

# NET SECURITY PROVIDER – GOING BEYOND CONCEPT

*Commander Ranendra Singh Sawan*

*“Our defence cooperation has grown and today we have unprecedented access to high technology, capital and partnerships. We have also sought to assume our responsibility for stability in the Indian Ocean Region. We are well positioned, therefore, to become a net provider of security in our immediate region and beyond.”*

*- Dr Manmohan Singh<sup>1</sup>*

## **Introduction**

In March this year, when India evacuated over 5600 personnel including 960 from 41 countries,<sup>2</sup> from strife-torn Yemen, it was hailed by many as India's 'Net Security Provider' moment.<sup>3</sup> Indeed, the swift response by India to a situation that potentially threatened the safety of her citizens more than a thousand miles from its shores was no small feat. That the constituents of India's national power,<sup>4</sup> and the Navy in particular, worked together to accomplish this task was an exemplar of the growing influence that India can now exert in defending and furthering her national interests. However, whether Operation Rahat<sup>5</sup> can truly be claimed as India's

'Net Security Provider' moment needs a more incisive analysis than the media would care about. Consider, for example, the fact that almost three decades ago, following a civil war in Aden in the aftermath of a coup, Godavari and Shakti were despatched for the evacuation of Indian nationals in an operation called Operation Rajdoot.<sup>6</sup> Although the situation in Yemen had subsequently stabilised and there was no need to evacuate Indian nationals from Aden, was this operation not comparable with Operation Rahat? Then why is it that the idea of India being a (potential) regional net security provider gained traction only in recent years? What are the factors that have shaped this perception?

---

<sup>1</sup> 'India well positioned to be a net provider of security: Manmohan Singh', *The Hindu* (online edition), 24 May 2013 accessed on 14 May 15. The former prime minister was quoted while addressing a gathering after laying the foundation stone of Indian National Defence University (INDU) on 23 May 13 at Binola, Gurgaon.

<sup>2</sup> Ministry of External Affairs Press Release dated 09 Apr 15 accessed at [www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm/dtl/25049.Evacuation\\_from\\_Yemen](http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases.htm/dtl/25049.Evacuation_from_Yemen) on 18 May 15.

<sup>3</sup> Rajeshwari Krishnamurthy, 'Yemen Evacuation: India's 'Net Security Provider' moment', *South Asia Monitor* (online edition) 09 Apr 15 accessed 14 May 15.

<sup>4</sup> Apart from the Indian Navy, the IAF, Air India, Indian railways and the SCI also played a significant role in this well coordinated operation termed "Rahat".

<sup>5</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>6</sup> GM Hiranandani, *Transition to Eminence, IHQ MoD (Navy)*, Lancer Publishers, New Delhi 2004 pp 182-183.

This article purports to identify, one, what would qualify as a 'Net Security Provider' and two, what might the Indian Navy be prepared to deliver in order to qualify as one. The paper will also argue in favour of gaining greater clarity about the concept of 'Net Security Provider' in order to foster an understanding of what might be expected of a 'Net Security Provider'. Finally, the article will also suggest that neither the Navy needs to be a 'Net Security Provider' in order to achieve its stated Objectives, Missions and Tasks pertaining to regional maritime security issues nor it might be required to be one, at least in the foreseeable future.

### **Who is a Net Security Provider?**

The term 'Net Security Provider' in the Indian context was first used by the Americans. While speaking at the Shangri-La Dialogue in 2009, the US Secretary of Defence, Robert Gates, argued that "we look to India to be a

partner and net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond." This phrase was subsequently repeated in the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, which predicted a benign vision of India's rise when it argued that "as its military capabilities grow, India will contribute to Asia as a net provider of security in the Indian Ocean and beyond."<sup>7</sup> Thereafter, in an interview to the *Jane's Defence Weekly* in June 2011, the then CNS, Admiral Nirmal Verma stated that the Indian Navy is evolving as a credible and operationally capable force that is looked upon as a regional net security provider.<sup>8</sup> In Jun 2012, Leon Panetta, Secretary of Defense of the USA, in his meeting with India's Prime Minister Dr Manmohan Singh and the NSA Shiv Shankar Menon stated that the United States views India as a net provider of security from the Indian Ocean to Afghanistan and beyond.<sup>9</sup> The former Defence Minister, AK Antony, also reportedly stated that the Indian Navy

---

<sup>7</sup>Anit Mukherjee, *India as a Net Security Provider: Concept and Impediments*, S Rajaratnam School of International Studies, Aug 2014.

<sup>8</sup>Rahul Bedi, Interview: Admiral Nirmal Verma, India's Chief of Naval Staff, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol 48, Issue 31, Jul 2011 accessed at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/885730567?accountid=132150> on 18 May 15.

<sup>9</sup>Readout of Secretary Panetta's Meeting with the Prime Minister of India Manmohan Singh and Indian National Security Advisor Shivshankar Menon published by Federal Information & News Dispatch Inc and accessed at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/1020571341?accountid=132150> on 18 May 15.

has been mandated to be 'Net Security Provider' to the island nations in IOR.<sup>10</sup> Thus, over a period of time, there has been a growing perception among global powers, and more importantly among Indian policy makers, about the role that India could and should play as a provider of net security.

A useful discussion on India's role as a net security provider can only progress on the basis of a clear understanding of what or who is a 'Net Security Provider.' Apparently, there is no single accepted definition or interpretation of this term and views on this subject vary among experts. According to Anit Mukherjee, the answer to this question is context dependent and one can approach this question from different perspectives. For instance, securing India's national interests, addressing security concerns of a foreign government or overall global security. For the most part, the term net security provider is usually meant as enhancing mutual security of more than one country by addressing common

security concerns, including dealing with transnational piracy, or responding to disasters, etc.<sup>11</sup>

Mukherjee points out further, that the role of a 'Net Security Provider' encompasses four different activities - Capacity Building(CB), Military Diplomacy, Military Assistance, and direct deployment of military forces to aid or stabilise a situation.<sup>12</sup> According to Mukherjee, Capacity Building refers to the training of foreign forces - both civilian and military, either at home or by deploying trainers abroad. Military Diplomacy comprises military visits (to foreign countries) and exercises (with foreign armed forces). Military Assistance primarily means supplying (military) equipment (to foreign countries).<sup>13</sup> However, this may not be the most comprehensive definition of a net security provider, for reasons brought out subsequently.

### **Pointers from the Past**

Assuming that the parameters

---

<sup>10</sup>Indian Navy to provide net security in Indian Ocean Region: Antony, SP's Naval Forces, Oct 2011 accessed at <http://search.proquest.com/docview/902264923?accountid=132150> on 03 Jun 15. The Defence Minister was addressing the Chief of Naval Staff Admiral Nirmal Verma and Defence Secretary Shri Shashikant Sharma among other senior officers of the Indian Navy and MoD at the beginning of the three day Naval Commander's Conference.

<sup>11</sup>Mukherjee, *op cit*.

<sup>12</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>13</sup>*Ibid*.

specified above indeed define, in a general sense, a ‘Net Security Provider.’ it would be worthwhile to assess how the Indian Navy has fared in the past.

- **Capacity Building.** Training of foreign naval personnel by Indian Navy began as early as in the 60s. Personnel from Myanmar, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Malaysia, Iraq, Iran, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Sudan, Mauritius and Nigeria were trained in basic as well as technical and specialist courses.<sup>14</sup>

- **Military Diplomacy.** IN ships have also been deployed on ‘Flag Showing’ missions in the past. In 1953, Delhi, Ranjit and Tir participated in the Coronation Naval Review at Portsmouth.<sup>15</sup> In 1985, three decades earlier, 20 ships were deployed overseas for operations (Operation Octopus) as well as training and diplomatic visits. In that year, IN ships visited about 50 ports - from East Africa to the South China Sea.<sup>16</sup> It is also interesting to note that port visits

of diplomatic significance, such as annual visits to Seychelles and Mauritius on the occasion of their respective Independence days have been a regular feature since 1970. As far as exercises with foreign navies are concerned, the Navy had commenced participation in the Joint Exercises at Trincomalee (JET) with the Commonwealth navies, as early as 1949.<sup>17</sup> These were the ‘most important evolutions’ during the 1950s and until the middle of 1960s.<sup>18</sup> Thus, it would not be unfair to state that scale of deployments in pursuit of military diplomacy was comparable, and perhaps even greater, than what it is today.

- **Military Assistance.** The Navy has also provided military assistance, which is, supplying of military equipment to foreign countries, to friendly countries in the past. For example, in 1973-74, Seaward Defence Boats Akshay and Ajay were transferred to the Bangladesh Navy.<sup>19</sup> Similarly, in 1974, the Navy provided

---

<sup>14</sup>Satyindra Singh, *Blueprint to Bluewater*, Lancer International, New Delhi, 1992 p 293.

<sup>15</sup>*Ibid* pp 483-84.

<sup>16</sup>Hiranandani, *op cit*, pp 215-224.

<sup>17</sup>*Ibid*.

<sup>18</sup>Singh, *op cit*. p 488.

<sup>19</sup>GM Hiranandani, *Transition to Triumph*, IHQ MoD (Navy), Lancer Publishers, New Delhi 2000 p 368.

SDB Amar to Mauritius along with training of its crew.<sup>20</sup>

• ***Deployment of Military Forces to Aid or Stabilise a Situation.*** Two significant operations where the Navy was deployed in direct aid of a friendly country or to stabilise a situation were Op Pawan and Op Cactus.<sup>21</sup> The Navy was also deployed in support of the Army in Somalia for Operation Restore Hope.<sup>22</sup> Even earlier, the Navy provided assistance to Bangladesh, after its liberation in 1971, in restoring port facilities, minesweeping and re-opening of river ports.<sup>23</sup> India also provided naval assistance to Sri Lanka in 1971 and again, in 1987.<sup>24</sup>

It will be fairly apparent that the Indian Navy has been a ‘Net Security Provider’ long before this concept was articulated. Thus, if there’s nothing different in what a net security provider should do from what the Navy has already been doing in the past, then what makes these pronouncements

about India (and the Indian Navy) significant? The answer perhaps lies in a deeper exploration of this concept.

In an age when the contemporary security lexicon is replete with terms such as Collective Defence, Collective Security, Common Security, Comprehensive Security, Cooperative Security, Cooperative Engagement, Mutual Security, Security Community and Security Pluralism,<sup>25</sup> it would be wiser to accord greater thought to ‘Net Security Provider’. There are more intriguing aspects, which need greater deliberation, related to this concept, some of which are brought out in succeeding paragraphs.

### **Net Security Provider – Some Posers**

***‘Net Security Provider’ versus ‘Cooperating State on Security’.*** How would a ‘Net Security Provider’ be different from a ‘Cooperator on Security’? Is it simply the catchy phraseology or does it carry a deeper,

---

<sup>20</sup>*Ibid* p. 375

<sup>21</sup>The Indian Navy was deployed for Op Pawan in Sri Lanka and Op Cactus in Maldives. See *Freedom to Use the Seas: India's Maritime Military Strategy*, p. 22. For details, also see Hiranandani, *Transition to Eminence*, pp. 183-200.

<sup>22</sup>Indian Maritime Doctrine, p. 112. Also see, *Somalia – UNOSOM I, UN Operation in Somalia I*, prepared by the Dept of Public Information, UN accessed at <http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unosomi.htm> on 29 May 15.

<sup>23</sup>Hiranandani, *Transition to Triumph*, IHQ MoD (Navy), Lancer Publishers, New Delhi 2000 pp 232-241.

<sup>24</sup>C Uday Bhaskar, *The Navy as an Instrument of Foreign Policy in The Rise of the Indian Navy* ed by Harsh V Pant. P 43.

<sup>25</sup>Each of these terms, and many more, have a distinct meaning and context. For details see David Capie and Paul Evans, *The Asia-Pacific Security Lexicon*, Institute of Southeast Asia Studies, Singapore: 2002.

more implicit meaning? If cooperation (on security related issues) is the only criterion, then there could be many states that can claim to be net providers of security in the Indian Ocean Region. Also, cooperation requires willingness of two or more actors for participation in an activity that might be beneficial to both. Whereas, a ‘Net Security Provider’ would perhaps provide security at its own expense and may not have any immediate or direct benefits from this transaction.

***Net Security Provider and Unilateral Action.*** Does a ‘Net Security Provider’ act only on request or is unilateralism ingrained in this concept? Does a ‘Net Security Provider’ take *suo motu* cognisance of a security breach and consider itself empowered to act unilaterally? Would it, in the words of Theodore Roosevelt, “exercise international police power”?<sup>26</sup>

Does a ‘Net Security Provider’ only address common security concerns, as Anit Mukherjee has pointed out?<sup>27</sup> Or does it also respond to situations that

might not concern it directly? Whereas common security concerns such as maritime piracy, smuggling, terrorism and safety of life at sea can be addressed within agreed regional security frameworks, it is far more difficult to respond to threats to security that emerge in a specific geographic location and have significant political effects. One such example could be a politico-military crisis within a country or between two countries in the region. What is a ‘Net Security Provider’ expected to do in such scenarios?

***Security Assurance.*** Does a ‘Net Security Provider’ provide reasonable assurance of response any and every time it is called upon to do so? What kind of assurance or guarantee does it provide to its client nations?

As was brought out earlier in this paper, India’s former Defence Minister had stated that the Indian Navy has been mandated to be ‘Net Security Provider’ to the island nations in IOR<sup>28</sup>. This was probably in context of the fact that

---

<sup>26</sup>James Holmes et al, *Indian Naval Strategy in the Twenty-first Century*, Routledge, New York; 2009, p. 49. In this book, the authors have referred to the ‘Roosevelt Corollary’ to the Monroe Doctrine and Roosevelt is quoted as stating that the United States, in adherence to the Monroe Doctrine, could be forced to exercise international police power (in the Western Hemisphere).

<sup>27</sup>Mukherjee, *op cit.*

<sup>28</sup>See Note 10.

Indian Navy regularly deploys ships and aircrafts for surveillance of the EEZ of Maldives, Mauritius and Seychelles at the request of host governments.<sup>29</sup> Does this fact alone make the IN a net provider of security to these nations – sans obligations and assurances?

***Whose Security?*** Finally, whose security does a ‘Net Security Provider’ ensure? For instance, the IOR comprises about 35 countries, each with its own EEZ, and an even vast expanse of the High Seas where thousands of neutrals ply. Are all these potentially the clients of the so-called ‘Net Security Provider’, regardless of extant geo-political arrangements and international relations? Would a regional ‘Net Security Provider’ assume, or at least acknowledge, its responsibility for maintaining security in that region? Further, what happens in a situation when acting in aid of one could be detrimental to the security of another!

***How Much Security?*** How far would a ‘Net Security Provider’ stretch its

own resources in order to ensure that its obligations (if any) are fulfilled? For instance, at the peak of Somali piracy, 30 vessels from as many as 22 countries were deployed for protection of merchant shipping off the coast of Somalia.<sup>30</sup> This also included the resources deployed by the Indian Navy. How much, if at all, should be a potential ‘Net Security Provider’s’ contribution in this effort? And then, would all the contributors to international efforts in suppression of piracy off the coast of Somalia qualify as ‘Net Security Providers’ in the IOR?

### **The Concept of ‘Exporting’ Security**

An insight on what a ‘Net Security Provider’ could be is also found in an article by Dr Thomas Barnett, titled “India’s 12 Steps to a World-Class Navy” that appeared in the Jul 2001 issue of the US Naval Institute Proceedings. Dr Barnett is of the view that India is not a great power until it generates a surplus of external security – beyond what it needs to protect the country from outside attack and then markets that surplus as a collective

---

<sup>29</sup>Annual Report of the Ministry of Defence 2014-15, Govt of India, p.36, accessed at [www.mod.nic.in](http://www.mod.nic.in) on 21 May 15.

<sup>30</sup>Statement of R Adm Joseph W Kuzmick, Director Operations and Plans, USN before the US House of Representatives on Efforts to Combat Piracy dated 10 Apr 13 accessed at [http://www.navy.mil/ah\\_online/antipiracy/images/gallery/testimony.pdf](http://www.navy.mil/ah_online/antipiracy/images/gallery/testimony.pdf) on 01 Jun 15.

good.<sup>31</sup> This ‘marketing of surplus security’ concept is appealing, even though abstract. It attempts to quantify security and ventures beyond into the domain of ‘trading in security’. Dr Barnett then goes on to say that India’s growing naval power could be put to good use across a very broad range of regional collective security needs. Though he hasn’t used the term ‘Net Security Provider’ in his article, it gives a fair idea of what it could mean. His article implies that a ‘Net Security Provider’ would be an exporter of security.

However, in general, Dr Barnett’s formulation has a couple of infirmities. Firstly, how does one measure security? Security, unlike the armed forces, is not easily quantifiable. Therefore, is the advice of generating surplus of external security a call for strengthening India’s armed forces? Secondly, why would a country like India generate a surplus of external security (read build armed forces surplus to the requirement) in the first place? With the ever widening gap

between the resource requirement projected by the Ministry of Defence and what it is finally allotted in successive budgets, how could generating a ‘surplus of security’ be justified?

It is pertinent to mention here that this gap was eight percent (Rs 12,453 crore) in 2009-10, which increased to 26 percent (Rs 79,363 crore) in 2014-15.<sup>32</sup> So, if the armed forces do not get their share of projected budget, on what grounds would it be possible for the Navy to seek additional budget for generating surplus of external security?

### **India as a ‘Net Security Provider’ – Role of the Indian Navy**

While this article resists the notion of a ‘Net Security Provider’, on grounds of doctrinal infirmities, political tenor<sup>33</sup> and abstractness, it would be worthwhile to evaluate the role of the Indian Navy in promoting maritime security cooperation in the Region. The Indian Maritime Doctrine includes

---

<sup>31</sup>Thomas Barnett, *India’s 12 Steps to a World Class Navy*, *US Naval Institute Proceedings*, Vol 127/7/1, 181, pp 41-45

<sup>32</sup>Laxman K Behera, *India’s Defence Budget*, *IDSA Issue Brief 02 Mar 15*, accessed at [www.idsa.in/issuebrief/IndiasDefenceBudget2015-16\\_lkbehera-020315.html](http://www.idsa.in/issuebrief/IndiasDefenceBudget2015-16_lkbehera-020315.html) on 15 Jun 15.

<sup>33</sup>In this regard, it is intended to make a mere suggestion at this stage, that the idea or notion of being a ‘Net Security Provider’ is primarily a political one.



these aspects in the Navy’s Diplomatic Role.<sup>34</sup> In fact, the Diplomatic Role for the Navy that has been outlined in the Indian Maritime Doctrine envisages a much wider application of naval power towards strengthening regional security. The table below shows the Objectives, Missions and Tasks of the

Navy in Diplomatic Role.

It is evident from the Table below that the Indian Navy is committed to promoting maritime security through bilateral and multilateral arrangements in the IOR and beyond. The recent operations by the Indian Navy, such as

Objectives	Missions	Tasks
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Strengthen Political Relations and Goodwill</li> <li>• Strengthen Defence Relations with Friendly States</li> <li>• Portray Credible Defence Posture and Capability</li> <li>• Strengthen Maritime Security in the IOR</li> <li>• Promote Regional and Global Stability</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>» Constructive maritime engagement</li> <li>» Maritime assistance and support</li> <li>» Presence</li> <li>» Peace Support Ops</li> </ul>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Overseas Deployments</li> <li>• Flag Showing/ Port Visits</li> <li>• Hosting foreign warship visits</li> <li>• Technical and Logistics assistance</li> <li>• Foreign Training</li> <li>• Maritime Patrols</li> <li>• Bilateral/ Multilateral exercises</li> <li>• OOAC Tasks</li> <li>• Non-combatant Evacuation Ops</li> <li>• Peace Enforcement, Peace Making, Peace Keeping and Peace Building</li> <li>• Activities under the IONS programme</li> </ul>

Table – Objectives, Missions and Tasks in the Diplomatic Role<sup>35</sup>

<sup>34</sup>Indian Maritime Doctrine, IHQ MOD(N), New Delhi: 2009, pp 105-115.

<sup>35</sup>Indian Maritime Doctrine, p. 108.

Op Neer, Op Rahat, SAR effort for MH 370, Hydrographic Survey assistance to Mauritius, Escort of MCGS Barracuda<sup>36</sup> and several other operations in the past bear testimony to its growing capabilities and the influence that it wields in the Region. However, this paper contends that merely providing assistance, strengthening maritime security or promoting global and regional stability does not tantamount to a net provider of security. This is because, in the current geopolitical environment, almost every nation is contributing and cooperating towards strengthening regional, if not global, security. Yet, not all these nations claim to be net providers of security.

**The Pitfalls.** Dr Thomas Barnett writes, “A small power may have regional interests, but only a great power has regional responsibilities”.<sup>37</sup> Admittedly, that’s an inspiring line. However, as Anit Mukherjee has pointed out, there are three structural impediments to India being a ‘Net Security Provider’ – ideological (non-

violence and non-interference), factious domestic politics and capacity of Indian defence industry and economy.<sup>38</sup> To an extent, these ‘impediments’ also highlight the ‘pitfalls’ of self-declaratory status of a ‘Regional Net Security Provider’. While India has never shied away from the use of force, including intervention in its immediate periphery, to defend its national interests,<sup>39</sup> it is opined that a deliberate and cautious approach would be preferable while handling regional security issues. In an article titled ‘India and ASEAN: Towards Maritime Security Co-operation’, C Rajamohan notes that “...(ASEAN) is seeking effective contributions from India in helping stabilise the region and demonstrating leadership on maritime security issues at a time when the Southeast Asian seas are becoming the locus of regional conflict and great power confrontation.”<sup>40</sup> This statement has huge implications for a ‘Regional Net Security Provider’ – is it expected to get embroiled in a regional conflict or a great power confrontation?

---

<sup>36</sup> See the official website of the Indian Navy at [www.indiannavy.nic.in](http://www.indiannavy.nic.in)

<sup>37</sup> Barnett, *op cit*.

<sup>38</sup> Mukherjee, *op cit*.

<sup>39</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>40</sup> C Rajamohan, “India and ASEAN: Towards Maritime Security Co-operation”, *Asia’s Arc of Advantage, A Report of ICRIER Wadhvani Chair in India US Policy Studies, ICRIER: New Delhi, Aug 2013, pp 45-46.*

## Conclusion

***Some Plain Speaking.*** It would be a lot simpler to understand what it takes to be a Net Security Provider by looking at someone who already is. This article suggests that there is none and argues that contributions to collective security efforts or assurance of security based on mutual agreements are merely pursuits of a nation's self-interest. This should not be (mis)understood as 'net provision of security'. It is also suggested that, in its present context, the term 'Net Security Provider' needs a clearer articulation. Simply stated, if an Actor 'A' claims to be able or to be mandated to provide security in his neighbourhood, then he might as well demonstrate a credible commitment towards this task by deploying his resources. This also means that he would have to convince his neighbours of assured response in the event of a crisis and, most importantly, be prepared to assume responsibility of security breaches in the neighbourhood. That would perhaps make him a 'Net Provider of Security'. However, in its present

context, 'Net Security Provider' is merely an acceptance (or declaration) of a capability – to influence events beyond one's own boundaries. There is no obligation or assurance or responsibility, not even an inclination, attached to it in so far as action to preserve or ensure security is concerned.

The spirit of the Navy's quest for regional cooperation and stability is articulated aptly in the guiding principles of the Indian Navy Vision Statement:<sup>41</sup>

*The Navy will effectively engage friendly maritime forces in the IOR and beyond through port visits, bilateral interactions, training initiatives, operational exercises and technical support arrangements, in order to establish a cooperative framework that promotes mutual understanding and enhances security and stability in the region.*

This article exhorts that we must scrutinise, understand and debate the concept of 'Net Security Provider'

---

<sup>41</sup>Indian Navy Vision Statement accessed at [www.indiannavy.nic.in](http://www.indiannavy.nic.in) on 27 May 15.

before we adopt it in our lexicon. As such, there is no doctrinal need for the Indian Navy to adopt this concept yet; the Indian Maritime Doctrine adequately reflects our aspirations and intentions.



***About the Author***

*Commander Ranendra Singh Sawan was commissioned into the Indian Navy on 01 Jul 96. The Officer is a Navigation and Direction Specialist and has carried out duties of Navigating Officer II of INS Ranvijay and Navigating Officer of IN Ships Nireekshak, Shakti and Gomti. He has carried out the duties of Executive Officer, INS Nashak and Commanding Officer, INS Agray. The officer is presently Directing Staff at the Defence Services Staff College, Wellington.*