h ic office in India. These senior surveying officers n o t only filled the vacuum in sea billets such as com m anding surveying ships, b u t guided th e staff in setting up the office a t D e h ra D u n .

M eanw hile L ieu ten an t C o m m an d er S. R a je n d ra (later C o m m o d o re) who had been deputed to the U .K . fo r six m onths train in g at the H y drographic Office a n d the R o y al N avy S urveying Ships, com pleted his tra in in g and retu rn e d to In d ia. A few ju n io r officers u n d e rw e n t sim ilar train in g later. In ad d itio n , tw o batches, consisting o f th ree Survey R ecorders each, were also sent to u ndergo train in g b o th ash o re an d on b o a rd ships. T he surveying cadre h ad only tw elve officers on its roll by D ecem ber 1950.

T o train perso n n el in th e surveying discipline in In d ia, a beginning was m ade by d eputing them fro m the general service to surveying ships w here they could learn w hilst on jo b . In o rd e r to a tta in proficiency in hydrography, how ever, an extensive, system atic a n d p lan n ed train in g in various facets o f th e subjects was essential. A h y d ro g ra p h ic tra in in g u n it w as th u s set up at N aval C h a rt D e p o t, B o m b ay u n d e r th e ad m in istrativ e c o n tro l o f the C om -

m o d o re-in -C h arg e, B om bay. T his u n it was p rim arily m ean t fo r train in g ju n io r officers an d sailors as well as a few civilians o f h y d ro g rap h ic o rg an isatio n s o f m a ritim e states a n d p o rts o f In d ia.

P e rso n n e l engaged on survey duties inv ariab ly spend nearly eight m onths o f th e y e a r a t sea, w o rk in g o n m a n y o ccasions in u n h a b ita b le environm ents fo r lo n g p erio d s. T h eirs is a n o n -g la m o ro u s specialisation req u irin g co n sid erab le persev eren ce a n d d e d icatio n in a n u n o b tru siv e m anner. T he final results o f th e ir en d e a v o u rs e n su re th a t th o se g o in g to sea— in th e fighting service as well as in th e m e rcan tile m a rin e — alw ays have safe passage a n d a re w arned o f h a z a rd s a n d d a n g e rs w h ere th e se exist. A s tim e goes on, the responsibilities o f su rv ey o rs will in crease w ith th e d ev elo p in g em phasis on o cean o g rap h ic science.

R E F E R E N C E S

1. P ra k a sh S atya, E v o lu tio n o f th e M a rin e C a rto g ra p h y o f In d ia , P a rt I, N av al H y d ro g ra p h ic Office, D e h ra D u n , In d ia , p . 2.

2 . T h e H y d ro g ra p h ic D e p a rtm e n t o f th e In d ia n N avy, 1977, N aval H ydrog ra p h ic Office, D e h ra D u n , In d ia , pp. 1-2.

3. Ib id ., p . 11 a n d N av al H y d ro g ra p h ic D e p a rtm e n t, In d ia , 1970, pp. 4-5.

4. Ib id ., p p . 6 a n d 7.

5. D ire c to ra te o f H y d ro g ra p h y , D e h ra D u n , In d ia , m aterial received, 1982, p. 2.

6. Ib id ., p. 3.

7. Ib id ., p. 4.

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8. Ibid., pp. 6-8 a n d N aval H e a d q u a rte rs (India) R ecords.

9. D ire c to ra te o f H y d ro g rap h y , op. cit., p. 5, an d R ep o rt on the Indian N avy A u g u st 1949 to D ecem ber 1950, N aval H ead q u arters, India, 1950, p p . 29-31.

10. Ib id ., pp. 11 a n d 12 and 14 to 17, and pp. 30-31.

11. [bid., pp. 2 and 6.

1 1 .

Th e M e d ico s a t Sea

W h e n t h e In d ia n M a rin e Service was created in 16 12 ,1 m edical needs o f officers an d sailors w ere m et by p ractitio n e rs th en classified as “ chirurgeon, tw oe a n d a b a rb e r” — th e 17th cen tu ry b arb er-su rg eo n —w ho was p a r t o f the sh ip ’s com pany. T hese ‘m edicos’, void o f an y m ilitary sta tu s o r ra n k , to o k care o f the m edical needs n o t only o f s h ip ’s perso n n el b u t also o f those sta tio n ed ash o re. They were, how ever, relieved o f th e la tte r duties in 1745

w hen th e A rm y organised a m edical set-u p a sh o re C h iru rg eo n s w ere soon im p a rte d respectability by th e ir b eing redesignated as sh ip s’ surgeons. T h e ir re c ru itm e n t w as generally fro m local shore m edical services. In due c o u rse the la tte r were o rg an ised into th ree P residency M edical Services,2 one each fo r th e Presidencies o f B om bay, Bengal a n d M adras. These th re e p a ra lle l m edical o rg a n isa tio n s w ere am algam ated in 1896 and the fam o u s In d ian M edical Service (IM S ) cam e in to being. M edicos who were in the IM S held co m m issio n s as c o m b a ta n t officers in ad d itio n to th eir w a rran t as a ssista n t su rg eo n s.

T o m eet th e g row ing needs o f th e B ritish a n d In d ia n tro o p s in In d ia , the In d ia n M ed ical D e p a rtm e n t— B ritish C a d re 2 (IM D -B C ) was later created and c o m p rise d p o o r B ritish an d A n g lo -In d ia n boys w ho w ere given m edical tra in ing u p to th e licen tiate level. T h e IM S a n d th e IM D -B C met the m edical req u ire m e n ts o f th e N avy a t th a t tim e — IM S officers sitting p retty o nshore w ith th e p o o r IM D -B C officers ro u g h in g it o u t a t sea!

E v ery sh ip o f th e R IM fro m 1892 o n w ard s carried an A ssistant Surgeon o f th e IM D -B C . T hese A ssistan t S urgeons h a d w a rra n t ra n k o f the A rm y, wore A rm y u n ifo rm , received A rm y rates o f p ay an d allow ances and drew their sto res fro m A rm y so u rces. T h ey w ere seconded to th e R IM fo r a p erio d o f tw o to th re e years. O n e o f th e ships, th e Investigatory in ad d itio n , carried on b o a rd an IM S officer w ho w as also a m arin e biologist and hence was called th e S u rg eo n N a tu ra list.

A t th e o u tb re a k o f W o rld W a r I, the R IM 3 sta rte d w orking in conjunction w ith th e R N w h ich h a d ta k e n over c o n tro l o f th e R IM by th en . D u rin g the W ar, e a c h o f th e large sh ip s c a rrie d a n A ssistan t Surgeon o f the IM D -B C .

T h re e ships, th e D ufferin, th e N orthbrooke a n d th e H ardinge, also h ad a m edical officer e a c h — e ith e r fro m th e In d ia n M edical Service (IM S) o r the Royal N av al V o lu n te e r R eserve (R N V R ).

W ith W o rld W a r I I th e re w as an acu te sh o rtag e o f personnel an d because

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o f its ow n needs, the A rm y could n o t m eet the requirem ent o f the N avy and the seco n d m en t o f A ssistan t Surgeons o f the IM D was discontinued. Instead, E m ergency C om m ission Officers4 o f the IM S were selected from volunteers for secondm ent to the N avy. This continued fo r ab o u t a year fro m the later h a lf o f 1942. Initially the set-up ap p eared to be satisfactory but later the q u ality and num b er o f volunteers for the N avy began to fall. At the same tim e th ere w as trem en d o u s expansion in the N avy and, therefore, the need was felt fo r a full-fledged m edical b ran ch for this Service. T he D irector G eneral o f the IM S a p p ro a c h e d the G ov ern m en t and obtained sanction for d irect recru itm en t o f d o cto rs into the N avy. In 1943 several civilian doctors were granted com m ission in the N avy to fo rm the R oyal Indian N avy M edical branch. T his gave th e N avy, M edical Officers w ho were keen to serve in the N avy and also p ro v id ed a w ider range o f selection. In ad d itio n to direct recru itm en t, suitable A rm y M edical Officers and officers o f the In d ian M edical Service continued to be selected fo r secondm ent to the N avy if they v olunteered.

In 1944, the Secretary o f State app ro v ed the fo rm a tio n o f a M edical B ran ch 4 o f the R oyal In d ian N avy V olunteer R eserve (R IN V R ). This consisted o f officers o f the IM S and A rm y M edical Officers w ho had been seconded for service in the R IN . D u rin g th eir service in th e N avy, the regular officers were com m issioned in the R IN and th e Em ergency C om m ission officers in the R IN V R . Som e h o n o ra ry co n su ltan ts w ere also com m issioned in the R IN V R .

N aval M edical Officers o f the R IN an d the R IN V R were fo r the first time given naval ran k s equivalent to th eir A rm y o r IM S entitlem ents. They were required to w ear the u niform o f th e N avy w ith a distinctive scarlet ban d in th eir badges o f ran k and were subject to the R oyal In d ia n N avy D iscipline Act.

A system o f ap p o in tin g specialists in v arious b ranches o f m edicine and surgery d id n o t exist in the R IN a t th a t tim e n o r was the system o f th e graded specialists recognised. T h e re w ere m any .Medical Officers o f the status o f specialists, o r a t least g rad ed specialists, in m edicine, surgery, public health, o p h th alm o lo g y a n d p ath o lo g y but they were denied this privilege. T o obtain expert opin io n an d treatm en t, th e R IN a p p o in ted nine co n su ltan ts from the leading specialists in B om bay who were given h o n o ra ry naval ra n k s an d were attach ed to the R oyal Indian N avy H o sp ital a t B om bay. T hese consultants gave approxim ately th ree m ornings a w eek to the N avy.

A N av al W ing o f the W o m en ’s A uxiliary C o rp s (In d ia)4 was fo rm ed on F e b ru ary 12,1944 an d was ren am ed the W o m en ’s R oyal In d ia n N aval Service (W R IN S ) o n M a rc h 2, 1945. T h e N aval S taff Surgeon looked after the p ersonnel based in B om bay w hich did n o t include wom en em ployees. The first lady d o c to r to be recru ited to m eet the m edical req u irem en ts o f the W R IN S

was D r. (M iss) D aisy P ereira w ho was com m issioned in the N avy on S eptem ber 4, 1944 in the ra n k o f Surgeon L ieu ten an t an d was ap p o in ted to H M IS

Dalhousie a t B om bay. M em bers o f th e W R IN S outside B om bay were a tte n d

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U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

ed to by the M edical Officers o f th e estab lish m en ts concerned and special arran g em en ts w ere m ade fo r them in th e sickbays.

T h e re were n o n u rsin g sisters in th e N av y u n til th e R oyal In d ian Navy H o sp ita l5 was opened in A pril 1943 a t Sewri, B om bay. Seven N ursing Officers were then enlisted. Tw o years la te r the n u m b er h ad risen to 17. T hey were recru ited directly by the M edical O fficer-in-C harge o f th e R IN H ospital from qualified civilian nurses. T h e ir pay and co n d itio n s o f service were sim ilar to those o f the In d ian M ilitary N u rsin g Service b u t different in th a t they were n o t com m issioned N u rsin g Officers. All the n u rsin g officers o f the N avy were released when the R IN H o sp ital at Sewri was closed d ow n in 1946.

T h e developm ent o f th e R IN M edical Service6 c o n tin u ed w ith the rapid ex p an sio n o f the N avy d u rin g W o rld W ar II and by the end o f the W ar, it h a d exp an d ed fro m ju s t one M a jo r a t th e o u tb re a k o f hostilities in 1939

to 100 M edical Officers including one Surgeon C ap tain a n d th ree Surgeon C o m m an d ers.

W ith th e passage o f tim e, the IM S (fro m w hich M edical Officers were seconded to the R IN fro m 1942 o n w ard s) becam e the In d ia n A rm y M edical C o rp s (IA M C ) in 1949. It, how ever, co n tin u e d to follow the old p a tte rn o f seconding its M edical Officers to th e In d ia n N av y ’s M edical branch.

T he co m p lem en t o f v ario u s sickbays, a sh o re a n d afloat, w as based on the a c tu a l w o rk lo a d a n d the ra n k stru c tu re o f M edical Officers at th e tim e and w as n o t rela te d to the b ed -stre n g th as w as the case in th e A rm y. W ith the inte g ratio n o f the A rm ed F o rces M edical Service in 1949, the staffing p atte rn in th e N avy w as revised a n d w as b ro u g h t alm o st o n p a r w ith the one followed in th e A rm y.

T his w as g o o d p ro g re ss indeed b u t th e reju v en atio n o f th e N aval M edical b ra n c h a n d th e cognisance o f th e im p o rta n c e o f the ro le o f the ‘D o c to r at S ea’ as a n im p o rta n t m em b er o f a sh ip ’s c o m p an y can be said to have begun w ith th e a p p o in tm e n t o f th e D ire c to r o f M edical Services in the N avy in J a n u ary 1949 in th e ra n k o f S urgeon C a p ta in .

T h e M edical Services o f the N avy k e p t p ace b o th w ith th e expansion in the N a v y a n d th e in te g ra tio n o f th e A rm e d F o rces M edical Services and a n u m b er o f J u n io r M edical Officers in clu d in g som e specialist M edical Officers from th e A rm y w ere seco n d ed to th e N avy, w hile som e N aval M edical Officers w ere re v e rte d to th e A rm y.

T h e d e v e lo p m e n t o f th e ca d re o f th e m ale n u rsin g sta lf know n today as M edical A ssistan ts7 d id n o t lag fa r beh in d . A lth o u g h th ere w ere doctors on b o a rd sh ip s fro m 1612 o n w ard s, n u r s i n g a n d general p atie n t care were neglected d u rin g th e th ree c e n tu ries th a t follow ed. In th o se days it was n o t considered necessary to em ploy tra in e d n u rsin g sta ff a n d a ratin g w ho w as either lazy or a n a lc o h o lic o r w as u n su ita b le f o r an y o th e r useful task s on the ship was allo tte d to th e u n fo rtu n a te d o c to r as th e h ig h -so u n d in g “ Surgeon s M ate ut

w as g en erally re fe rre d to as th e “ S u rg e o n ’s H a te ” because o f his questionab le use to th e S h ip ’s S u rg eo n . O n a c c o u n t o f the physical o r m enta s io it-co m in g s a n d o th e r h a n d ic a p s o f th e “ m ate” th e d o c to r h a d to o m ost o

T H E M EDICOS AT SEA

1 4 5

his w ork h im self and was fo r all practical purposes a one m an mini hospital.

This practice continued fo r m any years till it was decided to form a separate Sick B erth branch. Ten volunteers from the Seam an and the S toker branches were taken to form the Sick B erth b ran ch in 1914. These ratings were sent to the M ilitary H o sp ital, Pune for a 12-m onth training course in first aid and nursing. On com pletion o f the training, they were app o in ted on ships and shore establishm ents as Sick B erth A tten d an ts (SBAs). This is the nucleus from which, over the years, has em erged the M edical A ssistant’s branch o f today.

This innovation was obviously a success because soon after 1914, the N avy started selecting the ratings fo r the Sick B erth branch from the Seam an and Stoker b ran ch es instead o f taking volunteers. H ow ever, in the absence o f any naval m edical train in g facility at th a t time, the selected ratings continued to get th eir train in g in the M ilitary H ospital at P une.

A m ajo r step in the form ation o f the Sick B erth b ran ch 8 was taken in 1937

when ratings were enrolled fo r the b ran ch by direct recruitm ent. The response, how ever, was very p o o r because o f the low pay o f Rs. 25 p er m onth.

T he pay was later increased to Rs. 50-55-57 p er m o n th w hich produced the desired results a n d the Sick B erth b ran ch a t the end o f W orld W ar II had 600 SBAs and tw o B ranch List Officers. W ith the expansion o f the Navy, the strength o f the b ran ch has gone up considerably.

Besides sickbays, dispensaries, sick q u a rte rs an d o th er medical facilities ashore, the N avy has h a d h er hospitals fro m tim e to tim e. A m ap o f the B om bay D ockyard a re a 9 o f 1750 show s a G eneral H o sp ital w ithin the D ockyard prem ises. This hospital looked a fter the B ritish personnel ashore and those tran sferred ash o re from ships. The m ap o f Bom bay o f 1803, however, shows a M ilitary H ospital ju s t outside the N aval B arracks an d w ithin the a rea w hich at th a t tim e was know n as the B om bay C astle. Since the G eneral H ospital continued w here it was in the D ock y ard prem ises, it can be presum ed th a t a division o f lab o u r h ad taken place an d the A rm y h ad decided to tre a t its own sick an d w ounded. It could also be th a t the stren g th o f the A rm y in B om bay had gone up a t th a t tim e. B ut in teg ratio n , p erh ap s, was n o t considered p racticab le a t th a t tim e an d was n o t reso rted to.

F ro m 1863 to 1943, the N avy did n o t have a h ospital o f her own and naval officers an d th eir fam ilies were sent to St. G eo rg e’s H o sp ital, B om bay w henever hospitalisation was req u ired while the ratings were tran sferred to M ilitary H o sp ital, C o lab a and the civilian em ployees to v a rio u s civil hospitals in B om bay. These arrangem ents, how ever, resulted in a wide dispersal o f sick naval personnel. H ence, on a request fro m the N avy, the a u th o rities o f St. G eorge’s H ospital placed one o f th eir w ards a t the disposal o f the N avy on July 1, 1940. This ‘N aval W a rd ’ was m anned by the M edical Officers o f the RTN

a n d R N .

W ith the expansion o f th e N avy a fter the o u tb re a k o f W orld W ar II, the n u m b er o f p atien ts req u irin g ho sp italisatio n rose. T he IN also had to cater f o r the m edical needs o f th e R N , the A llied N avies an d the M erch an t N avy.

1 4 6

U N D ER T W O EN SIG N S

T he A rm y, because o f its ow n req u irem en ts, was alread y h a rd p u t and was unable to m eet the requirem ents o f the N avy. B ecause o f the u rg en t req u irem ent o f p ro p e r a n d a d e q u a te arran g em en ts f o r th e N av y ’s sick an d w o u n d ed, the need fo r a p ro p erly co n stitu ted N aval H o sp ital in o r a ro u n d B om bay w as felt. A t one stage, it w as p ro p o se d to tak e over St. G eo rg e’s H o sp ital fo r th e N avy b u t this was n o t do n e as it m ean t dep riv in g the civilian p o p u latio n o f its hospital.

The building o f the R am esh P rem ch an d S an ato riu m at Sewri, B om bay h ad been com pleted in 1940 b u t h a d n o t been equipped n o r w as it likely to be equipped d u rin g th e W a r. S anction o f the G o v ern m en t o f In d ia was th e re fo re o b tain ed in 1942 fo r th e N avy to ta k e over this b uilding alo n g w ith the su rro u n d in g land fo r the p u rp o se o f co n v ertin g it in to a R oyal In d ia n N avy H o sp ital (R IN H o sp ita l) o f 250 beds. In A pril 1943, a 50-bed hospital s ta rted fu n ctio n in g a n d th e b ed -stren g th increased rap id ly a n d rose to 300 by 1944. The h o sp ita l w as self-contained a n d h a d its ow n rad io lo g y an d clin ical p a th o lo g y d e p a rtm e n ts. T h e civilian em ployees o f th e N avy were also a d m itted d u rin g an em ergency subject to av ailab ility o f beds. It w as the N avy’s base h o sp ital a n d n av al p a tie n ts fro m a ll o v er the c o u n try were tak en there f o r specialised tre a tm e n t. T he specialist sta ff o f the R IN H o sp ita l, w hich was a te n d e r o f H M I S Dalhousie (now I N S Angre), w ere civilian d o cto rs g ran ted h o n o ra ry com m issions in the N avy. T his h o sp ita l, how ever, w as closed dow n in 1946 an d , in lieu, a R IN W ing o f 120 beds w as opened in the C om bined M ilita ry H o sp ita l, C o la b a . T his to o w as closed dow n in 1948 due to the m a rk ed reduction in th e stre n g th o f th e N avy caused by p o st-W o rld W a r II d em obilisation.

In d ependence h e ra ld e d m an ifo ld expansion o f v ario u s b ranches o f the A rm ed F o rces. T he N avy now need ed a sep arate h o sp ita l to lo o k a fter her p ersonnel. B om bay w as id eally suited since it h ad been the hom e p o rt o f the N avy. T he th e n D ire c to r G en eral, A rm ed F o rces M edical Services, L ieutenant G en eral D .R . T h a p a r, accepted th e req u est fo r establishing a N aval H o sp ital an d agreed to tu rn th e M ilita ry H o sp ita l, C o la b a over to th e N avy. The tra n sfe r w as effected on S eptem ber 1, 1951 a n d the h ospital w as com m issioned as In d ia n N av al H o sp ita l Ship A svini10 on S eptem ber 18, 1951. The

‘K in g ’s Seam an H o s p ita l’ o f 1758— a fter alm o st 200 years w ith h er foster-p a re n t, the A rm y — cam e back to h e r rig h tfu l ow ner, the Navy!

T he d ev elo p m en t o f facilities fo r d e n ta l ca re in th e N avy k e p t pace w ith th a t in th e o th e r disciplines. P rio r to 1943, d e n tal tre a tm e n t to n av al p e rso n nel was p ro v id ed by civilian d e n tal surgeons w ho w ork ed on an n u al, renew able, c o n tracts. A t th a t tim e, a w ell-know n d en tal surgeon o f B om bay, D r.

G . V achha h a d a c o n tra c t to p ro v id e d e n tal tre a tm e n t to naval p erso n n el in a n d a ro u n d B o m b ay a n d D r. T h o m a s w as atta c h e d to th e naval base a t C ochin. T hese civilian d e n ta l surgeons were p a id according to the type and q u a n tu m o f w o rk c a rrie d o u t fo r w hich th ey p u t in ten d ers every year.

T h e naval ca d re o f d e n ta l surgeons was fo u n d e d w hen a civilian d en tal surgeon—D r. A .R .S . H o sse n — w as com m issioned in the A rm y D en tal

TH E M ED ICO S AT SEA

1 4 7

C o rp s11 (A D C orps) on A pril 2, 1943 an d was seconded to th e N avy as a Surgeon L ieutenant. On secondm ent to the N avy, he was a p p o in ted to H M IS

Ham]a w hich was a L anding C ra ft W ing D ep o t at M arve, B om bay a t th a t tim e. B ut in actual practice he was statio n ed at M an d ap am which was the base fo r the com bined operations.

Subsequently, tw o m ore dental surgeons were inducted into the N avy from the A rm y D ental C o rp s— Surgeon L ieu ten an t M .R . Vig rep o rted to the N avy on M a rc h 18, 1944 and was m ade O fficer-in-Charge o f the D ental C entre at H M IS A kbar, B om bay, the train in g establishm ent fo r direct entry ratings.

Sim ilarly, Surgeon L ieutenant F .J.E . N a zareth jo in ed the N avy on A ugust 14, 1944 an d on Ja n u a ry 20, 1945 to o k over as the O fficer-in-Charge o f the D en tal C entre o f H M I S Shivaji a t L onavla.

A fter the W ar, the naval base a t M an d ap am was closed dow n an d Surgeon L ieu ten an t H ossen was ap p o in ted to the D ental C entre o f H M I S Cheetah, a co astal force base a t T ro m b ay in Bom bay.

A fter Independence, H M IS A kbar an d H M IS Cheetah were closed dow n.

Surgeon L ieu ten an t H ossen w ent aw ay to P akistan an d Surgeon L ieutenant Vig was tran sferred to the D en tal C en tre o f H M IS Dalhousie w hich was san ctio n ed on A ugust 15, 1947.

U n til 1948, the N avy had only tw o dental centres one w ith H M IS Dalhousie at B om bay an d the o th er w ith H M I S Shivaji a t L onavla. Several dental cen tres, b o th afloat and ash o re, were established th ereafter.

T here are no sep arate sailors fo r the N aval D en tal b ra n c h . T he medical assistan ts w ho spscialisein d ental subjects a fte rc o m p u lso ry training in general nu rsin g a re ap p o in ted to v ario u s naval d e n tal centres. These m edical assista n ts are also posted to v ario u s sickbays, fro m tim e to tim e, so th a t they co n tinue to practice th eir basic profession o f n u rsin g patients back to health.

R E F E R E N C E S

1. P in to (S urgeon R ear A d m iral), D .R .F . an d M allick (Surgeon C om m ander), R .S ., H isto ry o f the M edical Services o f the Indian Navy. p. 1, N av al H e a d q u a rte rs (In d ia) R ecords.

2. Ibid., p. 6.

3. Ibid., p. 26.

4. Ib id ., pp. 7-8.

5. Ib id ., p . 22.

6. Ibid., p . 9.

7. Ib id ., p . 23.

8. Ib id ., pp. 23-24.

9. Ibid., p. 34-36.

10. Ib id ., pp. 37-38.

11. Ib id ., p. 58.

1 2 .

Budget

T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f th e In d ia n N av y in re la tio n to th e re so u rc e a llo catio n s m ade d u rin g the p erio d 1945 to 1950 is significant due to certain m ajor events th a t to o k place d u rin g th o se eventful years.

T he p rim a ry objective o f the G o v e rn m e n t a t th a t tim e, ap p aren tly , was to red u ce the econom ic b u rd e n cau sed by th e W ar an d this was sought to be achieved by th e d em o b ilisatio n an d decom m issioning o f a sizeable p o rtio n o f the w ar m ach in ery w hich included m an p o w er, h ard w are, ships and craft.

T h e second objective w as to settle the w ar dues a n d R evenue A ccounts.

A t such a ju n c tu re , th erefo re, p rev alen t n o rm s o r defined guidelines could h a rd ly be follow ed. F u rth e rm o re , even a cu rso ry exam in atio n o f the d o c u m ents on the relevant D efence Services E stim ates reveals th a t explanatory m e m o ra n d a o f any k in d th a t were p re p a re d w ere only fro m 1947-48 onw ards.

N o ex p lan atio n is available to en ab le an analysis on the basis o f allocation o f fu n d s, th e th o u g h t process o f the p lan n ers, o r the prem ises leading to the o rd e r o f p rio rities f o r the allo catio n o f fu n d s d u rin g the earlier years. T h e re fo re, a p p reciatio n a n d justification o f allo catio n s o f fu n d s to v ario u s heads o f ex p en d itu re is very difficult. It is n e ith e r a p p ro p ria te n o r a fru itfu l exercise to carry o u t an analysis o r arrive a t d ed u ctio n s reg ard in g the trend o f financial m an ag em en t p e rta in in g to th is p erio d . W h erev er it is possible, how ever, an a ttem p t has been m ade to highlight certa in statem ents fo u n d in the docum ents an d to deduce th e relative p rio rities in the fiscal m ental m akeu p o f the financial bo d y o r th e au th o ritie s th a t laid d ow n th e g ro u n d rules a t the tim e.

T he D efence budget was divided in to fo u r categories: D efence Services Effective o r the expenditure on m ilitary defence, local naval defence an d air defence, Defence Services N on-effective, the ex p en d itu re o n rew ards, p en sions. decorations a n d paym ents to civil d e p a rtm e n ts; C ap ital E xpenditure, invo ving industrial expenditure, new co n stru ctio n fo r th e R IN , airfields and Ferein^™ 01?10, ^ 011 sc^ em esi a nd R ecoveries, o r w ar co n trib u tio n s an d receipts in In d ia an d England.

46 a n d 1946-47 bestd

^ e^ence Services E stim ates fo r the years 1945-

to various heads o f e ^ giy.*ng an indication o f th e relative p rio rity a ttach ed ing facts.

expen iture by the planners, brings o u t several interest-Table 1 indicates the

during 1945-46 and i9451.4^nitUde

^ e^ence Expenditure

^ s‘ crores)

BUD GET

1 4 9

TABLE 1

R ev en u e

B udget estim ates

1945-46

1946-47

Effective

385.1

232.84

N on-effective

9.2

10.93

T o tal

394.3

243.77

C ap ita l

17.7

1.57

T he significant d eductions th a t can be m ade fro m this table are th a t the allocation to D efence D evelopm ent o r C apital E xpenditure was only 3.9 per cent o f the m aintenance cost (T otal Revenue Expenditure). This too dropped drastically to 0.8 per cent in the follow ing year. This gives a very clear indication o f the British attitu d e (indifference?) tow ards developm ental activities in the field o f D efence in the In d ian subcontinent a t th a t time; the allocation fo r welfare, pensions an d aw ards was 2.2 to 2.7 per cent o f the to tal revenue expenditure. T he main share o f this w ent to the A rm y (both British a n d In d ian personnel) and the N avy, w hich in those years was p rim arily m anned by the B ritish; a large share co n trib u ted tow ards the w ar m achinery fo r the w ar th a t was n o t fo u g h t on Indian soil. H ow m uch o f this share was actually m eant for In d ia an d how m uch served B ritish interests a b ro a d could possibly be inferred from the sub-calculation o u t o f the to tal R evenue E stim ates as given in Table 2.

T A B L E 2

B udget e stim a te s

1945-46

1946-47

P re -W a r D efen ce Services

36.8

36.8

P ro v isio n fo r in cre ased p rice s

19.8

17.5

W ar m e a su re s c h arg e ab le to

328.5

178.6

In d ian R ev en u e

T o ta l

385.1

232.9

R esource allo catio n fo r “ certain m easures connected w ith th e Local N aval D efence” a n d th eir percentage shares on the to tal D efence A llocation m entioned e arlier are as given in T able 3.

T he cap ital outlay fo r the N avy is fo u n d to be 2.8 per cent o f the to tal c ap ital outlay fo r 1945-46 an d 28 per cen t fo r 1946-47. T he cap ital outlay w as earm ark ed u n d e r the h eading “ N ew C o n stru ctio n fo r the R oyal In d ian N av y .” A n interesting fact th a t em erges fro m this analysis is th a t while the overall tre n d o f the naval sh are w as on th e decline, th e allo catio n fo r co n s tru c tio n o f new ships fo r the R o y al In d ia n N avy was increased.

1 2 .

Budget

T h e d e v e l o p m e n t o f th e In d ia n N av y in re la tio n to th e re so u rc e a llo catio n s m ade d u rin g the p erio d 1945 to 1950 is significant due to certain m ajor events th a t to o k place d u rin g those ev en tfu l years.

T he p rim ary objective o f th e G o v e rn m e n t at th a t tim e, a p p aren tly , was to reduce the econom ic b u rd e n cau sed by th e W a r a n d this was sought to be achieved by the d em o b ilisatio n an d d ecom m issioning o f a sizeable p o rtio n o f the w ar m ach in ery w hich included m an p o w er, h ard w a re , ships and craft.

T h e second objective w as to settle th e w ar dues an d R evenue A ccounts.

A t such a ju n c tu re , th erefo re, p rev alen t n o rm s o r defined guidelines could h a rd ly be follow ed. F u rth e rm o re , even a cu rso ry ex am in atio n o f the d o c u m ents on th e relevant D efence Services E stim ates reveals th a t explanatory m em o ran d a o f any kind th a t were p re p a re d w ere only fro m 1947-48 onw ards.

N o ex p lan atio n is available to en ab le an analysis on the basis o f allocation o f funds, th e th o u g h t process o f the p lan n ers, o r the prem ises leading to the o rd e r o f p rio rities fo r th e allocation o f fu n d s d u rin g the earlier years. T h erefo re, a p p re c ia tio n a n d justification o f allo catio n s o f fu n d s to v ario u s heads o f ex p en d itu re is very difficult. I t is n eith e r a p p ro p ria te n o r a fru itfu l exercise to c a rry o u t an analysis o r arrive a t d ed u ctio n s reg ard in g the tren d o f financial m a n ag em en t p e rta in in g to this p e rio d . W herever it is possible, how ever, an a tte m p t has been m ade to highlight certain statem ents fo u n d in th e d o cu m en ts a n d to deduce th e relativ e priorities in the fiscal m ental m akeu p o f th e financial bod y o r the a u th o rities th a t laid d ow n the g ro u n d rules a t the tim e.

T he D efence bu d g et w as divided in to fo u r categories: D efence Services Effective o r the ex p en d itu re on m ilitary defence, local naval defence a n d air defence; D efence Services N on-effective, the ex p en d itu re on rew ards, p en sions, d eco ratio n s a n d pay m en ts to civil d e p a rtm e n ts; C ap ital E xpenditure, involving in d u strial ex p en d itu re, new c o n stru ctio n fo r th e R IN , airfields and telecom m unication schem es; a n d R ecoveries, o r w ar co n trib u tio n s and receipts in In d ia a n d E ngland.

A n analytical study o f the D efence Services E stim ates fo r the years 1945-46 an d 1946-47, besides giving an in d icatio n o f th e relative p rio rity a ttach ed to various h ead s o f ex p en d itu re by the p lan n ers, brings o u t several in teresting facts.

T able 1 indicates the m agnitude o f D efence E x p en d itu re (in R s. crores) d u rin g 1945-46 an d 1946-47:

BU D G ET

1 4 9

TABLE 1

R ev en u e

B udget estim ates

1945-46

1946-47

Effective

385.1

232.84

N o n -effectiv e

9.2

10.93

T o ta l

394.3

243.77

C ap ita l

17.7

1.57

T he significant d eductions th a t can be m ade fro m this table are th a t the allocation to D efence D evelopm ent o r C apital E xpenditure was only 3.9 per cent o f the m aintenance cost (T otal Revenue Expenditure). This too dropped d rastically to 0.8 per cent in the follow ing year. This gives a very clear indication o f the B ritish a ttitu d e (indifference?) tow ards developm ental activities in the field o f D efence in the Indian su bcontinent at th a t time; the allocation fo r w elfare, pensions an d aw ards was 2.2 to 2.7 p er cent o f the to tal revenue expenditure. T he m ain share o f this w ent to the A rm y (both B ritish an d In d ian personnel) and the N avy, which in those years was p rim arily m anned by the B ritish; a large share c o n trib u ted tow ards the w ar m achinery fo r the w ar th a t was n o t fo u g h t on Indian soil. H ow m uch o f this share was actually m eant fo r In d ia an d how m uch served B ritish in terests a b ro a d could possibly be inferred from the sub-calculation o u t o f the to tal R evenue Estim ates as given in Table 2.

T A B L E 2

B udget e stim a te s

1945-46

1946-47

P re -W a r D efen ce Services

36.8

36.8

P ro v isio n f o r in cre ased p rices

19.8

17.5

W ar m e a su re s c h arg e ab le to

328.5

178.6

In d ian R ev en u e

T o ta l

385.1

232.9

R esource allo catio n fo r “ certain m easures connected w ith the Local N aval D efence” a n d th eir percentage shares on the to tal D efence A llocation m entioned earlier are as given in T able 3.

T h e cap ital outlay fo r the N avy is fo u n d to be 2.8 p er cent o f the to ta l cap ital outlay fo r 1945-46 a n d 28 per ce n t fo r 1946-47. T he cap ital outlay was earm ark ed u n d e r the h ead in g “ N ew C o n stru ctio n fo r the R oyal In d ian N a v y .” A n interesting fact th a t em erges from this analysis is th a t while the overall tre n d o f th e n aval share w as on the decline, the allo catio n fo r co n s tru c tio n o f new ships fo r the R oyal In d ian N avy was increased.

1 5 0

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

T A B L E 3

R e v e n u e

B u d g et estim a te s

1945-46

1946-47

E ffectiv e

4.55

2.56

( 1. 1% )

(1.09% )

N o n -e ffec tiv e

0.09

0.1

(0 .9 % )

(0.9% )

C a p ita l

0.5

0.44

A scrutiny o f th e a llo catio n s fo r th e y ear 1947-48 m akes an o th e r fact discernible— w hile large-scale d em o b ilisatio n fro m the A rm y an d the N avy w as p lan n ed a n d p a rtia lly im plem ented in 1946, 1947 a n d 1948, it h ad been decided th a t th e A ir F o rc e stre n g th w as to be m a in tain ed at th e th en existing stren g th o f sq u a d ro n s. In th e co n te x t o f th e R IN , the d o c u m e n t states,

“ This is a sm all Service co m p ared to th e A rm y, b u t a su b stan tial red u ctio n in th e stren g th o f its p erso n n el has been achieved m ainly by th e release o f req u isitio n ed vessels, th e re tu rn o f o th ers to th e A d m iralty an d placing a n u m b er o f R IN vessels in re se rv e . . . by the end o f 1946 the to tal reduction in stren g th o f th e R IN . since V .J. D ay, am o u n t to ap p ro x im ately 19,500

officers an d m e n .” W hen we lo o k a t the allo catio n to the D efence Services ag ain st the b a c k g ro u n d o f large-scale d em obilisation, the red u ctio n app ears reaso n ab le. T he a llo catio n w as reduced to Rs. 188.70 cro res as ag ain st the allo catio n o f R s. 245.34 cro res in th e p rev io u s year. N o p ro v isio n f o r any c ap ital ex p en d itu re w as, how ever, m ade a n d it w as decided th a t provisions fo r all such e x p e n d itu re w ould be m ade u n d e r the a p p ro p ria te R evenue H ead s. T h e re w as n o definite policy reg ard in g th e size a n d co m p o sitio n o f free In d ia ’s A rm ed F o rces in general.

(Tn so fa r as th e naval sh are w as concerned, the percentage share was su b stan tially raised (fro m 2.56 to 4.42 p er cent). T h e ex p lan ato ry notes p e rta in in g to the naval b u d g et o f 1947-48 state th a t th e u ltim ate com p o sitio n o f th e R IN w ould d ep e n d u p o n the policy decision reg ard in g In d ia ’s p o st-w a r A rm ed F orces. T h e d o c u m e n t m akes the assu m p tio n th a t d u rin g 1947-48, th e R IN F leet w ould co n sist o f th e vessels as show n in T able 4.

T he average stre n g th o f p erso n n el aflo at f o r calcu latin g pay a n d allo w ances fo r th e p e rio d w as estim ated to b e 291 officers an d 4560 ratings.

The tren d o f b u d g e ta ry allo catio n to th e D efence Services u n d erw en t significant change d u rin g th e p e rio d 1948 to 1951. T h e ex p lan ato ry m em o ra n d u m p receding th e B udget E stim ates fo r 1948-49 sets f o rth the salient features o f the th en existing political a n d strategic en v iro n m en t. T o q u o te,

“ It was the in te n tio n to reo rg an ise th e A rm ed F o rces as soon as it.> reco n stitu tio n was com plete. T he A rm y was to have been reo rg an ised in to a well-k n it c o m p act fo rce— m echanised a n d m o d ern ised — to a l l o w fo r th e expansion o f the R oyal In d ia n N avy a n d th e R o y al In d ian A ir F o rce, so necessary fo r

BUD G ET

151

T A B L E 4

T ype o f ships

N u m b e r in

N u m b e r in

T o ta l

c o m m issio n

reserve

S lo o p s

6

6 (O ne o f these tw o

w ere serv in g in

Ja p a n ese w aters

a t th a t tim e)

F rig a te s

3

1

4

T raw lcrs

4

2

6

F le et M inesw eepers

4

12

16

S urvey V essels

1

—

1

C o rv e tte s

1

—

1

H a rb o u r D efen ce M o to r

8

—

8

L au n ch es

L an d in g C ra ft (v a rio u s types)

38

26

64

establishing a balance betw een the three Services w ith reference to the strategic requirem ents o f the c o u n try . As a result o f the o u tb re a k o f com m unal distu rb an ces in the c o u n try soon a fter p a rtitio n an d the ingress o f raiders into K ash m ir th ro u g h P ak istan territo ry , it h as n o t been possible to recom mence dem obilisation, as originally co n tem plated, n o r has it been possible to u n d ertak e long-term p lanning fo r th e reorganisation o f the A rm ed Forces.

“ C ertain m easures fo r the expansion o f the R oyal In d ian N avy and the A ir F o rce, how ever, have been initiated w hich will fit in w ith the tentative p lan fo r the fu tu re com position a n d size o f these fo rces.”

I t is th u s clear th a t by 1948 th ere existed a realisation th a t In d ia needed to be given a m aritim e com patibility w hich the size, shape an d geography o f the nation a n d the geo-political situ atio n in the region d em an d ed . It also ap p ears th a t th ere was a clear u n d erstan d in g even a t th a t tim e th a t developm en t o f m aritim e capability w ould have a long gestation p e rio d an d m easures fo r its developm ent c o u ld n o t be allow ed to aw ait finalisation o f long-term o r overall plans.

T he m em o ran d u m also brings o u t th a t the G o v ern m en t policy was th a t the A rm ed F o rces be m an n ed com pletely by In d ian nationals. A few B ritish officers, how ever, rem ain ed on n o n -o p eratio n al duties an d advisory a p p o in tm ents in such fields as train in g o f personnel a n d technical m aintenance. In the R IN , in p a rtic u la r, certain B ritish officers rem ained in executive c a p a city fo r quite som e tim e.

By the year 1949-50, the N avy’s sh are o f th e D efence b u d g et h a d reached 6.9 p er cent. T he actual percentage fall to 4.8, how ever, w as p a rtly d u e to the R I N ’s inability to fully utilise th e allo catio n and p artly to overspending by the A rm y w hich was, p e rh a p s, on acco u n t o f ad d itio n a l com m itm ents in Jam m u a n d K ashm ir.

In th e fifties, w hilst B ritain did ch arg e In d ia heavily fo r the m aintenance

1 5 2

U N D E R T W O EN SIG N S

o f the w ar m achinery and the surplus vehicles, eq uipm ent, stores, etc., left o behind, the sterling balance con tin u ed to rem ain in o u r fa v o u r fo r som e tim e. The R IN , th erefo re, m anaged the in d u ctio n o f som e old ships from the R N and the acquisition o f a few new frigates an d an a irc ra ft carrier in the later years which only indicated th a t the decision to develop the IN was finally being im plem ented.

R E F E R E N C E S

E xcerpts from D efence Services B udget E stim ated, M inistry o f D efence, India.

N aval H e a d q u a rte rs (In d ia) R ecords.

1 3 .

Logistics

N A V A L S T O R E S O R G A N IS A T IO N

T he N aval Stores O rganisation was able to meet the requirem ents o f the tiny fleet o f the R IN in the p re-W ar period quite satisfactorily b u t w ith the o u tb reak o f the W ar, heavy responsibilities fell upon it an d it could not rise to the occasion. The vast req u irem en ts th a t had to be catered fo r m ade it m ost difficult to establish facilities fo r the p ro v isio n o f stores on a reaso n able basis. T o begin with, ap proxim ately 1200 item s h ad been o b tained from the U .K . before the W ar and the rem ain d er m ainly th ro u g h a few shipchandlers in B om bay. T he Supply D e p a rtm e n t h ad previously d ealt w ith only very few item s such as oil, p etro l an d coal, and hence naval req u irem ents in the m atter o f general stores were com pletely unknow n to it. This was very largely due to the fact th a t before the W ar the average requirem ent o f m ost o f the item s was too sm all to be d ealt w ith by the Supply D e p a rtm en t an d rem ained w ithin the local p u rch ase pow ers o f the N aval Store Officers.

T here was n eith er any p ro p e r inspection service n o r any specifications o r p attern s, a n d th erefo re when it becam e necessary to obtain stores th ro u g h the Supply D e p a rtm e n t in June 1940, several problem s were faced. T he lack o f specifications together w ith the v ast range o f n o n -sta n d a rd articles being d em an d ed by all types o f ships a n d craft, b o th o f the R IN as well as those outside the Service, led to consid erab le confusion an d delay. It was estim ated th a t stores w orth ap p ro x im ately R s. 4 cro res were purchased in In d ia during the W ar. A v ery wide range o f m aterials h a d to be p ro c u re d fo r sam pling an d w hilst the C o n tro lle r o f Inspection was responsible f o r exam ining an d passing all supplies, it w as necessary fo r th e d e p a rtm e n t to keep a c o n sta n t w atch over these activities to ensure th a t reasonable sta n d a rd s w ere m a in tain ed .

P lan n in g the req u irem en ts w ith o u t any guidance a b o u t the possible exp e n d itu re was extrem ely difficult; b u t in Ju n e 1940, p ro fe ssio n a l officers were asked to give som e kind o f estim ate in the m a tte r such as m aterials, steel and tim ber. T his was the first real a tte m p t a t fo rw ard supply a rra n g e m ents . B ut the ever-increasing dem and on the services o f th e D o ck y ard soon m ade even these estim ates to ta lly in ad eq u ate. F u rth e rm o re , by the tim e som e o f these supplies w ere actually received, the sizes an d oth er req u irem en ts were

1 5 4

U N D ER T W O EN SIG N S

unsu itab le fo r th e type o f w ork th a t th e D o ck y ard was expected to u n d e rtak e a t th a t p o in t o f tim e. T he sizes o f supplies p ro cu red , fo r exam ple, were based on requirem ents o f sloops an d local naval defence vessels w hilst the w ork actually being h an d led at the D o ck y ard w as m ajo r rep airs to destroyers a n d cruisers d am ag ed in actio n . T he sam e situ a tio n aro se in reg ard to the range o f general stores— a t the beginning o f the W a r th ere were a b o u t 10,000

item s o f reg u lar supply stocked, m any o f w hich were o bsolete by th e R oyal N avy stan d ard s; these stores m ultiplied to 35,000 to 40,000 item s by th e end o f th e W ar.

In 1941, th e A d m iralty advised th a t all possible supplies m ust be o b tain ed lo cally a n d the R IN sh o u ld set a b o u t b uilding up p ro d u c tio n in In d ia. In the m a tte r o f clo th in g an d m ess trap s, this h a d been w ell-established by the end o f the year, b u t the R IN set up a V ictualling D ep o t in B om bay which w as n o t b o u n d to p u rch ase p ro v isio n s th ro u g h the Supply D e p a rtm e n t at th e tim e.

T he p ro fe ssio n a l staff o f the E lectrical D e p a rtm e n t w as o f considerable h elp an d very soon an excellent range o f electrical fittings o f special A d m iralty p a tte rn w ere u n d e r p ro d u c tio n in C alcu tta.

By the end o f 1942, th e R IN began to set u p v ario u s shore establishm ents fo r p erso n n el in B om bay. T his a d d ed to th e alre a d y heavy d em ands on the N a v a l Stores D e p a rtm e n t as it h a d to provide p ractically all th a t was re q u ired ex cep t buildings.

T h e gen eral stores p o sition in th e R oyal N aval Y ard s a b ro a d becam e p r o gressively w orse, ad d in g fu rth e r to th e d em an d s on the R IN . T he N aval Stores Office h ad several u n its o f the E astern F leet to deal w ith d u rin g the period.

T h e req u irem en ts o f all co u ld n a tu ra lly n o t be m et an d the serious state o f affairs, a fte r re p e a te d rep re se n ta tio n s to sen io r R N officers, w as ev en tu ally b ro u g h t to th e n o tice o f th e A d m iralty . As a resu lt, a M ain S tore D ep o t, a N a v a l S to re-k eep in g Office, a L an d in g C ra ft Base a n d several o th er special sto res estab lish m en ts w ere set up in 1943. T hese establishm ents, how ever, began to m ake h eavy d em an d s on th e R o y al In d ia n N avy O rg an isatio n due to d elay in the a rriv a l o f supplies fro m the U .K . a n d elsew here. T h e end resu lt o f all th is w as th a t th e su p p ly p o sitio n an d fo rw a rd policy were in a c o n tin u al state o f flux. T re m e n d o u s q u an titie s o f stores were sta te d to be essen tial fo r o p e ra tio n a l needs, so th a t it was alm o st im possible to discrim in ate a n d keep sufficient q u a n titie s in sto ck to m eet em ergency req u irem en ts. T h e N aval S tores D e p a rtm e n t, nevertheless, w as a b le to m eet a p p ro x im ately one m illion d em a n d s fro m sh ip s a n d estab lish m en ts d u rin g th e W ar.

In M ay 1943, p ro p o sa ls were su b m itted fo r expansion based on experience o f th e W a r u p to th a t tim e, on th e assu m p tio n th a t a sim ilar degree o f dem and w o u ld c o n tin u e , a n d a fter several m o n th s, ap p ro v al w as acco rd ed to this. The A d m ira lty sen t o u t its sta ff an d agreed to supply a ll requirem ents. T his was n ecessary as the S u p p ly D e p a rtm e n t had by th en nearly b ro k en dow n on a c c o u n t o f th e w ide v ariety a n d range o f stores req u ired fro m indigenous sources.

LO G ISTIC S

1 5 5

W hen W o rld W a r I I w as over, the requirem ents o f N aval Store items decreased considerably b u t the organisation continued to face difficulties in m eeting the requirem ents o f the R IN in respect o f m any items like boats, fum ig a tio n , refrig e rato rs and m achine tools. The organisation had to m ake co n certed efforts to ease the supply p o sitio n . T he D ire c to r G eneral, Shipbuilding an d R epairs in B om bay, an d the D irecto r G eneral, A m m unition Production an d A rm y H e a d q u a rte rs were ap p ro ach ed to meet the requirem ents th ro u g h the A dm iralty, fo r w hich a fo rm a l agreem ent was subsequently concluded.

T he ru n n in g and m aintenance o f the R IN M o to r T ra n sp o rt W ing was m ade the responsibility o f the N av al Stores O rganisation in 1946. In 1950, a decision on the question o f tak in g over the w ork o f m aintenance o f vehicles by the In d ian N avy from the A rm y, w hich was u n d er consideration fo r som e tim e, w as reached and it w as decided th a t the IN should take this over in the establishm ents where such facilities existed w ith o u t any extra expenditure by way o f staff, eq u ip m en t a n d o th er ancillary requirem ents.

C o n sid erab le activity was created in the org an isatio n in connection w ith the w o rk o f the provision o f new engines, badges an d b u tto n s consequent on the c o u n try being declared a R epublic on Ja n u a ry 26, 1950. Every possible source o f supply, either th ro u g h the U .K . o r fro m indigenous sources, was investigated an d efforts were m ade to provide the m axim um quantities po ssible to the ships an d establishm ents by th a t date.

T he q uestion o f supply o f b etter fitting g arm en ts fo r the IN in general was taken up in A ugust 1950 w ith the C hief Superintendent. D evelopm ent, Textiles and C lo th in g E stablishm ent, K a n p u r w here sam ples o f the existing ill-fitting garm ents an d sam ples o f garm ents req u ired were produced. A s a result o f this jo in t discussion, garm ents suiting th e requirem ents o f the Indian N avy are now being m an u factu red by the D ire c to r G eneral o f O rd n an ce F actories.

U p to O ctober 1943, the N aval Stores O rganisation was located in Bom bay w ith a N av al Stores Officer a t its head, th ere being no such org an isatio n at o th e r ports. In O ctober 1943 the A dm iralty agreed to loan tw o officers from th e U .K ., one as Superintending N aval Stores Officer (India) an d one as a D ep u ty N aval Stores Officer. T h ereafter expansion proceeded rap id ly and N aval Stores D ep o ts and Offices were set up a t all p o rts. T he C ochin D ep o t was, however, closed dow n in Septem ber 1944 an d th e R N assum ed responsibility fo r naval stores a t th a t p o rt.

Difficulty in ob tain in g suitable officers, b o th u niform ed an d civilian, for the N aval Stores O rganisation h a d been a source o f anxiety. T h e M aster G eneral o f th e O rdnance, how ever, lent the R IN eight officers in 1945 and the A d m iralty eventually agreed to the loan o f m ore officers from th e U .K .

M a tters co n cern in g th e N aval Stores O rganisation were, u n til N ovem ber 1945 handled a t N av al H ea d q u a rte rs by the E q u ip m en t D irecto rate when it was decided to m ove the office o f the S uperin ten d in g N av al Stores Officer (In d ia) fro m B om bay to D elhi. T he w ork co n n ected w ith the stores o rg a n isation was tak en over by the S uperintending N aval Stores Officer (In d ia) w ho w as redesignated D irecto r o f Stores in Ju ly 1946. T he E q uipm ent D irec-

1 5 6

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

to ra te w as abolished in S eptem ber 1946 a n d the m a jo r p o rtio n o f th e w ork w as tran sfe rre d to the D ire c to r o f S tores. T he section dealing w ith small c ra ft m achinery was p laced u n d e r the D ire c to ra te o f Engineering.

A fter In d ep en d en ce, a plan to expand the N avy to m eet th e m aritim e req u irem en ts o f the c o u n try was presen ted to the G o v ern m en t. T aking in view th e an ticip ated increase in logistic activities a n d responsibilities due to the expected expansion in the IN , the N aval Stores O rganisation presented a com prehensive plan fo r n atio n alisatio n an d a u g m en tatio n o f m anpow er to th e G o v e rn m e n t in 1948. T he m ajo r reco m m en d atio n s m ade in this plan p a p e r to the G o v ern m en t were: ap p ro v al in principle o f the plans fo r a u g m en tatio n o f m anpow er fo r the fu tu re , re c ru itm e n t o f officers th ro u g h the F ed eral P ublic Service C om m ission an d In d ian isatio n o f all senior posts held by the B ritish personnel.

In 1939, the en tire R oyal In d ian N avy O rganisation w as centred in HM 1

D o ck y ard , B om bay. T his included the H e a d q u a rte rs a n d train in g estab lishm ents. In 1940, the activities o f the D o ck y ard increased considerably with th e ta k in g over o f 30 local N av al D efence vessels, fitting o u t fo u r A rm ed M e rch an t C ruisers, th ree A rm ed B oarding Vessels a n d six H o sp ital Ships, resu ltin g in acu te congestion. In those early d ay s, req u isitio n o f sites and b uildings ou tsid e the D o c k y a rd w as extrem ely difficult. It w as n o t until e arly 1941 th a t the N av al S tore D e p a rtm e n t m anaged to secure ap p ro v a l for tw o Bulk Store D epots, som e 20 miles from the D o ck y ard . By the end o f 1942, these h a d been open ed an d fo u r m ore had begun to function a t either naval base. Tw o m ore sto rag e d ep o ts a n d th ree sto rag e p o in ts were opened by the m iddle o f 1943.

T h e d ev elo p m en t p la n f o r the In d ian N avy was presen ted to the G o v ern m en t in 1947. T h ere w as a p ro p o sa l to au g m en t the N av al Stores D e p o t at V ish ak h ap atn am w hich w as set u p in 1947 an d to set up a new N aval Stores D e p o t a t C ochin w hich w as co n seq u en tly set up in 1951.

R E F E R E N C E S

N av al H e a d q u a rte rs (In d ia ) R ecords.

E x cerp ts fro m R e p o rts on the R oyal In d ian N av y — 1945-1950, N aval H e a d q u a rte rs, India.

1 5 6

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

to ra te was ab o lish ed in S eptem ber 1946 a n d the m ajo r p o rtio n o f the w ork was tra n sferred to the D ire c to r o f S tores. T h e section dealing w ith small c ra ft m achinery was p laced u n d e r the D ire c to ra te o f Engineering.

A fter In d ependence, a plan to expand the N avy to m eet th e m aritim e req u irem en ts o f the c o u n try was presen ted to the G o v ern m en t. T ak in g in view th e an ticip ated increase in logistic activities a n d responsibilities due to the expected expansion in the IN , the N aval Stores O rganisation presented a com prehensive p lan fo r n atio n alisatio n an d au g m en tatio n o f m anpow er to th e G o v e rn m e n t in 1948. T he m ajo r reco m m en d atio n s m ade in this plan p a p e r to the G o v ern m en t were: ap p ro v al in principle o f the plan s fo r au g m en tatio n o f m anpow er fo r the fu tu re , recru itm en t o f officers th ro u g h the F e d e ra l P u b lic Service C om m ission a n d In d ian isatio n o f all senior posts held by the B ritish personnel.

In 1939, the en tire R oval In d ian N avy O rganisation w as cen tred in HM1

D o c k y ard , B om bay. T his in cluded th e H e a d q u a rte rs a n d train in g e stab lishm ents. In 1940, the activities o f the D ock y ard increased considerably with th e ta k in g over o f 30 local N a v a l D efence vessels, fitting o u t fo u r A rm ed M erc h a n t C ruisers, th ree A rm ed B o ard in g Vessels a n d six H o sp ital Ships, resu ltin g in acute congestion. In those early days, req u isitio n o f sites and buildings ou tsid e the D o ck y ard was extrem ely difficult. I t was n o t until e arly 1941 th a t th e N av al S tore D e p a rtm e n t m anaged to secure ap p ro v a l for tw o Bulk S tore D e p o ts, som e 20 miles fro m the D o ck y ard . By the end o f 1942, these h a d been open ed an d fo u r m o re had begun to function a t either naval base. Tw o m o re sto rag e d ep o ts an d th ree sto rag e points w ere opened by the m iddle o f 1943.

T he d ev elo p m en t p la n fo r th e In d ia n N avy was p resen ted to th e G o v ern m en t in 1947. T h e re was a p ro p o sa l to au g m en t the N av al Stores D ep o t at V ish ak h ap atn am w hich was set up in 1947 an d to set up a new N aval Stores D e p o t a t C ochin w hich w as co n seq u en tly set up in 1951.

R E F E R E N C E S

N av al H e a d q u a rte rs (In d ia) R ecords.

E x cerp ts fro m R e p o rts on the R o y al In d ian N avy— 1945-1950, N a v a lH e a d -

q u a rte rs, India.

1 4 .

D ev e lo p m e n t of Facilities for

Naval Scientific Research

As f a r b a c k as 1949, it was realised by Vice A dm iral Sir E dw ard P arry, the then C om m ander-in-C hief o f the R IN , th a t any Service th a t depended e n tirely on im p o rted ships, equipm ent and expertise w ould rue the day the um bilical co rd o f vital supplies fro m ab ro a d was severed. It was he w ho, d u rin g the late forties, had decided to set u p a naval research an d d evelopm ent o rg a n isa tio n 1 in In d ia so th a t it could help the N avy to progressively indigenise the p ro d u ctio n of. naval h a rd w are and develop the necessary expertise w ithin the co u n try . H e invited D r. J.E . K eyston o f the R oyal N aval Scientific Service to visit In d ia an d advise on the fo rm atio n o f a research and developm ent wing o f th e R IN . D r. K eyston arrived in In d ia in Septem ber 1949 on a tw o -m o n th fact finding and advisory assignm ent.

D u rin g his stay in India, D r. K eyston held discussions w ith various officials a n d visited several technical establishm ents, th ree naval establishm ents — H M I S Venduruthy, Valsura an d Shivaji, the technical developm ent establishm ents o f the In d ian A rm y, and som e o f the n atio n al lab o rato ries an d research institutes.

In his ‘R e p o rt on the R equirem ent o f the R oyal In d ian N avy fo r Scientific A ssistance’ subm itted to th e C IN C , R IN in D ecem ber 1949, D r. K eyston m ade several recom m en d atio n s fo r providing scientific assistance w hich w ould enhance the technological a n d o p eratio n al efficiency o f the R IN .

T he R IN , as free In d ia ’s naval arm , w ould need the services o f a scientific com m unity2 fo r the m ain p u rp o ses o f assisting in the efficient m aintenance o f ships an d equipm ent, involving: m odification to suit local conditions an d p ro m o tio n o f the m ost effective use o f naval m aterial; building up an indigenous storehouse o f scientific know ledge o f the p ro p erties an d b eh av io u r o f the sea, ships an d eq u ip m en t; application o f scientific study and analysis to the problem s o f the o p eratio n al use an d developm ent o f naval arm s and o th er h ard an d softw are; an d p ro v isio n o f assistance in th e developm ent o f scientific o rien tatio n in naval personnel. T he scientist responsible fo r c a rry ing o u t these tasks, as visualised a t th a t tim e, w ould be a co m b in atio n o f th e p u re research scientist, the applied research scientist, th e developm ent scientist an d the new -design scientist; besides, he w ould be a physicist, c h e m ist, m athem atician, electrical engineer, m echanical engineer, m arin e engi-

1 5 8

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

neer, n aval architect, m edical scientist, oceanographer, and biologist, all rolled in to o n e— a tall o rd e r but an inescapable necessity.

W hile discussing the kind o f assistance th a t the scientist w ould provide fo r the efficient m aintenance o f naval m aterial, D r. K eyston says, “ A c ra n k sh aft m ay fra c tu re , a casting crack, a w elded jo in t fail, a bearing corrode, o r a m echanism becom e inoperative th rough u n satisfactory lubrication. The d o ck y ard technician can m ake good the d efect b u t the reliability and a ssu rance o f his re p a ir o r replacem ent dep en d on how expertly the reasons why th e equipm ent has failed a re determ ined an d u n d ersto o d , an d .o n how effectively the technological process used in the repair o r replacem ent are m atched to th e co n d itio n s o f use o f the eq uipm ent; this is w here the need fo r the inv estigational scientist is felt.

“ T he investigational m etallurgist, chem ist, engineer and physicist can c o n trib u te very g reatly w ith his know ledge, techniques an d instrum ents, to an u n d e rsta n d in g o f reaso n s f o r failu re o f Service m aterial, to elim ination o f th e causes, to scientific c o n tro l o f w o rk sh o p a n d fo u n d ry practices, to exam in a tio n o f dockyard m aterials a n d p ro d u cts, an d to the econom y w ith w hich all processes a re o p erated . A la b o ra to ry in w hich scientific investigatio n a n d analysis can p ro ceed is an essential co m p o n en t o f a m odern d o ck y ard .

“ In investigating the origins an d solutions o f m aintenance problem s, the scientist’s w o rk will n o t be confined to the d o ck y ard la b o rato ry , b u t lead him to u n d e rta k e tests an d experim ents on equipm ent in ships a t sea, and to m ake experim ents on a n d u n d e r the sea, as, f o r exam ple, on the relative co rro d ib ility o f v ario u s alloys o r o n vario u s m eans fo r p rev en tin g the fo u lin g o f a sh ip ’s b o tto m by m arin e o rg an ism s.” 3

T his w as reco m m en d ed because it was felt th a t th o u g h the ships were m ain tain ed by the technicians in the ships an d d o ck y ard s, they w ould need th e p ro fessio n al help o f scientists in o rd e r to o b ta in th e m ost effective an d eco n o m ical resu lts. F u rth e r, n early all ships in th e R IN , im m ediately a fte r In d ep en d en ce, w ere th e o n es w hich h ad been acq u ired fro m th e U .K . and th u s w ere n o t suited to tro p ic a l a n d sub-tropical co n d itio n s. H ence a scientific study o f th e c o n d itio n s prev ailin g in the w aters a ro u n d In d ia an d c a rry ing o u t su itab le m odifications to ships, arm s, am m u n itio n a n d o th e r e q u ip m e n t to suit these c o n d itio n s w as c o n sid ered m o st essential.

F o r th e p ro m o tio n o f th e m o st effective use o f sh ip b o a rd eq u ip m en t, a p la n 4 o f a c tio n w as reco m m en d ed : (1) scientific tests f o r the selection o f the rig h t jo b s, i.e., th e jo b s best m atch ed fo r th e ir n a tu ra l ap titu d e s; (2) assisting in th e local im p ro v isatio n o f e q u ip m en t to fill th e gaps cre a te d by n o n availability o f im p o rta n t tra in in g aid s fro m a b ro a d ; (3) d eveloping suitable w orking c o n d itio n s in ships f o r optim ising th e efficiency o f tra in e d perso n n el such as c o n d itio n s o f v e n tilatio n a n d h e a t in su latio n in the w o rk in g spaces, clo th in g to su it tro p ic a l c o n d itio n s a n d giving m ax im u m c o m fo rt; (4) a d e q u ate an d su itab le fo o d a n d d ie t f o r m ain tain in g h e alth a n d efficiency an d solving the p ro b le m s arisin g in preventive a n d c u rativ e tro p ic a l n av al m edi-

F A C IL IT IE S FO R N A V A L SC IE N T IFIC RESEA RCH

1 5 9

cine; (5) p ro m o tin g the efficiency o f w eapons an d equipm ent such as guns, u n d erw ater w eapons, ra d a r and asdic (sonar) equipm ent by m easuring and studying the transm ission p ro p erties o f th e sea an d air and placing on a sound basis the science o f forecasting waves, swell an d m eteorological co n d itio n s a t sea for determ ining the tim ing o f am phibious o perations to the best ad v an tag e; an d (6) m an u factu rin g defence m aterial in India as had already been recom m ended by P rofessor P .N .S . B lackett in his 1948 re p o rt to the M inister o f Defence.

T o im plem ent the plan required the assistance o f scientists fo r th e m anufactu re o f naval equipm ent such as asdics, ra d a r, predictors, guns an d am m unition. This in tu rn necessitated scientists gaining expertise w ith naval scientific devices to ensure p ro p e r guidance to the n a tio n ’s industry in the initial stages o f m an u factu re. Special atten tio n was to be given to the use o f indigenous m aterial and to finding substitutes fo r items o r m aterial w hich were h ith erto im ported.

I t was felt a t th a t tim e th a t it was essential fo r the R IN to set up a reposito ry o f scientific inform ation and expertise in In d ia fo r studying such aspects as u n d erw ater w arfare, subm arines, m ines, to rp ed o es, ra d a r, underw ater detection an d p ro tectio n devices, rem ote co n tro l o f w eapons a n d equipm ent, an d com m unication. A body o f scientists skilled a n d experienced in the technique o f scientific experim entation, o n an d in the sea a n d a fu n d o f scientific know ledge o f the n a tu re and pro p erties o f sea—tem perature, currents, acoustic and electrom agnetic transm ission, un d erw ater characteristics o f ships including m agnetic an d acoustic fields— w ould be an asset to the Service.

O ver a period o f tim e, this w ould enable a scientist to in h erit a trad itio n o f sea a n d ship research and steep him self in the know ledge a n d experience o f this k in d o f scientific w o rk in th e new environm ent w ith ease an d rapidity.

T o q uote D r. K eyston, “ Should the R IN becom e involved in w ar, its ability to co u n ter speedily such ‘devil’s boxes’ as m agnetic a n d acoustic m ines, p e rhaps including som e novel types a n d com binations, w ould depend on w hether o r n o t th ere w ere available on th e sp o t in India, scientists sufficiently steeped in N aval aco u stical a n d m agnetic science to be able to im m ediately discern a n d atta c k the kernels o f the p ro b lem s posed by th e enem y.” 5

T his aim could be achieved by sending scientists a b ro a d to g ath er naval scientific experience and in fo rm atio n an d by o b tain in g the services o f experienced naval scientists fro m overseas. T his w ould, o f course, logically lead to th e establishm ent o f a naval science la b o ra to ry on the co ast o f India.

In o rd e r to lay a scientific fo u n d atio n fo r b uilding th e edifice o f naval scientific research, D r. K eyston exam ined the availability o f resources, the req u irem ents o f the Service fo r the follow ing tw o decades an d th e o rd e r o f p rio rities o f the naval au th o rities a n d m ade several reco m m en d atio n s fo r initiating such research. B ased o n these, he reco m m en d ed th e setting u p 6 o f a N aval D o ck y ard L ab o ra to ry an d an U n d erw ater Science E stab lish m en t fo r w hich scientific assistance w as to be so u g h t fro m th e scientific establishm ents o f th e A rm y, civilian scientific research in stitu tio n s a n d the scientific o rg an isatio n s o f o th er navies.

I

1 6 0

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

H e also recom m ended th e cre a tio n o f an In d ian D efence Science Service (ID S S ), em bracing b o th defence and civilian scientists, on the lines o f the th e n G o v ern m en t Scientific Service in the U .K . T his, he th o u g h t, was necessary as it w ould set th e seal on the objectives fo r inter-service action in research a n d d evelopm ent, fu n ctio n as a m achinery fo r determ ining satisfactory co n d itio n s o f service fo r defence scientists, give esprit de corps to those taking up th e new vocation in In d ia , an d be o f the greatest value in a ttractin g scientists to D efence Science careers.

R E F E R E N C E S

1. K eyston, J.E ., R e p o rt on th e R eq u irem en ts o f th e R oyal In d ian N avy fo r Scientific A ssistance, G o v ern m en t o f India, 1950, p. 1, and N aval H e a d q u a rte rs (In d ia) R ecords.

2. Ibid., p p . 1-2.

3. Ib id ., p . 3.

4. Ib id ., pp. 4-5.

5. Ibid., p . 6.

6. Ibid., p . 11.

The Royal Indian Marine Ensign being hauled down on O ctober 2, 1934 at Bombay on the occasion of the conversion of the Service into the Royal Indian Navy.

The building at left is the RIM O fficers’ Mess which now houses the Naval Dockyard Canteen, the Dockyard A p pre ntice School and the Dockyard D ispensary.

Photograph : courtesy Rear A d m ira l A . Chakraverti (retd.)*

n

T h e In d ia n Navy G u ard led by L ie u te n a n t R. K. S. G a nd hi, m a rc h in g to In d ia H o u s e on th e In dia n In de pe n de nce Day c e le b ra tio n s at Lon do n on A u g u s t 15, 1949.

■

i

K ing's C olour presented to the Royal Indian Navy on December 9, 1935 at Bombay being laid down in December 1949 at the Indian M ilitary Academ y, Dehradun. Lieutenant R S Malia is seen handing over the C olour to the Commandant. A ls o seen in the picture are the Defence M inister, Shri Baldev Singh, the Com m ander-,n-Ch.ef, Indian Arm y, General K.M. Cariappa and the C om m ander-in-C h,ef, Royal Indian Navy Vice A d m ira l Sir Edward Parry. Photograph: courtesy Com m odore R.S. Malia (retd.).

T h e In d ia n N avy G u a rd led by L ie u te n a n t R. K. S. G a n d h i, m a rc h in g to In d ia H ou se on th e In d ia n In d e p e n d e n c e Day c e le b ra tio n s a t L o n d o n on A u g u s t 15, 1949.

K in g ’s C olour presented to the Royal Indian Navy on December 9, 1935 at Bombay being laid down in December 1649 at the Indian M ilitary Academ y, Dehradun. Lieutenant R.S. Malia is seen handing over the C olour to the Commandant. A ls o seen in the picture are the Defence M inister, Shri Baldev Singh, the C om m ander-in-C hief, Indian Arm y, General K.M. Cariappa and the C om m ander-in-C hief, Royal Indian Navy, Vice A d m ira l S ir Edward Parry. Photograph: courtesy Com m odore R.S. M alia (retd.).

T h e In d ia n N avy G u a rd led by L ie u te n a n t R. K. S. G a n d h i, m a rc h in g to In d ia H o u s e on th e In d ia n In d e p e n d e n ce Day c e le b ra tio n s a t L o n d o n on A u g u s t 15, 1949.

K in g ’s C olour presented to the Royal Indian Navy on December 9, 1935 at Bombay being laid down in December 1649 at the Indian M ilita ry Academ y, Dehradun. Lieutenant R.S. Malia is seen handing over the C olour to the Commandant. A ls o seen in the picture are the Defence M inister, Shri Baldev Singh, the C om m ander-in-C hief, Indian A rm y, General K.M. Cariappa and the C om m ander-in-C hief, Royal Indian Navy, Vice A d m ira l S ir Edward Parry. Photograph: courtesy C om m odore R.S. M alia (retd.).

1 6 2

U N D E R T W O E N SIG N S

w ho w ent to see P anditji w ho w as th e P rim e M in iste r a t th a t tim e. We did express o u r feeling th a t this p a rtic u la r chan g e w as u nnecessary. P a n d itji then q u o ted c h ap ter an d verse fro m B ritish H isto ry and said th a t the R o y al N avy m ay have been th e senior Service u n d e r th e B ritish co n d itio n s because o f w hich the Royal In d ian N avy to o h a d becom e th e sen io r Service in In d ia b u t u n d e r In d ian co n d itio n s an d fo r re a so n s o f o u r h isto ry , the ro le p lay ed by the A rm y and the place o f the A rm y in In d ia n h isto ry w as m uch m ore im p o rta n t an d b o th the size and th e p a s t h isto ry o f In d ia w ere different fro m th a t o f the U n ited K in g d o m . U n d e r In d ia n co n d itio n s, th erefo re, it was m o re a p p ro p ria te th a t th e A rm y sh o u ld be d esig n ated as th e senior Service. In fact, as f a r as history w as co n cern ed , you c o u ld n ’t teach P an d itji verv m u c h .” 1

1

Since the change in the O rd e r o f S en io rity w as to ta k e p lace on o u r first R epublic D ay, Ja n u a ry 26, 1950, th e re w as c o n sid erab le c o n fu sio n d u rin g the reh earsals an d even on th e a c tu al d ay o f the R ep u b lic D a y p a ra d e on the relative p o sitio n in g o f the c o n tin g en ts fro m th e th re e Services. L ie u te n a n t C o m m an d er In d e r Singh (later ro se to ra n k o f C o m m o d o re ) rem inisces, “ A co n tin g en t consisting o f tw o officers, viz., I a n d L ie u te n a n t R .N . D as G u p ta (who retired as a C o m m an d er), an d som e ratin g s left C ocliin by rail early in Ja n u a ry 1950 to ta k e p a r t in the first R ep u b lic D a y p a ra d e to be h eld on th e 2 6 th o f the m o n th . F o r reaso n s o f m y p rid e in m y Service, th e jo u rn e y an d w h at tra n sp ire d a t th e end o f it tu rn e d in to one o f th e m o st eventful ones in m y life.

“ T he tra in jo u rn e y from C ochin h a d its ow n tale to tell. C o n fu sio n a t th e b o o k in g office a t M a d ra s C en tral led to th e d e ta c h m e n t o f th e special coach carry in g u s fro m the rest o f the tra in en ro u te a t B alh arsh ah . T he resu lt was th a t fo r once we were forcibly sep a ra te d fro m , to use a n a v a l ex-p ression, the teeth, i.e., o u r sw ords a n d rifles w hich w ere in th e b ra k e van.

A difficult situation was th u s created by th e R ailw ays fo r a b o d y o f y o u n g officers a n d m en fro m a fighting Service fo r, a fte r all, to su d d en ly becom e to o th le ss’ is n o t a very p le a sa n t experience b u t, to o u r g re a t relief, the ‘te e th ’

w ere resto red to us a t N ew D elhi R ailw ay S ta tio n w hen we a rriv e d there.

T he venue chosen fo r the p a ra d e was th e Irw in S tad iu m , w hich w as to be la te r renam ed the N a tio n a l S tad iu m , a n d th ere we assem bled every m o rn ing fo r p a rtic ip a tin g in th e reh earsals w ith th e c o n tin g en ts fro m th e o th e r r T

.he ° ffiCer n o m in ated f ° r f a d i n g th e p a ra d e w as B rigadier J.S. D hillon, w ho la te r retired as a n A rm y C o m m an d er.

“ A fter th e usual individual w arm ing u p a n d w orking u p p e rio d , we h a d o u r first jo in t p a ra d e a ro u n d Ja n u a ry 7, 1950 an d to m y h o r r o r a n d c o n ste rn a tio n , the N avy fo u n d itself p laced a fte r th e last co n tin g e n t o f t h e A rm y an o u r w o c o un™> in th eir N avy blue reg alia lo o k ed ab su rd ly sm all a fte r the sea (la n d ) o f K h a k .! M y p ro te st to the B rig ad ier in ch arg e o f th e p a ra d e is re ega ion ro m the N avy s p rid e o f p la c e w as n o t ta k e n seriously an we co n tin u e to fall in n ex t to the A rm y c o n tin g en ts. M y p ro te s t was repeated a second tim e w ith a stro n g er feeling o f h av in g been w ro n g ed b u t

W H E N THE NAVY BECAME NUMBER TW O

163

no rem edial m easures were forthcom ing. I then brought it to the notice of the Staff Officer, G unnery at the Naval H eadquarters and our Liaison Officer, L ieutenant M .R .A . R ao but they too did not react one way or the other as eith er they did not realise the implication o f our down-gradation or did not consider it im p o rta n t enough to be conveyed to the senior staff officers at N aval H ead q u arters. O ur frustration grew worse and on the day o f the th ird o r fo u rth com bined rehearsal, when the same pattern followed, I b ro u g h t it to the notice o f C om m ander S.M. N anda, the then Director of P ersonnel Services at N aval H eadquarters.

“ C om m ander N anda inform ally advised me to abstain from the parade if the ord er o f precedence on parade was n o t rectified. I conveyed this intention to the L ieutenant Colonel who officiated during the absence o f the B rigadier at the p arad e rehearsals. T o my utter chagrin, he too did not take it seriously or, may be, they were testing our p atience!

“ N aval H ead q u arters a t this stage took a serious view o f the development a n d directed the D irector o f Personnel Services to be present at the rehearsals a n d final parad e.

“ A fter this, things moved fast. A t the next rehearsal, I repeated my warning to the L ieutenant Colonel before form ing up for the parade but once again o u r p ro testatio n s were ignored and we were ordered to fall in as we had been d oing d u rin g o u r previous rehearsals.

“ I th erefo re, decided to act. We had form ed up and the usual practice m arch p ast was about to com m ence when I spotted Commander N anda a rriving on the scene. Inspired by his presence, in a dram atic flourish, I ord ered the entire N aval contingent to m arch forward in ‘advance order a n d m oved off the p arad e ground b u t not out o f the N ational Stadium !

“ A bsolute panic seized the officers in charge o f the parade! Men ran helter-shelter an d Brigadier D hillon arrived within 15 minutes followed by L ieu ten an t G eneral S.M . Shrinagesh, then GOC-in-C, W estern Command.

A fter b rief consultations, they decided to request us to rejoin the parade but this tim e in the lead, and th at was where we stayed until the final parade however, was a short-lived victory as on the day of the final parade therefore, had the unique privilege o f leading a

o f a n a tio n a l p a ra d e fo r the last tim e, an occas.on th at still arouses

^ n ^ b L o m

i n g a sovereign republic, the designation o f “ Royal”

, ormpfi f ro m titles o f the various regim ents possessing it, as a so roi

* > '“ ■ “

* “

• * " * “

“ “ ,,s

aw ards fo r gallantry, to replace the B r.tish awards.

164 UNDER TW O ENSIGNS

R E F E R E N C E S

1. K a ta ri (A d m iral) R .D ., R etd ., p e rso n a l m aterial received.

2. N a n d a (A d m iral) S.M ., R etd ., p erso n al m aterial received.

3. Singh (C o m m o d o re) Inder, R e td ., p erso n al m aterial received/interview.

In d e x

A b a d an , C a p tu re o f 26

A n g lo -S ik h w a r 18

Achilles, H M S 37. 39

Angre, IN S 146

A d e n 1, 2, 18-19. 25. 38. 48. 56

A n g re, K a n h o ji 13-14

A d m in is tra tiv e d isc re p a n c ie s 74-75

A n g re, S a m b h aji 14

A d m ira lty ‘see B ritish A d m iralty

A n g re, S ck h o ji 14

Adyar, H M IS 55

A n g re, T u k o ji 13

A eg ean s e a 2

A n ta rc tic a a n d e x p ed itio n s 1, 20-21

A fg h a n s a n d A fg h a n ista n 3. 32. 34

A n ti-su b m a rin e e stab lish m en t 25, 104, 116-A frica , E a s t a n d W est C o a s ts J, 8. 1 9 ,9 4 , 18. 121-22, 129

100, 111

A ra b ia n s e a —c o a s t a n d th e G u lf 1, 2, 4-8, Agra, H M IS 55

10, 12, 43, 73, 136-37

Ahmedabad, H M IS 56

A r a b s — th e ir s e a e x p lo its 6-10, 13-14, 17

A h m e d n a g a r 114, 117

A ra h a n s s a r ip u tta re lic s o f 100

A irc ra ft A rtific e r’s C o n v e rs io n C o u rs e 130

A ra k a n c o a s t a n d r u le rs 10. 28, 61

A irc ra ft c a r r ie r s 127

A ra to o n , Iv a n 71

A ir F o rc e 80-81, 150, 161 see also R oy al A rc tic 1

A ir F o rc e a n d R o y a l In d ian A ir F o rc e Argus, H M S 127

A ir S to re s C o u rs e 131

A rm e d F o rc e s a n d th e serv ices 31, 82-83, A k b a r, M u g h a l E m p e ro r 10

85, 88-89, 97, 103, 150-51, 161-63

Akbar, H M IS 25, 55. 99. I l l , 117-19.126.147

o r d e r o f s e n io rity 161-63

A lb u q u e rq u e 9. 10

A rm e n ia n s 3

A le x a n d e r, th e G r e a t 4

A rm y 17-18. 25, 34, 40, 69, 70. 80-81. 83.

A le x an d ra , Q u e en 20

85-86, 95. 109. I l l , 113, 122, 125, 128-29,

A le x a n d ria , p o r t 7, 8

143. 44, 146-47, 149-50, 155, 159, 161-63

A li M a ra k k a rs 9

D e n ta l c o rp s ( A .D . C o rp s ) 146-47

A lm eid a , D e F ra n c e s c o d* 9

se n io rity a m o n g s t serv ices 161-63

A m b e r, K h o ja 9

A r u n a A s a f A li 80, 83-84

A m e er A s la m 57-59

A ry a n s 3

A m e ric an flag -b u rn in g o f 54

A s a f A li, 84

A m e ric an N a v y 127

A s h o k a E m p e r o r 4

A m e ric a n r e c r u its 107

A s s a m 106

A m e ry 36

Assam, H M IS 55, 93

A m m u n itio n P r o d u c tio n D ir e c to r G e n e ra l A s s y ria n s 5, 7

155

A s tro n o m ic a l o b s e r v a tio n 137

A m p h ib ia n o p e r a tio n s 95, 127, 129

A tla n ta p o in ts 46

Amritsar, H M IS 55

A tla n tic , b a ttle o f 25

A m z a ri R o y a l N a v a l E s ta b lis h m e n t 125

A to m ic , B a c te rio lo g ic a l a n d

C h e m ic al

A n d a m a n sea a n d is la n d s 19. 43-47, 49-51, D a m a g e C o n tr o l S c h o o l (A B C D S c h o o l) 5 6. 94, 101, 136

122

A n d h ra s 4

A u c h in le c k , F ie ld M a rs h a l C la u d e 46-47, A n g lo In d ia n s 72. 106-07, 111

54, 80

1 6 6

INDEX

A u ran g zeb 10, 12-13

B ih a r 106

A u s tra lia (N avy, p e rso n n el an d th e exp ed i

Bihar, H M IS 56, 94

tio n to S o u th P o le) 21, 26, 47, 6 1 ,6 7 , B ird s— co m m u n ica tio n m ed ia 132-34

107

Birmingham USS 127

A u s tria n su ccessio n , w a r o f 15

B itte rn c la s s 104

Avenger, H M S 39, 40

B lack sea 7

A v ia tio n , n a v al 127-31

B lair, A rc h ib a ld 19, 136

A w ard s an d d e c o ra tio n s 27, 110, 163

B la c k e tt, P .N .S . 159

A z im u s-S h a n , P rin c e 13

B o a ts w a in s tra in in g c o u rse 122

B o m b a rd m e n t b a se s 138

B a b ariaw ad te r r ito ry a n d M u lg a ra s ia s o f B o m b a y 12, 16-17, 53-54, 56, 80, 84, 87, 94, 96-97

101, 106, 120-21, 123, 133, 137, 142

B a b -cl-M a n d eb 1 ,2

c e s s io n to th e B ritish by th e P o rtu g u e se B a b y lo n 7

12

Bahadur, H M IS 25. 54-55, 116, 120-21

d is tu rb a n c e s 53-54, 56, 80, 84, 87

B a h rain , an d s h o re e sta b lish m e n t 2, 17, 56.

Bombay, H M IS 55

107

B o m b a y D o c k y a rd 25, 39, 40, 137, 145, 156

B a k sh i, M .M . 129

B o m b ay F lo a tin g light 133

B a li 101

B o m b ay M a rin e 12-14, 17-19

Baluchistan, H M IS 56

B o m b ay , M e c h an ica l T ra in in g E s ta b lis h

B a n d ra 45, 94

m e n t 59, 104

Bangor 46, 93

B o m b ay N a v a l A n c h o ra g e S u rv ey o f 46, B a rb a ro s a , K h a ire d d in 2

138-39

B a r lc u , C a p ta in 13

B o m b a y , N a v a l H e a d q u a rte rs 23-24

B a r n a r d , R e a r A d m ira l G . 101

B o m b ay -Y ac h t C lu b 57

Baroda, H M IS 56

B o o n e , C h a rle s 13

B a r r a c k p o r e 13

B o ro b u d u r S c u lp tu re s o f 5

Barracuda, H M IS 56

B o sc a w a n ’s F le e t 15

B a se R e p a ir O rg a n is a tio n 122

B o se , S u b h as C h a n d ra 43-44

B a s ra 7, 18

B o u rd a n n a is L a 15

B a sse t C la s s tra w le rs 93

B o w ers, H .R . 20-21

B a ta v ia 10, 12, 94

B o y ’s T ra in in g E s ta b lish m e n t 24, 56, 94, B a th e n a , A .S . 129

104,

116, 118, 120-21, 125-26

Bathurst 46, 93

B ra g a n z a , P o rtu g u e s e P rin c e s s 12

B a y o f B en g al 1, 2, 4, 15, 43, 136-37

B ritis h A d m ira lty 13, 23, 41, 43, 45, 93, 139, B a y lie s, L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r J .E . 45

154

B eesly, P a tric k 62

B r itis h C o m m o n w ea lth o f N a tio n s 31-32, B e eto n , L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r 73

35, 46-47, 50

B e le m 8

B ritis h E a s t In d ia n C o m p a n y 17-18, 103, B e n g al 10, 14, 16, 106, 109, 136, 142

136-38

B en g al C o m p a n y o f E m p d en 16

B ritis h In d ia — ad v en t, e sta b lis h m e n t a n d Bengal, H M IS 26-28, 56. 94

g ra n t o f in d ep en d en ce 11-14, 17-18,20,

B e n g al M a rin e 19

33-34, 36, 38-40, 47-51, 81, 89, 94-95. 103,

Berar, H M IS 55

136-38

B e rb e ra , re o c c u p a tio n o f 25

B ritis h M e d ite rra n e a n o p e ra tio n 128

B e re n ik e p o r t 7

B r itis h N a tio n a lity a n d s ta tu s o f A lien s A ct Berrio 8

o f (1914) 111

B e st, C a p ta in T h o m a s 11

B ritish navy tra d itio n o f s e n io rity 161-63

Bhadravati, H M IS 55

B ritis h officers 66, 69-72, 74, 80

B h a tk a l, S u rv e y o f 138-39

B ritis h o v e rsea s in terests— ex ploits a n d re la

B h a v a n a g a r. s ta te o f 97-98

tio n s 2, 3, 5, 10-16, 31-35, 43, 45-47 <50

B h u s h a n , L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r 57

94, 128

B h u tto , S h a h N a w a z 95

B ritis h P acific F le e t 94

B h u tto , Z .A . 95

Bruiser, H M S 39

IN D EX

1 6 7

B u d g et 148-49, 151-52

C hiefs o f S taff C o m m ittee 31, 50

B u d d h ist J a ta k a s a n d B u d d h ism 3, 4, 6

C h ild , Jo h n Sir 12

B u h lcr 3

C h in a 4, 33, 47, 94

B ull o f P o p e C a lix tu s I I I 8

C h in a se a 136-37

B u rm a 1, 4. 6, 18-19, 28. 36, 47-48, 50, 87, C h itta g o n g 28, 94

93, 107, 111, 125, 128, 136

C h o las 4-6

to rtu o u s w a te r w ays 93

C h ris tia n s 106

B u rro u g h , A d m iral S ir H a ro ld 38

C h u sa n A rc h ip elag o 19

B u sh ire see B asra

Circars, H M IS 56, 121, 125-26

C iv il S ervice C o m m iss io n 111

C a b in e t M iss io n 81-82

C live, C o lo n e l R o b e rt 14-15

Cnbote 26

Clive, H M IS 25, 55, 104, 118

C a b ra l, P e d ro 9

C o a s ta l T ra in in g C e n tre 117

C a lc u tta 16, 40, 65, 100, 104, 114, 117, 132.

C o ch in 9, 12, 14, 100-01, 104, 106, 121-24,

139

131-32, 138-39, 156, 162

Calcutta, H M IS 56, 94

Cochin H M IS 55

C a lc u tta , n a v al a n d s h o re e stab lish m en t C o c h in — n av al a n d sh o re e stab lish m en t 25, 25

40, 56, 104, 138-39

C a lic u t 4, 69

C o c k b u rn , K . 129

C am b ay , G u lf o f 137

C o c o n a d a 25, 117

C a n a d a —navy a n d p e rso n n e l 61, 67, 107

C o e lh o , N ic o la s 8

C a p e M u s se n d o n 17

C o la b a 13-14

C a p e o f G o o d H o p e 8

C o llie r, C a p ta in 17

C a p e o f T e m p e s ts 8

C o lo m b o 12, 27

C a r N ic o b a r—J a p a n e se su rre n d e r 45-46, 49

C o lu m b u s 8

C a ria p p a , G e n e ra l K .M . 70, 161

C o m m a n d e r-in -C h ie f 76, 103, 110, 161

C a rn a tic w a r 15

C o m m iss io n o f E n q u iry 54, 74-75, 80, 89, C a rth a g e 7

103

C a sp ia n S ea 7

C o m m itte e f o r th e A rm e d F o rc e s D e v e lo p

C a ste d isc rim in a tio n 69, 71-72

m en t 31-32, 34-35

C a th e r in a , In fa n ta 12

C o m m o d o re S u p e rin te n d e n t o f T ra in in g Cauvery, H M IS 24, 38, 56,9 3 -9 4 ,9 8 -1 0 0 , R o y a l In d ia n N a v y 124

120

C o m m o n w ea lth o f N a tio n s see

B ritish

C ey lo n 47, 94 see also Sri L an k a

C o m m o n w e a lth o f N a tio n s

C h a g o s A rc h ip e la g o 2

C o m m u n a l

d is c rim in a tio n s

a n d d is tu r

C h a k ra v a rti, C a p ta in A . 42

b an ces 23, 64, 69, 71-72, 151

C h a k ra v e rti, T. 129

C o m m u n ic a tio n s 40, 8 8 ,9 4 , 108, 121, 123, C h a ld e a 7

129, 132-34

Chaniak, H M IS 25, 54-55, 117

C o m m u n is t P a r ty o f In d ia 80, 87

C h a n d c rn a g o re 14-16

C o m o rin , C a p e o f 43, 137

C h a n d ra g u p ta , E m p e ro r 4

C o m p a n io n o f th e O rd e r o f th e B a th 110

C h a rle s I I , K in g 12

C o m p a n io n o f th e O rd e r o f th e B ritis h C h a rts o f In d ia n C o a s t 138

E m p ire 110

C h a tfie ld C o m m itte e 23, 104, 123

C o m p a n io n o f th e O r d e r o f th e In d ia n C h a th a m isla n d 38-39, 42-43

E m p ire 110

C h a tte rji, C a p ta in A .K . 77, 101

C o n g re s s P a rty 48, 54, S0-81, 84, 88

C h a u l 9

C o n s c r ip tio n 86

C h e d u b a S tr a it 139

C o n s ta n tin o p le 7-8, 16

Cheetah, H M IS 55, 76, 117, 147

C o n s titu tio n — a lle g ia n c e to S3

C h e sa p e a k e B ay 127

C o o p e r, Peggy 114

Chetties, M a n ig ram m an 5

C o r a l se a , B a ttle o f 128

Chetty, S h u n m u g h am 22-23

C o rn w a ll 66

C h ic k e n , M is te r A c tin g M a s te r G .B . 18

Cornwallis. H M IS 104, 118

C h ie f o f th e N a v a l S ta ff 77, 101, 161

C o r o m a n d e l c o a s t o f 5

1 6 8

IN D EX

C o rru p tio n a n d n e p o tism 74

D o c to rs ’ re c ru itm e n t etc. 143, 146-47

C o rv e tte s 151

D o g ra s 98

C o tto n — in tro d u c tio n o v e rsea s 5, 6

Dolphin 16

C o u rt M a rtia l 99, 100

D o u g la s, L ie u ten a n t C o m m a n d e r G . 130

C o w a sji Je h a n g ir H a ll 27

Dragon 11

C ox B azar, su rv ey o f 138

D rin k in g h a b its o f officers 65

C re te 3

Duffer in 20, 23, 142

C ru is e rs 119, 127, 154, 156

D u p le ix 15

C u rse tji, C o m m a n d e r J . 128

D u tc h E a s t C o m p an y 10

Cuttack, H M IS 55

D u tc h o v e rse a s e x p lo its a n d re la tio n s 3, 5, C y ren c 4

10. 12, 14. 16,61, 94, 107, 137

D u tc h , V .C . 27

D ’A ch e 15

D u tt, B .C . 68-71, 89

D a lh o u s ie , L o rd 18

Dalhousie, H M IS 25, 116, 143, 146-47

E a s t In d ia C o m p an y 3, 11-12, 17-18, 103, D a n is h E a s t In d ia C o m p an y — o v e rse a s ex136,138 see also B ritish O v erseas interest, p lo its a n d re la tio n s 3, 13

ex p lo its a n d re la tio n s and B ritish E ast D a s G u p ta , R .N . 162

I n d ia C o m p an y

D a v e n p o rt 38

E a s t In d ie s 4, 11-12, 16, 19, 94, 100

D a v is , J o h n 136

E d u c a tio n a n d T ra in in g 119-21

D a y a n e 8

E g y p t 3-5, 7-9, 19

D ’c ru z , G .C . 129

E la n g a is 5

Deccan, H M IS 56, 93

E le c tric a l a n d T o rp e d o T ra in in g S ch o o l 36

D e co m m is s io n in g o f sh ip s 94, 100, 148

E l hind, S.S. 93

D e fe n c e C o n s u lta tiv e C o m m itte e 54

E liz a b e th I 10

D e fe n c e M in is te r ’s C o m m itte e (N a v y ) 130

E lliso n , C o m m o d o re H .B . 124

D e fe n c e S e rv ice s S taff C o lle g e 100

E m erg en cy C o m m is s io n O fficers 143

D e lft I s la n d 139

E n g in e erin g D ir e c to r a te 119, 156

Delhi, H M IS 37-39, 100-01, 122

E n q u iry C o m m iss io n sec C o m m issio n o f D e m o b ilis a tio n o f p e rso n n e l 103, 110-11, E n q u iry

116, 148, 150-51

E p iru s 4

D e n F ra n c e s c o d ’A lm e id a 9

E q u a to r C ro s s in g c ere m o n y 101

D e n ta l tre a tm e n t p ro v is io n 146-47

E q u ip m e n t D ir e c to r a te 155

D e s a i, M o ra rji 88

E u p h ra te s 20

D e s tro y e rs 40-42, 119, 127-28, 154

" E x e rc is e P e a c e ” 100

Dhamish, H M IS 55, 94

D h a m r a , riv e r 139

F a H ie n 6

D h illo n , B rig a d ie r J.S . 162-63

F a tim a 120

D h u r in d e r 71

Fer inghee 10

D ia z , B a rth o le m y 8

Feroze, H M IS 55, 73. I l l , 117

D ie g o G a r c ia 2, 26, 138

F ire-fig h tin g a n d D am ag e C o n tro l S ch o o l Dilawar, H M IS 56, 116-17, 121

118

Dipavati, H M IS 55, 118

F ireflies 129

D ir e c to r G e n e ra l, S h ip b u ild in g a n d R e

F itz h e rb c rt, V ice A d m ira l S ir H e rb e rt 27, p a irs , B o m b ay 155

59, 60. 132

D ir e c to r a te o f W e a p o n s a n d T ra in in g 121

F la g s h ip 100-01

D is c ip lin e 21. 59, 61, 65, 82-83, 90, 103,

F la g s a n d in s ig n ia 11

109

F le e t A n c h o ra g e s 138

D is c rim in a tio n a n d ill-tre a tm e n t 61, 63

F le m is h o v e rse a s in te re s ts 3

69-74, 80

“ F lo a tin g a irfie ld s” 127

D is tin g u is h e d s e rv ic e s c ro sse s 110

F o o d a n d se rv ice c o n d itio n s 72, 77-78, 84.

D i u b a ttle o f 9

109-10

D o c k y a r d 35, 4 0 ,5 5 , 68, 112, 116, 119 122-F o rb e s , A d m ira l 62

23, 137, 153-54, 156-59

Foremost 93

IN D EX

1 6 9

F o r e s t S tra its 93

H a q N aw az, L ie u te n a n t C olonel M . 63

F o r t B arrack s Supply an d S ecretarial T ra in

H a ra p p a 3

ing S ch o o l. B om bay 117

Hardinge 19, 142

Foudroyant TS 17

H a rm o n ic T id a l A nalysis 139

F re e d o m fighters a n d p e n sio n s 82, 88-90

H a sa n B in R e h m a n 17

F re n c h — o v erseas in te rests ex p lo its an d

H a v elo c k Is la n d 45

re la tio n s 3, 10, 15-16, 61, 107

H a w k in s, C a p ta in 11

F rig a te s 151-52

Hector 11

Heera, H M IS 55, 118

G a la n tr y aw ard s 163

H en n essey , C a p ta in 139

G a lin a ts 11

Hermes, H M S 127

G a m a , P a u lo d a 8

H e ro d o tu s 5

G a m a , V asco d a 8, 9

H a r v a r d s 129

G a n d h i, I n d ira 101

H ey d o n -S ey m o u r 70

G a n d h i, M a h a tm a 81-83, 85, 89

H ill, C a p ta in 65

G a rh w a li a n d G o rk h a so ld iers 58, 83

Himalaya, H M IS 25, 54-55, 114, 116, 119

G a s p e r s tra it 139

H in d u -m a ritim e in te re s ts 3-6, 10-11, 106

G a u ta m Singh, L ie u te n a n t 57-58

Hindustan, H M IS 25, 54, 93, 104

G a z e la r 84

H in d u s ta n sh ip y a rd 126

G e n o a 7, 16

H ip p a lu s 6

G e o rg e V I, K in g o f E n g la n d 79

H iro h ito , E m p e ro r 28

G e rm a n s, in te re s ts o v e rsea s a n d w o rld w ar H iro s h im a 44

3, 16. 93, 137

H o n a v a r 15

G h a n d h i, S u b -L ieu te n an t R .K .S . 56

H o n g K o n g 25

G h c ria 13-14

HongKong 56

G h u r a b s a n d G a liv a ts 11

H o o g h ly , riv e r 15-16, 136, 139

G ib r a lta r 38

Hooghly, H M IS 55

G ib s o n , J a c k 73-74

H o rm u z 1, 2, 9

G idney, S ir H en ry 23

H o rs m a n , C a p ta in H . 27

G ill, S q u a rd o n L ea d er P.S. 98

H o s p ita l sh ip s 156

G ill, S.S. 76

H o s se n , D r. A .R .S . 146-47

G o a 9, 106-07, 111

Hugh Lindsay 3, 18

Godavari, H M IS 24, 93-94

H u g h e s, A d m ira l E d w a rd 15

G o d frey , V ice A d m ira l J o h n 35, 62, 64, 66, H u n s 3

76, 82, 93-94, 108, 110

H y d ro g ra p h ic su rv ey (d e p a rtm e n t) 19, 103, Gondwana, H M IS 55

136-38, 140

G o v e rn m e n t o f In d ia A ct (1935) 48. 50

G re a t B rita in see B ritish . . .

Ib e ria n n a tio n s 7

G r e a t N ic o b a r islan d s see N ic o b a rs In a m u l-M a jid 46

G re e c e a n d G re ek s 4, 5, 7

In c h c a p e C o m m itte e 103

G u ja r a t 3, 6 , 8, 9;— S u ltan o f 9

In d e r Singh. C o m m a n d e r 162

G u n n e ry C o u rs e an d th e sc h o o l 24, 39, 55, In d ia — ind ep en d en ce,

d e v elo p m en t

a n d

112,

114, 116, 119, 122-24

in te rn a tio n a l re la tio n s 32-36, 39-40,43-44,

G u r d ia l S ingh, B rig ad ier 97-98

47-50, 59, 81-82, 89, 94-95, 97, 121

In d ia n D efen ce Science Service (ID S S )

H a id e r A li 15-16

160

H a in e s , C o m m a n d e r 18

In d ia n E x p e d itio n to A n ta rc tic a 21

H a j pilg rim s 10

In d ia n M a rin e 11-12, 137, 142-43

H a lc y o n c la ss m in esw eep ers 104

In d ia n M c d ica l S erv ice 142-43

Hamalawar, H M IS

In d ia n M e rc a n tile

M a rin e

D e p a rtm e n t

117

H a m ilto n , L ie u ten a n t H .J .D . 133

23-25

In d ia n M ilita ry A cad em y , D e h r a D u n 87

Hamla, H M IS 55, 117, 147

In d ia n N a tio n a l C o n g re ss 48, 54, 80-S4, 8

H a m m o n d , L ie u te n a n t 57-58

In d ia n N a v y 3. 18-23. 99-100. 103. 124.

H a n s th a l, C re e k su rv ey o f 139

1 7 0

IN D EX

146, 161-63 see also R o y a l In d ia n N a v y K o ri c rce k , su rv e y o f 138

In d ia n O cean 1, 2 ,4 , 7-10, 1 2 -1 3 ,3 1 ,3 3 -

K a rm a rk a r, C o m m a n d e r S .G . 87-88

34. 36, 46-47

K a rn a p h u li riv e r 139

In d o -C h in a 3, 6

K a r w a r 100

I n d o n e s ia a n d A rch ip elag o 1, 39, 101

K a ss im 9, 10, 106, 151

Indus, H M IS 25, 104

K a ta ri, C o m m a n d e r R .D . 37-38, 46, 88, 98, In d u s riv e r 97

161

v alley c iv ilis a tio n 3

K a th ia w a r D efen ce F o rc e 97, 100

Intelligence c o lle c tio n w o rk 93-94

Kathiawar, H M IS 55

Inter-S erv ice D e m o b ilisa tio n P la n n in g S taff K a th ia w a r s ta te s 95, 97-98

(IS D P S ) 110

K a u l, L ie u te n a n t M u k a l 58

Investigator, H M IS 56, 118, 137, 139, 142

K e ir, G e n e ra l W illia m G ra n t 17

Iq b a l S in g h 43, 45

K e ra la 4, 6

I r a n I

K e y sto n , D r. J .E . 157-59

Ira q 1 9 ,4 7 , 107

K h a ire d d in B a rb a ro s a 2

Ira w a d d y 19

K h a n , N a w a b M u rs h id K u li 14

Ish ik a v a , A d m ira l 44

K h a n , M .S. 71

Ism ail M o h a m m e d 27

Khanjar, H M IS 117

I s w a r S a ra n , M u n sh i 22

K h o ja A m b e r 9

Iy e n g ar, K .S. K ris h n a s w a m y 54

K h o r A b d u lla 138

Khyber, H M IS 55

J a ffa ra b a d 98-99

K in g , C o m m a n d e r F .W . 67, 69

Jahanara, H M IS 114, 117

K in g ’s S e a m e n H o s p ita l 146

J a h a n g ir, E m p e r o r 11

K irb y , W o o d b u m 43

Jahangir. H M IS 117

K irp a l Singh, L ie u ten a n t C o m m a n d e r 38

" J a i H in d ” flags a n d slo g a n s 54, 68

Kistna, H M IS 24, 38, 56, 93-94, 98, 100, J a k a r t a 12, 94

120

J a m e s I, K in g 11

K lin g s 4

Janies II

K o d in a r 98

J a m n a g a r e s ta b lis h m e n ts 25, 56, 117, 123

K o h li, L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r M a n m o h a n J a p a n a n d W o rld W a r II 4, 5, 25-26, 28, S in g h 21

35, 43-47, 87, 94, 107, 125, 128

K o h li, C o m m a n d e r S .N . 4 2 ,7 1 -7 2 , 77, 87-J a v a 3, 5, 6, 10, 9 4

88

Ja y a p ra k a s h N a ra y a n 84

K o ls e tt 55

Jefiford, C o m m o d o re J.W . 76

Konkan, H M IS 98-99

Je s u d a s a n 71

K o n k a n C o a st 11,13-14

Jew s 3-5, 107

K o p to s C ity 7

J in n a h , M o h a m m e d A li 22, 50, 120-21

K o r e a W a r 45, 129

J o a s a n is 17

K o ra n g e Is la n d 28, 139

J o d h p u r, I .A .F . S ta tio n 129

K r is h n a H a th e e Singh 87-88

Jumna, H M IS 24-25, 45, 55, 94, 98-99, 139

K ris h n a n , L ie u te n a n t N . 26, 57-59, 98

J u n a g a d h 95-99

Kukri, H M IS 139

K u lk a rn i, L ie u te n a n t K .L . 38, 99

Kakauri, H M IS 55, 111

Kumaon, H M IS 55

K a k in a d a 117

K u m a ria , L ie u te n a n t 71

Kalavati, H M IS 55

K u n ik a w a M a ru c la ss o f sh ip 26

K a lin g a r 4

K u n ja li M a ra k k a r II 9

K a m a th , L ie u ten a n t C o m m a n d e r V .A . 38-39

K u tc h , g u lf 14, 139

K a n d la p o rt 138-39

K y a u k P y u h a r b o u r 93, 139

K a n y a K u m a ri 1, 12,125

K a p o o r, C o m m a n d e r G .S . 42

L a B o u rd a n n a is 15

K a rac h i 25, 39, 54-55, 58, 77 84 94-95

L a b o ra to rie s a n d re s e a rc h in s titu tio n s 157, 1 0 4 ,1 1 7 .1 2 0 -2 1 ,1 2 5 ,1 2 8 ,1 3 2

159

Karachi, H M IS 55, 104, 114

L a b o u r P a rty o f E n g la n d 89

IND EX

171

L accadivcs 2, 43, 47, 49

M alay a sian P e n in su la I, 2, 5, 6

L ah o re 10

M ald iv es 2. 16

Lahore, H M IS 55

M alp e, S urvey o f 138-39

L ak sh ad w eep see L accad ivcs

M a lta 25, 38

Lai, H M IS 55, 118

M a n c h u ria , In v a sio n o f 45

L an d in g c ra ft a n d th e w ings 117, 147, 151, M a n d a p a m 25, 56, 93, 138, 147

154

M a n g a lo re 15, 138-39

L an d in g sh ip s ta n k s 39

M a n g ro l, te rrito ry a n d S h eik h o f 96-99

L an g , J o h n 41

M an ig ram m an ch ettie s 5

L an g u ag e po licy 111

M a n n a r, G u lf o f 139

L au n ch es 151

M an o c l, K in g o f P o rtu g al 8

Law , L ie u ten a n t B .D . 129

M a n o ra (K a rac h i), B oy’s T rain in g

L aw o f s e a c o n v en tio n 28

E stab lish m en t 104

Lawrence, H M IS 26, 55, 104

M a n o ri C re ek , Survey o f 138

L aw ren ce, C o m m o d o re J o h n 62, 76

M a n p o w e r 103-04, 156

L aw rence, L o rd P e th ic k 33, 47

M a ra k k a rs 9

Llanstophen Castle, H M IS 56

M a ra t h as 12-14, 16, 83

L ea rm o n t, C a p ta in P ercy 65

M a rin e Survey 19, 136, 138-39, 142

L eak e, S ir H e n ry 18

M a ritim e c h a rts 136

L ia q u a t A li K h a n 97

M a ritim e T rad e see T ra d e activ ities Lilavati, H M IS 26

M a rta b a n , G u lf o f 139

L isto w el, E arl 49, 50

M a rv e 55

L itto ra l s ta te s 2, 3

M a s a n i, M .R . 84-85

L o cal N a v al D efen ce B ase 123

M a s ira 47

L o g a n a th a n , L ie u te n a n t C o lo n e l 44

M a so n , P h ilip 84-85

L o g is tic s 153-56

M a ss aw a p o rt 25-26

L o n a v la 25, 117, 120

M a s te r G e n e ra l o f th e O rd in a n ce 155

L o n g islan d 45

M a stiff c la ss m inesw eeping traw le rs 104

L o th a l 3

M athew s. C o m m o d o re 14

L ynch, C a p ta in 18

‘M a ts y a Y a n tr a ’ 3, 4

M a u ritiu s 1, 15, 100

M cC lu er, C a p ta in J o h n 19,136-37

M a u ry a s 4

M a c e d o n ia 4

M ayo C o lleg e 73

Machlimar, H M IS 55, 117

M ay o , M iste r M id sh ip m an 18

M ack en zie, S ir C o m p to n 45

M azag o n D o c k 93

M a d a n S in g h 71-72

M e c ca 18

M a d h y a P ra d e s h P o lice 134

M ec h an ica l T ra in in g E s ta b lish m e n t 24-25, M a d ra s 15, 25, 55, 94, 104, 106, 132, 142

56,

59, 116-17

Madras, H M IS 5, 98-99

M e d a ls a n d d e c o ra tio n s 110

Madura, H M IS 55

M e d ica l c a re 142-47

Magar, H M IS 39, 40

M e d ite rra n e a n c o u n trie s 7

M a g e lla n 8

M e d ite rra n e a n fleet 38, 41, 121

Mag/i p irates 10

M e g asth en es 4

M a h a b o d h i S o ciety 100

M e h ta, C a d et D .R . 132-33

M a h a ja n , J u s tic e M .C . 54

M e lin d e 8

Maharatta, H M IS 55

M c n o n , V .K . K ris h n a 38

M a in te n a n c e U n it (312), C o c h in 131

M en o n , V .P. 95

M a in te n a n c e U n it o f R o y a l A ir F o rc e 124

M e rc e n a rie s 83

M a la b a r C o a s t a n d th e h ill 4, 6. 9, 12-13, Merchant N av y 23-24, 108, 111. 125, 14 .

55, 73

156

M a la c c a G u lf a n d th e s tr a its o f 1, 2, 6 , M erg n i A rc h ip elag o 93

10, 12, 45, 93, 137

M e s o p o ta m ia 19

M e teo ro lo g y 120

M a la g a s y 1

M iles, A d m ira l Sir G eo ffrey 120-21

M a la y a 1, 47, 87, 94, 109

1 7 2

IN D EX

M ilita ir W illem s O rd e r 27

N a v a l a v ia tio n 127-31

M ilita ry H o s p ita l, C o la b a 145-46

N a v a l d o c k y a rd See D o c k y a rd

M ir H u s s a in , A d m ira l 9

N a v a l G u n n e ry E s ta b lis h m e n t 114

M in efield s c lean in g o p e ra tio n s 61, 94

N a v a l H e a d q u a rte rs 23-24, 74-76, 110,

M in esw eep in g flo tilla 4 3 ,9 3 -9 4 , 104, 151

118, 123, 138-39, 155-56, 163

M in ic o y 100

N a v a l M u s e u m 21

M into 20

N a v a l S cien tific R e s e a rc h 157, 159

M o g a lla n a , R e lic s o f 100

N a v a l S e a m a n sh ip S ch o o l 124

M o g h u ls 3. 10, 12, 16

N a v a l S taff C o lle g e , G re e n w ic h 112

M o h a m m e d Ib ra h im 27

N a v a l S u b -c o m m itte e 94-95, 120

M o h e n -jo -D a ro 3

N a v a l tra in in g s c h o o ls 24-25

M o ra le R e p o r t 76

N a v a n a g a r s ta te 97

M oti, H M IS 55

N a v la k h i, S urvey o f 139

M o to r L a u n c h (M L 420) 99

N a v y 32, 34-35, 81, 161-63

M o to r T ra n s p o rt B o at T ra in in g B a se a t s e n io r to o th e r fo rces 161-63

T ro m b a y 117

N a v y , A rm y , A ir F o rc e In s titu te 62

M o u n tb a tte n , L o rd L o u is 36, 38, 50, 97, N a v y D a y P a ra d e 114

128

N a y y ar, L ie u te n a n t R .P . 71

M o z a m b iq u e 8

N a z a re th , S u rg e o n L ie u te n a n t F .J .E . 147

M u k e rji, C a p ta in D .N . 20

N e h ru , J a w a h a rla l 39, 54, 82, 87-88, 97, M u k h c rji, L ie u te n a n t H .K . 129

101, 161-62

M u l D w a r k a 98

c r u is e to In d o n e s ia 101

M u lg a ris ia s o f B a b a ria w a d 96

N e ls o n , L o rd 16

M u lta n , Seige o f 18

N e p tu n e ’s c o u r t 101

M u n g a v in , L ie u te n a n t P e trie G e o rg e 99, Netaji Subhas IN S 55

100

N e th e rla n d s , Q u e en o f 27

M u s c a t 13

Nettle 132

M u s lim L ea g u e 49, 54, 72, 80

N ew E n try R a tin g s T ra in in g S ch o o l 117

M u s s e n d o n , C a p e o f 17

N ew Z e a la n d 47, 61, 67, 107

M u tin y a n d m u tin e e rs 53-80, 82-90

N ia z i, G e n e ra l 59

c a u s e s 59-80, 84-89

N ic o b a r islan d s 4, 6, 43-51, 101, 136

d ism is sa l o r re in s ta te m e n t o f

Nilam, H M IS 55, 118

v o lu n te e rs 82-83, 88-90

N ile 7

p o litic a l in d iv id u a ls a n d p a rtie s ro le N in e v e h 7

62,

69, 78, 80, 82-85, 87-89

N iz a m 16

M u z iris 6

N o n -v io le n c e 83-84

M y s o re 106

N o rw a y 36, 61, 107

N o tt, C o m m o d o re M .H . St. L . 36, 45, 72, N a g a s a k i 45

98-99, 124

N a ir , R e a r A d m ira l K .R . 45-46

N u c le a r b o m b , d ro p p in g o f 44-45

Nalini, H M JS 114, 117

N a m b ia r, M a jo r 98, 100

O c e a n o g ra p h ic p r o p e rtie s , s tu d y o f 136

N a m d a s is 5

O g a le, V e n k a tra o 87

N a n c o w ry isla n d 43, 45, 49

O m a n , L a r o la 16

N a n d a , C o m m a n d e r S .M . 38, 161, 163

Ondina, M.V. 26-27

N a p o le o n 16, 59

O p e ra tio n C o u n te n a n c e 26

N a ra y a n a n , C o m m a n d e r C . 73

O p e ra tio n P o p c o r n 45

Narbada, H M IS 24, 45-46, 55, 73, 93-94

O p h ir 7

Nasik, H M JS 55

O fficers 2, 53, 55, 61-63, 65-67, 69, 73, 80,

N a tio n a l C a d e t C o r p s O fficers o f N a v a l 103-07, 112-13, 117, 121-22, 155

W in g 122

b e h a v io u r, d rin k in g h a b its , p a rtie s , N a tio n a l D e fe n c e A c ad e m y , 73, 100,

etc. 65, 72

113,

122

B ritish a n d E u r o p e a n 61, 67, 69, 72,

Nautilus, H M IS 55

107, 113

IN D EX

1 7 3

d e m o b ilisatio n a n d resettlem en t 53,

P h ilip p in es 19

55,

62-63. 104. 155

P h o en ician s 5, 7

In d ian 63. 71-72, 107

P h o to g ra p h y School, L o n av la 117

S h o rta g e 103, 107, 121

P h u k e t Isla n d 93

tra in in g 73, 117

P h y sical a n d R e c re a tio n a l T rain in g

O rd e r o f S e n io rity 162

S c h o o l, K a ra c h i 117

O rd in a n ce E x p o rt T ra n s it D e p o t 125

P ig eo n m ail service 132, 134

O ris s a 106

P illai, S u b -L ieu te n an t A n th o n y 57

Orissa, H M IS 55, 61

P in to , L ie u ten a n t E .L . 57

O rm a ra E a s t Bay, su rv ey o f 138-39

P ira te s see Sea p irates

O rm u z 1, 9, 12

P isa n s 7

Oriender 11

P lassey, B a ttle o f 14

O ste n d C o m p an y 14

P ly m o u th 38

Oudh, H M IS 55

P o co ck , A d m ira l 15

O u d h , N a w a b o f 16

P o in t P e d ro 139

O x u s 7

P o la n d a n d P o lish A rm y 85

P o litic a l lea d ers a n d p a rties, ro le o f 61, Pacific O cean 1, 6, 19

69. 78, 8 0 , 82-83, 85. 87-89

P a k is ta n 1, 35, 38-39, 46, 50, 64, 76, 94-97, P o n d ic h erry 15

112, 120-21, 128, 147, 151

P o n n a n i 9

a sse ts, tr a n s f e r to 38-39, 95, 120, 128

Poona, H M IS 55

P a lk s tr a it 139, 141

P o p e C alix tu s I I I 8

P a n d y a s 4, 6

P o rb a n d e r s ta te 96-99

P a n ik k a r, K .M . 1, 9

P o r tB a r u v e 125

P a n t, A p a 87

P o r t B la ir 19. 43-46. 94

P a ra s h a r, L ie u te n a n t P .N . 129

P o r t S aid 38

P arry , V ice A d m iral S ir E d w a rd 38, 128, P o rt V a d rev a 125

157, 161

P o rtla n d 38

Parvati, H M IS 25

P o rts m o u th 16-17, 38-39, 42, 73

P a te l, H .M . 41

P o rtu g u e se — overseas ex ploits an d

P a tel, V a lla b h b h ai 48, 54, 82-84, 88, 97, re la tio n s 3. 6, 9-15, 106, 137

99, 101

P o w er, A d m iral S ir A rth u r 38

Pa than, H M IS 133

P resid en cy M e d ica l Services 142

P a th a n s 3

Prince Henry o f Prussia 16

P a th fin d e r In le t, su rv ey 138

P riso n e rs-o f-w a r 87

Patna, H M IS 55

P to lem ies 7

Patrick Stewart 137

P to lem y P h ilad e lp h u s 7

P a tte rs o n , N .K . 46

P u b lic S ervice C o m m issio n 111

P a tte rs o n , V ice A d m ira l W .R . 54

P u lo Ve Is la n d 45

P a tw a rd h a n , J a n a rd h a n 87

P u n ja b 85, 106

P a u lo d a G a m a 8

Punjab, H M IS 55, 93-94

P e a rl H a r b o u r a c tio n 128

P u n ja b R e g im e n t 17

P e d ro C a b ra l 9

P y g m a lio n -P o in t 43

P eg u , r u le r o f 10

P e lo w Is la n d s 19

" Q u it In d ia ” , slo g a n 68, 81-82

P e n a n g 94, 101

Pennsylvania, USS 127

R a cial a rro g a n c e a n d d isc rim in atio n 61, P e n sio n s 82, 88-90

63,

69-74, 80

P e re ira , D r. D a isy 143

R a d a r S c h o o l a n d tra in in g 55, 109, 112, P e rs ia 3, 7, 12, 18, 33

116-17

P e rsia n G u lf 1-4, 7, 11-12, 17-19, 25-26,

Raider, H M S 40-42

R a ja r a ja I 5

59, 136

R a je n d r a 1 5

P esh w as 14

R a je n d ra , L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r S. 140

P e y to n , C a p ta in 15

1 7 4

IN D EX

R a jk h o w n . L ie u te n a n t P .C . 129

R o y a l In d ia n N a v a l R e se rv e 24, 76

Rajput, H M IS 42, 100

R o y a l In d ia n N a v y 11, 19, 20, 23-28, 31-Rajputana, H M IS 55, 106

32, 34-40, 53-55, 57-59, 61-80, 86-90,

R a jp u ta n a R ifles 45

93-101. 103-12. 151, 155

R a jk o t 98

R o y a l In d ia n N a v y H o s p ita l an d M edical R a m C h a ra n , L ie u te n a n t 21

Service 143-44. 146

Ramdas, H M IS 43, 55

R o y a l In d ia n N a v y V o lu n tee r R e se rv e R a m e sh P re m c h a n d S a n a to riu m (S ew ri, 24.

65. 73. 104. 120. 132-33. 161

B om bay) 146

R o y a l In d ia n N a v y W a r P u rp o s e s F u n d R a m rc e H a r b o u r 139

134

Rampur, H M IS 55

R o y a l N a v a l A ir S ta tio n 124, 129

Rana. H M IS 42, 100

R o y a l N a v a l L a n d in g C ra ft B ase 124

R a n a ld s , C a p ta in H .C . 129

R o y a l N a v a l V o lu n te e r R e se rv e 142-43

Ranger, H M S 93

R o y a l N a v y 20. 24, 35, 41, 70-71, 94. 100.

R a n g o o n 18, 43, 93, 100

103-04, 113, 116, 118, 161-63

Ranjit, H M IS 42, 100

R o y a l N ew Z e a la n d N a v y 67

R a n jit S ingh, M a h a ra ja 2

R o y a l P a k is ta n N a v y 76

R a o , L ie u te n a n t M .R .A . 163

R o y a l P r u s s ia n B en g al C o m p a n y 16

R a s-e l-K h a im a 17

R o z i, su rv e y o f 138

R a su lk h a n ji S ir M a h a b a tk h a n 95

R u d ra , C o lo n e l A .A . 63

R a ta n , M a jo r S h y am 98

R u ju k o k u s h i 5

R a tin g s 53-55, 61-62, 68-69, 72. 84. 103-06,

R u s s ia a n d R u s s ia n s 18, 33-34,44-45, 47

109, 112, 117

61, 85, 107

Ratnagiri, H M IS 25

w a r a g a in s t J a p a n 44-45

R a ttra y , R e a r A d m iral A .R . 71, 75, 76

R a w lin s o n C o m m itte e 20-21, 103

S a b a n g 45

R e c o n n a is s a n c e p ick e t 127

S a c ram en to S h o a l 138-39

R e c ru itm e n t a n d p ro m is e s 20, 76, 103, St. G e o rg e ’s c ro s s 11

105,

108-12

H o s p ita l, B o m b ay 145-46

R e d S ea 2 , 7, 19, 25, 136-37

S aiy ed F a z i A li, S ir 54

Redoubt, H M S 40-42

S a k a s 3

R e e s , M a jo r G e n e ra l T .W . 54

S a lary c o n d itio n s 72, 78, 79, 108

R c h m a n , H a s a n B in 17

S a lay a H a r b o u r 138

R e o rg a n is a tio n C o m m itte e 31-32, 34-35

S a ls e tta isla n d 14

R e p u b lic D a y p a ra d e 162-63

S a m so n , L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r B .A . 98

R e se rv e O fficers a n d W R 1N S O fficers

S a n d e rs o n , C a p ta in L. 28

T ra in in g E sta b lis h m e n t 117

S a n g h a m itra , P rin c ess 4

R e se ttle m e n t sch em e a n d p ro s p e c ts 79, Sao Gabriel 8

109-11

Sao Raphael 8

R itc h ie , J o h n 136

S a te llite c o m m u n ic a tio n 134

R o e , S ir T h o m a s 11

S aw hny, L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r R . 98

Rohilkhand, H M IS 55, 98-99

S c h o o l o f A irc ra ft M a in te n a n c e , C o ch in R o m a n s a n d R o m a n E m p ire 4, 5, 7

131

R o s s , C a p ta in D a n ie l 19. 137

S cien tific re s e a rc h 157-60

R o s s is la n d 43

S c in d ia s h ip y a rd 126

Rotherham, H M S 40-42

S c in d ia S te a m N a v ig a tio n C o . 23, 25

R o y a l A i r F o rc e 47, 50, 81, 85, 124, 129

S c o tt, C a p ta in 20, 21

R o y a l A u s tra lia n N a v y 67

S c o u t c ru is e rs 127

R o y a l B o m b ay Y a c h t C lu b 57

S e a b a ttle s 9, 11-12

R o y a l C a n a d ia n N a v y 67

S e a c o m m a n d 9

'R o y a l’ d e s ig n a tio n 163

S ea C o u n c il 13

R o y a l I n d ia n A ir F o rc e 80, 113, 151, 161

Seahorse 16

R o y a l In d ia n F le e t R e se rv e 24

S ea law c o n v e n tio n 28

R o y a l In d ia n M a rin e 19-23, 103

S e a p ira te s 10, 17-18

IN D EX

1 7 5

S ea ro u te s 6, 7, 8

Solomon 11

S ea T ra n s p o rt O rg a n isa tio n an d

S o m an , L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r B.S. 61, E m b a rk a tio n H e a d q u a rte rs 124

77

S eafircs 129

S o m n a th tem p le 99

S eafury (F B I) 129

Sonavati, H M IS 56, 65

S eam an sh ip School 24, 116

Sophie Marie, H M IS 43

S e a to n , C a p ta in 17

S o u th A frica 61, 107

S eaw ard D efen ce M o to r L au n c h 138

S o u th C h in a S ea 1

S e n io rity o r d e r 162

S o u th P o le 20-21

S c ra m p o re 13

S p a n ish A rm a d a 10

S ervice c o n d itio n s an d fo o d 72, 77, 84.

S ri L a n k a 1, 3-6, 12, 111

109-10

Sri V ijayas 5-6

Sew ri, R I N H o s p ita l 55

S taff C o lleg e, Q u e tta 112

S eychelles 1, 100

S te am sh ip s see also specific ship u n d e r S ey m o u r-H ey d o n , C o m m a n d e r 70

its nam e 18

S h a h ja h a n , M o g h al E m p e ro r 12

S to k e r B oys 121

Shamsher H M IS , 56-57, 59

S tra a t B a n k a 139

S h a n k a r, R e a r A d m iral D . 26

S tra it o f M a lac ca see M a lac ca s tra it S h a rif K h a n 39

S trateg ic fa cto rs 2

Shaw , L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r E . M ichael S treatficld -Jam cs, C o m m a n d e r E.C . 64

66-67, 71

S u d a n 25

S h ep p ard , L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r T o m S uez C a n a l 18-19

63-64

Suffren, A d m ira l 15

Shillong. H M IS 56

S u m a tra 1, 3, 5-6, 125

S h ip -b o rn e a irc ra ft 127

S u m er 3

S h ip b u ild in g 4, 10, 16-17, 25-26, 108, 155

S u n d a S tra its 94

S h ip s 4, 17-18, 37-40

S u p e rin te n d in g N a v a l S to res Officer 155

re o rg a n is a tio n 94

S u p p ly D e p a rtm e n t 153-55

ty p es o f 151-52

S u ra b a y a 101

S h iv a ji 12-13

S u ra t 10-12, 17

Shivaji, H M IS 25, 56, 117, 119-22, 147, 157

S urvey o f In d ia , D e h ra D u n 139

S h o re e sta b lish m e n ts 55-56

S urvey v essels 137, 140, 151

S h o rt serv ice c o m m issio n 113, 121-22

S u rv ey in g m e th o d s a n d survey service 137.

S h rin ag esh , L ie u te n a n t G e n e ra l S.M . 163

139

S hroff, L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r B o m an

Sutlej. H M IS 24-25, 56, 93,100, 139

K a ik a s h ro o 132-34

Sw ally 11-12

S h u ja -u d -D o w la 16

Sw am y, C o m m a n d e r M .S .I. 72

Sidis 12-14

S w arn a A la n k a r see Sri L a n k a

Signal S c h o o l 24-25, 116, 124

Sw eden 61, 107

S ik k a, su rv ey o f 138

S y ersto n , R A F S ta tio n 129

S im m o n s, L ie u te n a n t P ercy 39

S y ria 4, 7

S in d 106

Sind. H M IS 55, 93

T a d m o re 7

S in g a p o re 2, 46, 107, 113

T a j H o te l 46

Singh, S u rg eo n C o m m a n d e r M o h in d e r 57

Talwar. H M IS 25, 54-55, 66-68, 71-72, 76, Singh, L ie u te n a n t Y .N . 128

87-88, 117, 124

S kip w ith , M rs . M.T. 114

T a m il K in g s 6

S lo o p s see also specific slo o p u n d e r its T a m r a lip ta 4, 6

n a m e 104, 151

T a n k h a n d lin g c ra ft 98-99

Smiter, H M S 39

T a s m a n ia 19

S m u g g lin g p a tr o ls , a n ti- 94

T a tta 7

S o c o tra 1, 2, 4, 9

T av o y , C o a s t 93

T a y lo r, C a p ta in D u n d a s 137

S o k h i, L ie u te n a n t R .S . 129

T eizc H a r a , V ice A d m ira l 45

S o lo m a n , B rig a d ie r A .J. 45

1 7 6

IN D EX

T e la n g s 4

V e rso v a 55, 138

T e n a s s e rim , C o a s t 93

Vestal, H M S 93

Tengra, H M IS 56

V icero y o f In d ia 18, 33, 36, 47-51, 79

T h a ila n d 4 -6

p a ra d e 114

T h a p a r, L ie u te n a n t G e n e ra l D .R . 146

V ic to ria C ro s s 18,19

T h o m a s , D r. 146

V ig, S u rg e o n L ie u te n a n t M .R . 147

Thrasher, H M S 39

V ijay d u rg 13

T ig e r m o th s 129

V ish a k h a p a tn a m 25, 40, 56, 65, 93, 94, 104, T ig ris 19-20

121, 123, 125-26, 132, 156

T ip u S u lta n 15, 16

Tir, H M IS 56, 100, 120, 123

W ad e so n , C a p ta in L. 123

T o rp e d o b o a ts 104, 127

W ad ia, L ow jee N u s se rw a n je e 17

tr a in in g 5 6 ,1 1 2 , 116-18, 122

W alk er. G .E . 11, 20

T o y e, H u g h 43

W a rra n t O fficers 62, 104-05, 110

T ra d e a c tiv itie s 3-8, 10-13, 16, 23, 33-34

W a tso n , A d m ira l 14-15

r o u te s 7-8, 10

W av e ll, F ie ld M a rs h a l V isc o u n t 33, 36, T ra in in g e s ta b lis h m e n ts a n d s c h o o ls 39-40, 43, 47, 79

55-56, 59, 73, 94-95, 100, 104, 109-14,

W est In d ie s 8

116-24, 129-31

W h ite P o in t 139

T r a v a n c o r e 106

W ilh elm in a, Q u e en o f N e th e rla n d s 27

T ra w le rs 151

W illin g d o n Is la n d 123

T rin c o m a le e 56, 94, 100-01

W ire le ss C o m m u n ic a tio n 54, 123

Trincomalee, H M S 17

W ilso n , L ie u te n a n t C o m m a n d e r W .J.

T u rk s 8, 19, .107

26-27

W o m e n ’s A u x ilia ry C o rp s (In d ia ) 113, 143

U S S R see R u s s ia a n d R u s s ia n s W o m e n ’s R o y a l In d ia n N a v a l S ervice U n io n J a c k 11, 21

(W R 1N S ) 113-14, 117, 143

U n ited K in g d o m see B ritis h . . .

W o o d ru ff, P h ilip 84

U n ite d S ta te s 10

W o rld W a r I 20, 103, 127, 133

flag 11

W o rld W a r I I 23-28, 31, 43-46, 59, 61,

In fo rm a tio n O ffice 54

86-87, 93, 103-04, 107-08, 113, 116, 123,

N a v y 127

125, 128-29, 132, 142, 144, 145

U n to u c h a b le s 69

U lta r P ra d e s h 106

X erx es A rm y 6

V .J. D a y 128, 150

Y a c h t C lu b 57

V cd as 3

Y a rk e r, L ie u te n a n t F .M . 70-71

V ach h a, D r. G . 146

Y o u n g , M a c k w o rth 21, 23

Valsura, H M IS 56, 117, 157

Y u g o s la v ia 107

V asco d a G a m a 8, 9

V asu d ev a, R .N . 65

Z ah id H u s s a in , L ie u te n a n t 57

Venduruthy, H M IS 56, 123-24, 157

Z a k u t, A b ra h a m B en 8

V enice 5-8

Z a m o rin 9

V erg h cse, C o m m a n d e r P .M . 77

Z a n z ib a r 1, 100

R ear A d m ira l S a ty in d ra S in g h joined

the Royal Indian Naval Volunteer

Reserve, the W a vy Navy as it is

popularly know n, in June 1941 as a

Sub-Lieutenant and retired in 1977. He

has w itnessed the transition o f the

Navy from coal-fired ships to gas tu rbines; fro m conventional arm am ents to the present-day guided missiles; from

com m unication by pigeons to the

present-day satellites.

He has held various afloa t and sta ff

appointm ents and served both in the

M ilita ry and Intelligence W ings o f the

Cabinet Secretariat fo r 11 years. The

M ilita ry W in g provided the Secretariat

fo r various com m ittees o f higher

Defence co ntrol including the Defence

C om m ittee o f th e Cabinet presided over

by the then Prime M inister Shri

Jawaharlal Nehru. His last a pp ointm e nt

w as M em ber Secretary, J o in t Intelligence C om m ittee w h ich he held fo r seven years.

The author co ntribu te s regularly to

national dailies on topical subjects, both

civil and m ilitary. His intrinsic c o n trib u tio n to th e cause o f ex-S ervicem en's w elfa re is kn ow n th ro u g h o u t the

co un try.

ISBN 81-204-0094-1

Table of Contents

F o r e w o r d

A c k n o w l e d g e m e n t s

A b b r e v i a t i o n s

1. I n d i a ' s m a r i t i m e h i s t o r y

2 . P L A N S F O R T H E D E VEL OP ME NT OF T H E NA V Y

4 . T h e r o y a l i n d i a n n a v y m u t i n y , F e b r u a r y 1 9 4 6

5 . E v e n t s a t s e a

N a v a l a v i a t i o n

T h e n a v y ’s f e a t h e r e d a i r w i n g

1 0 . H y d r o g r a p h y

1 1 . T h e m e d i c o s a t s e a

1 3 . L o g i s t i c s